斯特劳森的识别理论研究
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摘要
本文立论于这一崭新视角：基于识别问题重审斯特劳森的主体哲学思想,并提炼出内嵌于斯特劳森哲学思想中的识别理论。这种研究既为在各个核心主题背景下推进对其识别问题的研究提供了丰富的理论支撑,又为深化研究其哲学的各个相关主题开辟了一条新的进路。本文的立论基于以下原因：
通过对其著述的研究我们发现：第一、尽管他的各个核心主题并非直接探讨识别问题,却与该问题有着密切关联。解答“识别的实现”的必要条件离不开各核心主题的论证和支持,而要完整把握各核心主题及其相互关系,又必须将其置于“识别的实现”这一分析框架中。第二,通过研究解答“识别的实现”的各相关主题,能清晰呈现其哲学思想的演进过程,该过程符合他在《分析的形而上学》中关于哲学总体构想和哲学分析方法的阐释。由此我们认为,识别理论完整而自成一体地内嵌于他的整体性哲学中。其一在于他涉及到识别问题的多个方面：指称与识别的关系、识别的本体论依据、认识框架和方法论等；其二在于识别理论并非孤立于他的描述的形而上学及先验论证的方法体系外,而是与之紧密结合,为他后期总结性提出哲学的分析方法和整体构想提供了坚实的理论基础。总之,识别理论贯穿于他的逻辑学、本体论与认识论之中,与它们融合成一个纵横交织的缜密系统,是其学术思想的重要组成部分。本文拟从以下部分展开研究：
第1章探讨识别理论的形成基础。他与罗素和奎因的论争为识别概念的形成提供了直接的铺垫,其中已提出了殊相识别的部分观点并包含了后来思想的萌芽。本章首先考察了他在对摹状词理论和单称词项可消除论的批评中正面树立的识别指称观以及将识别指称作为单称词项本质规定性的观点,接下来探讨了《个体》中的识别概念,从“听者—说者”这一识别的基本模式出发提炼出识别的几种情况并对各自适用范围进行了分析。
第2章探讨识别的本体论依据。本章围绕“识别的基础性”与“本体论的优先性”的关联展开。第1节从他对逻辑主项与存在的关系的论述入手探讨其本体论的基本立场。第2节探讨他对奎因本体论化约纲领的批评,这为正面阐发本体论的等级论提供了直接铺垫。第3节考察本体论等级论这一特色理论,剖析了“赋予基本殊相以本体论优先性”这一关键命题的内涵,重点分析了他通过对语法标准与范畴标准的比较以揭示主谓区分背后的“本体论优先性”的思路。第4节通过对他与奎因本体论思想的系统比较,深入揭示其本体论的特征和独特意义。
第3章探讨识别的认识框架,该框架与概念图式的构想有关。本章首先通过与康德“图式”的比较分析了这一概念图式的性质和特征,接下来围绕“时空系统与作为经验实在的基本殊相对于反映该概念图式具有怎样的关联性”的问题,探讨了作为概念图式之基本构架的时空系统的特征,以及他确立物质物体为基本殊对于识别活动的意义,并从“经验的可能性条件”的先验意义上分析了人对其它殊相的“不同却相关方式”的识别支持作用。本章最终揭示了他确立物质物体和人为基本殊相的目的,即将殊相放入现有的时空系统中以揭示思想的概念图式,整个识别活动正是围绕着对概念图式的说明这一基本任务而展开。
第4章探讨识别的方法论特征。旨在通过对识别理论中所运用的先验论证的特征、有效性和目标定位的考察,审视其先验论证关于识别活动之价值。第1节参照康德的策略考察了他有关经验的讨论与概念图式中基础概念之间的本质关联。第2节在考察关于识别的可能性的先验论证的形式特征的基础上,分析了其论证应对怀疑论的有效性,并赋予适度先验论证的内在辩护策略下的解读。第3节考察他对先验论证的深化,即对康德先验演绎的重构的“经验的客观性论证”,说明其论证的实质仍是对康德式方法路径的延续。第4节考察他的先验论证的价值目标,联系于对信念确定性的分析,从自然主义观点中为其论证寻找支撑。
第5章总结评价识别理论对于当代哲学的新贡献。我们通过前几章的研究的支撑,并结合他在《分析与形而上学》中对形而上学、分析方法及哲学整体图景的阐释,从三个方面归纳了他的贡献。
第6章基于以上研究对其哲学思想作出了拓展性思考：第一,从形而上学的“描述性”与“修正性”之关系、“语言理论的现实转向”的合理性以及识别活动的解释途径三个方面对识别理论的局限性进行了思考；第二,在知识论框架下将其思想解读为特殊的“先验建构型”的基础主义；第三,从拓扑学视角探析了其哲学观和方法论的启示。
本文的创新工作可概括为：1.主题上：通过综合思考,将识别理论作为内嵌于斯特劳森哲学中的一个系统整体而非局限于《个体》中对识别的直接探讨,从不同论著中提取出“识别的实现”作为统摄其主体哲学思想的基础问题。2.思路上：拟定了深入挖掘该问题的框架性思路,从形成基础、本体论依据、认识框架、方法论以及对当代哲学的影响等方面进行系统探讨,揭示出识别理论的内在发展理路,展现各核心主题的相互关系,并通过该思路彰显他的哲学整体图像。3.研究方法上：结合各核心主题,将他与奎因、康德的思想进行系统比较,比较中揭示其理论的思想渊源、特征和独特意义。4.归纳和解析上：(1)将其把握客观经验知识的方式解析为适度先验论证的内在辩护策略；(2)基于信念确定性的“普遍印证观”重审其先验论证的价值目标；(3)结合语言现象学,以及心理或认知科学的相关观点,对比研究中揭示其理论的局限性；(4)将其思想定位为“先验建构型”的基础主义；(5)从对其哲学思想的特征与拓扑学基本思想的内在相似性的分析中,归纳出从这种“拓扑学”风格的哲学研究中所得的方法启示。
This thesis is argued in a novel visual angle, which is said:reviewing Strawson's main thoughts of philosophy based on the theme of identification, and extracting the identification theory which is integrated in Strawson's philosophy. Such studies, on one hand, provide abundant theory supports to the studies about the theme of identification, and on the other hand, start a new approach for deepening each related coin subject in his philosophy. The arguments are based on the following reasons:
By studying Strawson's works, the writer finds that his each coin subject doesn't directly discuss the identification, but is closely related with it. It must be based on the support of each core subject to supply an explanatory key for "the realization of identifying", and also must be linked with the analytical frame about "the realization of identifying" to understand each core subject and demonstrate the correlations among them. Furthermore, by studying each correlative subject, can we clarify the evolvement of his philosophy thoughts, which accords with his explanation about the entire conception and analysis methods of philosophy in Analysis and Metaphysics. Accordingly, we think identification theory is integrated in Strawson's whole philosophy. One reason is that it entails many aspects of identification, such as the relation between referring and identifying, the ontology accordance, epistemology frame, and the methodology of identifying. Another reason is that identification theory is related to his descriptive metaphysics and the methodology system of transcendental arguments, which afford theoretical basis for his later analysis methods and entire conception of philosophy, In a word, the identification theory, integrated into his logic, ontology and epistemology, forming an inner complex meticulous system with them, is an important part of his academic thoughts.
The chapters are arranged as following:Chapter1is about the basis for the formation of identification theory. The debate between Strawson and Russell or Quine, in which his partial viewpoints have been included, lays a certain foundation for the formation of the concept of "identification". Firstly, it analyzes his views of identifying reference, and regarding identifying reference as the essential prescriptive of singular terms, which are formed in the process of criticizing the descriptions theory and the viewpoint that the singular terms is eliminable. Then, starting with the model of "Listener-speaker", it researches into the concept of identification in Individual, sums up the kinds of identifying, and makes an analysis about the applied Scope of each of them.
Chapter2is about the ontology accordance of identifying. This chapter centers about the correlation of the foundation position in identifying with ontological priority. Section1, starting with the relation between logical subject and existence, analyzes his basic standpoint of ontology. Section2is about his criticism to Quine's program of ontological reduction, which paves the way for his theory of ontological hierarch. Section3is about his characteristic theory—the ontological hierarch. It has a further analysis about the connotation of his key proposition—"endowing basic particulars with ontological priority", and especially analyzes his train of thought, which reveals the ontological priority hidden behind the Subject-Predicate items distinction by comparing grammar-criterion with the type-criterion. Section4compares his ontology with Quine's for revealing the characteristics and significance of his ontology.
Chapter3is about the epistemology frame of identifying, which is related to the conceptual schemes. Firstly, it analyzes the essence and characteristics of conceptual schemes by comparing the schemes with Kant's schemes. Then, concentrating on the question of "what's the correlation of temporal and spatial relations system with basic particulars in reflecting the conceptual schemes", it analyzes the characteristics of temporal and spatial relations system, and the significance of establishing material bodies as basic particulars for identifying. At last, from the transcendental angle of "the conditions for the possibility of experience", it analyzes the support with "different but correlative ways" given by the basic particular—"person" to other particulars. It finally reveals his motive to establish material bodies and person as basic particulars, which is to put particulars into the temporal and spatial relations system to elucidate the conceptual schemes. The whole identifying activity is around the basic task of elucidating the conceptual schemes.
Chapter4is about the methodology of identifying. Through the analysis about the characteristics, validity and objective orientation of transcendental arguments used in identification theory, it researches into the value of transcendental arguments in identifying activity. By discussing Kant's strategies as reference, Section1analyzes the essential relation between Strawson's discussion about experience and the basic concepts in conceptual schemes. Then, On the basis of reviewing the form characteristics of transcendental arguments about the possibility of identifying, Section2analyzes the validity of his arguments to cope with skepticism, and links his arguments with the strategy of internal defense of proper moderate transcendental arguments. Section3is about his further studies on transcendental arguments. From the analysis of his objectivity arguments of experience in restructuring Kant's transcendental deduction, it shows that the essence of his arguments is also a continuation of Kant's ways. Section4analyzes the value objective of his transcendental arguments. Linking it with the analysis about the certainty of belief, the writer tries to quest for a theory support from the view about naturalism.
Chapter5is about his new contribution to contemporary philosophy. Based on the above chapters, and his explanation of metaphysics, analysis methods and entire conception of philosophy in Analysis and Metaphysics, it generalizes the contributions in three aspects.
Based on all above studies, Chapter6does some divergent thinking about his philosophy thoughts. Firstly, it discusses the limitation from such aspects as the relationship between the descriptiveness and revisability of metaphysics, the rationality of the transition to reality of linguistic theory, and the ways of explanation to identifying. Secondly, it unscrambles his thoughts as special foundationalism of transcendental-construction under the frame of epistemology. Thirdly, it does some thinking of his views on philosophy and methodology from the angle of topology.
The creative work can be concluded as follows:Firstly, it is not limited in the direct analysis about identifying in Individual, but considers the identification theory as a whole which is integrated in Strawson's whole philosophy. It distills a question, that is,"the realization of identifying", and considers it as the basic question to govern his main philosophical thoughts. Secondly, it provides the analytical frame of this question, and makes an in-depth study from the aspects of the basis for the formation, ontology accordance, epistemology frame, methodology and the contribution to contemporary philosophy, so as to reveal the intrinsic development route of identification theory, clarify how the coin subjects are related to each other, and demonstrate his whole image of philosophy. Thirdly, through systematic comparative analyses of his thoughts' with Kant's and Quine's, it reveals the thought origins, characteristics and the peculiar significance of his theory in the comparative research. Fourthly, it makes some new generalizations and explanations as following:(1) It interprets the way of Strawson to understand the knowledge of objective experience as a strategy of internal defense of proper moderate transcendental arguments;(2) Based on the view of "universal conformation" about certainty of belief, it re-examines the value objective of his transcendental arguments;(3) By taking some viewpoints of the language" phenomenology, psychology and cognitive science as reference, it reveals the limitation of his theory in comparative research;(4) It unscrambles his thoughts as special foundationalism of transcendental-construction;(5) By analyzing the inner similarity between the characteristics of Strawson's philosophical view, and the basic thought of topology, it summarizes the inspiration of methodology from Strawson's philosophical studies with topologic style.
通过对其著述的研究我们发现：第一、尽管他的各个核心主题并非直接探讨识别问题,却与该问题有着密切关联。解答“识别的实现”的必要条件离不开各核心主题的论证和支持,而要完整把握各核心主题及其相互关系,又必须将其置于“识别的实现”这一分析框架中。第二,通过研究解答“识别的实现”的各相关主题,能清晰呈现其哲学思想的演进过程,该过程符合他在《分析的形而上学》中关于哲学总体构想和哲学分析方法的阐释。由此我们认为,识别理论完整而自成一体地内嵌于他的整体性哲学中。其一在于他涉及到识别问题的多个方面：指称与识别的关系、识别的本体论依据、认识框架和方法论等；其二在于识别理论并非孤立于他的描述的形而上学及先验论证的方法体系外,而是与之紧密结合,为他后期总结性提出哲学的分析方法和整体构想提供了坚实的理论基础。总之,识别理论贯穿于他的逻辑学、本体论与认识论之中,与它们融合成一个纵横交织的缜密系统,是其学术思想的重要组成部分。本文拟从以下部分展开研究：
第1章探讨识别理论的形成基础。他与罗素和奎因的论争为识别概念的形成提供了直接的铺垫,其中已提出了殊相识别的部分观点并包含了后来思想的萌芽。本章首先考察了他在对摹状词理论和单称词项可消除论的批评中正面树立的识别指称观以及将识别指称作为单称词项本质规定性的观点,接下来探讨了《个体》中的识别概念,从“听者—说者”这一识别的基本模式出发提炼出识别的几种情况并对各自适用范围进行了分析。
第2章探讨识别的本体论依据。本章围绕“识别的基础性”与“本体论的优先性”的关联展开。第1节从他对逻辑主项与存在的关系的论述入手探讨其本体论的基本立场。第2节探讨他对奎因本体论化约纲领的批评,这为正面阐发本体论的等级论提供了直接铺垫。第3节考察本体论等级论这一特色理论,剖析了“赋予基本殊相以本体论优先性”这一关键命题的内涵,重点分析了他通过对语法标准与范畴标准的比较以揭示主谓区分背后的“本体论优先性”的思路。第4节通过对他与奎因本体论思想的系统比较,深入揭示其本体论的特征和独特意义。
第3章探讨识别的认识框架,该框架与概念图式的构想有关。本章首先通过与康德“图式”的比较分析了这一概念图式的性质和特征,接下来围绕“时空系统与作为经验实在的基本殊相对于反映该概念图式具有怎样的关联性”的问题,探讨了作为概念图式之基本构架的时空系统的特征,以及他确立物质物体为基本殊对于识别活动的意义,并从“经验的可能性条件”的先验意义上分析了人对其它殊相的“不同却相关方式”的识别支持作用。本章最终揭示了他确立物质物体和人为基本殊相的目的,即将殊相放入现有的时空系统中以揭示思想的概念图式,整个识别活动正是围绕着对概念图式的说明这一基本任务而展开。
第4章探讨识别的方法论特征。旨在通过对识别理论中所运用的先验论证的特征、有效性和目标定位的考察,审视其先验论证关于识别活动之价值。第1节参照康德的策略考察了他有关经验的讨论与概念图式中基础概念之间的本质关联。第2节在考察关于识别的可能性的先验论证的形式特征的基础上,分析了其论证应对怀疑论的有效性,并赋予适度先验论证的内在辩护策略下的解读。第3节考察他对先验论证的深化,即对康德先验演绎的重构的“经验的客观性论证”,说明其论证的实质仍是对康德式方法路径的延续。第4节考察他的先验论证的价值目标,联系于对信念确定性的分析,从自然主义观点中为其论证寻找支撑。
第5章总结评价识别理论对于当代哲学的新贡献。我们通过前几章的研究的支撑,并结合他在《分析与形而上学》中对形而上学、分析方法及哲学整体图景的阐释,从三个方面归纳了他的贡献。
第6章基于以上研究对其哲学思想作出了拓展性思考：第一,从形而上学的“描述性”与“修正性”之关系、“语言理论的现实转向”的合理性以及识别活动的解释途径三个方面对识别理论的局限性进行了思考；第二,在知识论框架下将其思想解读为特殊的“先验建构型”的基础主义；第三,从拓扑学视角探析了其哲学观和方法论的启示。
本文的创新工作可概括为：1.主题上：通过综合思考,将识别理论作为内嵌于斯特劳森哲学中的一个系统整体而非局限于《个体》中对识别的直接探讨,从不同论著中提取出“识别的实现”作为统摄其主体哲学思想的基础问题。2.思路上：拟定了深入挖掘该问题的框架性思路,从形成基础、本体论依据、认识框架、方法论以及对当代哲学的影响等方面进行系统探讨,揭示出识别理论的内在发展理路,展现各核心主题的相互关系,并通过该思路彰显他的哲学整体图像。3.研究方法上：结合各核心主题,将他与奎因、康德的思想进行系统比较,比较中揭示其理论的思想渊源、特征和独特意义。4.归纳和解析上：(1)将其把握客观经验知识的方式解析为适度先验论证的内在辩护策略；(2)基于信念确定性的“普遍印证观”重审其先验论证的价值目标；(3)结合语言现象学,以及心理或认知科学的相关观点,对比研究中揭示其理论的局限性；(4)将其思想定位为“先验建构型”的基础主义；(5)从对其哲学思想的特征与拓扑学基本思想的内在相似性的分析中,归纳出从这种“拓扑学”风格的哲学研究中所得的方法启示。
This thesis is argued in a novel visual angle, which is said:reviewing Strawson's main thoughts of philosophy based on the theme of identification, and extracting the identification theory which is integrated in Strawson's philosophy. Such studies, on one hand, provide abundant theory supports to the studies about the theme of identification, and on the other hand, start a new approach for deepening each related coin subject in his philosophy. The arguments are based on the following reasons:
By studying Strawson's works, the writer finds that his each coin subject doesn't directly discuss the identification, but is closely related with it. It must be based on the support of each core subject to supply an explanatory key for "the realization of identifying", and also must be linked with the analytical frame about "the realization of identifying" to understand each core subject and demonstrate the correlations among them. Furthermore, by studying each correlative subject, can we clarify the evolvement of his philosophy thoughts, which accords with his explanation about the entire conception and analysis methods of philosophy in Analysis and Metaphysics. Accordingly, we think identification theory is integrated in Strawson's whole philosophy. One reason is that it entails many aspects of identification, such as the relation between referring and identifying, the ontology accordance, epistemology frame, and the methodology of identifying. Another reason is that identification theory is related to his descriptive metaphysics and the methodology system of transcendental arguments, which afford theoretical basis for his later analysis methods and entire conception of philosophy, In a word, the identification theory, integrated into his logic, ontology and epistemology, forming an inner complex meticulous system with them, is an important part of his academic thoughts.
The chapters are arranged as following:Chapter1is about the basis for the formation of identification theory. The debate between Strawson and Russell or Quine, in which his partial viewpoints have been included, lays a certain foundation for the formation of the concept of "identification". Firstly, it analyzes his views of identifying reference, and regarding identifying reference as the essential prescriptive of singular terms, which are formed in the process of criticizing the descriptions theory and the viewpoint that the singular terms is eliminable. Then, starting with the model of "Listener-speaker", it researches into the concept of identification in Individual, sums up the kinds of identifying, and makes an analysis about the applied Scope of each of them.
Chapter2is about the ontology accordance of identifying. This chapter centers about the correlation of the foundation position in identifying with ontological priority. Section1, starting with the relation between logical subject and existence, analyzes his basic standpoint of ontology. Section2is about his criticism to Quine's program of ontological reduction, which paves the way for his theory of ontological hierarch. Section3is about his characteristic theory—the ontological hierarch. It has a further analysis about the connotation of his key proposition—"endowing basic particulars with ontological priority", and especially analyzes his train of thought, which reveals the ontological priority hidden behind the Subject-Predicate items distinction by comparing grammar-criterion with the type-criterion. Section4compares his ontology with Quine's for revealing the characteristics and significance of his ontology.
Chapter3is about the epistemology frame of identifying, which is related to the conceptual schemes. Firstly, it analyzes the essence and characteristics of conceptual schemes by comparing the schemes with Kant's schemes. Then, concentrating on the question of "what's the correlation of temporal and spatial relations system with basic particulars in reflecting the conceptual schemes", it analyzes the characteristics of temporal and spatial relations system, and the significance of establishing material bodies as basic particulars for identifying. At last, from the transcendental angle of "the conditions for the possibility of experience", it analyzes the support with "different but correlative ways" given by the basic particular—"person" to other particulars. It finally reveals his motive to establish material bodies and person as basic particulars, which is to put particulars into the temporal and spatial relations system to elucidate the conceptual schemes. The whole identifying activity is around the basic task of elucidating the conceptual schemes.
Chapter4is about the methodology of identifying. Through the analysis about the characteristics, validity and objective orientation of transcendental arguments used in identification theory, it researches into the value of transcendental arguments in identifying activity. By discussing Kant's strategies as reference, Section1analyzes the essential relation between Strawson's discussion about experience and the basic concepts in conceptual schemes. Then, On the basis of reviewing the form characteristics of transcendental arguments about the possibility of identifying, Section2analyzes the validity of his arguments to cope with skepticism, and links his arguments with the strategy of internal defense of proper moderate transcendental arguments. Section3is about his further studies on transcendental arguments. From the analysis of his objectivity arguments of experience in restructuring Kant's transcendental deduction, it shows that the essence of his arguments is also a continuation of Kant's ways. Section4analyzes the value objective of his transcendental arguments. Linking it with the analysis about the certainty of belief, the writer tries to quest for a theory support from the view about naturalism.
Chapter5is about his new contribution to contemporary philosophy. Based on the above chapters, and his explanation of metaphysics, analysis methods and entire conception of philosophy in Analysis and Metaphysics, it generalizes the contributions in three aspects.
Based on all above studies, Chapter6does some divergent thinking about his philosophy thoughts. Firstly, it discusses the limitation from such aspects as the relationship between the descriptiveness and revisability of metaphysics, the rationality of the transition to reality of linguistic theory, and the ways of explanation to identifying. Secondly, it unscrambles his thoughts as special foundationalism of transcendental-construction under the frame of epistemology. Thirdly, it does some thinking of his views on philosophy and methodology from the angle of topology.
The creative work can be concluded as follows:Firstly, it is not limited in the direct analysis about identifying in Individual, but considers the identification theory as a whole which is integrated in Strawson's whole philosophy. It distills a question, that is,"the realization of identifying", and considers it as the basic question to govern his main philosophical thoughts. Secondly, it provides the analytical frame of this question, and makes an in-depth study from the aspects of the basis for the formation, ontology accordance, epistemology frame, methodology and the contribution to contemporary philosophy, so as to reveal the intrinsic development route of identification theory, clarify how the coin subjects are related to each other, and demonstrate his whole image of philosophy. Thirdly, through systematic comparative analyses of his thoughts' with Kant's and Quine's, it reveals the thought origins, characteristics and the peculiar significance of his theory in the comparative research. Fourthly, it makes some new generalizations and explanations as following:(1) It interprets the way of Strawson to understand the knowledge of objective experience as a strategy of internal defense of proper moderate transcendental arguments;(2) Based on the view of "universal conformation" about certainty of belief, it re-examines the value objective of his transcendental arguments;(3) By taking some viewpoints of the language" phenomenology, psychology and cognitive science as reference, it reveals the limitation of his theory in comparative research;(4) It unscrambles his thoughts as special foundationalism of transcendental-construction;(5) By analyzing the inner similarity between the characteristics of Strawson's philosophical view, and the basic thought of topology, it summarizes the inspiration of methodology from Strawson's philosophical studies with topologic style.
引文
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
②Ibid.,p.31.
①Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.330.
②Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
①译载车铭洲《现代西方语言哲学》,原文见Phenomenology and Ontology第7章(1970)。
②原文见Phenomenology and Ontology第4章。
③江怡：《哲学的用处在于使人有自知之明—访斯特劳森教授》,载《哲学动态》1996年第10期。
④ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
⑤ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
①Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.50.
②参见保罗.利科主编的《哲学主要倾向》(商务印书馆,1988年版)中《语言和本体论》部分。
③载陈嘉映《冷风集》,2001年版。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.39.
①参见《纯批》中《原理分析论》第1章“知性纯粹概念的图式法”
②参见《纯批》中《先验感性论》部分。
① Conversation with Peter Strawson, in B. Magge, ed., Modern British Philosophy, New York,1971, p.115.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.40.
③这些先验式问题可参见Strawson的Individuals (1959), The Bounds of Sense (1966), Skepticism and Naturalism (1985), Analysis and Metaphysics (1992, Kant's New Foundations of Metaphysics in his Entity and Identity (1997); P.Stroud的Transcendental Arguments (1968), Transcendental Arguments and Epistemological Naturalism. (1977); H.Putnam的Is Semantics Possible? (1970), Reason,Truth,and History (1981); J.Searle的The Construction of Social Reality (1995); Burge的Individualism and the Mental (1979); Davidson的Truth and Meaning(1967), In Defence of Convention-T(1973), Radical Interpretation(1973)等论著。
①可参见Richard Rorty的Strawson's Objectivity Argument, The Review of Metaphysics,Vol.24, No.2 (Dec, 1970), Ralph C.S.Walker的Kant(1978),以及W.Cerf的Critical Notice on The Bounds of Senses, Mind, vol.81 (1972).
①可参见程炼《先验论证》(《哲学研究》1998(10)),赵汀阳《先验论证》(《世界哲学》2005(3)),徐向东《怀疑论、知识与辩护》(2006)。
②载Daedalus, Winter,1997。
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
②也有学者将identify译为“确认”,将redentify译为“重新确认”(见《个体》,江怡译,2004年版,中国人民大学出版社),本文仍采用通译名“识别”和“再识别”。
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.31.
④ Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.330.
⑤ Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
① Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
③ Ibid., p.16.
④ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
⑤ Ibid.,p.50.
⑥ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.39.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.30.
② Conversation with Peter Strawson, in B. Magge, ed., Modern British Philosophy, New York,1971, p.115.
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.40.
④ Ibid..
⑤ Ibid.,p.78.
⑥ Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.16.
⑦ Strawon:Skepticism and Naturalism, Methuen,1985, p.21.
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.19.
② Ibid., p.32.
③ Ibid..
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Taylor & Francis Group,1959, p.87.
②康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A93,B126。
①转引自M.k.穆尼茨：《当代分析哲学》,上海：复旦大学出版社,1986年版,182页。
②罗素：《逻辑与知识》,苑莉均译,北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,21]页。
①罗素：《逻辑与知识》,苑莉均译,北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,418页。
②斯特劳森将具有唯一指称用法的语词简称为语词,将以具有唯一指称用法起首的语句简称为语句。
③单称指示代词、单称人称代词及非人称代词等在罗素处被称为“自我中心词”(索引词),罗素在《人类的知识》中有专门论述,即“意义随说话者和他在时空中位置的不同而改变的那些词”,被排除于专名体系之外。
④Strawson:On Referring, Mind, New Series, Vol.59, No.235(Jul.1950), p.326.
①Sawson:On Referring,Mind,Jul.1950,p.326.
②Ibjd..
③Ibid.,p-325.
④Ibid.,p.326.
① Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.325.
② Ibid., p.328.
①Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.328.
②Ibid.,p.330.
③Ibid..
④Ibid.,p.332.
⑤AC Grayling:《哲学逻辑引论》,牟博译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1990年版,101页。
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,174页。
②陈波：《逻辑哲学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,169-170页。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,146页。
②同上,12页。
③转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.441;原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959, p.224.
①转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.441:原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959, p.224.
① Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.439.
②转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.441;原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959,p.218.
③ Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, pp.441-443.
④奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,156页。
⑤同上。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年,129页。
②同上,29页。
① Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.442.
② Ibid., p.443.
①转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.447,原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959, p.224.
②同上p.256.
①Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.451.
①涂纪亮主编：《当代英美哲学》,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1988年版,170页。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.16.
③ Ibid., p.15.
④ Ibid., p.23.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.16.
② Ibid., p.52.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.18-19.
② Ibid., p.18.
③ Ibid., p.53.
④ Ibid., p.19.
⑤ Ibid.,p.21.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.20.
②Ibid., p.22.
③Ibid., p.24.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.31.
② Ibid..
③ Ibid., p.32.
④ Ibid.,p.35.
① Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
① J.M.E. Moravcsik:Strawson and Ontological Priority, in R.J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy (Second Series), Oxford,1965, p.25.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.16.
①维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》,北京：商务印书馆,1962年版,56页。
②Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.40.
① Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.161.
②奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,12页。
③ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.39.
④ Ibid.,p.40.
②Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.40.
Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.234.
③Ibid., p.236.
④Ibid., p.237.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.238.
② Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.52.
③ Ibid..
④ Ibid., p.54.
⑤ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.54.
① Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.125.
② Ibid., p.211.
①陈波：《奎因哲学研究——从逻辑和语言的观点看》,北京：三联书店,1998年版,278页。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,65页。
②奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,71页。
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.45.
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997,.47.
② Ibid..
③Ibid., p.45.
①Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
②Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.240.
③Ibid..
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.241.
②Ibid..
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
② Ibid..
③ Strawson:Singular term, Ontology and Identity, in Mind.Vol.Lxv.N.20,1956, p.438.
①斯特劳森从识别的认识框架出发借助于物质物体的特性和时空框架的相互依赖关系对物质物体作为基本殊相所作的论证,具体见第3章。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.60.
③ Ibid., p.16.
①B.A.O.Williams:Mr.Strawson on Individual,in Philosophy(36),1961,p.322.
②Ibid.,p.325.
③Ibid..
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.170.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.171.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.185.
② Ibid..
③ Ibid.,p.210.
① Strawson:Singular terms and predication, The Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961), p.395.
② Ibid., p.396.
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.179.
④ Ibid., p.138.
⑤ Ibid..
⑥ B.A.O.Williams:Mr.Strawson on Individual, in Philosophy (36),1961, p.326.
⑦关于人的基本殊相地位的确立,斯特劳森采用了一种区别于将物质物体确立为基本殊相的“不同却相关的方式”,具体探讨见第3章。
①陈嘉映在《事物、事实、论证》(载陈嘉映：《冷风集》,东方出版社2001年版,173-182页)一文的第3节和第8节中对斯特劳森将事实排除在世界之外的观点进行了批评,我们认为陈文由于并非立足于对斯特劳森的本体论的全面考察,因而未能看到其中事物本体论与事实本体论的不自洽因素,但该文的批判与发挥是极有见地的。
② Strawson:Truth, in his Logic-linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.195.
③ Ibid., p.198.
④见江怡主编《走向新世纪的西方哲学》中第4节《描述的形而上学：斯特劳森》(余纪元撰),北京：中国社会科学出版社,1998年版,75页。
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,175-176页。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.138.
③ Strawson:My Philosophy, in The Philosophy of P.F.Strawson, Indian Council of Philosophical Research,1995, p.9.
④ Strawson:Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, Methuen,1974, p.13.
5 Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.185.
⑥ Ibid., p.210.
⑦保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,176页。
⑧同上,176-177页。
①见车铭洲主编《现代西方语言哲学》中译载的J. N. Mohan ty:《意义与真理—Ⅰ》,天津：南开大学出版社,1989年版,381页。
②同上。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.226.
②Quine:Ontological Relativity and other Essays, New York:Columbia University Press,1969, p.50.
③Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.125.
④奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,16页。
①施太格谬勒：《当代哲学主流》(下卷),北京：商务印书馆,1992年版,269页。
②Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.39.
③Ibid., p.247.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.41.
② Ibid., pp.234-235.
③沙夫：《语义学引论》,北京：商务印书馆,1979年版,328页。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,43页。
②同上,41页。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
①Strawson:Construction and analysis,中译见《哲学中的变革》,上海：上海译文出版社,1985年版,81页。
②同上。
③同上,76页。
④同上。
①Strawson:Construction and analysis,中译见《哲学中的变革》,上海：上海译文出版社,1985年版,85页。
②Strawson:Introduction to Logic Theory, Methuen,1952, p.78.
③Ibid.,p.231.
① Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.7.
②戴维森：《论概念图式这一观念》,载《逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选》(陈波,韩林合主编),牟博译,北京：东方出版社,2005年版,557页。
③康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A140,B178,“图式”在韦卓民原文中译为“图型”
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A142,B181。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
②参见T.S.Kuhn:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press,1962.
③ T.S.Kuhn:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press,1962, p.134.
① Strawson:The Bound of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen&Co.Ltd,1966, p.15.
②戴维森：《论概念图式这一观念》,载《逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选》(陈波,韩林合主编),牟博译,北京：东方出版社,2005年版,562-563页。
①戴维森：《论概念图式这一观念》,载《逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选》(陈波,韩林合主编),牟博译,北京：东方出版社,2005年版,576-577页。
②同上,559页。
③同上,572页。
① Davidson:Meaning, Truth, and Evidence, in R.Barrett and R.Gibson (eds.) Perspective on Quine, Oxford: Blackwell,1991, pp.68-79.
② Maker,W.(1991)Davidson's Transcendental Arguments.Philosophy and Phenomeno-logical Research,vol.51.
③ Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, New York:Columbia University Press,1983, p.21.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.27.
② Ibid..
③ Ibid..
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.27.
② Ibid.,p.28.
③ Ibid.,p.29.
④ Ibid., p.30.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.27.
② Ibid.,p.216.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.42-43.
②Ibid.,p.42.
③Ibid..
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.25.
② Ibid.,p.31.
③ B.Magge:Conversation with Peter Strawson,in B.Magge (ed.):Modern British Philosophy,New York,1971. p.122.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.29.
② Ibid.,p.30.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.54.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.33.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.56.
②Ibid., p.58.
③Ibid..
④参见江怡译著：《个体：论描述的形而上学》序言,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004年版,7页。
⑤Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.56.
⑥Ibid.,p.57.
①应奇：《概念图式与形而上学》,学林出版社,2000年版,99页。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.60.
③ Ibid., p.66.
④ Ibid.,p.72.
⑤ Ibid., p.74.
⑥ Ibid.,p.88.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.86.
②具体参见Hacker P:Strawson's Concept of a Person, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 2002,102:21-40.
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.102.
④ Ibid..
①关于斯特劳森思想的基础主义特征的探讨具体见第6章第1节。
① Conversation with Peter Strawson, in B. Magge, ed.. Modern British Philosophy, New York,1971, pp.115-130.
② Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen,1966.
③康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A11,B25。
④康德：《未来形而上学导论》,北京：商务印书馆,1978年版,53页。
⑤同上,172页。
⑥康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A85,B117。
①参见A.C.Grayling:Transcendental Arguments, in his Refutation of Scepticism, Duckworth,1985.
①参见R.Carnap:Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, Revue Internationable de Philosophie 4(1950), pp.20-40.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.58.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.40.
② Ibid.,p.29.
③ Ibid.,p.40.
④康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A85,B117。
⑤同上。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A3,B126。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.35.
③ Ibid..
① Stroud, Barry:Transcendental Arguments, Journal of Philosophy (65),1968.
② John Locke:An essay concerning human understanding, P. H. Nidditch (Oxford:Clarendon Press),1975, p.409.
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A79,B105。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A79,B105。
②同上,A80,B106。
③同上,B20-B23。
④ Derek A. McDougall:"Descriptive"and"Revisionary"Metaphysics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.34, No.2 (Dec,1973), p.209.
⑤ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.9.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.34-35, p.78, p.106, p.109.
② Ibid., p.35.
③ Ibid., p.78.
④ Ibid., pp.34-35, p.78, p.106, p.35.
⑤ Ibid., p.35.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.36.
② A.C.Grayling:An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, pp.283-284, Duckworth,1990.
③该论证参见Barry Stroud:Transcendental Arguments, Journal of Philosophy 65,1968, pp.241-256.
①具体论述参见Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.87-116.
② Ibid., p.103.
③ Ibid., p.102.
④ Ibid., p.96.
⑤ Ibid., p.106.
①A.C.Grayling:Transcendental Arguments, in his Refutation of Scepticism, Duckworth,1985, p.84.
②Barry Stroud:Transcendental Arguments, Journal of Philosophy 65,1968, p.256.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.35.
② Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.16.
③ Ibid.,p.91.
④康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A104。
①类似思想的一个持有者是Sosa,参见Sosa:Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge, Mind 97 (1988),pp.153-188.我们关于适度先验论证的阐释也受到Sosa相关观点的启发。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A369。
②同上,A371-372.
③Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.16.
①Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.8
②Ibid..
③Ibid..
④Ibid.,p.90.
①Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.91.
②Ibid., p.98.
③Ibid., p.100.
④具体联系《个体》第3章关于人的论述。
① Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.102.
②康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,B132。
③此处的“认识”指将一个特殊的事物归类为某种一般种类的事物的过程,即归于某一概念的过程。
④ W.Cerf:Critical Notice on The Bounds of Sensem, Mind, vol.81,1972, p.612.
⑤ Richard Rorty:Strawson's Objectivity Argument, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.24, No.2 (Dec,1970), p.218.
① Ralph C.S.Walker:Kant. London:Routledge,1978, p.117.
② Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.94.
③康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,B158-159。
④ Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.104.
① Richard Rorty:Strawson's Objectivity Argument, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.24, No.2 (Dec,1970), p.218.
① Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London:Methuen,1966, pp.88-89..
② Ibid.,p.24.
③ Wittgenstein:On Certainty, Blackwell,1979, §1,以下《论确定性》的引文均只注明节数。
①现代数理逻辑中“证明”概念有了诸多变化。但作为一般论理词的“证明”,特别是基础主义框架下的“证明”,仍然是以经典数学证明作为范型的(参见以下“证明”与“印证”的比较)。
②On Certainty,§§141-2.
③On Certainty,§4.
④L.Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigation,Oxford,1967,§472,以下《哲学研究》的引文均只注明节数。
⑤Philosophical Investigation,§481.
⑥On Certainty,§144.
⑦On Certainty,§§275-6.
⑧On Certainty,§§204,110.
①On Certainty,§248.
②On Certainty,§§66-69,83,211.
③Philosophical Investigation,§84.
①参见Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, pp.12-13他运用了关于康德先验观念论与经验实在论的内在紧张(tension)的联想(p.12),然而他认为区别在于休谟理论的不自洽因素“留下的是未解决的怀疑论”,康德却给出了先验观念论的证明(p.13)。
②Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, p.24.
③Ibid., p.149.
④Ibid.,p.22-23.
①Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, p.23.
②Ibid., p.21.
③Ibid.,p.23.
④徐向东：《怀疑论、知识与辩护》,北京：北京大学出版社,2006年版,570页。
①Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.262.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.11
② Ibid..
③ Ibid., p.9.
④ Ibid., p.10.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.10.
②Ibid..
①Strawson:Construction and analysis,中译见《哲学中的革命》,上海：上海译文出版社,1985年版,81页。
②同上。
③同上,82页。
④同上,84-85页。
⑤同上,85页。
①参见周昌忠：《西方现代语言哲学》,上海：上海人民出版社,1992年版,336页。
②Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.17.
③Ibid..
④Ibid., p.19.
⑤陈波：《分析哲学：回顾与反省》,四川教育出版社,2001年版,196页。
①Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.19.
②斯特劳森认为使用“阐明" (elucidation)一词来代替这里的“分析”概念应更为合适,因为后者强烈地暗示着分解模式。但由于“分析”一词所具有的更宽泛的用法,他仍决定继续使用这一概念。
② Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.20.
④ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
⑤ Ibid., p.10.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.22.
② Ibid., p.23.
③参见周昌忠：《西方现代语言哲学》,上海：上海人民出版社,1992年版,339页。
④ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.19.
⑤ Ibid., p.32.
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.33.
② Ibid..
①Strawson:Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.18.
①巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,574页。
②同上,573页。
①巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,582页。
①参见塞拉斯论文《哲学和人的科学形象》(Philosophy and The Scientific Image of Man,1962),收录于塞拉斯《科学、知觉和实在》(参见Science, Perception and Reality, Ridgeview Pub Co,1991, p.40.)。
② B.A.O.Williams:Mr. Strawson on Individuals, in Philosophy (36),1961, p.325.
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,178页。
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,362页。
②具体可参见胡塞尔：《欧洲科学的危机和超验现象学》(Die Krisis der Europaischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phanomenologie)1954年版第二部分,§9h(“作为被忘却的自然科学基本意义的生活世界”),第48-54页。
①具体可参见胡塞尔：《纯粹现象学与现象学哲学的观念》(Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophic)第一卷《纯粹现象学一般导论》(Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine phano menologie,1931)(英译：Ideas,1931)。
②具体参见论文4.4“确定性、自然主义与先验论证的价值目标”中对信念确定性的实质的分析,维氏将一种常识的普遍印证观运用到对于确定性的解释中,此处的印证是相对于完备证明而言的,通过自然主义实在论的视角表达了一种强烈的隐含其中的反“因果关系决定论”的倾向。
①转引自巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,581页。
②同上,582页。
③ S. Hampshire:Thought and Action, Chatto and Windus,1959, p.28.
④具体可参见皮尔斯编：《自由和意志》(D.F. Pears:Freedom and the Will, Macmillan,1963)中汉普谢尔等和皮尔斯之间的讨论。
①巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,575页。
②具体可参见P.Geach:Mental acts:their content and their objects (Studies in philosophical psychology), Taylor & Francis,1971.
①苗力田译：《亚里士多德全集》(第1卷),北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990年版,247页。
②同上,251页。
③ Nicholars Rescher:Foundationalism, Coherentism an d the Idea of Cognitive Systematization, in Emest Sosa, ed., Knowledge and Justification, Vol.l.Brook field:Dartmou th Publishing Companion,1994.
④ John Locke:An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford University Press,1975.
①胡军：《知识论引论》,哈尔滨：黑龙江教育出版社,1997年版,62页。
②转引自周超：《逻辑、历史与社会》,北京：中国社会科学出版社,2003年版,26页。
③ T.S.Kuhn:The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago Press,1962, p.23.
④ Laudan:Beyond Positivism and Relativism:Theory, Method, and Evidence, Colorado:Westview Press,1996, 154.
① W. James:The Meaning of Truth:A Sequel to "Pragmatism", New York:Longmans, Green, and Co..1911, p.230.
②赖欣巴哈：《科学哲学的兴起》,北京：商务印书馆,1991年版,35页。
③陈嘉明：《康德哲学的基础主义》,南京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(3),65-71页。
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.11
② Ibid., p.10.
③ Ibid.,p.85.
④ Ibid., p.87.
⑤ Ibid., p.58.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.45.
②Ibid., p.52.
③Ibid., pp.52-54.
④Ibid., p.246.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.96-97.
②Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.165.
③Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.101.
④限于篇幅,斯特劳森《个体》第3章对人的概念与经验的归属的关系的分析未展开,这也是今后研究的一个内容。
④Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, p.23.
①Rorty:Introduction of the Linguistic Turm, Chicago,1967, p.35.
②Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
①更多参看胡作玄、邓明立：《二十世纪数学思想》,济南：山东教育出版社,1997年版,149页,359页,358-502页；以及王则柯：《拓扑理论及其应用》,北京：国际工业出版社,1991年版,236页。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A145,B184。
②同上,A140,B180。韦卓民原文译为“图型”
③同上,A140,B179。
①笛卡尔：《探究真理的指导原则》,管震湖译,北京：商务印书馆,1995年版,21-23页。
②康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,B27。
③康德：《任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论》,庞景仁译,北京：商务印书馆,1982年版,168页。
④Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.35.
⑤Ibid., p.10.
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②Ibid.,p.31.
①Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.330.
②Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
①译载车铭洲《现代西方语言哲学》,原文见Phenomenology and Ontology第7章(1970)。
②原文见Phenomenology and Ontology第4章。
③江怡：《哲学的用处在于使人有自知之明—访斯特劳森教授》,载《哲学动态》1996年第10期。
④ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
⑤ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
①Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.50.
②参见保罗.利科主编的《哲学主要倾向》(商务印书馆,1988年版)中《语言和本体论》部分。
③载陈嘉映《冷风集》,2001年版。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.39.
①参见《纯批》中《原理分析论》第1章“知性纯粹概念的图式法”
②参见《纯批》中《先验感性论》部分。
① Conversation with Peter Strawson, in B. Magge, ed., Modern British Philosophy, New York,1971, p.115.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.40.
③这些先验式问题可参见Strawson的Individuals (1959), The Bounds of Sense (1966), Skepticism and Naturalism (1985), Analysis and Metaphysics (1992, Kant's New Foundations of Metaphysics in his Entity and Identity (1997); P.Stroud的Transcendental Arguments (1968), Transcendental Arguments and Epistemological Naturalism. (1977); H.Putnam的Is Semantics Possible? (1970), Reason,Truth,and History (1981); J.Searle的The Construction of Social Reality (1995); Burge的Individualism and the Mental (1979); Davidson的Truth and Meaning(1967), In Defence of Convention-T(1973), Radical Interpretation(1973)等论著。
①可参见Richard Rorty的Strawson's Objectivity Argument, The Review of Metaphysics,Vol.24, No.2 (Dec, 1970), Ralph C.S.Walker的Kant(1978),以及W.Cerf的Critical Notice on The Bounds of Senses, Mind, vol.81 (1972).
①可参见程炼《先验论证》(《哲学研究》1998(10)),赵汀阳《先验论证》(《世界哲学》2005(3)),徐向东《怀疑论、知识与辩护》(2006)。
②载Daedalus, Winter,1997。
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
②也有学者将identify译为“确认”,将redentify译为“重新确认”(见《个体》,江怡译,2004年版,中国人民大学出版社),本文仍采用通译名“识别”和“再识别”。
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.31.
④ Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.330.
⑤ Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
① Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
③ Ibid., p.16.
④ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
⑤ Ibid.,p.50.
⑥ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.39.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.30.
② Conversation with Peter Strawson, in B. Magge, ed., Modern British Philosophy, New York,1971, p.115.
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.40.
④ Ibid..
⑤ Ibid.,p.78.
⑥ Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.16.
⑦ Strawon:Skepticism and Naturalism, Methuen,1985, p.21.
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.19.
② Ibid., p.32.
③ Ibid..
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Taylor & Francis Group,1959, p.87.
②康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A93,B126。
①转引自M.k.穆尼茨：《当代分析哲学》,上海：复旦大学出版社,1986年版,182页。
②罗素：《逻辑与知识》,苑莉均译,北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,21]页。
①罗素：《逻辑与知识》,苑莉均译,北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,418页。
②斯特劳森将具有唯一指称用法的语词简称为语词,将以具有唯一指称用法起首的语句简称为语句。
③单称指示代词、单称人称代词及非人称代词等在罗素处被称为“自我中心词”(索引词),罗素在《人类的知识》中有专门论述,即“意义随说话者和他在时空中位置的不同而改变的那些词”,被排除于专名体系之外。
④Strawson:On Referring, Mind, New Series, Vol.59, No.235(Jul.1950), p.326.
①Sawson:On Referring,Mind,Jul.1950,p.326.
②Ibjd..
③Ibid.,p-325.
④Ibid.,p.326.
① Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.325.
② Ibid., p.328.
①Strawson:On Referring, Mind, Jul.1950, p.328.
②Ibid.,p.330.
③Ibid..
④Ibid.,p.332.
⑤AC Grayling:《哲学逻辑引论》,牟博译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1990年版,101页。
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,174页。
②陈波：《逻辑哲学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,169-170页。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,146页。
②同上,12页。
③转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.441;原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959, p.224.
①转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.441:原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959, p.224.
① Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.439.
②转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.441;原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959,p.218.
③ Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, pp.441-443.
④奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,156页。
⑤同上。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年,129页。
②同上,29页。
① Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.442.
② Ibid., p.443.
①转引自Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.447,原文见Quine:Methods of Logic, New York,1959, p.224.
②同上p.256.
①Strawson:Singualar Terms, Ontology and Identity, Mind, Oct.1956, p.451.
①涂纪亮主编：《当代英美哲学》,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1988年版,170页。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.16.
③ Ibid., p.15.
④ Ibid., p.23.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.16.
② Ibid., p.52.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.18-19.
② Ibid., p.18.
③ Ibid., p.53.
④ Ibid., p.19.
⑤ Ibid.,p.21.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.20.
②Ibid., p.22.
③Ibid., p.24.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.31.
② Ibid..
③ Ibid., p.32.
④ Ibid.,p.35.
① Strawson:Singular Term and Predication, in his Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.59.
① J.M.E. Moravcsik:Strawson and Ontological Priority, in R.J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy (Second Series), Oxford,1965, p.25.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.16.
①维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》,北京：商务印书馆,1962年版,56页。
②Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.40.
① Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.161.
②奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,12页。
③ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.39.
④ Ibid.,p.40.
②Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.40.
Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.234.
③Ibid., p.236.
④Ibid., p.237.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.238.
② Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.52.
③ Ibid..
④ Ibid., p.54.
⑤ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.54.
① Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.125.
② Ibid., p.211.
①陈波：《奎因哲学研究——从逻辑和语言的观点看》,北京：三联书店,1998年版,278页。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,65页。
②奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,71页。
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997, p.45.
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1997,.47.
② Ibid..
③Ibid., p.45.
①Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
②Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.240.
③Ibid..
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.241.
②Ibid..
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.49.
② Ibid..
③ Strawson:Singular term, Ontology and Identity, in Mind.Vol.Lxv.N.20,1956, p.438.
①斯特劳森从识别的认识框架出发借助于物质物体的特性和时空框架的相互依赖关系对物质物体作为基本殊相所作的论证,具体见第3章。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.60.
③ Ibid., p.16.
①B.A.O.Williams:Mr.Strawson on Individual,in Philosophy(36),1961,p.322.
②Ibid.,p.325.
③Ibid..
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.170.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.171.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.185.
② Ibid..
③ Ibid.,p.210.
① Strawson:Singular terms and predication, The Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961), p.395.
② Ibid., p.396.
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.179.
④ Ibid., p.138.
⑤ Ibid..
⑥ B.A.O.Williams:Mr.Strawson on Individual, in Philosophy (36),1961, p.326.
⑦关于人的基本殊相地位的确立,斯特劳森采用了一种区别于将物质物体确立为基本殊相的“不同却相关的方式”,具体探讨见第3章。
①陈嘉映在《事物、事实、论证》(载陈嘉映：《冷风集》,东方出版社2001年版,173-182页)一文的第3节和第8节中对斯特劳森将事实排除在世界之外的观点进行了批评,我们认为陈文由于并非立足于对斯特劳森的本体论的全面考察,因而未能看到其中事物本体论与事实本体论的不自洽因素,但该文的批判与发挥是极有见地的。
② Strawson:Truth, in his Logic-linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.195.
③ Ibid., p.198.
④见江怡主编《走向新世纪的西方哲学》中第4节《描述的形而上学：斯特劳森》(余纪元撰),北京：中国社会科学出版社,1998年版,75页。
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,175-176页。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.138.
③ Strawson:My Philosophy, in The Philosophy of P.F.Strawson, Indian Council of Philosophical Research,1995, p.9.
④ Strawson:Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, Methuen,1974, p.13.
5 Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.185.
⑥ Ibid., p.210.
⑦保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,176页。
⑧同上,176-177页。
①见车铭洲主编《现代西方语言哲学》中译载的J. N. Mohan ty:《意义与真理—Ⅰ》,天津：南开大学出版社,1989年版,381页。
②同上。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.226.
②Quine:Ontological Relativity and other Essays, New York:Columbia University Press,1969, p.50.
③Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.125.
④奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,16页。
①施太格谬勒：《当代哲学主流》(下卷),北京：商务印书馆,1992年版,269页。
②Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.39.
③Ibid., p.247.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.41.
② Ibid., pp.234-235.
③沙夫：《语义学引论》,北京：商务印书馆,1979年版,328页。
①奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》,江天骥等译,上海：上海译文出版社,1987年版,43页。
②同上,41页。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
①Strawson:Construction and analysis,中译见《哲学中的变革》,上海：上海译文出版社,1985年版,81页。
②同上。
③同上,76页。
④同上。
①Strawson:Construction and analysis,中译见《哲学中的变革》,上海：上海译文出版社,1985年版,85页。
②Strawson:Introduction to Logic Theory, Methuen,1952, p.78.
③Ibid.,p.231.
① Quine:Word and Object, New York:The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1960, p.7.
②戴维森：《论概念图式这一观念》,载《逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选》(陈波,韩林合主编),牟博译,北京：东方出版社,2005年版,557页。
③康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A140,B178,“图式”在韦卓民原文中译为“图型”
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A142,B181。
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
②参见T.S.Kuhn:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press,1962.
③ T.S.Kuhn:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press,1962, p.134.
① Strawson:The Bound of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen&Co.Ltd,1966, p.15.
②戴维森：《论概念图式这一观念》,载《逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选》(陈波,韩林合主编),牟博译,北京：东方出版社,2005年版,562-563页。
①戴维森：《论概念图式这一观念》,载《逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选》(陈波,韩林合主编),牟博译,北京：东方出版社,2005年版,576-577页。
②同上,559页。
③同上,572页。
① Davidson:Meaning, Truth, and Evidence, in R.Barrett and R.Gibson (eds.) Perspective on Quine, Oxford: Blackwell,1991, pp.68-79.
② Maker,W.(1991)Davidson's Transcendental Arguments.Philosophy and Phenomeno-logical Research,vol.51.
③ Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, New York:Columbia University Press,1983, p.21.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.27.
② Ibid..
③ Ibid..
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.27.
② Ibid.,p.28.
③ Ibid.,p.29.
④ Ibid., p.30.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.27.
② Ibid.,p.216.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.42-43.
②Ibid.,p.42.
③Ibid..
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.25.
② Ibid.,p.31.
③ B.Magge:Conversation with Peter Strawson,in B.Magge (ed.):Modern British Philosophy,New York,1971. p.122.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.29.
② Ibid.,p.30.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.54.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.33.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.56.
②Ibid., p.58.
③Ibid..
④参见江怡译著：《个体：论描述的形而上学》序言,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004年版,7页。
⑤Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.56.
⑥Ibid.,p.57.
①应奇：《概念图式与形而上学》,学林出版社,2000年版,99页。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.60.
③ Ibid., p.66.
④ Ibid.,p.72.
⑤ Ibid., p.74.
⑥ Ibid.,p.88.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.86.
②具体参见Hacker P:Strawson's Concept of a Person, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 2002,102:21-40.
③ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.102.
④ Ibid..
①关于斯特劳森思想的基础主义特征的探讨具体见第6章第1节。
① Conversation with Peter Strawson, in B. Magge, ed.. Modern British Philosophy, New York,1971, pp.115-130.
② Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen,1966.
③康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A11,B25。
④康德：《未来形而上学导论》,北京：商务印书馆,1978年版,53页。
⑤同上,172页。
⑥康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A85,B117。
①参见A.C.Grayling:Transcendental Arguments, in his Refutation of Scepticism, Duckworth,1985.
①参见R.Carnap:Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, Revue Internationable de Philosophie 4(1950), pp.20-40.
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.58.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.40.
② Ibid.,p.29.
③ Ibid.,p.40.
④康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A85,B117。
⑤同上。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A3,B126。
② Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.35.
③ Ibid..
① Stroud, Barry:Transcendental Arguments, Journal of Philosophy (65),1968.
② John Locke:An essay concerning human understanding, P. H. Nidditch (Oxford:Clarendon Press),1975, p.409.
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A79,B105。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A79,B105。
②同上,A80,B106。
③同上,B20-B23。
④ Derek A. McDougall:"Descriptive"and"Revisionary"Metaphysics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.34, No.2 (Dec,1973), p.209.
⑤ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.9.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.34-35, p.78, p.106, p.109.
② Ibid., p.35.
③ Ibid., p.78.
④ Ibid., pp.34-35, p.78, p.106, p.35.
⑤ Ibid., p.35.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.36.
② A.C.Grayling:An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, pp.283-284, Duckworth,1990.
③该论证参见Barry Stroud:Transcendental Arguments, Journal of Philosophy 65,1968, pp.241-256.
①具体论述参见Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, pp.87-116.
② Ibid., p.103.
③ Ibid., p.102.
④ Ibid., p.96.
⑤ Ibid., p.106.
①A.C.Grayling:Transcendental Arguments, in his Refutation of Scepticism, Duckworth,1985, p.84.
②Barry Stroud:Transcendental Arguments, Journal of Philosophy 65,1968, p.256.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.35.
② Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.16.
③ Ibid.,p.91.
④康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A104。
①类似思想的一个持有者是Sosa,参见Sosa:Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge, Mind 97 (1988),pp.153-188.我们关于适度先验论证的阐释也受到Sosa相关观点的启发。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A369。
②同上,A371-372.
③Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.16.
①Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.8
②Ibid..
③Ibid..
④Ibid.,p.90.
①Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.91.
②Ibid., p.98.
③Ibid., p.100.
④具体联系《个体》第3章关于人的论述。
① Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.102.
②康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,B132。
③此处的“认识”指将一个特殊的事物归类为某种一般种类的事物的过程,即归于某一概念的过程。
④ W.Cerf:Critical Notice on The Bounds of Sensem, Mind, vol.81,1972, p.612.
⑤ Richard Rorty:Strawson's Objectivity Argument, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.24, No.2 (Dec,1970), p.218.
① Ralph C.S.Walker:Kant. London:Routledge,1978, p.117.
② Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.94.
③康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,B158-159。
④ Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.104.
① Richard Rorty:Strawson's Objectivity Argument, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.24, No.2 (Dec,1970), p.218.
① Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London:Methuen,1966, pp.88-89..
② Ibid.,p.24.
③ Wittgenstein:On Certainty, Blackwell,1979, §1,以下《论确定性》的引文均只注明节数。
①现代数理逻辑中“证明”概念有了诸多变化。但作为一般论理词的“证明”,特别是基础主义框架下的“证明”,仍然是以经典数学证明作为范型的(参见以下“证明”与“印证”的比较)。
②On Certainty,§§141-2.
③On Certainty,§4.
④L.Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigation,Oxford,1967,§472,以下《哲学研究》的引文均只注明节数。
⑤Philosophical Investigation,§481.
⑥On Certainty,§144.
⑦On Certainty,§§275-6.
⑧On Certainty,§§204,110.
①On Certainty,§248.
②On Certainty,§§66-69,83,211.
③Philosophical Investigation,§84.
①参见Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, pp.12-13他运用了关于康德先验观念论与经验实在论的内在紧张(tension)的联想(p.12),然而他认为区别在于休谟理论的不自洽因素“留下的是未解决的怀疑论”,康德却给出了先验观念论的证明(p.13)。
②Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, p.24.
③Ibid., p.149.
④Ibid.,p.22-23.
①Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, p.23.
②Ibid., p.21.
③Ibid.,p.23.
④徐向东：《怀疑论、知识与辩护》,北京：北京大学出版社,2006年版,570页。
①Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.262.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.11
② Ibid..
③ Ibid., p.9.
④ Ibid., p.10.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.10.
②Ibid..
①Strawson:Construction and analysis,中译见《哲学中的革命》,上海：上海译文出版社,1985年版,81页。
②同上。
③同上,82页。
④同上,84-85页。
⑤同上,85页。
①参见周昌忠：《西方现代语言哲学》,上海：上海人民出版社,1992年版,336页。
②Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.17.
③Ibid..
④Ibid., p.19.
⑤陈波：《分析哲学：回顾与反省》,四川教育出版社,2001年版,196页。
①Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.19.
②斯特劳森认为使用“阐明" (elucidation)一词来代替这里的“分析”概念应更为合适,因为后者强烈地暗示着分解模式。但由于“分析”一词所具有的更宽泛的用法,他仍决定继续使用这一概念。
② Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, P.F Strawson, Oxford University Press,1992, p.20.
④ Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
⑤ Ibid., p.10.
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.22.
② Ibid., p.23.
③参见周昌忠：《西方现代语言哲学》,上海：上海人民出版社,1992年版,339页。
④ Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.19.
⑤ Ibid., p.32.
① Strawson:Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,1992, p.33.
② Ibid..
①Strawson:Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen,1971, p.18.
①巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,574页。
②同上,573页。
①巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,582页。
①参见塞拉斯论文《哲学和人的科学形象》(Philosophy and The Scientific Image of Man,1962),收录于塞拉斯《科学、知觉和实在》(参见Science, Perception and Reality, Ridgeview Pub Co,1991, p.40.)。
② B.A.O.Williams:Mr. Strawson on Individuals, in Philosophy (36),1961, p.325.
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,178页。
①保罗.利科主编：《哲学主要趋向》,北京：商务印书馆,1988年版,362页。
②具体可参见胡塞尔：《欧洲科学的危机和超验现象学》(Die Krisis der Europaischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phanomenologie)1954年版第二部分,§9h(“作为被忘却的自然科学基本意义的生活世界”),第48-54页。
①具体可参见胡塞尔：《纯粹现象学与现象学哲学的观念》(Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophic)第一卷《纯粹现象学一般导论》(Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine phano menologie,1931)(英译：Ideas,1931)。
②具体参见论文4.4“确定性、自然主义与先验论证的价值目标”中对信念确定性的实质的分析,维氏将一种常识的普遍印证观运用到对于确定性的解释中,此处的印证是相对于完备证明而言的,通过自然主义实在论的视角表达了一种强烈的隐含其中的反“因果关系决定论”的倾向。
①转引自巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,581页。
②同上,582页。
③ S. Hampshire:Thought and Action, Chatto and Windus,1959, p.28.
④具体可参见皮尔斯编：《自由和意志》(D.F. Pears:Freedom and the Will, Macmillan,1963)中汉普谢尔等和皮尔斯之间的讨论。
①巴斯摩尔：《哲学百年·新近哲学家》(孙祖培译),北京：商务印书馆,1996年版,575页。
②具体可参见P.Geach:Mental acts:their content and their objects (Studies in philosophical psychology), Taylor & Francis,1971.
①苗力田译：《亚里士多德全集》(第1卷),北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990年版,247页。
②同上,251页。
③ Nicholars Rescher:Foundationalism, Coherentism an d the Idea of Cognitive Systematization, in Emest Sosa, ed., Knowledge and Justification, Vol.l.Brook field:Dartmou th Publishing Companion,1994.
④ John Locke:An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford University Press,1975.
①胡军：《知识论引论》,哈尔滨：黑龙江教育出版社,1997年版,62页。
②转引自周超：《逻辑、历史与社会》,北京：中国社会科学出版社,2003年版,26页。
③ T.S.Kuhn:The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago Press,1962, p.23.
④ Laudan:Beyond Positivism and Relativism:Theory, Method, and Evidence, Colorado:Westview Press,1996, 154.
① W. James:The Meaning of Truth:A Sequel to "Pragmatism", New York:Longmans, Green, and Co..1911, p.230.
②赖欣巴哈：《科学哲学的兴起》,北京：商务印书馆,1991年版,35页。
③陈嘉明：《康德哲学的基础主义》,南京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(3),65-71页。
① Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.11
② Ibid., p.10.
③ Ibid.,p.85.
④ Ibid., p.87.
⑤ Ibid., p.58.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.45.
②Ibid., p.52.
③Ibid., pp.52-54.
④Ibid., p.246.
①Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.96-97.
②Strawson:The Bounds of Sense:An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London:Methuen,1966, p.165.
③Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.101.
④限于篇幅,斯特劳森《个体》第3章对人的概念与经验的归属的关系的分析未展开,这也是今后研究的一个内容。
④Strawson:Skepticism and Naturalism:Some Varieties, Methuen,1985, p.23.
①Rorty:Introduction of the Linguistic Turm, Chicago,1967, p.35.
②Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.15.
①更多参看胡作玄、邓明立：《二十世纪数学思想》,济南：山东教育出版社,1997年版,149页,359页,358-502页；以及王则柯：《拓扑理论及其应用》,北京：国际工业出版社,1991年版,236页。
①康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,A145,B184。
②同上,A140,B180。韦卓民原文译为“图型”
③同上,A140,B179。
①笛卡尔：《探究真理的指导原则》,管震湖译,北京：商务印书馆,1995年版,21-23页。
②康德：《纯粹理性批判》,韦卓民译,武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2000年版,B27。
③康德：《任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论》,庞景仁译,北京：商务印书馆,1982年版,168页。
④Strawson:Individuals:An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York:Methuen,1959, p.35.
⑤Ibid., p.10.
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[1]斯特劳森：个体：论描述的形而上学(江怡译).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[2]斯特劳森：康德与当代哲学家.哲学研究,1988(9).
[3]艾耶尔：二十世纪哲学(李步楼等译).上海：上海译文出版社,1987.
[4]艾耶尔：哲学中的革命(陈少鸣等译).上海：上海译文出版社,1985.
[5]巴斯摩尔：哲学百年·新近哲学家(孙祖培译).北京：商务印书馆,1996.
[6]保罗·利科：哲学主要趋向(李幼蒸等).北京：商务印书馆,1988.
[7]戴维森：论概念图式这一观念.载逻辑与语言——分析哲学经典文选(牟博译).北京：东方出版社,2005.
[8]戴维森：真理、意义行动与事件(牟博译).北京：商务印书馆,1993.
[9]笛卡尔：第一哲学沉思录(庞景仁译).北京：商务印书馆,1986.
[10]笛卡尔：探究真理的指导原则(管震湖译).北京：商务印书馆,1995.
[11]弗朗奇：分析哲学基础(周继明等译).上海：上海译文出版社,1994.
[12]弗雷格：算术基础(王路译).北京：商务印书馆,1998.
[13]胡塞尔：纯粹现象学和现象学哲学的观念(李幼蒸译).北京：商务印书馆,1992.
[14]胡塞尔：欧洲科学的危机和超验现象学(张庆熊译).上海：上海译文出版社,2005.
[15]格雷林：哲学逻辑引论(牟博译).北京：中国社会科学出版社,1990.
[16]康德：纯粹理性批判(韦卓民译).湖北：华中师范大学出版社,1991.
[17]康德：任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论(庞景仁译).北京：商务印书馆,1982.
[18]康德：未来形而上学导论(庞景仁译).北京：商务印书馆,1978.
[19]奎因：从逻辑的观点看(陈启伟等译).上海：上海译文出版社,1987.
[20]奎因.语词和对象(朱锐等译).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[21]赖欣巴哈：科学哲学的兴起(伯尼译).北京：商务印书馆,1991.
[22]赖尔：心的概念(徐大健译).上海译文出版社,1987.
[23]罗素：逻辑与知识(温锡增译).北京：商务印书馆,1996.
[24]罗素：数理哲学导论(晏成书译).北京：商务印书馆,1983.
[25]罗素：我的哲学的发展(温锡增译).北京：商务印书馆,1996.
[26]罗素：哲学问题(何兆武译).北京：商务印书馆,1999.
[27]罗蒂：哲学与自然之镜(李幼蒸译).北京：商务印书馆,2003.
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