基于计算实验的排污权交易研究
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摘要
计算实验方法在社会科学各个领域的应用逐渐体现出蓬勃的朝气与生命力,使用计算实验方法研究社会科学问题具有开创性的意义。排污权交易系统作为一个典型的复杂系统,其复杂性特征对其研究方法提出了一定的要求,而计算实验方法则可以较好的解决这一问题。本文探讨了基于计算实验的排污权交易演化模型框架及其实现方法,并在该计算实验研究框架下,立足于政府需求,通过计算实验与系统分析、数理分析相结合的研究方法,对我国目前排污权交易实践中主要面临的三个关键问题进行了更深入细致的分析,具体结论如下：
(1)针对目前国内无限放大排污权交易的市场功能的误区,首先针对二级市场对排污权交易系统效率的研究,主要结论有四个内容：①排污主体具有明显的差异性是制度有效实施的基本前提,如果丧失了这点考虑,排污权交易系统的运行效率可能会比传统命令-控制型环境管制手段的效率更差；②要充分警惕排污权交易实施时,企业交易所面临的交易成本；当系统中面临巨大的交易成本而无法消解时,通过逐步增强系统内主体的异质性可以将其负面影响有效弱化；③经验驱动的企业行为偏差与架构效应使排污权价格对自身产生阻滞效应；④价格机制引导不等于完全价格追随,应注重对交易主体决策方式的引导。
(2)针对目前我国环境监管资源欠缺而导致对排污权交易监管能力不足的情况,运用博弈机理分析与计算实验方法相结合的研究方法,从监管力度、排污权分配、违规处罚结构等方面,研究了成本有效地实现总量控制目标的政府监管机制设计问题,主要结论有四个方面：①只要管制者在达成区域环境总量控制目标方面存在有效激励,则社会福利只取决于环境容量,进而,管制者监管机制优化设计的本质工作是追求管制成本有效的具体方案制定；②有效达成总量控制目标的最优监管策略不是单纯通过设置更高的惩罚力度或监管水平而实现的,而是需要追求监管水平、惩罚力度的统一；③由于管制效果具有滞后性、排污权价格具有不确定性等原因,管制者先于排污企业制定固定惩罚标准的静态监管机制尚不能确保排污权交易系统的有效实施；④与静态监管相比,整合了排污权市场价格的动态监管策略不但相对简单、可行,而且能够更有效地实现总量控制目标。
(3)针对目前我国排污权初始分配公平性与效率无法体现的问题,对现行初始分配机制进行优化设计,主要建议可概括为三点：①探索与构建以行政分配为主的有偿分配体系更符合我国当前国情；②从长期演化的视角来看,我国现行排污权初始分配标准都会难免对排污企业产生激励扭曲或失真的现象,直接导致排污权交易系统中无效率的资源配置结果与次优化的社会产出；③通过构建以企业社会责任为内涵的排污权初始分配机制,可以以排污权交易为契机有效促进其他外部性问题的解决,实现环境治理与社会治理的良性互动。
Computational experiment shows significance on the research of behaviors, emergency and the relation between micro-level and macro-lecel systems. As a typical complex system, emissions trading system is a suitable study subject to the method of computational experiments which to be a good solution for solving compliexity. Guided by the social science computational experiment method of system science, the dissertation utilizes multi-agent technique to construct an evolutive model of emissions trading system. Based on the evolutive framework, taking the eyes of the government, three key problems which the practices of emissions trading system in China are confronted with are researched. The major conclusions are as follows:
(1) Aiming at clarifying the misunderstanding that the market function of emission trading system is unbounded, the efficiency of emission trading market is firstly investigated. According to economic basis of emissions trading, a heterogeneous agent-based computational experiment platform for regional emissions trading was established, by combining analyses of the diversities and decision-making mechanisms of companies in real. Then pilot analyses were done on efficiency of emission trading and permit price. The experimental results showed that:distinctness of the diversities of companies is the precondition of emission trading implementing effectively, it would advance system efficiency, or the operating performance of system would be even bad than traditional controlled instruments; transaction cost in system should be bewared. If transaction costs are large but cannot be avoided, increasing the diversities of companies could weaken the passive effects effectively; market price converged above equilibrium price, and a retarding effect was on permit price through itself; Price-oriented trading strategy could not lead to effective collocation of permits, but diversities of companies would generate a countervailing effect on system efficiency. The requirement of heterogeneous modeling and analysis on emissions trading system was proofed thought experimental results.
(2) Effective supervision is the fundamental premise of emissions trading programs to exert advantages. The actuality of emissions trading programs in China haven't exerted its advantages, mainly is as the result of ancomfortable supervion caused by the shortage of supervison resources, capability and et cetera. In a two-stage dynamic game of regulator and polluting firms, the optimal supervision strategies to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively in emissions trading system is studied, including supervision level, the aggregate supply of permits and penalty shape. Based on gaming analysis, a heterogeneous agent-based experiment platform for regional emissions trading system was established using computational experiment. Then further analyses were done from perspectives of dynamic and bounded rational. The results show that, the optimal strategy to achieve target is to induce full compliance. This is not simply setting severe punishment, but seeking tradeoff between level of supervision and penalty. Finally, integrating the permit price directly into the penalty shape allows the policy objective to be achieved more cost-effective.
(3) Mechanism design of the initial allowances allocation. Based on complexity science, the construction of emissions trading system in China was studied, focusing on the mechanism design of the initial allowances allocation. The conclusions proposed in this section can be summarized in three points:Exploring and constructing emission allowance allocation system mainly based on financial administrative allocation mechanism is suitable for China's national condition; but in a long term point of view, current allocation criterions for administrative allocation would generate significant perverse effects on firms'abatement, output or input, directly reducing the efficiency and operating performance of emission trading system; aiming at solving this problem, through an in-depth analysis and comparison of different alternatives, an initial allocation criterions integrating corporate social responsibility was proposed, which can ensure optimal institutional motivation, and allow bring other social externalities into the purview of emissions trading.
(1)针对目前国内无限放大排污权交易的市场功能的误区,首先针对二级市场对排污权交易系统效率的研究,主要结论有四个内容：①排污主体具有明显的差异性是制度有效实施的基本前提,如果丧失了这点考虑,排污权交易系统的运行效率可能会比传统命令-控制型环境管制手段的效率更差；②要充分警惕排污权交易实施时,企业交易所面临的交易成本；当系统中面临巨大的交易成本而无法消解时,通过逐步增强系统内主体的异质性可以将其负面影响有效弱化；③经验驱动的企业行为偏差与架构效应使排污权价格对自身产生阻滞效应；④价格机制引导不等于完全价格追随,应注重对交易主体决策方式的引导。
(2)针对目前我国环境监管资源欠缺而导致对排污权交易监管能力不足的情况,运用博弈机理分析与计算实验方法相结合的研究方法,从监管力度、排污权分配、违规处罚结构等方面,研究了成本有效地实现总量控制目标的政府监管机制设计问题,主要结论有四个方面：①只要管制者在达成区域环境总量控制目标方面存在有效激励,则社会福利只取决于环境容量,进而,管制者监管机制优化设计的本质工作是追求管制成本有效的具体方案制定；②有效达成总量控制目标的最优监管策略不是单纯通过设置更高的惩罚力度或监管水平而实现的,而是需要追求监管水平、惩罚力度的统一；③由于管制效果具有滞后性、排污权价格具有不确定性等原因,管制者先于排污企业制定固定惩罚标准的静态监管机制尚不能确保排污权交易系统的有效实施；④与静态监管相比,整合了排污权市场价格的动态监管策略不但相对简单、可行,而且能够更有效地实现总量控制目标。
(3)针对目前我国排污权初始分配公平性与效率无法体现的问题,对现行初始分配机制进行优化设计,主要建议可概括为三点：①探索与构建以行政分配为主的有偿分配体系更符合我国当前国情；②从长期演化的视角来看,我国现行排污权初始分配标准都会难免对排污企业产生激励扭曲或失真的现象,直接导致排污权交易系统中无效率的资源配置结果与次优化的社会产出；③通过构建以企业社会责任为内涵的排污权初始分配机制,可以以排污权交易为契机有效促进其他外部性问题的解决,实现环境治理与社会治理的良性互动。
Computational experiment shows significance on the research of behaviors, emergency and the relation between micro-level and macro-lecel systems. As a typical complex system, emissions trading system is a suitable study subject to the method of computational experiments which to be a good solution for solving compliexity. Guided by the social science computational experiment method of system science, the dissertation utilizes multi-agent technique to construct an evolutive model of emissions trading system. Based on the evolutive framework, taking the eyes of the government, three key problems which the practices of emissions trading system in China are confronted with are researched. The major conclusions are as follows:
(1) Aiming at clarifying the misunderstanding that the market function of emission trading system is unbounded, the efficiency of emission trading market is firstly investigated. According to economic basis of emissions trading, a heterogeneous agent-based computational experiment platform for regional emissions trading was established, by combining analyses of the diversities and decision-making mechanisms of companies in real. Then pilot analyses were done on efficiency of emission trading and permit price. The experimental results showed that:distinctness of the diversities of companies is the precondition of emission trading implementing effectively, it would advance system efficiency, or the operating performance of system would be even bad than traditional controlled instruments; transaction cost in system should be bewared. If transaction costs are large but cannot be avoided, increasing the diversities of companies could weaken the passive effects effectively; market price converged above equilibrium price, and a retarding effect was on permit price through itself; Price-oriented trading strategy could not lead to effective collocation of permits, but diversities of companies would generate a countervailing effect on system efficiency. The requirement of heterogeneous modeling and analysis on emissions trading system was proofed thought experimental results.
(2) Effective supervision is the fundamental premise of emissions trading programs to exert advantages. The actuality of emissions trading programs in China haven't exerted its advantages, mainly is as the result of ancomfortable supervion caused by the shortage of supervison resources, capability and et cetera. In a two-stage dynamic game of regulator and polluting firms, the optimal supervision strategies to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively in emissions trading system is studied, including supervision level, the aggregate supply of permits and penalty shape. Based on gaming analysis, a heterogeneous agent-based experiment platform for regional emissions trading system was established using computational experiment. Then further analyses were done from perspectives of dynamic and bounded rational. The results show that, the optimal strategy to achieve target is to induce full compliance. This is not simply setting severe punishment, but seeking tradeoff between level of supervision and penalty. Finally, integrating the permit price directly into the penalty shape allows the policy objective to be achieved more cost-effective.
(3) Mechanism design of the initial allowances allocation. Based on complexity science, the construction of emissions trading system in China was studied, focusing on the mechanism design of the initial allowances allocation. The conclusions proposed in this section can be summarized in three points:Exploring and constructing emission allowance allocation system mainly based on financial administrative allocation mechanism is suitable for China's national condition; but in a long term point of view, current allocation criterions for administrative allocation would generate significant perverse effects on firms'abatement, output or input, directly reducing the efficiency and operating performance of emission trading system; aiming at solving this problem, through an in-depth analysis and comparison of different alternatives, an initial allocation criterions integrating corporate social responsibility was proposed, which can ensure optimal institutional motivation, and allow bring other social externalities into the purview of emissions trading.
引文
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