我国民营上市公司高管更换与经营业绩关系的研究
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摘要
随着我国改革开放的不断深入和国家对民营经济政策方针的演变,民营经济在国民经济中所占的比重越来越大。民营企业作为我国新兴的企业组织形态,已成为我国国民经济发展中不可缺少的重要力量,民营企业的经营状况和管理水平对国家的经济发展有着重大的影响。由于民营企业的迅猛发展,传统的家族式公司治理模式不再利于企业的长期发展,民营企业需要更多更专业的高级管理人才帮助他们管理公司,逐渐实现所有权和经营权的分离,这就使得民营企业开始着手解决公司高级管理人员更换的问题。基于此本文对上市民营企业的高管更换与经营业绩的关系进行研究。本文主要从公司控制机制引发的高管人员更换入手,对更换原因和更换方式进行分析,考察经营业绩在我国民营上市公司高管人员的更换中所起的作用和高管更换是否对经营业绩有促进作用,以检验民营上市公司高级管理人员监督机制的有效性。文章主要分为以下六个部分:
第一部分为绪论。该部分提出了本文的研究背景,指明了该项研究的理论意义和现实意义,并概括了文章的整体框架,使用的研究方法,最后特别说明了研究的创新之处。
第二部分对国内外有关高管更换与经营业绩关系的文献进行了综述,发现国外有大量研究高管更换问题的文献,相关文献的研究内容主要包括两个方面:一是对高级管理人员更换与公司经营业绩关系的研究,这类研究文献最多,主要从低劣的经营业绩是否会导致高管人员的更换,以及高管人员的更换是否会提高企业的经营业绩这两个角度来进行研究。二是对继任管理与经营业绩的关系研究。我国的学者则沿用国外的分析思路对我国的上市企业进行了研究。通过对国内外文献综述的分析,提出了四点对本文的研究启示。一是对研究范围界定的启示,国内的学者一般是对所有进行高管更换的公司进行研究,更多涉及的是国有企业,并没有针对民营企业进行经营业绩、继任管理与高管更换关系的这方面的研究,这就为本文的研究提供了一个新的思路。二是对研究方向的启示,国内研究高级管理人员更换的文献主要集中在董事会规模、股权结构和公司业绩之间的关系方面,研究高管更换与经营业绩关系的文献并不多,而且用的上市公司数据多为2000年之前的数据,故该领域的研究还有很大空间。特别是民营企业的继任管理,一般文献都从理论的角度加以分析,少有文章用实证的方法加以验证。因此,本文收集了我国上市民营企业的数据进行回归分析。三是对指标选择的启示,在文献中,公司经营业绩的衡量可以采用会计业绩和股票市场业绩两种方法。国外研究的文献一般都采用了市场业绩指标,国内的学者则更多地采用了会计业绩指标。由于我国资本市场效率不高,市场业绩指标的准确度和敏感度不够,因此,本文衡量民营企业经营业绩的指标为会计指标。四是对研究内容的启示,借鉴国外对于高管继任问题的研究,从两个方面来描述高管继任模式:一是继任者的来源;二是前任高管离职时的情境。继任者的来源一般分为内部继任者和外部继任者。前任离职的情境一般区分为强制性更换和正常更换。
第三部分详细分析了本文研究的理论基础,民营企业的相关理论和有关高管更换的法律法规。首先提出委托代理理论,由于委托人与代理人之间信息不对称,有必要对高管人员进行监督和激励。接着分析了公司治理的概念和公司治理的外部控制机制和内部控制机制,以及内外部控制机制间的关系,并针对我国治理机制的现状,提出由于我国没有建立起活跃的并购市场,以接管威胁为代表的外部控制在公司治理中很难发挥作用,而且我国的职业经理人市场同国外相比发展的也并不完善,以职业经理人市场为代表的外部控制同样在公司治理中很难发挥作用,于是公司就更需要依靠内部控制机制来监督和约束管理者。因此得出本文将侧重考察由内部控制机制发挥作用引发的强制性高管更换,而不考察由于控制权更换导致的高管更换。然后具体从股权结构和董事会特征两个方面分析了内部控制机制对高管更换的影响。跟着介绍了民营企业的相关理论,具体介绍了民营企业的含义,民营企业公司治理模式及其特点以及民营企业公司治理机制分析。含义的阐述为实证部分样本的选择打下理论基础,后两点的分析为实证研究的结论解释打下基础。最后,从高级管理人员任职的相关规定和控股股东更换与高级管理人员更换信息披露的相关规定两方面介绍了高管更换的法规制度,而实证部分的数据正是来自于相关法规规定披露的数据。
第四部分通过描述性统计对我国民营上市公司高管更换的现状进行分析,首先对2003-2007年民营上市企业高管更换公司的数量及比例进行统计,从整体上对民营上市公司的高管更换情况作出描述,发现五年来更换高管的民营上市公司数呈缓慢上升趋势。然后对高管更换的原因进行统计,发现工作调动、任期届满和辞职是高管更换的主要原因。而由控股股东变动引起的高管更换属于外部控制机制作用的结果,因此在后续分析中会扣除2004-2006年控股股东更换的公司,以便研究内部控制机制对民营企业高管更换的影响。由年龄因素造成的退休或因健康原因而离职的,也不是内部控制机制发挥作用的结果,即使企业更换了高管人员也不能记为强制性更换。而经营业绩引起内部控制机制发生作用,从而导致企业发生高管更换,因此经营业绩与强制性更换有密切关系。最后,通过对高管继任来源的统计,发现民营企业还是更倾向于内部继任。
第五部分是全文的重点,首先确定了样本范围与数据来源,选取了符合条件的民营上市企业2004-2006年的高管更换数据,并采集了2003-2007年5个年度的财务数据。然后分为两大部分进行实证研究,第一部分是研究经营业绩对高管更换的影响,这部分先提出强制性更换的定义,接着提出了研究假设,并对假设中涉及的变量进行定义和描述性统计,为后续模型建立,结果分析打下基础。通过建立模型,对模型进行多元线性回归,主要研究了经营业绩对我国民营企业高管强制性更换的影响,以及经营业绩对继任模式的影响。第二部分是研究强制性高管更换后对经营业绩的影响,这部分先提出了研究假设,并对建立的模型进行回归分析,主要研究了强制性高管更换是否会带来民营企业经营业绩的提高,以及外部继任是否会带来经营业绩的提高。
第六部分是本文的结论部分,首先是对第五部分的分析结果做一个总结,总结发现经营业绩的低劣确实会引起强制性的高管更换;资产规模与强制性高管更换间存在显著负相关关系,资产负债率与强制性高管人员更换有正相关关系,但是并不显著;两职兼任会降低强制更换发生的概率,但作用不明显;股权集中度、高管持股比例与强制性高管更换呈不显著的负相关;企业业绩与外部继任呈负相关,但是没有通过显著性检验;公司规模与外部继任呈负相关并通过了显著性检验,意味着公司规模越大就越有能力培养符合公司利益和价值观的储备人才;高管人员的更换能为企业带来短期经营业绩的提升;外部继任能够带来企业经营业绩的改善,但是效果并不明显。然后根据实证研究得出的结论,从三个方面提出了政策建议。一是完善民营企业公司内部治理,可以从两方面着手,分别是优化股权结构,构建多元产权和大股东控股相结合的民营企业股权结构模式,以及增强董事独立性,强化董事责任,进一步健全独立董事制度。二是完善民营企业外部治理,可以通过加快职业经理人市场的建设,完善资本市场来实现。三是建立继任管理计划,做好更换后的接班工作。最后提出本文的不足之处。
本文的创新之处在于以下三点:
1、首次从民营企业的角度研究了高管更换与经营业绩的关系,把探索的目光从大型国有企业转向了近年来我国快速发展的民营企业。为解决民营企业的高管更换问题,加快民营企业的发展在实证方面提供了经验证据。
2、关于控制变量指标的选取,在以往研究高管更换与企业业绩关系的模型中,加入股权集中度和高管持股比例两个指标,作为控制变量,控制他们对高管更换的影响,让模型更为完善。
3、本文选取的样本年度数据都是最新的,数据更新到了2007年12月31日,并对会计指标进行分类处理,扣除了当年行业的影响。这使得实证分析更具有实效性,可以为有关企业内部治理和政策制定者提供最新的实证证据。
With the deepening of the reform and opening-up and the evolution of the country's policy to private economy, the private economy in the national economy is growing. China's private companies, as a new form of business organization, have become an indispensable force in the development of China's national economy, the operation and the management of private companies has a significant impact on the country's economic development. Due to the rapid development of private companies, the traditional family model of corporate governance is no longer conducive to the long-term development of companies, private companies need more professional senior management talents to help them manage companies, and to achieve the separation of ownership and management rights, so it makes private companies start to handle the problem of company's senior manager turnover. Therefore this paper has a research on the relationship between the replacement of executives of private companies and the operating results. It starts from the replacement of company executives which triggered by the control mechanisms, and has an analysis in the replacement and the ways for the replacement, then we check whether the operating results play a role in the senior manager turnover of the private listed companies, and whether this exchange promote the performance of private listed companies, in order to test the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism. The article is divided into six main sections:
The first part was the introduction. This part summarized the research background of this article, pointed out the significance from theoretical and practical prospective , and outlined the overall framework, the use of research methods, at last showed the innovation.
The second part was the related articles in this research.The study found that there is a lot of foreign literature about executives' turnover, the research literature included two aspects: first, the literature about the relationship between senior manager replacement and the operating performance was the most, mainly about that poor operating performance would lead to the turnover of senior manager, as well as whether the replacement of senior manager would improve the operating results. Second was about the relationship between the succession management and performance. China's scholars used foreign analytic ways to study on China's listed companies. Through the national and international literature review, we put forward four points for the study inspiration in this article. The first enlightenment was about the scope of the study. The second one was about the research direction. The third one was about the indicators chosen. The fourth one was about the research contents.
The third part was detailed analysis on the theoretical foundation, the theory related to private companies and related laws and regulations of executives' turnover. First the principal-agent theory was proposed, as asymmetric information between an agent and the client, it was necessary to supervise and motivate executives. Followed by an analysis of the concept of corporate governance and internal control mechanisms and external control mechanisms, as well as the relationship between internal and external control mechanisms. In our country's governance situation, because that China had not established an active M & A market, and our professional managers market development compared to overseas development was not perfect, So the company needs more dependence on internal control mechanisms to monitor and restrain managers. Therefore, in this article, the study will focus on the mandatory turnover of executives triggered by the internal control mechanism, rather than controlling exchange. And then from the equity structure and the characteristics of the board of directors, we analysed the influence on the internal control mechanism to senior manager turnover. With the introduction of related theory about private companies, the paper specifically introduced the meaning of the private companies, their mode of corporate governance and the mode's characteristics of private companies, as well as corporate governance mechanism analysis. Finally, from the disclosure of the senior manager service, as well as controlling shareholders and senior manager turnover, this paper introduced the laws and regulations about senior manager turnover.
The fourth part analyzed current situation of senior manager turnover in China's private listed companies by the adoption of descriptive statistics, First, writer calculate the number and proportion of 2003-2007 executives changed companies, and found that the number of senior manager turnover had a few slow rise. Then calculate the reasons for the replacement and found that the work of mobilization, the term and the resignation are the main reasons for the turnover. The turnover caused by the controlling shareholder belonged to external control mechanisms, So in follow-up analysis would deduct from 2004-2006 controlling shareholder turnover's companies, in order to study the internal control mechanism's impact on executives turnover of private companies. The retirement or resignation was caused by age, not by the internal control mechanisms, even if the company replace executives, we can not define it as mandatory turnover. The operating results caused by the internal control mechanism, led to the executives turnover, so the operating results and mandatory turnover had close relationship. Finally, through the statistics of succession executives' source, we found that private company was more inclined to an internal successor, it may be due to internal succession was better than external succession.
The fifth part was the key in the paper, first of all the writer determined the scope of the samples and data sources, selected the qualified private listed companies' 2004-2006 data on the replacement of executives , and collected 2003-2007 the 5 years' financial data. And then two major empirical studies were divided, the first part was studied whether operating performance had impact on the senior manager turnover, this part proposed the definition of mandatory replacement, then made the assumption of research, defined the variables involved in the assumption, and did the description statistics, this laid the foundation for the establishment of following model and the results' analysis. Through the establishment of a model and regress the model, it mainly studied the impact on operating performance of China's private companies to mandatory turnover , as well as the operating performance to the succession. The second part studied the impact on the mandatory turnover to the operating performance, this part firstly made assumptions, and did regression analysis, mainly studied whether the replacement of senior manager would improve the operating results, and whether outsider succession would improve the operating performance.
The sixth part was the conclusion of this article, the first was a summary of the fifth part's analytic results, which found that the poor operating results would lead a mandatory turnover; there was a remarkable negative relationship betweeen the size of assets and mandatory turnover, a positive relationship between the leverage of capital and mandatory turnover, but not significantly; when the senior manager was a member of board the probability of his dismissal would be reduced, but the effect was not obvious; concentration of ownership, executives' ownership and mandatory replacement of senior managers were not significant negative correlation; operating performance and external succession were a negative correlation, but did not pass the test of significance; firm size and external succession were a negative correlation,and adopted the test of significance, it means that a larger company had more ability to train reserve personnel in line with the values and interests of the company; senior manager turnover would short-term operating performance improvement; external successor also improve operating performance, but the effects are not obvious. According to the empirical study's conclusion, the writer got the policy recommendations from three aspects. First, we would improve the private companies' internal governance, this issue could be applied from the following two method: adding more stakeholders to the structure and improve the independence of directors.Second, we would improve the private companies'the external governance, this target could be achieved by speeding up the construction of senior manager market and improving the capital market. The third was to establish succession management plan, and do a good job on succession work after the turnover. The last was the shortcomings of this article.
In this paper, the innovation lies in the following three points:
1、It's the first time to study the relationship between senior manager turnover and operating performance from the perspective of private companies, not from the large-scale state-owned companies. The article provided the empirical evidence to solve the problem of private companies' senior manager turnover and the development of companies.
2、In the selection of the variable indicators, the author added ownership concentration and senior manager's ownership as control variable, in order to control their effects on senior manager turnover.
3、The research selected the recent updated data, the data updated to the December 31, 2007, and the accounting indicators were reduced by the industrial effects. This made empirical analysis more effective, and provided the latest empirical evidence on internal governance to the policy-makers.
第一部分为绪论。该部分提出了本文的研究背景,指明了该项研究的理论意义和现实意义,并概括了文章的整体框架,使用的研究方法,最后特别说明了研究的创新之处。
第二部分对国内外有关高管更换与经营业绩关系的文献进行了综述,发现国外有大量研究高管更换问题的文献,相关文献的研究内容主要包括两个方面:一是对高级管理人员更换与公司经营业绩关系的研究,这类研究文献最多,主要从低劣的经营业绩是否会导致高管人员的更换,以及高管人员的更换是否会提高企业的经营业绩这两个角度来进行研究。二是对继任管理与经营业绩的关系研究。我国的学者则沿用国外的分析思路对我国的上市企业进行了研究。通过对国内外文献综述的分析,提出了四点对本文的研究启示。一是对研究范围界定的启示,国内的学者一般是对所有进行高管更换的公司进行研究,更多涉及的是国有企业,并没有针对民营企业进行经营业绩、继任管理与高管更换关系的这方面的研究,这就为本文的研究提供了一个新的思路。二是对研究方向的启示,国内研究高级管理人员更换的文献主要集中在董事会规模、股权结构和公司业绩之间的关系方面,研究高管更换与经营业绩关系的文献并不多,而且用的上市公司数据多为2000年之前的数据,故该领域的研究还有很大空间。特别是民营企业的继任管理,一般文献都从理论的角度加以分析,少有文章用实证的方法加以验证。因此,本文收集了我国上市民营企业的数据进行回归分析。三是对指标选择的启示,在文献中,公司经营业绩的衡量可以采用会计业绩和股票市场业绩两种方法。国外研究的文献一般都采用了市场业绩指标,国内的学者则更多地采用了会计业绩指标。由于我国资本市场效率不高,市场业绩指标的准确度和敏感度不够,因此,本文衡量民营企业经营业绩的指标为会计指标。四是对研究内容的启示,借鉴国外对于高管继任问题的研究,从两个方面来描述高管继任模式:一是继任者的来源;二是前任高管离职时的情境。继任者的来源一般分为内部继任者和外部继任者。前任离职的情境一般区分为强制性更换和正常更换。
第三部分详细分析了本文研究的理论基础,民营企业的相关理论和有关高管更换的法律法规。首先提出委托代理理论,由于委托人与代理人之间信息不对称,有必要对高管人员进行监督和激励。接着分析了公司治理的概念和公司治理的外部控制机制和内部控制机制,以及内外部控制机制间的关系,并针对我国治理机制的现状,提出由于我国没有建立起活跃的并购市场,以接管威胁为代表的外部控制在公司治理中很难发挥作用,而且我国的职业经理人市场同国外相比发展的也并不完善,以职业经理人市场为代表的外部控制同样在公司治理中很难发挥作用,于是公司就更需要依靠内部控制机制来监督和约束管理者。因此得出本文将侧重考察由内部控制机制发挥作用引发的强制性高管更换,而不考察由于控制权更换导致的高管更换。然后具体从股权结构和董事会特征两个方面分析了内部控制机制对高管更换的影响。跟着介绍了民营企业的相关理论,具体介绍了民营企业的含义,民营企业公司治理模式及其特点以及民营企业公司治理机制分析。含义的阐述为实证部分样本的选择打下理论基础,后两点的分析为实证研究的结论解释打下基础。最后,从高级管理人员任职的相关规定和控股股东更换与高级管理人员更换信息披露的相关规定两方面介绍了高管更换的法规制度,而实证部分的数据正是来自于相关法规规定披露的数据。
第四部分通过描述性统计对我国民营上市公司高管更换的现状进行分析,首先对2003-2007年民营上市企业高管更换公司的数量及比例进行统计,从整体上对民营上市公司的高管更换情况作出描述,发现五年来更换高管的民营上市公司数呈缓慢上升趋势。然后对高管更换的原因进行统计,发现工作调动、任期届满和辞职是高管更换的主要原因。而由控股股东变动引起的高管更换属于外部控制机制作用的结果,因此在后续分析中会扣除2004-2006年控股股东更换的公司,以便研究内部控制机制对民营企业高管更换的影响。由年龄因素造成的退休或因健康原因而离职的,也不是内部控制机制发挥作用的结果,即使企业更换了高管人员也不能记为强制性更换。而经营业绩引起内部控制机制发生作用,从而导致企业发生高管更换,因此经营业绩与强制性更换有密切关系。最后,通过对高管继任来源的统计,发现民营企业还是更倾向于内部继任。
第五部分是全文的重点,首先确定了样本范围与数据来源,选取了符合条件的民营上市企业2004-2006年的高管更换数据,并采集了2003-2007年5个年度的财务数据。然后分为两大部分进行实证研究,第一部分是研究经营业绩对高管更换的影响,这部分先提出强制性更换的定义,接着提出了研究假设,并对假设中涉及的变量进行定义和描述性统计,为后续模型建立,结果分析打下基础。通过建立模型,对模型进行多元线性回归,主要研究了经营业绩对我国民营企业高管强制性更换的影响,以及经营业绩对继任模式的影响。第二部分是研究强制性高管更换后对经营业绩的影响,这部分先提出了研究假设,并对建立的模型进行回归分析,主要研究了强制性高管更换是否会带来民营企业经营业绩的提高,以及外部继任是否会带来经营业绩的提高。
第六部分是本文的结论部分,首先是对第五部分的分析结果做一个总结,总结发现经营业绩的低劣确实会引起强制性的高管更换;资产规模与强制性高管更换间存在显著负相关关系,资产负债率与强制性高管人员更换有正相关关系,但是并不显著;两职兼任会降低强制更换发生的概率,但作用不明显;股权集中度、高管持股比例与强制性高管更换呈不显著的负相关;企业业绩与外部继任呈负相关,但是没有通过显著性检验;公司规模与外部继任呈负相关并通过了显著性检验,意味着公司规模越大就越有能力培养符合公司利益和价值观的储备人才;高管人员的更换能为企业带来短期经营业绩的提升;外部继任能够带来企业经营业绩的改善,但是效果并不明显。然后根据实证研究得出的结论,从三个方面提出了政策建议。一是完善民营企业公司内部治理,可以从两方面着手,分别是优化股权结构,构建多元产权和大股东控股相结合的民营企业股权结构模式,以及增强董事独立性,强化董事责任,进一步健全独立董事制度。二是完善民营企业外部治理,可以通过加快职业经理人市场的建设,完善资本市场来实现。三是建立继任管理计划,做好更换后的接班工作。最后提出本文的不足之处。
本文的创新之处在于以下三点:
1、首次从民营企业的角度研究了高管更换与经营业绩的关系,把探索的目光从大型国有企业转向了近年来我国快速发展的民营企业。为解决民营企业的高管更换问题,加快民营企业的发展在实证方面提供了经验证据。
2、关于控制变量指标的选取,在以往研究高管更换与企业业绩关系的模型中,加入股权集中度和高管持股比例两个指标,作为控制变量,控制他们对高管更换的影响,让模型更为完善。
3、本文选取的样本年度数据都是最新的,数据更新到了2007年12月31日,并对会计指标进行分类处理,扣除了当年行业的影响。这使得实证分析更具有实效性,可以为有关企业内部治理和政策制定者提供最新的实证证据。
With the deepening of the reform and opening-up and the evolution of the country's policy to private economy, the private economy in the national economy is growing. China's private companies, as a new form of business organization, have become an indispensable force in the development of China's national economy, the operation and the management of private companies has a significant impact on the country's economic development. Due to the rapid development of private companies, the traditional family model of corporate governance is no longer conducive to the long-term development of companies, private companies need more professional senior management talents to help them manage companies, and to achieve the separation of ownership and management rights, so it makes private companies start to handle the problem of company's senior manager turnover. Therefore this paper has a research on the relationship between the replacement of executives of private companies and the operating results. It starts from the replacement of company executives which triggered by the control mechanisms, and has an analysis in the replacement and the ways for the replacement, then we check whether the operating results play a role in the senior manager turnover of the private listed companies, and whether this exchange promote the performance of private listed companies, in order to test the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism. The article is divided into six main sections:
The first part was the introduction. This part summarized the research background of this article, pointed out the significance from theoretical and practical prospective , and outlined the overall framework, the use of research methods, at last showed the innovation.
The second part was the related articles in this research.The study found that there is a lot of foreign literature about executives' turnover, the research literature included two aspects: first, the literature about the relationship between senior manager replacement and the operating performance was the most, mainly about that poor operating performance would lead to the turnover of senior manager, as well as whether the replacement of senior manager would improve the operating results. Second was about the relationship between the succession management and performance. China's scholars used foreign analytic ways to study on China's listed companies. Through the national and international literature review, we put forward four points for the study inspiration in this article. The first enlightenment was about the scope of the study. The second one was about the research direction. The third one was about the indicators chosen. The fourth one was about the research contents.
The third part was detailed analysis on the theoretical foundation, the theory related to private companies and related laws and regulations of executives' turnover. First the principal-agent theory was proposed, as asymmetric information between an agent and the client, it was necessary to supervise and motivate executives. Followed by an analysis of the concept of corporate governance and internal control mechanisms and external control mechanisms, as well as the relationship between internal and external control mechanisms. In our country's governance situation, because that China had not established an active M & A market, and our professional managers market development compared to overseas development was not perfect, So the company needs more dependence on internal control mechanisms to monitor and restrain managers. Therefore, in this article, the study will focus on the mandatory turnover of executives triggered by the internal control mechanism, rather than controlling exchange. And then from the equity structure and the characteristics of the board of directors, we analysed the influence on the internal control mechanism to senior manager turnover. With the introduction of related theory about private companies, the paper specifically introduced the meaning of the private companies, their mode of corporate governance and the mode's characteristics of private companies, as well as corporate governance mechanism analysis. Finally, from the disclosure of the senior manager service, as well as controlling shareholders and senior manager turnover, this paper introduced the laws and regulations about senior manager turnover.
The fourth part analyzed current situation of senior manager turnover in China's private listed companies by the adoption of descriptive statistics, First, writer calculate the number and proportion of 2003-2007 executives changed companies, and found that the number of senior manager turnover had a few slow rise. Then calculate the reasons for the replacement and found that the work of mobilization, the term and the resignation are the main reasons for the turnover. The turnover caused by the controlling shareholder belonged to external control mechanisms, So in follow-up analysis would deduct from 2004-2006 controlling shareholder turnover's companies, in order to study the internal control mechanism's impact on executives turnover of private companies. The retirement or resignation was caused by age, not by the internal control mechanisms, even if the company replace executives, we can not define it as mandatory turnover. The operating results caused by the internal control mechanism, led to the executives turnover, so the operating results and mandatory turnover had close relationship. Finally, through the statistics of succession executives' source, we found that private company was more inclined to an internal successor, it may be due to internal succession was better than external succession.
The fifth part was the key in the paper, first of all the writer determined the scope of the samples and data sources, selected the qualified private listed companies' 2004-2006 data on the replacement of executives , and collected 2003-2007 the 5 years' financial data. And then two major empirical studies were divided, the first part was studied whether operating performance had impact on the senior manager turnover, this part proposed the definition of mandatory replacement, then made the assumption of research, defined the variables involved in the assumption, and did the description statistics, this laid the foundation for the establishment of following model and the results' analysis. Through the establishment of a model and regress the model, it mainly studied the impact on operating performance of China's private companies to mandatory turnover , as well as the operating performance to the succession. The second part studied the impact on the mandatory turnover to the operating performance, this part firstly made assumptions, and did regression analysis, mainly studied whether the replacement of senior manager would improve the operating results, and whether outsider succession would improve the operating performance.
The sixth part was the conclusion of this article, the first was a summary of the fifth part's analytic results, which found that the poor operating results would lead a mandatory turnover; there was a remarkable negative relationship betweeen the size of assets and mandatory turnover, a positive relationship between the leverage of capital and mandatory turnover, but not significantly; when the senior manager was a member of board the probability of his dismissal would be reduced, but the effect was not obvious; concentration of ownership, executives' ownership and mandatory replacement of senior managers were not significant negative correlation; operating performance and external succession were a negative correlation, but did not pass the test of significance; firm size and external succession were a negative correlation,and adopted the test of significance, it means that a larger company had more ability to train reserve personnel in line with the values and interests of the company; senior manager turnover would short-term operating performance improvement; external successor also improve operating performance, but the effects are not obvious. According to the empirical study's conclusion, the writer got the policy recommendations from three aspects. First, we would improve the private companies' internal governance, this issue could be applied from the following two method: adding more stakeholders to the structure and improve the independence of directors.Second, we would improve the private companies'the external governance, this target could be achieved by speeding up the construction of senior manager market and improving the capital market. The third was to establish succession management plan, and do a good job on succession work after the turnover. The last was the shortcomings of this article.
In this paper, the innovation lies in the following three points:
1、It's the first time to study the relationship between senior manager turnover and operating performance from the perspective of private companies, not from the large-scale state-owned companies. The article provided the empirical evidence to solve the problem of private companies' senior manager turnover and the development of companies.
2、In the selection of the variable indicators, the author added ownership concentration and senior manager's ownership as control variable, in order to control their effects on senior manager turnover.
3、The research selected the recent updated data, the data updated to the December 31, 2007, and the accounting indicators were reduced by the industrial effects. This made empirical analysis more effective, and provided the latest empirical evidence on internal governance to the policy-makers.
引文
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[2] Bonnier, K. A., and Robert, F. B., An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1989, (11)
[3] Brown, C. M., Administrative succession and organizational performance: The Succession effect, Administrative Science Quarterly, 1982, (27)
[4] Coughlan, A. T., and Schmidt, R. M., Executive compensation, management turnover, and the firm performance: an empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, (17)
[5] Conyon, M. J., Florou, A. L., Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance, Accounting and Business Research, 2002, (32)
[6] Dalton, D., and Kesner, I., Organizational performance as antecedent of Inside/outside chief executive succession: An empirical assessment, Academy of Management Journal, 1985, (28)
[7] David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin. Ownership structure and top executive turnover[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1997, (45)
[8] Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., Performance changes following top management dismissals, Journal of Finance, 1995, (50)
[9] Dennis K. K., Chung-Ming Lau, and Michael Young, Is China's corporate governance beginning to come of age? The case of CEO turnover, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2007, (15)
[10]Elliott, J., and Shaw, W., Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions, Journal of Accounting Research Supplement, 1988, (26)
[11]Fama, E. F., and Jensen., Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26)
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