上市公司关联交易信息披露重构
|
摘要
我国上市公司的违规问题大多与关联交易有着直接或间接的联系。众多恶性关联方交易行为不仅损害了上市公司本身的利益,还严重损害了中小股东的利益,最终将动摇资本市场本身存在的基石。因此,研究和规范上市公司关联交易,加强对关联交易会计信息披露的研究是一个值得深入研究的问题。因此本文试图从一个新的视角——价格共识形成的视角进行分析,首先对交易进行确认,重构上市公司信息披露的模式,确保信息在资本市场里能有效、充分地表达,从而达到提高上市公司信息披露质量,保护我国中小投资者的合法权益,维护证券市场的繁荣与稳定的目标。本文采用规范研究、分析式研究和实验研究的方法进行研究。
一、论文的研究内容
针对目前上市公司关联交易披露存在的问题,从5个方面就围绕如何改进关联交易信息披露模式而展开研究。
1.发现目前关联交易信息披露中存在的问题。无论国内还是国外研究,对关联交易问题的思考局限在：把关联交易与一般交易区分的思路是通过界定关联方来定义,中心在关联方的界定上,从而使关联交易及其披露的研究存在以下问题：①不具有区分性,即关联交易的特殊性没有与一般交易区分出来；②不具有直接性,由于关联交易仅仅在表外披露,约束力不强,信息披露不充分；③存在关联交易非关联化,从而逃避关联交易的信息披露问题。如果不能在理论上找到一个有效区分关联交易与一般交易的方法,那么无法提高信息披露的质量,达到降低关联交易危害的作用。
2.价格共识形成的实验及理论证明。我们常说“关联交易的价格明显有违正常的交易价格”，这“正常的交易价格”指的是什么价格?如何定量呢?如何成为大家的共同知识呢?我们带着这样的问题到经济学基础理论里寻求解答。在对传统理论的不足进行分析的基础上,设计并完成了价格共识不能形成的实验和价格共识能形成的实验,首次提出了价格共识的概念,提出并证明了价格共识理论。此外,还构建理论模型,采用严格的数理逻辑对价格共识形成理论进行了推演证明。
3.关联交易的确认、计量与披露分析。在对关联交易的确认与计量进行传统分析之后,基于价格共识形成理论进行了再分析,并用实验对价格共识形成理论结果加以进一步的论证。同时对关联交易新准则在披露上与旧准则、国际会计准则进行了比较。国内学者借鉴国际会计准则及其他国家会计准则中的合理成分,提出了一些改进的措施,本节就这些改进措施进行了简单评述,认为这些改进措施具有一定的积极意义,但无法解决关联交易非关联化的问题。
4.财务信息披露模式的重构。通过阐述关联交易披露新模式的目的,提出了新模式的基本框架,包括新模式的会计核算设计及核算举例。在传统的借贷记账法的基础上,新增加交易分类这一要素,即根据交易的特性来判断每项经济业务是属于第Ⅰ类或是第Ⅱ类。在原会计报表的基础上,通过增加一个《第Ⅱ类交易表》,避免因原会计报表合并各种交易所带来的交易属性丢失以及价格可比性的混淆,从而达到增强会计信息质量的目的。
5.提高上市公司信息质量的政策建议。如何增加上市公司财务信息披露的透明度,从而把关联交易的危害降到最低?我们认为政府应提供更多信息服务,加强对市场运行结果的披露,而不只是发布对市场运行的预期结果,具体提出以下政策建议：①应加强对企业第二类交易的披露方式的制度建设；②降低政府介入资本市场的深度和强度；③对上市公司关联交易及其会计信息披露质量进行综合治理；④建立分户信息披露管理电子档案；⑤营造上市公司诚信经营和谐创业的环境；⑥完善股东派生诉讼制度。
二、论文的主要结论
1.关联交易信息披露应满足区分性、直接性和时效性的要求。本文的研究表明,关联交易的信息披露必须满足：①区分性,②直接性,③时效性。在上述的“三性”要求之中,区分性最为关键,它决定关联交易信息能否以及如何进行直接地、动态地披露。本文之所以展开对商品价格共识如何形成的基础研究,是因为如果市场里商品的价格共识都不存在,那么如何判断公允与非公允的关联交易是不可能的。当然也就无法满足区分性。如果上市公司所经营、交易的商品有价格共识或能够形成价格共识,投资者应该自己承担读解、识别、判断上市公司的财务信息的责任；如果上市公司所经营、交易的商品中有的商品没有价格共识或很难形成价格共识,会计准则就应该要求上市公司将该项交易与其它交易相区别,以提醒投资人关注、判明该交易的实质及其相应财务信息的真伪。
2.通过严格证明得到了价格共识形成的充分条件。在同一种商品的一连串交易(而非赠与或掠夺)中,商品价格共识的逐渐形成需要下述4个条件,即①敏感性：在商品交易过程中参与者是“趋利避害”的；②公平性：在这个过程中既没有谁能以高于其他参与者卖价的、其差值不小于某固定值的卖价出售商品,也没有谁能以低于其他参与者买价的、其差值不小于某固定值的买价买入商品；③单纯性：商品的价格完全由供需决定；④渐趋稳定：在这个过程中供应与需求的量逐渐稳定；⑤常规性：在这个过程中供应与需求的量不会逐渐消失。那么关于这个商品的价格共识就会逐渐形成。根据价格共识形成的观点,商品价格共识形成是渐进的,商品的价格不是瞬间形成的。
3.基于价格共识如何形成的基础研究,要提高财务信息的质量,必须把交易分为第Ⅰ类和第Ⅱ类,并在此基础上重构信息披露的方式。根据对价格共识如何形成的基础的研究,商品价格共识的形成需要一定的条件。由于条件不充分,某些商品的价格共识不易形成。为了防止信息混淆,需要对报表做出改进,这样才能为投资者了解上市公司的经营情况提供必要的保障。本文认为要编撰满足“三性”要求的信息披露,首先要对交易进行确认、分类,所有交易可初步分为第Ⅰ类交易与第Ⅱ类交易。
三、论文的创新之处
本文对上市公司关联交易信息披露的研究是以价格共识形成为切入点。通过实验及分析式研究的方法,展开了对商品价格共识形成的理论研究,同时对会计的确认,报表披露的格式提出了新的见解。在以下方面有所创新和突破：
1.提出并证明了价格共识理论。采用分析式和实验研究方法,设计并完成了价格共识不能形成的实验和价格共识能形成的实验,提出并证明了价格共识理论。首先提出了价格共识的概念,并构建理论模型,采用严格的数学模型对价格共识形成理论进行了推演证明。找到了商品价格共识形成的条件。据此我们发现,在传统的商品交易中比较容易形成价格共识,其相应的财务数据也比较容易“读解”。对关联交易(包括非关联化的关联交易)这样难于在其中形成商品价格共识的交易的相应财务数据,需要新的财务信息披露的方式以增加对它的“注解”。
2.提出增加《第Ⅱ类交易表》的披露模式。在原会计报表的基础上,通过增加一个《第Ⅱ类交易表》的方式,避免因原会计报表合并各种交易所产生的数据所带来的交易属性丢失,以及价格可比性的混淆,从而达到增强会计信息质量的目的。这个《第Ⅱ类交易表》将起到一个注解原会计报表中各项数据产生背景的作用。例如当上市公司通过公开或隐蔽的关联方交易,向上市公司输送利益或从上市公司挖掘利益的时候,第Ⅱ类交易的额度都会明显增大。
3.在传统的借贷记账法的基础上,新增加交易分类这一要素,即根据交易的特性来判断每项经济业务是属于第Ⅰ类还是第Ⅱ类交易。相应的记账规则不是借贷记账法下只用借、贷二维；还要增加记为类的一维,即借、贷、类三维。也就是说,要想描述一项交易,应该用三维坐标来表示,而不是以前的只用二维坐标来表示。这一改良方案不仅为关联交易披露质量的提高有积极的作用,而且为金融工具会计、人力资源会计及社会责任会计信息从表外顺向转化到表内提供了一个全新的可行的思路,从而实现提高上市公司会计信息质量,保护投资者的合法权益,维护证券市场的繁荣与稳定。
Violation of regulation problems by listed companies in China is mostly associated directly or indirectly with RPTs (related party transactions). RPTs not only viciously harm the interests of listed companies themselves, but also seriously damage the interests of small shareholders, affect the efficient allocation of scarce resources, and increase the market operating costs and risks, which will eventually shake the foundation of the capital market itself. Therefore, it is of great importance to study and to standardize RPTs by listed companies, and to strengthen the relevance of accounting information disclosure of RPTs as well. This dissertation will analysis from a new viewpoint based on CPU (common price understanding). Firstly transactions are to be recognized and classified, then information disclosure on listed companies is to be reconstructed, so as to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure, to protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium investors, and to maintain prosperity and stability of the security market. Standard research, analytical studies and experimental research methods have been employed in the research of this dissertation.
1. Research contents of the dissertation
This dissertation focuses on problems associated with RPTs by the listed companies and centers on how to improve the information disclosure mode of RPTs from five aspects:
1.1 Problems found in the current information disclosure of RPTs. Domestic or foreign research on the issue of RPTs confined to the distinction between RPTs and general trading by the definition of related party. Therefore, the study about disclosure of RPTs has the following problems:①No distinction, that is no transaction specificity to distinguish between RPTs and ordinary transactions;②No immediacy, as information of RPTs was disclosed only in the off balance sheet resulting in weak binding force to the related companies and inadequate disclosure of related information;③Making RPTs unrelated to avoid information disclosure of RPTs. If a valid distinction in theory between RPT and general transaction can not find, the quality of information disclosure will not be improved to the extent to reduce the harm caused by RPTs.
1.2 The experimental and theoretical proof of CPU. It is often said "The price of RPTs is clearly contrary to the normal price of transaction". What price does this "normal price of transaction" refer to? How to quantitative it? How does it become a common understanding? Answers to all these questions have to be sought from the basic theory of economics. Based on the introduction on and analysis of the deficiencies of the traditional theories related to RPTs, the concept of CPU was firstly proposed and experiments that can form and cannot form CPU were designed and finished. From the results of the experiments, a new theory-the Theory of CPU-had been proposed and the theory was then further proved by theoretical model and deduced by strict mathematical logic.
1.3. Analysis on recognition, measurement and disclosure of RPTs. Results from traditional analysis on recognition and measurement of RPTs had been analyzed again with the theory of CPU and further demonstrated by experiments. In addition, a comparison between new guidelines on the disclosure of RPTs with the old criteria and the international accounting standards was carried out. Some domestic scholars suggested some improving measures on RPT information disclosure by reference to the reasonable parts of the international accounting standards and other national accounting standards. An analysis on these measures has been undertaken. Though these measures have shown some positive functions, but can not resolve the unrelated problem to RPTs.
1.4. Reconstruction of RPT information disclosure. Through describing the aim of the new model of RPT information disclosure, the basic framework of the new model, including the design of the new accounting model and accounting example, has been proposed. In a traditional debit and credit accounting system, a new element of trading classification is added that can be used to determine the type of the economic business. According to their characteristics, the transactions will be recorded in either categoryⅠor categoryⅡ. A "ClassⅡtransactions statement" has been proposed to add in the original basis of accounting statements to avoid the loss of transaction property and the confusion of price comparability resulted from the merger of various exchange transactions in original financial statements, so as to achieve the purpose of enhancing the quality of accounting information.
1.5 Some policy suggestions on improving financial information disclosure of the listed companies. How to publicly increase the transparency of financial information disclosure of the listed companies and thus minimize the harm associated with the RPTs. The government should provide more information services; enhance the disclosure of the results of the market operation rather than just the release of the expected market operation. Some measures have been suggested as follows:①Formulate strict regulations in regard to the disclosure ways of the second category of enterprises;②Reduce the depth and intensity of government intervention in capital markets;③Comprehensive management on disclosure of RPTs by listed companies and on accounting information quality;④Establish electronic management records on information disclosure for each listed company;⑤Create a harmonious environment that stimulate honest operation for listed companies;⑥Improve shareholder derivative litigation.
2. The main conclusion of the dissertation
2.1 RPT information disclosure must meet requirements of distinction, immediacy and timeliness. As to the issue of relevant disclosure of RPTs in the construction of information disclosure system of listed companies, a general principle must firstly be set up that can be used to judge if the content, form, perspective of the RPT information disclosure is necessary and sufficient. Our study shows that this general principle is that the relevant disclosure of RPTs must meet three requirements that are:①distinction;②immediacy; and③timeliness. Among the three requirements that relevant disclosure of RPTs must meet, distinction is the most critical one as it determines whether and how to disclose directly and dynamically. The reason why the basic research on how to form CPU has been carried out is that if the CPU does not exist in the market, then how it is possible to distinguish between fair and non fair RPTs. Of course, distinction will not be able to meet. If the prices of the commodities provided by the listed company can form the CPU, investors should take the responsible for their reading, identifying, and determining the financial information of the listed companies. If, on the contrary, the prices of the commodities provided by the listed company can not or is hard to form the CPU, accounting standards and regulations should require the listed company to distinguish those RPTs from other transactions in order to remind the investors to concern and to ascertain the substance of those transactions and the authenticity of the corresponding financial information.
2.2 Sufficient condition of CPU has been gained through a rigorous proof. CPU can arise in the market under the condition that the trading goods possess the fowlloing 5 prerequisites in the series of transactions of the same trading goods (rather than gifts or looting):①Sensitivity-any participants draw on advantages and avoid disadvantages;②Fairness-when some agents can succeed (possibly accidentally) to sell or buy at higher price, other agents can follow them (not simultaneously) in later trades;③Pureness-all agents trade in a free market and no one has the eternal trading privilege in the market and the price of goods are absolutely determined by the situation of supply-demand;④Tend-stable-the changing of supply-demand situation trends to be stable;⑤Regularity-the changing of supply-demand situation gradually disappears. That is to say that the CPU of a trading good is obtainable asymptotically rather than immediately.
2.3 Based on the basic research of CPU, transactions must be classified into either class I or class II and the model of information disclosure reconstructed in order to improve the quality of financial information. According to the basic study on how to form CPU, the formation of CPU needs some conditions. As the conditions are not sufficient, the CPU of some trading goods is not easy to form. In order to prevent confusion of information, the reports need improving that can provide the necessary protection for investors to understand the operation of listed companies. It has been deemed that the transactions have to be firstly recognized and classified before financial statement and information disclosure that meet the above-mentioned three requirements can be compiled. All transactions can be divided into either Class 1 or Class II.
3. Innovation Points of the dissertation
In this dissertation the theoretical study on consensus of trading goods price understanding is conducted through experimental and analytical research methods, and new perspectives on accounting recognition and disclosure format of reporting are raised at the same time. With some innovations and breakthroughs shown as follows:
3.1 The theory of CPU proposed and proved. Through analytical and experimental research methods, designed and completed the experiment about the formation of CPU. Conditions that are required for the CPU formation of trading goods have been uncovered. Accordingly it has been found that a CPU is easier to form in traditional trading goods and the corresponding financial data are easier for "Reading." New methods of financial information closure is required to increase their "notes" for RPTs (including unrelated RPTs) that are hard to form corresponding financial data during their CPU formation of trading goods.
3.2 To add a table of "Class II transaction statement" for better information disclosure. Loss of transaction attribute and confusion of price comparability resulted from the merger of various transaction data are avoided by the approach to add a table of "ClassⅡtransaction statement" to the original basis of accounting statements, so as to enhance the quality of accounting information disclosure. This "ClassⅡtransaction statement" will function as a note to the background of the original data in the accounting statements. For example, when the listed companies transfer benefits to or mine interests from themselves through an open or hidden RPT, the transaction amount for Class II will significantly increase.
3.3 Based on the traditional debit and credit accounting method, newly increase an element described as "transaction classification", namely belonging to either Class I or Class II of the transactions are to be determined according to their transaction characteristics. Then the corresponding debit and credit accounting rules are not only two-dimensions of Debit/ Credit; but three-dimensions of debit, credit and a new dimension "class" described as Debit/ Credit/Class. In other words, three-dimensional coordinates rather than the old way of two-dimensional coordinates are to be used to represent and to describe a transaction. This improvement not only improves the quality of information disclosure on RPTs, but also provides a new feasible ideas to transform information of financial instruments accounting, of human resource accounting and of social responsibility accounting from off-statement to the inside of the statement.
一、论文的研究内容
针对目前上市公司关联交易披露存在的问题,从5个方面就围绕如何改进关联交易信息披露模式而展开研究。
1.发现目前关联交易信息披露中存在的问题。无论国内还是国外研究,对关联交易问题的思考局限在：把关联交易与一般交易区分的思路是通过界定关联方来定义,中心在关联方的界定上,从而使关联交易及其披露的研究存在以下问题：①不具有区分性,即关联交易的特殊性没有与一般交易区分出来；②不具有直接性,由于关联交易仅仅在表外披露,约束力不强,信息披露不充分；③存在关联交易非关联化,从而逃避关联交易的信息披露问题。如果不能在理论上找到一个有效区分关联交易与一般交易的方法,那么无法提高信息披露的质量,达到降低关联交易危害的作用。
2.价格共识形成的实验及理论证明。我们常说“关联交易的价格明显有违正常的交易价格”，这“正常的交易价格”指的是什么价格?如何定量呢?如何成为大家的共同知识呢?我们带着这样的问题到经济学基础理论里寻求解答。在对传统理论的不足进行分析的基础上,设计并完成了价格共识不能形成的实验和价格共识能形成的实验,首次提出了价格共识的概念,提出并证明了价格共识理论。此外,还构建理论模型,采用严格的数理逻辑对价格共识形成理论进行了推演证明。
3.关联交易的确认、计量与披露分析。在对关联交易的确认与计量进行传统分析之后,基于价格共识形成理论进行了再分析,并用实验对价格共识形成理论结果加以进一步的论证。同时对关联交易新准则在披露上与旧准则、国际会计准则进行了比较。国内学者借鉴国际会计准则及其他国家会计准则中的合理成分,提出了一些改进的措施,本节就这些改进措施进行了简单评述,认为这些改进措施具有一定的积极意义,但无法解决关联交易非关联化的问题。
4.财务信息披露模式的重构。通过阐述关联交易披露新模式的目的,提出了新模式的基本框架,包括新模式的会计核算设计及核算举例。在传统的借贷记账法的基础上,新增加交易分类这一要素,即根据交易的特性来判断每项经济业务是属于第Ⅰ类或是第Ⅱ类。在原会计报表的基础上,通过增加一个《第Ⅱ类交易表》,避免因原会计报表合并各种交易所带来的交易属性丢失以及价格可比性的混淆,从而达到增强会计信息质量的目的。
5.提高上市公司信息质量的政策建议。如何增加上市公司财务信息披露的透明度,从而把关联交易的危害降到最低?我们认为政府应提供更多信息服务,加强对市场运行结果的披露,而不只是发布对市场运行的预期结果,具体提出以下政策建议：①应加强对企业第二类交易的披露方式的制度建设；②降低政府介入资本市场的深度和强度；③对上市公司关联交易及其会计信息披露质量进行综合治理；④建立分户信息披露管理电子档案；⑤营造上市公司诚信经营和谐创业的环境；⑥完善股东派生诉讼制度。
二、论文的主要结论
1.关联交易信息披露应满足区分性、直接性和时效性的要求。本文的研究表明,关联交易的信息披露必须满足：①区分性,②直接性,③时效性。在上述的“三性”要求之中,区分性最为关键,它决定关联交易信息能否以及如何进行直接地、动态地披露。本文之所以展开对商品价格共识如何形成的基础研究,是因为如果市场里商品的价格共识都不存在,那么如何判断公允与非公允的关联交易是不可能的。当然也就无法满足区分性。如果上市公司所经营、交易的商品有价格共识或能够形成价格共识,投资者应该自己承担读解、识别、判断上市公司的财务信息的责任；如果上市公司所经营、交易的商品中有的商品没有价格共识或很难形成价格共识,会计准则就应该要求上市公司将该项交易与其它交易相区别,以提醒投资人关注、判明该交易的实质及其相应财务信息的真伪。
2.通过严格证明得到了价格共识形成的充分条件。在同一种商品的一连串交易(而非赠与或掠夺)中,商品价格共识的逐渐形成需要下述4个条件,即①敏感性：在商品交易过程中参与者是“趋利避害”的；②公平性：在这个过程中既没有谁能以高于其他参与者卖价的、其差值不小于某固定值的卖价出售商品,也没有谁能以低于其他参与者买价的、其差值不小于某固定值的买价买入商品；③单纯性：商品的价格完全由供需决定；④渐趋稳定：在这个过程中供应与需求的量逐渐稳定；⑤常规性：在这个过程中供应与需求的量不会逐渐消失。那么关于这个商品的价格共识就会逐渐形成。根据价格共识形成的观点,商品价格共识形成是渐进的,商品的价格不是瞬间形成的。
3.基于价格共识如何形成的基础研究,要提高财务信息的质量,必须把交易分为第Ⅰ类和第Ⅱ类,并在此基础上重构信息披露的方式。根据对价格共识如何形成的基础的研究,商品价格共识的形成需要一定的条件。由于条件不充分,某些商品的价格共识不易形成。为了防止信息混淆,需要对报表做出改进,这样才能为投资者了解上市公司的经营情况提供必要的保障。本文认为要编撰满足“三性”要求的信息披露,首先要对交易进行确认、分类,所有交易可初步分为第Ⅰ类交易与第Ⅱ类交易。
三、论文的创新之处
本文对上市公司关联交易信息披露的研究是以价格共识形成为切入点。通过实验及分析式研究的方法,展开了对商品价格共识形成的理论研究,同时对会计的确认,报表披露的格式提出了新的见解。在以下方面有所创新和突破：
1.提出并证明了价格共识理论。采用分析式和实验研究方法,设计并完成了价格共识不能形成的实验和价格共识能形成的实验,提出并证明了价格共识理论。首先提出了价格共识的概念,并构建理论模型,采用严格的数学模型对价格共识形成理论进行了推演证明。找到了商品价格共识形成的条件。据此我们发现,在传统的商品交易中比较容易形成价格共识,其相应的财务数据也比较容易“读解”。对关联交易(包括非关联化的关联交易)这样难于在其中形成商品价格共识的交易的相应财务数据,需要新的财务信息披露的方式以增加对它的“注解”。
2.提出增加《第Ⅱ类交易表》的披露模式。在原会计报表的基础上,通过增加一个《第Ⅱ类交易表》的方式,避免因原会计报表合并各种交易所产生的数据所带来的交易属性丢失,以及价格可比性的混淆,从而达到增强会计信息质量的目的。这个《第Ⅱ类交易表》将起到一个注解原会计报表中各项数据产生背景的作用。例如当上市公司通过公开或隐蔽的关联方交易,向上市公司输送利益或从上市公司挖掘利益的时候,第Ⅱ类交易的额度都会明显增大。
3.在传统的借贷记账法的基础上,新增加交易分类这一要素,即根据交易的特性来判断每项经济业务是属于第Ⅰ类还是第Ⅱ类交易。相应的记账规则不是借贷记账法下只用借、贷二维；还要增加记为类的一维,即借、贷、类三维。也就是说,要想描述一项交易,应该用三维坐标来表示,而不是以前的只用二维坐标来表示。这一改良方案不仅为关联交易披露质量的提高有积极的作用,而且为金融工具会计、人力资源会计及社会责任会计信息从表外顺向转化到表内提供了一个全新的可行的思路,从而实现提高上市公司会计信息质量,保护投资者的合法权益,维护证券市场的繁荣与稳定。
Violation of regulation problems by listed companies in China is mostly associated directly or indirectly with RPTs (related party transactions). RPTs not only viciously harm the interests of listed companies themselves, but also seriously damage the interests of small shareholders, affect the efficient allocation of scarce resources, and increase the market operating costs and risks, which will eventually shake the foundation of the capital market itself. Therefore, it is of great importance to study and to standardize RPTs by listed companies, and to strengthen the relevance of accounting information disclosure of RPTs as well. This dissertation will analysis from a new viewpoint based on CPU (common price understanding). Firstly transactions are to be recognized and classified, then information disclosure on listed companies is to be reconstructed, so as to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure, to protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium investors, and to maintain prosperity and stability of the security market. Standard research, analytical studies and experimental research methods have been employed in the research of this dissertation.
1. Research contents of the dissertation
This dissertation focuses on problems associated with RPTs by the listed companies and centers on how to improve the information disclosure mode of RPTs from five aspects:
1.1 Problems found in the current information disclosure of RPTs. Domestic or foreign research on the issue of RPTs confined to the distinction between RPTs and general trading by the definition of related party. Therefore, the study about disclosure of RPTs has the following problems:①No distinction, that is no transaction specificity to distinguish between RPTs and ordinary transactions;②No immediacy, as information of RPTs was disclosed only in the off balance sheet resulting in weak binding force to the related companies and inadequate disclosure of related information;③Making RPTs unrelated to avoid information disclosure of RPTs. If a valid distinction in theory between RPT and general transaction can not find, the quality of information disclosure will not be improved to the extent to reduce the harm caused by RPTs.
1.2 The experimental and theoretical proof of CPU. It is often said "The price of RPTs is clearly contrary to the normal price of transaction". What price does this "normal price of transaction" refer to? How to quantitative it? How does it become a common understanding? Answers to all these questions have to be sought from the basic theory of economics. Based on the introduction on and analysis of the deficiencies of the traditional theories related to RPTs, the concept of CPU was firstly proposed and experiments that can form and cannot form CPU were designed and finished. From the results of the experiments, a new theory-the Theory of CPU-had been proposed and the theory was then further proved by theoretical model and deduced by strict mathematical logic.
1.3. Analysis on recognition, measurement and disclosure of RPTs. Results from traditional analysis on recognition and measurement of RPTs had been analyzed again with the theory of CPU and further demonstrated by experiments. In addition, a comparison between new guidelines on the disclosure of RPTs with the old criteria and the international accounting standards was carried out. Some domestic scholars suggested some improving measures on RPT information disclosure by reference to the reasonable parts of the international accounting standards and other national accounting standards. An analysis on these measures has been undertaken. Though these measures have shown some positive functions, but can not resolve the unrelated problem to RPTs.
1.4. Reconstruction of RPT information disclosure. Through describing the aim of the new model of RPT information disclosure, the basic framework of the new model, including the design of the new accounting model and accounting example, has been proposed. In a traditional debit and credit accounting system, a new element of trading classification is added that can be used to determine the type of the economic business. According to their characteristics, the transactions will be recorded in either categoryⅠor categoryⅡ. A "ClassⅡtransactions statement" has been proposed to add in the original basis of accounting statements to avoid the loss of transaction property and the confusion of price comparability resulted from the merger of various exchange transactions in original financial statements, so as to achieve the purpose of enhancing the quality of accounting information.
1.5 Some policy suggestions on improving financial information disclosure of the listed companies. How to publicly increase the transparency of financial information disclosure of the listed companies and thus minimize the harm associated with the RPTs. The government should provide more information services; enhance the disclosure of the results of the market operation rather than just the release of the expected market operation. Some measures have been suggested as follows:①Formulate strict regulations in regard to the disclosure ways of the second category of enterprises;②Reduce the depth and intensity of government intervention in capital markets;③Comprehensive management on disclosure of RPTs by listed companies and on accounting information quality;④Establish electronic management records on information disclosure for each listed company;⑤Create a harmonious environment that stimulate honest operation for listed companies;⑥Improve shareholder derivative litigation.
2. The main conclusion of the dissertation
2.1 RPT information disclosure must meet requirements of distinction, immediacy and timeliness. As to the issue of relevant disclosure of RPTs in the construction of information disclosure system of listed companies, a general principle must firstly be set up that can be used to judge if the content, form, perspective of the RPT information disclosure is necessary and sufficient. Our study shows that this general principle is that the relevant disclosure of RPTs must meet three requirements that are:①distinction;②immediacy; and③timeliness. Among the three requirements that relevant disclosure of RPTs must meet, distinction is the most critical one as it determines whether and how to disclose directly and dynamically. The reason why the basic research on how to form CPU has been carried out is that if the CPU does not exist in the market, then how it is possible to distinguish between fair and non fair RPTs. Of course, distinction will not be able to meet. If the prices of the commodities provided by the listed company can form the CPU, investors should take the responsible for their reading, identifying, and determining the financial information of the listed companies. If, on the contrary, the prices of the commodities provided by the listed company can not or is hard to form the CPU, accounting standards and regulations should require the listed company to distinguish those RPTs from other transactions in order to remind the investors to concern and to ascertain the substance of those transactions and the authenticity of the corresponding financial information.
2.2 Sufficient condition of CPU has been gained through a rigorous proof. CPU can arise in the market under the condition that the trading goods possess the fowlloing 5 prerequisites in the series of transactions of the same trading goods (rather than gifts or looting):①Sensitivity-any participants draw on advantages and avoid disadvantages;②Fairness-when some agents can succeed (possibly accidentally) to sell or buy at higher price, other agents can follow them (not simultaneously) in later trades;③Pureness-all agents trade in a free market and no one has the eternal trading privilege in the market and the price of goods are absolutely determined by the situation of supply-demand;④Tend-stable-the changing of supply-demand situation trends to be stable;⑤Regularity-the changing of supply-demand situation gradually disappears. That is to say that the CPU of a trading good is obtainable asymptotically rather than immediately.
2.3 Based on the basic research of CPU, transactions must be classified into either class I or class II and the model of information disclosure reconstructed in order to improve the quality of financial information. According to the basic study on how to form CPU, the formation of CPU needs some conditions. As the conditions are not sufficient, the CPU of some trading goods is not easy to form. In order to prevent confusion of information, the reports need improving that can provide the necessary protection for investors to understand the operation of listed companies. It has been deemed that the transactions have to be firstly recognized and classified before financial statement and information disclosure that meet the above-mentioned three requirements can be compiled. All transactions can be divided into either Class 1 or Class II.
3. Innovation Points of the dissertation
In this dissertation the theoretical study on consensus of trading goods price understanding is conducted through experimental and analytical research methods, and new perspectives on accounting recognition and disclosure format of reporting are raised at the same time. With some innovations and breakthroughs shown as follows:
3.1 The theory of CPU proposed and proved. Through analytical and experimental research methods, designed and completed the experiment about the formation of CPU. Conditions that are required for the CPU formation of trading goods have been uncovered. Accordingly it has been found that a CPU is easier to form in traditional trading goods and the corresponding financial data are easier for "Reading." New methods of financial information closure is required to increase their "notes" for RPTs (including unrelated RPTs) that are hard to form corresponding financial data during their CPU formation of trading goods.
3.2 To add a table of "Class II transaction statement" for better information disclosure. Loss of transaction attribute and confusion of price comparability resulted from the merger of various transaction data are avoided by the approach to add a table of "ClassⅡtransaction statement" to the original basis of accounting statements, so as to enhance the quality of accounting information disclosure. This "ClassⅡtransaction statement" will function as a note to the background of the original data in the accounting statements. For example, when the listed companies transfer benefits to or mine interests from themselves through an open or hidden RPT, the transaction amount for Class II will significantly increase.
3.3 Based on the traditional debit and credit accounting method, newly increase an element described as "transaction classification", namely belonging to either Class I or Class II of the transactions are to be determined according to their transaction characteristics. Then the corresponding debit and credit accounting rules are not only two-dimensions of Debit/ Credit; but three-dimensions of debit, credit and a new dimension "class" described as Debit/ Credit/Class. In other words, three-dimensional coordinates rather than the old way of two-dimensional coordinates are to be used to represent and to describe a transaction. This improvement not only improves the quality of information disclosure on RPTs, but also provides a new feasible ideas to transform information of financial instruments accounting, of human resource accounting and of social responsibility accounting from off-statement to the inside of the statement.
引文
[1]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2)：81-91.
[2]贝克奥伊.会计理论(第四版)[M].钱逢胜,等译.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2004.
[3]彼得·雷森伯格.西方公民身份传统——从柏拉图至卢梭.[M].吉林出版集团有限责任公司,2009.
[4]财政部.企业会计准则——关联方关系及其交易的披露(第1版).北京：中国财政经济出版社,1997：1-3.
[5]财政部会计司.关于我国上市公司2007年执行新会计准则情况的分析报告[J].会计之友,2008(7)：105-112.
[6]财政部会计司.国际会计准则2000[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2001.
[7]财政部会计司.企业会计准则[M].经济科学出版社,1997.
[8]曹廷求.大股东治理机制与公司绩效：来自中国上市公司的调查证据[J].由东社会科学,2005(1)：59-64.
[9]陈蝉,陈晓.赢余管理、关联交易与市场制约机制——基于五粮液的案例研究.中国企业管理论坛2007： 337--345
[10]陈汉文.证券市场与会计监管[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2001.
[11]陈红.公司控制权配置模式与治理效率研究[J].投资研究,2005(6)：56-63.
[12]陈宏辉,贾生华.企业利益相关者的利益协调与公司治理的平衡原理[J].中国工业经济,2005(8)：114-121.
[13]陈小悦,陈晓,顾斌.中国股市弱型效率的实证研究[J].会计研究,1997,9(14)：13-17.
[14]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效和投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001(11)：3-lO.
[15]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005(4)：77-86.
[16]陈晓,陈淑燕.股票交易量对年报信息的反应研究——来自上海、深圳股市的经验证据[J].金融研究,2001(7)：98-105.
[17]陈晓,秦跃红.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界,2003(3)：28-33.
[18]崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响：来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004(8)：72-80.
[19]杜滨,李若山.中国证券市场上市公司关联交易的实证研究[A].中国会计与财务问题国际研讨会论文集[C].中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[20]杜兴强.会计信息产权问题研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2002.
[21]段亚林.非公平关联交易下的公司利益转移问题研究[R].深证综研字第47号,2001(12).
[22]高雷,宋顺林.关联交易、线下项目与赢余管理[J].中国会计评论,2008(3)：61-79.
[23]葛家澎,杜兴强.财务会计概念框架与会计准则问题研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[24]葛家澎,林志军.现代西方会计理论(第二版)[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,2006.
[25]葛家澎,刘峰.会计理论——关于财务会计概念结构的研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[26]葛家澎.财务会计理论研究[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,2006.
[27]耿志民.大股东治理、机构投资者与公司治理结构改革[J].经济研究,2005,24(5)：131-134.
[28]管强.关联交易内幕[M].中华工商联合出版社,2003.
[29]何艳,张芬.发达国家如何保护小股东利益?论两种公司治理模式下小股东保护体系[J].北方经济,2007(1)：143-144.
[30]侯光明,李存金.管理博弈论[M]..北京理工大学,2005.
[31]洪剑峭,方君雄.关联交易与价值盈余的相关性中国会计评论2005(6)87-99
[32]洪剑峭,薛皓.股权制衡如何影响经营性应计的可靠性——关联交易视角[J].管理世界,2009(1)：153-161.
[33]黄本尧.上市公司关联交易监管问题研究[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告,2003：73-150.
[34]黄速建,余青.国有企业的性质、目标与社会责任[J].中国工业经济,2006(2)：68-75.
[35]吉拉德·德布鲁.价值理论及数理经济学的20篇论文[M].首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002.
[36]计小青,曹啸.资本市场财务呈报管制：理论及其对中国实践的解释[J].管理世界,2003(2)：4-14.
[37]蒋顺才,刘雪辉,刘迎新.上市公司信息披露[M].清华大学出版社,2004.
[38]蒋尧明.上市公司会计信息披露的真实性与虚假陈述研究[J].会计研究,2004(1)：39-43.
[39]蒋义宏,李树华.证券市场财务与会计问题研究[M].上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[40]杰弗瑞·A·杰里,等.高级微观经济学[M].上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[41]科斯,斯蒂格利茨,等.契约经济学[M].经济科学出版社,1999.
[42]雷光勇.企业会计契约：动态过程与效率[J].经济研究,2004(5)：98-106.
[43]李高中.论关联交易与我国公司法完善[J].华东政法学院学报,1998创刊号：70-80.
[44]李若山,周勤业,方军雄.注册会计师：经济警察吗?(第1版)[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003：87-103.
[45]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)：3-12.
[46]刘峰.会计准则变迁[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000.
[47]刘永泽,傅荣.高级财务会计[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2007.
[48]刘玉廷.中国企业会计准则体系：架构、趋同与等效[J].会计研究,2007(3)：2-8.
[49]陆建宇,张继袖,刘国艳.基于不确定性的公允价值计量与披露问题研究[J].会计研究,2007(2)：
18-23.
[50]罗党论,黄郡.审计师与控股股东“掏空”行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代经济管理,2007,29(2)：123-127.
[51]马克斯·韦伯.经济通史.[M].上海三联书店,2006.
[52]迈克尔,迪屈奇.交易成本经济学——关于公司的新的经济意义[M].王铁生,葛立成,译.经济科学出版社,1999.
[53]皮埃尔·勒维克.希腊的诞生——灿烂的古典文明.[法][M].上海书店出版社,2006
[54]彭晓洁.信息不对称与非公平关联交易透视[J].会计研究,2005,8(214)：67-72.
[55]乔彦军.掀起你的盖头来：关联者及关联交易——兼评关联关系及其交易的披露[J].会计研究,1997,12(25)：34-45.
[56]斯塔夫里阿诺斯.全球通史.[美][M].北京大学出版社,2007.
[57]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005(6)：63-85.
[58]佟岩,主化成.关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量[J].会计研究,2007(4)：75-82.
[59]瓦茨,齐默尔曼.实证会计理论[M].陈少华,黄世忠,陈箭深,译.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1978.
[60]汪建熙.关联方交易与以股份为基础的支付[M].大连出版社,2005.
[61]王国成,黄涛.经济行为的异质性和实验经济学的发展[J].经济研究,2005(11)：125—128.
[62]王纪平.关联方交易会计新论[M].经济科学出版社,2007.
[63]王来群.公允价值计量基础与关联交易监管[J].山东大学学报哲学社会科学版,2003(3)：126-131.
[64]王雄元,张鹏.上市公司信息保密研究[J].会计研究,2007(5)：25-30.
[65]王又庄.关于证券(股票)市场与会计信息披露问题研究(第1版)[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002.176～179
[66]威廉R.斯科特.财务会计理论[M].陈汉文,等译.北京：机械工业出版社,2006.
[67]吴联生.会计信息失真的“三分法”：理论框架与证据[J].会计研究,2003(1)：23-28.
[68]向凯.上市公司关联方关系及其交易信息披露质量——来自上市公司的初步证据.价值工程,2004(7)
[69]肖虹.我国关联方关系及其交易披露规范研究[J].会计研究,2000(7)：22-28.
[70]肖虹.中国上市公司控股股东关联交易盈余管理研究[D].博士论文,1999.
[71]谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制订权合约安排[J].经济研究,2000,(5)47-51.
[72]谢清喜,王瑞英.中国上市公司内部人控制与非公平关联交易的实证分析[J].经济评论,2004,4(32)：113-117.
[73]熊彼特.经济分析史[M].商务印书馆,1996.
[74]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上、下卷)[M].郭大力,王亚南,译·商务印书馆,1996.
[75]阎达五,王建英.上市公司利润操纵行为的财务指标特征研究[J].财务与会计,2001(10)：21-25·
[76]杨小凯.经济学—新兴古典与新古典框架 [M].社会科学文献出版社,2003.
[77]应唯.关联交易——政策及技术层面解析[J].财务与会计,2002(3)：5-10.
[78]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易：对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6)：33-38.
[79]占美松 表外披露性质解读及其启示：剩余控制权视角会计研究2008(1O)：
[80]占美松 财务报告信息与表外披露问题研究厦门大学博士学位论文2008
[81]朱·弗登伯格,戴卫·K·莱文.博弈学习理论[M].中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[82]邹薇.高级微观经济学[M].武汉大学出版社,2004.
[83]FASB.国际财务报告准则2004[M].财政部会计准则委员会,译.北京：中国财政经济出版社.
[84]FASB.国际财务报告准则2008[M].财政部会计准则委员会,泽.北京：中国财政经济出版社.
[85]Agrawal A, Chadha S. Corporate governance and accounting Scandals [J]. Journal of Law and Economics (Forthcoming),2005,14(5):77-95.
[86]Agrawal A, Knoeber C R. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J]. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis,1996(31):377-397.
[87]Alba P, Claessens S, Djankov S, et al. Thailand's corporate financing and governance structures [R]. The World Bank series Policy Research Working Paper with number 23,1998.
[88]Alchian A, William R, Armen A. Exchange & production:coordination & control [M]. Wadsworth Pub Co,1997.
[89]Allman M H. The future of accounting and financial reporting:The colorized Approach [J]. Accounting Horizons, June.1996:88-90.
[90]American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Accounting and Auditing for Related Parties arid Related Party Transactions:A Toolkit for Accountants and Auditors.2001.
[91]Arrow K J, Debreu G,. Existence of a equilibrium for a completive economy [J]. Econometrica, 1954(22):265-290.
[92]Aumann R J. Existence of a competitive equilibrium in markets with a continuum of traders. Econometrica,1966(34):1-17.
[93]Authur H. The importance standards [J]. Accounting Horizons,1998:346-357.
[94]Ball R S, Kothari P, Robin A. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000(29):1-51.
[95]Barbara D M. Related party transactions. Journal of Accountancy(pre-1986),2001,9(32):124-150.
[96]Bin K, Steven H, Kathy P. What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it:Evidence from insider trades [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1978,5(14):53-60.
[97]Bloomfield R J, Maureen O'Hara. Can transparent markets survive? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,55(3):122-125.
[98]Bowen R M, Rajgopal, Venkatachalam S M. Accounting Discretion,Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[C].14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting,2005.
[99]Bruce B. Segment earnings disclosure and the ability of security analysts to forecast earnings per share [J]. Accounting Review,1984.
[100]Canthlle M, Julian W. How do firms choose their lenders? An Empirical Investigation [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2000,13(28):104-115.
[101]Cheung Yan-Leung, Raghavendra Rau P. Tunneling, propping and expropriation evidence from conneted party transactions in Hong Kong, working paper,2003.
[102]Claessens S, Djankov S, Lang L H P. The separation of ownership and control in east asian coradorations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000(38):81-112.
[103]Collins D W, Simonds R R. SEC Line-of-business disclosure and market risk adjustment [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,23(45):76-79.
[104]Copeland T, Koller T, Murrin J. Valuation:measuring and managing the value of companies, Third Edition.2002.
[105]Deccine C T. Research methodology and accounting theory formulation. [J]. The Accounting Review,1960,37(4):32-34.
[106]Dimson E. Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1979(7):197-226.
[107]Elizabeth A, Gordon, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia. Related Party Transactions:Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value [M/OL].2004-8. http://www.ssrn.com.
[108]Evidence from Listed Companies. European Accounting Review,2004,Vol.13(2):319～340
[109]Faccio M, Lang L H P.2002, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[110]Fama E. Efficient capital markets:a review of theory and empirical work [J]. The Journal of Finance,1970:383-417.
[111]Financial Accounting Standard Board. Related Party Disclosures. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.57,1982.
[112]Fischer, Paul E, Stocken, Phillip C. Forecasts and Earnings. SSRN:Working Paper Series,2000: 86-90.
[113]Foster W. Financial accounting theory [M]. Prentice-Hall International Inc. U.S.A,1997.
[114]Fudenberg D, Levine D K. The theory of learning in games [M]. Cambridge:MIT Press,1998.
[115]Gire, Michael K. Avoiding conflict of interest and related-party.2001:123-129.
[116]Gordon E A, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia. Determinants of related party transactions and their impact on firm value.2004.
[117]Gresik T, Satterthwaite M. The rate at which a simple market becomes efficient as the number of traders increases:an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989(48):304-332.
[118]Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4),691-719.
[119]Gul F, Postlewaite A. Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information [J]. Econometrica,1992(60):1273-1292.
[120]Hague Ian P N. Lifting the fog on related party transactions [J]. CA Magazine,1995(12).
[121]Hart S, Mas-Colell A. Uncoupled dynamics do not lead Nash Equilibrium [J]. American Economic Review,2003(93):1830-1836.
[122]Hart S, Mas-Colell A. Stochastic uncouple dynamics and Nash Equilibrium [J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2006(57):86-303.
[123]Hazen T L. Treatise on the law of securities regulation,2nd Edition [M]. St.Paul:West Publishing Co,1990.
[124]Hinton R. Related party transaction:the UK Way [J]. Accountancy,1989(103):26-27.
[125]Hu J, Thomos H. Insider trading and managerial incentives. Joural of Banking & 130 Finance, 2001,25(49):83-87.
[126]IASB. International Financial Reporting Standards,2004.
[127]Inmoo L. Insider trading and performance of seasoned equity offering firms after controlling for exogenous trading needs [J]. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2002,17(39):107-112.
[128]Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,3(128):305-360.
[129]Stuckey J. Vertical integration and joint ventures in the aiuminum industry. Cambridge:Harvard Press,1983.
[130]Johnson S R, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review,2000:22-27.
[131]Jonk A. New evidence on the effects of federal regulations on insider trading:The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act [J]. Accounting review,2003,33(59):71-82.
[132]Katherine S. Commentary on earnings management[J]. Accounting Horizons,2003,5:75-93.
[133]Keisler H J. (1995) "Approximate Tatonnement Processes, " [J]. Economic Theory,1995(5): 127-173.
[134]Keisler H J. Getting to a competitive equilibrium [J]. Econometrica,1996(64):29-49.
[135]Khanna Tarun, Krishna Palepu. Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets [J]. Harvard Business Review,1997,75(4):41-51.
[136]La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world [J]. Journal of Finance,1999(54):471-517.
[137]Manaster S, Rendleman R. Option prices as predictors of equilibrium stock prices [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,37(4):32-34.
[138]Marcet, A., and Sargent, T., J., (1989):"Convergence of Least Squares Learning in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models," Joumal of Economic Theory,48,337-368.
[139]Ming Jian, Wong T J. Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups [J]. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003(6).
[140]Nash R. Auditing related parly transaction [J]. The CPA Journal,1988,58(4):84-86.
[141]Rendleman R C, Jones L, Yang Hatane. Empirical anomalies based on unexpected earnings and he importance of risk adjustments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1982,10(111):269-287.
[142]Robert S. An empirical investigation of the effect of quarterly earnings announcement timing on stock returns [J]. Journal Accounting Research,2004,45(69):112-120.
[143]Robert S, Edward J. Problems in developing guidelines for auditing related-party transactions [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2000,32(55):67-73.
[144]Rustichini A, Satterthwaite M A, Williams S R. Convergence to price-taking behavior in a Simple Market. Northwestern University,1990(914).
[145]Rustichini A, Satterthwaite M A, Williams S R. Converge to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information [J]. Econometrica,1994(62):1041-1063.
[146]Shick R A. On the theory of conglomerate mergers [J]. Journal of Finance,2004,12(27):78-86.
[147]Shleifer A, Vishny R W. A survey of corporate governance [J]. Journal of Finance,1997(52): 737-783.
[148]Shleifer A, Vishny R. The limits of arbitrage [J]. Journal of Finance,2004(52):35-55.
[149]Stacchetti E. Analysis of a dynamic, decentralized exchange economy [J]. Joumal of Mathetical Economics,1985(14):241-259.
[150]Trmstrong M. The politics of establishing accounting standards [J]. Journal of Accounting,2004, 7(18):23-30.
[151]US Congress The Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002(related accounting industry and investor protection) [R].2002.
[152]Watts,R. and Jerold Zimmerman,1983,Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: some evidence, Journal of Law and Economics, vol 26.
[153]Weisbach M. Outside directors and CEO turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988.
[154]William C. Related-party transactions some considerations [J]. The CPA Journal(pre-1986),2005, 16(22):87-91.
[155]Williams, S. (1991):"Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction," Review of Economic Studies,58,351-374.
[156]Zhang Y, Ma G. Law, economic, corporate governance and corporate scandal in a transition economy:insight [C]. International Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia.2005.
[2]贝克奥伊.会计理论(第四版)[M].钱逢胜,等译.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2004.
[3]彼得·雷森伯格.西方公民身份传统——从柏拉图至卢梭.[M].吉林出版集团有限责任公司,2009.
[4]财政部.企业会计准则——关联方关系及其交易的披露(第1版).北京：中国财政经济出版社,1997：1-3.
[5]财政部会计司.关于我国上市公司2007年执行新会计准则情况的分析报告[J].会计之友,2008(7)：105-112.
[6]财政部会计司.国际会计准则2000[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2001.
[7]财政部会计司.企业会计准则[M].经济科学出版社,1997.
[8]曹廷求.大股东治理机制与公司绩效：来自中国上市公司的调查证据[J].由东社会科学,2005(1)：59-64.
[9]陈蝉,陈晓.赢余管理、关联交易与市场制约机制——基于五粮液的案例研究.中国企业管理论坛2007： 337--345
[10]陈汉文.证券市场与会计监管[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2001.
[11]陈红.公司控制权配置模式与治理效率研究[J].投资研究,2005(6)：56-63.
[12]陈宏辉,贾生华.企业利益相关者的利益协调与公司治理的平衡原理[J].中国工业经济,2005(8)：114-121.
[13]陈小悦,陈晓,顾斌.中国股市弱型效率的实证研究[J].会计研究,1997,9(14)：13-17.
[14]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效和投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001(11)：3-lO.
[15]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005(4)：77-86.
[16]陈晓,陈淑燕.股票交易量对年报信息的反应研究——来自上海、深圳股市的经验证据[J].金融研究,2001(7)：98-105.
[17]陈晓,秦跃红.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界,2003(3)：28-33.
[18]崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响：来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004(8)：72-80.
[19]杜滨,李若山.中国证券市场上市公司关联交易的实证研究[A].中国会计与财务问题国际研讨会论文集[C].中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[20]杜兴强.会计信息产权问题研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2002.
[21]段亚林.非公平关联交易下的公司利益转移问题研究[R].深证综研字第47号,2001(12).
[22]高雷,宋顺林.关联交易、线下项目与赢余管理[J].中国会计评论,2008(3)：61-79.
[23]葛家澎,杜兴强.财务会计概念框架与会计准则问题研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[24]葛家澎,林志军.现代西方会计理论(第二版)[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,2006.
[25]葛家澎,刘峰.会计理论——关于财务会计概念结构的研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[26]葛家澎.财务会计理论研究[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,2006.
[27]耿志民.大股东治理、机构投资者与公司治理结构改革[J].经济研究,2005,24(5)：131-134.
[28]管强.关联交易内幕[M].中华工商联合出版社,2003.
[29]何艳,张芬.发达国家如何保护小股东利益?论两种公司治理模式下小股东保护体系[J].北方经济,2007(1)：143-144.
[30]侯光明,李存金.管理博弈论[M]..北京理工大学,2005.
[31]洪剑峭,方君雄.关联交易与价值盈余的相关性中国会计评论2005(6)87-99
[32]洪剑峭,薛皓.股权制衡如何影响经营性应计的可靠性——关联交易视角[J].管理世界,2009(1)：153-161.
[33]黄本尧.上市公司关联交易监管问题研究[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告,2003：73-150.
[34]黄速建,余青.国有企业的性质、目标与社会责任[J].中国工业经济,2006(2)：68-75.
[35]吉拉德·德布鲁.价值理论及数理经济学的20篇论文[M].首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002.
[36]计小青,曹啸.资本市场财务呈报管制：理论及其对中国实践的解释[J].管理世界,2003(2)：4-14.
[37]蒋顺才,刘雪辉,刘迎新.上市公司信息披露[M].清华大学出版社,2004.
[38]蒋尧明.上市公司会计信息披露的真实性与虚假陈述研究[J].会计研究,2004(1)：39-43.
[39]蒋义宏,李树华.证券市场财务与会计问题研究[M].上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[40]杰弗瑞·A·杰里,等.高级微观经济学[M].上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[41]科斯,斯蒂格利茨,等.契约经济学[M].经济科学出版社,1999.
[42]雷光勇.企业会计契约：动态过程与效率[J].经济研究,2004(5)：98-106.
[43]李高中.论关联交易与我国公司法完善[J].华东政法学院学报,1998创刊号：70-80.
[44]李若山,周勤业,方军雄.注册会计师：经济警察吗?(第1版)[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003：87-103.
[45]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)：3-12.
[46]刘峰.会计准则变迁[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000.
[47]刘永泽,傅荣.高级财务会计[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2007.
[48]刘玉廷.中国企业会计准则体系：架构、趋同与等效[J].会计研究,2007(3)：2-8.
[49]陆建宇,张继袖,刘国艳.基于不确定性的公允价值计量与披露问题研究[J].会计研究,2007(2)：
18-23.
[50]罗党论,黄郡.审计师与控股股东“掏空”行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代经济管理,2007,29(2)：123-127.
[51]马克斯·韦伯.经济通史.[M].上海三联书店,2006.
[52]迈克尔,迪屈奇.交易成本经济学——关于公司的新的经济意义[M].王铁生,葛立成,译.经济科学出版社,1999.
[53]皮埃尔·勒维克.希腊的诞生——灿烂的古典文明.[法][M].上海书店出版社,2006
[54]彭晓洁.信息不对称与非公平关联交易透视[J].会计研究,2005,8(214)：67-72.
[55]乔彦军.掀起你的盖头来：关联者及关联交易——兼评关联关系及其交易的披露[J].会计研究,1997,12(25)：34-45.
[56]斯塔夫里阿诺斯.全球通史.[美][M].北京大学出版社,2007.
[57]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005(6)：63-85.
[58]佟岩,主化成.关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量[J].会计研究,2007(4)：75-82.
[59]瓦茨,齐默尔曼.实证会计理论[M].陈少华,黄世忠,陈箭深,译.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1978.
[60]汪建熙.关联方交易与以股份为基础的支付[M].大连出版社,2005.
[61]王国成,黄涛.经济行为的异质性和实验经济学的发展[J].经济研究,2005(11)：125—128.
[62]王纪平.关联方交易会计新论[M].经济科学出版社,2007.
[63]王来群.公允价值计量基础与关联交易监管[J].山东大学学报哲学社会科学版,2003(3)：126-131.
[64]王雄元,张鹏.上市公司信息保密研究[J].会计研究,2007(5)：25-30.
[65]王又庄.关于证券(股票)市场与会计信息披露问题研究(第1版)[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002.176～179
[66]威廉R.斯科特.财务会计理论[M].陈汉文,等译.北京：机械工业出版社,2006.
[67]吴联生.会计信息失真的“三分法”：理论框架与证据[J].会计研究,2003(1)：23-28.
[68]向凯.上市公司关联方关系及其交易信息披露质量——来自上市公司的初步证据.价值工程,2004(7)
[69]肖虹.我国关联方关系及其交易披露规范研究[J].会计研究,2000(7)：22-28.
[70]肖虹.中国上市公司控股股东关联交易盈余管理研究[D].博士论文,1999.
[71]谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制订权合约安排[J].经济研究,2000,(5)47-51.
[72]谢清喜,王瑞英.中国上市公司内部人控制与非公平关联交易的实证分析[J].经济评论,2004,4(32)：113-117.
[73]熊彼特.经济分析史[M].商务印书馆,1996.
[74]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上、下卷)[M].郭大力,王亚南,译·商务印书馆,1996.
[75]阎达五,王建英.上市公司利润操纵行为的财务指标特征研究[J].财务与会计,2001(10)：21-25·
[76]杨小凯.经济学—新兴古典与新古典框架 [M].社会科学文献出版社,2003.
[77]应唯.关联交易——政策及技术层面解析[J].财务与会计,2002(3)：5-10.
[78]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易：对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6)：33-38.
[79]占美松 表外披露性质解读及其启示：剩余控制权视角会计研究2008(1O)：
[80]占美松 财务报告信息与表外披露问题研究厦门大学博士学位论文2008
[81]朱·弗登伯格,戴卫·K·莱文.博弈学习理论[M].中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[82]邹薇.高级微观经济学[M].武汉大学出版社,2004.
[83]FASB.国际财务报告准则2004[M].财政部会计准则委员会,译.北京：中国财政经济出版社.
[84]FASB.国际财务报告准则2008[M].财政部会计准则委员会,泽.北京：中国财政经济出版社.
[85]Agrawal A, Chadha S. Corporate governance and accounting Scandals [J]. Journal of Law and Economics (Forthcoming),2005,14(5):77-95.
[86]Agrawal A, Knoeber C R. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J]. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis,1996(31):377-397.
[87]Alba P, Claessens S, Djankov S, et al. Thailand's corporate financing and governance structures [R]. The World Bank series Policy Research Working Paper with number 23,1998.
[88]Alchian A, William R, Armen A. Exchange & production:coordination & control [M]. Wadsworth Pub Co,1997.
[89]Allman M H. The future of accounting and financial reporting:The colorized Approach [J]. Accounting Horizons, June.1996:88-90.
[90]American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Accounting and Auditing for Related Parties arid Related Party Transactions:A Toolkit for Accountants and Auditors.2001.
[91]Arrow K J, Debreu G,. Existence of a equilibrium for a completive economy [J]. Econometrica, 1954(22):265-290.
[92]Aumann R J. Existence of a competitive equilibrium in markets with a continuum of traders. Econometrica,1966(34):1-17.
[93]Authur H. The importance standards [J]. Accounting Horizons,1998:346-357.
[94]Ball R S, Kothari P, Robin A. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000(29):1-51.
[95]Barbara D M. Related party transactions. Journal of Accountancy(pre-1986),2001,9(32):124-150.
[96]Bin K, Steven H, Kathy P. What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it:Evidence from insider trades [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1978,5(14):53-60.
[97]Bloomfield R J, Maureen O'Hara. Can transparent markets survive? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,55(3):122-125.
[98]Bowen R M, Rajgopal, Venkatachalam S M. Accounting Discretion,Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[C].14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting,2005.
[99]Bruce B. Segment earnings disclosure and the ability of security analysts to forecast earnings per share [J]. Accounting Review,1984.
[100]Canthlle M, Julian W. How do firms choose their lenders? An Empirical Investigation [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2000,13(28):104-115.
[101]Cheung Yan-Leung, Raghavendra Rau P. Tunneling, propping and expropriation evidence from conneted party transactions in Hong Kong, working paper,2003.
[102]Claessens S, Djankov S, Lang L H P. The separation of ownership and control in east asian coradorations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000(38):81-112.
[103]Collins D W, Simonds R R. SEC Line-of-business disclosure and market risk adjustment [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,23(45):76-79.
[104]Copeland T, Koller T, Murrin J. Valuation:measuring and managing the value of companies, Third Edition.2002.
[105]Deccine C T. Research methodology and accounting theory formulation. [J]. The Accounting Review,1960,37(4):32-34.
[106]Dimson E. Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1979(7):197-226.
[107]Elizabeth A, Gordon, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia. Related Party Transactions:Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value [M/OL].2004-8. http://www.ssrn.com.
[108]Evidence from Listed Companies. European Accounting Review,2004,Vol.13(2):319～340
[109]Faccio M, Lang L H P.2002, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[110]Fama E. Efficient capital markets:a review of theory and empirical work [J]. The Journal of Finance,1970:383-417.
[111]Financial Accounting Standard Board. Related Party Disclosures. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.57,1982.
[112]Fischer, Paul E, Stocken, Phillip C. Forecasts and Earnings. SSRN:Working Paper Series,2000: 86-90.
[113]Foster W. Financial accounting theory [M]. Prentice-Hall International Inc. U.S.A,1997.
[114]Fudenberg D, Levine D K. The theory of learning in games [M]. Cambridge:MIT Press,1998.
[115]Gire, Michael K. Avoiding conflict of interest and related-party.2001:123-129.
[116]Gordon E A, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia. Determinants of related party transactions and their impact on firm value.2004.
[117]Gresik T, Satterthwaite M. The rate at which a simple market becomes efficient as the number of traders increases:an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989(48):304-332.
[118]Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4),691-719.
[119]Gul F, Postlewaite A. Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information [J]. Econometrica,1992(60):1273-1292.
[120]Hague Ian P N. Lifting the fog on related party transactions [J]. CA Magazine,1995(12).
[121]Hart S, Mas-Colell A. Uncoupled dynamics do not lead Nash Equilibrium [J]. American Economic Review,2003(93):1830-1836.
[122]Hart S, Mas-Colell A. Stochastic uncouple dynamics and Nash Equilibrium [J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2006(57):86-303.
[123]Hazen T L. Treatise on the law of securities regulation,2nd Edition [M]. St.Paul:West Publishing Co,1990.
[124]Hinton R. Related party transaction:the UK Way [J]. Accountancy,1989(103):26-27.
[125]Hu J, Thomos H. Insider trading and managerial incentives. Joural of Banking & 130 Finance, 2001,25(49):83-87.
[126]IASB. International Financial Reporting Standards,2004.
[127]Inmoo L. Insider trading and performance of seasoned equity offering firms after controlling for exogenous trading needs [J]. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2002,17(39):107-112.
[128]Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,3(128):305-360.
[129]Stuckey J. Vertical integration and joint ventures in the aiuminum industry. Cambridge:Harvard Press,1983.
[130]Johnson S R, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review,2000:22-27.
[131]Jonk A. New evidence on the effects of federal regulations on insider trading:The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act [J]. Accounting review,2003,33(59):71-82.
[132]Katherine S. Commentary on earnings management[J]. Accounting Horizons,2003,5:75-93.
[133]Keisler H J. (1995) "Approximate Tatonnement Processes, " [J]. Economic Theory,1995(5): 127-173.
[134]Keisler H J. Getting to a competitive equilibrium [J]. Econometrica,1996(64):29-49.
[135]Khanna Tarun, Krishna Palepu. Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets [J]. Harvard Business Review,1997,75(4):41-51.
[136]La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world [J]. Journal of Finance,1999(54):471-517.
[137]Manaster S, Rendleman R. Option prices as predictors of equilibrium stock prices [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,37(4):32-34.
[138]Marcet, A., and Sargent, T., J., (1989):"Convergence of Least Squares Learning in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models," Joumal of Economic Theory,48,337-368.
[139]Ming Jian, Wong T J. Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups [J]. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003(6).
[140]Nash R. Auditing related parly transaction [J]. The CPA Journal,1988,58(4):84-86.
[141]Rendleman R C, Jones L, Yang Hatane. Empirical anomalies based on unexpected earnings and he importance of risk adjustments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1982,10(111):269-287.
[142]Robert S. An empirical investigation of the effect of quarterly earnings announcement timing on stock returns [J]. Journal Accounting Research,2004,45(69):112-120.
[143]Robert S, Edward J. Problems in developing guidelines for auditing related-party transactions [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2000,32(55):67-73.
[144]Rustichini A, Satterthwaite M A, Williams S R. Convergence to price-taking behavior in a Simple Market. Northwestern University,1990(914).
[145]Rustichini A, Satterthwaite M A, Williams S R. Converge to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information [J]. Econometrica,1994(62):1041-1063.
[146]Shick R A. On the theory of conglomerate mergers [J]. Journal of Finance,2004,12(27):78-86.
[147]Shleifer A, Vishny R W. A survey of corporate governance [J]. Journal of Finance,1997(52): 737-783.
[148]Shleifer A, Vishny R. The limits of arbitrage [J]. Journal of Finance,2004(52):35-55.
[149]Stacchetti E. Analysis of a dynamic, decentralized exchange economy [J]. Joumal of Mathetical Economics,1985(14):241-259.
[150]Trmstrong M. The politics of establishing accounting standards [J]. Journal of Accounting,2004, 7(18):23-30.
[151]US Congress The Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002(related accounting industry and investor protection) [R].2002.
[152]Watts,R. and Jerold Zimmerman,1983,Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: some evidence, Journal of Law and Economics, vol 26.
[153]Weisbach M. Outside directors and CEO turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988.
[154]William C. Related-party transactions some considerations [J]. The CPA Journal(pre-1986),2005, 16(22):87-91.
[155]Williams, S. (1991):"Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction," Review of Economic Studies,58,351-374.
[156]Zhang Y, Ma G. Law, economic, corporate governance and corporate scandal in a transition economy:insight [C]. International Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia.2005.