政府监管与审计质量改进研究
|
摘要
审计质量一直以来都是审计领域研究的热点问题。高质量审计服务对于保证上市公司信息披露质量、提高资本市场配置效率的作用显而易见。但是,由于审计行业自身的特点,现实中审计质量低下、审计师和上市公司“共谋”的现象却屡见不鲜。例如,在震惊全球的“安然事件”中,安达信会计师事务所长期为其隐瞒亏损的事实,并在安然事件东窗事发前大量销毁相关审计资料。此后,“世界通讯”、“环球电讯”、“施乐”等愈演愈烈的财务丑闻也将当时的“五大”会计师事务所全部牵涉其中。在国内,从著名的“老三案(深圳原野、海南中水国际、长城机电)”、“新三案(琼民源、红光实业、东方锅炉)”,到“蓝田股份”、“亿安科技”、“秦丰农业”、“科龙电器”,上市公司财务丑闻陆续被曝光的同时,幕后总有一个“合谋者”的影子:大大小小的会计师事务所。类似浮出水面的财务丑闻,上市公司造假案例也清晰地呈现出“十假九同谋”的特点,屡屡上演“警察”与“大盗”沆瀣一气的丑剧。这一系列涉及审计师的财务丑闻的相继出现,使得审计质量问题变得更加引人注目。
然而,国内外系列财务丑闻的出现并非偶然,暴露的问题相当多,但审计行业监管不力却是众多问题中最为突出的。如何加强对审计行业的政府监管以提高审计质量因此成为理论界和实务界共同关注的一个焦点问题。本文正是从这一角度来研究审计质量问题的,研究思路如下:首先,在分析审计市场失灵的基础上,结合管制经济学、政府规制等相关理论,系统分析了政府监管对审计质量改进的作用机制;其次,分析目前国际上典型的三类审计监管模式及其适用条件,得出我国的监管模式应是“政府监管为主、行业自律为辅”的结论,并对我国目前审计监管体系存在的不足进行了深入剖析;再次,以我国证监会对审计师出具的处罚公告为样本,从政府监管的视角考察审计质量的影响因素,并从政府规则与政府惩戒两个角度考察了我国政府监管对审计质量改进的效果;最后,基于本文研究的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。
本文共分八章,各章的主要内容如下:
第1章导论,引出研究问题,对审计质量与政府监管的有关概念重新进行了界定,并提出本文的研究路径和框架。本章将审计质量的影响因素分为直接影响因素和间接影响因素两个层次,政府监管作为间接影响因素,通过对审计师自身因素或公司治理的影响实现对审计质量的改进;而对于审计质量的直接影响因素,除了传统的专业技能和独立性以外,提出审计师职业谨慎态度是影响审计质量的第三个直接因素。
第2章文献综述。在对现有研究领域中关于审计质量的实证研究成果进行系统回顾的基础上,笔者将现有研究文献中关于政府监管和审计质量的研究分为两大类:(1)以监管结果作为审计质量的衡量标准,(2)政府监管对审计质量的影响效果分析。前者主要是以审计师遭受的法律诉讼或处罚结果作为审计质量低下的替代指标,研究审计质量的影响因素;后者主要是关于我国证券市场某些监管政策的效力检验与处罚公告的分析性统计研究。
第3章政府监管与审计质量改进的理论分析。本章目的主要是为本文的研究主题提供理论框架,首先运用受托经济责任理论揭示审计的本质在于“控制”,并从价值增值角度认为审计增值功能的实现需要高质量审计服务的保证;紧接着,分析了现有审计委托模式对审计质量的影响,认为其造成了我国审计市场的失灵——高质量需求不足与低质量审计服务的供给;然后,结合管制经济学理论,在对三大管制理论进行分析评价后,认为公共利益理论能更好地为我国审计市场监管提供理论依据;最后,从理论上详细分析了我国审计市场的政府监管措施对审计质量改进的作用机制。
第4章我国审计质量监管模式与监管现状。本章在对三种审计质量监管模式分析评价之后,指出我国目前的审计质量监管模式;然后,针对我国各监管主体的监管实践,指出当前监管体系中存在的问题,为实证分析埋下伏笔。
第5章政府监管视角的审计质量影响因素分析。本章以证监会2002-2006再次,以我国证监会对审计师出具的处罚公告为样本,从政府监管的视角考察审计质量的影响因素,并从政府规则与政府惩戒两个角度考察了我国政府监管对审计质量改进的效果;最后,基于本文研究的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。
本文共分八章,各章的主要内容如下:
第1章导论,引出研究问题,对审计质量与政府监管的有关概念重新进行了界定,并提出本文的研究路径和框架。本章将审计质量的影响因素分为直接影响因素和间接影响因素两个层次,政府监管作为间接影响因素,通过对审计师自身因素或公司治理的影响实现对审计质量的改进;而对于审计质量的直接影响因素,除了传统的专业技能和独立性以外,提出审计师职业谨慎态度是影响审计质量的第三个直接因素。
第2章文献综述。在对现有研究领域中关于审计质量的实证研究成果进行系统回顾的基础上,笔者将现有研究文献中关于政府监管和审计质量的研究分为两大类:(1)以监管结果作为审计质量的衡量标准,(2)政府监管对审计质量的影响效果分析。前者主要是以审计师遭受的法律诉讼或处罚结果作为审计质量低下的替代指标,研究审计质量的影响因素;后者主要是关于我国证券市场某些监管政策的效力检验与处罚公告的分析性统计研究。
第3章政府监管与审计质量改进的理论分析。本章目的主要是为本文的研究主题提供理论框架,首先运用受托经济责任理论揭示审计的本质在于“控制”,并从价值增值角度认为审计增值功能的实现需要高质量审计服务的保证;紧接着,分析了现有审计委托模式对审计质量的影响,认为其造成了我国审计市场的失灵——高质量需求不足与低质量审计服务的供给;然后,结合管制经济学理论,在对三大管制理论进行分析评价后,认为公共利益理论能更好地为我国审计市场监管提供理论依据;最后,从理论上详细分析了我国审计市场的政府监管措施对审计质量改进的作用机制。
第4章我国审计质量监管模式与监管现状。本章在对三种审计质量监管模式分析评价之后,指出我国目前的审计质量监管模式;然后,针对我国各监管主体的监管实践,指出当前监管体系中存在的问题,为实证分析埋下伏笔。
第5章政府监管视角的审计质量影响因素分析。本章以证监会2002-2006接因素进而实现对审计质量的影响。
第三,本文修正创新了审计质量衡量指标与有关模型。在检验审计质量影响因素时,以证监会对审计师的行政处罚作为审计质量替代变量,较好地将政府监管与审计质量联系起来;并且,通过引入“审计师强制轮换”变量创新了Lennox审计意见估计模型,以检验强制轮换制对审计质量改进的效果。
Audit quality is always a hot problem in the auditing field. A high-quality audit has an obvious effect on ensuring information disclosure quality of listed companies and improving the allocation efficiency of the capital market. But due to the characteristics of auditing industry, the phenomenon of low-quality auditing and the“conspiracy”between auditors and listed companies frequently arise in practice. For example, in Enron event which shaking the whole world, Andersen CPA firm in a long time had concealed the deficit fact for Enron and destroyed an amount of relevant auditing materials when the truth was revealed. Henceforth, the World Com Group, global dispatch and Xerox etc.,“Big Five”CPA firms also had been involved in more and more financial scandals. In homeland, from the“old three fraud cases”, the“new three fraud cases”to Lantian, Yi-an, Qinfeng agriculture and KeLon etc., the financial scandals of listed companies have been exposed. At the same time we always could find a conspirator, CPA firm, under the shadow. Similar to scandals floating out, fraud cases in the listed companies also show the conspiracy between regulating institutions and companies. These financial scandals in which auditors had been involved appeared one after another, making audit quality problems become more noticeable.
It is not accidental that a series of financial scandals happened in domestic and abroad, and the problems bringing out are quite more, of which the most serious problem is the inefficient regulation on auditing industry. So it becomes an issue both in theory and in practice that how to reinforce the government regulation in auditing industry to improve the audit quality. This dissertation studies audit quality just from this viewpoint, and the research approach is as follows: Firstly, based on analyzing the failure of auditing market, the author systematically analyzes the function mechanism of government regulation to improve audit quality in theory using regulation economics and government regulation theory and so on. Secondly, after analyzing three kinds of auditing regulation patterns and their suitable conditions, the author concludes that the regulation pattern in our country should "mainly focus on government regulation with supplementary of industry discipline", and deeply analyses the defects existing in our regulation system. Thirdly, taking the penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission to auditors as samples, the author investigates the factors influencing audit quality from the government regulation, and examines the effects of government regulation to improve audit quality from governmental rules and punishment. Finally, in view of the results, the author proposes some strategic suggestions.
This dissertation is composed of eight chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are as the following.
Chapter one is an introduction, leading out the research subject, re-defining the concepts of audit quality and government regulation, and indicating the research approach and structure. In this chapter, the author divides influencing factors of audit quality into direct and indirect factors at two levels. As an indirect factor, government regulation improves audit quality through affecting auditors or corporate governance factors. However, in the direct factors, in addition to professional competence and independence, the author adds due care as the third factor which directly affects the audit quality.
Chapter two is literature review. In this chapter, the author systematically reviews the empirical documents on audit quality, and classifies the existing literatures on the government regulation and audit quality into two categories: one is about taking the regulation results as a measure of audit quality, the other is about analyzing the effect of government regulation on audit quality. The former mainly examines the factors affecting audit quality just by taking lawsuit or punishment as a result of poor audit, and the latter mainly tests the effectiveness of regulatory policies in China's securities market and statistically analyzes the penalty notices.
Chapter three is the theoretical analysis on government regulation and audit quality improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the theme of this study. First of all, the author reveals the nature of auditing is“control”by applying the theory of accountability, and concludes that high audit quality plays a necessary guarantee for achieving the audit function of value-added. Then, the author analyzes the influence of the current engage model on audit quality and concludes the factors resulting in the failure of audit market: insufficient demand for high-quality and low-quality audit services. After that, associating with the regulation economics and evaluating them, the author concludes that the public interest theory could preferably provide a theoretical basis for China's regulation in audit market. At last, the author analyses the function mechanism of government regulation to improve the audit quality in details.
Chapter four is a discussion of China's auditing regulation pattern and current situation. In this chapter, after analyzing and evaluating the current three auditing regulation patterns, the author points out China's current auditing regulation pattern. Then, in accordance with the regulation practice of main bodies in China, the author indicates the problems existing in the current regulation system which lays hints for the following empirical studies.
Chapter five is an empirical analysis on factors affecting the audit quality from the government regulatory perspective. This chapter takes the penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission from 2002 to 2006 as the research samples to examine whether the primary factor which affects the China’s audit quality is professional competence or independence. The result shows that independence is the chief reason for low quality audit.
Chapter six mentions the establishment of government rules and audit quality improvement with the mandatory rotation of auditors as an example. According to the conclusion of chapter 5, the author selects the mandatory rotation of auditors as an example to test the government rules’effect on improving audit quality from the pre-regulatory perspective. The results indicate that the rule of CPA mandatory rotation does not reach the expected purpose. In mandatory rotation, the firms change plays a better role on the improvement of audit quality than the rotation of CPA does. However in voluntary changes, when audit opinion in last year was qualified, the rotation of CPA plays a better role on the improvement of audit quality than the firms change does, but the conclusion is contrary when audit opinion in last year was unqualified.
Chapter seven is an empirical discussion of the government punishment and audit quality improvement. Following chapter 6, this chapter from the post-regulatory perspective to test the government punishment’effect on improving audit quality. The results indicate that China's government regulation can identify the poor audit quality in a certain extent. But due to the constraints of regulatory power and force, it diminishes the efficiency of government regulation to improve the audit quality. Specifically, auditors only in negative earnings management group improve audit quality by reducing the surplus space after being punished.
Chapter eight gives policy recommendations on strengthening government regulation and improving the audit quality. On the basis of summarizing the main conclusions of this paper, the author proposes some corresponding policy recommendations from strengthening regulation for improving audit quality, and points out the limitations of this study and the directions of future research.
There are several innovations in this dissertation.
Firstly, the anthor comprehensively and systematically studies the relationship between government regulation and audit quality improvement from the government regulatory perspective in this dissertation. She not only clarifies the function mechanism of government regulation to improve the audit quality in theory and establishes the important status of government regulation in policy arrangement of independent auditing, but also obtains some valuable empirical evidences by using the method of empirical research to test the effect of government regulation on improving audit quality.
Secondly, this dissertation develops the analysis approach on the factors affecting audit quality, and divides them into direct and indirect factors at two levels. In direct influencing factors, in DeAngelo’s view on audit quality that professional competence and independence are two influencing factors of audit quality, the author adds due care as the third factor according to analysis of penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In indirect factors, such as company, government regulation and other factors, the author considers government regulation is one of the most important factors which will influence audit quality through direct or indirect factors.
Thirdly, this dissertation amends and innovates the indicators of audit quality and the model. On testing what influence audit quality, the author uses the punishments of China Securities Regulatory Commission made to auditors as the indicator for audit quality, which better associates the government regulation with the audit quality. Furthermore, this dissertation innovates the Lennox model by introducing the“mandatory rotation”variable to test the effect of mandatory rotation of auditors in improving audit quality.
然而,国内外系列财务丑闻的出现并非偶然,暴露的问题相当多,但审计行业监管不力却是众多问题中最为突出的。如何加强对审计行业的政府监管以提高审计质量因此成为理论界和实务界共同关注的一个焦点问题。本文正是从这一角度来研究审计质量问题的,研究思路如下:首先,在分析审计市场失灵的基础上,结合管制经济学、政府规制等相关理论,系统分析了政府监管对审计质量改进的作用机制;其次,分析目前国际上典型的三类审计监管模式及其适用条件,得出我国的监管模式应是“政府监管为主、行业自律为辅”的结论,并对我国目前审计监管体系存在的不足进行了深入剖析;再次,以我国证监会对审计师出具的处罚公告为样本,从政府监管的视角考察审计质量的影响因素,并从政府规则与政府惩戒两个角度考察了我国政府监管对审计质量改进的效果;最后,基于本文研究的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。
本文共分八章,各章的主要内容如下:
第1章导论,引出研究问题,对审计质量与政府监管的有关概念重新进行了界定,并提出本文的研究路径和框架。本章将审计质量的影响因素分为直接影响因素和间接影响因素两个层次,政府监管作为间接影响因素,通过对审计师自身因素或公司治理的影响实现对审计质量的改进;而对于审计质量的直接影响因素,除了传统的专业技能和独立性以外,提出审计师职业谨慎态度是影响审计质量的第三个直接因素。
第2章文献综述。在对现有研究领域中关于审计质量的实证研究成果进行系统回顾的基础上,笔者将现有研究文献中关于政府监管和审计质量的研究分为两大类:(1)以监管结果作为审计质量的衡量标准,(2)政府监管对审计质量的影响效果分析。前者主要是以审计师遭受的法律诉讼或处罚结果作为审计质量低下的替代指标,研究审计质量的影响因素;后者主要是关于我国证券市场某些监管政策的效力检验与处罚公告的分析性统计研究。
第3章政府监管与审计质量改进的理论分析。本章目的主要是为本文的研究主题提供理论框架,首先运用受托经济责任理论揭示审计的本质在于“控制”,并从价值增值角度认为审计增值功能的实现需要高质量审计服务的保证;紧接着,分析了现有审计委托模式对审计质量的影响,认为其造成了我国审计市场的失灵——高质量需求不足与低质量审计服务的供给;然后,结合管制经济学理论,在对三大管制理论进行分析评价后,认为公共利益理论能更好地为我国审计市场监管提供理论依据;最后,从理论上详细分析了我国审计市场的政府监管措施对审计质量改进的作用机制。
第4章我国审计质量监管模式与监管现状。本章在对三种审计质量监管模式分析评价之后,指出我国目前的审计质量监管模式;然后,针对我国各监管主体的监管实践,指出当前监管体系中存在的问题,为实证分析埋下伏笔。
第5章政府监管视角的审计质量影响因素分析。本章以证监会2002-2006再次,以我国证监会对审计师出具的处罚公告为样本,从政府监管的视角考察审计质量的影响因素,并从政府规则与政府惩戒两个角度考察了我国政府监管对审计质量改进的效果;最后,基于本文研究的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。
本文共分八章,各章的主要内容如下:
第1章导论,引出研究问题,对审计质量与政府监管的有关概念重新进行了界定,并提出本文的研究路径和框架。本章将审计质量的影响因素分为直接影响因素和间接影响因素两个层次,政府监管作为间接影响因素,通过对审计师自身因素或公司治理的影响实现对审计质量的改进;而对于审计质量的直接影响因素,除了传统的专业技能和独立性以外,提出审计师职业谨慎态度是影响审计质量的第三个直接因素。
第2章文献综述。在对现有研究领域中关于审计质量的实证研究成果进行系统回顾的基础上,笔者将现有研究文献中关于政府监管和审计质量的研究分为两大类:(1)以监管结果作为审计质量的衡量标准,(2)政府监管对审计质量的影响效果分析。前者主要是以审计师遭受的法律诉讼或处罚结果作为审计质量低下的替代指标,研究审计质量的影响因素;后者主要是关于我国证券市场某些监管政策的效力检验与处罚公告的分析性统计研究。
第3章政府监管与审计质量改进的理论分析。本章目的主要是为本文的研究主题提供理论框架,首先运用受托经济责任理论揭示审计的本质在于“控制”,并从价值增值角度认为审计增值功能的实现需要高质量审计服务的保证;紧接着,分析了现有审计委托模式对审计质量的影响,认为其造成了我国审计市场的失灵——高质量需求不足与低质量审计服务的供给;然后,结合管制经济学理论,在对三大管制理论进行分析评价后,认为公共利益理论能更好地为我国审计市场监管提供理论依据;最后,从理论上详细分析了我国审计市场的政府监管措施对审计质量改进的作用机制。
第4章我国审计质量监管模式与监管现状。本章在对三种审计质量监管模式分析评价之后,指出我国目前的审计质量监管模式;然后,针对我国各监管主体的监管实践,指出当前监管体系中存在的问题,为实证分析埋下伏笔。
第5章政府监管视角的审计质量影响因素分析。本章以证监会2002-2006接因素进而实现对审计质量的影响。
第三,本文修正创新了审计质量衡量指标与有关模型。在检验审计质量影响因素时,以证监会对审计师的行政处罚作为审计质量替代变量,较好地将政府监管与审计质量联系起来;并且,通过引入“审计师强制轮换”变量创新了Lennox审计意见估计模型,以检验强制轮换制对审计质量改进的效果。
Audit quality is always a hot problem in the auditing field. A high-quality audit has an obvious effect on ensuring information disclosure quality of listed companies and improving the allocation efficiency of the capital market. But due to the characteristics of auditing industry, the phenomenon of low-quality auditing and the“conspiracy”between auditors and listed companies frequently arise in practice. For example, in Enron event which shaking the whole world, Andersen CPA firm in a long time had concealed the deficit fact for Enron and destroyed an amount of relevant auditing materials when the truth was revealed. Henceforth, the World Com Group, global dispatch and Xerox etc.,“Big Five”CPA firms also had been involved in more and more financial scandals. In homeland, from the“old three fraud cases”, the“new three fraud cases”to Lantian, Yi-an, Qinfeng agriculture and KeLon etc., the financial scandals of listed companies have been exposed. At the same time we always could find a conspirator, CPA firm, under the shadow. Similar to scandals floating out, fraud cases in the listed companies also show the conspiracy between regulating institutions and companies. These financial scandals in which auditors had been involved appeared one after another, making audit quality problems become more noticeable.
It is not accidental that a series of financial scandals happened in domestic and abroad, and the problems bringing out are quite more, of which the most serious problem is the inefficient regulation on auditing industry. So it becomes an issue both in theory and in practice that how to reinforce the government regulation in auditing industry to improve the audit quality. This dissertation studies audit quality just from this viewpoint, and the research approach is as follows: Firstly, based on analyzing the failure of auditing market, the author systematically analyzes the function mechanism of government regulation to improve audit quality in theory using regulation economics and government regulation theory and so on. Secondly, after analyzing three kinds of auditing regulation patterns and their suitable conditions, the author concludes that the regulation pattern in our country should "mainly focus on government regulation with supplementary of industry discipline", and deeply analyses the defects existing in our regulation system. Thirdly, taking the penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission to auditors as samples, the author investigates the factors influencing audit quality from the government regulation, and examines the effects of government regulation to improve audit quality from governmental rules and punishment. Finally, in view of the results, the author proposes some strategic suggestions.
This dissertation is composed of eight chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are as the following.
Chapter one is an introduction, leading out the research subject, re-defining the concepts of audit quality and government regulation, and indicating the research approach and structure. In this chapter, the author divides influencing factors of audit quality into direct and indirect factors at two levels. As an indirect factor, government regulation improves audit quality through affecting auditors or corporate governance factors. However, in the direct factors, in addition to professional competence and independence, the author adds due care as the third factor which directly affects the audit quality.
Chapter two is literature review. In this chapter, the author systematically reviews the empirical documents on audit quality, and classifies the existing literatures on the government regulation and audit quality into two categories: one is about taking the regulation results as a measure of audit quality, the other is about analyzing the effect of government regulation on audit quality. The former mainly examines the factors affecting audit quality just by taking lawsuit or punishment as a result of poor audit, and the latter mainly tests the effectiveness of regulatory policies in China's securities market and statistically analyzes the penalty notices.
Chapter three is the theoretical analysis on government regulation and audit quality improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the theme of this study. First of all, the author reveals the nature of auditing is“control”by applying the theory of accountability, and concludes that high audit quality plays a necessary guarantee for achieving the audit function of value-added. Then, the author analyzes the influence of the current engage model on audit quality and concludes the factors resulting in the failure of audit market: insufficient demand for high-quality and low-quality audit services. After that, associating with the regulation economics and evaluating them, the author concludes that the public interest theory could preferably provide a theoretical basis for China's regulation in audit market. At last, the author analyses the function mechanism of government regulation to improve the audit quality in details.
Chapter four is a discussion of China's auditing regulation pattern and current situation. In this chapter, after analyzing and evaluating the current three auditing regulation patterns, the author points out China's current auditing regulation pattern. Then, in accordance with the regulation practice of main bodies in China, the author indicates the problems existing in the current regulation system which lays hints for the following empirical studies.
Chapter five is an empirical analysis on factors affecting the audit quality from the government regulatory perspective. This chapter takes the penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission from 2002 to 2006 as the research samples to examine whether the primary factor which affects the China’s audit quality is professional competence or independence. The result shows that independence is the chief reason for low quality audit.
Chapter six mentions the establishment of government rules and audit quality improvement with the mandatory rotation of auditors as an example. According to the conclusion of chapter 5, the author selects the mandatory rotation of auditors as an example to test the government rules’effect on improving audit quality from the pre-regulatory perspective. The results indicate that the rule of CPA mandatory rotation does not reach the expected purpose. In mandatory rotation, the firms change plays a better role on the improvement of audit quality than the rotation of CPA does. However in voluntary changes, when audit opinion in last year was qualified, the rotation of CPA plays a better role on the improvement of audit quality than the firms change does, but the conclusion is contrary when audit opinion in last year was unqualified.
Chapter seven is an empirical discussion of the government punishment and audit quality improvement. Following chapter 6, this chapter from the post-regulatory perspective to test the government punishment’effect on improving audit quality. The results indicate that China's government regulation can identify the poor audit quality in a certain extent. But due to the constraints of regulatory power and force, it diminishes the efficiency of government regulation to improve the audit quality. Specifically, auditors only in negative earnings management group improve audit quality by reducing the surplus space after being punished.
Chapter eight gives policy recommendations on strengthening government regulation and improving the audit quality. On the basis of summarizing the main conclusions of this paper, the author proposes some corresponding policy recommendations from strengthening regulation for improving audit quality, and points out the limitations of this study and the directions of future research.
There are several innovations in this dissertation.
Firstly, the anthor comprehensively and systematically studies the relationship between government regulation and audit quality improvement from the government regulatory perspective in this dissertation. She not only clarifies the function mechanism of government regulation to improve the audit quality in theory and establishes the important status of government regulation in policy arrangement of independent auditing, but also obtains some valuable empirical evidences by using the method of empirical research to test the effect of government regulation on improving audit quality.
Secondly, this dissertation develops the analysis approach on the factors affecting audit quality, and divides them into direct and indirect factors at two levels. In direct influencing factors, in DeAngelo’s view on audit quality that professional competence and independence are two influencing factors of audit quality, the author adds due care as the third factor according to analysis of penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In indirect factors, such as company, government regulation and other factors, the author considers government regulation is one of the most important factors which will influence audit quality through direct or indirect factors.
Thirdly, this dissertation amends and innovates the indicators of audit quality and the model. On testing what influence audit quality, the author uses the punishments of China Securities Regulatory Commission made to auditors as the indicator for audit quality, which better associates the government regulation with the audit quality. Furthermore, this dissertation innovates the Lennox model by introducing the“mandatory rotation”variable to test the effect of mandatory rotation of auditors in improving audit quality.
引文
①DeAngelo, L., 1986, Auditor Size and Audit Quality, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.3, Issue 3, pp183-199.
②Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, 1986, Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs.
③Titman, Sheridan; Trueman, Brett, Information quality and the valuation of new issues, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Jun86, Vol. 8 Issue 2, pp159-172.
④Palmrose, Z., 1986, Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.24, Issue 1, pp.97-110.
⑤Teoh, S. H., and T. J. Wong,1993, Perceived Audit Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient, The Accounting Review, Vol.68, No.2, pp.346-366.
①王永平等,1988,《关于审计工作质量问题的研讨》,中国审计,第8期。
②侯文铿,1988,《审计辞典》,福州,福建人民出版社,第16页。
③王福正,1989,《关于审计质量之我见》,中国审计,第6期。
④李金华,1992,《审计师专业知识必备》,北京,中国审计出版社,第137页。
⑤张龙平,1994,《注册会计师审计控制系统研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第208-209页。
⑥刘力云,1999,《审计风险与控制》,北京,中国审计出版社,第51-52页。
⑦徐政旦、谢荣等,2002,《审计研究前沿》,上海,上海财经大学出版社,第214页。
①R.B. Ekelund, Jr.1998, The foundations of regulatory economics, Vol.I.Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,Cheltenham, UK-Northampton, MA, USA.p10.
②《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》第四卷,中译本,1996,北京,经济科学出版社,第134页。
①施蒂格勒,1996,产业组织和政府管制,上海,上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,第210页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博,余晖等译,市场与管制,上海,上海人民出版社,1999,第45页。
③植草益,1992,微观规制经济学,北京,中国发展出版社,第2页。
④见布雷耶尔和麦卡沃伊(Breyer, S.&P. W. MacAvoy),1992,“管制和放松管制”,载《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典》(第4卷),北京,经济科学出版社,第137页。
①Kahn, A. E, 1970, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institution, New York: Wiley, p3.
②王俊豪,1999,《政府管制经济学导论》,北京,商务印书馆,第1页。
③陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店,第6页。
④毕秀玲,2002,《政府会计监管论》,厦门大学博士论文,第12页。
⑤本文对事前监管和事后监管的划分借鉴了李爽、吴溪(2005)的观点,他们认为证券市场的审计管制可以分为: (1)执业准入规则(包括会计师事务所和注册会计师两个层面);(2)执业行为规范(包括技术准则和职业道德规范);(3)执业检查和处罚;(4)执业信息披露。具体参见李爽、吴溪,2005,后中天勤时代的中国证券审计市场,会计研究,第6期。
①DeAngelo L. E.,1981, Auditor size and audit quality, Journal of Accounting and Economics,Vol. 1, pp113-127.
①Becker, C. , M. DeFond, and J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam,1998, The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management, Contemporary Accounting Research 15, pp1-24.
②Teoh, S. H. and T. J. Wong, 1993, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient, Accounting Review, Vol. 68 Issue 2, pp346-366.
③DeFond, Mark L.; Jiambalvo, James, 1993,Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements over Income-Increasing Accounting Methods, Contemporary Accounting Research,Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp415-431.
④Krishnan, G. 2003, Audit Quality and the Pricing of Earnings Management, Auditing, Vol.22, pp110-126.
⑤陈关亭、兰凌,2004,操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较,审计与经济研究,第4期。
⑥漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳,2004,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究,审计研究,第3期。
①蔡春、黄益建、赵莎,2005,关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据,审计研究,第2期。
②证明“八大”提供高质量的研究还包括: Simunic et at (1987),Francis et al (1988), Slovin et al (1990), Davidson et al(1993)等。
③Wyer, J. C. ,White, G. T., Janson, E. C.,1988,Audits of Public Companies by Smaller CPA Firms: Clients, Reports, and Quality, Auditing Vol. 7 Issue 2, pp164-173.
④原红旗、李海建,2003,会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量,审计研究,第1期。
⑤刘运国、麦剑青,2006,论四大会计师事务所的审计质量——来自中国证券市场的初步证据,中山大学学报(社会科学版),第3期。
①Copley, P. A., Doucet, M. S.,1994, A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Quality Control Review Outcomes and Engagement Fees for Audits of Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance, Accounting Review Vol. 69 Issue 1, pp244-256.
②DeFond, M. L.., Francis, J. R. and Wong, T. J., 2000, Auditor Industry Specialization and Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong, Auditing Vol.19 Issue 1, pp49-66.
③漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳,2004,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究,审计研究,第3期。
①刘运国、麦剑青、魏哲妍,2006,审计费用与盈余管理实证分析——来自中国证券市场的证据,审计研究,第2期。
②Davis, L. R, B. Soo and G. Trompeter, 2002, Auditor Tenure, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management, Working paper, Bobton College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
①李爽、吴溪,2003,中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据,北京,中国财政经济出版社,第56页。
②American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA, 1992, Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies. New York, N Y: AICPA.
③Myers J. N., Myers L.A. and Omer T. C., 2003, Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? , The Accounting Review Vol.78, pp779-799.
④Geiger M.A. and Raghunandan K., 2002, Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Mar.), pp67-78.
①Myers J. N., Myers L. A., Palmrose Z. V. and Scholz S. W., 2004, Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, Working paper.
②Mansi S. A., Maxwell W. F. and Miller D. P., 2004, Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors?Evidence from the Bond Market, Journal of Accounting Research (Forthcoming), Vol. 42 Issue 4, pp755-793.
③夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,2005,审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,中国会计与财务研究,第1期。
④余玉苗、李琳,2003,审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析,经济评论,第11期。
⑤陈信元、夏立军,2006,审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,审计研究,第1期。
①刘启亮,2006,事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据,审计研究,第4期。
②Deis, D. J. and G. A. Griroux, 1992, Determinants of Audit Quality in the Public Sector, The Accounting Review, Vol. 67(3), pp462-479.
③O' Keefe, T. B. , R. D. King and K. M. Gaver. 1994, Audit fees, industry specialization and compliance with GAAS reporting standards, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory Vol. 13, pp41-55.
④Krishnan, G., 2003, Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management?, Accounting Horizons (Supplement), pp1-16.
⑤Balsam S. , J. Krishnan and J. S. Yang, 2003, Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory Vol. 22,pp71-97.
①刘少峰,2006,会计师事务所行业专长对审计质量的影响,财会月刊(综合版),第36期。
②蔡春、鲜文铎,2007,会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的检验──来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据,会计研究,第6期。
③Cadbury, A., 1992, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
④Hampel, R., 1998, Committee on Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
⑤Chan, P., Ezzamel, M. and Gwilliam, D., 1993, Determinants of Audit Fees for Quoted UK Companies, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, 20, pp765-786.
①肖作平,2006,公司治理影响审计质量吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据,管理世界,第7期。
②余宇莹、刘启亮,2007,公司治理系统有助于提高审计质量吗?,审计研究,第5期。
③O’Sullivan, N., 2000, The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies, British Accounting Review, pp397-414.
④Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. L., 2000, Audit committee composition and auditor reporting, The Accounting Review,Vol.75, pp453-467.
⑤Ho Young Lee, Vivek Mande, Richard Ortman, 2004,The Effect of Audit Committee and Board of Director Independence on Auditor Resignation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, pp131-146.
①Pierre, K., and J. A. Anderson, 1984, An analysis of the factors associated with lawsuits against public accountants, The Accounting Review (April), pp242-263.
②Palmrose, 1988, An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality, The Accounting Review (January), pp55-73.
③Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
①夏立军、杨海斌,2002,注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反映,审计研究,第4期。
②陆正飞、童盼,2003,审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究,审计研究,第3期。
③张立民、黄旸杨,2004,审计师自愿性变更与审计监管,审计与经济研究,第4期。
④张立民、陈小林、钱华,2004,证券市场的政府监管对与国际惯例协调的影响——来自A公司的审计案例分析,现代管理科学,第2期。
⑤张奇峰,2005,政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据,管理世界,第12期。
①李爽、吴溪,2002,审计失败与证券审计市场监管——基于中国证监会处罚公告的思考,会计研究,第2期。
②Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
①文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第5页。
②文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第5页。
③Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, 1985, Statement of Guidelines On The Role of supreme Audit Institations In Promoting public Accountability, Tokyo, Japan.
①文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第5页。
②Coopar, w.w. and Yuji Ijiri, 1983, The Kohler’s Dictionary of Accountants, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood clifls, p18.
③秦荣生,1994,《受托经济责任论》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第22页。
④蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第80-81页。
①文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第3页。
②Lee, T., 1988, The Evolution of Audit Thought and Practice, Van Nostrand Reinhold (uk) Co. Ltd., p994.
③Flint, D., 1988, Philosophy and principles of Auditing: An Introduction, Macmillan Education Ltd., P25.
④蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第79页。
①AAA, 1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, p8.
②AAA, 1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, pp11-12.
③Mautz, R.K., 1975, The Role of Auditing In Our Society,AICPA, p17.
①Sullivan, J.D., etal, 1985, Montgomery’s Auditing,John Wiley & Sons, p21.
②AAA,1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, p13.
③蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第44页。
④《蒙哥马利审计学》翻译组译,1989,《蒙哥马利审计学》(上),北京,中国商业出版社,第13页。
⑤AAA,1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, p13.
①德勤开出“中国药方”医治财务欺诈,经济观察报,2002年7月8日, http://finance.sina.com.cn/b/20020708/229991.html.
②Herbert L.,1979, Auditing the Performance of Management, Wadsworth Inc, pp4-5.
①参见蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第44页。
①张红凤,2005,《西方规制经济学的变迁》,北京,经济科学出版社,第31页。
②Giles H. Burgess, Jr., 1995, The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, New York: Harper Cullins College Publishers, pp43-44.
③王俊豪,2001,《政府管制经济学论:基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用》,北京,商务印书馆,第7-8页。
①王俊豪,2001,《政府管制经济学论:基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用》,北京,商务印书馆,第364-366页。
②陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店,第11页。
①George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, 1962, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, Journal of Law and Economics, vol 5 (October), pp1-16.
①陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店,第15-16页。
①文硕,1996,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第250页。
②中国证券监督管理委员会编,2001,《中国证券市场信息披露规范2001》,北京,中国财政经济出版社,第46、48页。
①郭道扬、吴联生,2003,《论注册会计师审计质量保持机制——兼论我国注册会计师审计质量保持机制的改进》,审计研究,第5期。
①中国注册会计师协会,1993,《中国注册会计师法》,北京,中国财经经济出版社,第2页,第7、8、9条。
②蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第100页。
①谢德仁(2001)认为:注册会计师行业的混合管制模式可能呈现以自我管制为主的,也可能呈现以政府管制为主的或以独立管制为主的混合管制形态。本文的观点与此相同,认为纯粹的、独立的监管模式是不存在的,每一种监管模式中都有其它模式的融合。因此,本文所称的行业自律、政府监管和独立监管模式分别指以行业自律为主、以政府监管为主和以独立监管为主的混合监管模式。
②谢德仁,2001,《注册会计师行业管制模式的国际比较》,审计研究,第4期。
①谢德仁,2002,《注册会计师行业管制模式:理论分析》,会计研究,第2期。
①参见阚京华,2005,《后安然时代中国注册会计师行业监管分析》,南京财经大学学报,第6期,有改动。
①摘自财政部网站:http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/20061103_3015_20771.htm。
①摘自中国烟台审计网《关于审计机关开展社会审计机构审计报告质量核查工作的几点思考》,见http://sjj.yantai.gov.cn/html/keyan_show.jsp?id=84920。
①参见中华人民共和国审计署审计结果公告2005年第4号(总第12号):16家会计师事务所审计业务质量检查结果。http://www.audit.gov.cn/cysite/docpage/c516/200509/0928_516_14510.htm。
②摘自中注协2006年检查工作动态(20),http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/newsaffix/8041_200612141659_1.doc。
①李长爱,2004,《政府行政监管与行业自律监管的协调发展——提高我国注册会计师行业监管效率研究》,审计研究,第6期。
①《萨班斯——奥克斯利法案》之第八章:公司欺诈及其刑事责任。参见友联时骏管理顾问编著,2005,《企业内部控制和风险管理:《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》释义》,上海,复旦大学出版社,第175、179页。
①Joe Hoyle, 1978, Mandatory auditor rotation: the arguments and an alternative, The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 Issue 5, pp69-78.
②Bates, Homer L., Ingram, Robert W. and Reckers, Philip M. J., 1982, Auditor-client affiliation: the impact on“materiality”, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 153 Issue 4, pp60-63.
③Benito Arrunada, 1997, Mandatory rotation of company auditors: a critical examination, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.17 Issue 1, pp31-61.
①刘峰、张立民、雷科罗,2002,《我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析》,会计研究,第12期。
②在我国,由于签字注册会计师的强制轮换是从2003年年报审计才开始实施的,故在2004年以前,我国不存在研究因审计任期到限而必须强制变更审计师的条件,故当时关于审计师强制轮换的研究主要是针对由于某种原因事务所被撤销证券从业资格而迫使其原客户重新选择审计师的情况。
③李爽、吴溪,2006,《签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响》,会计研究,第1期。
④沈玉清、戚务清、曾勇,2006,《我国审计师强制轮换制度有效性的实证分析》,审计研究,第4期。
⑤Dopuch N.,R. R. King, and R. Schwartz.,2001, An experimental investigation of retention and rotation requirements, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.39 Issue 1, pp93-117.
①郑国坚、吴立扬,2005,《强制性与自愿性审计师变更下的经济后果比较——来自1997-2001年中国上市公司的经验证据》,当代经济科学,第6期。
①该3个样本分别是,*ST圣方000620,审计师由西安希格玛(黄志斌、倪军)变为北京京都(黄志斌、倪军);山鹰纸业600567,审计师由天健(何降星、秦超)变为德勤华永(何降星、秦超);东方创业600278,审计师由上海立信长江(周正云、朱炜中)变为上海众华沪银(周正云、朱炜中),前2个样本为2005年的,最后一个为2006的。
②这8个样本公司的证券代码分别是000596、000837、600107、600215、600495、600663、600775和600853。
③这5个样本公司的证券代码分别是000848、600155、600585、600763和600876。
①李爽、吴溪,2003a,《中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据》,北京,中国财政经济出版社,第131页。
②Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
③刘亚莉、胡志颖、徐晓宇,2006,注册会计师的注意领域与审计质量——基于对我国资本市场审计意见及证监会处罚公告的调查,审计研究,第5期。
①刘峰、林斌,2000,《会计师事务所脱钩与政府选择:一种解释》,会计研究,第2期。
①刘峰、许菲,2002,《风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量──兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为》,会计研究,第2期。
②王华、姜虹等,2007,《会计师事务所审计质量保证机制研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第140-143页。
1.蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
2.蔡春、鲜文铎,2007,《会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的检验──来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据》,会计研究,第7期
3.蔡春、黄益建、赵莎,2005,《关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据》,审计研究,第2期
4.曹宇、赵莹,2004,《审计监管与审计质量》,审计与经济研究,第3期
5.陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店
6.陈关亭、兰凌,2004,《操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较》,审计与经济研究,第4期
7.陈晓,2003,《对“上市公司的财务指标与审计意见类型相关性的实证分析”一文的点评》,中国会计评论,第1期
8.陈信元、夏立军,2006,《审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,会计研究,第1期
9.成翔,2006,《审计独立性与盈余管理的实证研究》,金融经济,第22期
10.丹尼尔·F·史普博,余晖等译,《市场与管制》,上海,上海人民出版社
11.杜兴强,2002,《注册会计师审计:行业自律或外部监管的艰难抉择》,审计理论与实践,第7期
12.方军雄,2007,《经济依赖性真的损害审计质量吗?——来自中国证券市场的初步证据》,产业经济研究,第2期
13.方军雄、洪剑峭、李若山,2004,《我国上市公司审计质量影响因素研究:发现和启示》,审计研究,第6期
14.郭道扬、吴联生,2003,《论注册会计师审计质量保持机制——兼论我国注册会计师审计质量保持机制的改进》,审计研究,第5期
15.季小琴,2006,《会计监管理论:综述及其引申》,中南财经政法大学学报,第6期
16.郝秀琴,2006,《注册会计师审计监管的经济学分析》,经济研究参考,第88期
17.黄世忠,2002,《安然事件对注册会计师监管模式的影响——兼论诚信教育和审计质量》,中国注册会计师,第2期
18.李长爱,2004,《政府行政监管与行业自律监管的协调发展——提高我国注册会计师行业监管效率研究》,审计研究,第6期
19.李金华,1992,《审计师专业知识必备》,北京,中国审计出版社
20.李树华,2000,《审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离》,上海,上海三联书店
21.李爽、吴溪,2006,《签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响》,会计研究,第1期
22.李爽、吴溪,2003,《中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据》,北京,中国财政经济出版社
23.李爽、吴溪,2002,《审计失败与证券审计市场监管——基于中国证监会处罚公告的思考》,会计研究,第2期
24.李眺,2005,《审计市场:产业组织视角的分析》,上海,上海财经大学出版社
25.李扬、王国刚主编,1998,《资本市场导论》,北京,经济管理出版社
26.李兆华,2005,《我国会计师事务所实行定期轮换制的博弈分析》,会计研究,第3期
27.刘峰、林斌,2000,《会计师事务所脱钩改制与政府选择:一种解释》,会计研究,第2期
28.刘峰、许菲,2002,《风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量──兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为》,会计研究,第2期
29.刘峰、张立民、雷科罗,2002,《我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析》,会计研究,第12期
30.刘力云,1999,《审计风险与控制》,北京,中国审计出版社
31.刘明辉、徐正刚,2004,《注册会计师行业管理模式的现实选择——兼论行业自律》,审计研究,第1期
32.刘少峰,2006,会计师事务所行业专长对审计质量的影响,财会月刊(综合版),第36期
33.刘亚莉、胡志颖、徐晓宇,2006,《注册会计师的注意领域与审计质量——基于对我国资本市场审计意见及证监会处罚公告的调查》,审计研究,第5期
34.刘永泽、陈艳,2002,《政府监管与行业自律导向的现实选择——对美国注册会计师行业监管模式的剖析引发的思考》,会计研究,第11期
35.刘启亮,2006,《事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,审计研究,第4期
36.刘运国、麦剑青、魏哲妍,2006,《审计费用与盈余管理实证分析——来自中国证券市场的证据》,审计研究,第2期
37.刘运国、麦剑青,2006,《论四大会计师事务所的审计质量——来自中国证券市场的初步证据》,中山大学学报(社会科学版),第3期
38.陆正飞、童盼,2003,《审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究》,审计研究,第3期
39.罗伯特·K·莫茨、侯赛因·A·夏拉夫著,文硕等译,1990,《审计理论结构》,北京,中国商业出版社
40.《蒙哥马利审计学》翻译组译,1989,《蒙哥马利审计学》(上),北京,中国商业出版社
41.潘立新,2003,《政府监管与效率改进——从财政部收回“三权”谈起》,财会通讯,第7期
42.漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳,2004,《事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究》,审计研究,第3期
43.秦荣生,1994,《受托经济责任论》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
44.阚京华,2005,《后安然时代中国注册会计师行业监管分析》,南京财经大学学报,第6期
45.沈玉清、戚务清、曾勇,2006,《我国审计师强制轮换制度有效性的实证分析》,审计研究,第4期
46.施蒂格勒,1996,《产业组织和政府管制》,上海,上海三联书店和上海人民出版社
47.王华、姜虹等,2007,《会计师事务所审计质量保证机制研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
48.王俊豪,1999,《政府管制经济学导论》,北京,商务印书馆
49.王俊豪,2001,《政府管制经济学论:基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用》,北京:商务印书馆
50.王善平、赵国宇,2006,《注册会计师行业监管的若干问题研究》,审计与经济研究,第3期
51.王英姿,2002,《注册会计师审计质量评价与控制研究》,上海,上海财经大学出版社
52.王跃堂、赵子夜,2003,《股权结构影响审计意见吗?来自沪深股市的经验证据》,中国会计与财务研究,第4期
53.文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社
54.吴联生,2005,《审计意见购买:行为特征与监管策略》,第7期
55.吴联生、顾智勇,2002,《审计质量与注册会计师责任》,中国注册会计师,第5期
56.吴联生、谭力,2005,《审计师变更决策与审计意见改善》,审计研究,第2期
57.夏立军,2004,《审计师行业专长与审计市场研究综述及启示》,中国注册会计师,第7期
58.夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,2005,《事务所任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,中国会计与财务研究,第7期
59.夏立军、杨海斌,2002,《注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反映》,审计研究,第4期
60.夏立军,2002,《国外盈余管理计量方法述评》,外国经济与管理,第10期
61.肖作平,2006,公司治理影响审计质量吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据,管理世界,第7期
62.谢德仁,2002,《注册会计师行业管制模式:理论分析》,会计研究,第2期
63.谢德仁,2001,《注册会计师行业管制模式的国际比较》,审计研究,第4期
64.徐政旦、谢荣等,2002,《审计研究前沿》,上海,上海财经大学出版社
65.徐正刚,2007,《中国审计市场结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
66.叶少勤,2004,《中国上市公司注册会计师审计质量研究》,北京,中国财政经济出版社
67.易琮,2004,《审计意见类型能反映审计质量吗?》,中国注册会计师,第8期
68.友联时骏管理顾问编著,2005,《企业内部控制和风险管理:《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》释义》,上海,复旦大学出版社
69.于玉林,2004,《会计监管:会计理论的发展、会计职能的扩张》,财会通讯(综合版),第5期
70.余玉苗,2004,《行业知识、行业专门化与独立审计风险的控制》,审计研究,第4期
71.余玉苗、李琳,2003,《审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析》,经济评论,第11期
72.余宇莹、刘启亮,2007,《公司治理系统有助于提高审计质量吗?》,审计研究,第5期
73.原红旗、李海建,2003,《会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量》,审计研究,第1期
74.张红凤,2005,《西方规制经济学的变迁》,北京,经济科学出版社
75.张立民、陈小林、钱华,2004,《证券市场的政府监管对与国际惯例协调的影响——来自A公司的审计案例分析》,现代管理科学,第2期
76.张立民、管劲松,2004,《我国A股审计市场的结构研究─来自2002上市公司年度报告》,审计研究,第5期
77.张立民、黄旸杨,2004,《审计师非自愿性变更与审计监管——来自2001年中国审计市场的证据》,审计与经济研究,第4期
78.张龙平,1994,《注册会计师审计控制系统研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
79.张奇峰,2005,《政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,管理世界,第12期
80.植草益,1992,《微观规制经济学》,北京,中国发展出版社
81.郑国坚、吴立扬,2005,《强制性与自愿性审计师变更下的经济后果比较——来自1997-2001年中国上市公司的经验证据》,当代经济科学,第6期
82.中国注册会计师协会课题组,2001,《自我管制、政府管制与独立管制——注册会计师行业管理模式比较研究》,中国注册会计师,第2期
83.中国注册会计师协会,1993,《中华人民共和国注册会计师法》,北京,中国财经经济出版社
84.《注册会计师执业环境问题研究》课题组,2006,《注册会计师执业环境与审计质量问题研究——供给与需求的视角》,会计研究,第10期
85. Aharony, Joseph; Lee, Chi-Wen Jevons; Wong, T. J., 2000, Financial Packaging of IPO Firms in China, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38 Issue 1, pp103-126.
86. American Accounting Association, 1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts
87. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants .AICPA, 1992, Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies. New York, N Y: AICPA.
88. Ashbaugh, Hollis; LaFond, Ryan; Mayhew, Brian W., 2003, Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence, Accounting Review, Vol. 78 Issue 3, pp611-639.
89. Balsam, Steven; Krishnan, Jagan; Yang, Joon S., 2003, Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality, Auditing, Vol. 22 Issue 2, pp71-97.
90. Bao, B. and Chen, G.,1998, Audit qualifications prediction using accounting and market variables: The case of Chinese listed companies, Working paper
91. Bates, Homer L., Ingram, Robert W. and Reckers, Philip M. J., 1982, Auditor-client affiliation: the impact on“materiality”, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 153 Issue 4, pp60-63.
92. Bartov, Eli; Gul, Ferdinand A.; Tsui, Judy S.L.,2000, Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 30Issue 3, pp421-452.
93. Becker. C, M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K. Subramanyam, 1998, The effect of audit quality on earnings management, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.15 Issue 1, pp1-24.
94. Benito Arrunada, 1997, Mandatory rotation of company auditors: a critical examination, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.17 Issue 1, pp31-61.
95. Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. L., 2000, Audit committee composition and auditor reporting, The Accounting Review, Vol.75 Issue 4, pp453-467.
96. Carcello, J. V. and Nagy, A. L.,2002, Auditor industry specialization and fraudulent financial reporting, In Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte and Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems.
97. Carcello, Joseph V.; Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna, 1994, Auditor Litigation and Modified Reporting on Bankrupt Clients, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 Issue 3, pp1-30.
98. Carcello, Joseph V.; Nagy, Albert L, 2004, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Auditing, Vol. 23 Issue 2, pp57-71.
99. Cadbury, A., 1992, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
100.Chan, P., Ezzamel, M. and Gwilliam, D., 1993, Determinants of Audit Fees for Quoted UK Companies, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Vol. 20 Issue 6, pp765-786.
101.Chow C. W., Rice S. J., 1982, Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor Switching, Accounting Review, Vol. 57 Issue 2, pp326-335.
102.Copley, P. A., Doucet, M. S.,1994, A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Quality Control Review Outcomes and Engagement Fees for Audits of Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance, Accounting Review Vol. 69 Issue 1,pp244-256.
103.Coopar, w.w. and Yuji Ijiri, 1983, The Kohler’s Dictionary of Accountants, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood clifls.
104. Craswell A Stokes D & Laughton J., 2002, Auditor independence and fee dependence, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33 Issue 2, pp253-275.
105.Craswell A. T., 1988, The Association Between Qualified Opinions andAuditor Switches, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 19 Issue 73, pp23-31.
106.Davis, L. R, B. Soo and G. Trompeter, 2002, Auditor Tenure, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management, Working paper, Bobton College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
107.DeAgelo, 1981, Auditor size and auditor quality, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 1, pp113-127.
108.Dechow, Patricia M.; Sloan, Richard G.; Sweeney, Amy P.,1996, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 13 Issue 1, pp1-36.
109.DeFond, M. L.., Francis, J. R. and Wong, T. J., 2000, Auditor Industry Specialization and Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong, Auditing Vol.19 Issue 1, pp49-66.
110.DeFond, Mark L.; Jiambalvo, James, 1993, Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements over Income-Increasing Accounting Methods, Contemporary Accounting Research,Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp415-431.
111.Defond, M., and M. Jiambalvo, 1994, Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.17 Issue 1/2, pp145-176.
112.Deis, D. J. and G. A. Griroux, 1992, Determinants of Audit Quality in the Public Sector, The Accounting Review Vol. 67(3), pp462-479.
113. Dopuch N., R. R. King, and R. Schwartz., 2001, An experimental investigation of retention and rotation requirements, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.39 Issue 1, pp93-117.
114.Firth, Michael, 1985, An Analysis of Audit Fees and Their Determinants in New Zealand, Auditing, Vol. 4 Issue 2, pp23-37.
115.Flint, D., 1988, Philosophy and principles of Auditing: An Introduction, Macmillan Education Ltd.
116.Francis J. R. and Krishnan J., 1999, Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.16 Issue 1, pp135-165.
117.Francis J. R.; Stokes, Donald J., 1986, Audit Prices, Product Differentiation,and Scale Economies:Further Evidence from the Australian Market, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24 Issue 2, pp383-393.
118.Gaeremynck, Ann; Willekens, Marleen, 2003, The endogenous relationship between audit-report type and business termination: evidence on private firms in a non-litigious environment, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 33 Issue 1, pp65-79.
119.Geiger M.A. and Raghunandan K., 2002, Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures, auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Mar.), Vol. 21 Issue 1, pp67-78.
120.George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, 1962, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October), pp1-16.
121.Ghosh, Aloke; Moon, Doocheol, 2005, Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality, Accounting Review, Vol. 80 Issue 2, pp585-612.
122.Giles H. Burgess, Jr., 1995, The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, New York: Harper Cullins College Publishers, pp43-44.
123.Guay, Wayne R.; Kothari, S. P.; Watts, Ross L. , 1996, A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34 Issue 3, pp83-105.
124.Hampel, R., 1998, Committee on Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
125.Ho Young Lee, Vivek Mande, Richard Ortman, 2004, The Effect of Audit Committee and Board of Director Independence on Auditor Resignation, Auditing, Vol. 23 Issue 2, pp133-148.
126.Joe Hoyle, 1978, Mandatory auditor rotation: the arguments and an alternative, The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 Issue 5, pp69-78.
127.Kinney, W., and R. Martin, 1994, Does Auditing Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audit-Related Adjustment Studies, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol.13 Issue 1, pp149-156.
128.Kellogg, R., 1984, Accounting activities, securities prices and class action lawsuits, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 6 Issue 3, pp185-204.
129.Krishnan, G., 2003, Audit Quality and the Pricing of discretionary accruals, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 22 Issue 1, pp109-126.
130. Krishnan, Jagan; Krishnan, Jayanthi; Stephens, Ray G.., 1996, The Simultaneous Relation Between Auditor Switching and Audit Opinion:AnEmpirical Analysis, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 26 Issue 3, pp224-236.
131.Lee, T., 1988, The Evolution of Audit Thought and Practice, Van Nostrand Reinhold (uk) Co. Ltd.
132.Lennox, C., 2000, Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.29 Issue 3, pp321-337.
133.Lys, Thomas; Watts, Ross L., 1994, Lawsuits Against Auditors, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 Issue 3, pp65-93.
134.Mansi S. A., Maxwell W. F. and Miller D. P., 2004, Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence from the Bond Market, Journal of Accounting Research (Forthcoming), Vol. 42 Issue 4, pp755-793.
135.Mautz, R.K.,1975, The Role of Auditing In Our Society, AICPA
136.Myers J. N., Myers L.A. and Omer T. C., 2003, Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? , The Accounting Review, Vol. 78 Issue 3, p779-799.
137.Myers J. N., Myers L. A., Palmrose Z. V. and Scholz S. W., 2004, Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, Working paper.
138.O' Keefe, T. B., R. D. King and K. M. Gaver. 1994, Audit fees, industry specialization and compliance with GAAS reporting standards, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 13 Issue 2, pp41-55.
139.O’Sullivan, N., 2000, The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies, British Accounting Review, pp397-414.
140.Owhoso, Vincent E.; Messier, Jr., William F.; Lynch, Jr., John G, 2002, Error Detection by Industry-Specialized Teams during Sequential Audit Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40 Issue 3, pp883-900.
141.Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna, 1988, An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality, Accounting Review, Vol. 63 Issue 1, pp55-73.
142.Palmrose, Z., 1986, Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.24, Issue 1, pp97-110.
143.Palmrose Z.,1991, An Analysis of Auditor Litigation Disclosures, Auditing,Vol. 10, pp54-71
144.Petty, Richard; Cuganesan, Suresh, 1996, Auditor rotation: Framing the debate, Australian Accountant, Vol. 66 Issue 4, pp40-41.
145.Pierre, Kent St.; Anderson, James A., 1984, An Analysis of the Factors Associated with Lawsuits Against Public Accountants, Accounting Review, Vol. 59 Issue 2, pp242-263.
146.Reynolds, J. Kenneth; Francis, Jere R., 2000, Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 30 Issue 3, pp375-400.
147. R.B. Ekelund, Jr.,1998, The foundations of regulatory economics, Vol.I.Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,Cheltenham, UK-Northampton, MA, USA
148.Simunic, Dan A., 1980, The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18 Issue 1, pp161-190.
149.Subramanyam. K., 1996, The pricing of discretionary accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.22 Issue 1-3, pp249-281.
150.Teoh, S. H., and T. J. Wong, 1993, Perceived Audit Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient, The Accounting Review, Vol.68, No.2, pp346-366.
151.Trompeter G., 1994, The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles on Audit Partner Judgment, Auditing, Vol. 13 Issue 2, pp56-68.
152. Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, 1986, Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
153.Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
154.Wyer, J. C. ,White, G. T., Janson, E. C.,1988,Audits of Public Companies by Smaller CPA Firms: Clients, Reports, and Quality, Auditing Vol. 7 Issue 2, pp164-173.
155.中国证券监督管理委员会:http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/index.html
156.中国注册会计师协会:http://www.cicpa.org.cn/
157.中华人民共和国审计署:http://www.audit.gov.cn/cysite/chpage/c394/doclist.htm
158.中国烟台审计网:http://sjj.yantai.gov.cn/html/keyan_show.jsp?id=84920
159.中华人民共和国财政部会计信息质量检查公告(第十二号): http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/20061103_3015_20771.htm
②Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, 1986, Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs.
③Titman, Sheridan; Trueman, Brett, Information quality and the valuation of new issues, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Jun86, Vol. 8 Issue 2, pp159-172.
④Palmrose, Z., 1986, Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.24, Issue 1, pp.97-110.
⑤Teoh, S. H., and T. J. Wong,1993, Perceived Audit Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient, The Accounting Review, Vol.68, No.2, pp.346-366.
①王永平等,1988,《关于审计工作质量问题的研讨》,中国审计,第8期。
②侯文铿,1988,《审计辞典》,福州,福建人民出版社,第16页。
③王福正,1989,《关于审计质量之我见》,中国审计,第6期。
④李金华,1992,《审计师专业知识必备》,北京,中国审计出版社,第137页。
⑤张龙平,1994,《注册会计师审计控制系统研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第208-209页。
⑥刘力云,1999,《审计风险与控制》,北京,中国审计出版社,第51-52页。
⑦徐政旦、谢荣等,2002,《审计研究前沿》,上海,上海财经大学出版社,第214页。
①R.B. Ekelund, Jr.1998, The foundations of regulatory economics, Vol.I.Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,Cheltenham, UK-Northampton, MA, USA.p10.
②《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》第四卷,中译本,1996,北京,经济科学出版社,第134页。
①施蒂格勒,1996,产业组织和政府管制,上海,上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,第210页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博,余晖等译,市场与管制,上海,上海人民出版社,1999,第45页。
③植草益,1992,微观规制经济学,北京,中国发展出版社,第2页。
④见布雷耶尔和麦卡沃伊(Breyer, S.&P. W. MacAvoy),1992,“管制和放松管制”,载《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典》(第4卷),北京,经济科学出版社,第137页。
①Kahn, A. E, 1970, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institution, New York: Wiley, p3.
②王俊豪,1999,《政府管制经济学导论》,北京,商务印书馆,第1页。
③陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店,第6页。
④毕秀玲,2002,《政府会计监管论》,厦门大学博士论文,第12页。
⑤本文对事前监管和事后监管的划分借鉴了李爽、吴溪(2005)的观点,他们认为证券市场的审计管制可以分为: (1)执业准入规则(包括会计师事务所和注册会计师两个层面);(2)执业行为规范(包括技术准则和职业道德规范);(3)执业检查和处罚;(4)执业信息披露。具体参见李爽、吴溪,2005,后中天勤时代的中国证券审计市场,会计研究,第6期。
①DeAngelo L. E.,1981, Auditor size and audit quality, Journal of Accounting and Economics,Vol. 1, pp113-127.
①Becker, C. , M. DeFond, and J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam,1998, The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management, Contemporary Accounting Research 15, pp1-24.
②Teoh, S. H. and T. J. Wong, 1993, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient, Accounting Review, Vol. 68 Issue 2, pp346-366.
③DeFond, Mark L.; Jiambalvo, James, 1993,Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements over Income-Increasing Accounting Methods, Contemporary Accounting Research,Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp415-431.
④Krishnan, G. 2003, Audit Quality and the Pricing of Earnings Management, Auditing, Vol.22, pp110-126.
⑤陈关亭、兰凌,2004,操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较,审计与经济研究,第4期。
⑥漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳,2004,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究,审计研究,第3期。
①蔡春、黄益建、赵莎,2005,关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据,审计研究,第2期。
②证明“八大”提供高质量的研究还包括: Simunic et at (1987),Francis et al (1988), Slovin et al (1990), Davidson et al(1993)等。
③Wyer, J. C. ,White, G. T., Janson, E. C.,1988,Audits of Public Companies by Smaller CPA Firms: Clients, Reports, and Quality, Auditing Vol. 7 Issue 2, pp164-173.
④原红旗、李海建,2003,会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量,审计研究,第1期。
⑤刘运国、麦剑青,2006,论四大会计师事务所的审计质量——来自中国证券市场的初步证据,中山大学学报(社会科学版),第3期。
①Copley, P. A., Doucet, M. S.,1994, A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Quality Control Review Outcomes and Engagement Fees for Audits of Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance, Accounting Review Vol. 69 Issue 1, pp244-256.
②DeFond, M. L.., Francis, J. R. and Wong, T. J., 2000, Auditor Industry Specialization and Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong, Auditing Vol.19 Issue 1, pp49-66.
③漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳,2004,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究,审计研究,第3期。
①刘运国、麦剑青、魏哲妍,2006,审计费用与盈余管理实证分析——来自中国证券市场的证据,审计研究,第2期。
②Davis, L. R, B. Soo and G. Trompeter, 2002, Auditor Tenure, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management, Working paper, Bobton College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
①李爽、吴溪,2003,中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据,北京,中国财政经济出版社,第56页。
②American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA, 1992, Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies. New York, N Y: AICPA.
③Myers J. N., Myers L.A. and Omer T. C., 2003, Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? , The Accounting Review Vol.78, pp779-799.
④Geiger M.A. and Raghunandan K., 2002, Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Mar.), pp67-78.
①Myers J. N., Myers L. A., Palmrose Z. V. and Scholz S. W., 2004, Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, Working paper.
②Mansi S. A., Maxwell W. F. and Miller D. P., 2004, Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors?Evidence from the Bond Market, Journal of Accounting Research (Forthcoming), Vol. 42 Issue 4, pp755-793.
③夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,2005,审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,中国会计与财务研究,第1期。
④余玉苗、李琳,2003,审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析,经济评论,第11期。
⑤陈信元、夏立军,2006,审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,审计研究,第1期。
①刘启亮,2006,事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据,审计研究,第4期。
②Deis, D. J. and G. A. Griroux, 1992, Determinants of Audit Quality in the Public Sector, The Accounting Review, Vol. 67(3), pp462-479.
③O' Keefe, T. B. , R. D. King and K. M. Gaver. 1994, Audit fees, industry specialization and compliance with GAAS reporting standards, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory Vol. 13, pp41-55.
④Krishnan, G., 2003, Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management?, Accounting Horizons (Supplement), pp1-16.
⑤Balsam S. , J. Krishnan and J. S. Yang, 2003, Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory Vol. 22,pp71-97.
①刘少峰,2006,会计师事务所行业专长对审计质量的影响,财会月刊(综合版),第36期。
②蔡春、鲜文铎,2007,会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的检验──来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据,会计研究,第6期。
③Cadbury, A., 1992, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
④Hampel, R., 1998, Committee on Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
⑤Chan, P., Ezzamel, M. and Gwilliam, D., 1993, Determinants of Audit Fees for Quoted UK Companies, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, 20, pp765-786.
①肖作平,2006,公司治理影响审计质量吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据,管理世界,第7期。
②余宇莹、刘启亮,2007,公司治理系统有助于提高审计质量吗?,审计研究,第5期。
③O’Sullivan, N., 2000, The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies, British Accounting Review, pp397-414.
④Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. L., 2000, Audit committee composition and auditor reporting, The Accounting Review,Vol.75, pp453-467.
⑤Ho Young Lee, Vivek Mande, Richard Ortman, 2004,The Effect of Audit Committee and Board of Director Independence on Auditor Resignation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, pp131-146.
①Pierre, K., and J. A. Anderson, 1984, An analysis of the factors associated with lawsuits against public accountants, The Accounting Review (April), pp242-263.
②Palmrose, 1988, An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality, The Accounting Review (January), pp55-73.
③Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
①夏立军、杨海斌,2002,注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反映,审计研究,第4期。
②陆正飞、童盼,2003,审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究,审计研究,第3期。
③张立民、黄旸杨,2004,审计师自愿性变更与审计监管,审计与经济研究,第4期。
④张立民、陈小林、钱华,2004,证券市场的政府监管对与国际惯例协调的影响——来自A公司的审计案例分析,现代管理科学,第2期。
⑤张奇峰,2005,政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据,管理世界,第12期。
①李爽、吴溪,2002,审计失败与证券审计市场监管——基于中国证监会处罚公告的思考,会计研究,第2期。
②Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
①文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第5页。
②文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第5页。
③Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, 1985, Statement of Guidelines On The Role of supreme Audit Institations In Promoting public Accountability, Tokyo, Japan.
①文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第5页。
②Coopar, w.w. and Yuji Ijiri, 1983, The Kohler’s Dictionary of Accountants, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood clifls, p18.
③秦荣生,1994,《受托经济责任论》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第22页。
④蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第80-81页。
①文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第3页。
②Lee, T., 1988, The Evolution of Audit Thought and Practice, Van Nostrand Reinhold (uk) Co. Ltd., p994.
③Flint, D., 1988, Philosophy and principles of Auditing: An Introduction, Macmillan Education Ltd., P25.
④蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第79页。
①AAA, 1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, p8.
②AAA, 1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, pp11-12.
③Mautz, R.K., 1975, The Role of Auditing In Our Society,AICPA, p17.
①Sullivan, J.D., etal, 1985, Montgomery’s Auditing,John Wiley & Sons, p21.
②AAA,1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, p13.
③蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第44页。
④《蒙哥马利审计学》翻译组译,1989,《蒙哥马利审计学》(上),北京,中国商业出版社,第13页。
⑤AAA,1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts, p13.
①德勤开出“中国药方”医治财务欺诈,经济观察报,2002年7月8日, http://finance.sina.com.cn/b/20020708/229991.html.
②Herbert L.,1979, Auditing the Performance of Management, Wadsworth Inc, pp4-5.
①参见蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第44页。
①张红凤,2005,《西方规制经济学的变迁》,北京,经济科学出版社,第31页。
②Giles H. Burgess, Jr., 1995, The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, New York: Harper Cullins College Publishers, pp43-44.
③王俊豪,2001,《政府管制经济学论:基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用》,北京,商务印书馆,第7-8页。
①王俊豪,2001,《政府管制经济学论:基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用》,北京,商务印书馆,第364-366页。
②陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店,第11页。
①George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, 1962, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, Journal of Law and Economics, vol 5 (October), pp1-16.
①陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店,第15-16页。
①文硕,1996,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社,第250页。
②中国证券监督管理委员会编,2001,《中国证券市场信息披露规范2001》,北京,中国财政经济出版社,第46、48页。
①郭道扬、吴联生,2003,《论注册会计师审计质量保持机制——兼论我国注册会计师审计质量保持机制的改进》,审计研究,第5期。
①中国注册会计师协会,1993,《中国注册会计师法》,北京,中国财经经济出版社,第2页,第7、8、9条。
②蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第100页。
①谢德仁(2001)认为:注册会计师行业的混合管制模式可能呈现以自我管制为主的,也可能呈现以政府管制为主的或以独立管制为主的混合管制形态。本文的观点与此相同,认为纯粹的、独立的监管模式是不存在的,每一种监管模式中都有其它模式的融合。因此,本文所称的行业自律、政府监管和独立监管模式分别指以行业自律为主、以政府监管为主和以独立监管为主的混合监管模式。
②谢德仁,2001,《注册会计师行业管制模式的国际比较》,审计研究,第4期。
①谢德仁,2002,《注册会计师行业管制模式:理论分析》,会计研究,第2期。
①参见阚京华,2005,《后安然时代中国注册会计师行业监管分析》,南京财经大学学报,第6期,有改动。
①摘自财政部网站:http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/20061103_3015_20771.htm。
①摘自中国烟台审计网《关于审计机关开展社会审计机构审计报告质量核查工作的几点思考》,见http://sjj.yantai.gov.cn/html/keyan_show.jsp?id=84920。
①参见中华人民共和国审计署审计结果公告2005年第4号(总第12号):16家会计师事务所审计业务质量检查结果。http://www.audit.gov.cn/cysite/docpage/c516/200509/0928_516_14510.htm。
②摘自中注协2006年检查工作动态(20),http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/newsaffix/8041_200612141659_1.doc。
①李长爱,2004,《政府行政监管与行业自律监管的协调发展——提高我国注册会计师行业监管效率研究》,审计研究,第6期。
①《萨班斯——奥克斯利法案》之第八章:公司欺诈及其刑事责任。参见友联时骏管理顾问编著,2005,《企业内部控制和风险管理:《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》释义》,上海,复旦大学出版社,第175、179页。
①Joe Hoyle, 1978, Mandatory auditor rotation: the arguments and an alternative, The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 Issue 5, pp69-78.
②Bates, Homer L., Ingram, Robert W. and Reckers, Philip M. J., 1982, Auditor-client affiliation: the impact on“materiality”, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 153 Issue 4, pp60-63.
③Benito Arrunada, 1997, Mandatory rotation of company auditors: a critical examination, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.17 Issue 1, pp31-61.
①刘峰、张立民、雷科罗,2002,《我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析》,会计研究,第12期。
②在我国,由于签字注册会计师的强制轮换是从2003年年报审计才开始实施的,故在2004年以前,我国不存在研究因审计任期到限而必须强制变更审计师的条件,故当时关于审计师强制轮换的研究主要是针对由于某种原因事务所被撤销证券从业资格而迫使其原客户重新选择审计师的情况。
③李爽、吴溪,2006,《签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响》,会计研究,第1期。
④沈玉清、戚务清、曾勇,2006,《我国审计师强制轮换制度有效性的实证分析》,审计研究,第4期。
⑤Dopuch N.,R. R. King, and R. Schwartz.,2001, An experimental investigation of retention and rotation requirements, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.39 Issue 1, pp93-117.
①郑国坚、吴立扬,2005,《强制性与自愿性审计师变更下的经济后果比较——来自1997-2001年中国上市公司的经验证据》,当代经济科学,第6期。
①该3个样本分别是,*ST圣方000620,审计师由西安希格玛(黄志斌、倪军)变为北京京都(黄志斌、倪军);山鹰纸业600567,审计师由天健(何降星、秦超)变为德勤华永(何降星、秦超);东方创业600278,审计师由上海立信长江(周正云、朱炜中)变为上海众华沪银(周正云、朱炜中),前2个样本为2005年的,最后一个为2006的。
②这8个样本公司的证券代码分别是000596、000837、600107、600215、600495、600663、600775和600853。
③这5个样本公司的证券代码分别是000848、600155、600585、600763和600876。
①李爽、吴溪,2003a,《中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据》,北京,中国财政经济出版社,第131页。
②Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
③刘亚莉、胡志颖、徐晓宇,2006,注册会计师的注意领域与审计质量——基于对我国资本市场审计意见及证监会处罚公告的调查,审计研究,第5期。
①刘峰、林斌,2000,《会计师事务所脱钩与政府选择:一种解释》,会计研究,第2期。
①刘峰、许菲,2002,《风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量──兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为》,会计研究,第2期。
②王华、姜虹等,2007,《会计师事务所审计质量保证机制研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,第140-143页。
1.蔡春,2001,《审计理论结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
2.蔡春、鲜文铎,2007,《会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的检验──来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据》,会计研究,第7期
3.蔡春、黄益建、赵莎,2005,《关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据》,审计研究,第2期
4.曹宇、赵莹,2004,《审计监管与审计质量》,审计与经济研究,第3期
5.陈富良,2001,《放松规制与强化规制:论转型经济中的政府规制改革》,上海,上海三联书店
6.陈关亭、兰凌,2004,《操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较》,审计与经济研究,第4期
7.陈晓,2003,《对“上市公司的财务指标与审计意见类型相关性的实证分析”一文的点评》,中国会计评论,第1期
8.陈信元、夏立军,2006,《审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,会计研究,第1期
9.成翔,2006,《审计独立性与盈余管理的实证研究》,金融经济,第22期
10.丹尼尔·F·史普博,余晖等译,《市场与管制》,上海,上海人民出版社
11.杜兴强,2002,《注册会计师审计:行业自律或外部监管的艰难抉择》,审计理论与实践,第7期
12.方军雄,2007,《经济依赖性真的损害审计质量吗?——来自中国证券市场的初步证据》,产业经济研究,第2期
13.方军雄、洪剑峭、李若山,2004,《我国上市公司审计质量影响因素研究:发现和启示》,审计研究,第6期
14.郭道扬、吴联生,2003,《论注册会计师审计质量保持机制——兼论我国注册会计师审计质量保持机制的改进》,审计研究,第5期
15.季小琴,2006,《会计监管理论:综述及其引申》,中南财经政法大学学报,第6期
16.郝秀琴,2006,《注册会计师审计监管的经济学分析》,经济研究参考,第88期
17.黄世忠,2002,《安然事件对注册会计师监管模式的影响——兼论诚信教育和审计质量》,中国注册会计师,第2期
18.李长爱,2004,《政府行政监管与行业自律监管的协调发展——提高我国注册会计师行业监管效率研究》,审计研究,第6期
19.李金华,1992,《审计师专业知识必备》,北京,中国审计出版社
20.李树华,2000,《审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离》,上海,上海三联书店
21.李爽、吴溪,2006,《签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响》,会计研究,第1期
22.李爽、吴溪,2003,《中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据》,北京,中国财政经济出版社
23.李爽、吴溪,2002,《审计失败与证券审计市场监管——基于中国证监会处罚公告的思考》,会计研究,第2期
24.李眺,2005,《审计市场:产业组织视角的分析》,上海,上海财经大学出版社
25.李扬、王国刚主编,1998,《资本市场导论》,北京,经济管理出版社
26.李兆华,2005,《我国会计师事务所实行定期轮换制的博弈分析》,会计研究,第3期
27.刘峰、林斌,2000,《会计师事务所脱钩改制与政府选择:一种解释》,会计研究,第2期
28.刘峰、许菲,2002,《风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量──兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为》,会计研究,第2期
29.刘峰、张立民、雷科罗,2002,《我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析》,会计研究,第12期
30.刘力云,1999,《审计风险与控制》,北京,中国审计出版社
31.刘明辉、徐正刚,2004,《注册会计师行业管理模式的现实选择——兼论行业自律》,审计研究,第1期
32.刘少峰,2006,会计师事务所行业专长对审计质量的影响,财会月刊(综合版),第36期
33.刘亚莉、胡志颖、徐晓宇,2006,《注册会计师的注意领域与审计质量——基于对我国资本市场审计意见及证监会处罚公告的调查》,审计研究,第5期
34.刘永泽、陈艳,2002,《政府监管与行业自律导向的现实选择——对美国注册会计师行业监管模式的剖析引发的思考》,会计研究,第11期
35.刘启亮,2006,《事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,审计研究,第4期
36.刘运国、麦剑青、魏哲妍,2006,《审计费用与盈余管理实证分析——来自中国证券市场的证据》,审计研究,第2期
37.刘运国、麦剑青,2006,《论四大会计师事务所的审计质量——来自中国证券市场的初步证据》,中山大学学报(社会科学版),第3期
38.陆正飞、童盼,2003,《审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究》,审计研究,第3期
39.罗伯特·K·莫茨、侯赛因·A·夏拉夫著,文硕等译,1990,《审计理论结构》,北京,中国商业出版社
40.《蒙哥马利审计学》翻译组译,1989,《蒙哥马利审计学》(上),北京,中国商业出版社
41.潘立新,2003,《政府监管与效率改进——从财政部收回“三权”谈起》,财会通讯,第7期
42.漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳,2004,《事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究》,审计研究,第3期
43.秦荣生,1994,《受托经济责任论》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
44.阚京华,2005,《后安然时代中国注册会计师行业监管分析》,南京财经大学学报,第6期
45.沈玉清、戚务清、曾勇,2006,《我国审计师强制轮换制度有效性的实证分析》,审计研究,第4期
46.施蒂格勒,1996,《产业组织和政府管制》,上海,上海三联书店和上海人民出版社
47.王华、姜虹等,2007,《会计师事务所审计质量保证机制研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
48.王俊豪,1999,《政府管制经济学导论》,北京,商务印书馆
49.王俊豪,2001,《政府管制经济学论:基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用》,北京:商务印书馆
50.王善平、赵国宇,2006,《注册会计师行业监管的若干问题研究》,审计与经济研究,第3期
51.王英姿,2002,《注册会计师审计质量评价与控制研究》,上海,上海财经大学出版社
52.王跃堂、赵子夜,2003,《股权结构影响审计意见吗?来自沪深股市的经验证据》,中国会计与财务研究,第4期
53.文硕,1990,《世界审计史》,北京,中国审计出版社
54.吴联生,2005,《审计意见购买:行为特征与监管策略》,第7期
55.吴联生、顾智勇,2002,《审计质量与注册会计师责任》,中国注册会计师,第5期
56.吴联生、谭力,2005,《审计师变更决策与审计意见改善》,审计研究,第2期
57.夏立军,2004,《审计师行业专长与审计市场研究综述及启示》,中国注册会计师,第7期
58.夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,2005,《事务所任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,中国会计与财务研究,第7期
59.夏立军、杨海斌,2002,《注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反映》,审计研究,第4期
60.夏立军,2002,《国外盈余管理计量方法述评》,外国经济与管理,第10期
61.肖作平,2006,公司治理影响审计质量吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据,管理世界,第7期
62.谢德仁,2002,《注册会计师行业管制模式:理论分析》,会计研究,第2期
63.谢德仁,2001,《注册会计师行业管制模式的国际比较》,审计研究,第4期
64.徐政旦、谢荣等,2002,《审计研究前沿》,上海,上海财经大学出版社
65.徐正刚,2007,《中国审计市场结构研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
66.叶少勤,2004,《中国上市公司注册会计师审计质量研究》,北京,中国财政经济出版社
67.易琮,2004,《审计意见类型能反映审计质量吗?》,中国注册会计师,第8期
68.友联时骏管理顾问编著,2005,《企业内部控制和风险管理:《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》释义》,上海,复旦大学出版社
69.于玉林,2004,《会计监管:会计理论的发展、会计职能的扩张》,财会通讯(综合版),第5期
70.余玉苗,2004,《行业知识、行业专门化与独立审计风险的控制》,审计研究,第4期
71.余玉苗、李琳,2003,《审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析》,经济评论,第11期
72.余宇莹、刘启亮,2007,《公司治理系统有助于提高审计质量吗?》,审计研究,第5期
73.原红旗、李海建,2003,《会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量》,审计研究,第1期
74.张红凤,2005,《西方规制经济学的变迁》,北京,经济科学出版社
75.张立民、陈小林、钱华,2004,《证券市场的政府监管对与国际惯例协调的影响——来自A公司的审计案例分析》,现代管理科学,第2期
76.张立民、管劲松,2004,《我国A股审计市场的结构研究─来自2002上市公司年度报告》,审计研究,第5期
77.张立民、黄旸杨,2004,《审计师非自愿性变更与审计监管——来自2001年中国审计市场的证据》,审计与经济研究,第4期
78.张龙平,1994,《注册会计师审计控制系统研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社
79.张奇峰,2005,《政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,管理世界,第12期
80.植草益,1992,《微观规制经济学》,北京,中国发展出版社
81.郑国坚、吴立扬,2005,《强制性与自愿性审计师变更下的经济后果比较——来自1997-2001年中国上市公司的经验证据》,当代经济科学,第6期
82.中国注册会计师协会课题组,2001,《自我管制、政府管制与独立管制——注册会计师行业管理模式比较研究》,中国注册会计师,第2期
83.中国注册会计师协会,1993,《中华人民共和国注册会计师法》,北京,中国财经经济出版社
84.《注册会计师执业环境问题研究》课题组,2006,《注册会计师执业环境与审计质量问题研究——供给与需求的视角》,会计研究,第10期
85. Aharony, Joseph; Lee, Chi-Wen Jevons; Wong, T. J., 2000, Financial Packaging of IPO Firms in China, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38 Issue 1, pp103-126.
86. American Accounting Association, 1973, A Statement of Basic Auditing concepts
87. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants .AICPA, 1992, Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies. New York, N Y: AICPA.
88. Ashbaugh, Hollis; LaFond, Ryan; Mayhew, Brian W., 2003, Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence, Accounting Review, Vol. 78 Issue 3, pp611-639.
89. Balsam, Steven; Krishnan, Jagan; Yang, Joon S., 2003, Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality, Auditing, Vol. 22 Issue 2, pp71-97.
90. Bao, B. and Chen, G.,1998, Audit qualifications prediction using accounting and market variables: The case of Chinese listed companies, Working paper
91. Bates, Homer L., Ingram, Robert W. and Reckers, Philip M. J., 1982, Auditor-client affiliation: the impact on“materiality”, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 153 Issue 4, pp60-63.
92. Bartov, Eli; Gul, Ferdinand A.; Tsui, Judy S.L.,2000, Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 30Issue 3, pp421-452.
93. Becker. C, M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K. Subramanyam, 1998, The effect of audit quality on earnings management, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.15 Issue 1, pp1-24.
94. Benito Arrunada, 1997, Mandatory rotation of company auditors: a critical examination, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.17 Issue 1, pp31-61.
95. Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. L., 2000, Audit committee composition and auditor reporting, The Accounting Review, Vol.75 Issue 4, pp453-467.
96. Carcello, J. V. and Nagy, A. L.,2002, Auditor industry specialization and fraudulent financial reporting, In Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte and Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems.
97. Carcello, Joseph V.; Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna, 1994, Auditor Litigation and Modified Reporting on Bankrupt Clients, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 Issue 3, pp1-30.
98. Carcello, Joseph V.; Nagy, Albert L, 2004, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Auditing, Vol. 23 Issue 2, pp57-71.
99. Cadbury, A., 1992, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
100.Chan, P., Ezzamel, M. and Gwilliam, D., 1993, Determinants of Audit Fees for Quoted UK Companies, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Vol. 20 Issue 6, pp765-786.
101.Chow C. W., Rice S. J., 1982, Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor Switching, Accounting Review, Vol. 57 Issue 2, pp326-335.
102.Copley, P. A., Doucet, M. S.,1994, A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Quality Control Review Outcomes and Engagement Fees for Audits of Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance, Accounting Review Vol. 69 Issue 1,pp244-256.
103.Coopar, w.w. and Yuji Ijiri, 1983, The Kohler’s Dictionary of Accountants, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood clifls.
104. Craswell A Stokes D & Laughton J., 2002, Auditor independence and fee dependence, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33 Issue 2, pp253-275.
105.Craswell A. T., 1988, The Association Between Qualified Opinions andAuditor Switches, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 19 Issue 73, pp23-31.
106.Davis, L. R, B. Soo and G. Trompeter, 2002, Auditor Tenure, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management, Working paper, Bobton College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
107.DeAgelo, 1981, Auditor size and auditor quality, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 1, pp113-127.
108.Dechow, Patricia M.; Sloan, Richard G.; Sweeney, Amy P.,1996, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 13 Issue 1, pp1-36.
109.DeFond, M. L.., Francis, J. R. and Wong, T. J., 2000, Auditor Industry Specialization and Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong, Auditing Vol.19 Issue 1, pp49-66.
110.DeFond, Mark L.; Jiambalvo, James, 1993, Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements over Income-Increasing Accounting Methods, Contemporary Accounting Research,Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp415-431.
111.Defond, M., and M. Jiambalvo, 1994, Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.17 Issue 1/2, pp145-176.
112.Deis, D. J. and G. A. Griroux, 1992, Determinants of Audit Quality in the Public Sector, The Accounting Review Vol. 67(3), pp462-479.
113. Dopuch N., R. R. King, and R. Schwartz., 2001, An experimental investigation of retention and rotation requirements, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.39 Issue 1, pp93-117.
114.Firth, Michael, 1985, An Analysis of Audit Fees and Their Determinants in New Zealand, Auditing, Vol. 4 Issue 2, pp23-37.
115.Flint, D., 1988, Philosophy and principles of Auditing: An Introduction, Macmillan Education Ltd.
116.Francis J. R. and Krishnan J., 1999, Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.16 Issue 1, pp135-165.
117.Francis J. R.; Stokes, Donald J., 1986, Audit Prices, Product Differentiation,and Scale Economies:Further Evidence from the Australian Market, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24 Issue 2, pp383-393.
118.Gaeremynck, Ann; Willekens, Marleen, 2003, The endogenous relationship between audit-report type and business termination: evidence on private firms in a non-litigious environment, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 33 Issue 1, pp65-79.
119.Geiger M.A. and Raghunandan K., 2002, Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures, auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Mar.), Vol. 21 Issue 1, pp67-78.
120.George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, 1962, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October), pp1-16.
121.Ghosh, Aloke; Moon, Doocheol, 2005, Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality, Accounting Review, Vol. 80 Issue 2, pp585-612.
122.Giles H. Burgess, Jr., 1995, The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, New York: Harper Cullins College Publishers, pp43-44.
123.Guay, Wayne R.; Kothari, S. P.; Watts, Ross L. , 1996, A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34 Issue 3, pp83-105.
124.Hampel, R., 1998, Committee on Corporate Governance, GEE, London.
125.Ho Young Lee, Vivek Mande, Richard Ortman, 2004, The Effect of Audit Committee and Board of Director Independence on Auditor Resignation, Auditing, Vol. 23 Issue 2, pp133-148.
126.Joe Hoyle, 1978, Mandatory auditor rotation: the arguments and an alternative, The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 Issue 5, pp69-78.
127.Kinney, W., and R. Martin, 1994, Does Auditing Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audit-Related Adjustment Studies, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol.13 Issue 1, pp149-156.
128.Kellogg, R., 1984, Accounting activities, securities prices and class action lawsuits, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 6 Issue 3, pp185-204.
129.Krishnan, G., 2003, Audit Quality and the Pricing of discretionary accruals, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 22 Issue 1, pp109-126.
130. Krishnan, Jagan; Krishnan, Jayanthi; Stephens, Ray G.., 1996, The Simultaneous Relation Between Auditor Switching and Audit Opinion:AnEmpirical Analysis, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 26 Issue 3, pp224-236.
131.Lee, T., 1988, The Evolution of Audit Thought and Practice, Van Nostrand Reinhold (uk) Co. Ltd.
132.Lennox, C., 2000, Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.29 Issue 3, pp321-337.
133.Lys, Thomas; Watts, Ross L., 1994, Lawsuits Against Auditors, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 Issue 3, pp65-93.
134.Mansi S. A., Maxwell W. F. and Miller D. P., 2004, Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence from the Bond Market, Journal of Accounting Research (Forthcoming), Vol. 42 Issue 4, pp755-793.
135.Mautz, R.K.,1975, The Role of Auditing In Our Society, AICPA
136.Myers J. N., Myers L.A. and Omer T. C., 2003, Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? , The Accounting Review, Vol. 78 Issue 3, p779-799.
137.Myers J. N., Myers L. A., Palmrose Z. V. and Scholz S. W., 2004, Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, Working paper.
138.O' Keefe, T. B., R. D. King and K. M. Gaver. 1994, Audit fees, industry specialization and compliance with GAAS reporting standards, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 13 Issue 2, pp41-55.
139.O’Sullivan, N., 2000, The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies, British Accounting Review, pp397-414.
140.Owhoso, Vincent E.; Messier, Jr., William F.; Lynch, Jr., John G, 2002, Error Detection by Industry-Specialized Teams during Sequential Audit Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40 Issue 3, pp883-900.
141.Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna, 1988, An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality, Accounting Review, Vol. 63 Issue 1, pp55-73.
142.Palmrose, Z., 1986, Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.24, Issue 1, pp97-110.
143.Palmrose Z.,1991, An Analysis of Auditor Litigation Disclosures, Auditing,Vol. 10, pp54-71
144.Petty, Richard; Cuganesan, Suresh, 1996, Auditor rotation: Framing the debate, Australian Accountant, Vol. 66 Issue 4, pp40-41.
145.Pierre, Kent St.; Anderson, James A., 1984, An Analysis of the Factors Associated with Lawsuits Against Public Accountants, Accounting Review, Vol. 59 Issue 2, pp242-263.
146.Reynolds, J. Kenneth; Francis, Jere R., 2000, Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 30 Issue 3, pp375-400.
147. R.B. Ekelund, Jr.,1998, The foundations of regulatory economics, Vol.I.Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,Cheltenham, UK-Northampton, MA, USA
148.Simunic, Dan A., 1980, The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18 Issue 1, pp161-190.
149.Subramanyam. K., 1996, The pricing of discretionary accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.22 Issue 1-3, pp249-281.
150.Teoh, S. H., and T. J. Wong, 1993, Perceived Audit Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient, The Accounting Review, Vol.68, No.2, pp346-366.
151.Trompeter G., 1994, The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles on Audit Partner Judgment, Auditing, Vol. 13 Issue 2, pp56-68.
152. Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman, 1986, Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
153.Wong Man Kong and Raymond, 2005, An Empirical Study of Audit Quality in China from the Perspectives of Regulators and the Accounting Profession, School of Accounting and Finance, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
154.Wyer, J. C. ,White, G. T., Janson, E. C.,1988,Audits of Public Companies by Smaller CPA Firms: Clients, Reports, and Quality, Auditing Vol. 7 Issue 2, pp164-173.
155.中国证券监督管理委员会:http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/index.html
156.中国注册会计师协会:http://www.cicpa.org.cn/
157.中华人民共和国审计署:http://www.audit.gov.cn/cysite/chpage/c394/doclist.htm
158.中国烟台审计网:http://sjj.yantai.gov.cn/html/keyan_show.jsp?id=84920
159.中华人民共和国财政部会计信息质量检查公告(第十二号): http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/20061103_3015_20771.htm