中国企业债务结构和债务工具选择的理论和实证研究
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摘要
目前,我国企业的债务融资格局,银行贷款占据了绝大部分,企业债券市场份额很小。与此同时,我国企业的债务期限结构过于短期化。债务期限短期化是否与企业债券市场发展滞后有一种内在的联系?最近几年国内学者对我国上市公司的债务期限结构的研究也涉及到了企业债券市场,不过多数仅从外部制度的角度谈到,没有更深入地研究债务期限与债务工具选择的关系以及对金融市场格局的影响。上述问题对已有的研究提出了挑战,它需要探究我国银行融资主导下企业债券市场发展的微观机理。
企业通常从最低融资成本角度寻求最佳债务融资期限结构。短期债务契约可以增加放款人的流动性,减少借贷双方的代理问题,这和现实中的银行贷款比较吻合；长期债务契约可以减少借款人的流动性风险、交易谈判成本,这和企业债券的特点接近。于是,企业对短期与长期代理成本这些矛盾因素进行权衡就可以获得最优的债务期限结构。最优债务期限结构决定了企业最优的债务融资工具选择,这又决定了信贷市场和企业债券市场的最优边界。
本文在回顾了相关理论及研究成果的基础上,以企业债务结构作为分析起点,采用多种实证研究的方法,从宏观和微观不同角度对我国企业的债务期限结构和债务工具选择问题进行了系统的研究。首先在制度层面上阐述了我国银行主导融资下企业债券市场的发展,分析了银行贷款契约和企业债券契约的特点以及赖以存在的法律,金融监管和政府干预等外部治理机制；接着运用时间序列实证研究了我国宏观整体债务结构的演变规律,进一步通过省际面板数据分析了我国不同地区债务融资结构的影响因素；从微观角度,先运用增量法GMM计量分析了企业债务期限和债务工具的选择。再把金融管制和外部治理环境指数纳入到PROBIT模型中考察了我国企业债务融资工具的选择问题。研究表明债券和贷款的选择不仅由债务工具本身的属性特征和发债企业的财务状况决定的,而且也受金融管制的强弱和各地区外部治理环境的影响。最后我们对我国企业债务融资工具的选择以及企业债券市场的发展提出了相应的建议。
At present, In Chinese enterprise's debt financing pattern, bank loan is dominant, while enterprise bond market is just a small portion. Meanwhile, our enterprise's debt maturity structure is over short-termed. Is there a relationship between our short-term debt maturity and under-developed enterprise bond market? In recent years, some of our country's scholars have related to enterprise bond market when they studied Chinese listed company's debt maturity structure, but most of them talked about them only from external system and didn't study the relationship between debt maturity and debt instrument's choice deeply, they also didn't study how it influenced financial market's pattern.
Usually enterprise seeks for optimal debt financing structure with the lowest financing cost. Short-term debt covenant can increase the lender's mobility and reduce the agency problem of the borrower and the lender, which coincides with realistic bank loan; Long-term debt covenant can reduce the lender's mobility risk and transaction negotiation costs, which is similar with enterprise bond. So, through weighting the contradictory factors of short-term and long-term agency cost, enterprise can acquire optimal debt maturity structure. Optimal maturity structure decides debt enterprise's financing instrument's selection, which also decides credit market and enterprise bond market optimal boundary.
After reviewing relevant theories and research achievements, this paper Starts from the analysis of enterprise's debt maturity, mainly applies empirical study to conduct a comprehensive study on firm's debt maturity structure and debt instrument' choice, both macroscopically and microcosmically. First, from institutional aspect, this paper expounds enterprise bond market's development in bank-based financing, analyzes bank loan contract's and enterprise bond's characteristics, studies the law on which it exists and exterior governance mechanism like financial regulation and government intervention; Then in chronological sequence, it conducts empirical studies on our country's macro and integral debt structure's development, furthermore, it conducts analysis based on panel data of provinces and analyzes our country's debt financing structure's influencing factor in different districts; From macro aspect, this paper applies incremental method GMM computation to analyze enterprise's debt maturity and debt instrument's choice. Then put financial regulation and exterior management environment index into PROBIT matrix to study our country's debt financing instrument's choice. The study shows the choice of bond and loan is not only decided by debt tool's intrinsic attributive character and debt issuer's financial status but also influenced by strong or weak financial regulation and exterior management environment in different districts. Finally, we put forward corresponding advices on our country's debt financing instrument's choice and enterprise's bond market development.
企业通常从最低融资成本角度寻求最佳债务融资期限结构。短期债务契约可以增加放款人的流动性,减少借贷双方的代理问题,这和现实中的银行贷款比较吻合；长期债务契约可以减少借款人的流动性风险、交易谈判成本,这和企业债券的特点接近。于是,企业对短期与长期代理成本这些矛盾因素进行权衡就可以获得最优的债务期限结构。最优债务期限结构决定了企业最优的债务融资工具选择,这又决定了信贷市场和企业债券市场的最优边界。
本文在回顾了相关理论及研究成果的基础上,以企业债务结构作为分析起点,采用多种实证研究的方法,从宏观和微观不同角度对我国企业的债务期限结构和债务工具选择问题进行了系统的研究。首先在制度层面上阐述了我国银行主导融资下企业债券市场的发展,分析了银行贷款契约和企业债券契约的特点以及赖以存在的法律,金融监管和政府干预等外部治理机制；接着运用时间序列实证研究了我国宏观整体债务结构的演变规律,进一步通过省际面板数据分析了我国不同地区债务融资结构的影响因素；从微观角度,先运用增量法GMM计量分析了企业债务期限和债务工具的选择。再把金融管制和外部治理环境指数纳入到PROBIT模型中考察了我国企业债务融资工具的选择问题。研究表明债券和贷款的选择不仅由债务工具本身的属性特征和发债企业的财务状况决定的,而且也受金融管制的强弱和各地区外部治理环境的影响。最后我们对我国企业债务融资工具的选择以及企业债券市场的发展提出了相应的建议。
At present, In Chinese enterprise's debt financing pattern, bank loan is dominant, while enterprise bond market is just a small portion. Meanwhile, our enterprise's debt maturity structure is over short-termed. Is there a relationship between our short-term debt maturity and under-developed enterprise bond market? In recent years, some of our country's scholars have related to enterprise bond market when they studied Chinese listed company's debt maturity structure, but most of them talked about them only from external system and didn't study the relationship between debt maturity and debt instrument's choice deeply, they also didn't study how it influenced financial market's pattern.
Usually enterprise seeks for optimal debt financing structure with the lowest financing cost. Short-term debt covenant can increase the lender's mobility and reduce the agency problem of the borrower and the lender, which coincides with realistic bank loan; Long-term debt covenant can reduce the lender's mobility risk and transaction negotiation costs, which is similar with enterprise bond. So, through weighting the contradictory factors of short-term and long-term agency cost, enterprise can acquire optimal debt maturity structure. Optimal maturity structure decides debt enterprise's financing instrument's selection, which also decides credit market and enterprise bond market optimal boundary.
After reviewing relevant theories and research achievements, this paper Starts from the analysis of enterprise's debt maturity, mainly applies empirical study to conduct a comprehensive study on firm's debt maturity structure and debt instrument' choice, both macroscopically and microcosmically. First, from institutional aspect, this paper expounds enterprise bond market's development in bank-based financing, analyzes bank loan contract's and enterprise bond's characteristics, studies the law on which it exists and exterior governance mechanism like financial regulation and government intervention; Then in chronological sequence, it conducts empirical studies on our country's macro and integral debt structure's development, furthermore, it conducts analysis based on panel data of provinces and analyzes our country's debt financing structure's influencing factor in different districts; From macro aspect, this paper applies incremental method GMM computation to analyze enterprise's debt maturity and debt instrument's choice. Then put financial regulation and exterior management environment index into PROBIT matrix to study our country's debt financing instrument's choice. The study shows the choice of bond and loan is not only decided by debt tool's intrinsic attributive character and debt issuer's financial status but also influenced by strong or weak financial regulation and exterior management environment in different districts. Finally, we put forward corresponding advices on our country's debt financing instrument's choice and enterprise's bond market development.
引文
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