机构投资者参与上市公司治理研究
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摘要
上世纪80年代后西方国家机构投资者积极主义兴起,其主要原因是各国资本市场、控制权市场的发展和各国法律制度的调整,机构投资者规模扩大后难以通过抛售股票获得长期收益,需要通过积极参与公司治理来保障自身获利能力和市场地位。机构投资者参与公司治理成为公司外部治理机制的重要组成部分。我国机构投资者近年来迅速发展,随着股权分置改革的进行和相关政策法规的调整,我国机构投资者参与公司治理的能力逐步提高。
国内外学者对机构投资者参与公司治理进行了广泛的研究,主要集中于机构投资者参与公司治理的因素、主要的渠道和机构投资者参与公司治理的效果。在理论分析的基础上,众多学者采取了实证分析的方法对该问题进行研究,所取得的实证结果是混合的,这说明学术界对机构投资者参与公司治理的效果并未取得一致的观点。基于此,有必要在不同的市场环境和法律条件下分别进行研究,同时,该问题是一个不断发展的问题,需要持续的研究。
美国机构投资者参与公司治理的积极性较高,机构投资者结构比较健全。通过分析美国机构投资者的实践经验有助于给我国机构投资者提供启示和借鉴,本文分析了美国机构投资者参与公司治理的动因、障碍和途径。通过与其比较,我国机构投资者参与公司治理正经历着美国曾经走过的从混乱到逐步自我调整和完善的历程,机构投资者结构尚需完善,相应的政策法规应进一步健全,应逐步采取灵活的途径参与公司治理。
本文选取了2004年—2006年沪深股市上市公司的样本进行实证研究,在这三年中我国机构投资者所处的市场环境和政策环境都发生了较大变化,研究中选取了三年的截面数据和混合截面数据,截面数据反映了各年度的情况,混合截面数据反映了整体的趋势。实证研究分别从机构投资者对公司绩效的影响、对公司管理人员薪酬影响和对公司内部治理机构的影响三个方面分析。通过对三年数据的统计分析发现机构投资者对公司绩效有积极作用;机构投资者在现阶段有助于高管薪酬的提高;机构投资者对公司治理机构的影响不显著。
本文在实证结论基础上提出了相应的政策建议,我国现阶段应优化机构投资者结构,既要大力发展投资基金发挥其稳定股市的作用,又要发展养老基金、保险基金等长期资金提高机构投资者的稳定性,强化机构投资者对公司治理的关注;在发展机构投资者的同时应促进金融市场健康稳定发展,推动股指期货等金融工具的发展;机构投资者应完善自身内部治理机制。在发展机构投资者的同时还应加强相关法规的建设,逐步提高上市公司质量。
本文创新点在于通过2004年-2006年的数据研究了机构投资者参与公司治理的最新动态,丰富了现有的实证研究。并且,不同于以往由绩效或薪酬单方面考察机构投资参与公司治理的状况,本文通过多方面的实证检验,系统分析了机构投资者对公司治理的影响。
The institutional investor activism rase during 1980s in the western countries.It mainly attribute to the development of capital market and controling market,the change of law in these countries is another reason.For the large scale of the institutional investor,they cannot get the long-term revenue from selling the stocks they hold,they need take take part in corporate governance to ensure their revenue and market place.Institutioal investor taking part in corporate governance has been an important mechanism . Along with the reform of non-tradable shares and adjustment of policies ,the institutional investor rapidly developed in China ,the power of influence corporate governance increasingly enhanced.
Domestic and foreign scholars researched the institutional investor comprehensively,most of the researches focused in three aspects:the factor of institutional investor taking part in corporate governance,the main channel that institutional investor adopt to take part in corporate governance,the effect of institutional investor taking part in the corporate governance.Beside theories,many scholars adopt demonstration to research the problem,the results are different,the academe has not got a consistent viewpoint.For this reason,we need research the problem in different market and law.Because institutional investor taking part in corporate governance is a developing problem it is necessary to research this problem continuously.
The institutional investor is enthusiasm in American,there are all kinds of institutional investors in American.We can leran good experience from research the practise of American institutioanl investor.Compare with American institutional investor we can find that the institutional investor in China is undergoing the period from confusion to perfect,the structure of institutional investor need perfect and relevant policies need enrich,institutional investor need flexible approach to take part in the corporate governance.
In this paper,we use the date of listed company from 2004 to 2006.We get the listed company from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market.The research include three aspects:the relationship between institutional investor and corporate performance,the relationship between institutional investor and mananger salary,the relationship between institutional investor and the operation of inside governance.From the result it appears that institutional investor can actively affect corporate performance,institutional investor can increase mananger salary,there isn't marketbal relationship between institutional investor and the inside governance.
The structure of institutional invester should be optimized,investment fund、pension fund、insurance fund should be developed. At the same time,we should keep the capital market healthy and steady,perfect the inside governance of institutional investor,increase the quality of listed company,make a good environment of law.
The date is an innovation,we use the date from 2004 to 2006,these dates can reflect the new trends on this topic.Another innovation is researching the topic from three approachs,the integrated research can reflect the topic systematically.
国内外学者对机构投资者参与公司治理进行了广泛的研究,主要集中于机构投资者参与公司治理的因素、主要的渠道和机构投资者参与公司治理的效果。在理论分析的基础上,众多学者采取了实证分析的方法对该问题进行研究,所取得的实证结果是混合的,这说明学术界对机构投资者参与公司治理的效果并未取得一致的观点。基于此,有必要在不同的市场环境和法律条件下分别进行研究,同时,该问题是一个不断发展的问题,需要持续的研究。
美国机构投资者参与公司治理的积极性较高,机构投资者结构比较健全。通过分析美国机构投资者的实践经验有助于给我国机构投资者提供启示和借鉴,本文分析了美国机构投资者参与公司治理的动因、障碍和途径。通过与其比较,我国机构投资者参与公司治理正经历着美国曾经走过的从混乱到逐步自我调整和完善的历程,机构投资者结构尚需完善,相应的政策法规应进一步健全,应逐步采取灵活的途径参与公司治理。
本文选取了2004年—2006年沪深股市上市公司的样本进行实证研究,在这三年中我国机构投资者所处的市场环境和政策环境都发生了较大变化,研究中选取了三年的截面数据和混合截面数据,截面数据反映了各年度的情况,混合截面数据反映了整体的趋势。实证研究分别从机构投资者对公司绩效的影响、对公司管理人员薪酬影响和对公司内部治理机构的影响三个方面分析。通过对三年数据的统计分析发现机构投资者对公司绩效有积极作用;机构投资者在现阶段有助于高管薪酬的提高;机构投资者对公司治理机构的影响不显著。
本文在实证结论基础上提出了相应的政策建议,我国现阶段应优化机构投资者结构,既要大力发展投资基金发挥其稳定股市的作用,又要发展养老基金、保险基金等长期资金提高机构投资者的稳定性,强化机构投资者对公司治理的关注;在发展机构投资者的同时应促进金融市场健康稳定发展,推动股指期货等金融工具的发展;机构投资者应完善自身内部治理机制。在发展机构投资者的同时还应加强相关法规的建设,逐步提高上市公司质量。
本文创新点在于通过2004年-2006年的数据研究了机构投资者参与公司治理的最新动态,丰富了现有的实证研究。并且,不同于以往由绩效或薪酬单方面考察机构投资参与公司治理的状况,本文通过多方面的实证检验,系统分析了机构投资者对公司治理的影响。
The institutional investor activism rase during 1980s in the western countries.It mainly attribute to the development of capital market and controling market,the change of law in these countries is another reason.For the large scale of the institutional investor,they cannot get the long-term revenue from selling the stocks they hold,they need take take part in corporate governance to ensure their revenue and market place.Institutioal investor taking part in corporate governance has been an important mechanism . Along with the reform of non-tradable shares and adjustment of policies ,the institutional investor rapidly developed in China ,the power of influence corporate governance increasingly enhanced.
Domestic and foreign scholars researched the institutional investor comprehensively,most of the researches focused in three aspects:the factor of institutional investor taking part in corporate governance,the main channel that institutional investor adopt to take part in corporate governance,the effect of institutional investor taking part in the corporate governance.Beside theories,many scholars adopt demonstration to research the problem,the results are different,the academe has not got a consistent viewpoint.For this reason,we need research the problem in different market and law.Because institutional investor taking part in corporate governance is a developing problem it is necessary to research this problem continuously.
The institutional investor is enthusiasm in American,there are all kinds of institutional investors in American.We can leran good experience from research the practise of American institutioanl investor.Compare with American institutional investor we can find that the institutional investor in China is undergoing the period from confusion to perfect,the structure of institutional investor need perfect and relevant policies need enrich,institutional investor need flexible approach to take part in the corporate governance.
In this paper,we use the date of listed company from 2004 to 2006.We get the listed company from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market.The research include three aspects:the relationship between institutional investor and corporate performance,the relationship between institutional investor and mananger salary,the relationship between institutional investor and the operation of inside governance.From the result it appears that institutional investor can actively affect corporate performance,institutional investor can increase mananger salary,there isn't marketbal relationship between institutional investor and the inside governance.
The structure of institutional invester should be optimized,investment fund、pension fund、insurance fund should be developed. At the same time,we should keep the capital market healthy and steady,perfect the inside governance of institutional investor,increase the quality of listed company,make a good environment of law.
The date is an innovation,we use the date from 2004 to 2006,these dates can reflect the new trends on this topic.Another innovation is researching the topic from three approachs,the integrated research can reflect the topic systematically.
引文
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1 http://www.csrc.gov.cn
1 Brickley,J.,R.Lease and C.Smith.Ownership Structure and Voting on AntitakeoverAmendments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):267-292.
2 Romano,R..Public Pension Fund Activism In Corporate Governance Reconsidered[J].Columbia Law Review,1993(94):795-853.
1 耿志民.中国机构投资者研究[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
2 广发证券股份有限公司课题组.机构投资者投资行为研究[J].上证研究,2004(1):150.
3 Gillan,S.L.and L.T.Starks.Corporate Ownership,Corporate Governance and the Role of Institutional Investors:A Global Perspectives[J].Journal of Applied Finance,2003(4):20.
1 Light.The Privatization of Equity[J].Harvard Business Review,1989(1/2):61-74.
2 Smith,M..Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors:Evidence for CalPERS[J].Journal of Finance,1996(51):227-52.
3 Prowse S.D.Institutional Investment Patterns And Corporate Financial Behavior In The Unite d States and Japan[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(27):43-66.
1 Ayres,I.and P.Cramton.An Agency Perspective on Relational Investing[R].Working Paper,Stanford Law School,1993.
2 转引自汪忠等.机构投资者参与公司治理研究综述[J].经济学动态,2005(10):109-p114.
3 hagat,S.and B.Black.The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance[R].University of Colorado and Stanford University Working Paper,1998.
4 Coffee,Jr..Liquidity Versus Control:The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor[J].Columbia Law Review,1991(91),1277-1368.
5 Bhide,A..Efficient Markets,Deficient Governance:U.S.Securities Regulations Protect Investors and Enhance Market Liquidity.But Do They Alienate Managers and Shareholders[J].Harvard Business Review,1994(72),128-140.
1 Maug,E..Large Shareholders as Monitors:Is There A Trade-off Between Liquidity and Control[J].Journal of Finance,1998(53):65-98.
2 转引自汪忠等.机构投资者参与公司治理研究综述[J].经济学动态,2005(10):109-p114
3 Berle and Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M].New York:Macmillan Publishing Company,1932.
4 Shleifer A.,R.Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial,1997(52):737-783.
5 Steven Kaplan.The Effect of Management Buyout on Operating Performance and Value[J].Journal of Financial and Economics,1998(24):217-241.
6 Gillan,S.L.and L.T.Starks.Corporate Ownership,Corporate Governance and the Role of Institutional Investors:A Global Perspectives[J].Journal of Applied Finance,2003(4):20.
1 Blair M.M..Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporate Governance for The 21 Century[M]Washington DC:The Brooking Institution,1995.
2 Fama,E.and Jensen,M..Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics 1983(26):301-325.
3 A.R.Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial,1997(52):737-783.
4 Hermanlin,B.E.and M.S.Weisbach.The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance[J].Financial Management,1991(20):101-112.
5 Adams.Renee B..The Dual Role of Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of Management[R].SSRN Working Paper,2001.
6 转引自汪忠等.机构投资者参与公司治理研究综述[J].经济学动态,2005(10):109-p114.
7 Pearce,John A.,Ⅱ.and Shaker A.Zahra.The Relative Power of CEO's and Boards of Directors:Association with Corporate Performance[J].Strategic Management Journal,1991(12):135-153.
8 Weisbach.M.S..Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):431-460.
1 Stuart Rosenstein and Jeffrey G.Wyatt.Outside Directors,Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):175-191.
2 Douglas W.Diamond.Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,Journal of Political Economics,1989,Vol.97,No.41
3 Hansen,G.S.and C.W.Hill.Are Institutional Investors Myopic A Time-Series Study of Four Technology-Driven Industries[J].Strategic Management Journal,991(12):1-16.
4 Laverty,K.J..Economic Short-termism:The Debate,The Unresolved Issues,and the Implications for Management Practice and Research[J].Academy of Management,1996(21):825-860.
5 Brickley,J.,R.Lease and C.Smith.Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):267-292.
6 Jensen,M.and K.J.Murphy.Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990(98):225-264.
7 Berle and Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M].New York:Macmillan,1932.
8 Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986(94):461-488.
1 Abowd,J.M..Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance[J].Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990(43,3):52-73.
2 Agrawal,A.and G.Mandelker.Executiveial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions[J].Journal of Finance,1987(42):823-837.
3 Dechow,P.,R.Sloan,and A.Sweeney.Detecting Earnings Management[J].The Accounting Review,1995(70):193-225.
1 Shleifer,Andrei and Robert W.Vishny.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986(94):461-488.
2 Huddart S..The effect of a large shareholder on corporate value[J].Management Science,1993(11):1407-1421.
3 Maug,E..Large Shareholders as Monitors:Is There a Trade-off between Liquidity and Control [J].Journal of Finance,1998(53):65-98.
4 Noe.T.Institutional Activism and Financial Market Structure[M].Review of Financial Studies,2002.
5 Kang,J.-K.,Shivdasani,A.Firm performance,corporate governance and top executive turnover in Japan[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995(38):29-58.
6 Kaplan,S.N.and B.A.Minton.Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards Peterninants and Implication for Managers[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1994(36):225-258.
7 Bertrand,Marianne,and SendAl1Mullainathan.Do CEOs set their own pay? The ones without principals do[R].NBER working paper,2000.
8 Chidambaran,N,John,K.Relationship investing:large shareholder monitoring with managerial cooperation[R].Leonard N Stern School Finance Department Working Paper,1998,No.98-044,New York University.
9 Chung,R.,Firth,M.,iim,J.B.Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earnings Management [J]Journal of CorporateFinance,2002(8):29-48.
10 Bushee,B.The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior[J].The Accounting Review,1998(73):305-333.
11 Wahal and McConnell.Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2000(6):307-329.
12 Agrawal A.and G.Mandelker.Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990(25):143-161.
13 Duggal&Millar.Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance:The Case of Bidder Returns[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,1999(5):103-117.
1 Agrawal A.and G.Mandelker..Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990(25):143-161.
2 Chaganti R.and F.Damanpour.Institutional ownership,capital structure,and firm performance[J].Strategic Management Journal,1991(7):479-491.
3 G.Eakins.Financial Markets and Institutions[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2001.
4 Daily CM.and Dalton DR.CEO and Director Turnover in Failing Firms:An Illusion of Change[J].Strategic Management Journal,1995(16):393-400.
5 arpoff J.M.,Malatestth P.H.and Walkling R.A..Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives:Empirical Evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996(42):365-395.
6 Wahal S..Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance[J].Journalof Financial and Quantitative Analysis.1996(31):1-23.
7 陈国力.机构投资者与公司治理[J].管理现代化,2001(6):18-20.
1 王斌,袁琳.论竞争性股权结构与机构投资者在企业改革中的角色——从“所有者缺位”到“机构投资者补位”[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2002(1):47-52.
2 李向前.机构投资者、公司治理与资本市场稳定研究[J].南开经济研究,2002(2):69-73.
3 苏振华.论机构投资者介入上市公司治理[J].浙江社会科学,2002(2):61-63.
4 万俊毅,王伯成.机构投资者的决策人属性及其决策特征[J].中央财经大学学报,2003(5):30-34.
5 类淑志,宫玉松.关于机构投资者的几个问题[J].经济学动态,2004(3):53-56.
1 张恒,刘力昌.中国机构投资者参与上市公司治理研究[J].经济管理,2005(10):31-36.
2 娄伟.基金持股与上市公司业绩相关性的实证研究[J].上海经济研究,2002(6):58-62.
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