智能电网需求侧管理配套政策建议及评价机制研究
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摘要
智能电网技术的深入与发展,必然会对电网需求侧的发展带来深刻的变化,如何应对新技术与新变化,这给电力需求侧管理提出了严峻的挑战。如何有效地针对如今日新月异的电网发展,运用合适的理论与方法提出适用智能电网时代的需求侧管理配套政策体系,解决新时期电力系统的各种突出的结构性矛盾,值得探索。
本文主要以智能电网的发展为电网带来的具体影响变化为立足点,指出了我国传统电力需求侧管理的配套机制与政策体系在这些影响下产生的种种问题,针对这些问题结合各国的研究现状,提出了更加合理与适用性更强的政策建议,并通过理论分析与建模对这些政策建议进行了评价与验证。主要完成了以下工作:
首先,对智能电网下世界各国电力系统的发展与变化进行了阐述,着重分析了分布式电源、电动汽车与储能技术这三种需求侧变化给电网带来的具体影响。
其次,基于上述分布式电源、电动汽车与储能技术对电网带来的具体影响,并借鉴世界其他国家关于智能电网电力需求侧管理的先进实践经验,分别对上述三种需求侧发展的新变化在我国电网中的应用,提出了电力需求侧管理配套机制的激励政策建议。
为了实现对所提出的需求侧管理配套政策建议较为全面的评估,引入了博弈理论与进化博弈论,建立了基于进化博弈论的评价及决策模型,提出了需求侧政策评价指标体系,进一步提出了需求侧激励政策评价的多方进化博弈模型,针对三种需求侧变化之一——分布式电源的需求侧管理配套政策建议进行了理论建模与评价分析。
最后,结合具体的应用算例,对本文所提出的分布式电源接入电网的配套激励政策进行了计算与验证,算例结果表明,所提出的激励政策建议基本实现了初衷,验证了本文模型与方法的合理性。
同时,论文对智能电网需求侧管理配套机制做出了整体的研究与分析,提出了与之相关的具体政策建议,提出了运用进化博弈论模型进行政策评价的方法体系,能够为进一步建立智能电网需求侧管理长效机制提供有益参考。
With the rapid development of Smart Grid technology, it is bound to bring about profound changes to the demand side of the grid. How to deal with these new technologies and new changes which are so different with the traditional grid, it poses a severe challenge to DSM of power system. Therefore, the traditional political system of DSM is no longer suitable. National power system researchers should be effective to propose the new political system of DSM in the era of smart grid for rapid development of grid with new theories and methods, to solve the variety of prominent structural contradictions in the new power system.
The paper is based on the specific impact and changes in the grid by the development of Smart Grid. It points out that the problems of China's traditional political and mechanism system of DSM under these influences, and propose the more reasonable political recommendations with the issues above and the national research applicability status, then the political recommendations are evaluated and validated by theoretical analysis and modeling.
Firstly, the development and changes of power systems around the world under Smart Grid are described, and three specific changes in demand-side—DG, PHEV and Energy Storage technology are Summarized. After that the specific impact to the power grid by the three demand-side changes is analyzed.
Secondly, the specific political recommendations and mechanism are proposed related to DSM of three kinds of demand-side changes in China's power grid in this paper, which is based on the specific impact by DG, PHEV and Energy Storage technology, and the advanced experience and practice on Smart Grid’s DSM from the other countries.
Then, in order to properly assess the reasonableness of political recommendations of DSM proposed, the Evolutionary Game Theory is introduced, which is synthesized by the classic game theory and the theory of evolution, political recommendations of DG’s DSM, one of three changes in the demand side, is modeled and evaluated by the application of Evolutionary Game theory, and the relevant specific evaluation index system is obtained.
Finally, with specific numerical example, the evaluation index of political recommendations for DG’s DSM is actually calculated, Numerical results has proved that, the corresponding effect of the specific political recommendations is achieved, and reasonable.
The paper has made the overall research and analysis about the DSM mechanisms under Smart Grid, proposed the specific political recommendations, and Evolutionary Game Theory for policy evaluation, and the final research results is very beneficial to build content and long-term DSM mechanism of Smart Grid.
本文主要以智能电网的发展为电网带来的具体影响变化为立足点,指出了我国传统电力需求侧管理的配套机制与政策体系在这些影响下产生的种种问题,针对这些问题结合各国的研究现状,提出了更加合理与适用性更强的政策建议,并通过理论分析与建模对这些政策建议进行了评价与验证。主要完成了以下工作:
首先,对智能电网下世界各国电力系统的发展与变化进行了阐述,着重分析了分布式电源、电动汽车与储能技术这三种需求侧变化给电网带来的具体影响。
其次,基于上述分布式电源、电动汽车与储能技术对电网带来的具体影响,并借鉴世界其他国家关于智能电网电力需求侧管理的先进实践经验,分别对上述三种需求侧发展的新变化在我国电网中的应用,提出了电力需求侧管理配套机制的激励政策建议。
为了实现对所提出的需求侧管理配套政策建议较为全面的评估,引入了博弈理论与进化博弈论,建立了基于进化博弈论的评价及决策模型,提出了需求侧政策评价指标体系,进一步提出了需求侧激励政策评价的多方进化博弈模型,针对三种需求侧变化之一——分布式电源的需求侧管理配套政策建议进行了理论建模与评价分析。
最后,结合具体的应用算例,对本文所提出的分布式电源接入电网的配套激励政策进行了计算与验证,算例结果表明,所提出的激励政策建议基本实现了初衷,验证了本文模型与方法的合理性。
同时,论文对智能电网需求侧管理配套机制做出了整体的研究与分析,提出了与之相关的具体政策建议,提出了运用进化博弈论模型进行政策评价的方法体系,能够为进一步建立智能电网需求侧管理长效机制提供有益参考。
With the rapid development of Smart Grid technology, it is bound to bring about profound changes to the demand side of the grid. How to deal with these new technologies and new changes which are so different with the traditional grid, it poses a severe challenge to DSM of power system. Therefore, the traditional political system of DSM is no longer suitable. National power system researchers should be effective to propose the new political system of DSM in the era of smart grid for rapid development of grid with new theories and methods, to solve the variety of prominent structural contradictions in the new power system.
The paper is based on the specific impact and changes in the grid by the development of Smart Grid. It points out that the problems of China's traditional political and mechanism system of DSM under these influences, and propose the more reasonable political recommendations with the issues above and the national research applicability status, then the political recommendations are evaluated and validated by theoretical analysis and modeling.
Firstly, the development and changes of power systems around the world under Smart Grid are described, and three specific changes in demand-side—DG, PHEV and Energy Storage technology are Summarized. After that the specific impact to the power grid by the three demand-side changes is analyzed.
Secondly, the specific political recommendations and mechanism are proposed related to DSM of three kinds of demand-side changes in China's power grid in this paper, which is based on the specific impact by DG, PHEV and Energy Storage technology, and the advanced experience and practice on Smart Grid’s DSM from the other countries.
Then, in order to properly assess the reasonableness of political recommendations of DSM proposed, the Evolutionary Game Theory is introduced, which is synthesized by the classic game theory and the theory of evolution, political recommendations of DG’s DSM, one of three changes in the demand side, is modeled and evaluated by the application of Evolutionary Game theory, and the relevant specific evaluation index system is obtained.
Finally, with specific numerical example, the evaluation index of political recommendations for DG’s DSM is actually calculated, Numerical results has proved that, the corresponding effect of the specific political recommendations is achieved, and reasonable.
The paper has made the overall research and analysis about the DSM mechanisms under Smart Grid, proposed the specific political recommendations, and Evolutionary Game Theory for policy evaluation, and the final research results is very beneficial to build content and long-term DSM mechanism of Smart Grid.
引文
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[11]上海交通大学,福建省电力科学研究院.分布式电源接入配电网的典型模式研究[R].2011(5):126-128
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[18]刘军.需求侧管理评价指标体系及评价模型[J].华北电力技术,2003,7:10-11
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[34]马丁J奥斯本,阿里尔鲁宾斯坦,魏玉根.博弈论教程[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[35]库恩,韩松等译.博弈论经典[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004:1-3.
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[2] Didden, M.H., and D'haeseleer, W.D. Demand side management in a competitive European market: who should be responsible for its implementation[J], Energy Policy,2003,26-38
[3]李扬.世界各国DSM的现状和有关技术[J].电力需求侧管理,1999, 1-5
[4] Stefan Thomas, Uwe Leprich, Lorenzo Pagliano, Schulte Janson. The future IRPand DSM in changing markets. http://www.eceee.org/library links/proceedings/1999/index.lasso.2003.10
[5]周肖,黎娜娜,杨莹.电力需求侧管理影响因素的解释结构模型分析[J].继电器,2007(7):58~61
[6]赵飞,周渝慧.轮流出价博弈在电力需求侧管理中的应用[J].电力需求侧管理,2007(5):21~23
[7]王蓓蓓,李扬,高赐威.智能电网框架下的需求侧管理展望与思考[J].电力系统自动化,2009,33(20):17-20
[8]陈琳.分布式发电接入电力系统若干问题的研究[D].浙江大学.2007,
[9]文升,顾洁,程浩忠等.分布式电源的准入容量与优化布置的实用方法研究[J].电力自动化设备,2011(12):32-34
[10] Caisheng Wang, M. Hashem Nehrir. Analytical Approaches for Optimal Placement of Distributed Generation Sources in Power Systems[J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 19, NO. 4, NOVEMBER 2004:2068-2075
[11]上海交通大学,福建省电力科学研究院.分布式电源接入配电网的典型模式研究[R].2011(5):126-128
[12]王帆,包海龙,徐凡等.电动汽车接入对配电网运行影响的研究与分析[J].华东电力,2011,39(7):1089-1092.
[13]李旭.电动汽车最优充放电策略对区域电网的影响[D].上海交通大学.2011,15-19.
[14]陈寅.车联网作用下的电网调节新形势[J].http://www.paper.edu.cn
[15]夏翔,雷金勇,甘德强.储能装置延缓配电网升级的探讨[J].电力科学与技术学报,2009,24(3):33-39.
[16]朱守真,清华大学电机系.分布式能源并网运行研究[R]. 2011.
[17]哲喆.美国新能源发电激励政策[J].2011, 3. http://www.escn.com.cn/
[18]刘军.需求侧管理评价指标体系及评价模型[J].华北电力技术,2003,7:10-11
[19]滕耘,胡天军,卫振林.电动汽车充电电价定价分析[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2008,8(3):127-130
[20] Sehoenung S M.Burns C.Utility energy storage applications studies[J].IEEE Transactions On Energy Conversions,1996,11(3):658-665.
[21] Lachs W R,Sutanto D.Battery storage plant within large load centers[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,1992,7(2):762—769.
[22] Narayan S R,Blane Taylor.A central inventory of storage and other teehnologie8 to defer distribution upgrades optimization and economics[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,1998,13(1):194-202.
[23]李光久.博弈论基础教程[M].北京:化学工业出版社,2005 : 4-7
[24]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004: 6-7
[25]谢识予.经济博弈论(第二版)[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002:17-36.
[26]黄韬,易宪容,高占军等.博弈论的发展与创新[J].财经问题研究,1995,5 (138): 3-9.
[27]于维生,朴正爱.博弈论及其在经济管理中的应用[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005: 1-17.
[28]罗杰B.迈尔森.博弈论[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2001:245-290.
[29] Shapley, L .S .A value for n Person Games[M], pp.307-317 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II, Princeton University Press.1953.
[30] Harsanyi, J.,Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players Parts III [J] .Management Science, 1967, 14:489.
[31]约翰冯诺伊曼,奥斯卡摩根斯坦.博弈论与经济行为[M].普林斯顿大学出版,1944.
[32] Nash, J. N on cooperative games, Ph.D. thesis[M]. Mathematics Department, Princeton University, 1950.
[33]海萨尼.海萨尼博弈论论文集(中文版)[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2003:302-304.
[34]马丁J奥斯本,阿里尔鲁宾斯坦,魏玉根.博弈论教程[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[35]库恩,韩松等译.博弈论经典[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004:1-3.
[36]张良桥,冯从文.理性与有限理性:论经典博弈理论与进化博弈理论之关系[J].世界经济,2001(8): 74-77.
[37]乔根.W.威布尔,王永钦.演化博弈论[M].上海:上海人民大学出版社2006:40-56.
[38]朱弗登伯格,让梯若尔,黄涛等.博弈论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[39] Nowak M A, Sasaki A, Taylor C, et al. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations [J]. Nature, 2004, 428: 646-650.
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