农地产权制度建设研究
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摘要
重庆市是国家唯一的省级统筹城乡综合配套改革试验区,肩负着城乡统筹配套改革特别是农地产权制度改革的历史使命。统筹重庆市城乡发展关键在农村,农村发展的动力源于农地产权制度的变革。改革的深水区便是农地产权制度的改革。因此,选择《农地产权制度建设研究—以重庆市为例》为题进行研究,明晰农地产权,提出适应生产力发展的农地产权制度的总体思路和具体方案,对重庆市及全国统筹城乡配套改革研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。
研究思路是在充分研究国内外农地产权制度研究进展和新中国成立以来历史演替的基础上,以产权制度的基本理论为指导,以重庆市璧山县大路镇为研究区域,以集体所有农地产权制度为研究对象,考察现行农地产权制度运行状况及绩效,定性定量评估国有化、私有化、完善集体所有三种改革路径的风险,充分了解农户、基层干部对农地产权的意愿,借鉴重庆市农地产权制度改革实践的经验教训,进而提出构建农地产权制度的总体思路和具体方案。
研究主要从五个方面进行并得出相应的结论：
1、农地产权制度现实运行与绩效评价
从现行农地产权制度运行状况看,激励约束、资源配置、收益分配功能基本上发挥了作用,交易功能有待进一步发挥,外部性内部化功能基本未发挥作用。(1)激励约束功能看,在农业比较效益低的情况下,58.87%的农业劳动力从事非农产业,导致大路镇撂荒地有462.70hm2,占耕地面积的7.89%,但是撂荒地大多土壤肥力较低(9等以下占69.02%),位于坡度较陡(15°以上占80.07%),区位条件(场镇周围1km外占84.23%)、交通条件(道路两侧200m外占81.40%)、灌溉条件差(灌溉设施周围100m外占80.03%)的地方。(2)资源配置功能看,在平均分配的思想下,土地细碎化较为严重,大路镇各村人均耕地仅有0.09hm2,最高的仅有0.13hm2,家庭田块数在7-9块,彼此距离较远,但同时也导致了土地流转开始发育,土地流转面积476.13hm2,占耕地面积的10.16%。(3)交易功能看,土地流转交易费用为1.64,交易成本较高,有待进一步发挥；(4)外部性内部化功能看,大路镇土地污染面积约553.33hm2,土地污染很难获得经济赔偿,此项功能基本未发挥作用；(5)收益分配功能看,89.84%的农地为农户家庭经营获得收益,10.16%进行土地流转,农户获得租金收益,业主获得使用收益；土地征收过程中,20%的土地补偿费由集体所得,80%归农户所得。(6)从激励约束、资源配置和交易功能定量评价农地产权制度绩效,得到综合评价系数为0.6639,高于0.5000低于理想值1.0000。这说明现行农地产权制度总体绩效为中度(0.6000-0.7000为中度效率),需要进一步推进农地产权制度建设,着重发挥激励约束功能(与理想值差0.1708),强化资源配置功能(与理想值差0.0866)和交易功能(与理想值差0.0787),确实发挥外部性内部化功能。
2、农地产权制度改革风险评估
根据农地产权制度现实运行及绩效评价,农地产权制度需要进一步建设,而建设的路径需要进行风险评估。采用鱼骨图法确定农地产权制度改革社会风险、经济风险、生态风险和政治风险等风险因素,利用层次分析法确定风险类及风险因素的指标权重,评估农地产权制度朝国有化、私有化和集体所有三条路径的改革风险大小。农地产权制度朝国有化的改革风险系数为0.4195,朝私有化的改革风险系数为0.3756,在现有集体所有的基础上改革风险最小为0.2049,因此农地产权制度应在维持现有农地集体所有的基础上进行改革。农地产权制度改革四类风险中应特别注意规避政治风险,其风险系数为0.6025,依次为社会风险(0.2015)、经济风险(0.1217)和生态风险(0.0743)。改革的风险因素中应特别对顺应群众的意愿,其风险系数为0.2675,其次是避免引起社会动荡(0.2284)、改革成本过大无法分摊(0.0816)和引起贫富差距进一步拉大导致阶层对立(0.0638),因此农地产权制度改革需要调查民众对农地产权的意愿,维护大多数群众的利益,避免引起大规模的群众对抗。
3、农地产权群众意愿调查研究
从农地产权制度改革风险评估看,农地产权制度的建设需要特别重视对群众农地产权意愿调查。对大路镇14个村3个社区农户发放1300份调查问卷,回收有效问卷902份,走访17位村社干部了解农村基层干部农地产权意愿。从农户农地产权意愿看：(1)农户对农地所有权认识认识较混乱,认为农地集体所有的占62.64%,国家所有的占33.59%,私人所有的占3.33%。(2)大多数农户(62.64%)认为农地集体所有,认为应该保持农地社集体所有(44.01%)。(3)农地处分权越权行使严重,仅有33.70%的农户认为社集体具有处分权,25.50%的农户认为国家为农地最终处分权,充分说明了土地征收对农户产权意识的影响之深。(4)不同年龄段、学历和收入水平的农户对农地所有权和处分权的意愿存在明显的分异特征。随着年龄的增大和收入的提高,正确认识农地社集体所有的比例有明显增加的趋势,青年组、中年组和老年组比例分别为40.32%<42.92%<55.05%,人均收入3000元以下、3000元～6000元、6000元以上比例分别为42.51%<44.21<47.50%；而具有初中学历的农户群体正确认识农地所有权主体的比例(47.19%)则明显高于小学学历以下(41.49%)和高中学历以上(37.68%)的群体；不同收入水平的农户对土地处分权的认识差异不大(比例相差在2%以内),小学文化程度组(33.25%)和初中文化程度组(35.51%)的认识也是趋同的。从基层干部产权意愿看：(1)大部分农村基层干部(80%)认为农地社集体所有,但也有少部分认为属国家所有(10%)和未村社合并前的社集体所有(10%)。(2)所有的农村基层干部均认为农地分配应实行增人不增地减人不减地的做法,保持集体成员相对稳定。(3)大部分农村基层干部(约60%)认为撂荒严重,约40%认为土地细碎化严重,建议应加大土地承包经营权流转力度(90%)和建立退出机制(40%)。
4、重庆市农地产权制度改革实践借鉴
农地产权制度的建设应从农地产权自身的产权改革和运行的外部环境统筹考虑,进行综合配套改革。(1)土地承包经营权入股,体现了财产权的处置权能,但缺乏完善的农村保障体制下,农地承包经营权所具有的社会保障功能无法剥离。(2)“股田公司”工商登记具有法学和经济学理论意义,但无法解决现行公司法规定的50人的股东人数和土地细碎化下的承包家庭人数众多的矛盾,同时存在经营不善导致承包经营权落入城市居民手中的风险。(3)双溪村土地综合改革在小范围内改革无法融入大范围下的社会保障体系必然产生巨大的资金缺口,无法全面推广。(4)开县承包经营权抵(质)押实现了承包经营权物权化,但是在法律法规未修订之前改革也很难全面铺开。
5、农地产权制度建设总体思路和具体方案
农地产权制度建设的总体思路是完善农地所有权制度,稳定土地承包经营权制度,强化农地使用权制度,健全农地他项权利制度。具体方案如下：(1)完善农地所有权制度。明确农地所有权法人主体为股份合作社,法人代表为村(社)长,社员代表大会为法人最终意思表达机构；农地所有权性质为共有所有权；社员是股份合作社的成员,享有股份退出处置权,社员股份实行最高限制并接受股份合作社全体社员的监督;赋予农地所有权完整的占有、使用、收益、处分、排除妨害及剩余收益的权能。(2)稳定土地承包经营权制度。明确承包经营权主体为农村集体经济组织成员；确定承包经营权为一种物权；健全承包经营权占有、使用、收益、转让、抵押和继承等权能；规定承包经营权期限为70年或者永久。(3)强化农地使用权制度。明确所有愿意从事农业生产的单位和个人均可为农地使用权主体；明确农地使用权为一种相对独立、受限制的用益物权;赋予农地使用权占有、使用、收益、转让、抵押和排除妨害等权能；明确农地使用权最短和最长期限。(4)健全农地抵押权、租赁权、地役权、空中权、地下权等他项权利制度。
最后,根据研究结论,提出以下政策建议：
1、健全农地产权法制体系。修订农地相关法律法规；设立土地权属登记中心,对承包地、林地和宅基地等统一进行法律登记管理；严格规划管理和用途管制；改革土地征收制度。
2、加快农地市场体系建设。建立农地有形市场；建立农地估价和地价体系；健全农地金融市场；健全农业补贴制度；改革农村税收体制。
3、统筹城乡社会经济发展。改革城乡分割的户籍制度；加快农村剩余劳动力转移；大力推进小城镇建设；统一城乡土地市场。
4、完善农村社会保障体系。建立农村养老保险制度；完善农村医疗保险制度；完善农村最低生活保障制度。
Chongqing city which take the historic mission of reform in city & countryside especially in reform of farmland property rights system is the unique country province-level tests area where is the reform testing areas with synthesis and whole set are supporting by the center government. The key of coordination of urban and rural development is in rural area and the driving force of the rural development is reformation of farmland property rights system. The deep end of reformation is of that farmland property rights system. So, the choice of "Study on Construction of Farmland Property Rights System—Case Study in Chongqing City", clear of farmland property rights and suggestion of total train of thought and concrete scheme which adapting to the productive force development can play important theory and practical significance of coordination of urban and rural development in Chongqing city even in China.
The total train of thought is that, sufficient base on domestic-foreign research development and history performs since new China founded, guided by theory of fundamental property rights, studying at Dalu town, Bishan county, Chongqing City, study object of collective farmland proprietary rights system, inspection to operational state and defect imitate of current farmland property rights system, qualitative and quantify appraising of reformation risk of nationalization, privatization and perfecting collective route, knowing sufficient the awareness of peasant household and cadre at the basic level, drawing experience and lessons of reform practice of farmland property rights system and at last put forward the total train thought and concrete scheme of farmland property rights system.
The thesis carries out research mainly from five the following aspect and reaches the corresponding conclusions.
1. Reality works and performance assessment of farmland property rights system
Function of stimulating & constraint, distribution allocation of resources and income distribution are playing role but less of outside effect inside and trade function complying with reality works of farmland property rights system. (1) Stimulating & constraint. There are 58.87% agricultural labor which not be engaged in agriculture which lead to 462.70 hm2 abandoned cropland which accounts 7.89% for the cultivated area. But majority abandoned cropland are low soil fertility (69.02% proportions are below 9 rank), in steep slope (80.07% proportions are above 15°), far from town(84.23% proportions are except 1 km), poor traffic conditions(81.40% proportions are outside 200 m the road), lack of irrigation facilities(80.03% proportions are outside the 100 m irrigation facilities); (2) Distribution allocation of resources. Under thought distributing in average, land is broken comparatively graves. There is only 0.09 hm2 in every per capita village farmland and the highest per capita only 0.13 hm2 to lead to 7-9 pieces in family field piece and keeping far away from comparative distance. Land circulation beginning growth, land circulation covers an area of 476.13 hm2, accounts for 10.16% of cultivated area. (3) Trade function. Transaction cost of land circulation is 1.64 which is high business cost and remains to be brought into play further. (4) Outside effect inside function. There are land contaminates area about 553.33 hm2 which are very difficult to gain economy reparation and has not produced a marked effect basically; (5) Income distribution function. The 89.84% farmland avails are gained by family. There are 10.16% proportions by land circulated in which peasants gains rent avails and the proprietor gains usage avails. During land levying 20% land compensation are gained by collective and 80% belongs to peasant household. (6) The synthetic evaluation coefficient (SEC) of farmland proprietary rights system is 0.6639 which is evaluated from stimulating & constraint, distribution allocation of resources and trade function. The SEC is between 0.5000 and 1.0000 (0.6000-0.7000 is middle degree efficiency) which is in general efficiency and still has more space for reform. There should bring an excitation into play a function in stimulating & constraint function (less 0.1708 for ideal value), strengthen the allocation of resources function (less 0.0866 for ideal value) and trade function (less 0.0787 for ideal value), truly bring inside of the outside into play melting a function.
2. Reform risk assessment of farmland property rights system
Based on reality works and performance evaluation of farmland property rights system, there should construct further and assess the rout of construction risk. Method of Fishbone Diagram is applied to ascertain the society risk, economic risk, ecological risk and political risk and method of Analytic Hierarchy Process is applied to ascertain the weigh of risk group and risk factors to assess the reform rout of nationalization, privatization and collectivization. The reform risk index for nationalization is 0.4195 and 0.3756 for privatization and 0.2049 for collectivization which indicates that the reform of farmland property rights system should be based on collective property rights. During the four reform risk group, we should play especially attention to evading a political risk whose risk index is 0.6025 and then society risk (0.2015), economic risk (0.1217), ecological risk (0.0743). So we should play especially attention to evading masses opposed which risk is 0.2675 and then society turbulence (0.2284), much reform cost to have no way to share (0.0816), arousing the gap in wealth and poor(0.0638). So farmland property rights system reform should investigate the awareness of masses' farmland property rights and maintain the majority populace's benefits to avoid causing the large-scale population resistance.
3. Research on masses'awareness of farmland property rights
The construction of farmland property rights should pay attention to the masses' awareness of farmland property rights from the reform risk assessment of farmland property rights system. So give out 1300 investigation questionnaires which reclaimed 902 effective questionnaires in Dalu town including 14 villages and 3 communities and interview 17 cadres of village community at basic level to acquaintance their property rights awareness. From peasant household farmland property rights, the wish takes a look on that:(1) The awareness of proprietary right is chaos in peasant household with 62.64% proportion for collectivization,33.59% proportion for nationalization and 3.33% proportion for privatization. (2) Great majority peasant households (62.64%) thinks that the farmland is owned by the collective and regarding it being owned by the collective ought to keep group collective agency accounts 44.01%. (3) The condition of farmland disposition ultra virus runs gravelly which 33.70% peasant household regard that the group collective agency has a disposition and 25.50% regard that nation has the ultimate farmland disposition which indicates that land levy effects depth on the awareness of farmland property rights. (4) There is obvious mark of different characteristic of proprietary rights and disposition rights in different age groups, different educational background and different incoming levels. With the age enhancing and the rise taking in the proportion of right awareness that recognize the farmland owned by the group collective agency by youth group, middle age group and old group is 40.32% <42.92% <55.05% and under 3000 yuan incoming group,3000-6000 yuan incoming group and above 6000 yuan incoming is 42.51% <44.21<47.50%. But the proportion of right awareness of farmland proprietary owner is 47.19% that is higher than under junior educational background (41.49%) and above high school educational background (37.68%). There is small difference of different incoming group with only 2% difference. There is also the same trade between elementary school group (33.25%) and junior middle school group (35.51%). From farmland property rights awareness of cadres at the grassroots level in countryside, it takes a look on that:(1) Most cadres at the grassroots level in countryside (80%) recognize that farmland owned by the group collective agency, also 10% recognize owned by nation and 10% by group collective agency that before combining. (2) All cadres at the grassroots level in countryside think it should applied the method of whether increasing or subtracting person keep farmland condition to keep relative collective member stability. (3) Most cadres at the grassroots level in countryside (60%) think that it is grave in abandoned cropland and broken bits grave (40%), so they suggest should increase land transfer(90%) and build up withdraw mechanism(40%).
4. Draw lessons from Chongqing reformation practice of farmland property rights
The construction of farmland property rights should carries out synthetic supporting reforms from farmland-self property rights reform and outside work environment. (1) Contracted management rights to invest embody the disposition function of ownership of property, but because of insufficiency rural guarantee system the function of social security cling to farmland can't be peeled off. (2) Enterprise registration of stock farmland which has theory significance in law and economy but can't resolve the contradiction of many contracted household because of simultaneous management and 50cooperation regulated by current company law, and also existence the risk that urban resident has the contracted management rights for bad management. (3) The supporting reform in Shuangxi village which lack of macroscopic social security system surely produce gigantic financing gap to be unable all-round extension. (4) The mortgage and pledged of contracted management rights in Kai county which realizes managerial right for contracted management rights is also very difficult all-round extension without revision of laws and statutes.
5. Total train thought and concrete scheme of farmland property rights construction
The total train thought of farmland property rights construction is to perfect farmland ownership system, stabilize contracted management rights system, strengthen farmland servitude system and perfect farmland other rights. Concrete scheme as follows:(1) Perfect farmland ownership system. Clear the main body of farmland ownership is stock cooperative agency and legal representative is village head or group head and commune congress expresses the final meaning for legal person; farmland ownership is a altogether property right; the member of stock cooperative agency enjoys the disposal right of stock cooperative; the share puts restricting and accepting the entire share member of stock cooperative agency; farmland proprietary rights has functions of possession, servitude, usufruct, disposition, trouble shooting and surplus usufruct powers. (2) Stabilize contracted management rights system. Make clear that rural collective economic organization member is the main body of contracted management right; contracted management right is a material right; improve the functions and powers of possession, servitude, usufruct, transfer, mortgage and inheritance; stipulate the time of contract management right last 70 years and permanent best. (4) Improve the system of mortgage, leasehold, land servitude, aerial right and underground right.
At last, based on above main research the theasis carries out policy suggests as follws:
1. Improves legal institutions system of farmland property right. Revise farmland relevance laws and statutes; set up the land right category register centre in which register contracted management rights, forest and house site; carry out strictly in plan administration and use control; reform land collects system.
2. Accelerate farmland market system construction. Build tangible farmland market and farmland appraisement and price system; improve farmland financial market and allowance system; reform rural tax revenue system.
3. Plan development of ruban and rural as a whole. Reform urban and rural partitioned census register system; accelerate the surplus rura labor metastasis; push forward construction of small towns and cities energetically; unite land market in urban and rural.
4. Perfect rural social security system. Build rural pension system; perfect rural medical insurance system and rural ensuring a minimum standard of living.
研究思路是在充分研究国内外农地产权制度研究进展和新中国成立以来历史演替的基础上,以产权制度的基本理论为指导,以重庆市璧山县大路镇为研究区域,以集体所有农地产权制度为研究对象,考察现行农地产权制度运行状况及绩效,定性定量评估国有化、私有化、完善集体所有三种改革路径的风险,充分了解农户、基层干部对农地产权的意愿,借鉴重庆市农地产权制度改革实践的经验教训,进而提出构建农地产权制度的总体思路和具体方案。
研究主要从五个方面进行并得出相应的结论：
1、农地产权制度现实运行与绩效评价
从现行农地产权制度运行状况看,激励约束、资源配置、收益分配功能基本上发挥了作用,交易功能有待进一步发挥,外部性内部化功能基本未发挥作用。(1)激励约束功能看,在农业比较效益低的情况下,58.87%的农业劳动力从事非农产业,导致大路镇撂荒地有462.70hm2,占耕地面积的7.89%,但是撂荒地大多土壤肥力较低(9等以下占69.02%),位于坡度较陡(15°以上占80.07%),区位条件(场镇周围1km外占84.23%)、交通条件(道路两侧200m外占81.40%)、灌溉条件差(灌溉设施周围100m外占80.03%)的地方。(2)资源配置功能看,在平均分配的思想下,土地细碎化较为严重,大路镇各村人均耕地仅有0.09hm2,最高的仅有0.13hm2,家庭田块数在7-9块,彼此距离较远,但同时也导致了土地流转开始发育,土地流转面积476.13hm2,占耕地面积的10.16%。(3)交易功能看,土地流转交易费用为1.64,交易成本较高,有待进一步发挥；(4)外部性内部化功能看,大路镇土地污染面积约553.33hm2,土地污染很难获得经济赔偿,此项功能基本未发挥作用；(5)收益分配功能看,89.84%的农地为农户家庭经营获得收益,10.16%进行土地流转,农户获得租金收益,业主获得使用收益；土地征收过程中,20%的土地补偿费由集体所得,80%归农户所得。(6)从激励约束、资源配置和交易功能定量评价农地产权制度绩效,得到综合评价系数为0.6639,高于0.5000低于理想值1.0000。这说明现行农地产权制度总体绩效为中度(0.6000-0.7000为中度效率),需要进一步推进农地产权制度建设,着重发挥激励约束功能(与理想值差0.1708),强化资源配置功能(与理想值差0.0866)和交易功能(与理想值差0.0787),确实发挥外部性内部化功能。
2、农地产权制度改革风险评估
根据农地产权制度现实运行及绩效评价,农地产权制度需要进一步建设,而建设的路径需要进行风险评估。采用鱼骨图法确定农地产权制度改革社会风险、经济风险、生态风险和政治风险等风险因素,利用层次分析法确定风险类及风险因素的指标权重,评估农地产权制度朝国有化、私有化和集体所有三条路径的改革风险大小。农地产权制度朝国有化的改革风险系数为0.4195,朝私有化的改革风险系数为0.3756,在现有集体所有的基础上改革风险最小为0.2049,因此农地产权制度应在维持现有农地集体所有的基础上进行改革。农地产权制度改革四类风险中应特别注意规避政治风险,其风险系数为0.6025,依次为社会风险(0.2015)、经济风险(0.1217)和生态风险(0.0743)。改革的风险因素中应特别对顺应群众的意愿,其风险系数为0.2675,其次是避免引起社会动荡(0.2284)、改革成本过大无法分摊(0.0816)和引起贫富差距进一步拉大导致阶层对立(0.0638),因此农地产权制度改革需要调查民众对农地产权的意愿,维护大多数群众的利益,避免引起大规模的群众对抗。
3、农地产权群众意愿调查研究
从农地产权制度改革风险评估看,农地产权制度的建设需要特别重视对群众农地产权意愿调查。对大路镇14个村3个社区农户发放1300份调查问卷,回收有效问卷902份,走访17位村社干部了解农村基层干部农地产权意愿。从农户农地产权意愿看：(1)农户对农地所有权认识认识较混乱,认为农地集体所有的占62.64%,国家所有的占33.59%,私人所有的占3.33%。(2)大多数农户(62.64%)认为农地集体所有,认为应该保持农地社集体所有(44.01%)。(3)农地处分权越权行使严重,仅有33.70%的农户认为社集体具有处分权,25.50%的农户认为国家为农地最终处分权,充分说明了土地征收对农户产权意识的影响之深。(4)不同年龄段、学历和收入水平的农户对农地所有权和处分权的意愿存在明显的分异特征。随着年龄的增大和收入的提高,正确认识农地社集体所有的比例有明显增加的趋势,青年组、中年组和老年组比例分别为40.32%<42.92%<55.05%,人均收入3000元以下、3000元～6000元、6000元以上比例分别为42.51%<44.21<47.50%；而具有初中学历的农户群体正确认识农地所有权主体的比例(47.19%)则明显高于小学学历以下(41.49%)和高中学历以上(37.68%)的群体；不同收入水平的农户对土地处分权的认识差异不大(比例相差在2%以内),小学文化程度组(33.25%)和初中文化程度组(35.51%)的认识也是趋同的。从基层干部产权意愿看：(1)大部分农村基层干部(80%)认为农地社集体所有,但也有少部分认为属国家所有(10%)和未村社合并前的社集体所有(10%)。(2)所有的农村基层干部均认为农地分配应实行增人不增地减人不减地的做法,保持集体成员相对稳定。(3)大部分农村基层干部(约60%)认为撂荒严重,约40%认为土地细碎化严重,建议应加大土地承包经营权流转力度(90%)和建立退出机制(40%)。
4、重庆市农地产权制度改革实践借鉴
农地产权制度的建设应从农地产权自身的产权改革和运行的外部环境统筹考虑,进行综合配套改革。(1)土地承包经营权入股,体现了财产权的处置权能,但缺乏完善的农村保障体制下,农地承包经营权所具有的社会保障功能无法剥离。(2)“股田公司”工商登记具有法学和经济学理论意义,但无法解决现行公司法规定的50人的股东人数和土地细碎化下的承包家庭人数众多的矛盾,同时存在经营不善导致承包经营权落入城市居民手中的风险。(3)双溪村土地综合改革在小范围内改革无法融入大范围下的社会保障体系必然产生巨大的资金缺口,无法全面推广。(4)开县承包经营权抵(质)押实现了承包经营权物权化,但是在法律法规未修订之前改革也很难全面铺开。
5、农地产权制度建设总体思路和具体方案
农地产权制度建设的总体思路是完善农地所有权制度,稳定土地承包经营权制度,强化农地使用权制度,健全农地他项权利制度。具体方案如下：(1)完善农地所有权制度。明确农地所有权法人主体为股份合作社,法人代表为村(社)长,社员代表大会为法人最终意思表达机构；农地所有权性质为共有所有权；社员是股份合作社的成员,享有股份退出处置权,社员股份实行最高限制并接受股份合作社全体社员的监督;赋予农地所有权完整的占有、使用、收益、处分、排除妨害及剩余收益的权能。(2)稳定土地承包经营权制度。明确承包经营权主体为农村集体经济组织成员；确定承包经营权为一种物权；健全承包经营权占有、使用、收益、转让、抵押和继承等权能；规定承包经营权期限为70年或者永久。(3)强化农地使用权制度。明确所有愿意从事农业生产的单位和个人均可为农地使用权主体；明确农地使用权为一种相对独立、受限制的用益物权;赋予农地使用权占有、使用、收益、转让、抵押和排除妨害等权能；明确农地使用权最短和最长期限。(4)健全农地抵押权、租赁权、地役权、空中权、地下权等他项权利制度。
最后,根据研究结论,提出以下政策建议：
1、健全农地产权法制体系。修订农地相关法律法规；设立土地权属登记中心,对承包地、林地和宅基地等统一进行法律登记管理；严格规划管理和用途管制；改革土地征收制度。
2、加快农地市场体系建设。建立农地有形市场；建立农地估价和地价体系；健全农地金融市场；健全农业补贴制度；改革农村税收体制。
3、统筹城乡社会经济发展。改革城乡分割的户籍制度；加快农村剩余劳动力转移；大力推进小城镇建设；统一城乡土地市场。
4、完善农村社会保障体系。建立农村养老保险制度；完善农村医疗保险制度；完善农村最低生活保障制度。
Chongqing city which take the historic mission of reform in city & countryside especially in reform of farmland property rights system is the unique country province-level tests area where is the reform testing areas with synthesis and whole set are supporting by the center government. The key of coordination of urban and rural development is in rural area and the driving force of the rural development is reformation of farmland property rights system. The deep end of reformation is of that farmland property rights system. So, the choice of "Study on Construction of Farmland Property Rights System—Case Study in Chongqing City", clear of farmland property rights and suggestion of total train of thought and concrete scheme which adapting to the productive force development can play important theory and practical significance of coordination of urban and rural development in Chongqing city even in China.
The total train of thought is that, sufficient base on domestic-foreign research development and history performs since new China founded, guided by theory of fundamental property rights, studying at Dalu town, Bishan county, Chongqing City, study object of collective farmland proprietary rights system, inspection to operational state and defect imitate of current farmland property rights system, qualitative and quantify appraising of reformation risk of nationalization, privatization and perfecting collective route, knowing sufficient the awareness of peasant household and cadre at the basic level, drawing experience and lessons of reform practice of farmland property rights system and at last put forward the total train thought and concrete scheme of farmland property rights system.
The thesis carries out research mainly from five the following aspect and reaches the corresponding conclusions.
1. Reality works and performance assessment of farmland property rights system
Function of stimulating & constraint, distribution allocation of resources and income distribution are playing role but less of outside effect inside and trade function complying with reality works of farmland property rights system. (1) Stimulating & constraint. There are 58.87% agricultural labor which not be engaged in agriculture which lead to 462.70 hm2 abandoned cropland which accounts 7.89% for the cultivated area. But majority abandoned cropland are low soil fertility (69.02% proportions are below 9 rank), in steep slope (80.07% proportions are above 15°), far from town(84.23% proportions are except 1 km), poor traffic conditions(81.40% proportions are outside 200 m the road), lack of irrigation facilities(80.03% proportions are outside the 100 m irrigation facilities); (2) Distribution allocation of resources. Under thought distributing in average, land is broken comparatively graves. There is only 0.09 hm2 in every per capita village farmland and the highest per capita only 0.13 hm2 to lead to 7-9 pieces in family field piece and keeping far away from comparative distance. Land circulation beginning growth, land circulation covers an area of 476.13 hm2, accounts for 10.16% of cultivated area. (3) Trade function. Transaction cost of land circulation is 1.64 which is high business cost and remains to be brought into play further. (4) Outside effect inside function. There are land contaminates area about 553.33 hm2 which are very difficult to gain economy reparation and has not produced a marked effect basically; (5) Income distribution function. The 89.84% farmland avails are gained by family. There are 10.16% proportions by land circulated in which peasants gains rent avails and the proprietor gains usage avails. During land levying 20% land compensation are gained by collective and 80% belongs to peasant household. (6) The synthetic evaluation coefficient (SEC) of farmland proprietary rights system is 0.6639 which is evaluated from stimulating & constraint, distribution allocation of resources and trade function. The SEC is between 0.5000 and 1.0000 (0.6000-0.7000 is middle degree efficiency) which is in general efficiency and still has more space for reform. There should bring an excitation into play a function in stimulating & constraint function (less 0.1708 for ideal value), strengthen the allocation of resources function (less 0.0866 for ideal value) and trade function (less 0.0787 for ideal value), truly bring inside of the outside into play melting a function.
2. Reform risk assessment of farmland property rights system
Based on reality works and performance evaluation of farmland property rights system, there should construct further and assess the rout of construction risk. Method of Fishbone Diagram is applied to ascertain the society risk, economic risk, ecological risk and political risk and method of Analytic Hierarchy Process is applied to ascertain the weigh of risk group and risk factors to assess the reform rout of nationalization, privatization and collectivization. The reform risk index for nationalization is 0.4195 and 0.3756 for privatization and 0.2049 for collectivization which indicates that the reform of farmland property rights system should be based on collective property rights. During the four reform risk group, we should play especially attention to evading a political risk whose risk index is 0.6025 and then society risk (0.2015), economic risk (0.1217), ecological risk (0.0743). So we should play especially attention to evading masses opposed which risk is 0.2675 and then society turbulence (0.2284), much reform cost to have no way to share (0.0816), arousing the gap in wealth and poor(0.0638). So farmland property rights system reform should investigate the awareness of masses' farmland property rights and maintain the majority populace's benefits to avoid causing the large-scale population resistance.
3. Research on masses'awareness of farmland property rights
The construction of farmland property rights should pay attention to the masses' awareness of farmland property rights from the reform risk assessment of farmland property rights system. So give out 1300 investigation questionnaires which reclaimed 902 effective questionnaires in Dalu town including 14 villages and 3 communities and interview 17 cadres of village community at basic level to acquaintance their property rights awareness. From peasant household farmland property rights, the wish takes a look on that:(1) The awareness of proprietary right is chaos in peasant household with 62.64% proportion for collectivization,33.59% proportion for nationalization and 3.33% proportion for privatization. (2) Great majority peasant households (62.64%) thinks that the farmland is owned by the collective and regarding it being owned by the collective ought to keep group collective agency accounts 44.01%. (3) The condition of farmland disposition ultra virus runs gravelly which 33.70% peasant household regard that the group collective agency has a disposition and 25.50% regard that nation has the ultimate farmland disposition which indicates that land levy effects depth on the awareness of farmland property rights. (4) There is obvious mark of different characteristic of proprietary rights and disposition rights in different age groups, different educational background and different incoming levels. With the age enhancing and the rise taking in the proportion of right awareness that recognize the farmland owned by the group collective agency by youth group, middle age group and old group is 40.32% <42.92% <55.05% and under 3000 yuan incoming group,3000-6000 yuan incoming group and above 6000 yuan incoming is 42.51% <44.21<47.50%. But the proportion of right awareness of farmland proprietary owner is 47.19% that is higher than under junior educational background (41.49%) and above high school educational background (37.68%). There is small difference of different incoming group with only 2% difference. There is also the same trade between elementary school group (33.25%) and junior middle school group (35.51%). From farmland property rights awareness of cadres at the grassroots level in countryside, it takes a look on that:(1) Most cadres at the grassroots level in countryside (80%) recognize that farmland owned by the group collective agency, also 10% recognize owned by nation and 10% by group collective agency that before combining. (2) All cadres at the grassroots level in countryside think it should applied the method of whether increasing or subtracting person keep farmland condition to keep relative collective member stability. (3) Most cadres at the grassroots level in countryside (60%) think that it is grave in abandoned cropland and broken bits grave (40%), so they suggest should increase land transfer(90%) and build up withdraw mechanism(40%).
4. Draw lessons from Chongqing reformation practice of farmland property rights
The construction of farmland property rights should carries out synthetic supporting reforms from farmland-self property rights reform and outside work environment. (1) Contracted management rights to invest embody the disposition function of ownership of property, but because of insufficiency rural guarantee system the function of social security cling to farmland can't be peeled off. (2) Enterprise registration of stock farmland which has theory significance in law and economy but can't resolve the contradiction of many contracted household because of simultaneous management and 50cooperation regulated by current company law, and also existence the risk that urban resident has the contracted management rights for bad management. (3) The supporting reform in Shuangxi village which lack of macroscopic social security system surely produce gigantic financing gap to be unable all-round extension. (4) The mortgage and pledged of contracted management rights in Kai county which realizes managerial right for contracted management rights is also very difficult all-round extension without revision of laws and statutes.
5. Total train thought and concrete scheme of farmland property rights construction
The total train thought of farmland property rights construction is to perfect farmland ownership system, stabilize contracted management rights system, strengthen farmland servitude system and perfect farmland other rights. Concrete scheme as follows:(1) Perfect farmland ownership system. Clear the main body of farmland ownership is stock cooperative agency and legal representative is village head or group head and commune congress expresses the final meaning for legal person; farmland ownership is a altogether property right; the member of stock cooperative agency enjoys the disposal right of stock cooperative; the share puts restricting and accepting the entire share member of stock cooperative agency; farmland proprietary rights has functions of possession, servitude, usufruct, disposition, trouble shooting and surplus usufruct powers. (2) Stabilize contracted management rights system. Make clear that rural collective economic organization member is the main body of contracted management right; contracted management right is a material right; improve the functions and powers of possession, servitude, usufruct, transfer, mortgage and inheritance; stipulate the time of contract management right last 70 years and permanent best. (4) Improve the system of mortgage, leasehold, land servitude, aerial right and underground right.
At last, based on above main research the theasis carries out policy suggests as follws:
1. Improves legal institutions system of farmland property right. Revise farmland relevance laws and statutes; set up the land right category register centre in which register contracted management rights, forest and house site; carry out strictly in plan administration and use control; reform land collects system.
2. Accelerate farmland market system construction. Build tangible farmland market and farmland appraisement and price system; improve farmland financial market and allowance system; reform rural tax revenue system.
3. Plan development of ruban and rural as a whole. Reform urban and rural partitioned census register system; accelerate the surplus rura labor metastasis; push forward construction of small towns and cities energetically; unite land market in urban and rural.
4. Perfect rural social security system. Build rural pension system; perfect rural medical insurance system and rural ensuring a minimum standard of living.
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