我国上市公司的控制权私利行为及其经济后果研究
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摘要
早期关于代理问题的研究主要集中在公司管理者与外部股东之间,在外部股东的处理上学者们所广泛遵循的基本假设是股东同质、股权分散。但Fama and Jensen的研究表明,当前世界上大多数国家的股权结构不再是高度分散而是相当程度的集中。集中的所有权模式导致了控股股东的存在,控股股东可以根据其在公司结构分布中的优势地位,通过多种手段侵害中小股东的利益,谋取控制权私利。代理问题已不仅仅局限于管理者与外部股东之间,控制权私利及其对公司投资行为的影响也逐渐成为经济学界和财务学界研究的焦点问题。
基于股东异质化探索纬度的开辟,众多学者开始逐步探讨不同股权结构层次下控股股东与中小股东之间的利益差异,并剖析该差异产生的原因及其对公司投资行为和公司价值所造成的影响,取得了卓有成效的结论。但对此类文献进行归纳和梳理后发现,现有研究多侧重于单期投资的层面,很少有人考虑新投资机会存在下的两期问题,对于两期投资下的控股股东两期控制权私利行为研究则几乎没有。并且在探寻控制权私利影响公司的资本配置决策时,学者们多集中于单一投资的层面,长期以来真正以组合投资为研究对象,运用规范方法定量分析非效率投资问题的文献尚不多见。
为此,考虑到连续投资的可能性以及大股东侵占行为的可重复性,研究两期投资下的控股股东利益侵占问题,对于从根本上把握控制权私利的整体特征,明晰制约控制权私利的影响因素,进而制订约束控制权私利发生的有效措施,具有重要的理论意义。而运用实物期权理论动态分析我国上市公司扭曲性投资行为的整体趋势,不但避免了在一个时点进行静态分析时所造成的片面性不足,而且对于进一步深入探讨治理机制下的资本配置模式,改善内部资本市场对企业财务决策的传导机制以及完备中小股东的法律保护体系也具有重要的现实意义。本文主要内容如下:
第一,基于新投资机会存在的假设,将单期投资拓展为两期情形,构建出两期投资下的控股股东两期控制权私利模型,理论剖析现金流权比例、中小股东法律保护水平以及新投资收益率与控制权私利之间的关系。研究结果表明,控股股东的现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度以及新投资收益率的高低均与控制权私利水平负相关。增大控股股东的现金流权比例,增强对中小股东的法律保护力度以及提高新投资收益率均能在一定程度上降低控制权私利水平。当其他条件不变时,给定现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度和新投资收益率之一,控股股东在两期侵占中的即期最优私利水平与单期侵占中的即期最优私利水平相比有所降低,而远期最优私利水平没有变化。进一步分析表明,控股股东非短视,其终极目标是追求控制权私利的长期收益最大化,而获取控制权的长期收益最大化也是导致其两期侵占行为发生的主要原因。
第二,在理论分析的基础上,结合我国上市公司控制权私利产生的制度背景,以2000-2008年间我国沪深两市A股股票市场发生控制权转移的上市公司为样本,实证检验了包括现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度以及新投资机会在内的各影响因素与控制权私利之间的关系。结果发现,新投资收益率与控制权私利之间显著负相关,说明增加新投资收益率对于抑制控制权私利具有重要重要;而现金流权比例与控制权私利之间的负相关关系没有得到证实,经调整模型后发现,二者之间存在一种先上升后下降的倒“U”型关系,虽然没有通过显著性检验,但与部分学者的研究结论一致;对于表征中小股东的法律保护变量——独立董事占董事会中总人数的比例与控制权私利显著不相关,再次说明了我国的独立董事制度在公司治理方面的低效性。此外,描述公司特征的其他变量,公司规模、公司财务、非流通股比例等与控制权私利之间存在不同程度的相关性。
第三,从投资行为和公司价值两个方面分析控制权私利产生的经济后果。基于控制权私有收益的基本假设,从两种不同性质资产的组合投资出发,构建出控制权私利下的公司价值期权模型,运用标准的实物期权分析方法推导出有无大股东侵占时的最优资本配置比例和公司价值。最后,根据对控制权私利水平的度量,结合我国的上市公司数据,实证检验了控制权私利对资本配置行为和公司价值的影响。理论和实证分析发现:控制权私利类公司的最优资本配置显著低于不存在控制权私利公司的最优资本配置例,并且随着投资时点的不断推迟,公司的“挤占”倾向越来越明显。而在整个投资区间内,控股股东的控制权私利水平与公司价值负相关,降低控制权私利水平有利于提升公司价值。
第四,针对我国上市公司中高控制权私利和非效率投资的现状,分别从控股股东、中小股东、资本市场和媒体的角度提出抑制控股股东私利行为,提高公司的投资效率,提升公司价值的对策建议。
本文的研究特色和创新之处在于:
①目前国内关于控制权私利的研究多集中于单期投资单期侵占的层面,很少有人考虑新投资机会存在下的动态投资问题,对于动态投资下的两期控制权私利研究几乎没有。本文基于新投资机会存在的假设,在两期投资视角下构建一个两期利益侵占模型,深入剖析了控制权私利与现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度以及新投资收益率之间的关系,并比较分析两期侵占水平与单期侵占水平之间的差异,根据数值模拟结果总结出控股股东攫取长期控制权私利的终极动因。
②跟据两期投资下控制权私利的理论分析,结合我国上市公司控制权转移时的高控制权私利现状,利用2000-2008年间沪深两市A股股票市场发生控制权转移的上市公司相关数据,度量出我国上市公司的控制权私利实际水平。进一步从新投资机会存在的视角,将样本分为新投资机会公司和非新投资机会公司两类,运用GLS回归方法,检验包括新投资收益率、控股股东的现金流权比例和中小股东的法律保护力度在内的各影响因素与控制权私利水平之间的关系。
③目前国内关于控制权私利影响投资行为和公司价值的研究大都停留在股权结构这一较为泛化的层面,以控制权私利为切入点的深层次研究尚未展开,研究方法也比较单一。本文基于大股东控制的分析框架,以两种性质不同资产的组合投资为研究对象,构建出大股东侵占下的公司价值期权模型,运用标准的实物期权分析方法动态分析控制权私利对公司投资决策和公司价值的影响,总结出控制权私利导致投资行为扭曲和公司价值损害的研究结论,并实证检验该结论的正确性。
The early researcher on Agency Theory focused on studying the relationship between corporation manager and outside shareholders. Nearly all of them assumed that the outside shareholders shared common interests while the actual corporation shares are dispersed widely among the shareholders. However, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s researches showed that the most common share structure in contemporary world is relatively concentrated instead of highly fragmented. The institutions with large shares become the controlling shareholders. These controlling shareholders can use their share advantages to damage the interest of small and medium shareholders. To understand the controlling shareholders influence on corporation management and the effects on the company value are a hot research area in the corporate governance research society.
There are many excellent papers which discuss the difference of interests between controlling shareholders and medium-small shareholders, the cause of the differences and its impacts on the corporate value and investment behavior. These researches, however, only focus on the level of single-term investment. No scholars consider the area of double-temporal investment and the expropriation of the controlling shareholder on each investment phase. This paper tries to use standardized methods to analyze the shareholding structure and corporate governess process. Its main focus is the study of expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders under double-temporal investment. The goal is to find out all the factors that influence the expropriation behavior and design procedures that can prevent its happening.There is also a practical reason to study the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders in contemporary China. The widely used method to analyze the corporation capital allocation strategy nowadays is the single case analysis method. However this method only presents a static corporation feature at the time of analysis and it could not show the whole picture. This paper uses the real option theory to dynamically analyze the behavior of distorted and low-efficient capital allocation, thus provide a mechanism to improve the corporate financial decision making and protect the interests of medium and small shareholders.
The contents are listed below:
(1) This paper constructs an extended model of double-temporal expropriation by the controlling shareholder to extend the classical single-term expropriation model based on the given existence of new investment opportunities, and analyzes theoretically the private benefits of control from the aspects of cash flow rights proportion, legal protection of mid-small shareholders and new investment return rate. The conclusions show that: the level of private benefits of control are all negatively related to the cash flow rights proportion, legal protection of mid-small shareholders and the new investment return rate. And the shares diverts by controlling shareholders decrease when the cash flow rights, the strengthen of legal protection to mid-small shareholders and the new investment return rate all increase; other things being equal, the controlling shareholders’current first-best expropriation level is lower than in single-term model if given one of the cash flow rights proportion, strengthen of legal protection to mid-small shareholders or new investment return rate, while their future levels are the same; the current first-best expropriation level is negatively related to the future first-best level and the controlling shareholder is not short-sighted. Their ultimate goal is to maximize long-term private benefits of control. This goal is also the reason for their double-temporal expropriation behavior.
(2) According to the unique institutional context and legal environment of Chinese listed companies, this paper examines empirically the relation between cash flow rights, legal protection of mid-small shareholders, new investment return rate and private benefits of control under the guide of the theoretic results summarized formerly, and the sample data come from the listed companies which controlling rights diverted in A stock markets of Shang hai and Shen zhen during 2000-2008. The results reveal that it is the negative relationship between the level of priate benefits of control and new investment return rate, and the increase of new investment return rate can decrease the level of priate benefits of control. It isn’t verified that the negative relationship between the level of priate benefits of control and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, but we find an inverted "U"-type relationship between them through adjusting the regression model. Although this conclusion is not significant, it is consistent with existing research findings. Furthermore, we examine the relation between the level of private benefits of control and legal protection of mid-small shareholders using the proportion of independent director in board of directors, and find it is not relational significantly between them, once again our independent director system in corporate governance is proved non-efficient. Finally, we also test the relation between the level of private benefits of control and other factors, for example, corporate size, corporate finance.
(3) It discusses the economic consequences of private benefit of control from the perspective of inefficient investment and corporate value. Based on the assumption that the controlling shareholders seek the private benefits of control, this paper incorporates large shareholders’expropriation into real option model to analyze numerically the effect of the large shareholders' expropriation on the capital allocation strategy and firm valuations. The conclusions show that: controlling shareholder's expropriation is one of the most important reasons leading to distortion and inefficiency of capital allocation. The higher the level of private benefits is, the lower corporate investment efficiency is. The first-best capital allocation strategy under the large shareholder’s expropriation is lower than the first-best capital allocation strategy under no large shareholder’s expropriation during the whole investment interval. Meanwhile, the existence of large controlling shareholders clearly prevents the optimal allocation of capital. With the postponements of the investment, the enterprise's "squeeze" tendency becomes more and more obvious, leads to further lower investment efficiency; controlling shareholders’expropriation level is negative with the firm valuation during the whole investment interval, it can decrease the large shareholder’s expropriation level from increasing the cash flow rights, hence to increase the firm value.
(4) It puts forword a few recommendations to solve the private benefits of control, distorted capital allocation and corporate value problems in Chinese listed companies from the perspective of controlling shareholders, mid-small shareholders and the capital market according to the higher level of private benefits of control and the inefficient investment of Chinese listed companies. Finally, this paper summarizes the ideas in the previous chapters and gives the research limitations and future prospects.
This article has the following research characteristics and innovations:
(1) Most of previous studies on the large shareholders’expropriation behavior focused on single-term and the intertemporal expropriation behavior were also constrained in single-term application. The researcher builds a double-temporal expropriation model based on the intertemporal investments to extend the classical single period expropriation behaviour model. This model is created from double-temporal investment and large controlling shareholders.
(2) According to the theoretically analytical conclusion under the double-temporal investment and the current situation of higher private benefits of control from Chinese listed companies, this paper utilizes the available corporation data to test the influence on private benefits of control by cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, new investment opportunity, strengthen of legal protection, legal protection of mid-small shareholders.meanwhile, based on above aspects the paper explors the cause of private benefits of control in the listed companies, to propose theory reference for policies making.
(3) The exiting literatures about the effect of private benefits of control on corporate investment behaviors mainly study a generalizable level of equity structure, the deep study from the view of large shareholder expropriation has not been developed, and the study method is simplex. This paper, being in the framework of large shareholder expropriation, studys the combined investment of two assests, builds a corporate value model with large shareholder expropriation, dynamicly analyses the effect of private benefits of control on corporate investment decisions with the theory of real option, and based on this exploits the causes of corporate inefficient investment.
基于股东异质化探索纬度的开辟,众多学者开始逐步探讨不同股权结构层次下控股股东与中小股东之间的利益差异,并剖析该差异产生的原因及其对公司投资行为和公司价值所造成的影响,取得了卓有成效的结论。但对此类文献进行归纳和梳理后发现,现有研究多侧重于单期投资的层面,很少有人考虑新投资机会存在下的两期问题,对于两期投资下的控股股东两期控制权私利行为研究则几乎没有。并且在探寻控制权私利影响公司的资本配置决策时,学者们多集中于单一投资的层面,长期以来真正以组合投资为研究对象,运用规范方法定量分析非效率投资问题的文献尚不多见。
为此,考虑到连续投资的可能性以及大股东侵占行为的可重复性,研究两期投资下的控股股东利益侵占问题,对于从根本上把握控制权私利的整体特征,明晰制约控制权私利的影响因素,进而制订约束控制权私利发生的有效措施,具有重要的理论意义。而运用实物期权理论动态分析我国上市公司扭曲性投资行为的整体趋势,不但避免了在一个时点进行静态分析时所造成的片面性不足,而且对于进一步深入探讨治理机制下的资本配置模式,改善内部资本市场对企业财务决策的传导机制以及完备中小股东的法律保护体系也具有重要的现实意义。本文主要内容如下:
第一,基于新投资机会存在的假设,将单期投资拓展为两期情形,构建出两期投资下的控股股东两期控制权私利模型,理论剖析现金流权比例、中小股东法律保护水平以及新投资收益率与控制权私利之间的关系。研究结果表明,控股股东的现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度以及新投资收益率的高低均与控制权私利水平负相关。增大控股股东的现金流权比例,增强对中小股东的法律保护力度以及提高新投资收益率均能在一定程度上降低控制权私利水平。当其他条件不变时,给定现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度和新投资收益率之一,控股股东在两期侵占中的即期最优私利水平与单期侵占中的即期最优私利水平相比有所降低,而远期最优私利水平没有变化。进一步分析表明,控股股东非短视,其终极目标是追求控制权私利的长期收益最大化,而获取控制权的长期收益最大化也是导致其两期侵占行为发生的主要原因。
第二,在理论分析的基础上,结合我国上市公司控制权私利产生的制度背景,以2000-2008年间我国沪深两市A股股票市场发生控制权转移的上市公司为样本,实证检验了包括现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度以及新投资机会在内的各影响因素与控制权私利之间的关系。结果发现,新投资收益率与控制权私利之间显著负相关,说明增加新投资收益率对于抑制控制权私利具有重要重要;而现金流权比例与控制权私利之间的负相关关系没有得到证实,经调整模型后发现,二者之间存在一种先上升后下降的倒“U”型关系,虽然没有通过显著性检验,但与部分学者的研究结论一致;对于表征中小股东的法律保护变量——独立董事占董事会中总人数的比例与控制权私利显著不相关,再次说明了我国的独立董事制度在公司治理方面的低效性。此外,描述公司特征的其他变量,公司规模、公司财务、非流通股比例等与控制权私利之间存在不同程度的相关性。
第三,从投资行为和公司价值两个方面分析控制权私利产生的经济后果。基于控制权私有收益的基本假设,从两种不同性质资产的组合投资出发,构建出控制权私利下的公司价值期权模型,运用标准的实物期权分析方法推导出有无大股东侵占时的最优资本配置比例和公司价值。最后,根据对控制权私利水平的度量,结合我国的上市公司数据,实证检验了控制权私利对资本配置行为和公司价值的影响。理论和实证分析发现:控制权私利类公司的最优资本配置显著低于不存在控制权私利公司的最优资本配置例,并且随着投资时点的不断推迟,公司的“挤占”倾向越来越明显。而在整个投资区间内,控股股东的控制权私利水平与公司价值负相关,降低控制权私利水平有利于提升公司价值。
第四,针对我国上市公司中高控制权私利和非效率投资的现状,分别从控股股东、中小股东、资本市场和媒体的角度提出抑制控股股东私利行为,提高公司的投资效率,提升公司价值的对策建议。
本文的研究特色和创新之处在于:
①目前国内关于控制权私利的研究多集中于单期投资单期侵占的层面,很少有人考虑新投资机会存在下的动态投资问题,对于动态投资下的两期控制权私利研究几乎没有。本文基于新投资机会存在的假设,在两期投资视角下构建一个两期利益侵占模型,深入剖析了控制权私利与现金流权比例、中小股东的法律保护力度以及新投资收益率之间的关系,并比较分析两期侵占水平与单期侵占水平之间的差异,根据数值模拟结果总结出控股股东攫取长期控制权私利的终极动因。
②跟据两期投资下控制权私利的理论分析,结合我国上市公司控制权转移时的高控制权私利现状,利用2000-2008年间沪深两市A股股票市场发生控制权转移的上市公司相关数据,度量出我国上市公司的控制权私利实际水平。进一步从新投资机会存在的视角,将样本分为新投资机会公司和非新投资机会公司两类,运用GLS回归方法,检验包括新投资收益率、控股股东的现金流权比例和中小股东的法律保护力度在内的各影响因素与控制权私利水平之间的关系。
③目前国内关于控制权私利影响投资行为和公司价值的研究大都停留在股权结构这一较为泛化的层面,以控制权私利为切入点的深层次研究尚未展开,研究方法也比较单一。本文基于大股东控制的分析框架,以两种性质不同资产的组合投资为研究对象,构建出大股东侵占下的公司价值期权模型,运用标准的实物期权分析方法动态分析控制权私利对公司投资决策和公司价值的影响,总结出控制权私利导致投资行为扭曲和公司价值损害的研究结论,并实证检验该结论的正确性。
The early researcher on Agency Theory focused on studying the relationship between corporation manager and outside shareholders. Nearly all of them assumed that the outside shareholders shared common interests while the actual corporation shares are dispersed widely among the shareholders. However, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s researches showed that the most common share structure in contemporary world is relatively concentrated instead of highly fragmented. The institutions with large shares become the controlling shareholders. These controlling shareholders can use their share advantages to damage the interest of small and medium shareholders. To understand the controlling shareholders influence on corporation management and the effects on the company value are a hot research area in the corporate governance research society.
There are many excellent papers which discuss the difference of interests between controlling shareholders and medium-small shareholders, the cause of the differences and its impacts on the corporate value and investment behavior. These researches, however, only focus on the level of single-term investment. No scholars consider the area of double-temporal investment and the expropriation of the controlling shareholder on each investment phase. This paper tries to use standardized methods to analyze the shareholding structure and corporate governess process. Its main focus is the study of expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders under double-temporal investment. The goal is to find out all the factors that influence the expropriation behavior and design procedures that can prevent its happening.There is also a practical reason to study the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders in contemporary China. The widely used method to analyze the corporation capital allocation strategy nowadays is the single case analysis method. However this method only presents a static corporation feature at the time of analysis and it could not show the whole picture. This paper uses the real option theory to dynamically analyze the behavior of distorted and low-efficient capital allocation, thus provide a mechanism to improve the corporate financial decision making and protect the interests of medium and small shareholders.
The contents are listed below:
(1) This paper constructs an extended model of double-temporal expropriation by the controlling shareholder to extend the classical single-term expropriation model based on the given existence of new investment opportunities, and analyzes theoretically the private benefits of control from the aspects of cash flow rights proportion, legal protection of mid-small shareholders and new investment return rate. The conclusions show that: the level of private benefits of control are all negatively related to the cash flow rights proportion, legal protection of mid-small shareholders and the new investment return rate. And the shares diverts by controlling shareholders decrease when the cash flow rights, the strengthen of legal protection to mid-small shareholders and the new investment return rate all increase; other things being equal, the controlling shareholders’current first-best expropriation level is lower than in single-term model if given one of the cash flow rights proportion, strengthen of legal protection to mid-small shareholders or new investment return rate, while their future levels are the same; the current first-best expropriation level is negatively related to the future first-best level and the controlling shareholder is not short-sighted. Their ultimate goal is to maximize long-term private benefits of control. This goal is also the reason for their double-temporal expropriation behavior.
(2) According to the unique institutional context and legal environment of Chinese listed companies, this paper examines empirically the relation between cash flow rights, legal protection of mid-small shareholders, new investment return rate and private benefits of control under the guide of the theoretic results summarized formerly, and the sample data come from the listed companies which controlling rights diverted in A stock markets of Shang hai and Shen zhen during 2000-2008. The results reveal that it is the negative relationship between the level of priate benefits of control and new investment return rate, and the increase of new investment return rate can decrease the level of priate benefits of control. It isn’t verified that the negative relationship between the level of priate benefits of control and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, but we find an inverted "U"-type relationship between them through adjusting the regression model. Although this conclusion is not significant, it is consistent with existing research findings. Furthermore, we examine the relation between the level of private benefits of control and legal protection of mid-small shareholders using the proportion of independent director in board of directors, and find it is not relational significantly between them, once again our independent director system in corporate governance is proved non-efficient. Finally, we also test the relation between the level of private benefits of control and other factors, for example, corporate size, corporate finance.
(3) It discusses the economic consequences of private benefit of control from the perspective of inefficient investment and corporate value. Based on the assumption that the controlling shareholders seek the private benefits of control, this paper incorporates large shareholders’expropriation into real option model to analyze numerically the effect of the large shareholders' expropriation on the capital allocation strategy and firm valuations. The conclusions show that: controlling shareholder's expropriation is one of the most important reasons leading to distortion and inefficiency of capital allocation. The higher the level of private benefits is, the lower corporate investment efficiency is. The first-best capital allocation strategy under the large shareholder’s expropriation is lower than the first-best capital allocation strategy under no large shareholder’s expropriation during the whole investment interval. Meanwhile, the existence of large controlling shareholders clearly prevents the optimal allocation of capital. With the postponements of the investment, the enterprise's "squeeze" tendency becomes more and more obvious, leads to further lower investment efficiency; controlling shareholders’expropriation level is negative with the firm valuation during the whole investment interval, it can decrease the large shareholder’s expropriation level from increasing the cash flow rights, hence to increase the firm value.
(4) It puts forword a few recommendations to solve the private benefits of control, distorted capital allocation and corporate value problems in Chinese listed companies from the perspective of controlling shareholders, mid-small shareholders and the capital market according to the higher level of private benefits of control and the inefficient investment of Chinese listed companies. Finally, this paper summarizes the ideas in the previous chapters and gives the research limitations and future prospects.
This article has the following research characteristics and innovations:
(1) Most of previous studies on the large shareholders’expropriation behavior focused on single-term and the intertemporal expropriation behavior were also constrained in single-term application. The researcher builds a double-temporal expropriation model based on the intertemporal investments to extend the classical single period expropriation behaviour model. This model is created from double-temporal investment and large controlling shareholders.
(2) According to the theoretically analytical conclusion under the double-temporal investment and the current situation of higher private benefits of control from Chinese listed companies, this paper utilizes the available corporation data to test the influence on private benefits of control by cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, new investment opportunity, strengthen of legal protection, legal protection of mid-small shareholders.meanwhile, based on above aspects the paper explors the cause of private benefits of control in the listed companies, to propose theory reference for policies making.
(3) The exiting literatures about the effect of private benefits of control on corporate investment behaviors mainly study a generalizable level of equity structure, the deep study from the view of large shareholder expropriation has not been developed, and the study method is simplex. This paper, being in the framework of large shareholder expropriation, studys the combined investment of two assests, builds a corporate value model with large shareholder expropriation, dynamicly analyses the effect of private benefits of control on corporate investment decisions with the theory of real option, and based on this exploits the causes of corporate inefficient investment.
引文
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