股权结构与CEO报酬关系的实证研究
|
摘要
CEO报酬越来越受到理论界以及社会各界的广泛关注。合理的经营者报酬制度成为了建立有效的公司治理的核心内容,众多学者对公司管理人员的报酬进行实证分析。本文运用人力资本理论、交易成本理论、委托代理理论、管理学和其他学科知识,构建CEO报酬模型来研究中国上市公司中股权结构在报酬契约方面的能力。
本文采用沪深两市2006年报数据,通过引入公司发展特征、CEO个人特征衡量股权结构对CEO报酬水平的影响。在CEO报酬水平研究中,本文采用不同于以往研究的变量如成长性(净利润增长率)、股权集中度(CR3、CR5、H5)、股权控制度(CR1、Z)、第一大股东的性质等。另外还涉及公司绩效、规模、CEO年龄和任期等控制变量。通过多元逐步回归模型研究各因子对薪酬的影响。另外,由于我国大型企业和中小企业股权结构差异性比较大,影响因子的解释存在异议,本文利用两组数据分别研究了两者的股权结构对CEO报酬的影响,更加准确地解释各变量对CEO报酬影响。
统计研究发现:大型企业CEO货币报酬高于中小企业CEO,但总报酬偏低;公司的绩效和成长性并不因为规模的庞大而降低;国有股的比例随着规模减小而降低,外资股随着规模减少趋向于降低,流通A股则随着规模减少而提高;大型和中小企业第一大股东控制度并不特别强,但大型企业表现三大股东的联合控制,而中小企业股权相对分散。实证结论表明:无论大型企业还是中小企业,公司规模都是决定CEO报酬的重要因素,公司绩效与中小企业CEO总报酬显著正相关。股权收益已经逐步成为我国上市公司高管人员整体薪酬计划中的重要组成部分。外资股权与CEO总报酬正相关,但是大型企业外资比例高是由于外资流通股比例高,公司治理机制弱化,CEO实际控制度增强,报酬增加,中小企业则是外资直接投资增加,报酬政策标准越高,CEO很可能收到高的货币报酬。股权集中度与CEO报酬并不呈现正U型关系,而是呈现负相关。中小企业CEO是因为股权分散,而获得高比例的个人股以增加股权收益,而大型企业CEO更倾向于利用股权分散的公司治理问题而提高个人报酬收益。
最后本文对CEO报酬机制提出建议,并对以后的研究方向做了展望。
The CEO compensation has come under more and more consideration in academia and industry. The construction of rational manager compensation system is a core content of efficient governance, and many academicians start to carry on the empirical analysis to corporate mangers’compensation. In order to investigate the effectiveness of listed corporate’ownership structure to compensation, my paper constructs the CEO reward influence the structural model under the property right theory, the transaction cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the management science and other discipline knowledge.
Base on data from annual report of companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai in2006 and 2007, this paper analyses effectiveness among enterprises’features, stockholding structure and CEO compensation. This article used variable like growth potential (the net profit rate of increment), the stockholder's rights concentration degree (CR3, CR5, and H5), and the stockholder's rights controlled the system (CR1, Z), the first major stockholder's nature and so on. In addition, it involves controlled variables and so on company achievements, scale, CEO age and tenure in office, and study various factors to compensation influence through multi-dimensional stepwise regression model. Because our country Major industry and the small-sized enterprises stockholder's rights structure difference is in evidence, the explanation to the interrelated factors the exist objection. This article studies the influence, relating to both stockholders’rights structure separately to the CEO compensation, with two groups of data. They can accurately explain the relations of the variables and CEO compensation.
In the model, the research discovered that, The MP reward of CEO from the major industries is higher than small and medium-sized enterprises, while the total compensation is lower. The huge scale does not reduce the efficiency of companies’performance; the state-owned stock proportion reduces along with the scale reduces, and the foreign capital stock tends to along with the scale reduction in reduces, and circulates A stock proportion reduces along with the scale enhances. The controlling of the most major stockholder of large-scale and the small-sized enterprises are not strong, however, the major industries displays several major stockholder's union controlling, while the small and medium-sized enterprises stockholder's rights relatively disperser, moreover the first major stockholder and second major stockholder disparity in strength is not remarkable.
The real diagnosis conclusion indicated in follows: first, Regardless of the major industry or the small and medium-sized enterprise, the company scale is the determining factor deciding the CEO reward, the company achievements and the small-sized enterprise’CEO total compensation is remarkably connected. Secondly, the stockholder's rights income already gradually became to be listed high tube personnel overall salary plan the important constituent in our country. Third, the headers in the state-owned companies also are supervised and restrained by the government, the relatively, their stockholder's rights proportion are fewer. While the foreign capital direct investment to small and medium-sized enterprise increases, the reward policy standard is higher, and CEO possibly receives the high monetary payoff; if the large-scale business owner the foreign capital circulation stock increase, CEO actual increase the controlling of the system, and also the reward increases. The stockholder's rights concentration degree and the CEO reward do not present the U relations, but present the inverse correlation. The concentration degree is higher, the reward is lower, because the stockholder's rights of small and medium-sized enterprise is dispersible, he can obtain the high annual bonus by increasing the stockholder's rights income, while Major industry CEO favors in enhancing the enterprise by using the company governance problem.
Finally, this article proposes to suggest about the CEO reward mechanism, also has made the forecast to later research direction.
本文采用沪深两市2006年报数据,通过引入公司发展特征、CEO个人特征衡量股权结构对CEO报酬水平的影响。在CEO报酬水平研究中,本文采用不同于以往研究的变量如成长性(净利润增长率)、股权集中度(CR3、CR5、H5)、股权控制度(CR1、Z)、第一大股东的性质等。另外还涉及公司绩效、规模、CEO年龄和任期等控制变量。通过多元逐步回归模型研究各因子对薪酬的影响。另外,由于我国大型企业和中小企业股权结构差异性比较大,影响因子的解释存在异议,本文利用两组数据分别研究了两者的股权结构对CEO报酬的影响,更加准确地解释各变量对CEO报酬影响。
统计研究发现:大型企业CEO货币报酬高于中小企业CEO,但总报酬偏低;公司的绩效和成长性并不因为规模的庞大而降低;国有股的比例随着规模减小而降低,外资股随着规模减少趋向于降低,流通A股则随着规模减少而提高;大型和中小企业第一大股东控制度并不特别强,但大型企业表现三大股东的联合控制,而中小企业股权相对分散。实证结论表明:无论大型企业还是中小企业,公司规模都是决定CEO报酬的重要因素,公司绩效与中小企业CEO总报酬显著正相关。股权收益已经逐步成为我国上市公司高管人员整体薪酬计划中的重要组成部分。外资股权与CEO总报酬正相关,但是大型企业外资比例高是由于外资流通股比例高,公司治理机制弱化,CEO实际控制度增强,报酬增加,中小企业则是外资直接投资增加,报酬政策标准越高,CEO很可能收到高的货币报酬。股权集中度与CEO报酬并不呈现正U型关系,而是呈现负相关。中小企业CEO是因为股权分散,而获得高比例的个人股以增加股权收益,而大型企业CEO更倾向于利用股权分散的公司治理问题而提高个人报酬收益。
最后本文对CEO报酬机制提出建议,并对以后的研究方向做了展望。
The CEO compensation has come under more and more consideration in academia and industry. The construction of rational manager compensation system is a core content of efficient governance, and many academicians start to carry on the empirical analysis to corporate mangers’compensation. In order to investigate the effectiveness of listed corporate’ownership structure to compensation, my paper constructs the CEO reward influence the structural model under the property right theory, the transaction cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the management science and other discipline knowledge.
Base on data from annual report of companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai in2006 and 2007, this paper analyses effectiveness among enterprises’features, stockholding structure and CEO compensation. This article used variable like growth potential (the net profit rate of increment), the stockholder's rights concentration degree (CR3, CR5, and H5), and the stockholder's rights controlled the system (CR1, Z), the first major stockholder's nature and so on. In addition, it involves controlled variables and so on company achievements, scale, CEO age and tenure in office, and study various factors to compensation influence through multi-dimensional stepwise regression model. Because our country Major industry and the small-sized enterprises stockholder's rights structure difference is in evidence, the explanation to the interrelated factors the exist objection. This article studies the influence, relating to both stockholders’rights structure separately to the CEO compensation, with two groups of data. They can accurately explain the relations of the variables and CEO compensation.
In the model, the research discovered that, The MP reward of CEO from the major industries is higher than small and medium-sized enterprises, while the total compensation is lower. The huge scale does not reduce the efficiency of companies’performance; the state-owned stock proportion reduces along with the scale reduces, and the foreign capital stock tends to along with the scale reduction in reduces, and circulates A stock proportion reduces along with the scale enhances. The controlling of the most major stockholder of large-scale and the small-sized enterprises are not strong, however, the major industries displays several major stockholder's union controlling, while the small and medium-sized enterprises stockholder's rights relatively disperser, moreover the first major stockholder and second major stockholder disparity in strength is not remarkable.
The real diagnosis conclusion indicated in follows: first, Regardless of the major industry or the small and medium-sized enterprise, the company scale is the determining factor deciding the CEO reward, the company achievements and the small-sized enterprise’CEO total compensation is remarkably connected. Secondly, the stockholder's rights income already gradually became to be listed high tube personnel overall salary plan the important constituent in our country. Third, the headers in the state-owned companies also are supervised and restrained by the government, the relatively, their stockholder's rights proportion are fewer. While the foreign capital direct investment to small and medium-sized enterprise increases, the reward policy standard is higher, and CEO possibly receives the high monetary payoff; if the large-scale business owner the foreign capital circulation stock increase, CEO actual increase the controlling of the system, and also the reward increases. The stockholder's rights concentration degree and the CEO reward do not present the U relations, but present the inverse correlation. The concentration degree is higher, the reward is lower, because the stockholder's rights of small and medium-sized enterprise is dispersible, he can obtain the high annual bonus by increasing the stockholder's rights income, while Major industry CEO favors in enhancing the enterprise by using the company governance problem.
Finally, this article proposes to suggest about the CEO reward mechanism, also has made the forecast to later research direction.
引文
[1] G.S. Becker. Human Capital[M]. Chicago:Chicago University Press, 1964.
[2]高欢迎,阎薇,陈亚光.资源的稀缺性与企业剩余索取权安排——关于企业人力资本的重要性及激励问题研究[J].经济问题探索,2004,12,P43-45.
[3]阿尔钦和德姆塞茨:财产权利与制度变迁-产权学派与新制度学派[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 1994.
[4]马尔萨斯.人口原理[M].北京:商务印书馆, 1992.
[5]马歇尔.经济学原理[M].北京:商务印书馆, 1981.
[6]马克思:资本论[M].北京:人民出版社, 1975.
[7]大卫·P·艾勒曼.民主的公司制[ M].北京:新华出版社, 1998.
[8]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社, 2003.
[9]威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约[M ].北京:商务印书馆, 2002.
[10]刘小玄.现代企业的激励机制:剩余支配权[J].经济研究, 1996. 5, P3-11.
[11]艾尔弗雷德·D·钱德勒.战略与结构[M ].云南:云南出版社, 2002.
[12] Lazear,Edward. and Sherwin Rosen.. Rank-Ordered Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1981.89:P841-864.
[13] Rosen,Sherwin. Prises and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments[J]. American Economic Review,1986.76:P701-715.
[14] O Reilly C A, Main B G, Crystal G S.CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison:A tale of two theories[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1988.33:P 257—274.
[15] Lambert, R. A. and D. F. Larcker,. An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1987.25:P85-125.
[16] Andrei Shleifer, Robert, Vishny. A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of finance,1997.2:P737–783.
[17]张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系[J].经济研究, 1996 .9:P3-15.
[18]杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义—兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997.1:P12-22.
[19]亚当·斯密.国富论[M].陕西:陕西人民出版社, 2001.
[20]凡勃伦.企业理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,1959.
[21] A伯利, C米恩斯.现代公司与和私有财产[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005.
[22] E.G..菲吕博腾, S.配杰威齐.产权与经济理论:近期文献的一个综述,财产权力与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店. 1994.
[23] Martin,Stepher, David Parker.The Impact of Privatization-Ownership and Corporate in the UK[Z]. Rountledge,1997.
[24] Ross S. The Economic theory of agency:the principal’S Problem [J]. American Economic Review,1973.63:134—139.
[25] Grossman, Sanford, Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986.94:691-719.
[26] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard in Team[J]. Bell Journal of Economic,1982.13:P324-340.
[27] Wilson,James Q., Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It[M]. New York:Basic Books,1989.
[28] Fama,Eugene. What s Different about Bank [J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1985 15:P29—39.
[29] Carter, R.Rand, S.Manaster. Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation[J]. Journal of Finance,1990.45:P1045-l067.
[30] Jensen,M.C, Meckling, W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976.3:P305-360.
[31] Murphy.K.J. Executive Compensation and the Modem Industrial Revolution[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1997.15:P469-492.
[32] Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W.Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economics,1986.94:P461—88.
[33] Agrawal A, and G.Mandetker. Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments[J]. Journal of Financia1 and Quantitative Analysis, 1990.25:P143—161.
[34] Tosi H, Wemer S, Katz J, Gomes-Mejia L. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of executive compensation studies [J]. Journal of Management,2000.2:P301—339.
[35] Core J,Holthausen R, Larcker D. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999.51:P371-406.
[36] James J Cordeiro, Rajamm Veliyath. Beyond pay for performance:panel study of the determinants of CEO compensation[J]. Angelical business review,2003.1:P56-67.
[37] Khan, Raihan. Dharwadkar, Ravi. Brandes, Pamela.Institutional ownership and CEO compensation : alongitudinal examination[J]. Journal of Business Research,2004.8 : P1078-1088.
[38]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001.3:P3-11.
[39]于东智.董事会行为、治理效率与公司绩效──基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2001.2:P200-202.
[40]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002.5:P58-70.
[41]陈爽英,唐小我.股权结构与高管人员薪酬的实证研究[J].软科学,2005.4:P23-25.
[42]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000.3:P32-39.
[43]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000.1:P24-30.
[44]蹇明,崔红卫,武振业.我国上市公司高管人员报酬影响因素分析及实证研究[J].软科学,2006.5:P 46-50.
[45]杜胜利,翟艳玲.总经理年度报酬决定因素的实证分析[J].管理科学,2005.8:P 114-120. [46白重恩,刘俏,路洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005.2:P 81-91.
[47]宋德舜.国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效[J].中国工业经济,2004.3:P91-98.
[48]谌新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003.8:P55-63.
[49]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文. CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003.3:P35-39.
[50]林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J].经济研究,2003.4:P31-40.
[51]李琦.上市公司高级经理人薪酬影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2003.6:P113-121
[52]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002.1:P80-87.
[53]赵西萍,李有根,李怀祖.董事会构成与经理控制机制关系研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002.11:P64-69.
[54] Jensen, M., Murphy, K..Performance pay and top-management incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990.98:P225–264.
[55] Koen, C. The dialectics of globalization: what are the effects for management and organization in Germany and Japan[J]. Research Internation Business Finance,2004.18:P173–197.
[56] Tobin, J. A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory[J]. Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,1969.1:P15-29.
[57] Taussings F W, Baker W S. American corporations and their executive: A statistical inquiry [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1925.1:P1—51.
[58] Steven N. Kaplan. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japanand the United States[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1994.102:P510-546.
[59] Hermalin, E and Weisbach, M.. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO[J]. Journal of American Economy Review,1998.88:P96–118.
[60] Hill C W, Phan P. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1991.34:P712-717.
[61] Hambrick.D C, Fukutomi G. The seasons of a CEO’s tenure[J ] . Academy of Management Review,1991 .16:P719– 742.
[62] James J Cordeiro, Rajamm Veliyath. Beyond pay for performance:panel study of the determinants of CEO compensation[J]. American business review,2003.1:P56-67.
[63]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层更换[J].经济研究,2001.10:P75-82.
[64] Harris, M and Holmstrom, B. A theory of wage dynamics[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1982.49:P315-333.
[65] McKnight PJ., Tomkins C., Weir C.and Hobson,D.CEO age and top executive pay:A UK empirical study[J]. Journal of Management and Governance,1989.48:P173-187.
[66] La Porta, R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes, and A.Shleifer. Corporate Ownership around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,1999.54:P471—518.
[67] Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman. Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998.113:P653-691.
[68] Bede, A and Means, G.The Modem Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York Macmillan, 1932.
[69]李东明,邓世强.上市公司董事会结构、职能的实证研究[J].证券市场导报, 1999.10:P25-30.
[70]王凌云,刘洪.我国不同所有制企业薪酬体系比较研究[J].商业经济与管理, 2007.19 :P37-41.
[71]吕臣.我国上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效实证研究[D].四川省社科院, 2007.
[2]高欢迎,阎薇,陈亚光.资源的稀缺性与企业剩余索取权安排——关于企业人力资本的重要性及激励问题研究[J].经济问题探索,2004,12,P43-45.
[3]阿尔钦和德姆塞茨:财产权利与制度变迁-产权学派与新制度学派[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 1994.
[4]马尔萨斯.人口原理[M].北京:商务印书馆, 1992.
[5]马歇尔.经济学原理[M].北京:商务印书馆, 1981.
[6]马克思:资本论[M].北京:人民出版社, 1975.
[7]大卫·P·艾勒曼.民主的公司制[ M].北京:新华出版社, 1998.
[8]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社, 2003.
[9]威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度:论企业签约与市场签约[M ].北京:商务印书馆, 2002.
[10]刘小玄.现代企业的激励机制:剩余支配权[J].经济研究, 1996. 5, P3-11.
[11]艾尔弗雷德·D·钱德勒.战略与结构[M ].云南:云南出版社, 2002.
[12] Lazear,Edward. and Sherwin Rosen.. Rank-Ordered Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1981.89:P841-864.
[13] Rosen,Sherwin. Prises and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments[J]. American Economic Review,1986.76:P701-715.
[14] O Reilly C A, Main B G, Crystal G S.CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison:A tale of two theories[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1988.33:P 257—274.
[15] Lambert, R. A. and D. F. Larcker,. An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1987.25:P85-125.
[16] Andrei Shleifer, Robert, Vishny. A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of finance,1997.2:P737–783.
[17]张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系[J].经济研究, 1996 .9:P3-15.
[18]杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义—兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997.1:P12-22.
[19]亚当·斯密.国富论[M].陕西:陕西人民出版社, 2001.
[20]凡勃伦.企业理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,1959.
[21] A伯利, C米恩斯.现代公司与和私有财产[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005.
[22] E.G..菲吕博腾, S.配杰威齐.产权与经济理论:近期文献的一个综述,财产权力与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店. 1994.
[23] Martin,Stepher, David Parker.The Impact of Privatization-Ownership and Corporate in the UK[Z]. Rountledge,1997.
[24] Ross S. The Economic theory of agency:the principal’S Problem [J]. American Economic Review,1973.63:134—139.
[25] Grossman, Sanford, Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986.94:691-719.
[26] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard in Team[J]. Bell Journal of Economic,1982.13:P324-340.
[27] Wilson,James Q., Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It[M]. New York:Basic Books,1989.
[28] Fama,Eugene. What s Different about Bank [J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1985 15:P29—39.
[29] Carter, R.Rand, S.Manaster. Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation[J]. Journal of Finance,1990.45:P1045-l067.
[30] Jensen,M.C, Meckling, W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976.3:P305-360.
[31] Murphy.K.J. Executive Compensation and the Modem Industrial Revolution[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1997.15:P469-492.
[32] Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W.Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economics,1986.94:P461—88.
[33] Agrawal A, and G.Mandetker. Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments[J]. Journal of Financia1 and Quantitative Analysis, 1990.25:P143—161.
[34] Tosi H, Wemer S, Katz J, Gomes-Mejia L. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of executive compensation studies [J]. Journal of Management,2000.2:P301—339.
[35] Core J,Holthausen R, Larcker D. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999.51:P371-406.
[36] James J Cordeiro, Rajamm Veliyath. Beyond pay for performance:panel study of the determinants of CEO compensation[J]. Angelical business review,2003.1:P56-67.
[37] Khan, Raihan. Dharwadkar, Ravi. Brandes, Pamela.Institutional ownership and CEO compensation : alongitudinal examination[J]. Journal of Business Research,2004.8 : P1078-1088.
[38]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001.3:P3-11.
[39]于东智.董事会行为、治理效率与公司绩效──基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2001.2:P200-202.
[40]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002.5:P58-70.
[41]陈爽英,唐小我.股权结构与高管人员薪酬的实证研究[J].软科学,2005.4:P23-25.
[42]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000.3:P32-39.
[43]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000.1:P24-30.
[44]蹇明,崔红卫,武振业.我国上市公司高管人员报酬影响因素分析及实证研究[J].软科学,2006.5:P 46-50.
[45]杜胜利,翟艳玲.总经理年度报酬决定因素的实证分析[J].管理科学,2005.8:P 114-120. [46白重恩,刘俏,路洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005.2:P 81-91.
[47]宋德舜.国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效[J].中国工业经济,2004.3:P91-98.
[48]谌新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003.8:P55-63.
[49]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文. CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003.3:P35-39.
[50]林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J].经济研究,2003.4:P31-40.
[51]李琦.上市公司高级经理人薪酬影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2003.6:P113-121
[52]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002.1:P80-87.
[53]赵西萍,李有根,李怀祖.董事会构成与经理控制机制关系研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002.11:P64-69.
[54] Jensen, M., Murphy, K..Performance pay and top-management incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990.98:P225–264.
[55] Koen, C. The dialectics of globalization: what are the effects for management and organization in Germany and Japan[J]. Research Internation Business Finance,2004.18:P173–197.
[56] Tobin, J. A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory[J]. Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,1969.1:P15-29.
[57] Taussings F W, Baker W S. American corporations and their executive: A statistical inquiry [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1925.1:P1—51.
[58] Steven N. Kaplan. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japanand the United States[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1994.102:P510-546.
[59] Hermalin, E and Weisbach, M.. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO[J]. Journal of American Economy Review,1998.88:P96–118.
[60] Hill C W, Phan P. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1991.34:P712-717.
[61] Hambrick.D C, Fukutomi G. The seasons of a CEO’s tenure[J ] . Academy of Management Review,1991 .16:P719– 742.
[62] James J Cordeiro, Rajamm Veliyath. Beyond pay for performance:panel study of the determinants of CEO compensation[J]. American business review,2003.1:P56-67.
[63]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层更换[J].经济研究,2001.10:P75-82.
[64] Harris, M and Holmstrom, B. A theory of wage dynamics[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1982.49:P315-333.
[65] McKnight PJ., Tomkins C., Weir C.and Hobson,D.CEO age and top executive pay:A UK empirical study[J]. Journal of Management and Governance,1989.48:P173-187.
[66] La Porta, R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes, and A.Shleifer. Corporate Ownership around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,1999.54:P471—518.
[67] Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman. Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998.113:P653-691.
[68] Bede, A and Means, G.The Modem Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York Macmillan, 1932.
[69]李东明,邓世强.上市公司董事会结构、职能的实证研究[J].证券市场导报, 1999.10:P25-30.
[70]王凌云,刘洪.我国不同所有制企业薪酬体系比较研究[J].商业经济与管理, 2007.19 :P37-41.
[71]吕臣.我国上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效实证研究[D].四川省社科院, 2007.