创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制研究
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摘要
面对全球经济一体化的挑战,大力发展高技术产业,推动创新型国家的建设成为当务之急。创业投资(VC)通过支持高科技企业的创业活动,从而对推进创新型经济的发展、经济的增长和就业的扩大,都发挥着不可或缺的重要作用。创业投资在我国起步较晚,但近年来发展迅速,到2010年末,全国备案的创业投资企业所管理的总资产已达1500亿元,较上年增长54%,而且与国外发达国家相比,创业投资未来的发展空间还很大。
由此,创业投资得到了广大学者的关注,成为理论研究和企业界的热点话题,然而当前的研究中还存在着一些不足之处：1、国外尤其是美国对创业投资的研究主要围绕创业投资的运作过程,侧重于研究其“技术”方面,如创业投资的组织架构、评估程序、契约机制、投资工具的数理分析等,对创业投资如何影响风险企业绩效的作用机制这一方面的研究相对较少。2、与国外相比,国内对创业投资的研究相对较少,且研究大多偏重于宏观层面,在企业这个微观层面上的研究仍然较少。3、国内对创业投资的研究更多的是偏向概念性的研究,而实证研究较少。因此,本文以创业投资和科技风险企业为研究对象,综合运用企业能力理论和代理理论,围绕“创业投资机构活动如何影响科技风险企业绩效”这一核心问题,对创业投资机构活动的内涵和构成进行了界定,进而深入剖析了创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制,并进一步探讨了信任在此作用机制中的调节效应。本文的研究主要通过以下部分展开：
(1)文献述评与理论发展。通过对创业投资、企业能力理论、公司治理等的详细回顾,找出现有研究的不足。对创业投资机构活动构成进行了辨析,形成了本文论证的基础。
(2)探索性案例研究与理论模型的提出。在众多企业田野调查的基础上,选择了4家不同行业的企业进行了深入访谈,运用探索性案例研究的方法,初步构建了创业投资机构活动通过公司治理和企业能力影响科技风险企业绩效的作用机制模型,为下一步的研究提供了来源于实践的构想。
(3)创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效作用机制的模型构建与实证分析。在探索性案例研究的基础上,通过进一步的文献展开,确立了创业投资机构活动作用于科技风险企业绩效的概念模型。通过调查问卷,运用探索性因子分析方法、验证性因子分析方法和路径分析方法进行了实证研究。最终确认了创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制模型。
(4)信任对创业投资机构活动与科技风险企业关系的影响。在前述作用机制模型的基础上,以信任作为调节变量,深入探讨了不同类型的信任情境下创投机构活动对科技风险企业的影响机制,并通过问卷调查,运用多元线性回归分析等方法对调节效应模型进行了验证与修正。
基于以上的研究论证工作,本文主要得出如下结论：
(1)创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效有积极的影响作用。创业投资具有高风险高收益的特点,创业投资机构为了投入资本的安全,提高投资的收益率,必然会介入所投企业的管理活动,通过减少代理成本和增加企业价值的方式来提升风险企业的绩效。
(2)创业投资机构活动通过影响科技风险企业的公司治理和企业能力继而作用于其企业绩效。本文在文献综述和对探索性案例进行剖析的基础上,设计和完善了对科技风险企业的调查问卷,通过对209家企业的调查数据进行结构方程建模后发现,创业投资机构活动对企业绩效的作用主要是通过三条路径实现的：创业投资机构的监控活动通过影响科技风险企业的公司治理间接影响绩效；创业投资机构的资金投入除直接作用于企业绩效外,也通过企业能力而间接地影响企业绩效；创业投资机构的增值活动既直接作用于企业绩效,同时通过影响企业能力间接影响绩效,这些路径一起构成了创业投资机构活动对企业绩效的作用机制。
(3)信任在创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响中发挥调节作用。由于信任水平不同,创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响有所不同,信任作为企业间的一种非正式治理机制,决定了创业投资机构活动是否能真正影响风险企业的绩效。本文的实证研究表明,计算型信任越高,创业投资机构的监控活动对风险企业的公司治理水平以及增值活动对企业能力的正向影响就越显著,而关系型信任越高,增值活动对企业能力的提升却不显著,说明风险企业不能仅仅期望通过与创业投资机构营造良好的关系就能从中得到高含金量的增值服务,因为随着大量资本进入创投行业,创投机构的能力良莠不齐,风险企业应努力从中选择那些能真正对自身能力的提升有帮助的创投机构。
上述研究结论深化了创业投资对科技风险企业绩效作用过程的理解,纵观全文,本研究在以下三个方面进行了深化和拓展：
(1)对创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制进行了深入和全面的剖析,揭示了创业投资影响科技风险企业绩效的本质过程。传统的研究要么是关注公司治理对企业绩效的影响,要么是关注创业投资对风险企业公司治理的影响,也有学者对创业投资机构行为、企业能力、高新技术企业成长这三者之间的关系进行了详细分析和阐述,本文在探索性案例研究和文献总结的基础上,首次构建了包含创业投资机构活动、公司治理、企业能力到企业绩效的概念模型,从而将这四者之间的关系纳入了一个统一的分析框架,揭示了创业投资机构活动是如何影响科技风险企业绩效的。
(2)实证检验了公司治理、企业能力在创业投资机构活动与科技风险企业绩效正相关关系中的中介作用。在构建了创业投资机构活动、企业能力、公司治理、企业绩效之间关系的概念模型后,利用调查问卷的数据,运用大样本的统计分析发现,公司治理和企业能力在创业投资机构活动和科技风险企业绩效之间的正相关关系的中介作用确实存在。创业投资机构的增值活动通过强化企业能力,为风险企业创造了更多的价值,而监控活动则通过提高风险企业的公司治理水平,降低了代理成本,它们都促进了企业绩效的改善。这些发现对创业投资的理论和实践具有一定的借鉴意义。
(3)揭示了信任在创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响中的调节效应。本文将信任分为计算型信任和关系型信任,探讨了在不同的计算型信任和关系型信任的情境下,创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响机制存在的差异,初步揭示了信任的调节效应,为风险企业如何有效地从创业投资机构提供的支持中获取更大的价值提供理论依据。
创业投资对科技风险企业绩效的影响研究是一项具有挑战性但值得深入研究的课题,然而,由于笔者时间、能力和精力所限,本研究仍存在诸多不足之处。因此本文在最后一章进行了总结,并探讨了未来有可能值得进一步研究的方向。
Facing with challenges of economic globalization, it is an urgent affair to vigorously develop high-tech industry and promote construction of an innovative country. By supporting entrepreneurial activity of high-tech firms, venture capital plays an indispensable role of promoting the development of an innovative economy, economic growth and employment expansion. Venture capital started relatively later in China, but has been developed rapidly in recent years. Until the end of 2010, the total capital managed by venture capital companies, which are put on record, has reached 150 billion yuan in China, that has increased by 54% than that of last year. Compared with other developed countries in the world, there is a broad space for China to develop venture capital in future.
Hence, venture capital has attracted much attention of many scholars and has been a hot topic in theory researches and business world. However, there are still some shortcomings in current researches:First, in other countries, especially in the U.S., researches on venture capital are centered on its operational process, which focused on "technology" level, such as venture capital's organizational structure, assessment procedure, contract mechanism, and mathematical analysis of investment tools, while they do relatively less researches on mechanism of how venture capital influences the performance of venture-backed technology firm. Second, compared with other countries, China does fewer researches and most of researches are focused on macro-level, the researches on micro-level are rare. Third, researches on venture capital in China emphasize more on conceptual researches and less empirical researches. Therefore, this dissertation researches on venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm, first defines the concept and structure of venture capital company's activities, then applies firm capability theory and agency theory to analyze thoroughly how venture capital company's activities influence the performance of venture-backed technology firm, at last discusses the moderating effect of trust in this mechanism. The main work is done as follows:
(1) Literature review and theoretical development. By reviewing details of venture capital, firm capability theory and corporate governance, shortcomings in researches can be found. The argument foundation can be shaped by analyzing the construction of venture capital company's activities.
(2) Exploratory case studies and proposing of theoretical framework. On the base of numerous investigations, four different kinds of firms are chosen for deep interview; with exploratory research approaches, the mechanism model of impact of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm has been built primarily; that provides practical idea for researches in future.
(3) Model construction and empirical analysis of mechanism that venture capital company's activities influence venture-backed technology firm's performance. On the base of exploratory case studies, the conceptual model of impact of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm's performance has been established. By doing questionnaires, empirical researches are done with exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and path analysis. Eventually, the mechanism model of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm is built and confirmed.
(4) The relationship between venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm is related to trust. On the basis of the above mechanism of the model, this dissertation researches further the influence mechanism of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm under different types of trust situations, with trust as a moderating variable. And through questionnaires, using some methods, like multiple linear regression analysis, to verify and revise the moderate effect model.
Based on the above exploratory and testing processes, following conclusions can be reached:
(1) Venture capital company's activities have positive effects on performance of venture-backed technology firm. Venture capital has characteristics of high-risk and high-yield; in order to secure input cost and improve investment revenue, venture capital organizations will interfere with management activities of the enterprises they invest and try to promote their performance by reducing agent cost and increasing corporate value.
(2) Venture capital company's activities influence on firm performance partly through mediating role of corporate governance and firm capability of venture-backed technology firm. On the base of literature review and analysis of exploratory examples, the questionnaires on venture-backed technology firm have been planed and completed. By doing structural equation modeling based on data of 209 enterprises, we find there are three ways for impact of venture capital company's activities on firm performance. The monitoring activities of venture capital influences indirectly firm performance through mediating role of corporate governance. The fund input of venture capital not only has direct effects on firm performance, but also influences firm performance indirectly by influencing firm capability. Value-added activities of venture capital will have direct effects on firm performance, and influence firm performance indirectly through mediating role of firm capability. All of these construct the effect mechanism of venture capital company's activities on firm performance.
(3) Empirical study has tested moderating role of trust on venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm. Due to the different level of trust, venture capital company's activities have different influence on venture-backed technology firm, trust as an informal governance mechanism between the firms decides whether venture capital company's activities can affect firm performance. The empirical study of this dissertation shows that the higher the calculation-based trust is, the more significantly the monitoring activities of venture capital company affects the level of corporate governance of venture-backed technology firm, and more significantly the value-added activities of venture capital company affects the level of firm capability. However, when the relationship-based trust is high, the influence to the increasing of firm capability given by value-added activities is not so distinct, which shows that venture-backed technology firm can't get the high value-added services relying on the good relationship with venture capital company. Because as the large amounts of capital enters the venture capital industry, the capabilities of venture capital company are not the same. Therefore the venture-backed technology firm should try to choose the helpful and capable venture capital company which can help to improve the firm capabilities among them.
The above researches strengthen the understanding of impact of venture capital on venture-backed firm. Throughout the whole, this dissertation tries to make some innovation in the following three aspects:
(1) By deep and comprehensive analysis of effect mechanism of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm's performance, the essential process that venture capital affects venture-backed technology firm has been demonstrated. The traditional researches either focus on the effects of corporate governance on firm performance or effects of venture capital on corporate governance of venture-backed technology firm. Also some scholars have analyzed and explained specifically the relationships among venture capital company's behavior, firm capability and growth of high-tech enterprises. On the base of exploratory researches and literature review, the dissertation constructs the conceptual model with a combination of venture capital company's activities, corporate governance, firm capability and firm performance for the first time and brings this interrelation into a comprehensive analytical framework to show how venture capital company's activities affect venture-backed technology firm's performance.
(2) Empirical study has tested mediating effects of corporate governance and firm capability between venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm. After building the conceptual model among the relationships of venture capital company's activities, firm capability, corporate governance and firm performance and by doing questionnaires, and statistic analysis of large samples, the positive correlations of mediating effects between venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm do exist. The value-added activities of venture capital create much more value for the enterprises by strengthening firm capabilities, while agent cost is reduced by more monitoring activities. All of these promote the improvement of firm performance. These discoveries have some instructive meaning for theory and practice of venture capital.
(3) Revealing the moderating effect of trust in the influence of venture-backed technology firm given by venture capital company's activities. This dissertation divides trust into the calculation-based trust and the relationship-based trust, and researches the diversity of the influence mechanisms which the venture capital company's activities gives to venture-backed technology firm under different types of trust. It reveals the moderating effect of trust and provides theoretical basis of how the venture-backed technology firms get more value from the support of venture capital.
The researches of the impact of venture capital on venture-backed technology firm are very challenging, but very valuable. However, due to limitations of time, ability and energy, there are still some deficiencies in this research. Therefore, in the last chapter of this dissertation we summarize and discuss further work needed to be done in future.
由此,创业投资得到了广大学者的关注,成为理论研究和企业界的热点话题,然而当前的研究中还存在着一些不足之处：1、国外尤其是美国对创业投资的研究主要围绕创业投资的运作过程,侧重于研究其“技术”方面,如创业投资的组织架构、评估程序、契约机制、投资工具的数理分析等,对创业投资如何影响风险企业绩效的作用机制这一方面的研究相对较少。2、与国外相比,国内对创业投资的研究相对较少,且研究大多偏重于宏观层面,在企业这个微观层面上的研究仍然较少。3、国内对创业投资的研究更多的是偏向概念性的研究,而实证研究较少。因此,本文以创业投资和科技风险企业为研究对象,综合运用企业能力理论和代理理论,围绕“创业投资机构活动如何影响科技风险企业绩效”这一核心问题,对创业投资机构活动的内涵和构成进行了界定,进而深入剖析了创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制,并进一步探讨了信任在此作用机制中的调节效应。本文的研究主要通过以下部分展开：
(1)文献述评与理论发展。通过对创业投资、企业能力理论、公司治理等的详细回顾,找出现有研究的不足。对创业投资机构活动构成进行了辨析,形成了本文论证的基础。
(2)探索性案例研究与理论模型的提出。在众多企业田野调查的基础上,选择了4家不同行业的企业进行了深入访谈,运用探索性案例研究的方法,初步构建了创业投资机构活动通过公司治理和企业能力影响科技风险企业绩效的作用机制模型,为下一步的研究提供了来源于实践的构想。
(3)创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效作用机制的模型构建与实证分析。在探索性案例研究的基础上,通过进一步的文献展开,确立了创业投资机构活动作用于科技风险企业绩效的概念模型。通过调查问卷,运用探索性因子分析方法、验证性因子分析方法和路径分析方法进行了实证研究。最终确认了创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制模型。
(4)信任对创业投资机构活动与科技风险企业关系的影响。在前述作用机制模型的基础上,以信任作为调节变量,深入探讨了不同类型的信任情境下创投机构活动对科技风险企业的影响机制,并通过问卷调查,运用多元线性回归分析等方法对调节效应模型进行了验证与修正。
基于以上的研究论证工作,本文主要得出如下结论：
(1)创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效有积极的影响作用。创业投资具有高风险高收益的特点,创业投资机构为了投入资本的安全,提高投资的收益率,必然会介入所投企业的管理活动,通过减少代理成本和增加企业价值的方式来提升风险企业的绩效。
(2)创业投资机构活动通过影响科技风险企业的公司治理和企业能力继而作用于其企业绩效。本文在文献综述和对探索性案例进行剖析的基础上,设计和完善了对科技风险企业的调查问卷,通过对209家企业的调查数据进行结构方程建模后发现,创业投资机构活动对企业绩效的作用主要是通过三条路径实现的：创业投资机构的监控活动通过影响科技风险企业的公司治理间接影响绩效；创业投资机构的资金投入除直接作用于企业绩效外,也通过企业能力而间接地影响企业绩效；创业投资机构的增值活动既直接作用于企业绩效,同时通过影响企业能力间接影响绩效,这些路径一起构成了创业投资机构活动对企业绩效的作用机制。
(3)信任在创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响中发挥调节作用。由于信任水平不同,创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响有所不同,信任作为企业间的一种非正式治理机制,决定了创业投资机构活动是否能真正影响风险企业的绩效。本文的实证研究表明,计算型信任越高,创业投资机构的监控活动对风险企业的公司治理水平以及增值活动对企业能力的正向影响就越显著,而关系型信任越高,增值活动对企业能力的提升却不显著,说明风险企业不能仅仅期望通过与创业投资机构营造良好的关系就能从中得到高含金量的增值服务,因为随着大量资本进入创投行业,创投机构的能力良莠不齐,风险企业应努力从中选择那些能真正对自身能力的提升有帮助的创投机构。
上述研究结论深化了创业投资对科技风险企业绩效作用过程的理解,纵观全文,本研究在以下三个方面进行了深化和拓展：
(1)对创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业绩效的作用机制进行了深入和全面的剖析,揭示了创业投资影响科技风险企业绩效的本质过程。传统的研究要么是关注公司治理对企业绩效的影响,要么是关注创业投资对风险企业公司治理的影响,也有学者对创业投资机构行为、企业能力、高新技术企业成长这三者之间的关系进行了详细分析和阐述,本文在探索性案例研究和文献总结的基础上,首次构建了包含创业投资机构活动、公司治理、企业能力到企业绩效的概念模型,从而将这四者之间的关系纳入了一个统一的分析框架,揭示了创业投资机构活动是如何影响科技风险企业绩效的。
(2)实证检验了公司治理、企业能力在创业投资机构活动与科技风险企业绩效正相关关系中的中介作用。在构建了创业投资机构活动、企业能力、公司治理、企业绩效之间关系的概念模型后,利用调查问卷的数据,运用大样本的统计分析发现,公司治理和企业能力在创业投资机构活动和科技风险企业绩效之间的正相关关系的中介作用确实存在。创业投资机构的增值活动通过强化企业能力,为风险企业创造了更多的价值,而监控活动则通过提高风险企业的公司治理水平,降低了代理成本,它们都促进了企业绩效的改善。这些发现对创业投资的理论和实践具有一定的借鉴意义。
(3)揭示了信任在创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响中的调节效应。本文将信任分为计算型信任和关系型信任,探讨了在不同的计算型信任和关系型信任的情境下,创业投资机构活动对科技风险企业的影响机制存在的差异,初步揭示了信任的调节效应,为风险企业如何有效地从创业投资机构提供的支持中获取更大的价值提供理论依据。
创业投资对科技风险企业绩效的影响研究是一项具有挑战性但值得深入研究的课题,然而,由于笔者时间、能力和精力所限,本研究仍存在诸多不足之处。因此本文在最后一章进行了总结,并探讨了未来有可能值得进一步研究的方向。
Facing with challenges of economic globalization, it is an urgent affair to vigorously develop high-tech industry and promote construction of an innovative country. By supporting entrepreneurial activity of high-tech firms, venture capital plays an indispensable role of promoting the development of an innovative economy, economic growth and employment expansion. Venture capital started relatively later in China, but has been developed rapidly in recent years. Until the end of 2010, the total capital managed by venture capital companies, which are put on record, has reached 150 billion yuan in China, that has increased by 54% than that of last year. Compared with other developed countries in the world, there is a broad space for China to develop venture capital in future.
Hence, venture capital has attracted much attention of many scholars and has been a hot topic in theory researches and business world. However, there are still some shortcomings in current researches:First, in other countries, especially in the U.S., researches on venture capital are centered on its operational process, which focused on "technology" level, such as venture capital's organizational structure, assessment procedure, contract mechanism, and mathematical analysis of investment tools, while they do relatively less researches on mechanism of how venture capital influences the performance of venture-backed technology firm. Second, compared with other countries, China does fewer researches and most of researches are focused on macro-level, the researches on micro-level are rare. Third, researches on venture capital in China emphasize more on conceptual researches and less empirical researches. Therefore, this dissertation researches on venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm, first defines the concept and structure of venture capital company's activities, then applies firm capability theory and agency theory to analyze thoroughly how venture capital company's activities influence the performance of venture-backed technology firm, at last discusses the moderating effect of trust in this mechanism. The main work is done as follows:
(1) Literature review and theoretical development. By reviewing details of venture capital, firm capability theory and corporate governance, shortcomings in researches can be found. The argument foundation can be shaped by analyzing the construction of venture capital company's activities.
(2) Exploratory case studies and proposing of theoretical framework. On the base of numerous investigations, four different kinds of firms are chosen for deep interview; with exploratory research approaches, the mechanism model of impact of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm has been built primarily; that provides practical idea for researches in future.
(3) Model construction and empirical analysis of mechanism that venture capital company's activities influence venture-backed technology firm's performance. On the base of exploratory case studies, the conceptual model of impact of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm's performance has been established. By doing questionnaires, empirical researches are done with exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and path analysis. Eventually, the mechanism model of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm is built and confirmed.
(4) The relationship between venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm is related to trust. On the basis of the above mechanism of the model, this dissertation researches further the influence mechanism of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm under different types of trust situations, with trust as a moderating variable. And through questionnaires, using some methods, like multiple linear regression analysis, to verify and revise the moderate effect model.
Based on the above exploratory and testing processes, following conclusions can be reached:
(1) Venture capital company's activities have positive effects on performance of venture-backed technology firm. Venture capital has characteristics of high-risk and high-yield; in order to secure input cost and improve investment revenue, venture capital organizations will interfere with management activities of the enterprises they invest and try to promote their performance by reducing agent cost and increasing corporate value.
(2) Venture capital company's activities influence on firm performance partly through mediating role of corporate governance and firm capability of venture-backed technology firm. On the base of literature review and analysis of exploratory examples, the questionnaires on venture-backed technology firm have been planed and completed. By doing structural equation modeling based on data of 209 enterprises, we find there are three ways for impact of venture capital company's activities on firm performance. The monitoring activities of venture capital influences indirectly firm performance through mediating role of corporate governance. The fund input of venture capital not only has direct effects on firm performance, but also influences firm performance indirectly by influencing firm capability. Value-added activities of venture capital will have direct effects on firm performance, and influence firm performance indirectly through mediating role of firm capability. All of these construct the effect mechanism of venture capital company's activities on firm performance.
(3) Empirical study has tested moderating role of trust on venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm. Due to the different level of trust, venture capital company's activities have different influence on venture-backed technology firm, trust as an informal governance mechanism between the firms decides whether venture capital company's activities can affect firm performance. The empirical study of this dissertation shows that the higher the calculation-based trust is, the more significantly the monitoring activities of venture capital company affects the level of corporate governance of venture-backed technology firm, and more significantly the value-added activities of venture capital company affects the level of firm capability. However, when the relationship-based trust is high, the influence to the increasing of firm capability given by value-added activities is not so distinct, which shows that venture-backed technology firm can't get the high value-added services relying on the good relationship with venture capital company. Because as the large amounts of capital enters the venture capital industry, the capabilities of venture capital company are not the same. Therefore the venture-backed technology firm should try to choose the helpful and capable venture capital company which can help to improve the firm capabilities among them.
The above researches strengthen the understanding of impact of venture capital on venture-backed firm. Throughout the whole, this dissertation tries to make some innovation in the following three aspects:
(1) By deep and comprehensive analysis of effect mechanism of venture capital company's activities on venture-backed technology firm's performance, the essential process that venture capital affects venture-backed technology firm has been demonstrated. The traditional researches either focus on the effects of corporate governance on firm performance or effects of venture capital on corporate governance of venture-backed technology firm. Also some scholars have analyzed and explained specifically the relationships among venture capital company's behavior, firm capability and growth of high-tech enterprises. On the base of exploratory researches and literature review, the dissertation constructs the conceptual model with a combination of venture capital company's activities, corporate governance, firm capability and firm performance for the first time and brings this interrelation into a comprehensive analytical framework to show how venture capital company's activities affect venture-backed technology firm's performance.
(2) Empirical study has tested mediating effects of corporate governance and firm capability between venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm. After building the conceptual model among the relationships of venture capital company's activities, firm capability, corporate governance and firm performance and by doing questionnaires, and statistic analysis of large samples, the positive correlations of mediating effects between venture capital company's activities and venture-backed technology firm do exist. The value-added activities of venture capital create much more value for the enterprises by strengthening firm capabilities, while agent cost is reduced by more monitoring activities. All of these promote the improvement of firm performance. These discoveries have some instructive meaning for theory and practice of venture capital.
(3) Revealing the moderating effect of trust in the influence of venture-backed technology firm given by venture capital company's activities. This dissertation divides trust into the calculation-based trust and the relationship-based trust, and researches the diversity of the influence mechanisms which the venture capital company's activities gives to venture-backed technology firm under different types of trust. It reveals the moderating effect of trust and provides theoretical basis of how the venture-backed technology firms get more value from the support of venture capital.
The researches of the impact of venture capital on venture-backed technology firm are very challenging, but very valuable. However, due to limitations of time, ability and energy, there are still some deficiencies in this research. Therefore, in the last chapter of this dissertation we summarize and discuss further work needed to be done in future.
引文
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