基于博弈视角的闭环供应链定价与利益协调激励研究
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摘要
闭环供应链是在传统的“正向”供应链上加入逆向反馈过程,即逆向供应链而形成的一个完整的闭环体系。实质上是通过产品的正向交付与逆向回收再利用,使“资源-生产-消费-废弃”的开环过程变成了“资源-生产-消费-再生资源”的闭环反馈式循环过程。在整个供应链运作过程中,闭环供应链综合考虑环境因素和资源利用效率,以现代信息技术和供应链管理技术为基础,使产品从原材料的获取、加工、包装、仓储、运输、使用到报废处理及回收利用的全生命周期中,减少对环境的负面影响,提高资源利用效率。
本文选用博弈论作为工具对闭环供应链进行定量模型研究,分析闭环供应链各方利益主体的激励机制与协调机制,拓展闭环供应链的研究领域与方法,增强其可操作性,使闭环供应链的发展更具有现实意义。
论文第一章介绍了闭环供应链研究意义和发展现状。第二章介绍了闭环供应链的基础理论,为后面的研究提供理论依据。
论文第三、四章研究了逆向供应链和闭环供应链的协调机制。研究表明,在实施闭环供应链过程中,只有加强供应链成员间的协调合作,才能维护成员各自的利益以及减少供应链系统环境中可能发生的风险。此外,合作策略不仅使供应链系统利益最大化,而且消费者也从中收益,增加了其对产品的满意度。但是,由于各成员追求自身利益最大化,合作并不总是被每个闭环供应链成员所接受,只是在保证自身利益的情况下合作才能有效进行。因此,需要我们建立有效的利益分配机制,才能实现成员利益和系统利益达到最大化的双赢目标。
闭环供应链成员之间的协调是基于完全信息下的理想状态。现实中,企业之间大多程度都是信息不完全公开的,针对在逆向供应链中可能存在的虚假行为,本文第五章构建了废旧品质量不确定下逆向供应链回购中的信号博弈模型,分析了模型中的精练贝叶斯均衡:分离均衡、混同均衡、准分离均衡;同时,构建了市场需求信息不确定下的信号博弈模型,结果显示:只有高需求类型的制造商提供分离均衡回购价格时,回收商才能得到真实的市场需求信息;而混同均衡时,低需求类型的制造商模仿高需求类型的制造商,导致高需求类型的制造商收益受损,不利于RSC的顺利实施。
企业的合作策略需要企业在合作过程中建立长期信任关系,只有如此,才能提高闭环供应链的资源集成能力,使得合作具有更高的生产率。其中,闭环供应链合作伙伴的选择是影响闭环供应链运作绩效的重要因素。第六章把模糊层次分析法应用到闭环供应链合作伙伴的选择中,克服了日常选择中的片面性、主观性,引入模糊的思想,更利于评价专家给出准确的评分。
第六章还着重研究了闭环供应链的激励问题。首先采用委托-代理理论讨论了政府规制下逆向供应链的激励问题,得出奖励、惩罚同步实施的方案是政府最优的激励方案。此外,还研究了基于零售商回收的闭环供应链中的激励机制设计问题,从分析结果看:当零售商投入的设施规模较大时,制造商更加注重对零售商销售努力的激励,为有效调动零售商回收废旧品的积极性,建议将委托代理人的年限延长,并且建议制造商对零售商回收努力的激励采用固定支付的措施,而对销售努力的激励采用根据工作成果确定激励支付的激励合同比较合适。最后研究了基于第三方回收的闭环供应链的激励机制,从结果看:非对称信息条件下,制造商的成本比对称信息条件下的成本要高;此时,第三方回收商要求自身必须具有一定的运作能力,并保持相应的努力水平,才能获得最大效益。
上述章节的结论只是一个静态的理论结论,在现实中,闭环供应链的发展是一个动态的、渐进的演化过程。第七章利用演化博弈理论对供应链中开放型生产商与保守型生产商关于是否积极实施逆向供应链的演化过程进行了研究,结果表明:(1)在市场机制下,只有当实施逆向供应链后额外增加收益时,生产商才有积极性实施逆向供应链;(2)当实施RSC的成本较高而使得生产商出现了亏损,生产商会消极对待逆向供应链。此时,政府将采取一定的调控措施来促使生产商接受逆向供应链:对于生产具有负外部性的生产商,将实施惩罚机制以调整生产商的决策,并且只有当惩罚力度足够大,这种惩罚才是有效的;对于生产具有正外部性的生产商,政府将采取财政补贴措施影响生产商的决策,而且只有当补贴值足够大时,这种补贴才有效果。
Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) is an integrated closed circuit system formed through combining traditional“forward direction”supply chain with reverse feedback process (viz. Reverse Supply Chain, acronym for RSC). In essence, it makes the open circuit process of“resources-production-consumption-abandonment”being transformed into the closed circuit feedback circulating process through forward delivery and reverse recycle. In the whole operating process of the supply chain, CLSC takes into account environmental factors and the efficiency of resource use in comprehensive way, based upon modern information technology and technology of supply chain management. It minimizes the environmental side effect and maximizes the efficiency of resource use in the whole lifecycle of raw materials acquisition, processing, packing, storing, transportation, use, abandonment as well as recycle.
The present dissertation studies the quantitative models of CLSC by game theory, to analyze the incentive and coordination mechanism of all sides, to expand the research field and method of CLSC, to improve its operability, so as to make the expansion of CLSC of more practical significance.
Chapter One introduces the research significance and present situation of CLSC. Then Chapter Two introduces some basic theories about CLSC so as to provide a theoretical framework for the following studies.
Chapter Three and Chapter Four deal with the mechanism of coordination of RSC and CLSC. The result shows that, in implementing CLSC, it is only through the enhancement of coordination and cooperation between members of the supply chain that the interests of respective members could be protected and the probable risk in the systematic environment might be reduced. In addition, the cooperation strategy can not only maximize the interests of system, but also benefit the consumers and thus improve their satisfaction towards products. However, not all members of CLSC would accept cooperation due to their effort to maximize self-interests; the cooperation is possible only when the self-interest of each member is guaranteed. Therefore, it needs to build up an efficient system of interest distribution so as to realize the win-win goal to maximize the member interests and system interests.
However, the coordination between members of CLSC is based on the ideal condition of complete information. In fact, to a large extent, information is incompletely between businesses. Therefore, considering the possible deceits in RSC, Chapter Five builds up the signal game model in the buyback of RSC under incomplete information of the used products’quality, analyzes perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the model, including separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium. In addition, it also constructs a signal game under the condition of uncertain market demand information; the analysis results show that, only when the high demand manufacturer provides the buyback price of separating equilibrium, the take-backer can get the true information of market demand. Under the condition of pooling equilibrium, the low demand manufacturer would imitate the high demand manufacturer, which decreases the interests of the latter and thus prevents a smooth realization of RSC.
The cooperative strategy of enterprises requires the building of long-term relationship of mutual trust in their cooperation, which can improve the resources integrating ability and thus make the cooperation more productive. In fact, the choice of cooperative partners is an important factor that influences the operative performance of CLSC. Chapter Six, through putting FAHP into the practice of choosing CLSC cooperative partners, avoids the one-sidedness and subjectivity of choices. The use of fuzzy thoughts is good to evaluate the evaluation of experts.
Chapter Six deals with the incentive problem of CLSC as well. First of all, it discusses the incentive problem under governmental regulation by the principal-agency theory, concluding that the plan of simultaneously implementing reward and punishment is the best incentive way of government. In addition, it studies the incentive mechanism of RT-CLSC. The analysis shows that manufacturers would work harder to motivate the sell efforts when retailers build larger facilities. It is proposed that the period of agency should be prolonged so as to encourage them to take back the used products more actively. In addition, it is proposed that manufacturers should use fixed payment to motivate the efforts of retailers to take back; and it is suitable to motivate the selling efforts by the payment in accordance with performance. Finally, this chapter deals with the incentive mechanism of TPT-CLSC. The study reveals that under the condition of asymmetric information, the cost of manufacturers is higher than that of the symmetric information; meanwhile the third party themselves need some operative ability and should keep a corresponding effort so as to maximize the benefits.
The conclusion of the above chapters is nothing but a static, theoretic one. In reality, the growth of CLSC is a dynamic, evolutionary process. Chapter Seven, making use of evolvement game theory, deals with the evolving question of whether open-minded manufacturers and conservative manufacturers would actively implement RSC. The analysis shows that, 1) Under market mechanism, the manufacturer could have the enthusiasm to implement RSC only when the implementation increases the extra benefits; 2) When the relatively high cost of carrying out RSC makes the manufacturer lose, they would take a passive attitude towards RSC. It is the high time that governments could make the manufacturer accept RSC through some adjustment measures, for example, to implement punishment mechanism for those manufacturers of negative externality so as to adjust their decisions, and the punish can be effective only when it is severe enough; to subsidize those manufacturers of positive externality so as to influence their decisions, and the subsidy can be effective only when it is adequate enough.
本文选用博弈论作为工具对闭环供应链进行定量模型研究,分析闭环供应链各方利益主体的激励机制与协调机制,拓展闭环供应链的研究领域与方法,增强其可操作性,使闭环供应链的发展更具有现实意义。
论文第一章介绍了闭环供应链研究意义和发展现状。第二章介绍了闭环供应链的基础理论,为后面的研究提供理论依据。
论文第三、四章研究了逆向供应链和闭环供应链的协调机制。研究表明,在实施闭环供应链过程中,只有加强供应链成员间的协调合作,才能维护成员各自的利益以及减少供应链系统环境中可能发生的风险。此外,合作策略不仅使供应链系统利益最大化,而且消费者也从中收益,增加了其对产品的满意度。但是,由于各成员追求自身利益最大化,合作并不总是被每个闭环供应链成员所接受,只是在保证自身利益的情况下合作才能有效进行。因此,需要我们建立有效的利益分配机制,才能实现成员利益和系统利益达到最大化的双赢目标。
闭环供应链成员之间的协调是基于完全信息下的理想状态。现实中,企业之间大多程度都是信息不完全公开的,针对在逆向供应链中可能存在的虚假行为,本文第五章构建了废旧品质量不确定下逆向供应链回购中的信号博弈模型,分析了模型中的精练贝叶斯均衡:分离均衡、混同均衡、准分离均衡;同时,构建了市场需求信息不确定下的信号博弈模型,结果显示:只有高需求类型的制造商提供分离均衡回购价格时,回收商才能得到真实的市场需求信息;而混同均衡时,低需求类型的制造商模仿高需求类型的制造商,导致高需求类型的制造商收益受损,不利于RSC的顺利实施。
企业的合作策略需要企业在合作过程中建立长期信任关系,只有如此,才能提高闭环供应链的资源集成能力,使得合作具有更高的生产率。其中,闭环供应链合作伙伴的选择是影响闭环供应链运作绩效的重要因素。第六章把模糊层次分析法应用到闭环供应链合作伙伴的选择中,克服了日常选择中的片面性、主观性,引入模糊的思想,更利于评价专家给出准确的评分。
第六章还着重研究了闭环供应链的激励问题。首先采用委托-代理理论讨论了政府规制下逆向供应链的激励问题,得出奖励、惩罚同步实施的方案是政府最优的激励方案。此外,还研究了基于零售商回收的闭环供应链中的激励机制设计问题,从分析结果看:当零售商投入的设施规模较大时,制造商更加注重对零售商销售努力的激励,为有效调动零售商回收废旧品的积极性,建议将委托代理人的年限延长,并且建议制造商对零售商回收努力的激励采用固定支付的措施,而对销售努力的激励采用根据工作成果确定激励支付的激励合同比较合适。最后研究了基于第三方回收的闭环供应链的激励机制,从结果看:非对称信息条件下,制造商的成本比对称信息条件下的成本要高;此时,第三方回收商要求自身必须具有一定的运作能力,并保持相应的努力水平,才能获得最大效益。
上述章节的结论只是一个静态的理论结论,在现实中,闭环供应链的发展是一个动态的、渐进的演化过程。第七章利用演化博弈理论对供应链中开放型生产商与保守型生产商关于是否积极实施逆向供应链的演化过程进行了研究,结果表明:(1)在市场机制下,只有当实施逆向供应链后额外增加收益时,生产商才有积极性实施逆向供应链;(2)当实施RSC的成本较高而使得生产商出现了亏损,生产商会消极对待逆向供应链。此时,政府将采取一定的调控措施来促使生产商接受逆向供应链:对于生产具有负外部性的生产商,将实施惩罚机制以调整生产商的决策,并且只有当惩罚力度足够大,这种惩罚才是有效的;对于生产具有正外部性的生产商,政府将采取财政补贴措施影响生产商的决策,而且只有当补贴值足够大时,这种补贴才有效果。
Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) is an integrated closed circuit system formed through combining traditional“forward direction”supply chain with reverse feedback process (viz. Reverse Supply Chain, acronym for RSC). In essence, it makes the open circuit process of“resources-production-consumption-abandonment”being transformed into the closed circuit feedback circulating process through forward delivery and reverse recycle. In the whole operating process of the supply chain, CLSC takes into account environmental factors and the efficiency of resource use in comprehensive way, based upon modern information technology and technology of supply chain management. It minimizes the environmental side effect and maximizes the efficiency of resource use in the whole lifecycle of raw materials acquisition, processing, packing, storing, transportation, use, abandonment as well as recycle.
The present dissertation studies the quantitative models of CLSC by game theory, to analyze the incentive and coordination mechanism of all sides, to expand the research field and method of CLSC, to improve its operability, so as to make the expansion of CLSC of more practical significance.
Chapter One introduces the research significance and present situation of CLSC. Then Chapter Two introduces some basic theories about CLSC so as to provide a theoretical framework for the following studies.
Chapter Three and Chapter Four deal with the mechanism of coordination of RSC and CLSC. The result shows that, in implementing CLSC, it is only through the enhancement of coordination and cooperation between members of the supply chain that the interests of respective members could be protected and the probable risk in the systematic environment might be reduced. In addition, the cooperation strategy can not only maximize the interests of system, but also benefit the consumers and thus improve their satisfaction towards products. However, not all members of CLSC would accept cooperation due to their effort to maximize self-interests; the cooperation is possible only when the self-interest of each member is guaranteed. Therefore, it needs to build up an efficient system of interest distribution so as to realize the win-win goal to maximize the member interests and system interests.
However, the coordination between members of CLSC is based on the ideal condition of complete information. In fact, to a large extent, information is incompletely between businesses. Therefore, considering the possible deceits in RSC, Chapter Five builds up the signal game model in the buyback of RSC under incomplete information of the used products’quality, analyzes perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the model, including separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium. In addition, it also constructs a signal game under the condition of uncertain market demand information; the analysis results show that, only when the high demand manufacturer provides the buyback price of separating equilibrium, the take-backer can get the true information of market demand. Under the condition of pooling equilibrium, the low demand manufacturer would imitate the high demand manufacturer, which decreases the interests of the latter and thus prevents a smooth realization of RSC.
The cooperative strategy of enterprises requires the building of long-term relationship of mutual trust in their cooperation, which can improve the resources integrating ability and thus make the cooperation more productive. In fact, the choice of cooperative partners is an important factor that influences the operative performance of CLSC. Chapter Six, through putting FAHP into the practice of choosing CLSC cooperative partners, avoids the one-sidedness and subjectivity of choices. The use of fuzzy thoughts is good to evaluate the evaluation of experts.
Chapter Six deals with the incentive problem of CLSC as well. First of all, it discusses the incentive problem under governmental regulation by the principal-agency theory, concluding that the plan of simultaneously implementing reward and punishment is the best incentive way of government. In addition, it studies the incentive mechanism of RT-CLSC. The analysis shows that manufacturers would work harder to motivate the sell efforts when retailers build larger facilities. It is proposed that the period of agency should be prolonged so as to encourage them to take back the used products more actively. In addition, it is proposed that manufacturers should use fixed payment to motivate the efforts of retailers to take back; and it is suitable to motivate the selling efforts by the payment in accordance with performance. Finally, this chapter deals with the incentive mechanism of TPT-CLSC. The study reveals that under the condition of asymmetric information, the cost of manufacturers is higher than that of the symmetric information; meanwhile the third party themselves need some operative ability and should keep a corresponding effort so as to maximize the benefits.
The conclusion of the above chapters is nothing but a static, theoretic one. In reality, the growth of CLSC is a dynamic, evolutionary process. Chapter Seven, making use of evolvement game theory, deals with the evolving question of whether open-minded manufacturers and conservative manufacturers would actively implement RSC. The analysis shows that, 1) Under market mechanism, the manufacturer could have the enthusiasm to implement RSC only when the implementation increases the extra benefits; 2) When the relatively high cost of carrying out RSC makes the manufacturer lose, they would take a passive attitude towards RSC. It is the high time that governments could make the manufacturer accept RSC through some adjustment measures, for example, to implement punishment mechanism for those manufacturers of negative externality so as to adjust their decisions, and the punish can be effective only when it is severe enough; to subsidize those manufacturers of positive externality so as to influence their decisions, and the subsidy can be effective only when it is adequate enough.
引文
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