中国证券分析师预测与盈余管理研究
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摘要
我国资本市场的发展已经走过了二十余年的历程,而其中证券分析师制度的建立也已经有了十多年的时间。现今,证券分析师作为投资者与上市公司中间的信息纽带,已经成为资本市场不可或缺的参与主体之一。证券分析师在缓解市场投资者与上市公司之间信息不对称,保护广大利益相关者,提高资本市场决策效率等方面发挥着越来越重要的作用。证券分析师作为信息的传播媒介,连结着决策者和上市公司,是成熟资本市场的重要力量。为了向市场传递有效信息,提高信息的可靠性,分析师时时关注上市公司,通过研读业绩报告、行业研究和调查分析等方法,尽可能地搜集影响资产价格的各种宏观经济政策,市场信息及公司信息。之后采用一定的估价方法和自身对行业的系统性理解,做出有价值的投资分析。最后,分析师将含有预测信息及投资建议等内容的研究报告发布给决策者,从而增加了决策者认知的广度与深度,满足了决策者的信息使用需求,有效的保证了资本市场的资源配置效率。
然而随着二十世纪九十年代以来证券分析师在资本市场中越来越重要的中间地位,证券分析师所发布的盈利预测逐渐成为上市公司最重要的业绩國值标准,避免负向盈余意外的现象在资本市场日益严重。作为信息中介的证券分析师盈利预测一方面缓解了上市公司和决策者之间信息不对称等相关问题,另一方面却诱发了上市公司管理层为实现正向盈余意外的盈余管理行为。随着我国资本市场的发展,证券分析师在资本市场上的影响力也越来越大,如何抑制管理层的盈余管理行为保护广大利益相关人的权益成为政策制定者迫切需要解决的问题。虽然近年来的研究表明：年报审计能抑制上市公司为追求目标股价而产生的盈余管理行为(Brown and Pinello,2007);萨班斯法案的颁布和实施也能够减少公司的盈余管理程度(Cohen,2010);高质量的内部控制对于上市公司的盈余管理行为也具有抑制作用(方红星,2011),但是也有相关研究表明以上这些方案的实施似乎对于投资者来说需要付出较大的成本代价(Cohen,2010),因而学术界一直致力于寻找更为经济合理的方式来降低上市公司的盈余管理程度。
本文基于我国证券分析师的制度背景,结合国务院最新颁布的“国九条”关于中小投资者利益保护的相关内容,在系统梳理了信息不对称理论、有效市场假说、前景理论与利益相关者理论的基础上,构建了证券分析师预测和管理层盈余管理行为的相关理论框架,实证分析了我国证券分析师盈利及现金流双预测对于上市公司盈余管理行为的抑制效应,并进一步研究了我国证券分析师双预测对不同产权性质公司盈余管理的区别效应,填补了国内关于证券分析师双预测与盈余管理这一方面研究的空白,有助于监管部门更好的监督和管理上市公司的业绩操控行为,更好的保护利益相关者的相关权益。
本文首先回顾了证券分析师预测和盈余管理这两方面的相关文献,并详细介绍了我国目前关于证券分析师的制度背景,引入了有效市场假说等相关理论并进行系统阐述和理论分析,以支持本文关于分析师预测和盈余管理行为导向的研究视角。在实证分析部分,文章首先运用BD(1997)的实证方法分析我国上市公司是否存在操纵业绩以避免负向盈余意外的现象,并对比分析了分析师盈利预测误差程度与上市公司盈余管理水平的变动趋势,以此得出了我国证券分析师盈利预测诱导管理层盈余管理行为的结论。然后,本文进一步研究我国证券分析师盈利及现金流双预测对盈余管理行为的影响,文章选取分析师提供双预测的上市公司作为观测样本,并运用PSM倾向得分匹配法寻找到了与这些观测样本匹配的配对样本,采用DID双重差分方法研究证券分析师双预测对于我国上市公司应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的影响,结果发现我国证券分析师双预测能有效抑制上市公司的应计盈余管理水平,却一定程度上提升了真实盈余管理水平。最后,本文采用Logt模型深入研究了我国证券分析师双预测对于上市公司应计和真实盈余管理替代效应的影响,并结合我国上市公司的产权性质进行了拓展性分析,结果发现我国证券分析师双预测能有效抑制上市公司的盈余管理行为,降低了管理层实现正向盈余意外的程度,而且对于不同产权性质的公司,这种抑制效应具有显著差别。
本文的结构分为以下几个部分：
第一部分：绪论,对本文的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路、论文结构以及创新点进行了介绍。
第二部分：文献综述,本部分通过系统梳理有关证券分析师盈利预测和现金流预测,以及盈余管理概念、业绩预期与盈余管理、盈余管理方式的相关文献,总结近年来国内外有关证券分析师预测和盈余管理的学术成果,并就现有研究成果进行文献述评。
第三部分：制度背景,本部分首先介绍了证券分析师的分类、作用以及发展历程；其次,明确了我国目前制度背景下证券分析师的职业定位、职责功能；然后从内部角色和外部角色两方面明确阐述证券分析师与各市场主体的关系,并结合我国新颁布的“国九条”相关内容系统介绍现阶段我国证券分析师的监管状况。
第四部分：理论基础,本部分系统梳理了与证券分析师预测、盈余管理有关的基础理论,系统论述了相关理论与证券分析师预测及盈余管理之间的关系。说明了有效市场假说和信息不对称情况下证券分析师存在的必要性,分析师发布的预测信息缓解了资本市场信息不对称的状况,提高了证券市场的资本配置效率；前景理论下的管理层损失厌恶心理使得证券分析师盈利预测被作为业绩衡量标准以致加深了管理层的盈余管理水平；在利益相关者理论基础上论证证券分析师、盈余管理、资源有效配置之间的关系,为后面的研究打下了理论基础。
第五部分：分析师盈利预测与盈余管理研究,本部分通过运用BD(1997)的研究方法,研究发现在盈余意外的阈值0处,出现正向盈余意外和出现负向盈余意外的上市公司频数分布并不平滑,其研究结果表明我国证券分析师盈利预测诱导了管理层的盈余管理行为。而通过基于盈利误差的管理层应计和真实盈余管理分析中可以看出,预测误差在0-20%之间的上市公司盈余管理行为最为显著。这与张跃进和金喜成(2006)的结论一致,从均值分析可以看出,管理层为了迎合分析师盈利预测,预测误差越大,盈余管理的程度越深。
第六部分：分析师双预测与应计和真实盈余管理研究,本部分选取了2002-2011年间证券分析师提供了双预测的1875个观测样本和采用PSM倾向得分匹配法寻找到的与这些观测样本得分相近的849个配对样本,运用DID双重差分研究法来进行研究分析。研究发现分析师同时提供盈利和现金流双预测,能显著抑制上市公司管理层的应计盈余管理行为,而且这种抑制效应在非国有上市公司中更为显著；本节还对比分析了分析师提供现金流预测前后,观测样本和配对样本的真实盈余管理水平,结果发现分析师提供双预测会导致管理层真实盈余管理水平的提升。
第七部分：分析师双预测与盈余管理替代效应研究,本部分构建Logit模型研究了分析师双预测与管理层MB行为之间的关系,结果发现分析师双预测能减弱应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理之间的替代效应,最终降低了管理层为实现MB而操纵盈余管理的程度。在进一步的研究中,基于我国资本市场的产权性质特征对于国有上市公司和非国有上市公司进行了分组回归,深入研究了分析师提供双预测信息对于不同产权性质的公司盈余管理抑制效应的差异,经研究发现,分析师双预测对于非国有上市公司的盈余管理行为的抑制作用明显高于其对于国有上市公司的影响,即分析师双预测对于非国有上市公司管理层的盈余管理抑制效应更为显著。
第八部分：结论及建议,本部分全面概括了本文研究所得出的主要结论,简单介绍了本文的研究贡献,并提出了相关政策建议以及未来研究的方向。
本文的创新点包括：
第一,本文在系统阐述了信息不对称理论、有效市场假说、前景理论以及利益相关者理论的基础上分析论证了我国证券分析师预测和管理层盈余管理行为的作用机理：信息不对称→证券分析师预测→盈余管理→资源有效配置,引入了证券分析师双预测对上市公司盈余管理影响的研究思路,为今后深入研究投资者保护的相关问题提供了文献基础。
第二,本文将PSM倾向得分匹配法和DID双重差分研究法以及Logit模型运用到实证分析之中,深入研究我国证券分析师双预测对上市公司应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理以及盈余管理替代效应的影响,并结合我国上市公司的产权性质特征,构建虚拟交互变量和采用分组检验的方法进一步拓展分析了我国证券分析师双预测对于不同产权性质公司盈余管理水平的差别效应。
第三,本文基于分析师盈利预测与盈余管理→分析师盈利和现金流双预测与应计和真实盈余管理→分析师盈利和现金流双预测与盈余管理替代效应的技术路线,实现了从证券分析师盈利单预测的盈余管理行为导向到证券分析师盈利及现金流双预测对盈余管理水平影响的逐层分析,拓展了关于证券分析师预测信息含量有效性的研究领域,其研究结论开辟了关于证券分析师预测信息含量与管理层行为约束以提升投资者决策效率的研究新视角。
China' Securities market has been estabished more than twenty years, The system of Securities Analysts also has been established more than ten years. Today, The Securities Analysts played important role which could changed information asymmetry situation and enhance the level of investor protection that has became the indispensable participation in the Capital Markets. They became more and more important. Securities Analysts served as information intermediaries that linked Investors and Listed Companies. Securities Analysts tracked listed companies in order to publish reliable information, They collected market information and company information that impacted variety of asset prices as much as possible, After that, they make a valuable analysis through use a certain valuation methods and their systematic understanding of the Industry. Finally, Securities Analysts publish research report that containing forecasting information and investment advice, thereby increased the breadth and depth of knowledge of decision-markers and ensuring effectively the liquidity of capital in the markets.
However, since the1990s, Securities Analysts' earnings forecasts has became threshold standard of earnings for listed companies. The phenomenon of avoid negative earnings surprise everywhere. Securities Analysts'as third-party mediation alleviated the asymmetry information, on the other hand they make management of listed companies to achieve earnings forecasts means positive earnings surprises. With the development of China's capital market, The influence of securities analyst in the capital markets is also growing, How to inhibit management behavior of earnings management to protect the interests of the majority of stakeholders, it become urgently to policy makers. Although recent studies have shown that:Annual audit can inhibit earnings management to pursue price target of Listed Companies (Brown and Pinello,2007); Promulgation and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley also able to reduce the level of earnings management (Cohen,2010); Best internal control also have inhibit level of earnings management of listed companies (Fang Hongxing,2011), but there are studies indicate that the implementation of these programs seem require pay for larger cost to investors(Cohen,2010), so scholars has been committed to finding a more economical way to reduce earnings management of listed companies.
However, since the1990s, with securities analysts in the capital market more and more important in the middle position, securities analysts' earnings forecasts is becoming the most important results of listed companies threshold criteria, to avoid the phenomenon of negative earnings surprises in the capital market increasingly serious. As a third-party mediation, securities analysts' earnings forecasts reduce the asymmetric information and other related problems, but they induce the management of listed companies to achieve earnings management behavior of positive earnings surprises. With the development of China's capital market, The influence of securities analyst in the capital market is also growing, how to suppress earnings management behavior management to protect the interests of the majority of stakeholders become urgently need to be addressed for policy makers. Although recent studies have shown that:Annual audit can inhibit Earnings Management of Listed Companies to pursue price target generated (Brown and Pinello,2007); Promulgation and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also able to reduce the extent of earnings management (Cohen,2010); Quality of internal control for earnings management of listed companies also have inhibitory effects (Fang Hongxing,2011), But there are studies indicate that the implementation of these programs seem to require investors to pay for the cost of a larger consideration (Cohen,2010), thus academia has been committed to finding a more economical way to reduce earnings management of listed companies.
This paper constructed theoretical framework of Securities Analysts'forecasts and earnings management based on introduced asymmetric information theory, the efficient market hypothesis, prospect theory and stakeholder theory, empirical analysis the effect of Securities Analysts'double forecasts of earnings and cash flow to earnings management, and study further of the effect of Securities Analysts' double forecasting in the difference nature of companies, and filled in the blanks of Securities Analysts and earnings management research based on the institutional context of "National Nine" of published recently by State Council on the protection of the interests of small investors.
This paper firstly reviews the relevant literature of Securities Analysts' forecasts and earnings management, then introduced and theoretical analysis of the efficient market hypothesis and related theories to support research perspective in this paper of Analysts' forecasts and behavior-oriented of earnings management. In the empirical analysis, This paper firstly used BD(1997) empirical analysis method to research the phenomenon of positive earnings surprise of listed companies, then comparative analysis the changed trend of analyst earnings'forecast errors and the level of earnings management of listed companies, in order to get the conclusions of securities analyst' earnings forecasts will induce earnings management. Then, the paper further studies the influence of Securities Analysts' double forecasts for earnings management. This paper selected as observed sample that analysts' published double forecasts of listed companies, and use propensity score matching to find matching samples, research Securities Analysts'double forecasts and real earnings management and accrual earnings management and found that Securities Analysts' double forecasts can effectively inhibit the level of accrued earnings management of listed company, but enhance the level of real earnings management. Finally, we use the Logit model to study of Securities Analysts' double forecasts of listed company and The substitution effect of earnings management, and expanding analysis combined with the nature of ownership of listed companies. This paper found that Securities Analysts' double forecasts can effectively inhibit the earnings management behavior, reducing the level of management to achieve positive earnings surprises, but also for the different nature of the Company's property, this inhibitory effect was significant difference.
The paper is organized as follows:
Part Ⅱ:Introduction, this paper introduces the research background, significance, research ideas, the structure and the innovation.
Part Ⅱ:Literature Review, this section introduce the relevant literature that include Securities Analysts' earnings forecasts and cash flow forecasts, as well as the concept of earnings management, performance expectations and earnings management, earnings management, summarizes the Academic achievements of Securities Analysts' forecasts and Earnings Management at home and abroad in recent years, and review existing literature.
Part Ⅲ:Institutional Background, Firstly in this section introduced the classification of Securities Analysts, role and development; Secondly, has been clear Securities Analysts'professional orientation about the current system in our country under the background in China; Then from both internal and external actors articulate the relationship between Securities Analysts and market players, combined with the relevant content of "National Nine" that newly issued systems introduce the regulatory status of Securities Analysts in China.
Part Ⅳ:Theoretical Basis, This part systematically analyzes the basic theory related to Securities Analysts'forecasts and earnings management, and discusses the relationship between theory and Securities Analysts'forecast and earnings management. Based on the efficient market hypothesis and asymmetric information theoretical, Securities analysts is necessity, the analysts'forecast changed information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of capital allocation in the securities markets; Under the management of prospect theory, because preferences of aversion loss, Securities analysts' earnings forecasts as performance measures that deepened the level of earnings management in the securities market, Based on the stakeholder theory argument, the relationship between the efficient allocation of capital, Securities Analysts and earnings management, constructed theoretical framework for later study.
Part Ⅴ:Securities Analysts'Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Management Research, This paper firstly used BD(1997) empirical analysis method to research the phenomenon of positive earnings surprise of listed companies, the study found in0earnings threshold, there number of positive earnings surprises and unexpected negative earnings of listed companies frequency distribution is not smooth, get the conclusions of securities analysts'earnings forecasts will induce earnings management. The earnings error between0-20%in earnings management behavior is most significant. This is conclusion consistent with Zhang Yuejin and Jin Xicheng (2006) that can be seen from the mean analysis, the prediction error more biger, the level of earnings management more deeper.
Part Ⅵ:Analysts' double Forecasts and Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management Studies, This paper selected as observed sample that analysts' published double forecasts of listed companies, and use propensity score matching to find matching samples, research Securities Analysts' double forecasts and real earnings management and accrual earnings management, the observed sample are1875from2002-2011,the matching sample are849, then use difference-in-difference to research and found that Securities Analysts' double forecasts can effectively inhibit the level of accrued earnings management of listed company and this inhibitory effect in non-state-owned listed companies is more significant, but it could enhance the level of real earnings management.
Part Ⅶ:Analysts' double Forecasts and The substitution effect of Earnings Management, this section build Logit model to research the relationship between Securities Analysts' double forecasts and the behavior that management meeting or beating Securities Analysts' earnings forecasts. This paper found that Analysts' double forecasts could weaken the substitution of Earnings Management. In further studies, Based on the difference non-state-owned listed companies and listed companies, The research have been two grouped regression, the study found that inhibition effect of Analysts' double forecasts for non-state-owned listed company more significantly.
Part Ⅶ:Conclusions and Suggestions, This part summarizes the main conclusions of this study, introduces the contribution of this study, and put forward the relevant policy suggestion, and the development of future research.
Innovation of this paper include:
First, this paper demonstrated the mechanism of Securities Analysts' forecasts and Earnings Management behavior based on the system of asymmetric information theory, the efficient market hypothesis, the basis of prospect theory and stakeholder theory:Information Asymmetry→Securities Analysts' Forecast→Earnings Management→efficient allocation of Capital, established research ideas of the effect of securities analysts' double forecasts about earnings management this paper provided literature foundation on in-depth study of investor protection in the future.
Second, This article applied difference-in-difference and propensity score matching method and Logit models being to the empirical analysis, in-depth study of Securities Analysts' double forecasts for accrued earnings management, real earnings management and the substitution effect of earnings management and binding properties characteristic property of a listed company, to build a virtual interactive variables and using two group regress to further expand our analysis of securities analysts' double predict differential effects for different Ownership structure companies.
Third, the paper based on technology line that Analysts' earnings forecasts and Earnings Management→Analysts' double Forecast of Earnings and Cash Flow and Accrued and Real earnings management→Analysts' double Forecasts and The substitution of Earnings Management, realized from Securities Analysts' single earnings forecast oriented to Securities Analysts' double forecasts impact on the level of earnings management, expanding the field of research on the effectiveness of Securities Analysts' forecast information, and its conclusions opened up the new perspective about Securities Analyst' forecast information and management behavioral constraints in order to improve the efficiency of decision-making for investor.
然而随着二十世纪九十年代以来证券分析师在资本市场中越来越重要的中间地位,证券分析师所发布的盈利预测逐渐成为上市公司最重要的业绩國值标准,避免负向盈余意外的现象在资本市场日益严重。作为信息中介的证券分析师盈利预测一方面缓解了上市公司和决策者之间信息不对称等相关问题,另一方面却诱发了上市公司管理层为实现正向盈余意外的盈余管理行为。随着我国资本市场的发展,证券分析师在资本市场上的影响力也越来越大,如何抑制管理层的盈余管理行为保护广大利益相关人的权益成为政策制定者迫切需要解决的问题。虽然近年来的研究表明：年报审计能抑制上市公司为追求目标股价而产生的盈余管理行为(Brown and Pinello,2007);萨班斯法案的颁布和实施也能够减少公司的盈余管理程度(Cohen,2010);高质量的内部控制对于上市公司的盈余管理行为也具有抑制作用(方红星,2011),但是也有相关研究表明以上这些方案的实施似乎对于投资者来说需要付出较大的成本代价(Cohen,2010),因而学术界一直致力于寻找更为经济合理的方式来降低上市公司的盈余管理程度。
本文基于我国证券分析师的制度背景,结合国务院最新颁布的“国九条”关于中小投资者利益保护的相关内容,在系统梳理了信息不对称理论、有效市场假说、前景理论与利益相关者理论的基础上,构建了证券分析师预测和管理层盈余管理行为的相关理论框架,实证分析了我国证券分析师盈利及现金流双预测对于上市公司盈余管理行为的抑制效应,并进一步研究了我国证券分析师双预测对不同产权性质公司盈余管理的区别效应,填补了国内关于证券分析师双预测与盈余管理这一方面研究的空白,有助于监管部门更好的监督和管理上市公司的业绩操控行为,更好的保护利益相关者的相关权益。
本文首先回顾了证券分析师预测和盈余管理这两方面的相关文献,并详细介绍了我国目前关于证券分析师的制度背景,引入了有效市场假说等相关理论并进行系统阐述和理论分析,以支持本文关于分析师预测和盈余管理行为导向的研究视角。在实证分析部分,文章首先运用BD(1997)的实证方法分析我国上市公司是否存在操纵业绩以避免负向盈余意外的现象,并对比分析了分析师盈利预测误差程度与上市公司盈余管理水平的变动趋势,以此得出了我国证券分析师盈利预测诱导管理层盈余管理行为的结论。然后,本文进一步研究我国证券分析师盈利及现金流双预测对盈余管理行为的影响,文章选取分析师提供双预测的上市公司作为观测样本,并运用PSM倾向得分匹配法寻找到了与这些观测样本匹配的配对样本,采用DID双重差分方法研究证券分析师双预测对于我国上市公司应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的影响,结果发现我国证券分析师双预测能有效抑制上市公司的应计盈余管理水平,却一定程度上提升了真实盈余管理水平。最后,本文采用Logt模型深入研究了我国证券分析师双预测对于上市公司应计和真实盈余管理替代效应的影响,并结合我国上市公司的产权性质进行了拓展性分析,结果发现我国证券分析师双预测能有效抑制上市公司的盈余管理行为,降低了管理层实现正向盈余意外的程度,而且对于不同产权性质的公司,这种抑制效应具有显著差别。
本文的结构分为以下几个部分：
第一部分：绪论,对本文的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路、论文结构以及创新点进行了介绍。
第二部分：文献综述,本部分通过系统梳理有关证券分析师盈利预测和现金流预测,以及盈余管理概念、业绩预期与盈余管理、盈余管理方式的相关文献,总结近年来国内外有关证券分析师预测和盈余管理的学术成果,并就现有研究成果进行文献述评。
第三部分：制度背景,本部分首先介绍了证券分析师的分类、作用以及发展历程；其次,明确了我国目前制度背景下证券分析师的职业定位、职责功能；然后从内部角色和外部角色两方面明确阐述证券分析师与各市场主体的关系,并结合我国新颁布的“国九条”相关内容系统介绍现阶段我国证券分析师的监管状况。
第四部分：理论基础,本部分系统梳理了与证券分析师预测、盈余管理有关的基础理论,系统论述了相关理论与证券分析师预测及盈余管理之间的关系。说明了有效市场假说和信息不对称情况下证券分析师存在的必要性,分析师发布的预测信息缓解了资本市场信息不对称的状况,提高了证券市场的资本配置效率；前景理论下的管理层损失厌恶心理使得证券分析师盈利预测被作为业绩衡量标准以致加深了管理层的盈余管理水平；在利益相关者理论基础上论证证券分析师、盈余管理、资源有效配置之间的关系,为后面的研究打下了理论基础。
第五部分：分析师盈利预测与盈余管理研究,本部分通过运用BD(1997)的研究方法,研究发现在盈余意外的阈值0处,出现正向盈余意外和出现负向盈余意外的上市公司频数分布并不平滑,其研究结果表明我国证券分析师盈利预测诱导了管理层的盈余管理行为。而通过基于盈利误差的管理层应计和真实盈余管理分析中可以看出,预测误差在0-20%之间的上市公司盈余管理行为最为显著。这与张跃进和金喜成(2006)的结论一致,从均值分析可以看出,管理层为了迎合分析师盈利预测,预测误差越大,盈余管理的程度越深。
第六部分：分析师双预测与应计和真实盈余管理研究,本部分选取了2002-2011年间证券分析师提供了双预测的1875个观测样本和采用PSM倾向得分匹配法寻找到的与这些观测样本得分相近的849个配对样本,运用DID双重差分研究法来进行研究分析。研究发现分析师同时提供盈利和现金流双预测,能显著抑制上市公司管理层的应计盈余管理行为,而且这种抑制效应在非国有上市公司中更为显著；本节还对比分析了分析师提供现金流预测前后,观测样本和配对样本的真实盈余管理水平,结果发现分析师提供双预测会导致管理层真实盈余管理水平的提升。
第七部分：分析师双预测与盈余管理替代效应研究,本部分构建Logit模型研究了分析师双预测与管理层MB行为之间的关系,结果发现分析师双预测能减弱应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理之间的替代效应,最终降低了管理层为实现MB而操纵盈余管理的程度。在进一步的研究中,基于我国资本市场的产权性质特征对于国有上市公司和非国有上市公司进行了分组回归,深入研究了分析师提供双预测信息对于不同产权性质的公司盈余管理抑制效应的差异,经研究发现,分析师双预测对于非国有上市公司的盈余管理行为的抑制作用明显高于其对于国有上市公司的影响,即分析师双预测对于非国有上市公司管理层的盈余管理抑制效应更为显著。
第八部分：结论及建议,本部分全面概括了本文研究所得出的主要结论,简单介绍了本文的研究贡献,并提出了相关政策建议以及未来研究的方向。
本文的创新点包括：
第一,本文在系统阐述了信息不对称理论、有效市场假说、前景理论以及利益相关者理论的基础上分析论证了我国证券分析师预测和管理层盈余管理行为的作用机理：信息不对称→证券分析师预测→盈余管理→资源有效配置,引入了证券分析师双预测对上市公司盈余管理影响的研究思路,为今后深入研究投资者保护的相关问题提供了文献基础。
第二,本文将PSM倾向得分匹配法和DID双重差分研究法以及Logit模型运用到实证分析之中,深入研究我国证券分析师双预测对上市公司应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理以及盈余管理替代效应的影响,并结合我国上市公司的产权性质特征,构建虚拟交互变量和采用分组检验的方法进一步拓展分析了我国证券分析师双预测对于不同产权性质公司盈余管理水平的差别效应。
第三,本文基于分析师盈利预测与盈余管理→分析师盈利和现金流双预测与应计和真实盈余管理→分析师盈利和现金流双预测与盈余管理替代效应的技术路线,实现了从证券分析师盈利单预测的盈余管理行为导向到证券分析师盈利及现金流双预测对盈余管理水平影响的逐层分析,拓展了关于证券分析师预测信息含量有效性的研究领域,其研究结论开辟了关于证券分析师预测信息含量与管理层行为约束以提升投资者决策效率的研究新视角。
China' Securities market has been estabished more than twenty years, The system of Securities Analysts also has been established more than ten years. Today, The Securities Analysts played important role which could changed information asymmetry situation and enhance the level of investor protection that has became the indispensable participation in the Capital Markets. They became more and more important. Securities Analysts served as information intermediaries that linked Investors and Listed Companies. Securities Analysts tracked listed companies in order to publish reliable information, They collected market information and company information that impacted variety of asset prices as much as possible, After that, they make a valuable analysis through use a certain valuation methods and their systematic understanding of the Industry. Finally, Securities Analysts publish research report that containing forecasting information and investment advice, thereby increased the breadth and depth of knowledge of decision-markers and ensuring effectively the liquidity of capital in the markets.
However, since the1990s, Securities Analysts' earnings forecasts has became threshold standard of earnings for listed companies. The phenomenon of avoid negative earnings surprise everywhere. Securities Analysts'as third-party mediation alleviated the asymmetry information, on the other hand they make management of listed companies to achieve earnings forecasts means positive earnings surprises. With the development of China's capital market, The influence of securities analyst in the capital markets is also growing, How to inhibit management behavior of earnings management to protect the interests of the majority of stakeholders, it become urgently to policy makers. Although recent studies have shown that:Annual audit can inhibit earnings management to pursue price target of Listed Companies (Brown and Pinello,2007); Promulgation and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley also able to reduce the level of earnings management (Cohen,2010); Best internal control also have inhibit level of earnings management of listed companies (Fang Hongxing,2011), but there are studies indicate that the implementation of these programs seem require pay for larger cost to investors(Cohen,2010), so scholars has been committed to finding a more economical way to reduce earnings management of listed companies.
However, since the1990s, with securities analysts in the capital market more and more important in the middle position, securities analysts' earnings forecasts is becoming the most important results of listed companies threshold criteria, to avoid the phenomenon of negative earnings surprises in the capital market increasingly serious. As a third-party mediation, securities analysts' earnings forecasts reduce the asymmetric information and other related problems, but they induce the management of listed companies to achieve earnings management behavior of positive earnings surprises. With the development of China's capital market, The influence of securities analyst in the capital market is also growing, how to suppress earnings management behavior management to protect the interests of the majority of stakeholders become urgently need to be addressed for policy makers. Although recent studies have shown that:Annual audit can inhibit Earnings Management of Listed Companies to pursue price target generated (Brown and Pinello,2007); Promulgation and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also able to reduce the extent of earnings management (Cohen,2010); Quality of internal control for earnings management of listed companies also have inhibitory effects (Fang Hongxing,2011), But there are studies indicate that the implementation of these programs seem to require investors to pay for the cost of a larger consideration (Cohen,2010), thus academia has been committed to finding a more economical way to reduce earnings management of listed companies.
This paper constructed theoretical framework of Securities Analysts'forecasts and earnings management based on introduced asymmetric information theory, the efficient market hypothesis, prospect theory and stakeholder theory, empirical analysis the effect of Securities Analysts'double forecasts of earnings and cash flow to earnings management, and study further of the effect of Securities Analysts' double forecasting in the difference nature of companies, and filled in the blanks of Securities Analysts and earnings management research based on the institutional context of "National Nine" of published recently by State Council on the protection of the interests of small investors.
This paper firstly reviews the relevant literature of Securities Analysts' forecasts and earnings management, then introduced and theoretical analysis of the efficient market hypothesis and related theories to support research perspective in this paper of Analysts' forecasts and behavior-oriented of earnings management. In the empirical analysis, This paper firstly used BD(1997) empirical analysis method to research the phenomenon of positive earnings surprise of listed companies, then comparative analysis the changed trend of analyst earnings'forecast errors and the level of earnings management of listed companies, in order to get the conclusions of securities analyst' earnings forecasts will induce earnings management. Then, the paper further studies the influence of Securities Analysts' double forecasts for earnings management. This paper selected as observed sample that analysts' published double forecasts of listed companies, and use propensity score matching to find matching samples, research Securities Analysts'double forecasts and real earnings management and accrual earnings management and found that Securities Analysts' double forecasts can effectively inhibit the level of accrued earnings management of listed company, but enhance the level of real earnings management. Finally, we use the Logit model to study of Securities Analysts' double forecasts of listed company and The substitution effect of earnings management, and expanding analysis combined with the nature of ownership of listed companies. This paper found that Securities Analysts' double forecasts can effectively inhibit the earnings management behavior, reducing the level of management to achieve positive earnings surprises, but also for the different nature of the Company's property, this inhibitory effect was significant difference.
The paper is organized as follows:
Part Ⅱ:Introduction, this paper introduces the research background, significance, research ideas, the structure and the innovation.
Part Ⅱ:Literature Review, this section introduce the relevant literature that include Securities Analysts' earnings forecasts and cash flow forecasts, as well as the concept of earnings management, performance expectations and earnings management, earnings management, summarizes the Academic achievements of Securities Analysts' forecasts and Earnings Management at home and abroad in recent years, and review existing literature.
Part Ⅲ:Institutional Background, Firstly in this section introduced the classification of Securities Analysts, role and development; Secondly, has been clear Securities Analysts'professional orientation about the current system in our country under the background in China; Then from both internal and external actors articulate the relationship between Securities Analysts and market players, combined with the relevant content of "National Nine" that newly issued systems introduce the regulatory status of Securities Analysts in China.
Part Ⅳ:Theoretical Basis, This part systematically analyzes the basic theory related to Securities Analysts'forecasts and earnings management, and discusses the relationship between theory and Securities Analysts'forecast and earnings management. Based on the efficient market hypothesis and asymmetric information theoretical, Securities analysts is necessity, the analysts'forecast changed information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of capital allocation in the securities markets; Under the management of prospect theory, because preferences of aversion loss, Securities analysts' earnings forecasts as performance measures that deepened the level of earnings management in the securities market, Based on the stakeholder theory argument, the relationship between the efficient allocation of capital, Securities Analysts and earnings management, constructed theoretical framework for later study.
Part Ⅴ:Securities Analysts'Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Management Research, This paper firstly used BD(1997) empirical analysis method to research the phenomenon of positive earnings surprise of listed companies, the study found in0earnings threshold, there number of positive earnings surprises and unexpected negative earnings of listed companies frequency distribution is not smooth, get the conclusions of securities analysts'earnings forecasts will induce earnings management. The earnings error between0-20%in earnings management behavior is most significant. This is conclusion consistent with Zhang Yuejin and Jin Xicheng (2006) that can be seen from the mean analysis, the prediction error more biger, the level of earnings management more deeper.
Part Ⅵ:Analysts' double Forecasts and Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management Studies, This paper selected as observed sample that analysts' published double forecasts of listed companies, and use propensity score matching to find matching samples, research Securities Analysts' double forecasts and real earnings management and accrual earnings management, the observed sample are1875from2002-2011,the matching sample are849, then use difference-in-difference to research and found that Securities Analysts' double forecasts can effectively inhibit the level of accrued earnings management of listed company and this inhibitory effect in non-state-owned listed companies is more significant, but it could enhance the level of real earnings management.
Part Ⅶ:Analysts' double Forecasts and The substitution effect of Earnings Management, this section build Logit model to research the relationship between Securities Analysts' double forecasts and the behavior that management meeting or beating Securities Analysts' earnings forecasts. This paper found that Analysts' double forecasts could weaken the substitution of Earnings Management. In further studies, Based on the difference non-state-owned listed companies and listed companies, The research have been two grouped regression, the study found that inhibition effect of Analysts' double forecasts for non-state-owned listed company more significantly.
Part Ⅶ:Conclusions and Suggestions, This part summarizes the main conclusions of this study, introduces the contribution of this study, and put forward the relevant policy suggestion, and the development of future research.
Innovation of this paper include:
First, this paper demonstrated the mechanism of Securities Analysts' forecasts and Earnings Management behavior based on the system of asymmetric information theory, the efficient market hypothesis, the basis of prospect theory and stakeholder theory:Information Asymmetry→Securities Analysts' Forecast→Earnings Management→efficient allocation of Capital, established research ideas of the effect of securities analysts' double forecasts about earnings management this paper provided literature foundation on in-depth study of investor protection in the future.
Second, This article applied difference-in-difference and propensity score matching method and Logit models being to the empirical analysis, in-depth study of Securities Analysts' double forecasts for accrued earnings management, real earnings management and the substitution effect of earnings management and binding properties characteristic property of a listed company, to build a virtual interactive variables and using two group regress to further expand our analysis of securities analysts' double predict differential effects for different Ownership structure companies.
Third, the paper based on technology line that Analysts' earnings forecasts and Earnings Management→Analysts' double Forecast of Earnings and Cash Flow and Accrued and Real earnings management→Analysts' double Forecasts and The substitution of Earnings Management, realized from Securities Analysts' single earnings forecast oriented to Securities Analysts' double forecasts impact on the level of earnings management, expanding the field of research on the effectiveness of Securities Analysts' forecast information, and its conclusions opened up the new perspective about Securities Analyst' forecast information and management behavioral constraints in order to improve the efficiency of decision-making for investor.
引文
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