农用地使用权征用的补偿制度研究
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摘要
随着我国城市化、工业化进程的加快,基础设施建设投资迅速增加,建设用地需求大幅增长,农用地征收与农用地使用权征用行为因此而日渐频繁,直接导致农地非农化速度加快,农民土地权益受到严重侵害。然而,无论是在学术层面,还是在实践层面,对农用地征收补偿制度的关注都非常高,研究成果丰富且在国家法律条文中都有专门的规定。相比之下,农用地使用权征用虽然与农用地征收同时发生,却尚未得到学术层面和实践层面的应有重视,尤其是农用地使用权征用的补偿制度研究非常欠缺,在现有法律规定中更是只字未提。因此,在当前的现实情况下,构建出合理的农用地使用权征用补偿制度,完善农民权益保护机制,不仅关系到广大农民的切身利益,还影响到经济的持续增长和社会的和谐稳定,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
     本文以土地产权理论、资源价值理论和农户风险理论为理论基础,借助资源经济学、生态经济学、发展经济学、制度经济学以及计量经济学等学科的分析工具,将农用地使用权征用补偿制度作为研究对象,通过实地考察和问卷调查,实证分析了农户农用地使用权征用意愿的关键影响因素和农户对现有农用地使用权征用补偿的认知,为构建农用地使用权征用补偿制度奠定了基础并指明了方向。同时,‘论文深入探讨了农用地使用权征用的风险损失构成,通过拓展已有的估算方法估算了农用地使用权征用的农户损失,包括经济损失和非经济损失,以此作为制定农用地使用权征用补偿标准的唯一依据。最后,论文依据调查区域农户对农用地使用权征用补偿的认知及农民损失的估算结果,构建农用地使用权征用的补偿制度框架、实现途径和法律保障,为湖北地区乃至全国构建农用地使用权征用补偿制度提供基本依据和决策参考。论文的主要内容和结论如下:
     (1)比较分析不同农用地使用权征用意愿的农户特征。不同农户对待农用地使用权征用的态度存在着明显差别。本文利用笔者对湖北省4个市46个村302户农户的问卷调查数据,对不同农用地使用权征用意愿的农户特征(户主的个人特征、农户的家庭特征、户主的认知特征)进行了比较分析。结果发现,相对于愿意农用地被征用的农户来说,不愿意农用地被征用的农户具有较低的文化水平、较低的征地民主认同度、较少获得谈判支持、较强烈地不满意征地补偿水平、较少拥有非农劳动技能和较难在本地实现转移就业等典型特征。
     (2)通过构建模型,识别农户农用地使用权征用意愿的主要影响因素。本文利用实地问卷调查所得的数据,采用Probit模型对农户农用地使用权征用意愿的影响因素进行实证分析。结果显示,农户户主受教育年限、农户对征地后生活改善预期、农户对征地补偿满意程度、农户家庭成员健康状况、征用地在养老保障中的作用、户主是否有非农劳动技能等因素对农户农用地使用权征用意愿具有显著的影响,是农户农用地使用权征用意愿的主要影响因素。
     (3)农民对农用地使用权征用补偿认知与制度需求。本文利用问卷调查数据,深入分析农民对现有农用地使用权征用补偿的认知,寻求现有农用地使用权征用补偿制度中存在的问题,为其进一步的完善提供了经验基础。与此同时,论文还从制度需求的角度探求了农用地使用权征用补偿制度建设的关键点,为构建农用地使用权征用补偿制度框架奠定基础。
     (4)系统研究农民在农用地使用权征用中面临的风险损失构成及认知。本文把农民在农用地使用权征用中面临的风险损失分为经济损失和非经济损失,且采用简单而又通俗的问题了解农民对风险损失认知的情况,采用问卷调查数据实证分析了以下几个方面的风险损失认知:①农户对农用地在家庭收入中作用的认知;②农户对补偿政策及补偿标准的认知;③农户对农用地使用权征用导致环境污染的认知;④农户对征地前后生活变化的认知。结果发现,农户对部分风险损失认识不足,其风险认知能力较弱;同时,农户主观上对主要风险规避措施有较清楚的认识,但是限于自身能力和客观条件,实际规避能力非常有限。
     (5)估算农民在农用地使用权征用中面临的综合损失,并以此作为补偿标准制定的依据。实地调查发现,农民对征地补偿标准普遍满意度不高。因此,制定科学合理的征用补偿标准成为构建农用地使用权征用补偿制度的关键。为此,论文在总结了公共利益需要下农地使用权征用的基本特征的同时,系统梳理了已有文献关于农地价值的估算方法,并分别分析了各种估算方法的优势与不足。本着科学性强、易于理解和实际操作的原则,采用了收益还原法的拓展形式估算农用地使用权征用的经济损失,采用固碳制氧价格法估算农用地使用权征用的非经济损失。最后,采用经济损失与非经济损失直接加总的方法和农户最低受偿意愿(WTA)法估算农用地使用权征用的农户综合损失。结合问卷调查数据,假定农用地使用权征用期限为3年,估算得到农用地使用权征用给农民带来的综合损失为59457元/亩。
     (6)构建农用地使用权征用补偿制度框架。论文从分析我国土地产权与补偿之间的关系入手,明晰我国农用地使用权征用的补偿对象,即农用地使用权被征用农户和村集体。在此基础上,结合问卷调查数据,分析农户对村集体参与农用地使用权征用补偿分配的认知,并初步探讨了农用地使用权征用补偿及其分配制度,使农用地使用权被征用农户和村集体在补偿分配中的地位更加明确。同时,借鉴国外临时性用地征用补偿的经验,系统阐述构建农用地使用权征用补偿制度框架的目标,包括:保护农用地使用权人的利益、加大耕地保护、保障粮食安全和加强社会稳定等。与此同时,进一步讨论了农用地使用权征用补偿标准的制定,包括:制定补偿标准的依据;制定补偿标准遵循的原则和补偿标准的制定方法,并利用调查案例实际估算补偿标准与实际补偿标准进行比较。最后,从补偿方式的选择、农用地使用权被征用农户获取补偿的途径与保障、农用地使用权征用补偿的产业支撑、农用地使用权征用补偿的机制创新和农用地使用权征用补偿的法律保障等角度阐述农用地使用权征用补偿制度的实现途径。
With the rapid development of the economy, the process of urbanization and industrialization is accelerated continuity and the investment in infrastructures construction is further strengthened. The loss of agricultural land to developed uses has been a public policy issue and the quantity of the construction land has a substantial increase at an astonishing speed. Meanwhile, the complaint about land taking becomes progressively worse and the disputes induced by the compensation mechanism of land taking trend to have adverse effect to the social stability and economic development. Why there are so many questions in the process of land taking? At present, the construction of the rational compensation mechanism for farmland use right taking reflects not only the immediate interests of the general peasants, but also the development of the society. To construct the fair compensation mechanism, it is necessary to define the loss and the risk that the farmer suffered in land taking and identify the decisive factors for compensation mechanism construction.
     Based on the theory of the property rights of land, the value of natural resource, the risk of farmer, the paper makes the empirical study on the institutional evolution of land taking and the compensation mechanism in virtue of resources economics, ecological economics, development economics, institutional economics, agricultural policy and econometrics. According to the questionnaire and regional inspection, the paper made a study on the decisive factors affecting the farmers'will to farmland use right taking and the farmers'recognition on current compensation mechanism. This will lay the foundations for the construction of the compensation mechanism of farmland use right taking and direct the direction for the coming research. Meanwhile, the paper expands the existed methods of estimating the loss suffered by the farmer and adhere to the principle of fair compensation to the loss. The loss is consisted of two parts:financial and non-financial loss. According to the above analysis, the paper constructs the compensation mechanism of farmland use right taking and defines the principle of fair compensation. This will provide support to the decision-making in future compensation. The main conclusions are as follows:
     (ⅰ) The paper analyze the differential features of the farmers in the cognition of farmland use right taking, it can be found that there is a significant difference in the attitude to farmland use right taking among farmers. Based on the questionnaire data which was collected from 302 peasant household in 46 villages of 4 cities in Hubei Province, different features of farmer household are compared. It can be found that farmers who are loath to be taken the farmland use right have the features and characteristics as follows:lower literacy standards, lower democratic consultation recognition, less negotiation support, stronger discontent in compensation, lack of industrial skills and it is rather difficult for them to find reemployment locally.
     (ⅱ) The Probit model to analyze the affecting factors of farmers'will to farmland use right taking with the questionnaire data collected from Hubei province. The result shows that the main influencing factors are as follows:the average length of education, the expectation of improved living standards after the taking of farmland, the satisfaction of the family health status, farmers'old-age security and health security, whether the head of a household has the special skills.
     (ⅲ) With the questionnaire data collected in the survey, the paper makes a through research on farmers'cognition to farmland use right taking and the need for reform in compensation mechanism with a brief account of the problems in current compensation mechanism. Meanwhile. The paper carries out the key factors of carrying out the compensation mechanism in mechanism demand terms and lays the foundation for the compensation mechanism.
     (ⅳ) The paper makes a systematic study on the risk loss in farmland use right taking and the risk loss is classified as financial and non-financial loss. Several simple and clear questions are designed in questionnaire to investigate the cognitive and affective attitude of farmers toward farmland use right taking. The contents are listed as follow:cognition of the ratio of agricultural to total income, cognition of the compensation policy and compensation standard, cognition of the environmental pollution due to the farmland taking and the cognition of the change in daily lives. The farmers were found that there is a lack of understanding of preparation for the risk loss. Meanwhile, the farmer has a clear subjective understanding of the risk loss and has limited ability of risk aversion with own condition.
     (ⅴ) The paper calculates the comprehensive loss caused by farmland taking for compensation purpose. The survey found that there is a widespread dissatisfaction among the farmers with the compensation mechanism and therefore the key problem to improve compensation satisfaction is to lay down a scientific and reasonable criterion. For this purpose, the paper summarizes the general characterizations of farmland use right taking in the public interest. Basing on the theoretical analysis for calculating the farmland value, the paper points out the advantage and disadvantage of existing methods and makes improvement in many aspects. The paper estimates the financial loss with improved income capitalization approach and taking the carbon-fixation and oxygen production method to estimate the non-financial loss. By summing up the financial and non-financial loss, the total loss was estimated and then the paper adopts the WTA to estimate the total loss. The result shows that the total loss is 59457 Yuan per mu for three-year's taking.
     (ⅵ) Based on the work done before, the paper analyzes the relationship between land property rights and compensation mechanism makes clear of the compensation subjects are farmer and collective. With the data collected in the investigation, the paper analyzes the cognitions of the farmer and makes a discussion on compensation mechanism to make clear of the farmers'position in the compensation mechanism. With the reference of the foreign advanced experiences, the framework for the farmland use right taking compensation mechanism is illustrated systematically with the principal objective are as follows:a legal mechanism for protecting the rights of the holders of the right to the use, farmland protection mechanism, policies to strength food security and maintaining social stability. Meanwhile, the establishment of the compensation mechanism is also discussed and the basic principles mainly consist of the establishment of compensation standard mechanism, the principle with condensations must adhere to and the formulation of the compensation standard. Finally, the paper seeks the way to realize the compensation mechanism from the following aspects:selection of the compensation method, the way of receiving compensation, the support of non-agricultural industries, the mechanism innovation and the legal protection.
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