高管变更与会计变更相关性研究
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摘要
财务会计的目标是为财务报告的使用者提供决策有用的财务信息,为了提供更为可靠、相关的财务信息,企业可以进行自发性会计政策变更。然而,由于利益的驱使,企业有时会通过合法而不合理的会计变更来满足自身的利益需求,特别是上市公司,利用会计变更进行利润操纵的情形尤为严重。因此,探究企业会计变更的动因,找出存在的问题根源、规范企业的会计行为具有重要的现实意义。
自发性会计政策变更及高管变更是实证会计理论研究的核心内容之一,国外会计学界围绕上述问题进行了卓有成效的大量研究。但是这些研究在很大程度上忽略了转型经济国家的固有特征,因而不能达到解释转型经济国家会计实务的目的。正是在这样的背景下,本文着重研究了发生高管变动的上市公司在变动过程中否存在滥用会计变更的行为,旨在为规范上市公司管理层激励、完善上市公司治理结构和会计变更会计准则、加强证券市场外部监管提供有意义的参考。
本文首先对会计选择和高管的概念进行了界定,并且分别从会计政策分类、会计政策选择的环境分析与高管概念、高管人员界定等概念进行了阐述,然后依次介绍了委托代理理论、激励理论、信息不对称、选择性不实财务披露与经济后果学说等相关理论,总结了高管人员的会计变更动机,接下来对我国高管变更与会计变更现状进行了初步描述,得出,由于我国外部监管和公司治理结构的逐步完善,公司对高管的更换越来越谨慎,会计变更的行为主要集中在会计估计变更。最后为了说明高管变更与会计变更之间的关系,本文引入线性回归模型分析,筛选出2007-2009年自发性会计变更的样本,然后把其划分为高管约束性更换与非约束性更换及高管未更换两个子样本,结合自发性会计变更的方向,进行实证之后得出高管变更同时伴随着利润操纵的事实。最后,总结出正是由于上市公司在内部管理机制和外部审计监控力度不够的缺陷下,才导致利用会计变更这一手段达到调节利润的目的。由此对我国上市公司治理机制的完善与会计选择提出建议,以使提供给财务报表使用者的财务信息更加相关、可靠。
Financial accounting is to provide users of financial reports for the decision-useful financial information, in order to provide more reliable and relevant financial information, corporate accounting policy changes can be spontaneous. However, driven by the interests, companies sometimes legitimate and reasonable by the accounting change to meet the needs of their own interests, in particular, is a listed company, using the manipulation of accounting changes for the profit situation is particularly serious. Therefore, to explore the dynamic changes in corporate accounting for, find out the root of the problem, standard corporate accounting behavior has important practical significance.
Voluntary changes in accounting policies and executive changes are positive accounting theory of the core content of foreign scholars on the issues of accounting for a large number of fruitful. However, these studies largely ignored the inherent characteristics of the countries with economies in transition, and therefore can not explain the transition economies to achieve the purpose of accounting practice. In this context, the paper focuses on changes occurring executives of listed companies in the process of change if there is abuse of the behavior of accounting changes, designed to encourage the management of listed companies, improve corporate governance structure and accounting change in accounting guidelines to strengthen the securities market to provide a meaningful reference for external supervision.
This article first choice and executives of accounting defines the concept and are classified from an accounting policy, accounting policy choice of the concept of environmental analysis and executives, senior management defined the concepts were introduced, followed by introduction of the principal-agent theory, motivation theory, asymmetric information, selective disclosure of false financial theory and economic consequences of such theories summed up the motivation of executives of accounting change, the next change of senior management and accounting changes of status of a preliminary description, draw, due to of external supervision and the gradual improvement of corporate governance, company executives more cautious change, the behavior of accounting changes focus on changes in accounting estimates. Finally, to illustrate the changes in senior management and accounting changes the relationship between the linear regression model is introduced to screen out the 2007-2009 sample of voluntary accounting changes, and then divided into executive and non-binding binding Replacement Replacement and the executives did not replace both sub-samples, with the direction of voluntary accounting changes, executive changes come after the empirical accompanied by the fact that profit manipulation. Finally, it is as listed companies are summarized in the internal management mechanisms and inadequate monitoring of external audit deficiencies, the use of accounting change was a result of the means to adjust the profits. The impact on corporate governance in China Mechanism and the accounting choices to make suggestions to make available to users of financial statements more relevant financial information, and reliable.
自发性会计政策变更及高管变更是实证会计理论研究的核心内容之一,国外会计学界围绕上述问题进行了卓有成效的大量研究。但是这些研究在很大程度上忽略了转型经济国家的固有特征,因而不能达到解释转型经济国家会计实务的目的。正是在这样的背景下,本文着重研究了发生高管变动的上市公司在变动过程中否存在滥用会计变更的行为,旨在为规范上市公司管理层激励、完善上市公司治理结构和会计变更会计准则、加强证券市场外部监管提供有意义的参考。
本文首先对会计选择和高管的概念进行了界定,并且分别从会计政策分类、会计政策选择的环境分析与高管概念、高管人员界定等概念进行了阐述,然后依次介绍了委托代理理论、激励理论、信息不对称、选择性不实财务披露与经济后果学说等相关理论,总结了高管人员的会计变更动机,接下来对我国高管变更与会计变更现状进行了初步描述,得出,由于我国外部监管和公司治理结构的逐步完善,公司对高管的更换越来越谨慎,会计变更的行为主要集中在会计估计变更。最后为了说明高管变更与会计变更之间的关系,本文引入线性回归模型分析,筛选出2007-2009年自发性会计变更的样本,然后把其划分为高管约束性更换与非约束性更换及高管未更换两个子样本,结合自发性会计变更的方向,进行实证之后得出高管变更同时伴随着利润操纵的事实。最后,总结出正是由于上市公司在内部管理机制和外部审计监控力度不够的缺陷下,才导致利用会计变更这一手段达到调节利润的目的。由此对我国上市公司治理机制的完善与会计选择提出建议,以使提供给财务报表使用者的财务信息更加相关、可靠。
Financial accounting is to provide users of financial reports for the decision-useful financial information, in order to provide more reliable and relevant financial information, corporate accounting policy changes can be spontaneous. However, driven by the interests, companies sometimes legitimate and reasonable by the accounting change to meet the needs of their own interests, in particular, is a listed company, using the manipulation of accounting changes for the profit situation is particularly serious. Therefore, to explore the dynamic changes in corporate accounting for, find out the root of the problem, standard corporate accounting behavior has important practical significance.
Voluntary changes in accounting policies and executive changes are positive accounting theory of the core content of foreign scholars on the issues of accounting for a large number of fruitful. However, these studies largely ignored the inherent characteristics of the countries with economies in transition, and therefore can not explain the transition economies to achieve the purpose of accounting practice. In this context, the paper focuses on changes occurring executives of listed companies in the process of change if there is abuse of the behavior of accounting changes, designed to encourage the management of listed companies, improve corporate governance structure and accounting change in accounting guidelines to strengthen the securities market to provide a meaningful reference for external supervision.
This article first choice and executives of accounting defines the concept and are classified from an accounting policy, accounting policy choice of the concept of environmental analysis and executives, senior management defined the concepts were introduced, followed by introduction of the principal-agent theory, motivation theory, asymmetric information, selective disclosure of false financial theory and economic consequences of such theories summed up the motivation of executives of accounting change, the next change of senior management and accounting changes of status of a preliminary description, draw, due to of external supervision and the gradual improvement of corporate governance, company executives more cautious change, the behavior of accounting changes focus on changes in accounting estimates. Finally, to illustrate the changes in senior management and accounting changes the relationship between the linear regression model is introduced to screen out the 2007-2009 sample of voluntary accounting changes, and then divided into executive and non-binding binding Replacement Replacement and the executives did not replace both sub-samples, with the direction of voluntary accounting changes, executive changes come after the empirical accompanied by the fact that profit manipulation. Finally, it is as listed companies are summarized in the internal management mechanisms and inadequate monitoring of external audit deficiencies, the use of accounting change was a result of the means to adjust the profits. The impact on corporate governance in China Mechanism and the accounting choices to make suggestions to make available to users of financial statements more relevant financial information, and reliable.
引文
[1]财政部.企业会计准则第28号—会计政策、会计估计变更和差错更正.2007年1月1日起施行.
[2]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层变换.经济研究,2001年第10期：75-82.
[3]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究.会计研究,1999年第9期：25-3.
[4]司可脱著.陈汉文等译.财务会计理论.机械工业出版社,2000年：235-247.
[5]刘斌,刘星,周轶强.自愿性会计政策变更的市场反应研究.经济科学,2004：55-62.
[6]朱红军.我国上市公司高管人员更换的现状分析.管理世界,2002年第5期：126-141.
[7]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员更换：经营业绩的作用.会计研究,2002年第9期：31-40.
[8]朱红军.高级管理人员更换的原因与经济后果—业绩效的实证研究.海财经大学博士学位论文,2002年：1-109.
[9]龚光明,李晚金.会计政策选择：理论逻辑与经济后果—以美国石油大然气会计准则演进为例的分析.会计研究,2004(7)：24-29.
[10]曹蕾.中国钢铁行业上市公司自发性会计选择变更实证研究.江苏大学硕士学位论文,2009年：1-61.
[11]许良虎,赵海荣.我国上市公司会计估计变更的实证研究.财会月刊(理论),2008.1：15-18.
[12]刘星,丙萌.尹立东.转轨背景下中国上市公司高级管理者变更的影响因素研究.中国软科学,2005(2)：85-90.
[13]蔡祥,张海燕.资产减值的计提、追溯与市场效应.中国会计与财务研究,2004(3)： 31-55.
[14]杜晓宇.中国上市公司高管变更期间业绩预告披露行为研究.吉林大学博士学位论文,2009年：1-188.
[15]陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵.经济研究,1999(1)：30-36.
[16]颜志元.中国上市公司会计估计变更实证研究.厦门大学博士学位论文,2006 年：1-126.
[17]沈振宇,王金圣,薛爽.坏账准备与上市公司利润操纵—来自中国上市公司的证据.中国会计与财务研究,2004(2)：93-111.
[18]刘斌.中国上市公司自愿性会计政策变更的实证研究.重庆大学博士学位论文,2004年：1-130.
[19]张鸣.会计政策变更研究.财经问题研究,2001年第8期：13-16
[20]张小莉.我国上市公司高层变动与盈余管理的实证研究.重庆大学硕士论文,2004年：1-53.
[21]王跃堂.会计政策选择的经济动机——基于沪深股市的实证研究.会计研究,2000年第12期,31-40.
[22]王跃堂,孙铮,陈世敏.股份有限公司会计制度经济后果的实证分析.中国会计与财务研究,2001a(4)：35-52.
[23]新夫,陈纪南,徐青.我国上市公司会计政策选择的经济动机.江苏大学学报,2004(2)
[24]栩春.上市公司滥用会计估计分析与对策.会计之友,2006(02A)：72-72.
[25]翟胜宝.上市公司会计政策选择的伦理思考.会计研究2009.3：11-17.
[26]钱伟.我国上市公司高管变更与盈余管理的实证研究.暨南大学硕士学位论文,2007年：1-55.
[27]李维安.公司治理.南开大学出版社,2001：23-109.
[28]颜志元.2004年深市上市公司年报会计问题分析[J].证券市场导报,2005(7)
[29]张维迎.《所有权、治理结构及委托—代理关系》.经济研究,1996年第9期.
[30]刘胜军.会计操纵问题研究.证券市场导报,2002年第5期,46-50.
[31]唐松华.企业会计政策选择的经济学分析.会计研究,2000：35.
[32]戴奉祥.企业会计政策选择的经济后果与政治成本.财务与会计,2001年第1期.
[33]宋在科、王柱,企业会计政策选择研究—基于利益相关者理论.会计研究,2008.6
[34]袁志.企业会计的崭新课题.会计研究,1994(0)：40-42
[35]潘理科.试论会计选择.会计之友,1995(1)：6-7.
[36]陈燕,会计选择要素分析.中央财经大学学报,1998(4)14-16.
[37]DeAngelo H, Managerial Competition.Information Cost and Corporate Governance:the Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests Journal of Accounting and Economics,1988(October):3-36.
[38]Dechow P.M.and Richard G.Sloan.Executive Incentives and the Horizons Problems:An Empirical Investigation.Journal of Accounting and,1991(14):51-89.
[39]Pourciau S.Earnings. Management and Nonroutine Executive Changes Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993(16):317-336.
[40]DeFond M.L. and Chul W.Park. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997(23):115-139.
[41]Paul M.Healy.The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985(4):85-07.
[42]Frishkoff,P."An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Materiality in Auditing. "Journal of Accounting Research,1970(Supplement):116-129.
[43]Boatsman,J.R.,and J.C.Robertson."Policy-Capturing on Selected Materiality Judgments".The Accounting Review,1974.No.4:342-52.
[44]Denis and Denis.Performance Changes Followings Top Management Dismissals.The Journal of Finance, Vol.50,No.4 (September,1995):1029-1057.
[45]DeFond and Park. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics,23,1997:115-139.
[46]Guay,Kothari and Watts. A Market-based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models,Journal ofAccounting Research,VoL34(Supplement,1996):83-105.
[47]Watts and Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory, The accounting review,1990(1):131-156.
[2]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层变换.经济研究,2001年第10期：75-82.
[3]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究.会计研究,1999年第9期：25-3.
[4]司可脱著.陈汉文等译.财务会计理论.机械工业出版社,2000年：235-247.
[5]刘斌,刘星,周轶强.自愿性会计政策变更的市场反应研究.经济科学,2004：55-62.
[6]朱红军.我国上市公司高管人员更换的现状分析.管理世界,2002年第5期：126-141.
[7]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员更换：经营业绩的作用.会计研究,2002年第9期：31-40.
[8]朱红军.高级管理人员更换的原因与经济后果—业绩效的实证研究.海财经大学博士学位论文,2002年：1-109.
[9]龚光明,李晚金.会计政策选择：理论逻辑与经济后果—以美国石油大然气会计准则演进为例的分析.会计研究,2004(7)：24-29.
[10]曹蕾.中国钢铁行业上市公司自发性会计选择变更实证研究.江苏大学硕士学位论文,2009年：1-61.
[11]许良虎,赵海荣.我国上市公司会计估计变更的实证研究.财会月刊(理论),2008.1：15-18.
[12]刘星,丙萌.尹立东.转轨背景下中国上市公司高级管理者变更的影响因素研究.中国软科学,2005(2)：85-90.
[13]蔡祥,张海燕.资产减值的计提、追溯与市场效应.中国会计与财务研究,2004(3)： 31-55.
[14]杜晓宇.中国上市公司高管变更期间业绩预告披露行为研究.吉林大学博士学位论文,2009年：1-188.
[15]陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵.经济研究,1999(1)：30-36.
[16]颜志元.中国上市公司会计估计变更实证研究.厦门大学博士学位论文,2006 年：1-126.
[17]沈振宇,王金圣,薛爽.坏账准备与上市公司利润操纵—来自中国上市公司的证据.中国会计与财务研究,2004(2)：93-111.
[18]刘斌.中国上市公司自愿性会计政策变更的实证研究.重庆大学博士学位论文,2004年：1-130.
[19]张鸣.会计政策变更研究.财经问题研究,2001年第8期：13-16
[20]张小莉.我国上市公司高层变动与盈余管理的实证研究.重庆大学硕士论文,2004年：1-53.
[21]王跃堂.会计政策选择的经济动机——基于沪深股市的实证研究.会计研究,2000年第12期,31-40.
[22]王跃堂,孙铮,陈世敏.股份有限公司会计制度经济后果的实证分析.中国会计与财务研究,2001a(4)：35-52.
[23]新夫,陈纪南,徐青.我国上市公司会计政策选择的经济动机.江苏大学学报,2004(2)
[24]栩春.上市公司滥用会计估计分析与对策.会计之友,2006(02A)：72-72.
[25]翟胜宝.上市公司会计政策选择的伦理思考.会计研究2009.3：11-17.
[26]钱伟.我国上市公司高管变更与盈余管理的实证研究.暨南大学硕士学位论文,2007年：1-55.
[27]李维安.公司治理.南开大学出版社,2001：23-109.
[28]颜志元.2004年深市上市公司年报会计问题分析[J].证券市场导报,2005(7)
[29]张维迎.《所有权、治理结构及委托—代理关系》.经济研究,1996年第9期.
[30]刘胜军.会计操纵问题研究.证券市场导报,2002年第5期,46-50.
[31]唐松华.企业会计政策选择的经济学分析.会计研究,2000：35.
[32]戴奉祥.企业会计政策选择的经济后果与政治成本.财务与会计,2001年第1期.
[33]宋在科、王柱,企业会计政策选择研究—基于利益相关者理论.会计研究,2008.6
[34]袁志.企业会计的崭新课题.会计研究,1994(0)：40-42
[35]潘理科.试论会计选择.会计之友,1995(1)：6-7.
[36]陈燕,会计选择要素分析.中央财经大学学报,1998(4)14-16.
[37]DeAngelo H, Managerial Competition.Information Cost and Corporate Governance:the Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests Journal of Accounting and Economics,1988(October):3-36.
[38]Dechow P.M.and Richard G.Sloan.Executive Incentives and the Horizons Problems:An Empirical Investigation.Journal of Accounting and,1991(14):51-89.
[39]Pourciau S.Earnings. Management and Nonroutine Executive Changes Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993(16):317-336.
[40]DeFond M.L. and Chul W.Park. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997(23):115-139.
[41]Paul M.Healy.The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985(4):85-07.
[42]Frishkoff,P."An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Materiality in Auditing. "Journal of Accounting Research,1970(Supplement):116-129.
[43]Boatsman,J.R.,and J.C.Robertson."Policy-Capturing on Selected Materiality Judgments".The Accounting Review,1974.No.4:342-52.
[44]Denis and Denis.Performance Changes Followings Top Management Dismissals.The Journal of Finance, Vol.50,No.4 (September,1995):1029-1057.
[45]DeFond and Park. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics,23,1997:115-139.
[46]Guay,Kothari and Watts. A Market-based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models,Journal ofAccounting Research,VoL34(Supplement,1996):83-105.
[47]Watts and Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory, The accounting review,1990(1):131-156.