农村劳动力转移培训的供给和需求研究
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摘要
我国政府自2003年开始推行农村劳动力转移培训计划,旨在提高农村劳动力的非农就业技能、促进非农转移、满足产业发展的需要。与个人自费培训的高成本、高风险及企业培训的小范围、小机会和强专业性相比,参加政府以补贴甚至免费等形式提供的培训应该是理性的。但现实状况却是农村劳动力缺乏参与培训的热情,政府培训的参与率较低,而定点培训机构承担政府培训任务的积极性也不高。
针对政府支持的农村劳动力转移培训中农民缺乏参与培训热情的困境,本研究的目的在于分析农村劳动力转移培训中的供需矛盾,探讨制约农村转移劳动力参与政府培训计划的供需因素,评估政府转移培训政策的农民满意度,旨在为改善政府培训质量、提高培训参与率的政府培训政策的机制构建和完善提供参考依据。
由于政府支持的农村劳动力转移培训计划的实施涉及地方政府、培训机构、农村劳动力三方,政府委托培训机构对农村劳动力提供技能培训,政府(培训供给方和委托方)、培训机构(代理方)和农村劳动力(需求方和参培方)三方的培训目标、利益诉求各不相同,但最终都要通过参培农村劳动力实现城市劳动力市场就业这个效率目标来实现。政府培训的三方性以及培训三方在培训市场和劳动力市场的相互作用构成本研究分析的基本出发点
从培训供给的角度看,因一般培训具有的经济外部性导致的培训市场失灵为政府介入培训市场提供了理论基础。纠正由于外部性所造成的培训资源配置低效,除了政府直接提供培训计划外,委托社会各类培训机构提供培训是有效运用市场机制的方式。在委托-代理的培训模式下,政府培训计划的适当性和培训效果就取决于培训项目的代理方(培训机构)供给的培训产品(技术)和服务与受训方(农村劳动力个人)培训需求的匹配程度以及适应劳动力市场技能需求变化的程度。
从培训需求的角度看,农村劳动力作为政府培训的参培方,其对政府支持的培训项目缺乏热情,本质上仍是比较培训的成本和收益后所做出的理性选择。由于农村劳动力的培训需求是劳动力市场就业的引致需求,培训收益最终要通过劳动力市场的非农就业来实现。在政府补贴的培训项目中,农村劳动力的参培费用部分或全部由政府承担,能否实现劳动力市场就业以及能够实现什么样的就业,决定了农村劳动力的寻工成本和收入预期。在城市劳动力市场不完备、市场分割加剧并且就业前景不明了的情况下,就业不确定性所导致的培训风险对农村劳动力培训决策的影响是通过加大培训成本、降低培训预期收益而起作用。
基于培训供需两方面的考虑,本研究以人力资本理论、劳动力流动和就业理论、外部性和一般培训市场失灵理论、委托-代理理论、顾客满意度理论为基础,采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,运用国家统计局数据和实地调研数据,从培训供给和培训需求两个角度,深入分析制约农村转移劳动力参加政府培训计划的影响因素,评估政府支持的农村劳动力转移培训计划的农户满意度。以此分析结果为依据,基于政府培训计划的三方互动原则,提出完善政府培训政策的配套措施。
主要内容及结论如下：
(1)从培训供给看,在委托-代理的培训模式下,受托培训的职技校等定点培训机构基于自身利益诉求的培训行为,是影响政府培训计划实施效果的重要环节。定点培训机构的反馈效果表明：生源短缺是培训机构面临的最大困难；培训补贴标准过低导致的激励不足是培训机构培训行为短期化的主因；培训机构软硬件设施不足、对职业技能鉴定和结业证书的关注度较少制约培训机构培训质量的提高。培训机构的反馈效果凸显农村劳动力转移培训计划的低质量和低效率,暴露出政府培训计划存在的机制缺陷,表现为①缺少一个技能获取赖以依存和发展的坚实的农村基础教育机制；②缺少一个三方积极参与的有效的互动协作机制；③缺少一个能有效促使培训制度提供中长期高水平技能的激励机制；④缺少一个能够对技能培训质量进行有效评估和监督的评价机制。
(2)从劳动力市场就业看,城市劳动力市场的非正规就业是农村转移劳动力实现非农就业的主要途径。非正规就业所导致的低就业保障、高就业流动、高就业波动性凸显了农村转移劳动力非农就业的高脆弱特征。在我国现有的劳动力市场人力资本型分割不断加剧的条件下,高就业脆弱特征通过加大培训投入风险和产出风险,降低培训收入预期而对其培训决策产生负面影响,表现为①市场对低技能劳动力排斥趋势渐显,加大就业难度,降低培训收入预期；②非正规部门低培训回报率降低收入预期,抑制个体投资；③高就业流动性降低企业和雇员对培训的投资意愿。
(3)从培训需求看,农村劳动力的潜在培训需求意愿高但实际培训比例低；对政府培训效果的认可程度低于企业培训；培训投资的不确定性风险成为农村劳动力培训投资决策的首要制约因素。影响农村转移劳动力技能培训意愿的主要因素包括受训者的年龄、对培训效果的看法、前期培训经历以及社会对劳动力的资质要求等。基于农户满意度的实证结果表明,影响农户培训满意度的最重要的变量是感知培训质量,其次是培训预期,最后才是感知培训价值。农村劳动力对政府培训政策的满意度指数为3.42,折合百分数为68%,属于中等水平。
基于政府培训的三方性,针对农村劳动力转移培训供给和需求两方面的研究结论,本研究提出①完善三方互动机制的社会伙伴关系,保证培训质量；②完善激励机制,鼓励企业、个人培训；③完善信息服务,加强培训管理；④针对农村新成长劳动力,加大教育投入,突出培训重点的政策建议。
The Rural Labour Force Training program (RLFT), launched by the Chinese government in2003, is aimed at improving the rural labour force's skills for employment in order to meet industrial development needs. However, the reality is that there seems to be a lack of enthusiasm in the Rural Labour force training and government training participation rate is lower. Also, designated training institutions are reluctant to assume the task of government training.
The purpose of this study is to analyze and illuminate the contradiction between supply and demand in RLFT.It aims to provide a reference for improving the quality of government training and participation rate, as well as build and improve on mechanisms of government training policy. In order to implement RLFT, the government has commissioned programs involving:local governments (supply), training institutions (agent), rural labour (Trainee) to provide the necessary skills. It is this tripartite interaction in training and labour market that constitutes the basic starting point of the analysis in this study.
From the training supply point of view, general training with the economic externality will lead to reduced private investment training incentive, this training market failure, caused by externality, provides the government a theoretical basis to intervene in the training market. To correct the inefficient allocation of training resources caused by externalities, aside from direct government provided training programs, entrusting the various social training institutions to provide training is an effective way of applying proper market methods. The effectiveness of training depends on the principal-agent training mode, training products (technology), services with the trainees, as well as the degree of matching of the labour market skills requirements.
From the training demand point of view, the labour force in rural areas lack enthusiasm on the government-supported training programs. That, essentially, is a rational choice after comparing the cost and benefit of the training. The training needs of the rural labour force arise due to the demand of labour market, thus, the benefit of training will be achieved ultimately through non-agricultural employment on the labour market. In the government-supported training program, the cost of training is partly or completely provided for by the government. The capability for employment, as well as the ability to realize what kind, determines the cost of labour force looking for work and the expected revenue. In the circumstance that the labour market is not complete, the market segmentation is increasing and the prospect of employment is unknown. Training risk caused by employment uncertainty will inevitably reduce the trainee's participation in the training
In view of the two aspects mentioned above, based on human capital theory, transfer employment theory, externality effect, general term market failure and customer satisfaction theory, Combined with the normative analysis and empirical analysis obtained from the national bureau of statistics data and field investigation data, we can analyse the factors that restrict RLFT participation in the government-supported training programs in depth and evaluate the government training achievements from customer satisfaction degree perspective. According to the results of analysis, it is proposed to construct the ideas and supporting measures of the government training programs through a tripartite interaction mechanism. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:
(1) Under the Principal-agent training mode, the training behaviours based on self-interest demands of the fiduciary training vocational technical school and other designated training institutions is also an important part that influences the implementation effect of the government training programs. From the feedback effects of the designated training institutions, Shortage of students is the greatest difficulty that the training institution faces. Shortage of the hardware and software facilities of the training institutions, lack of incentive caused by the low training subsidy standard, less attention towards the occupational skill testing and certificate and so on, restricts the designated training institutions to improve the quality of training. The feedback effect of the training institutions contrast the low efficiency of the rural labour transference training programs, and expose the defects of the mechanism of government training programs. These can be shown as follows:①The lack of a solid rural basic education mechanism dependent on which skills can be acquired and developed;②The lack of an effective interactive collaboration mechanism in which the tripartite can actively participate;③The lack of an Incentive mechanism which can effectively promote training system to provide medium-and long-term high-level skills;④The lack of an evaluation mechanism which can effectively evaluate and supervise the skill training quality.
(2) Informal employment is an important way for RLFT to realize non-agricultural employment in urban labour market. Low employment security, high employment flow and high employment volatility caused by Informal employment highlights the high vulnerability of RLFT towards non-agricultural employment. Under the conditions in our country's current labour market, strengthening the training investment and output risk will impact the training income expectations. High employment vulnerability has a negative impact on its training decision. The specific performances are:①The trend of market's rejection for low skill labour, employment difficulty increases and income anticipation lowers;②Informal departments'low rate of training return reduces income expectations, inhibiting individual investment;③High job mobility reduces the willingness of enterprises towards investment and employees towards training.
(3) From the point of personal demand for RLFT training, the willingness of potential rural labour force training is high but in reality, the proportion is low. The uncertainty of training investment becomes the first restricting factor of rural labour force training investment decisions. The main factors that influence the willingness of skills training of the rural labour force include the trainees'age, the view towards the effect of training, the training experience and the community's labour qualification requirements etc. Based on the satisfaction of the farmers, the empirical results indicate that the satisfaction index of rural labour force towards the government training policy is3.42which is equivalent to68%, the mid-level.
In summary, this study proposes the following policy suggestions:①Ensure the quality of training by promoting the social partnership through tripartite interaction mechanism;②Perfect the'incentive mechanism'to encourage enterprise and personal training;③improve on the information services and strengthening training management;④Increasing investment in education highlighting training policy to improve growth of new rural labour force.
针对政府支持的农村劳动力转移培训中农民缺乏参与培训热情的困境,本研究的目的在于分析农村劳动力转移培训中的供需矛盾,探讨制约农村转移劳动力参与政府培训计划的供需因素,评估政府转移培训政策的农民满意度,旨在为改善政府培训质量、提高培训参与率的政府培训政策的机制构建和完善提供参考依据。
由于政府支持的农村劳动力转移培训计划的实施涉及地方政府、培训机构、农村劳动力三方,政府委托培训机构对农村劳动力提供技能培训,政府(培训供给方和委托方)、培训机构(代理方)和农村劳动力(需求方和参培方)三方的培训目标、利益诉求各不相同,但最终都要通过参培农村劳动力实现城市劳动力市场就业这个效率目标来实现。政府培训的三方性以及培训三方在培训市场和劳动力市场的相互作用构成本研究分析的基本出发点
从培训供给的角度看,因一般培训具有的经济外部性导致的培训市场失灵为政府介入培训市场提供了理论基础。纠正由于外部性所造成的培训资源配置低效,除了政府直接提供培训计划外,委托社会各类培训机构提供培训是有效运用市场机制的方式。在委托-代理的培训模式下,政府培训计划的适当性和培训效果就取决于培训项目的代理方(培训机构)供给的培训产品(技术)和服务与受训方(农村劳动力个人)培训需求的匹配程度以及适应劳动力市场技能需求变化的程度。
从培训需求的角度看,农村劳动力作为政府培训的参培方,其对政府支持的培训项目缺乏热情,本质上仍是比较培训的成本和收益后所做出的理性选择。由于农村劳动力的培训需求是劳动力市场就业的引致需求,培训收益最终要通过劳动力市场的非农就业来实现。在政府补贴的培训项目中,农村劳动力的参培费用部分或全部由政府承担,能否实现劳动力市场就业以及能够实现什么样的就业,决定了农村劳动力的寻工成本和收入预期。在城市劳动力市场不完备、市场分割加剧并且就业前景不明了的情况下,就业不确定性所导致的培训风险对农村劳动力培训决策的影响是通过加大培训成本、降低培训预期收益而起作用。
基于培训供需两方面的考虑,本研究以人力资本理论、劳动力流动和就业理论、外部性和一般培训市场失灵理论、委托-代理理论、顾客满意度理论为基础,采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,运用国家统计局数据和实地调研数据,从培训供给和培训需求两个角度,深入分析制约农村转移劳动力参加政府培训计划的影响因素,评估政府支持的农村劳动力转移培训计划的农户满意度。以此分析结果为依据,基于政府培训计划的三方互动原则,提出完善政府培训政策的配套措施。
主要内容及结论如下：
(1)从培训供给看,在委托-代理的培训模式下,受托培训的职技校等定点培训机构基于自身利益诉求的培训行为,是影响政府培训计划实施效果的重要环节。定点培训机构的反馈效果表明：生源短缺是培训机构面临的最大困难；培训补贴标准过低导致的激励不足是培训机构培训行为短期化的主因；培训机构软硬件设施不足、对职业技能鉴定和结业证书的关注度较少制约培训机构培训质量的提高。培训机构的反馈效果凸显农村劳动力转移培训计划的低质量和低效率,暴露出政府培训计划存在的机制缺陷,表现为①缺少一个技能获取赖以依存和发展的坚实的农村基础教育机制；②缺少一个三方积极参与的有效的互动协作机制；③缺少一个能有效促使培训制度提供中长期高水平技能的激励机制；④缺少一个能够对技能培训质量进行有效评估和监督的评价机制。
(2)从劳动力市场就业看,城市劳动力市场的非正规就业是农村转移劳动力实现非农就业的主要途径。非正规就业所导致的低就业保障、高就业流动、高就业波动性凸显了农村转移劳动力非农就业的高脆弱特征。在我国现有的劳动力市场人力资本型分割不断加剧的条件下,高就业脆弱特征通过加大培训投入风险和产出风险,降低培训收入预期而对其培训决策产生负面影响,表现为①市场对低技能劳动力排斥趋势渐显,加大就业难度,降低培训收入预期；②非正规部门低培训回报率降低收入预期,抑制个体投资；③高就业流动性降低企业和雇员对培训的投资意愿。
(3)从培训需求看,农村劳动力的潜在培训需求意愿高但实际培训比例低；对政府培训效果的认可程度低于企业培训；培训投资的不确定性风险成为农村劳动力培训投资决策的首要制约因素。影响农村转移劳动力技能培训意愿的主要因素包括受训者的年龄、对培训效果的看法、前期培训经历以及社会对劳动力的资质要求等。基于农户满意度的实证结果表明,影响农户培训满意度的最重要的变量是感知培训质量,其次是培训预期,最后才是感知培训价值。农村劳动力对政府培训政策的满意度指数为3.42,折合百分数为68%,属于中等水平。
基于政府培训的三方性,针对农村劳动力转移培训供给和需求两方面的研究结论,本研究提出①完善三方互动机制的社会伙伴关系,保证培训质量；②完善激励机制,鼓励企业、个人培训；③完善信息服务,加强培训管理；④针对农村新成长劳动力,加大教育投入,突出培训重点的政策建议。
The Rural Labour Force Training program (RLFT), launched by the Chinese government in2003, is aimed at improving the rural labour force's skills for employment in order to meet industrial development needs. However, the reality is that there seems to be a lack of enthusiasm in the Rural Labour force training and government training participation rate is lower. Also, designated training institutions are reluctant to assume the task of government training.
The purpose of this study is to analyze and illuminate the contradiction between supply and demand in RLFT.It aims to provide a reference for improving the quality of government training and participation rate, as well as build and improve on mechanisms of government training policy. In order to implement RLFT, the government has commissioned programs involving:local governments (supply), training institutions (agent), rural labour (Trainee) to provide the necessary skills. It is this tripartite interaction in training and labour market that constitutes the basic starting point of the analysis in this study.
From the training supply point of view, general training with the economic externality will lead to reduced private investment training incentive, this training market failure, caused by externality, provides the government a theoretical basis to intervene in the training market. To correct the inefficient allocation of training resources caused by externalities, aside from direct government provided training programs, entrusting the various social training institutions to provide training is an effective way of applying proper market methods. The effectiveness of training depends on the principal-agent training mode, training products (technology), services with the trainees, as well as the degree of matching of the labour market skills requirements.
From the training demand point of view, the labour force in rural areas lack enthusiasm on the government-supported training programs. That, essentially, is a rational choice after comparing the cost and benefit of the training. The training needs of the rural labour force arise due to the demand of labour market, thus, the benefit of training will be achieved ultimately through non-agricultural employment on the labour market. In the government-supported training program, the cost of training is partly or completely provided for by the government. The capability for employment, as well as the ability to realize what kind, determines the cost of labour force looking for work and the expected revenue. In the circumstance that the labour market is not complete, the market segmentation is increasing and the prospect of employment is unknown. Training risk caused by employment uncertainty will inevitably reduce the trainee's participation in the training
In view of the two aspects mentioned above, based on human capital theory, transfer employment theory, externality effect, general term market failure and customer satisfaction theory, Combined with the normative analysis and empirical analysis obtained from the national bureau of statistics data and field investigation data, we can analyse the factors that restrict RLFT participation in the government-supported training programs in depth and evaluate the government training achievements from customer satisfaction degree perspective. According to the results of analysis, it is proposed to construct the ideas and supporting measures of the government training programs through a tripartite interaction mechanism. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:
(1) Under the Principal-agent training mode, the training behaviours based on self-interest demands of the fiduciary training vocational technical school and other designated training institutions is also an important part that influences the implementation effect of the government training programs. From the feedback effects of the designated training institutions, Shortage of students is the greatest difficulty that the training institution faces. Shortage of the hardware and software facilities of the training institutions, lack of incentive caused by the low training subsidy standard, less attention towards the occupational skill testing and certificate and so on, restricts the designated training institutions to improve the quality of training. The feedback effect of the training institutions contrast the low efficiency of the rural labour transference training programs, and expose the defects of the mechanism of government training programs. These can be shown as follows:①The lack of a solid rural basic education mechanism dependent on which skills can be acquired and developed;②The lack of an effective interactive collaboration mechanism in which the tripartite can actively participate;③The lack of an Incentive mechanism which can effectively promote training system to provide medium-and long-term high-level skills;④The lack of an evaluation mechanism which can effectively evaluate and supervise the skill training quality.
(2) Informal employment is an important way for RLFT to realize non-agricultural employment in urban labour market. Low employment security, high employment flow and high employment volatility caused by Informal employment highlights the high vulnerability of RLFT towards non-agricultural employment. Under the conditions in our country's current labour market, strengthening the training investment and output risk will impact the training income expectations. High employment vulnerability has a negative impact on its training decision. The specific performances are:①The trend of market's rejection for low skill labour, employment difficulty increases and income anticipation lowers;②Informal departments'low rate of training return reduces income expectations, inhibiting individual investment;③High job mobility reduces the willingness of enterprises towards investment and employees towards training.
(3) From the point of personal demand for RLFT training, the willingness of potential rural labour force training is high but in reality, the proportion is low. The uncertainty of training investment becomes the first restricting factor of rural labour force training investment decisions. The main factors that influence the willingness of skills training of the rural labour force include the trainees'age, the view towards the effect of training, the training experience and the community's labour qualification requirements etc. Based on the satisfaction of the farmers, the empirical results indicate that the satisfaction index of rural labour force towards the government training policy is3.42which is equivalent to68%, the mid-level.
In summary, this study proposes the following policy suggestions:①Ensure the quality of training by promoting the social partnership through tripartite interaction mechanism;②Perfect the'incentive mechanism'to encourage enterprise and personal training;③improve on the information services and strengthening training management;④Increasing investment in education highlighting training policy to improve growth of new rural labour force.
引文
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12 目前,我国工会会员数已由最低时的8700万人(1999年)发展到1.23亿人(2003年)。与全部2.56亿城镇从业人员相比,仍有1亿多人未加入工会,其中,绝大多数属于没有劳动关系或劳动关系极不规范的非正规就业劳动力。在非公经济发达的浙江,非公有制企业的工会组建率还低于50%。资料来源：欧阳华.非正规就业劳动者加入工会问题研究[J].中国教工,2006(12)：27-30.
13 1978年,我国农业劳动力的就业份额是73.8%,1988年降到60.1%,1998年降到49.8%,2008年进一步下降到39.6%(国家统计局,2009)。
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