基于博弈论的普适计算信任模型的安全问题研究
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摘要
普适计算应用中移动实体的交互关系具有开放性、对等性和动态性等特点,需要基于信誉的信任模型生成和管理实体间的各种关系。来自不同组织的交互实体因资源受限等原因,从自身利益出发不执行信任模型的规定操作,从而引发信任模型的安全问题。针对这种“被动式攻击”,本文研究基于博弈论和机制设计的信任模型安全问题解决方法。在总结国内外已有研究成果的基础上,进行了多方面的深入研究和实验,取得了一些有意义的成果,扩充了信息安全经济学的研究范围和内容。具体研究内容包括以下几个方面:
(1)针对推荐获取过程中由于中间实体丢包和推荐给予实体沉默造成的推荐获取率低的问题,提出了一种基于信用积分的激励机制对两种实体同时进行激励,全面保证推荐获取的成功。首先,研究了自私实体模型,并应用非合作推荐获取博弈对自私实体的合作条件进行了研究。其次,考虑存在“贪婪”实体要价情况下,通过合作的竞争选择博弈研究推荐请求实体如何利用多条路由间的竞争降低总体支付的信用积分。最后,模拟实验结果显示激励机制较为有效,可提高约15%-30%的成功率并降低合作者的要价。
(2)针对推荐中存在欺骗的情况,从非合作博弈论角度提出了一种基于VCG机制的防护策略信任决策机制。该机制可应用于连续或者二元信任值信任模型,激励实体进行真实汇报。通过将信任决策看作社会选择过程,证明提出的信任机制是一个VCG机制,从而保证实体只有在真实汇报时才能实现利益的最大化。进一步,提出了基于WMC算法的加权VCG信任机制用于实现更精确的信任预测,并对支付特性进行了研究。
(3)为了探寻更多的防护策略信任机制,首先在提出一般信任决策机制的基础上,研究了激励相容机制的特性,使满足社会选择函数特性要求的信任模型可被构造成为真实信任机制。并以基于VCG的信任机制为例,具体说明如何从信任模型构造出具有激励相容机制的信任机制。其次,研究了信任等级和推荐权值对推荐获取成本的影响。最后,模拟实验结果表明提出的信任机制可以有效应对各种积极偏差、消极偏差和策略性欺骗。
(4)针对推荐中存在团体欺骗的情况,从合作博弈论的角度提出了一种团体防护策略机制,将与信任值相关的风险损失值汇报看作赔偿的声明,超模支付赔偿博弈的解看作实际赔偿。首先,提出了与汇报损失值相关无关两种形式的团体赔偿总额函数,证明其超模性并证明了超模赔偿支付博弈的性质。在选择博弈的基础上,构造了对应的间接显示机制和直接显示的赔偿声明机制,证明了该机制满足团体防护策略要求。其次,选取Shapley值作为实际的赔偿支付方案,证明其满足单调交叉性,并给出了赔偿声明机制的结果团体算法。模拟实验结果表明当采用与损失值相关的团体赔偿总额函数,尽管其具有超模性,但机制并不具有防护策略特性。采用与损失值无关的团体赔偿总额函数时,赔偿声明机制满足团体防护策略特性,最后,总结和举例团体防护策略机制中谎报者所有的可能结果。
Interactions between mobile entities in pervasive computing have properties suchas open, peer to peer and dynamic etc and therefore it is needed to adopt trust models togenerate and manage various relations between entities. However, because entities arefrom different organizations and are resource limited, they will not take the predefinedactions of trust models according to their own benefits. Hence the security problemsof trust models occur. For such”passive attack”, we study the solution based on gametheory and mechanism design to solve the security problems of trust models in thisthesis. Based on summarizing exist research results in home and abroad, we studyfrom several perspectives and do simulations in details. The obtained results in thisthesis enlarge the scope and contend of the disciple called Economics of InformationSecurity. The concrete research content includes:
(1) For the problem of low recommendation acquisition rate in the recommenda-tion acquisition process due to the dropping of middle entities and duck of recommen-dation rendering entity, we propose a utility based incentive mechanism to encouragethese two kinds of entities to guarantee the full success of recommendation acquisition.First, we study the selfish model and the cooperation condition of selfish entities utiliz-ing a non cooperative game called Recommendation Acquisition Game. Then considerthe situation where asking prices are proposed by greedy entities, based on a coopera-tive game called Competition and Section Game, we study how the requestor lowers thetotal paid cost utilizing the competition between several routings. Finally, the simula-tion results show that the proposed incentive mechanism is effective and increase about15% to 30% success rate and lowers the asking prices of cooperators.
(2) For the cheating in the recommendation, we proposed a strategy-proof trustmechanism based on VCG mechanism from the perspective of non cooperative game. This mechanism can be adopted by continuous and binary trust value models to stim-ulate truthful reportings. By considering the trust decision as a social section process,we prove that the proposed trust mechanism is a VCG mechanism so that the entitycan only maximize its utility when truthfully reports. Furthermore, utilizing WMC al-gorithm, we propose a weighted VCG mechanism to predict trust more accurately andmoreover, we study the characteristic of payment.
(3) For discovering more strategy-proof trust mechanisms, based on the proposedgeneral trust mechanism, we study the characteristic properties of incentive compatibleso that all the trust models satisfying character requirement of social choice functioncan be constructed to truthful trust mechanisms. Taking the VCG trust mechanism asexample, we explain in details how to construct the incentive compatible trust mecha-nisms. Moreover, we study how the trust level and recommendation weight in?uencethe recommendation acquisition cost. Finally, simulation results show that the proposedtrust mechanism can deal with all kinds of positive and negative deviations.
(4) For the problem of group cheating in recommendation reporting, we proposed agroup strategy-proof mechanism from the perspective of cooperative game. The mech-anism considers the risk cost value relating to the trust value as a declared compensationand treats the solution of supermodular compensation payment game as paid compen-sation. First, we proposed two kinds of collective compensation functions in which oneis relates to the reported cost and one is not and prove the supermodularity of these twofunctions and the property of supermodular compensation payment game. Based on theselection game, we construct the corresponding indirect and direct mechanism whichis called Claiming Compensation Mechanism and prove that this mechanism is groupstrategy-proof. Furthermore, we take the Shapley value as the actual compensationpayment scheme and prove that it satisfies the property called cross-monotonicity. Analgorithm in generating the outcome coalition is given. Simulation results show that forthe collective cost function which is related to the cost value, although it is supermodu-lar, the corresponding mechanism is not strategy-proof. By adopting the collective costfunction which is not related to the cost value, the Claiming Compensation Mechanismis group strategy-proof. Finally, we summarize and demonstrate all possible results of the lying reporter.
(1)针对推荐获取过程中由于中间实体丢包和推荐给予实体沉默造成的推荐获取率低的问题,提出了一种基于信用积分的激励机制对两种实体同时进行激励,全面保证推荐获取的成功。首先,研究了自私实体模型,并应用非合作推荐获取博弈对自私实体的合作条件进行了研究。其次,考虑存在“贪婪”实体要价情况下,通过合作的竞争选择博弈研究推荐请求实体如何利用多条路由间的竞争降低总体支付的信用积分。最后,模拟实验结果显示激励机制较为有效,可提高约15%-30%的成功率并降低合作者的要价。
(2)针对推荐中存在欺骗的情况,从非合作博弈论角度提出了一种基于VCG机制的防护策略信任决策机制。该机制可应用于连续或者二元信任值信任模型,激励实体进行真实汇报。通过将信任决策看作社会选择过程,证明提出的信任机制是一个VCG机制,从而保证实体只有在真实汇报时才能实现利益的最大化。进一步,提出了基于WMC算法的加权VCG信任机制用于实现更精确的信任预测,并对支付特性进行了研究。
(3)为了探寻更多的防护策略信任机制,首先在提出一般信任决策机制的基础上,研究了激励相容机制的特性,使满足社会选择函数特性要求的信任模型可被构造成为真实信任机制。并以基于VCG的信任机制为例,具体说明如何从信任模型构造出具有激励相容机制的信任机制。其次,研究了信任等级和推荐权值对推荐获取成本的影响。最后,模拟实验结果表明提出的信任机制可以有效应对各种积极偏差、消极偏差和策略性欺骗。
(4)针对推荐中存在团体欺骗的情况,从合作博弈论的角度提出了一种团体防护策略机制,将与信任值相关的风险损失值汇报看作赔偿的声明,超模支付赔偿博弈的解看作实际赔偿。首先,提出了与汇报损失值相关无关两种形式的团体赔偿总额函数,证明其超模性并证明了超模赔偿支付博弈的性质。在选择博弈的基础上,构造了对应的间接显示机制和直接显示的赔偿声明机制,证明了该机制满足团体防护策略要求。其次,选取Shapley值作为实际的赔偿支付方案,证明其满足单调交叉性,并给出了赔偿声明机制的结果团体算法。模拟实验结果表明当采用与损失值相关的团体赔偿总额函数,尽管其具有超模性,但机制并不具有防护策略特性。采用与损失值无关的团体赔偿总额函数时,赔偿声明机制满足团体防护策略特性,最后,总结和举例团体防护策略机制中谎报者所有的可能结果。
Interactions between mobile entities in pervasive computing have properties suchas open, peer to peer and dynamic etc and therefore it is needed to adopt trust models togenerate and manage various relations between entities. However, because entities arefrom different organizations and are resource limited, they will not take the predefinedactions of trust models according to their own benefits. Hence the security problemsof trust models occur. For such”passive attack”, we study the solution based on gametheory and mechanism design to solve the security problems of trust models in thisthesis. Based on summarizing exist research results in home and abroad, we studyfrom several perspectives and do simulations in details. The obtained results in thisthesis enlarge the scope and contend of the disciple called Economics of InformationSecurity. The concrete research content includes:
(1) For the problem of low recommendation acquisition rate in the recommenda-tion acquisition process due to the dropping of middle entities and duck of recommen-dation rendering entity, we propose a utility based incentive mechanism to encouragethese two kinds of entities to guarantee the full success of recommendation acquisition.First, we study the selfish model and the cooperation condition of selfish entities utiliz-ing a non cooperative game called Recommendation Acquisition Game. Then considerthe situation where asking prices are proposed by greedy entities, based on a coopera-tive game called Competition and Section Game, we study how the requestor lowers thetotal paid cost utilizing the competition between several routings. Finally, the simula-tion results show that the proposed incentive mechanism is effective and increase about15% to 30% success rate and lowers the asking prices of cooperators.
(2) For the cheating in the recommendation, we proposed a strategy-proof trustmechanism based on VCG mechanism from the perspective of non cooperative game. This mechanism can be adopted by continuous and binary trust value models to stim-ulate truthful reportings. By considering the trust decision as a social section process,we prove that the proposed trust mechanism is a VCG mechanism so that the entitycan only maximize its utility when truthfully reports. Furthermore, utilizing WMC al-gorithm, we propose a weighted VCG mechanism to predict trust more accurately andmoreover, we study the characteristic of payment.
(3) For discovering more strategy-proof trust mechanisms, based on the proposedgeneral trust mechanism, we study the characteristic properties of incentive compatibleso that all the trust models satisfying character requirement of social choice functioncan be constructed to truthful trust mechanisms. Taking the VCG trust mechanism asexample, we explain in details how to construct the incentive compatible trust mecha-nisms. Moreover, we study how the trust level and recommendation weight in?uencethe recommendation acquisition cost. Finally, simulation results show that the proposedtrust mechanism can deal with all kinds of positive and negative deviations.
(4) For the problem of group cheating in recommendation reporting, we proposed agroup strategy-proof mechanism from the perspective of cooperative game. The mech-anism considers the risk cost value relating to the trust value as a declared compensationand treats the solution of supermodular compensation payment game as paid compen-sation. First, we proposed two kinds of collective compensation functions in which oneis relates to the reported cost and one is not and prove the supermodularity of these twofunctions and the property of supermodular compensation payment game. Based on theselection game, we construct the corresponding indirect and direct mechanism whichis called Claiming Compensation Mechanism and prove that this mechanism is groupstrategy-proof. Furthermore, we take the Shapley value as the actual compensationpayment scheme and prove that it satisfies the property called cross-monotonicity. Analgorithm in generating the outcome coalition is given. Simulation results show that forthe collective cost function which is related to the cost value, although it is supermodu-lar, the corresponding mechanism is not strategy-proof. By adopting the collective costfunction which is not related to the cost value, the Claiming Compensation Mechanismis group strategy-proof. Finally, we summarize and demonstrate all possible results of the lying reporter.
引文
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[33] D. Quercia, S. Hailes, and L. Capra. Lightweight distributed trust propagation. In Data Min-ing, 2007. ICDM 2007. Seventh IEEE International Conference on, pages 282–291. IEEE,2008.
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[35] C.N. Ziegler and G. Lausen. Spreading activation models for trust propagation. In e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service, 2004. EEE’04. 2004 IEEE International Conferenceon, pages 83–97. IEEE, 2004.
[36] D. Quercia, S. Hailes, and L. Capra. B-trust: Bayesian trust framework for pervasive com-puting. Trust Management, pages 298–312, 2006.
[37] D. Quercia, S. Hailes, and L. Capra. TRULLO-local trust bootstrapping for ubiquitous de-vices. In Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking & Services, 2007. MobiQuitous 2007.Fourth Annual International Conference on, pages 1–9. IEEE, 2008.
[38]王勇,李明,崔灵果,胡晶晶和张龙飞.开放式网络环境下的上下文敏感的信任管理.北京理工大学学报, 28(3), 2008.
[39] J. Douceur. The sybil attack. Peer-to-peer Systems, pages 251–260, 2002.
[40] J.M. Seigneur and C. Jensen. The role of identity in pervasive computational trust. Privacy,Security and Trust within the Context of Pervasive Computing, pages 65–75, 2005.
[41]郭亚军,王亮,洪帆和韩兰胜.基于信任的普适计算的动态授权模型.华中科技大学学报(自然科学版), 35(8), 2007.
[42]郭亚军和洪帆.基于信任的普适计算安全机制.计算机工程, 32(8), 2006.
[43]王小英,赵海,林涛,张文波和尹震宇.基于信任的普适计算服务选择模型.通信学报,26(005):1–8, 2005.
[44]赵曦滨,游之洋和赵志峰.基于MANET可用性的信任度量模型.通信学报, 31(3), 2010.
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