非对称信息下供应链协调问题研究
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摘要
供应链管理是随着全球制造业的兴起、以及为了适应客户需求的快速变化而产生的一种新型的管理模式,企业为了有效地管理供应链,使供应链的整体性能达到最佳,要求供应链中各成员之间必须高度协调。由于供应链中的各个成员分属于不同的企业,他们都是基于自身的利益目标进行决策,为了使成员的行为与供应链系统的最优策略相一致,必须通过设计适当的激励机制对成员企业的行为进行协调和约束。如何从现实中供应链管理遇到的问题出发,基于供应链系统协调的角度,研究供应链成员企业之间的合作与竞争,谋求双赢,是供应链协调研究的重要课题。
本论文运用运筹学、经济学(包括博弈论以及委托代理理论)等学科的理论与方法,研究了关于不对称信息下的供应链协调契约模型,主要内容包括:
文中阐述了企业实施三级供应链协调的方式以及存在的问题,并且对非对称信息下供应链的协调问题进行分析,并且对企业进行三级供应链协调的动因以及影响因素进行分析。针对协调中存在的问题,提出适于企业进行多级供应链管理的供应链契约协调机制。
在实际生产销售过程中,供应链契约直接决定了企业资源配置的方式与企业之间利益的协调方式,只有当契约所规定的协调方式使供应链的活动满足纳什均衡的时候,契约才会起到协调供应链的作用,在这种模式下任何理性的供应链成员都不会选择偏离最优的行为。本文从供应链契约模型中进行总结得到共同的特点,即大多数为两级供应链,销售周期较短,并且制造商位于核心企业位置,由它向其他企业提供契约。因此,本文建立供应链契约的通用模型,对整合型供应链以及纵向分离型供应链分别进行分析,证明其在激励供应链企业选择优化策略时,能够同时达到供应链的整体协调。
本文考虑了在价格折扣契约下,制定多阶段订货策略,考虑在固定的市场需求情况下,分别分析由一个供应商和一个购买商组成的两级供应链系统的协调模型以及有独立的物流商参与的三级供应链系统的协调模型。验证在这种供应链契约下,供应链各成员企业的收益会相应增加,同时供应链的整体利益也会相应增加。由此可以得出,使用多阶段订货策略可以使供应链得到协调,并且供应链成员企业也乐于接受该种契约。
With the increasing competition, in order to achieve a quick response to rapidly changing customer's requirements, supply chain management has been receiving more and more attention of managers, consultants and researchers. Among various entities and functional units in a supply chain, coordination pattern is needed to achieve a global performance optimization. Because supply chain members are independent enterprises, they make decisions to optimize their own objectives. In order that the enterprises' behavior follows the optimal action of the supply chain, it is necessary to design appropriate mechanism to restrain and coordinate the entities on the supply chain. The supply chain management applies supply chain contracts as an effective managing tool to control incentive conflicts and to improve the supply chain performance. The study of supply chain enterprises' game and cooperation problems stemmed from supply chain management in reality to reach win-win is an important research area of supply chain contract.
The paper combines the theories and methods in some fields such as Operational Research, Economics and so on to study the problem of supply chain coordination contract on asymmetric information. The main content of the dissertation as follows:
Analysis the problems of coordination of supply chain on asymmetric information, including the motivation factors of the three stage supply chain coordination, and the co-ordinated approach and problems of the enterprises elaborate the three stage supply chain coordinated method. The paper also showed the supply chain contract coordination mechanisms according to the coordination problem of supply chain.
Supply chain contract will determine the way of enterprises distribute their business resources and the interests with other enterprises. When the contracts are under the coordination mechanism and make the activities of the supply chain satisfy the Nash equilibrium, the supply chain members will not deviate from optimal behavior. In this kind of mode, the contract played a role in coordinating the supply chain. The paper summarizes the common characteristics in a variety of supply chain contract models. The characteristics include that the supply chain usually is two stages, the sales cycle is often short, the core enterprise is always manufacturer, and the contract is provided by manufacturer to other enterprises in supply chain. Therefore, the paper established a common supply chain contract model and analysis two kinds of supply chain (the integrated supply chain and the vertical separated supply chain). The contract model can encourage the enterprises to choose strategy which can optimize the whole supply chain.
The next part of the paper, the n-stage ordering strategy is made considering the price discount contract of supply chain. The market demand is fixed in the case. The dissertation respectively analysis a two stage supply chain including one supplier and one retailer and a three stage supply chain including one supplier, one retailer and one logistics operator. In this supply chain contract model, the supply chain member enterprises can obtain more interests, so this strategy can make the supply chain coordinated, and the supply chain members are also welcome to use it.
本论文运用运筹学、经济学(包括博弈论以及委托代理理论)等学科的理论与方法,研究了关于不对称信息下的供应链协调契约模型,主要内容包括:
文中阐述了企业实施三级供应链协调的方式以及存在的问题,并且对非对称信息下供应链的协调问题进行分析,并且对企业进行三级供应链协调的动因以及影响因素进行分析。针对协调中存在的问题,提出适于企业进行多级供应链管理的供应链契约协调机制。
在实际生产销售过程中,供应链契约直接决定了企业资源配置的方式与企业之间利益的协调方式,只有当契约所规定的协调方式使供应链的活动满足纳什均衡的时候,契约才会起到协调供应链的作用,在这种模式下任何理性的供应链成员都不会选择偏离最优的行为。本文从供应链契约模型中进行总结得到共同的特点,即大多数为两级供应链,销售周期较短,并且制造商位于核心企业位置,由它向其他企业提供契约。因此,本文建立供应链契约的通用模型,对整合型供应链以及纵向分离型供应链分别进行分析,证明其在激励供应链企业选择优化策略时,能够同时达到供应链的整体协调。
本文考虑了在价格折扣契约下,制定多阶段订货策略,考虑在固定的市场需求情况下,分别分析由一个供应商和一个购买商组成的两级供应链系统的协调模型以及有独立的物流商参与的三级供应链系统的协调模型。验证在这种供应链契约下,供应链各成员企业的收益会相应增加,同时供应链的整体利益也会相应增加。由此可以得出,使用多阶段订货策略可以使供应链得到协调,并且供应链成员企业也乐于接受该种契约。
With the increasing competition, in order to achieve a quick response to rapidly changing customer's requirements, supply chain management has been receiving more and more attention of managers, consultants and researchers. Among various entities and functional units in a supply chain, coordination pattern is needed to achieve a global performance optimization. Because supply chain members are independent enterprises, they make decisions to optimize their own objectives. In order that the enterprises' behavior follows the optimal action of the supply chain, it is necessary to design appropriate mechanism to restrain and coordinate the entities on the supply chain. The supply chain management applies supply chain contracts as an effective managing tool to control incentive conflicts and to improve the supply chain performance. The study of supply chain enterprises' game and cooperation problems stemmed from supply chain management in reality to reach win-win is an important research area of supply chain contract.
The paper combines the theories and methods in some fields such as Operational Research, Economics and so on to study the problem of supply chain coordination contract on asymmetric information. The main content of the dissertation as follows:
Analysis the problems of coordination of supply chain on asymmetric information, including the motivation factors of the three stage supply chain coordination, and the co-ordinated approach and problems of the enterprises elaborate the three stage supply chain coordinated method. The paper also showed the supply chain contract coordination mechanisms according to the coordination problem of supply chain.
Supply chain contract will determine the way of enterprises distribute their business resources and the interests with other enterprises. When the contracts are under the coordination mechanism and make the activities of the supply chain satisfy the Nash equilibrium, the supply chain members will not deviate from optimal behavior. In this kind of mode, the contract played a role in coordinating the supply chain. The paper summarizes the common characteristics in a variety of supply chain contract models. The characteristics include that the supply chain usually is two stages, the sales cycle is often short, the core enterprise is always manufacturer, and the contract is provided by manufacturer to other enterprises in supply chain. Therefore, the paper established a common supply chain contract model and analysis two kinds of supply chain (the integrated supply chain and the vertical separated supply chain). The contract model can encourage the enterprises to choose strategy which can optimize the whole supply chain.
The next part of the paper, the n-stage ordering strategy is made considering the price discount contract of supply chain. The market demand is fixed in the case. The dissertation respectively analysis a two stage supply chain including one supplier and one retailer and a three stage supply chain including one supplier, one retailer and one logistics operator. In this supply chain contract model, the supply chain member enterprises can obtain more interests, so this strategy can make the supply chain coordinated, and the supply chain members are also welcome to use it.
引文
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