闭环供应链契约协调问题研究
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摘要
随着人们对环境保护及可持续发展认识的逐步深入,制造企业越来越重视废弃产品的回收再造。这样的行为不仅仅是由于企业迫于相关环保政策的压力,相反,更多地是由于企业已发现利用回收来的产品在为企业赢得绿色环保声誉的同时,还可以降低生产成本,提高企业利润。然而,由于闭环供应链成员在合作过程中往往具有不同的目标,拥有不同的私人信息,因此,和传统的开环供应链相似,闭环供应链中也普遍存在着道德风险,不可避免地会发生利益冲突,导致整条供应链运作绩效降低,整体利润下降,处于失调状态。所以,本文在产业组织理论、委托-代理理论、契约理论的基础上,以博弈论、最优化方法为工具,采用以定量分析为主、定性分析为辅的研究方法,深入讨论无产品差异的闭环供应链协调问题,闭环供应链的信息甑别与信号传递问题,以及新产品和再造品存在产品差异时的闭环供应链协调问题。这些工作一方面对各种情况下闭环供应链成员的决策行为进行解释;另一方面对如何协调闭环供应链,提高闭环供应链整体竞争优势提供指导,因此具有一定的理论和现实意义。
本文的主要研究工作及成果:
1、研究表明,在信息对称的双边垄断闭环供应链模式下,相对于不实施回收再造的开环供应链,无论哪种闭环供应链的零售价格都要低于开环供应链,这有利于社会福利的提高;同时闭环供应链成员和系统的利润也要高于相应的开环供应链,实现了企业和消费者的双赢。
2、与开环供应链类似,分散决策下零售商销售模式下的闭环供应链中也存在着批发价到零售价的正向双重边际加价问题,此外在由第三方物流进行回收的闭环供应链中(即MRCTM和MCTM)还存在着回收价格到回收转移价格的逆向双重边际加价问题,但是在零售商销售-零售商回收(即MRCRM)模式下,制造商能够通过整合零售商的销售渠道来整合逆向渠道,即将再造节约的成本全部用作回收转移费用的策略,使得在回收成本系数相同的情况下,制造商、零售商和系统三者的利润达到只存在正向双重边际加价问题的MRCM模式的水平。
3、在甑别第三方物流私有信息的情况下,制造商可以根据第三方物流的选择来制定和零售商的契约,此时零售商由于不具备信息优势,其利润始终等于其保留利润。但是拥有私有信息的第三方物流能够获得高于其保留利润的期望利润,尤其是在制造商不采用甑别机制的时候。制造商可以通过分离契约,通过第三方物流的自选择来判断第三方物流的真实类型,以提高自身的期望利润及在系统利润中所占的比例。
4、当制造商存在不同类别时,高类型的制造商可以通过信号传递机制将自己的类型传递给零售商和第三方物流,将自己和低类型的制造商区分开来,以避免零售商和第三方物流的逆向选择,提高自己的利润,促进闭环供应链目标的实现。
5、研究了新产品和再造品存在纵向产品差异的情况。此时采用闭环供应链对于企业和消费者来说都要优于开环供应链。而且新产品的定价与开环供应链是相同的,这说明制造商在转变自己的供应链策略(由开环到闭环)时,制造商和零售商只需参照新产品和再造品成本、社会对再造品认可程度及回收模式和回收成本系数对再造品制定合适的价格,以实现自身利益最大化。
6、产品纵向差异下,当零售商和制造商回收成本系数相同时,二者都有实施回收的动力。因为无论是制造商还是零售商,其负责回收后利润都较对方回收时有所提高,这说明回收这一行为虽然要支付相应的成本,但仍然是有利可图的。但当制造商和零售商的回收系数满足一定条件时,零售商回收模式的闭环供应链更优。
7、无论在何种假设下(新产品和再造品是否存在产品纵向差异),采用何种模式(即由谁销售又由谁回收),制造商都可以利用其领导者地位去加以协调,在不降低零售商(和第三方物流)利润的同时,提高自己和系统的利润。在协调契约方面,二部定价契约和收入费用共享契约都是很好的选择,通过使用协调契约,系统的利润可以提升到集中决策的水平,实现闭环供应链系统目标。
本文的主要创新点:
1、建立了双边垄断环境下5种闭环供应链的价格决策体系以及协调机制。在已有双边垄断环境下的闭环供应链定价决策研究中,尚未有考虑到社会环保意识对闭环供应链中决策结果的影响,同时仅有少量涉及闭环供应链协调问题的研究。本文在归纳已有研究的基础上,发展了较为完整的闭环供应链定价决策模型,并且详细讨论各种闭环供应链的特点和适用范围。同时在传统的二部定价和收入分享契约基础上,给出了可以协调闭环供应链的二部定价契约和销售收入回收费用分享契约用以解决闭环供应链内部利益冲突。
2、给出了闭环供应链模式与回收方成本系数之间的关系。由于回收方和回收市场关系不同,其相同回收量的回收成本也不同,本文在此基础上给出了制造商利润和回收方回收成本系数的关系,为制造商选择合适的回收方提供参考。同时考虑了回收方回收努力程度对闭环供应链的影响。
3、提出了信息不对称环境下闭环供应链的信息甑别机制和信号传递机制。目前已有的关于闭环供应链信息共享问题的文献尚未有定量分析。本文首先假设回收方拥有对社会环保意识的私有信息,并据此给出了适当的分离契约以对不同类型的回收方进行甑别,防止回收方的道德风险,同时根据甑别的结果向零售商提供适当的契约。然后本文又在假设制造商对产品质量拥有私有信息基础上,为高质量制造商设计了信号传递机制,高质量的制造商可以以最小成本原则来传递自己的类型型号,避免闭环供应链中的零售商和回收方的逆向选择,提高自身利润。
4、本文在最后讨论了新产品和再造品存在纵向差异的情况下闭环供应链的定价策略和协调机制。现有的大量研究闭环供应链协调问题的文献大多是假设新产品和再造品是无差别的,但在现实世界中无论从实际的产品品质还是消费者对再造品的认可程度,新产品和再造品是存在差别的。因此第5章本文在纵向差异模型的基础上,对闭环供应链的定价和制造商对再造品的质量确定进行定量分析。最后在第3章的基础上,同样用二部定价契约和销售收入回收费用分享契约以协调分散决策下的闭环供应链内部冲突。
The importance of the environmental performance in sustainable manufacturing and service operations is being widely recognized, which leads many enterprises to focus on the value of their end-of-life (EOL) products by remanufacturing. The reason for remanufacturing lies not only in the environmental policy, but also in the fact that more and more manufacturers have found it could help them decrease cost and increase profit. However, like the traditional supply chains, there is the moral hazard and incentive conflict in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), which may lead to bad performance and decreased profit. Therefore, based on industrial organizational theory, principal-agent theory and contract theory, this paper particularly analyzes the issues of coordination mechanisms (based on no differentiation and vertical differentiation), the screening and signalling mechanisms of CLSCs by combined qualitative and quantitative analysis with game theory and optimization method as tools. The work is of much value in theory and real life because on the one hand it explains the behavior of CLSC members in different circumstances, and on the other hand it makes suggestions for realization of coordination and enhancement of CLSC competitive advantage.
Main research works and achievements of this paper:
1. In bilateral monopoly with complete information, the price in CLSCs is lower than in the traditional supply chains without remanufacturing, which enhances social welfare. At the same time, the profit of the members and the system in CLSCs is higher. So the enterprises and the customers can achieve win-win outcome.
2. Like in traditional supply chains, there is also forward double marginalization in CLSCs. Besides, there is reverse double marginalization from the collection price to the return transfer price in the CLSCs under the third-party logistics (3PL) collection channels (i.e. MRCTM & MCTM). But under the retailer distribution and retailer collection channel (i.e. MRCRM), the manufacturer can eliminate the reverse double marginalization by integrating the distribution channel with the collection channel, transferring all cost saving to the return transfer price.
3. In screening private information of the 3PL, the manufacturer can contract with the retailer based on the choice of 3PL. The retailer will gain his reservation profit for no information advantage. However, the 3PL will gain more than his reservation profit for information advantage especially if the manufacturer does not screen. At the same time, the manufacturer can improve his profit and the rate of system profit by separating contracts with the 3PL’s self-selection.
4. When manufacturers have their private information, the high type manufacturer will show his type to the retailer and the 3PL through the signalling mechanisms, in order to avoid the reverse selection, enhance profit and promote the realization of CLSCs’target.
5. This paper studies the status of differentiation between new product and remanufactured product. The CLSCs is better than the traditional supply chains for both the enterprises and the consumers. Further, the new product’s price in the CLSCs is equal to the price in the traditional supply chains, which means the manufacturer and the retailer can maximize profit by only deciding the remanufactured product’s price referring to the cost of the new and the remanufactured products, the acceptability of remanufactured products, collection channel and collection cost coefficient.
6. The manufacturer and the retailer have incentive to collect the EOL product when their collection cost coefficient is same based on the product vertical differentiation, because the profit with collection is higher than non-collection.
7. Both the two-part tariff contracts and the revenue-and-cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized CLSCs (no matter who sells the product, no matter who collects the EOL product and no matter whether there is differentiation between the new product and the remanufactured product), which improves profit of both the members and the system.
Main innovations of this paper:
1. Considering social environment consciousness, this paper describes the pricing models, particularly discusses the characteristic and application of the 5 type CLSCs in a bilateral monopoly. At the same time, the paper designs the coordination mechanisms to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized CLSCs through the two-part tariff contracts and the revenue-and-cost-sharing contracts.
2. This paper shows how the manufacturers select the CLSC model referring to the relation between the manufacturer’s profit and collection cost coefficient under the different collection channels. Furthermore, it also considers how the collection effort influences upon the CLSCs.
3. This paper proposes the screening and signalling mechanisms in a given CLSC (i.e. under retailer distribution and 3PL collection channel). Firstly, when the 3PL has the private information about the social environment consciousness, the manufacturing can screen the 3PL’s type through a menu of separating contracts, and then provide the right contract to the retailer. Secondly, when there are two types of manufacturer (i.e. high type and low type), the high type manufacturer can disclose his type by least-cost principle to avoid the retailer and the 3PL’s reverse selection and enhance profit.
4. This paper provides the pricing models and coordination mechanisms based on the vertical differentiation between new products and remanufactured products. In addition, the decision about the quality of remanufactured products made by the manufacturer is quantitatively analyzed. At last, coordination mechanisms are designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized CLSCs through the two-part tariff contracts and the revenue-and-cost-sharing contracts.
本文的主要研究工作及成果:
1、研究表明,在信息对称的双边垄断闭环供应链模式下,相对于不实施回收再造的开环供应链,无论哪种闭环供应链的零售价格都要低于开环供应链,这有利于社会福利的提高;同时闭环供应链成员和系统的利润也要高于相应的开环供应链,实现了企业和消费者的双赢。
2、与开环供应链类似,分散决策下零售商销售模式下的闭环供应链中也存在着批发价到零售价的正向双重边际加价问题,此外在由第三方物流进行回收的闭环供应链中(即MRCTM和MCTM)还存在着回收价格到回收转移价格的逆向双重边际加价问题,但是在零售商销售-零售商回收(即MRCRM)模式下,制造商能够通过整合零售商的销售渠道来整合逆向渠道,即将再造节约的成本全部用作回收转移费用的策略,使得在回收成本系数相同的情况下,制造商、零售商和系统三者的利润达到只存在正向双重边际加价问题的MRCM模式的水平。
3、在甑别第三方物流私有信息的情况下,制造商可以根据第三方物流的选择来制定和零售商的契约,此时零售商由于不具备信息优势,其利润始终等于其保留利润。但是拥有私有信息的第三方物流能够获得高于其保留利润的期望利润,尤其是在制造商不采用甑别机制的时候。制造商可以通过分离契约,通过第三方物流的自选择来判断第三方物流的真实类型,以提高自身的期望利润及在系统利润中所占的比例。
4、当制造商存在不同类别时,高类型的制造商可以通过信号传递机制将自己的类型传递给零售商和第三方物流,将自己和低类型的制造商区分开来,以避免零售商和第三方物流的逆向选择,提高自己的利润,促进闭环供应链目标的实现。
5、研究了新产品和再造品存在纵向产品差异的情况。此时采用闭环供应链对于企业和消费者来说都要优于开环供应链。而且新产品的定价与开环供应链是相同的,这说明制造商在转变自己的供应链策略(由开环到闭环)时,制造商和零售商只需参照新产品和再造品成本、社会对再造品认可程度及回收模式和回收成本系数对再造品制定合适的价格,以实现自身利益最大化。
6、产品纵向差异下,当零售商和制造商回收成本系数相同时,二者都有实施回收的动力。因为无论是制造商还是零售商,其负责回收后利润都较对方回收时有所提高,这说明回收这一行为虽然要支付相应的成本,但仍然是有利可图的。但当制造商和零售商的回收系数满足一定条件时,零售商回收模式的闭环供应链更优。
7、无论在何种假设下(新产品和再造品是否存在产品纵向差异),采用何种模式(即由谁销售又由谁回收),制造商都可以利用其领导者地位去加以协调,在不降低零售商(和第三方物流)利润的同时,提高自己和系统的利润。在协调契约方面,二部定价契约和收入费用共享契约都是很好的选择,通过使用协调契约,系统的利润可以提升到集中决策的水平,实现闭环供应链系统目标。
本文的主要创新点:
1、建立了双边垄断环境下5种闭环供应链的价格决策体系以及协调机制。在已有双边垄断环境下的闭环供应链定价决策研究中,尚未有考虑到社会环保意识对闭环供应链中决策结果的影响,同时仅有少量涉及闭环供应链协调问题的研究。本文在归纳已有研究的基础上,发展了较为完整的闭环供应链定价决策模型,并且详细讨论各种闭环供应链的特点和适用范围。同时在传统的二部定价和收入分享契约基础上,给出了可以协调闭环供应链的二部定价契约和销售收入回收费用分享契约用以解决闭环供应链内部利益冲突。
2、给出了闭环供应链模式与回收方成本系数之间的关系。由于回收方和回收市场关系不同,其相同回收量的回收成本也不同,本文在此基础上给出了制造商利润和回收方回收成本系数的关系,为制造商选择合适的回收方提供参考。同时考虑了回收方回收努力程度对闭环供应链的影响。
3、提出了信息不对称环境下闭环供应链的信息甑别机制和信号传递机制。目前已有的关于闭环供应链信息共享问题的文献尚未有定量分析。本文首先假设回收方拥有对社会环保意识的私有信息,并据此给出了适当的分离契约以对不同类型的回收方进行甑别,防止回收方的道德风险,同时根据甑别的结果向零售商提供适当的契约。然后本文又在假设制造商对产品质量拥有私有信息基础上,为高质量制造商设计了信号传递机制,高质量的制造商可以以最小成本原则来传递自己的类型型号,避免闭环供应链中的零售商和回收方的逆向选择,提高自身利润。
4、本文在最后讨论了新产品和再造品存在纵向差异的情况下闭环供应链的定价策略和协调机制。现有的大量研究闭环供应链协调问题的文献大多是假设新产品和再造品是无差别的,但在现实世界中无论从实际的产品品质还是消费者对再造品的认可程度,新产品和再造品是存在差别的。因此第5章本文在纵向差异模型的基础上,对闭环供应链的定价和制造商对再造品的质量确定进行定量分析。最后在第3章的基础上,同样用二部定价契约和销售收入回收费用分享契约以协调分散决策下的闭环供应链内部冲突。
The importance of the environmental performance in sustainable manufacturing and service operations is being widely recognized, which leads many enterprises to focus on the value of their end-of-life (EOL) products by remanufacturing. The reason for remanufacturing lies not only in the environmental policy, but also in the fact that more and more manufacturers have found it could help them decrease cost and increase profit. However, like the traditional supply chains, there is the moral hazard and incentive conflict in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), which may lead to bad performance and decreased profit. Therefore, based on industrial organizational theory, principal-agent theory and contract theory, this paper particularly analyzes the issues of coordination mechanisms (based on no differentiation and vertical differentiation), the screening and signalling mechanisms of CLSCs by combined qualitative and quantitative analysis with game theory and optimization method as tools. The work is of much value in theory and real life because on the one hand it explains the behavior of CLSC members in different circumstances, and on the other hand it makes suggestions for realization of coordination and enhancement of CLSC competitive advantage.
Main research works and achievements of this paper:
1. In bilateral monopoly with complete information, the price in CLSCs is lower than in the traditional supply chains without remanufacturing, which enhances social welfare. At the same time, the profit of the members and the system in CLSCs is higher. So the enterprises and the customers can achieve win-win outcome.
2. Like in traditional supply chains, there is also forward double marginalization in CLSCs. Besides, there is reverse double marginalization from the collection price to the return transfer price in the CLSCs under the third-party logistics (3PL) collection channels (i.e. MRCTM & MCTM). But under the retailer distribution and retailer collection channel (i.e. MRCRM), the manufacturer can eliminate the reverse double marginalization by integrating the distribution channel with the collection channel, transferring all cost saving to the return transfer price.
3. In screening private information of the 3PL, the manufacturer can contract with the retailer based on the choice of 3PL. The retailer will gain his reservation profit for no information advantage. However, the 3PL will gain more than his reservation profit for information advantage especially if the manufacturer does not screen. At the same time, the manufacturer can improve his profit and the rate of system profit by separating contracts with the 3PL’s self-selection.
4. When manufacturers have their private information, the high type manufacturer will show his type to the retailer and the 3PL through the signalling mechanisms, in order to avoid the reverse selection, enhance profit and promote the realization of CLSCs’target.
5. This paper studies the status of differentiation between new product and remanufactured product. The CLSCs is better than the traditional supply chains for both the enterprises and the consumers. Further, the new product’s price in the CLSCs is equal to the price in the traditional supply chains, which means the manufacturer and the retailer can maximize profit by only deciding the remanufactured product’s price referring to the cost of the new and the remanufactured products, the acceptability of remanufactured products, collection channel and collection cost coefficient.
6. The manufacturer and the retailer have incentive to collect the EOL product when their collection cost coefficient is same based on the product vertical differentiation, because the profit with collection is higher than non-collection.
7. Both the two-part tariff contracts and the revenue-and-cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized CLSCs (no matter who sells the product, no matter who collects the EOL product and no matter whether there is differentiation between the new product and the remanufactured product), which improves profit of both the members and the system.
Main innovations of this paper:
1. Considering social environment consciousness, this paper describes the pricing models, particularly discusses the characteristic and application of the 5 type CLSCs in a bilateral monopoly. At the same time, the paper designs the coordination mechanisms to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized CLSCs through the two-part tariff contracts and the revenue-and-cost-sharing contracts.
2. This paper shows how the manufacturers select the CLSC model referring to the relation between the manufacturer’s profit and collection cost coefficient under the different collection channels. Furthermore, it also considers how the collection effort influences upon the CLSCs.
3. This paper proposes the screening and signalling mechanisms in a given CLSC (i.e. under retailer distribution and 3PL collection channel). Firstly, when the 3PL has the private information about the social environment consciousness, the manufacturing can screen the 3PL’s type through a menu of separating contracts, and then provide the right contract to the retailer. Secondly, when there are two types of manufacturer (i.e. high type and low type), the high type manufacturer can disclose his type by least-cost principle to avoid the retailer and the 3PL’s reverse selection and enhance profit.
4. This paper provides the pricing models and coordination mechanisms based on the vertical differentiation between new products and remanufactured products. In addition, the decision about the quality of remanufactured products made by the manufacturer is quantitatively analyzed. At last, coordination mechanisms are designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized CLSCs through the two-part tariff contracts and the revenue-and-cost-sharing contracts.
引文
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