基于策略消费者行为的供应链运作与协调研究
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摘要
策略消费者在预见到未来产品价格上涨或下跌时，会相应有抢购囤积或持币观望的行为，这在现实中很常见，但传统的供应链建模只关注需求总量，没有从策略消费者行为的角度考虑需求。本学位论文拟在深入了解策略消费者行为和厂商营销策略的互动关系的基础上，将策略消费者的选择行为引入到需求建模中，同时区分消费者的类型，分析策略消费者行为对厂商定价、质量和库存决策的影响，进一步将决策扩展至二级供应链，研究能使整个供应链绩效水平更优的信息共享方式和契约协调方式。
论文分析了策略消费者所占比例对厂商决策的影响，当消费者对产品的评价为随机变量时，分别在价格外生和内生、折扣内生条件下，比较不限量两阶段动态定价、限量两阶段动态定价和天天平价三种策略的适用范围：当价格外生时，仅当对产品评价高的消费者数量较多且策略消费者所占比例适中时，限量策略较好；当价格内生时，若策略消费者比例较大，薄利多销的天天平价策略能吸引消费者尽早购买，若策略消费者比例较小，采取不限量动态定价能获取更多短视消费者的剩余。当市场需求和消费者对产品的评价均为随机变量时，比较限量策略与承诺价格不变策略发现：限量可以吸引策略消费者尽早购买，承诺产品价格不变可以完全打消策略消费者等待的念头；当策略消费者所占比例较低时，宜采取限量策略，当策略消费者所占比例较高时，价格承诺更有助于厂商提高利润。
在厂商价格和库存决策的基础上，增加质量决策，将产品质量设计和快速反应策略结合起来，探讨面对策略消费者时，两种策略应如何配合以使厂商利润最大化。从消费者类型和库存策略两个角度将运作策略分为四种类型，分析各种策略下的质量、价格和库存决策：当面对策略消费者时，质量设计和快速反应的价值比面对短视消费者要大得多；如果市场上是短视消费者，快速反应策略应与较高的产品质量相配合，如果市场上是策略消费者，快速反应策略应与较低的产品质量相配合。
在分析了厂商的定价、库存和质量决策基础上，论文进一步将决策拓展到二级供应链。当产品质量外生时，引入策略消费者等待的耐心程度，将数量承诺下的利润作为供应链协调的标杆，比较零售商管理库存的批发价格契约和供应商管理库存的收益共享契约两种情况下的风险分担和利润分配情况。研究表明，当考虑策略消费者行为时，消费者越耐心等待，厂商利润越低；数量承诺可以提高供应链整体利润，但是承诺常常不可信；分散供应链下的零售商管理库存的批发价格契约和供应商管理库存的收益共享契约都能实现数量承诺下的供应链总利润，但是不同的契约对库存风险分担和利润分配的影响不同，如果不承担库存风险的一方具有更多的市场势力，有利于供应链绩效的提高。当产品质量作为内生变量，由供应商决定时，分散供应链下的产品质量与供应链上下游的议价能力相关，供应商议价能力越强，产品质量越高；当供应商完全掌握制定批发价格的权利时，策略消费者的行为加剧了供应商和零售商之间利润分配的不公，供应商能获得更大比例的利润。
It’s quite common that when strategic consumers anticipate products’ prices rise orfall, they will rush to purchase or wait for lower price correspondingly. However, traditionalsupply chain models only pay attention to total demand, not to consumer behavior. Thisdissertation intends to interpret relationship between consumer behavior and firm’s market-ing strategies in the presence of different types of consumers, and analyzes influences ofstrategic consumers on firm’s pricing, quality and inventory decisions. Further we extenddecisions to two-echelon supply chains, in order to find better information sharing way andcontract coordination pattern.
We analyze how strategic consumers’ fraction affects firm’s decision. With randomconsumers’ evaluation, we compare three strategies: rationing dynamic pricing, unrationingdynamic pricing and everyday low pricing in the situation of exogenous and endogenousprices, endogenous discount respectively. When price is exogenous, rationing dynamic pric-ing is optimal only if there is a sufficiently large segment of high-valuation consumers andthe proportion of strategic consumer is medium. When price is endogenous, rationing dy-namic pricing is always inferior. Everyday low pricing outperforms while the number ofstrategic consumer is small, otherwise unrationing dynamic pricing is optimal. When bothmarket demand and consumers’ evaluation are random variables, we compare rationing andprice commitment(keeping prices high) policies: rationing can induce strategic consumersto purchase earlier, while price commitment can totally deter consumers’ waiting behavior.When strategic consumers’ fraction is relatively low, rationing will be preferred, and pricecommitment tends to be more valuable when strategic consumers’ fraction becomes larger.
We then add quality decision to firms’ decision. Research shows that strategies such asimproving product quality, quick response to the market demand can induce strategic con-sumers to buy earlier, but what’s the relationship between quality design and quick response?We categorize strategies into four classes, different from each other in two dimensions: con-sumer type and ordering policy. It’s indicated that if consumers are strategic, quality designand quick response can provide enormous additional benefits; when consumers are myopic,quick response should be cooperated with higher quality, and when consumers are strategic, quick response should be combined with lower quality.
Lastly, we extend firms’ decisions to two-echelon supply chains, concentrate on theimpact of strategic consumer behavior on supply chain coordination with one retailer andone supplier. Strategic consumers anticipate future price and choose optimal purchasetiming. With strategic consumer behavior, we find that (i)the more patient consumers are,the less profit firms have;(ii)quantity commitment can improve supply chain’s profit, butit is not credible;(iii)the desired profit with quantity commitment can be attained througheither wholesale price contract under retailer managed inventory or revenue sharing contractunder vendor managed inventory, and supply chain efficiency can be improved if firm whodon’t carry the risk of inventory has more market power. If supplier decides quality, optimalquality is related to the bargaining power of retailer and supplier. The more power supplierhas, the higher the quality. When wholesale price is completely decided by supplier,strategic consumer may increase unfairness between supplier and retailer, and supplier canget a larger proportion of the profits.
论文分析了策略消费者所占比例对厂商决策的影响，当消费者对产品的评价为随机变量时，分别在价格外生和内生、折扣内生条件下，比较不限量两阶段动态定价、限量两阶段动态定价和天天平价三种策略的适用范围：当价格外生时，仅当对产品评价高的消费者数量较多且策略消费者所占比例适中时，限量策略较好；当价格内生时，若策略消费者比例较大，薄利多销的天天平价策略能吸引消费者尽早购买，若策略消费者比例较小，采取不限量动态定价能获取更多短视消费者的剩余。当市场需求和消费者对产品的评价均为随机变量时，比较限量策略与承诺价格不变策略发现：限量可以吸引策略消费者尽早购买，承诺产品价格不变可以完全打消策略消费者等待的念头；当策略消费者所占比例较低时，宜采取限量策略，当策略消费者所占比例较高时，价格承诺更有助于厂商提高利润。
在厂商价格和库存决策的基础上，增加质量决策，将产品质量设计和快速反应策略结合起来，探讨面对策略消费者时，两种策略应如何配合以使厂商利润最大化。从消费者类型和库存策略两个角度将运作策略分为四种类型，分析各种策略下的质量、价格和库存决策：当面对策略消费者时，质量设计和快速反应的价值比面对短视消费者要大得多；如果市场上是短视消费者，快速反应策略应与较高的产品质量相配合，如果市场上是策略消费者，快速反应策略应与较低的产品质量相配合。
在分析了厂商的定价、库存和质量决策基础上，论文进一步将决策拓展到二级供应链。当产品质量外生时，引入策略消费者等待的耐心程度，将数量承诺下的利润作为供应链协调的标杆，比较零售商管理库存的批发价格契约和供应商管理库存的收益共享契约两种情况下的风险分担和利润分配情况。研究表明，当考虑策略消费者行为时，消费者越耐心等待，厂商利润越低；数量承诺可以提高供应链整体利润，但是承诺常常不可信；分散供应链下的零售商管理库存的批发价格契约和供应商管理库存的收益共享契约都能实现数量承诺下的供应链总利润，但是不同的契约对库存风险分担和利润分配的影响不同，如果不承担库存风险的一方具有更多的市场势力，有利于供应链绩效的提高。当产品质量作为内生变量，由供应商决定时，分散供应链下的产品质量与供应链上下游的议价能力相关，供应商议价能力越强，产品质量越高；当供应商完全掌握制定批发价格的权利时，策略消费者的行为加剧了供应商和零售商之间利润分配的不公，供应商能获得更大比例的利润。
It’s quite common that when strategic consumers anticipate products’ prices rise orfall, they will rush to purchase or wait for lower price correspondingly. However, traditionalsupply chain models only pay attention to total demand, not to consumer behavior. Thisdissertation intends to interpret relationship between consumer behavior and firm’s market-ing strategies in the presence of different types of consumers, and analyzes influences ofstrategic consumers on firm’s pricing, quality and inventory decisions. Further we extenddecisions to two-echelon supply chains, in order to find better information sharing way andcontract coordination pattern.
We analyze how strategic consumers’ fraction affects firm’s decision. With randomconsumers’ evaluation, we compare three strategies: rationing dynamic pricing, unrationingdynamic pricing and everyday low pricing in the situation of exogenous and endogenousprices, endogenous discount respectively. When price is exogenous, rationing dynamic pric-ing is optimal only if there is a sufficiently large segment of high-valuation consumers andthe proportion of strategic consumer is medium. When price is endogenous, rationing dy-namic pricing is always inferior. Everyday low pricing outperforms while the number ofstrategic consumer is small, otherwise unrationing dynamic pricing is optimal. When bothmarket demand and consumers’ evaluation are random variables, we compare rationing andprice commitment(keeping prices high) policies: rationing can induce strategic consumersto purchase earlier, while price commitment can totally deter consumers’ waiting behavior.When strategic consumers’ fraction is relatively low, rationing will be preferred, and pricecommitment tends to be more valuable when strategic consumers’ fraction becomes larger.
We then add quality decision to firms’ decision. Research shows that strategies such asimproving product quality, quick response to the market demand can induce strategic con-sumers to buy earlier, but what’s the relationship between quality design and quick response?We categorize strategies into four classes, different from each other in two dimensions: con-sumer type and ordering policy. It’s indicated that if consumers are strategic, quality designand quick response can provide enormous additional benefits; when consumers are myopic,quick response should be cooperated with higher quality, and when consumers are strategic, quick response should be combined with lower quality.
Lastly, we extend firms’ decisions to two-echelon supply chains, concentrate on theimpact of strategic consumer behavior on supply chain coordination with one retailer andone supplier. Strategic consumers anticipate future price and choose optimal purchasetiming. With strategic consumer behavior, we find that (i)the more patient consumers are,the less profit firms have;(ii)quantity commitment can improve supply chain’s profit, butit is not credible;(iii)the desired profit with quantity commitment can be attained througheither wholesale price contract under retailer managed inventory or revenue sharing contractunder vendor managed inventory, and supply chain efficiency can be improved if firm whodon’t carry the risk of inventory has more market power. If supplier decides quality, optimalquality is related to the bargaining power of retailer and supplier. The more power supplierhas, the higher the quality. When wholesale price is completely decided by supplier,strategic consumer may increase unfairness between supplier and retailer, and supplier canget a larger proportion of the profits.
引文
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