上市公司高管人员变更与企业绩效关系的实证研究
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摘要
高级管理人员变更与企业绩效的关系是研究公司治理的重要内容。从委托代理理论角度来看,如果公司治理机制是有效的,公司的绩效可以作为股东评价经理人经营管理水平的重要衡量指标。良好的公司治理机制能够及时对绩效低劣公司的高管人员做出惩罚,及时解聘不称职的高管,并且重新选聘更加适合的继任者。伴随着我国社会主义市场经济体制的改革,公司治理结构不断完善,对高级管理人员的各种约束力量也在不断增强,导致了近些年来我国公司高级管理人员的更换频率越来越高,引起了社会各界的高度关注。频繁的高管变更是否因为企业绩效低劣引起?高管变更之后给上市公司带来了怎样的经济后果?再者,在我国这类情况又有所特别,国有控股型上市公司构成了我国上市公司的主流,这种国有股占有的控制地位的独特属性存在诸如委托代理链条超长、最终所有者缺位、公司治理机制尚不科学等问题,那么我国上市公司高管人员的更换与企业绩效之间的敏感性会是如何?这些问题值得我们研究。纵观国内外学者对高管人员变更与企业绩效关系的研究,可以发现以我国上市公司作为研究对象进行研究的国外文献很少。而从国内已有的研究文献来看,绝大多数的研究采用的数据稍显陈旧,并且大多数针对我国上市公司的整体状况,抑或是单单针对国有控股型上市公司的高管人员变更与公司绩效的关系,很少有学者将国有企业与民营企业进行对比分析。这就需要再次对我国国有企业与民营企业高管人员变更与企业绩效关系的差异做出科学、客观的对比分析,收集最新的数据通过实证的手段引以援证,更进一步借此发现我国上市公司约束和激励机制中仍存在的种种缺陷,为国有企业与民营企业上市公司建立更为有效的约束和激励机制提供必要依据。
本文在国内外文献综述的基础上,从委托代理理论和公司治理角度分析了我国上市公司高管变更和企业绩效的相互关系,在探讨了我国国有企业和民营企业在治理机制上存在的差异的基础上,对我国国有企业与民营企业上市公司经营绩效对高级管理人员更换影响的差异进行了对比分析。在实证检验中,本文依照我国上市公司年报披露的高级管理人员的更换原因和理论上约束性更换的概念筛选了我国上市公司2007—2008年度高管变更的样本(数据跨度2005—2009年度),并按照一定的原则选择未发生高管更换的公司作为控制样本。本文选取了总资产净利率和每股收益两个绩效指标,再选择市场竞争变量、公司规模、资产负债率、第一大股东持股比例及监督状况等控制变量,通过建立与高级管理人员更换的回归模型进行实证研究,结果发现：低劣的企业绩效会导致高管更换；国有企业高管变更对企业绩效的敏感性比民营企业低；高层管理人员变更后企业绩效得到短期内显著提高。基于理论上的分析和实证检验的结果,为加强和优化对经理人的约束和激励机制,本文从改革和完善高管人员任免机制、加快经理人市场建设和加强董事会监督作用等方面,提出了相关政策建议。
本文分为五个部分。第一部分为引言,主要概述本文研究的背景和意义,提出将要研究的问题及论文的整体框架；第二部分对国内外有关高管变更理论的研究以及高管变更与企业绩效关系的研究进行回顾,分析有关高管变更与企业绩效关系的不同观点；第三部分为高管变更与企业绩效关系的理论分析。笔者根据梳理高管变更的基本理论,对比分析国有企业和民营企业高管人员任免方面存在的问题,总结前人的观点对高管变更和企业绩效关系,进行分析并提出本文的假设；第四部分是本文的实证分析,从国泰安数据库中提取本文研究样本,通过进行统计分析检验前述假设；第五部分为本文结论,归结高管变更和企业绩效之间的关系,提出相应的政策建议,并总结本文的不足。
The relationship between senior management personnel changes and the enterprise performance is an important content of researching corporate governance. From the principal-agent theory viewpoint, if the company governance mechanism is effective, the company's performance can be used as an important index for shareholder to evaluating executive management level. Good corporate governance mechanism can promptly make punishment to the poor performance of the company executives, timely dismiss incompetent executives, and hiring more suitable employment successor afresh. Along with our socialist market economic system reform, constantly improve the corporate governance structure.The senior managerial personnel of constraint forces are increasing in recent years.These led to a frequency change of senior management in our country,and aroused the attention from all walks of life.Is that frequent change of executive was caused by poor performance?What was brought to the listed company after the change of the executives? The listed companies in China was mostly restructed by state-owned enterprise.They had their unique properties such as the principal-agent chains extend.Then how sensitivity between the changing executives in the listed companies of our country and enterprise performance? These problems were worth to research. Making a general survey of the relationship between the changing executives and enterprise performance at home and abroad,there was little study that use Chinese listed companies by foreign scholars. But from domestic scholars' research, most research were using old data,and mostly studied all the whole situation of listed companies, or only studied the relevance between state-owned enterprise or private enterprise's personnel changes and the company performance.They rarely did comparative analysis between state-owned and private enterprise. It needs to be objective and scientific from the angle of empirical to analysis the senior executives of changing differences between the Chinese state-owned listed companies and private enterprises listed companies.So we can find the existing problems in the constraints and incentive mechanism, for studing advantages, removing disadvantages in the state-owned listed enterprises and private listed enterprises.To provide necessary basis for establishing more effective constraint and incentive mechanism.
The paper was based on the review, analyzed the relationship between the listed corporate executives changes and corporate governance from the principal-agent theory and the angle of corporate governance, discussed the situation of Chinese listed executives' appoint and dismiss.Further analysis the differences from Chinese state-owned listed enterprises and private listed enterprises's performance to senior management personnel changeable.In the empirical test, according to the Chinese listed companies' disclosure situation of the reason for replacement of senior management personnel,and in accordance with the concept of binding replacement,I screened Chinese listed company's data of executives changeable from 2007 to 2008, and according to the certain principle to choose as the control samples that without the company executives replacement.This paper selected a total asset net interest rates and earnings per share index, then choose the market competition variables, the company scale, asset-liability ratio, the share ratio of the largest shareholder and oversight variables.Through the situation with senior management personnel changable regression model for empirical research, the results showed that:the poor performance will lead to executives replacement,the state-owned enterprise's sensitivity of executives changeable to the enterprise performance is lower than the private enterprise. Senior management personnel changes will lead to a short-term increased significantly of the enterprise performance. According to the mechanism analysis and empirical test results, in order to strengthen the restriction of senior management personnel and incentive,the paper put forward relevant policy suggestions from strengthen internal control mechanism, perfecting manager market.
This paper is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction, mainly summary of the background and significance of this paper, and puts forward the future research problems and the papers whole framework. The second part review the research of the executives change's theory and the relationship between executives change and the enterprise performance from home and abroad,and analysis the difference between executives change and the enterprise performance.The third part is the theoretical analysis of the relationship between executives change and the enterprise performance. According to carding the basic theory of executives changes, comparison and analysis of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises' problems of senior executives appointment, summarizes the previous view of the relationship between executives change and enterprise performance, analyzing and proposed hypotheses.The fourth part is the empirical analysis,the data is from Guo Taian Database. Through the statistical analysis to test the hypothesis. The fifth part is the conclusion, Attribute the relationship between executives change and enterprise performance, put forward the corresponding policy recommendations and summarize disadvantages of the paper.
本文在国内外文献综述的基础上,从委托代理理论和公司治理角度分析了我国上市公司高管变更和企业绩效的相互关系,在探讨了我国国有企业和民营企业在治理机制上存在的差异的基础上,对我国国有企业与民营企业上市公司经营绩效对高级管理人员更换影响的差异进行了对比分析。在实证检验中,本文依照我国上市公司年报披露的高级管理人员的更换原因和理论上约束性更换的概念筛选了我国上市公司2007—2008年度高管变更的样本(数据跨度2005—2009年度),并按照一定的原则选择未发生高管更换的公司作为控制样本。本文选取了总资产净利率和每股收益两个绩效指标,再选择市场竞争变量、公司规模、资产负债率、第一大股东持股比例及监督状况等控制变量,通过建立与高级管理人员更换的回归模型进行实证研究,结果发现：低劣的企业绩效会导致高管更换；国有企业高管变更对企业绩效的敏感性比民营企业低；高层管理人员变更后企业绩效得到短期内显著提高。基于理论上的分析和实证检验的结果,为加强和优化对经理人的约束和激励机制,本文从改革和完善高管人员任免机制、加快经理人市场建设和加强董事会监督作用等方面,提出了相关政策建议。
本文分为五个部分。第一部分为引言,主要概述本文研究的背景和意义,提出将要研究的问题及论文的整体框架；第二部分对国内外有关高管变更理论的研究以及高管变更与企业绩效关系的研究进行回顾,分析有关高管变更与企业绩效关系的不同观点；第三部分为高管变更与企业绩效关系的理论分析。笔者根据梳理高管变更的基本理论,对比分析国有企业和民营企业高管人员任免方面存在的问题,总结前人的观点对高管变更和企业绩效关系,进行分析并提出本文的假设；第四部分是本文的实证分析,从国泰安数据库中提取本文研究样本,通过进行统计分析检验前述假设；第五部分为本文结论,归结高管变更和企业绩效之间的关系,提出相应的政策建议,并总结本文的不足。
The relationship between senior management personnel changes and the enterprise performance is an important content of researching corporate governance. From the principal-agent theory viewpoint, if the company governance mechanism is effective, the company's performance can be used as an important index for shareholder to evaluating executive management level. Good corporate governance mechanism can promptly make punishment to the poor performance of the company executives, timely dismiss incompetent executives, and hiring more suitable employment successor afresh. Along with our socialist market economic system reform, constantly improve the corporate governance structure.The senior managerial personnel of constraint forces are increasing in recent years.These led to a frequency change of senior management in our country,and aroused the attention from all walks of life.Is that frequent change of executive was caused by poor performance?What was brought to the listed company after the change of the executives? The listed companies in China was mostly restructed by state-owned enterprise.They had their unique properties such as the principal-agent chains extend.Then how sensitivity between the changing executives in the listed companies of our country and enterprise performance? These problems were worth to research. Making a general survey of the relationship between the changing executives and enterprise performance at home and abroad,there was little study that use Chinese listed companies by foreign scholars. But from domestic scholars' research, most research were using old data,and mostly studied all the whole situation of listed companies, or only studied the relevance between state-owned enterprise or private enterprise's personnel changes and the company performance.They rarely did comparative analysis between state-owned and private enterprise. It needs to be objective and scientific from the angle of empirical to analysis the senior executives of changing differences between the Chinese state-owned listed companies and private enterprises listed companies.So we can find the existing problems in the constraints and incentive mechanism, for studing advantages, removing disadvantages in the state-owned listed enterprises and private listed enterprises.To provide necessary basis for establishing more effective constraint and incentive mechanism.
The paper was based on the review, analyzed the relationship between the listed corporate executives changes and corporate governance from the principal-agent theory and the angle of corporate governance, discussed the situation of Chinese listed executives' appoint and dismiss.Further analysis the differences from Chinese state-owned listed enterprises and private listed enterprises's performance to senior management personnel changeable.In the empirical test, according to the Chinese listed companies' disclosure situation of the reason for replacement of senior management personnel,and in accordance with the concept of binding replacement,I screened Chinese listed company's data of executives changeable from 2007 to 2008, and according to the certain principle to choose as the control samples that without the company executives replacement.This paper selected a total asset net interest rates and earnings per share index, then choose the market competition variables, the company scale, asset-liability ratio, the share ratio of the largest shareholder and oversight variables.Through the situation with senior management personnel changable regression model for empirical research, the results showed that:the poor performance will lead to executives replacement,the state-owned enterprise's sensitivity of executives changeable to the enterprise performance is lower than the private enterprise. Senior management personnel changes will lead to a short-term increased significantly of the enterprise performance. According to the mechanism analysis and empirical test results, in order to strengthen the restriction of senior management personnel and incentive,the paper put forward relevant policy suggestions from strengthen internal control mechanism, perfecting manager market.
This paper is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction, mainly summary of the background and significance of this paper, and puts forward the future research problems and the papers whole framework. The second part review the research of the executives change's theory and the relationship between executives change and the enterprise performance from home and abroad,and analysis the difference between executives change and the enterprise performance.The third part is the theoretical analysis of the relationship between executives change and the enterprise performance. According to carding the basic theory of executives changes, comparison and analysis of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises' problems of senior executives appointment, summarizes the previous view of the relationship between executives change and enterprise performance, analyzing and proposed hypotheses.The fourth part is the empirical analysis,the data is from Guo Taian Database. Through the statistical analysis to test the hypothesis. The fifth part is the conclusion, Attribute the relationship between executives change and enterprise performance, put forward the corresponding policy recommendations and summarize disadvantages of the paper.
引文
1张维迎.产权激励与公司治理.北京：经济科学出版社,2005：82。
1累计非正常报酬率：指累计的实际报酬与正常期望报酬之间的差异(Culmulative Abnormal Return)。
1单凤儒.试析公司治理结构中的控制机制：商业研究.2002/02(上半月版)：45。
1本文所说的敏感性是指高管变更机制对企业绩效优劣的反应灵敏程度。
1柏丙林.转轨时期的经营者激励与约束研究：南开大学博士论文,2005：7-12
[1]陈漩,刘卉.公司绩效对高管更换的影响分析一基于我国高新技术企业与传统企业的实践.西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2006(175)：164-167
[2]丁翔,陈东林.国有资产分级产权新体制下的国有投资公司研究.财贸研究,2003(4)：54-56
[3]单凤儒.试析公司治理结构中的控制机制：商业研究.2002/02：45
[4]李增泉.激励制与企业绩效.会计研究,2005：24-30
[5]李增泉,杨春燕.企业绩效、控制权转移与经理人员变更.中国会计与财务研究,2003(4)：51-108
[6]李增泉,孙铮.股价反应、企业绩效与控制权转移.中国会计与财务研究,2003(1)：1-53
[7]王辉.双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释.经济研究,2001(8)：71-78
[8]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效.经济研究,2000(3)：32-64
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[10]杨瑞龙.论国有经济中的多级委托代理关系.管理世界,1997(1)：106-115
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1累计非正常报酬率：指累计的实际报酬与正常期望报酬之间的差异(Culmulative Abnormal Return)。
1单凤儒.试析公司治理结构中的控制机制：商业研究.2002/02(上半月版)：45。
1本文所说的敏感性是指高管变更机制对企业绩效优劣的反应灵敏程度。
1柏丙林.转轨时期的经营者激励与约束研究：南开大学博士论文,2005：7-12
[1]陈漩,刘卉.公司绩效对高管更换的影响分析一基于我国高新技术企业与传统企业的实践.西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2006(175)：164-167
[2]丁翔,陈东林.国有资产分级产权新体制下的国有投资公司研究.财贸研究,2003(4)：54-56
[3]单凤儒.试析公司治理结构中的控制机制：商业研究.2002/02：45
[4]李增泉.激励制与企业绩效.会计研究,2005：24-30
[5]李增泉,杨春燕.企业绩效、控制权转移与经理人员变更.中国会计与财务研究,2003(4)：51-108
[6]李增泉,孙铮.股价反应、企业绩效与控制权转移.中国会计与财务研究,2003(1)：1-53
[7]王辉.双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释.经济研究,2001(8)：71-78
[8]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效.经济研究,2000(3)：32-64
[9]龚玉池.公司绩效与总经理变更.经济研究,2001(10)：75-82
[10]杨瑞龙.论国有经济中的多级委托代理关系.管理世界,1997(1)：106-115
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