美国知识分子与美国核战略思想的演变（1945-1960）
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摘要
二十世纪四五十年代,核武器与冷战形势的出现和不断发展,带动了美国知识界围绕着核武器与国家战略进行了广泛的思考,在社会科学界造就了一批研究核战略的战略学者(又称民间战略家),如布罗迪、福克斯、沃尔弗斯、瓦伊纳、奥斯古德、谢林、基辛格、卡恩、沃尔斯泰特、考夫曼、希契、特纳、哈恩、卡普兰、希尔斯曼、坎内尔等。这些学者通过出版著作、发表文章、撰写报告、发表演讲等多种方式充分表达了自己的思想,涉及内容广泛,产生了优秀而丰富的思想成果,涉及核武器的军事与政治意义与影响、核武器与威慑战略、全面战争与有限战争理论、恐怖平衡理论、核武器对一般国际关系以及西方同盟关系的影响、核武器与民防计划、核武器的控制、核裁军、核扩散等诸多问题。
这些思想是与冷战时代核武器及其形势的发展、与美国国家核战略的发展相伴而行的。有些是对核武器本身影响的思考,有些是对美苏冷战特别是核军备竞赛形势的反应,有些是对美国官方核战略的批评和建议,还有对核威胁下民众安全与生活的关怀。这些思考与讨论,通常与官方的核政策产生一些互动,有些观点或许被政府和军方采纳从而对官方的政策产生影响；或许不被采纳,但也会为官方或民众看待这些问题开阔了视野、增加了角度。其中在五十年代,他们围绕着“大规模报复”战略,对热核时代的威慑战略的思考与讨论,带动了美国朝野各界对当时美国核战略的广泛探讨,为五十年代到六十年代美国核战略的转变——由“大规模报复”向“灵活反应”,由全面战争战略向以“确保摧毁”为后盾的有限战争战略的转变——发挥了巨大的推动作用。
此外,核问题既是历史问题,更是现实问题。冷战早已结束,发生大规模核战争的危险基本消除了,但它遗留的核扩散的危险加大了,那就是不负责任的国家行为体和以恐怖分子为代表的非国家行为体获取核武器的努力愈加威胁着世界大多数国家和民众的安全。而中国已成为世界上拥有核邻国最多的国家,并且与这些邻国关系复杂,某些地区局势始终不稳定,这都成为中国极大的安全隐患。通过对核武器发展前期美国知识分子战略思想的研究,我们能够从中汲取一些智慧、经验和教训,为解决以上国际问题和中国自身问题提供些许的借鉴。
In the1940s and1950s, with the development of nuclear weapons and cold war, American intellectuals devoted plenty of thoughts on the nuclear weapons and national strategy. Under this circumstance, lots of strategic scholars or civilian strategists became well known in the field of social science, such as Bernard Brodie, William Fox, Arnold Wolfers, Jacob Viner, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, William Kaufmann, Roger Hilsman, Charles Hitch, Gordon Turner, Walter Hahn、Rogers Gannell, Morton Kaplan and so on. All these scholars expressed their thoughts by publishing books, articles, writing reports, giving lectures and making speeches, and made great achievement which involved nuclear weapons'military and political effects, strategy of nuclear deterrence, the theory of general war and limited war, balance of terror, nuclear weapons'effects to international relations and western allies, civil defense, nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms control, nuclear proliferation and so on.
All the thoughts above interacted with the development of nuclear weapons and the United States'national nuclear strategy in cold war era, some of which involved with the nuclear weapons themselves'effects, some were responses to the American-Soviet nuclear contest, some were critics and suggestions to the United States'national nuclear strategy and some were concerns about civilians'safety and life under the nuclear threat. Some opinions may be accepted by the U.S. government and military service and affected the official policy, some may not be accepted, but still could open the government and public's mind on the nuclear issues. In the1950s, the strategic scholars'thoughts and debate on the strategy of "massive retaliation" promoted American government and public's great argumentation on "limited war", which played a very important role in the transition from the strategy of "massive retaliation" to the strategy of "flexible response", which was a limited war strategy backed up by general war ability, in the early1960s.
Furthermore, the nuclear issue is not only a historical problem but also a contemporary problem. With the end of the Cold War, the danger of massive nuclear war disappeared basically, however, the danger of nuclear proliferation increased. Irresponsible state actors and non-state actors represented by international terrorists' effort to possess nuclear weapons is making more and more threat to most nations and peoples'security in the world. And since China is surrounded by the most nuclear armed neighbors, and has complicated relations with these nuclear neighbors, some of which are in an unstable situation, China is actually suffering serious nuclear threat today. Based on American intellectuals'strategic thoughts on the nuclear issue in the early time, maybe we can learn some wisdom and knowledge to help solving the problems face by the world and China.
这些思想是与冷战时代核武器及其形势的发展、与美国国家核战略的发展相伴而行的。有些是对核武器本身影响的思考,有些是对美苏冷战特别是核军备竞赛形势的反应,有些是对美国官方核战略的批评和建议,还有对核威胁下民众安全与生活的关怀。这些思考与讨论,通常与官方的核政策产生一些互动,有些观点或许被政府和军方采纳从而对官方的政策产生影响；或许不被采纳,但也会为官方或民众看待这些问题开阔了视野、增加了角度。其中在五十年代,他们围绕着“大规模报复”战略,对热核时代的威慑战略的思考与讨论,带动了美国朝野各界对当时美国核战略的广泛探讨,为五十年代到六十年代美国核战略的转变——由“大规模报复”向“灵活反应”,由全面战争战略向以“确保摧毁”为后盾的有限战争战略的转变——发挥了巨大的推动作用。
此外,核问题既是历史问题,更是现实问题。冷战早已结束,发生大规模核战争的危险基本消除了,但它遗留的核扩散的危险加大了,那就是不负责任的国家行为体和以恐怖分子为代表的非国家行为体获取核武器的努力愈加威胁着世界大多数国家和民众的安全。而中国已成为世界上拥有核邻国最多的国家,并且与这些邻国关系复杂,某些地区局势始终不稳定,这都成为中国极大的安全隐患。通过对核武器发展前期美国知识分子战略思想的研究,我们能够从中汲取一些智慧、经验和教训,为解决以上国际问题和中国自身问题提供些许的借鉴。
In the1940s and1950s, with the development of nuclear weapons and cold war, American intellectuals devoted plenty of thoughts on the nuclear weapons and national strategy. Under this circumstance, lots of strategic scholars or civilian strategists became well known in the field of social science, such as Bernard Brodie, William Fox, Arnold Wolfers, Jacob Viner, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, William Kaufmann, Roger Hilsman, Charles Hitch, Gordon Turner, Walter Hahn、Rogers Gannell, Morton Kaplan and so on. All these scholars expressed their thoughts by publishing books, articles, writing reports, giving lectures and making speeches, and made great achievement which involved nuclear weapons'military and political effects, strategy of nuclear deterrence, the theory of general war and limited war, balance of terror, nuclear weapons'effects to international relations and western allies, civil defense, nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms control, nuclear proliferation and so on.
All the thoughts above interacted with the development of nuclear weapons and the United States'national nuclear strategy in cold war era, some of which involved with the nuclear weapons themselves'effects, some were responses to the American-Soviet nuclear contest, some were critics and suggestions to the United States'national nuclear strategy and some were concerns about civilians'safety and life under the nuclear threat. Some opinions may be accepted by the U.S. government and military service and affected the official policy, some may not be accepted, but still could open the government and public's mind on the nuclear issues. In the1950s, the strategic scholars'thoughts and debate on the strategy of "massive retaliation" promoted American government and public's great argumentation on "limited war", which played a very important role in the transition from the strategy of "massive retaliation" to the strategy of "flexible response", which was a limited war strategy backed up by general war ability, in the early1960s.
Furthermore, the nuclear issue is not only a historical problem but also a contemporary problem. With the end of the Cold War, the danger of massive nuclear war disappeared basically, however, the danger of nuclear proliferation increased. Irresponsible state actors and non-state actors represented by international terrorists' effort to possess nuclear weapons is making more and more threat to most nations and peoples'security in the world. And since China is surrounded by the most nuclear armed neighbors, and has complicated relations with these nuclear neighbors, some of which are in an unstable situation, China is actually suffering serious nuclear threat today. Based on American intellectuals'strategic thoughts on the nuclear issue in the early time, maybe we can learn some wisdom and knowledge to help solving the problems face by the world and China.
引文
① Lawrence Freedman,The Evolution of Unclear Strategy,London,The Macmillan Press LTD,1981.
②劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,黄钟青译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1989年。
①劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,第1-2页。
②劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,第2-3页。
③劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,第8页。
① Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster,1983.
② Andrew David May, Ph.D. "The RAND Corporation and the Dynamics of American Strategic Thought, 1946-1962", Emory University,1998,435 pages; AAT 9901863.
③ Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1973.
① Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States, New York: Free Press,1984.
② McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival—Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, New York: Random House, Inc.,1988.其中译本为《美国核战略》,褚广友等译,北京：世界知识出版社,1991年。
③ Barry Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1991.
① Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, London:Frank Cass,2004.
② Eugene, Emme, Book Review on Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Military Affairs, Vol.22, No.1 (Spring,1958), pp.42-43.
③ Harry Ransom, Book Review on Strategy in the Missile Age and War and Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking, Military Affairs, Vol.23, No.4 (Winter,1959-1960), pp. 216-217.
① Lawrence Kaplan, Book Review on NATO and American Security, Military Affairs, Vol.24, No.4 (Winter, 1960-1961), pp.212-213.
② William Kaufmann, "Crisis in Military Affairs", World Politics, Vol.10, No.4 (July,1958), pp.579-603.
③ Laurence Martin, Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press,1979.
④ Robert Jervis, The logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press,1984.
① K. S. Tripathi, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Vikas Publications,1970.
② P.M.S. Blackett, Studies of War, Oliver and Boyd, London,1962. Sir John Slessor, Strategy for the West, London, Cassell and Co.,1954.
③为该书作序的是印度空军上将、前空军参谋长阿尔琼·辛格(Arjan Singh),该书的目的和意义可见一斑。
④黄椿：“对大规模报复战略的几点评价”,《美国研究》,1989年第4期；朱昕昌：“大规模报复战略的兴衰”,《外国问题研究》,1993年第1期：田景梅：“核威慑与核战争”,《外交学院学报》,1997年第4期;潘锐：“‘从大规模报复’到‘星球大战’——论冷战时期美国核战略的演变”,《太平洋学报》,2002年第3期。
①徐光裕：《核战略纵横》,北京：国防大学出版社,1987年。
①许嘉：《美国战略思维研究》,北京：军事科学出版社,2003年,第187-188页。 ①本文研究范围之内,布罗迪的经历简介如下：1945年9月4日以海军中尉的职衔退役,随后进入耶鲁大学国际关系学院任副教授,其中1946-1947年,兼任国家军事学院研究员,1947年曾兼任空军学院年度讲座教授,1946-1949年问,一直兼任国防问题高级专家。1950年8月到1951年6月担任空军参谋长特别助理,其间1950年11月-1951年6月兼任兰德公司顾问,并离开耶鲁大学。1951年8月离开空军部门,担任兰德公司全职资深研究员,直到1965年8月从兰德公司退休,进入加州大学洛杉矶分校任政治学教授。
② Barry Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1991, page XI.
③ Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, page XI.
① Bernard Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security", New York Times, October 5,1945. 本文后收录于 Phillip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, Gregory Treverton:US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, New York:New York University Press,1989.
① Bernard Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,1946.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.65.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.65.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.67-68.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.68.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.68-69.
④导弹和偷运原子弹的攻击方式并非布罗迪的首创想法,早在1945年5月参与原子弹研制美国科学家利奥·希拉德(Leo Hilliard)就提出过这两种方式。见Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Unclear Strategy, London: The Macmillan Press LTD,1981, p.26.
⑤ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.69.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.69-70.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.66.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, pp.70-71.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.71.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.75.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.73.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.73.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.73-74.
④ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.74-75.
① Jacob Viner, "The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations",这是瓦伊纳在1945年11月16日的一次原子能及其影响座谈会上的发言稿,随后发表于Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,90 (January 29,1946)后来文本收录于Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, New York & London:Garland Publishing, Inc.,1987, p.2.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.75.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.75.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, 见 p.1.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.1.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.3.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.1-2.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.2-3.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.111.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.114.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.115.
④日本法政大学政治学教授下斗米伸夫于2009年3月3日晚在(中国上海)华东师范大学冷战国际史研究中心会议室所做“冷战时期的苏朝关系”的讲座。
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.117-118.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.118-119.
Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.129.
①此处应该指近代欧洲君主制与共和制国家间共处的历史经验。
② Brodie,"The Atomic Bomb as Policy Maker", 见 Trachtenberg,The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on.Strategy 1945-1951,pp.138-139.
③ Brachtenberg,The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951,pp.141一142.
④ Brodie ed.,The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order,pp.131-132.
⑤ Brodie ed.,The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and Worder,pp.132-133.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.134.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.134.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.136.
④ Brodie ed.e, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.147.
⑤ Brodie, "New Techniques of War and National Policies"，本文原载于Technology and International Relations, edited by William F. Ogburn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1949后收录于Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951,见 p.160.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.163-164.
②当时美国现役主力战略轰炸机为B-29“超级堡垒”轰炸机,最大载弹量137000磅,最大时速400英里,最大飞行高度32000英尺,作战半径3200英里。美国第一代喷气式轰炸机B-36“和事佬”轰炸机,1946年首飞,1948年开始生产交付,最大飞行距离8000英里,最大载弹量10000磅。然后是B-47“同温层堡垒”喷气式轰炸机,1947年首飞,1951年开始服役,时速可达600英里,作战半径2300英里,并可以进行空中加油,达到“全球可及”。见巴瑞特·提尔曼：《美国空军》,周正、徐明毅译,南京出版社,2004年,第118页,第155页,第169贞。
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951,pp.165-169.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.171-172.布鲁迪设想的第二阶段,并没有反映于实际中,苏联在美国大规模生产原子弹之前,就打破了美国的核垄断,直接进入了第三阶段。而第三阶段和第二阶段的形势差异不大,这两个阶段的战略设想对当今核力量相差悬殊的几个核国家具有一定的参考意义。
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.173.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.173.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.174-175.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.169.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.169.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.88-89.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.89.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.89-90.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.90.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.90.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.91.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.80.
④ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon:Atomic Power and World Order, p.149.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.149-150.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.4-5.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.5.
④ Brodie, "The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy",本文原载于 Quincy Wright, A Foreign Policy of the United States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1947, pp.89-125.后来收录于 Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.95-131.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.113-114.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.114-115.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.117.
④福克斯引用了苏联官方评论员在提及那些倡议苏联应同其他国家一样放弃主权的支持者时写道：“目前他们不但谈及欧洲联合体,甚至还有世界联合体、世界议会、世界政府等,这四个词汇的深层含义是放弃与法西斯侵略做斗争的阵地,放弃为争取持久和平做斗争的阵地。”见Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.117-172.
⑤ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.172.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.191-193.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.5.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.6.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.154-155.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.157.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.161.
① Brodie, "Tactical Effects of H-bombs", RAND report,7 November 1952后被收录于Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, p.8.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 23.
③ Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives",这是布罗迪1952年4月17日在美国空军学院的演讲,后收录于Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp.68-69.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 69.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 78-79.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 7-8.
③ Roger Hilsman, "Strategic Doctrines for Nuclear War", 见 William Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1959, p.69
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I,p. 31; p.75.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 82-83.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 84.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought:Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 82.
⑤ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 33.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 34.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I,p. 24.
③ Brodie, "A Commentary of the Preventative War Doctrine", RAND report,11 June 1953, Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960 Volume I, pp.146-147;此论还见Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives", Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960 Volume I, p.84.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I,p. 148.
⑥布罗迪在此前的论述中曾指出,美国拥有了氢弹之后,人们在讨论是否要用第一颗氢弹来打击俄国人,客观讲这个问题本身并不重要。在1950年之前,美国垄断相当数量的原子弹,而苏联什么都没有,最多有
一两个样品的时候,就什么也没有发生,何况是现在。见Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p.23.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 34-35.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 35-36.
① Gordon Turner and Richard Challener, "Strategic and Political Implications of Missiles",见, Gordon Turner and Richard Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,1960, pp.80-81.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.85-86.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.84-85.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.85-86.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.87-88.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.89-90.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.901955年11月26日,美国国防部长查尔斯·威尔逊(Charles Wilson)发布命令将发展和使用陆基洲际弹道导弹的责任交给了空军而不是陆军。见博伊恩：《跨越苍穹：美国空军史1947-1997)),第505页。此后,美国的战略空军,不仅包括战略轰炸机部队,还包括陆基洲际弹道导弹部队。②特纳和查理两人计算过,如果部属得当,射程1700英里的中程导弹以海洋为平台就可以打击到地球任何陆地上的目标,在射程上足以与远程陆基导弹相媲美。Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.90-91.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.921959年12月30日,美国第一艘载有弹道导弹的潜艇“乔治·华盛顿”号进入现役,并于1960年7月20日,成功从水下试射了UGM-27“北极星”弹道导弹,射程1200海里(相当于2000多公里)。见博伊恩：《跨越苍穹：美国空军史1947-1997》,第514-515页。
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.93.
⑤ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.93-94.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.94-95.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.95-96.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.102.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.103-104.
①德怀特·艾森豪威尔：《艾森豪威尔回忆录》(三),樊迪、静海译,北京：东方出版社,2007年,第437-438页。
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.104-105.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.105.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.106-107.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.107.
②此处查利纳举了1958年台海危机的事例,当时美国威胁对中国大陆动用核武器,而欧洲国家则致力于寻求非战争的解决方式,来说明美欧在一些冷战政策上的分歧,表明欧洲的怀疑与不安。Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.108.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.108-109.
④一战前夕曾经有一个故事,英国领导人询问自己盟友法国领导人,希望在法国大陆部署多少英国士兵,法国人说：“一个就够了,我还希望他在开战之时就被杀掉。”有一个英国士兵被杀掉就意味着对英国宣战,英国必然要卷入战争。美国海外基地的某些意义也许与这个英国士兵的意义是一致的。
①本文所指陆海空军应该理解为陆上军事力量、海上军事力量和空中军事力量的广义概念,为行文方便简称陆军、海军和空军,特此说明。
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.59.
Robert Coakley, "The Army as a Flexible Instrument of National Policy", 见, Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.253.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.253-264.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.264.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.264-265.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.266-267.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.267.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.268-269.
④ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.59.
⑤ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.269-270.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.271-272.
②之前希尔斯曼就提出要出色的完成传统任务,地面部队需要同时具备易疏散性和机动性。要避免核武器的打击,需要尽可能的疏散,而为了阻挡敌人进攻或者进攻敌人又需要迅速的集中。见Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.60.
③ U. S. Army Center of Military History, American Military History, p.584.
④ Turner, "Air and Sea Power in Relations to National Power", 见 Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age:Basic Facts and Theories, p.240.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.240-241.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facs and Theories, p.242.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.243.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.244.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.244-245.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.245.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.241.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.242.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.58.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.245-246.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.230-232.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.234-237.
③博伊恩：《跨越苍穹：美国空军史1947-1997》,第126页。
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.238.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.238-239.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.239.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.238.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.248-252.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.239.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.245.
① Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1959, pp.176-177.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.180-181.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.184.
④ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.184-185.
⑤ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.185.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.185.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.185-186.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.188.
④ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.188-189.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.189-190.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.190.
Klaus Knorr, "Passive Air Defense for the United States", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.79.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.191.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.194-195.
③波马克地对空导弹是美国空军第一代远程地空飞航式导弹,代号CIM-10。主要用于区域防空,能拦截远距离的中、高空飞机或飞航式导弹,为美国50年代至60年代中期本土防空主要武器系统之一,外形类似超音速歼击机。它是美国空军发展的唯一的地空导弹系统,美军所有其他的地空导弹都是由陆军发展的,同时也是世界上射程最远的地对空导弹武器系统。该类A型导弹最大射高18000米,最低射高3000米,最远射程320公里,A型导弹1964年全部退役,布罗迪撰文
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.202-203.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.86; p.93.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.203-204.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.204-205.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.87.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.206-207.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.86-87.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.88-94.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.211-212.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.215-216.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.86.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.213.
①政策的形成过程参见Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, Boston:The Atlantic Monthly Press,1973, pp.191-193该战略主要体现于美国政府NSC-162、NSC-162/1、NSC-162/2系列文件以及杜勒斯1954年1月12日在纽约向外交关系委员会发表的演讲,由于政府政策并非本文研究内容,故不多做介绍。该系列文件和演讲主要内容请参见Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1977, pp.401-405全文参见华东师范大学冷战国际史研究中心馆藏美国国家安全档案NSC-162系列文件,馆藏编号分别为Reel Ⅲ:0997,1031、 1062。
Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, p.409.
①早期意识到核武器的威慑意义的学者当然不止布罗迪一人,前文所述沃尔弗斯提出的“三道防线”应对苏联的观点中,第三道防线就是依靠核武器的威慑力；而瓦伊纳也曾暗示核威慑对稳定国际关系的意义。见本文第一章第二节。
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.76.
① Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security",见 Phillip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, Gregory Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.77.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, pp.75-77.
③威慑(deter)一词及其相关衍生词(deterrence, deterrent)等就是在二战后出现的,虽然在十九世纪就存在这样的意义,但是正式的称谓和最初的理论表述是来自布罗迪,而布罗迪被认为是二战之后最早的威慑理论家。见James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,1990, pp.387-391.
④ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.73.
① Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and the Science Crisis", Saturday Review of Literature, December 24, 1945, p.10.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.73.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.74.
④ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.77-78.
⑤ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.77.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.79.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.80.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.83-84.
Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.84.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.85.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.86.
①该演讲全文发表于New York Times, January 13,1954, p.2.
① William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.16-17.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.17.
③ Kaufrnann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.18.
④ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.19.
⑤ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.19-20.
⑥ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.20.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.20-21.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.21-22.
①如艾森豪威尔政府最终没有在朝鲜战争中如自己宣称的那样使用原子弹,不再像干预朝鲜那样干预印度支那的事态,对匈牙利事件无动于衷,在苏伊士运河危机中与苏联妥协。再如陆军部发展研究组组长詹姆斯·加文将军因对“大规模报复”战略不满,愤而辞职,公开著书立说阐述自己的不同意见,反对这种可能走向毁灭的核政策,见James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, Hutchinson of London, 1959此外,参谋长联席会议主席兰福德海军上将(Arthur Radford)积极倡导和支持该战略,而参联会重要成员、陆军参谋长李奇微将军(Matthew Ridgway)就明确反对这样的战略。见Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press,1981, p.36同时,政府与国会围绕着削减预算进行了“一连串的争吵”,艾森豪威尔政府已经尽力削减预算了,国会还不满足。一方面要威胁进行“大规模报复”,一方面削减国防开支,内部争吵不休,使人进一步怀疑政府的决断力与实践能力。见《艾森豪威回忆录》(三),第339-350页。
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.23.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.24-25.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.28-29.
③ Bernard Brodie, "Strategy Hits a Dead End", 见 Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, New York & London:Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, p.91.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, pp. 91-92.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 2.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 93.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 4.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 95.
① Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the "Grey Areas", 见 Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, p.78.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, p. 78.
① Paul Nitz, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy",本文最初发表于Foreign Affairs,34 (January,1954),后收录于Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, p.97.
②“有限战争”一词最早出自美国五星上将乔治·马歇尔(George Marshall)之口。1951年5月,美国参议院军事委员会举行听证会,讨论远东军事形势及相关对外政策,参议员凯恩(Cain)质询时任国防部长的马歇尔,如何定义朝鲜的冲突。马歇尔回答说“我将其定义为一种有限战争,并且希望它继续保持有限。”见K. S. Tripathi, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore: Vikas Publications,1970, p.82.
③ Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp.1-2.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.238.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.238.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.241.
④ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.241.
①比如,同样是在越南进行的战争,美国对越南作战,动用了除核武器以外的几乎所有的军事手段,而且还根据越南战场的特殊条件,使用落叶剂等特殊常规武器。美国具备多样的战争资源和技术,但其目标只是为了遏制共产主义向南越的扩张,并不是要占领北越,加之越南山川丛林地貌的限制,所以像坦克、装甲车等强大的地面攻击力量并没有投入多少,反而大规模使用了直升机等辅助作战力量,而其海空军的作战任务除了直接支援地面作战,就是打击北越的战争能力,阻隔交通运输等,也没有用于攻城略地。而几年之后中国对越南也进行了一场非常有限的战争,这次边界反击战,只是为了“教训”越南,维护南部边界稳定,为中国的改革开放事业保驾护航,也并非要攻城掠地,战争目标更加有限。因此,中国仅在陆地边界上动用了地面部队,海空军都没有参战。而且地面作战投入也是有限的,基本上处于二战时期的作战模式,炮兵支援步兵,少量坦克、装甲部队作为火力支援和运输力量参战,但这些就足以实现中国的作战目标。可见有限战争手段的确定是要“具体情况、具体分析”的。
②一枚两千吨当量的核弹最大摧毁半径也就是几百码,其辐射微不足道：一枚两万吨当量的氢弹将摧毁十英里半径以内的所有东西,其有害辐射范围将达数百英里。见Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.248-249.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.258-259.
① Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper & Brothers,1957, pp.183-185.
Hanson Baldwin, "Limited War", 见 Walter Hahn and John Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960, pp.258-261.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.244.
② Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.102.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.102-103.
④ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.4.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.6.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.6-7.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.7.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.7-8.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.8.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.128.后来的越南战争也说明了这一点。
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.129-130.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.130.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.131.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.131.
② Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, p.190.
③ Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p.190.
④ Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp.190-191.
① Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p.191.
② Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp.191-192.
① Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p.192.
② Schelling, Strategy of Co nflict, pp.193-194.
①截至到1959年,苏军先后装备SS-4、SS-5、SS-6系列导弹,其中SS-4为中程导弹,射程2000公里；SS-5射程为4000公里；SS-6为苏联第一种洲际导弹,射程达8000公里,命中精度3.7公里。以上为苏联第一代导弹,缺点是液体燃料推进,命中精度较差,单弹头,安全性低。在轰炸机方面,五十年代苏军主要装备了图-95“熊”式和米亚-4“野牛”式两种战略轰炸机,前者作战半径8300公里,可挂载巡航导弹,进行洲际攻击：后者作战半径5600公里,可携带4枚核航弹(每枚100万吨当量),命中精度0.37公里,加上巡航导弹自身的射程,同样可以进行洲际攻击。以上信息参见徐光裕：《核战略纵横》,第219页,第235页。
② James King, Jr.,Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", Foreign Affairs, Vol.35, No.2 (January 1957), pp.240-241.
③ King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.239.
① King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.242.
② King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.242.
③ King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.244.
① Albert Wohlstetter,"The Delicate Balance of Terror", RAND report, P-1472,6 November 1958, revised December 1958, 见 Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume III, New York & London:Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, p.3.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 4-5.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 5.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 9.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 9-10.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ,pp. 14-15.
①民兵系列导弹(Minuteman missile)有三种型号,二十世纪六十年代初服役的民兵T导弹,弹长17.55米,弹径1.67米,起飞重量33.1吨,可携带核弹头,战斗部威力为100-200万吨梯恩梯当量,射程11260公里,命中精度560米,可车载机动。北极星导弹(Polaris Missile) A-1型,最早于1959年11月服役,它既可供水面舰船使用,也可由潜艇从水下发射,1961年开始装备于核潜艇,可携带核弹头。特制的北极星型潜艇可在15分钟内将定额装备的16枚导弹全部发射出去。每枚弹长9.4米,直径1.4米,射程4600公里,最大时速7800英里,采用惯性制导方式,配有多个分导式弹头。
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 15-17.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 17.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 18.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 34.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 34-35.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 35-36.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 36-37.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 37.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume III, pp. 37-38.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 38.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 39-40.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 40.
② Herman Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", RAND Research Memorandum, P-1888-RC, January 20,1960, p.4.网络下载来源：http://search.rand.org/search?input-form=rand-simple&query=P-1888-RC&Go=Search.
③ Herman Kahn,"Some Specific Suggestions for Achieving Early Non-military Defense Capabilities and Initiating Long-range Programs", RAND Research Memorandum, RM-2206-RC, July 1,1958, pp.107-110.网络下载来源： http://search.rand.org/search?input-form=rand-simple&v%3Asources=rand-bundle&query=RM-2206-RC.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.17.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.18-19.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.19.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.19-22.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.24.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.29-30.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.31.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.31-33.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.33.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.18.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.34-35.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.35-36.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.36-37.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.37.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.39-40.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.42.
③“灰色地带”一说来自美国学者托马斯·费赖特,是指在北约国家外围,邻近苏联、中国,西起土耳其向东经伊朗、阿富汗、巴基斯坦、印度、缅甸、泰国、马来亚、印尼、台湾、朝鲜半岛、日本,最后到阿留申群岛为止的广大区域,这些属于前线地区,较为脆弱。见Thomas Finletter, Power and Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,1954, pp.84-85.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.259-260.
Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.260.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.261-262
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.261.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.261.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.261.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.266.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.266-267.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.267.
④ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.267-268.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.268.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.269.
Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.269.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.269.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.270.
① Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the'Grey Areas", 见 Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought:Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, pp.80-81.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, pp. 81-82.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, pp. 83-84.
① Roger Hilsman, "Coalitions and Alliance", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp. 162-165.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.164-165.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.165-166.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.166-168.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.168-170.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.170-171.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.174-175.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.176-177.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.177.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.181-182.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.183-184.
① Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.185-188.
① Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.189-191.
② Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.191-192
③ Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.192-193.
① George Rathjens, Jr., "NATO Strategy:Total War". 见 Klaus Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1959, pp.65-66.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.81-82.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.82-83.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.83-84.
③ Alvin Cottrell and Walter Hahn, "Needed:A New NATO Shield", 见 Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age,1960, p.270.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.85.
② NATO: Deterrent and Shield ", NATO letter, February 1,1957, pp.27-30.转引自Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.98-99.所谓的盾牌力量是指美国和其它北约国家部署在欧洲大陆的地面常规部队,在北约拥有了大规模的战略报复力量的利剑之后,再部署相应的常规部队作为前卫,这样就为利剑增加了一块“盾牌”。
③ Malcolm Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy ", 见 Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp. 99-100.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.103.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.100-101.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.120-121.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.123-124.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.282-283.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.284-285.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.285-286.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.286.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.286.
① Morton Kaplan,"Problems of Coalition and Deterrence", 见 Knorred., NATO and American Security, p.127.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.127.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.130-131.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.131-132.卡普兰之前举了个例子,如英国这样的国家不加入北约的核防御体系,可能导致整个体系的崩溃,而丹麦这样的国家不加入也没有什么大碍。见Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.129.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.132-133.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.83.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.277-279.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.279-280.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.280-281.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.133-134.
②后来英法两国都发展了自己的核力量,不过他们意识到自己领土范围的限制,更多地依靠机动性与隐蔽性都很高的核潜艇作为主要的威慑力量,没有大规模发展陆基核力量。西德这样特殊的国家尽管拥有足够的技术,但是没有发展核武器的权力,一直处在美国的核保护下,允许美国在本国部署核武器。即便是英国核力量的独立性也没有达到百分之百,英国的核潜艇与核弹头是自己的,但是装载的导弹却是美国的北极星系列潜射导弹。
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.134.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.135.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.135-136.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.136-137.
①如英国自己研发核弹头和潜艇,但发射工具主要是美国的北极星潜射导弹。
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.137-138.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.138.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.138-139.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.139-141.
③在一致同意原则下,任何一国不同意的话就不能动用核武器,那么只要苏联能威胁或者收买其中一国,就可以瘫痪北约的联合核力量体系。
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.141.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.141-142.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.142.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.140.
① Malcolm Hoag, "The Economics of Military Alliance", 见 Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1960, p.285.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.286.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.289.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.292.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.293.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.294.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.296.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.203.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.204-205.
③ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.205.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.207-208.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.209-210.
③ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.211.
④ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.211-212.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.216-217.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.218.
①此论参见Thomas Finletter, Power and Policy, p.392, Charles Bolte, The Price of Peace, Boston: The Beacon Press,1956, p.68.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.220.
③ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.220-221.
④ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.222.
⑤ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.231.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.231.
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.231-232.
② Kissinger, "Disarmament: Illusion and Reality", 见 Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p. 313.
① Thomas Schelling, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament", 见 Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.176.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.176.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.177.
④ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.177.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.178.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.179.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.181.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.181-182.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.183-185.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.185-186.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.187.
③ Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterence", World Politics, ⅩⅠ, No.2 (January 1959), p.187.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.188-189.
②谢林所说前者是指精确制导对点攻击的核武器,打击一个军事基地或者导弹发射井等：后者无需精确制导对面攻击的核武器,如打击城市居民区等。
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.190-191.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.307.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.307.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pp.307-308.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.308.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.308.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.308.
④ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.309.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.310.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pp.310-311.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.312.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.312.
① Rogers Cannell, "The Strategic Role of Civil Defense", 见 Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.326.本文撰写于1959年,最初发表于斯坦福研究院的季刊,后收录于本书。
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.327.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.327.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.323.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.327-328.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.328.
④ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.328-329.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.329.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.329.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.329-331.此处所涉之美元,是上世纪五十年代的美元。
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.331.在二十世纪五六十年代,全美曾经重视试图在防核战争的民事准备方面有所建树,但政府出于预算和经济原因,所做不够,并不平衡。据生活在那个时代的一名美国人介绍,他出生和成长于堪萨斯州西部的乡村地区,每个农户家都有地下室,以前用来储存农产品等,后来用作防空掩体,也储存食物、水和燃料等。他所在的小学校经常进行防空演练,而且学校也建立地下室储存生活必需品等,包括孩子的糖果。他们的小伙伴曾多次私下地下室偷糖果吃。不过据他所说,这些只存在于乡村地区,大城市里就没有这么多的地下掩体了。美国中西部时间2010年9月18日中午,本人作者于堪萨斯州曼哈顿市采访了出生于1955年的美国当地居民Tracy Weaver,以上信息由Weaver先生提供,在此表示感谢。另外,美国政府在五十年代曾就大规模兴建掩体等民防计划展开过大讨论,但鉴于成本过高,“美国政府在全国民防掩体规划和实践方面鲜有作为,民防掩体计划陷于一种‘合理’的困境之中。”有关1950年代美国民防计划的更多细节请参见华东师范大学历史系2010届硕士毕业论文：蒋华杰：“1950年代美国民防政策初探”。
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.331-332.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.332.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.333-334.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.334.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.326.
④ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.334-335.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.322.
② Herman Kahn, "Some Specific Suggestions for Achieving Early Non-Military Defense Capabilities and Initiating Long-Range Programs", RAND Research Memorandum, RM-2206-RC, July 1,1958, p.100.
①张曙光：“威慑理论：美国国际战略学的一个重要领域”,《美国研究》,1990年第4期,第31—33页。
①《纽约时报》的评论,本书日译本“译者后记”,东洋政治经济研究所,1967年版,第500页。见本书的中译本代前言,《核时代的国防经济学》,闵振范等译,北京理工大学出版社,2007年,第1页。希契、麦基因、沃尔斯泰特、霍格等人直接参与本书的撰写,另外,谢林、卡普兰、布罗迪等许多人都为本书内容提供了诸多意见,这本“圣经”实际上是众多战略学者集体智慧的结晶。更多贡献者详见the Preface of TheEconomics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.
② David Hounshell," The Cold War, RAND, and the Generation of Knowledge,1946-1962", RAND/RP-729, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol.27, No.2,1997, p.256
① "Report of the Panel on Weapons Technology For Limited Warfare", May 16,1960, PSAC, see Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky): Records,1957-61, Box No.:12, Limited War [September 1959-December 1960].
② "United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962", Prepared by in Interdepartmental Study Group of Representatives from State Department, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, see Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for
① Dwight Eisenhower Library, Lilly, Edward P.:Papers,1928-1992, Box No.:55, Limited War Office.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, Papers as President of the United States,1953-61, (Ann Whiteman File), DDE Diary Series, Box No.:25.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carrol, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell,1952-61, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box No.:5.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky):Records, 1957-61, Box No.:2.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky):Records, 1957-61, Box No.:12.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs:Records,1952-61, NSC Series, Subject Series, Box No.: 5.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office:Office of the f Secretary, 1952-61, Subject Series; Alphabetical Subseries, Box No.:23.
Dwight Eisenhower Library, Lilly, Edward P.:Papers,1928-1992, Box No.:55.
1947年美国国家安全档案部分文件,华东师范大学冷战国际史研究中心藏：NSC-68, NSC-162, NSC-162/1, NSC-162/2。
Trachtenberg, Marc, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, New York & London, Garland Publishing, Inc,1987.
Trachtenberg, Marc, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, volume I, New York & London, Garland Publishing, Inc, 1988.
Trachtenberg, Marc, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, volume II, New York & London, Garland Publishing, Inc, 1988.
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李秋发：“肯尼迪政府的灵活反应战略探析”,《军事历史研究》,1997年第1 期。
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萨本望：“美国核战略的演变及走向(上)”,《和平与发展》,1998年第3期。
田景梅：“核威慑与核战争”,《外交学院学报》,1997年第4期。
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张曙光：“威慑理论：美国国际战略学的一个重要领域”,《美国研究》,1990年第4期。
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朱昕昌：“大规模报复战略的兴衰”,《外国问题研究》,1993年第1期。蒋华杰：“1950年代美国民防政策初探”,华东师范大学历史系2010届硕士研究生毕业论文(未发表)。
②劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,黄钟青译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1989年。
①劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,第1-2页。
②劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,第2-3页。
③劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《核战略的演变》,第8页。
① Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster,1983.
② Andrew David May, Ph.D. "The RAND Corporation and the Dynamics of American Strategic Thought, 1946-1962", Emory University,1998,435 pages; AAT 9901863.
③ Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1973.
① Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States, New York: Free Press,1984.
② McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival—Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, New York: Random House, Inc.,1988.其中译本为《美国核战略》,褚广友等译,北京：世界知识出版社,1991年。
③ Barry Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1991.
① Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, London:Frank Cass,2004.
② Eugene, Emme, Book Review on Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Military Affairs, Vol.22, No.1 (Spring,1958), pp.42-43.
③ Harry Ransom, Book Review on Strategy in the Missile Age and War and Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking, Military Affairs, Vol.23, No.4 (Winter,1959-1960), pp. 216-217.
① Lawrence Kaplan, Book Review on NATO and American Security, Military Affairs, Vol.24, No.4 (Winter, 1960-1961), pp.212-213.
② William Kaufmann, "Crisis in Military Affairs", World Politics, Vol.10, No.4 (July,1958), pp.579-603.
③ Laurence Martin, Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press,1979.
④ Robert Jervis, The logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press,1984.
① K. S. Tripathi, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Vikas Publications,1970.
② P.M.S. Blackett, Studies of War, Oliver and Boyd, London,1962. Sir John Slessor, Strategy for the West, London, Cassell and Co.,1954.
③为该书作序的是印度空军上将、前空军参谋长阿尔琼·辛格(Arjan Singh),该书的目的和意义可见一斑。
④黄椿：“对大规模报复战略的几点评价”,《美国研究》,1989年第4期；朱昕昌：“大规模报复战略的兴衰”,《外国问题研究》,1993年第1期：田景梅：“核威慑与核战争”,《外交学院学报》,1997年第4期;潘锐：“‘从大规模报复’到‘星球大战’——论冷战时期美国核战略的演变”,《太平洋学报》,2002年第3期。
①徐光裕：《核战略纵横》,北京：国防大学出版社,1987年。
①许嘉：《美国战略思维研究》,北京：军事科学出版社,2003年,第187-188页。 ①本文研究范围之内,布罗迪的经历简介如下：1945年9月4日以海军中尉的职衔退役,随后进入耶鲁大学国际关系学院任副教授,其中1946-1947年,兼任国家军事学院研究员,1947年曾兼任空军学院年度讲座教授,1946-1949年问,一直兼任国防问题高级专家。1950年8月到1951年6月担任空军参谋长特别助理,其间1950年11月-1951年6月兼任兰德公司顾问,并离开耶鲁大学。1951年8月离开空军部门,担任兰德公司全职资深研究员,直到1965年8月从兰德公司退休,进入加州大学洛杉矶分校任政治学教授。
② Barry Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1991, page XI.
③ Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, page XI.
① Bernard Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security", New York Times, October 5,1945. 本文后收录于 Phillip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, Gregory Treverton:US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, New York:New York University Press,1989.
① Bernard Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,1946.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.65.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.65.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.67-68.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.68.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.68-69.
④导弹和偷运原子弹的攻击方式并非布罗迪的首创想法,早在1945年5月参与原子弹研制美国科学家利奥·希拉德(Leo Hilliard)就提出过这两种方式。见Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Unclear Strategy, London: The Macmillan Press LTD,1981, p.26.
⑤ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.69.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.69-70.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.66.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, pp.70-71.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.71.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.75.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.73.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.73.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.73-74.
④ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.74-75.
① Jacob Viner, "The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations",这是瓦伊纳在1945年11月16日的一次原子能及其影响座谈会上的发言稿,随后发表于Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,90 (January 29,1946)后来文本收录于Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, New York & London:Garland Publishing, Inc.,1987, p.2.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.75.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.75.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, 见 p.1.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.1.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.3.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.1-2.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.2-3.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.111.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.114.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.115.
④日本法政大学政治学教授下斗米伸夫于2009年3月3日晚在(中国上海)华东师范大学冷战国际史研究中心会议室所做“冷战时期的苏朝关系”的讲座。
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.117-118.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.118-119.
Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.129.
①此处应该指近代欧洲君主制与共和制国家间共处的历史经验。
② Brodie,"The Atomic Bomb as Policy Maker", 见 Trachtenberg,The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on.Strategy 1945-1951,pp.138-139.
③ Brachtenberg,The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951,pp.141一142.
④ Brodie ed.,The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order,pp.131-132.
⑤ Brodie ed.,The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and Worder,pp.132-133.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.134.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.134.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.136.
④ Brodie ed.e, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.147.
⑤ Brodie, "New Techniques of War and National Policies"，本文原载于Technology and International Relations, edited by William F. Ogburn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1949后收录于Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951,见 p.160.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.163-164.
②当时美国现役主力战略轰炸机为B-29“超级堡垒”轰炸机,最大载弹量137000磅,最大时速400英里,最大飞行高度32000英尺,作战半径3200英里。美国第一代喷气式轰炸机B-36“和事佬”轰炸机,1946年首飞,1948年开始生产交付,最大飞行距离8000英里,最大载弹量10000磅。然后是B-47“同温层堡垒”喷气式轰炸机,1947年首飞,1951年开始服役,时速可达600英里,作战半径2300英里,并可以进行空中加油,达到“全球可及”。见巴瑞特·提尔曼：《美国空军》,周正、徐明毅译,南京出版社,2004年,第118页,第155页,第169贞。
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951,pp.165-169.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.171-172.布鲁迪设想的第二阶段,并没有反映于实际中,苏联在美国大规模生产原子弹之前,就打破了美国的核垄断,直接进入了第三阶段。而第三阶段和第二阶段的形势差异不大,这两个阶段的战略设想对当今核力量相差悬殊的几个核国家具有一定的参考意义。
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.173.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.173.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.174-175.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.169.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.169.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.88-89.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.89.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.89-90.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.90.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.90.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.91.
③ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.80.
④ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon:Atomic Power and World Order, p.149.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.149-150.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.4-5.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.5.
④ Brodie, "The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy",本文原载于 Quincy Wright, A Foreign Policy of the United States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1947, pp.89-125.后来收录于 Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.95-131.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.113-114.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, pp.114-115.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.117.
④福克斯引用了苏联官方评论员在提及那些倡议苏联应同其他国家一样放弃主权的支持者时写道：“目前他们不但谈及欧洲联合体,甚至还有世界联合体、世界议会、世界政府等,这四个词汇的深层含义是放弃与法西斯侵略做斗争的阵地,放弃为争取持久和平做斗争的阵地。”见Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.117-172.
⑤ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.172.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.191-193.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.5.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, p.6.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.154-155.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.157.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.161.
① Brodie, "Tactical Effects of H-bombs", RAND report,7 November 1952后被收录于Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, p.8.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 23.
③ Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives",这是布罗迪1952年4月17日在美国空军学院的演讲,后收录于Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp.68-69.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 69.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 78-79.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 7-8.
③ Roger Hilsman, "Strategic Doctrines for Nuclear War", 见 William Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1959, p.69
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I,p. 31; p.75.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 82-83.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 84.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought:Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 82.
⑤ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 33.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p. 34.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I,p. 24.
③ Brodie, "A Commentary of the Preventative War Doctrine", RAND report,11 June 1953, Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960 Volume I, pp.146-147;此论还见Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives", Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960 Volume I, p.84.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I,p. 148.
⑥布罗迪在此前的论述中曾指出,美国拥有了氢弹之后,人们在讨论是否要用第一颗氢弹来打击俄国人,客观讲这个问题本身并不重要。在1950年之前,美国垄断相当数量的原子弹,而苏联什么都没有,最多有
一两个样品的时候,就什么也没有发生,何况是现在。见Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, p.23.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 34-35.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume I, pp. 35-36.
① Gordon Turner and Richard Challener, "Strategic and Political Implications of Missiles",见, Gordon Turner and Richard Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,1960, pp.80-81.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.85-86.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.84-85.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.85-86.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.87-88.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.89-90.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.901955年11月26日,美国国防部长查尔斯·威尔逊(Charles Wilson)发布命令将发展和使用陆基洲际弹道导弹的责任交给了空军而不是陆军。见博伊恩：《跨越苍穹：美国空军史1947-1997)),第505页。此后,美国的战略空军,不仅包括战略轰炸机部队,还包括陆基洲际弹道导弹部队。②特纳和查理两人计算过,如果部属得当,射程1700英里的中程导弹以海洋为平台就可以打击到地球任何陆地上的目标,在射程上足以与远程陆基导弹相媲美。Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.90-91.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.921959年12月30日,美国第一艘载有弹道导弹的潜艇“乔治·华盛顿”号进入现役,并于1960年7月20日,成功从水下试射了UGM-27“北极星”弹道导弹,射程1200海里(相当于2000多公里)。见博伊恩：《跨越苍穹：美国空军史1947-1997》,第514-515页。
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.93.
⑤ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.93-94.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.94-95.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.95-96.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.102.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.103-104.
①德怀特·艾森豪威尔：《艾森豪威尔回忆录》(三),樊迪、静海译,北京：东方出版社,2007年,第437-438页。
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.104-105.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.105.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.106-107.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.107.
②此处查利纳举了1958年台海危机的事例,当时美国威胁对中国大陆动用核武器,而欧洲国家则致力于寻求非战争的解决方式,来说明美欧在一些冷战政策上的分歧,表明欧洲的怀疑与不安。Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.108.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.108-109.
④一战前夕曾经有一个故事,英国领导人询问自己盟友法国领导人,希望在法国大陆部署多少英国士兵,法国人说：“一个就够了,我还希望他在开战之时就被杀掉。”有一个英国士兵被杀掉就意味着对英国宣战,英国必然要卷入战争。美国海外基地的某些意义也许与这个英国士兵的意义是一致的。
①本文所指陆海空军应该理解为陆上军事力量、海上军事力量和空中军事力量的广义概念,为行文方便简称陆军、海军和空军,特此说明。
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.59.
Robert Coakley, "The Army as a Flexible Instrument of National Policy", 见, Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.253.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.253-264.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.264.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.264-265.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.266-267.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.267.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.268-269.
④ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.59.
⑤ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.269-270.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.271-272.
②之前希尔斯曼就提出要出色的完成传统任务,地面部队需要同时具备易疏散性和机动性。要避免核武器的打击,需要尽可能的疏散,而为了阻挡敌人进攻或者进攻敌人又需要迅速的集中。见Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.60.
③ U. S. Army Center of Military History, American Military History, p.584.
④ Turner, "Air and Sea Power in Relations to National Power", 见 Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age:Basic Facts and Theories, p.240.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.240-241.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facs and Theories, p.242.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.243.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.244.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.244-245.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.245.
④ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.241.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.242.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.58.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.245-246.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.230-232.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.234-237.
③博伊恩：《跨越苍穹：美国空军史1947-1997》,第126页。
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.238.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.238-239.
③ Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.239.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.238.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, pp.248-252.
① Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.239.
② Turner and Challener, National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories, p.245.
① Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1959, pp.176-177.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.180-181.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.184.
④ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.184-185.
⑤ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.185.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.185.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.185-186.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.188.
④ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.188-189.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.189-190.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.190.
Klaus Knorr, "Passive Air Defense for the United States", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.79.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.191.
② Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.194-195.
③波马克地对空导弹是美国空军第一代远程地空飞航式导弹,代号CIM-10。主要用于区域防空,能拦截远距离的中、高空飞机或飞航式导弹,为美国50年代至60年代中期本土防空主要武器系统之一,外形类似超音速歼击机。它是美国空军发展的唯一的地空导弹系统,美军所有其他的地空导弹都是由陆军发展的,同时也是世界上射程最远的地对空导弹武器系统。该类A型导弹最大射高18000米,最低射高3000米,最远射程320公里,A型导弹1964年全部退役,布罗迪撰文
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.202-203.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.86; p.93.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.203-204.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.204-205.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.87.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.206-207.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.86-87.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.88-94.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.211-212.
① Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp.215-216.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.86.
③ Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.213.
①政策的形成过程参见Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, Boston:The Atlantic Monthly Press,1973, pp.191-193该战略主要体现于美国政府NSC-162、NSC-162/1、NSC-162/2系列文件以及杜勒斯1954年1月12日在纽约向外交关系委员会发表的演讲,由于政府政策并非本文研究内容,故不多做介绍。该系列文件和演讲主要内容请参见Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1977, pp.401-405全文参见华东师范大学冷战国际史研究中心馆藏美国国家安全档案NSC-162系列文件,馆藏编号分别为Reel Ⅲ:0997,1031、 1062。
Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, p.409.
①早期意识到核武器的威慑意义的学者当然不止布罗迪一人,前文所述沃尔弗斯提出的“三道防线”应对苏联的观点中,第三道防线就是依靠核武器的威慑力；而瓦伊纳也曾暗示核威慑对稳定国际关系的意义。见本文第一章第二节。
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.76.
① Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security",见 Phillip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, Gregory Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.77.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, pp.75-77.
③威慑(deter)一词及其相关衍生词(deterrence, deterrent)等就是在二战后出现的,虽然在十九世纪就存在这样的意义,但是正式的称谓和最初的理论表述是来自布罗迪,而布罗迪被认为是二战之后最早的威慑理论家。见James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,1990, pp.387-391.
④ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.73.
① Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and the Science Crisis", Saturday Review of Literature, December 24, 1945, p.10.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.73.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.74.
④ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.77-78.
⑤ Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.77.
① Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.79.
② Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton, US Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, p.80.
③ Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, pp.83-84.
Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.84.
① Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.85.
② Brodie ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, p.86.
①该演讲全文发表于New York Times, January 13,1954, p.2.
① William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.16-17.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.17.
③ Kaufrnann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.18.
④ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.19.
⑤ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.19-20.
⑥ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.20.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.20-21.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.21-22.
①如艾森豪威尔政府最终没有在朝鲜战争中如自己宣称的那样使用原子弹,不再像干预朝鲜那样干预印度支那的事态,对匈牙利事件无动于衷,在苏伊士运河危机中与苏联妥协。再如陆军部发展研究组组长詹姆斯·加文将军因对“大规模报复”战略不满,愤而辞职,公开著书立说阐述自己的不同意见,反对这种可能走向毁灭的核政策,见James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, Hutchinson of London, 1959此外,参谋长联席会议主席兰福德海军上将(Arthur Radford)积极倡导和支持该战略,而参联会重要成员、陆军参谋长李奇微将军(Matthew Ridgway)就明确反对这样的战略。见Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press,1981, p.36同时,政府与国会围绕着削减预算进行了“一连串的争吵”,艾森豪威尔政府已经尽力削减预算了,国会还不满足。一方面要威胁进行“大规模报复”,一方面削减国防开支,内部争吵不休,使人进一步怀疑政府的决断力与实践能力。见《艾森豪威回忆录》(三),第339-350页。
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.23.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.24-25.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.28-29.
③ Bernard Brodie, "Strategy Hits a Dead End", 见 Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, New York & London:Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, p.91.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, pp. 91-92.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 2.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 93.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 4.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, p. 95.
① Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the "Grey Areas", 见 Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, p.78.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, p. 78.
① Paul Nitz, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy",本文最初发表于Foreign Affairs,34 (January,1954),后收录于Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, p.97.
②“有限战争”一词最早出自美国五星上将乔治·马歇尔(George Marshall)之口。1951年5月,美国参议院军事委员会举行听证会,讨论远东军事形势及相关对外政策,参议员凯恩(Cain)质询时任国防部长的马歇尔,如何定义朝鲜的冲突。马歇尔回答说“我将其定义为一种有限战争,并且希望它继续保持有限。”见K. S. Tripathi, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore: Vikas Publications,1970, p.82.
③ Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp.1-2.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.238.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.238.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.241.
④ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.241.
①比如,同样是在越南进行的战争,美国对越南作战,动用了除核武器以外的几乎所有的军事手段,而且还根据越南战场的特殊条件,使用落叶剂等特殊常规武器。美国具备多样的战争资源和技术,但其目标只是为了遏制共产主义向南越的扩张,并不是要占领北越,加之越南山川丛林地貌的限制,所以像坦克、装甲车等强大的地面攻击力量并没有投入多少,反而大规模使用了直升机等辅助作战力量,而其海空军的作战任务除了直接支援地面作战,就是打击北越的战争能力,阻隔交通运输等,也没有用于攻城略地。而几年之后中国对越南也进行了一场非常有限的战争,这次边界反击战,只是为了“教训”越南,维护南部边界稳定,为中国的改革开放事业保驾护航,也并非要攻城掠地,战争目标更加有限。因此,中国仅在陆地边界上动用了地面部队,海空军都没有参战。而且地面作战投入也是有限的,基本上处于二战时期的作战模式,炮兵支援步兵,少量坦克、装甲部队作为火力支援和运输力量参战,但这些就足以实现中国的作战目标。可见有限战争手段的确定是要“具体情况、具体分析”的。
②一枚两千吨当量的核弹最大摧毁半径也就是几百码,其辐射微不足道：一枚两万吨当量的氢弹将摧毁十英里半径以内的所有东西,其有害辐射范围将达数百英里。见Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.248-249.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.258-259.
① Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper & Brothers,1957, pp.183-185.
Hanson Baldwin, "Limited War", 见 Walter Hahn and John Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960, pp.258-261.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.244.
② Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.102.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.102-103.
④ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.4.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.6.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.6-7.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.7.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.7-8.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.8.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.128.后来的越南战争也说明了这一点。
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.129-130.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.130.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.131.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.131.
② Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, p.190.
③ Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p.190.
④ Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp.190-191.
① Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p.191.
② Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp.191-192.
① Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p.192.
② Schelling, Strategy of Co nflict, pp.193-194.
①截至到1959年,苏军先后装备SS-4、SS-5、SS-6系列导弹,其中SS-4为中程导弹,射程2000公里；SS-5射程为4000公里；SS-6为苏联第一种洲际导弹,射程达8000公里,命中精度3.7公里。以上为苏联第一代导弹,缺点是液体燃料推进,命中精度较差,单弹头,安全性低。在轰炸机方面,五十年代苏军主要装备了图-95“熊”式和米亚-4“野牛”式两种战略轰炸机,前者作战半径8300公里,可挂载巡航导弹,进行洲际攻击：后者作战半径5600公里,可携带4枚核航弹(每枚100万吨当量),命中精度0.37公里,加上巡航导弹自身的射程,同样可以进行洲际攻击。以上信息参见徐光裕：《核战略纵横》,第219页,第235页。
② James King, Jr.,Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", Foreign Affairs, Vol.35, No.2 (January 1957), pp.240-241.
③ King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.239.
① King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.242.
② King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.242.
③ King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War", p.244.
① Albert Wohlstetter,"The Delicate Balance of Terror", RAND report, P-1472,6 November 1958, revised December 1958, 见 Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume III, New York & London:Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, p.3.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 4-5.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 5.
④ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 9.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 9-10.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ,pp. 14-15.
①民兵系列导弹(Minuteman missile)有三种型号,二十世纪六十年代初服役的民兵T导弹,弹长17.55米,弹径1.67米,起飞重量33.1吨,可携带核弹头,战斗部威力为100-200万吨梯恩梯当量,射程11260公里,命中精度560米,可车载机动。北极星导弹(Polaris Missile) A-1型,最早于1959年11月服役,它既可供水面舰船使用,也可由潜艇从水下发射,1961年开始装备于核潜艇,可携带核弹头。特制的北极星型潜艇可在15分钟内将定额装备的16枚导弹全部发射出去。每枚弹长9.4米,直径1.4米,射程4600公里,最大时速7800英里,采用惯性制导方式,配有多个分导式弹头。
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 15-17.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 17.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 18.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 34.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 34-35.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 35-36.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 36-37.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 37.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume III, pp. 37-38.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 38.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, pp. 39-40.
① Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅲ, p. 40.
② Herman Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", RAND Research Memorandum, P-1888-RC, January 20,1960, p.4.网络下载来源：http://search.rand.org/search?input-form=rand-simple&query=P-1888-RC&Go=Search.
③ Herman Kahn,"Some Specific Suggestions for Achieving Early Non-military Defense Capabilities and Initiating Long-range Programs", RAND Research Memorandum, RM-2206-RC, July 1,1958, pp.107-110.网络下载来源： http://search.rand.org/search?input-form=rand-simple&v%3Asources=rand-bundle&query=RM-2206-RC.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.17.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.18-19.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.19.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.19-22.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.24.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.29-30.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.31.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.31-33.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.33.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.18.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.34-35.
③ Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.35-36.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.36-37.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.37.
① Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", pp.39-40.
② Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence", p.42.
③“灰色地带”一说来自美国学者托马斯·费赖特,是指在北约国家外围,邻近苏联、中国,西起土耳其向东经伊朗、阿富汗、巴基斯坦、印度、缅甸、泰国、马来亚、印尼、台湾、朝鲜半岛、日本,最后到阿留申群岛为止的广大区域,这些属于前线地区,较为脆弱。见Thomas Finletter, Power and Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,1954, pp.84-85.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.259-260.
Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.260.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.261-262
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.261.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.261.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.261.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.266.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.266-267.
③ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.267.
④ Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, pp.267-268.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.268.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.269.
Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.269.
① Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.269.
② Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p.270.
① Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the'Grey Areas", 见 Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought:Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume II, pp.80-81.
② Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, pp. 81-82.
③ Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1952-1960, Volume Ⅱ, pp. 83-84.
① Roger Hilsman, "Coalitions and Alliance", 见 Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp. 162-165.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.164-165.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.165-166.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.166-168.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.168-170.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.170-171.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.174-175.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.176-177.
① Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, p.177.
② Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.181-182.
③ Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security, pp.183-184.
① Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.185-188.
① Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.189-191.
② Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.191-192
③ Kaufmann ed.,Military Policy and National Security,pp.192-193.
① George Rathjens, Jr., "NATO Strategy:Total War". 见 Klaus Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1959, pp.65-66.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.81-82.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.82-83.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.83-84.
③ Alvin Cottrell and Walter Hahn, "Needed:A New NATO Shield", 见 Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age,1960, p.270.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.85.
② NATO: Deterrent and Shield ", NATO letter, February 1,1957, pp.27-30.转引自Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.98-99.所谓的盾牌力量是指美国和其它北约国家部署在欧洲大陆的地面常规部队,在北约拥有了大规模的战略报复力量的利剑之后,再部署相应的常规部队作为前卫,这样就为利剑增加了一块“盾牌”。
③ Malcolm Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy ", 见 Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp. 99-100.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.103.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.100-101.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.120-121.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.123-124.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.282-283.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.284-285.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.285-286.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.286.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.286.
① Morton Kaplan,"Problems of Coalition and Deterrence", 见 Knorred., NATO and American Security, p.127.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.127.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.130-131.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.131-132.卡普兰之前举了个例子,如英国这样的国家不加入北约的核防御体系,可能导致整个体系的崩溃,而丹麦这样的国家不加入也没有什么大碍。见Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.129.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.132-133.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.83.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.277-279.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.279-280.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.280-281.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.133-134.
②后来英法两国都发展了自己的核力量,不过他们意识到自己领土范围的限制,更多地依靠机动性与隐蔽性都很高的核潜艇作为主要的威慑力量,没有大规模发展陆基核力量。西德这样特殊的国家尽管拥有足够的技术,但是没有发展核武器的权力,一直处在美国的核保护下,允许美国在本国部署核武器。即便是英国核力量的独立性也没有达到百分之百,英国的核潜艇与核弹头是自己的,但是装载的导弹却是美国的北极星系列潜射导弹。
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.134.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.135.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.135-136.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.136-137.
①如英国自己研发核弹头和潜艇,但发射工具主要是美国的北极星潜射导弹。
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.137-138.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.138.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.138-139.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.139-141.
③在一致同意原则下,任何一国不同意的话就不能动用核武器,那么只要苏联能威胁或者收买其中一国,就可以瘫痪北约的联合核力量体系。
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.141.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.141-142.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.142.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.140.
① Malcolm Hoag, "The Economics of Military Alliance", 见 Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1960, p.285.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.286.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.289.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.292.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.293.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.294.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.296.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.203.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.204-205.
③ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.205.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.207-208.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.209-210.
③ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.211.
④ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.211-212.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.216-217.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.218.
①此论参见Thomas Finletter, Power and Policy, p.392, Charles Bolte, The Price of Peace, Boston: The Beacon Press,1956, p.68.
② Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.220.
③ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.220-221.
④ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.222.
⑤ Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.231.
① Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.231.
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp.231-232.
② Kissinger, "Disarmament: Illusion and Reality", 见 Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p. 313.
① Thomas Schelling, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament", 见 Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.176.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.176.
③ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.177.
④ Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.177.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.178.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.179.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.181.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.181-182.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.183-185.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.185-186.
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, p.187.
③ Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterence", World Politics, ⅩⅠ, No.2 (January 1959), p.187.
① Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.188-189.
②谢林所说前者是指精确制导对点攻击的核武器,打击一个军事基地或者导弹发射井等：后者无需精确制导对面攻击的核武器,如打击城市居民区等。
② Knorr ed., NATO and American Security, pp.190-191.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.307.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.307.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pp.307-308.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.308.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.308.
③ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.308.
④ Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.309.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.310.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pp.310-311.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.312.
② Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.312.
① Rogers Cannell, "The Strategic Role of Civil Defense", 见 Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.326.本文撰写于1959年,最初发表于斯坦福研究院的季刊,后收录于本书。
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.327.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.327.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.323.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.327-328.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.328.
④ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.328-329.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.329.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.329.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.329-331.此处所涉之美元,是上世纪五十年代的美元。
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.331.在二十世纪五六十年代,全美曾经重视试图在防核战争的民事准备方面有所建树,但政府出于预算和经济原因,所做不够,并不平衡。据生活在那个时代的一名美国人介绍,他出生和成长于堪萨斯州西部的乡村地区,每个农户家都有地下室,以前用来储存农产品等,后来用作防空掩体,也储存食物、水和燃料等。他所在的小学校经常进行防空演练,而且学校也建立地下室储存生活必需品等,包括孩子的糖果。他们的小伙伴曾多次私下地下室偷糖果吃。不过据他所说,这些只存在于乡村地区,大城市里就没有这么多的地下掩体了。美国中西部时间2010年9月18日中午,本人作者于堪萨斯州曼哈顿市采访了出生于1955年的美国当地居民Tracy Weaver,以上信息由Weaver先生提供,在此表示感谢。另外,美国政府在五十年代曾就大规模兴建掩体等民防计划展开过大讨论,但鉴于成本过高,“美国政府在全国民防掩体规划和实践方面鲜有作为,民防掩体计划陷于一种‘合理’的困境之中。”有关1950年代美国民防计划的更多细节请参见华东师范大学历史系2010届硕士毕业论文：蒋华杰：“1950年代美国民防政策初探”。
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.331-332.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.332.
① Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.333-334.
② Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.334.
③ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p.326.
④ Hahn and Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp.334-335.
① Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p.322.
② Herman Kahn, "Some Specific Suggestions for Achieving Early Non-Military Defense Capabilities and Initiating Long-Range Programs", RAND Research Memorandum, RM-2206-RC, July 1,1958, p.100.
①张曙光：“威慑理论：美国国际战略学的一个重要领域”,《美国研究》,1990年第4期,第31—33页。
①《纽约时报》的评论,本书日译本“译者后记”,东洋政治经济研究所,1967年版,第500页。见本书的中译本代前言,《核时代的国防经济学》,闵振范等译,北京理工大学出版社,2007年,第1页。希契、麦基因、沃尔斯泰特、霍格等人直接参与本书的撰写,另外,谢林、卡普兰、布罗迪等许多人都为本书内容提供了诸多意见,这本“圣经”实际上是众多战略学者集体智慧的结晶。更多贡献者详见the Preface of TheEconomics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.
② David Hounshell," The Cold War, RAND, and the Generation of Knowledge,1946-1962", RAND/RP-729, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol.27, No.2,1997, p.256
① "Report of the Panel on Weapons Technology For Limited Warfare", May 16,1960, PSAC, see Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky): Records,1957-61, Box No.:12, Limited War [September 1959-December 1960].
② "United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962", Prepared by in Interdepartmental Study Group of Representatives from State Department, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, see Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for
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