中国土地收支预算管理研究
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摘要
威廉·配第曾言：“劳动是财富之父，土地是财富之母”。随着改革的发展深入，土地财富资源不断地涌现，成为我国经济发展和现代化建设资金的重要来源。目前我国正处在社会转型期，社会发展面临各种新的机遇和挑战，尤其是随着城市化进程的推进，土地收益占地方政府财政收入的比例不断攀升，但在实际管理过程中却并未形成有效的收支管理模式，这不仅加剧了地方政府对土地收益依赖性，也助长了地方政府土地收支分配行为的随意性。因此，深入探究土地出让金的收支渠道，将土地出让收入由过去预算外资金管理方式转变为“体制内+预算内”的管理方式，努力构建土地收支预算管理新模式具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文的研究内容主要包括三大部分：
第1章和第2章为基础研究部分。第1章重点介绍了本选题的研究背景、研究目的及意义、研究内容与框架、主要概念界定及研究方法。第2章深入阐述了土地收支预算管理研究的基本理论，并对国内外研究文献进行了综述评析。
第3章至第7章为主体研究部分。第3章深入研究中国土地收支预算管理的历史沿革，实证考察中国土地收支预算管理现状，总结中国土地收支预算管理的总体特征。第4章探讨了中国土地收支预算管理的计划调节功能、收入分配功能和反映监督功能。第5章具体分析了中央地方政府间的“非零和博弈”特征，阐释中央地方政府间利益博弈的经济学分析及Nash讨价还价博弈解，构建中央对地方政府土地出让收支预算管理的博弈支付矩阵，并以省际土地出让收支面板数据实证检验土地出让收入对地方经济增长效应。第6章重点探讨了构建中国土地收支预算管理的目标模式，提出了构建土地收支预算的指导思想与原则、土地收支预算管理流程，以及重构土地收支预算管理框架的初步建议。第7章从体制机制、考评工作机制，以及科学化精细化管理三个方面进行中国土地收支预算绩效评价。
第8章为全文的总结部分。该章节系统归纳了全文研究结论，指出了本文的研究创新与不足之处，同时也提出了未来的研究方向。
本文的研究结论主要有：
（1）土地出让收支预算体制的演进是多方博弈过程，而这种博弈也是一种相互依存、互相妥协与合作的“非零和”博弈。在中央与地方政府间的非零和博弈中，（努力征收，预算内管理）是该博弈的一组占优策略均衡，此时中央与地方政府的效用之和达到最大，由此实现了帕累托最优状态。
（2）自2007年以来，中央与地方政府间的“非零和”博弈，拓宽了中央财政的预算监督范围，地方土地出让收支以政府性基金预算方式纳入了中央财政的监管视线，由此土地出让收支实现了“由体制外走入体制内、由预算外列入预算内”的巨大转变。
（3）利用2001-2009年间省际面板数据的固定效应模型检验发现，土地出让收入占地区GDP的比重越大，越能够促进地方经济发展；较高的固定资产投资能够促进地方经济增长；社会就业人口增长可以推动经济增长，同时适度的通货膨胀率也有效刺激了地方经济增长。
（4）新的土地收支预算管理模式是在现有土地出让收支预算管理的基础上，将土地出让收支预算单列为财政预算结构体系的一个子系统，借鉴国有资本经营预算和社会保障预算的构建模式，将当前的土地出让收支全部纳入预算管理，编制成综合性的土地收支预算，构建成一个完整独立的土地预算体系，有利于提高政府预算的统一性和完整性，同时能够增强土地收支预算的约束力和透明度，以更好地接受人大和社会的监督管理。
本文的研究创新主要体现在：
（1）融合制度经济学、管理学等多学科理论知识，立足土地收支预算管理这一视角，建立将土地收益纳入财政预算的制度模式和技术体系。
（2）首次采取事件研究的分析方法，通过设置指标，采集数据，回归模型分析等步骤，实证评价了我国的土地收支预算管理影响因素和绩效考评。
（3）深入分析土地出让收支预算的起源、现状及问题，突破现有的财政预算体制安排，大胆提出将土地出让收支预算单列成财政预算体系的一个子系统，尤其是设计创新技术方法、管理流程、绩效评价等政策制度，为我国转型期的土地预算管理实践提供重要参考。
William Petty once said: Nature is the mother of wealth and the father of labor.With the deepening and furthering of our country’s reform and opening-up, the wealth ofland continues to emerge, and becomes an important source of funds for economicdevelopment and modernization. At present, China is in a period of social transition, andsocial development is constantly faced with new opportunities and challenges. With theadvance of the process of urbanization, the proportion of land revenue accounted for localfiscal revenue has increased dramatically, but an effective fiscal management model ofland revenue has not been formed yet, which has not only exacerbated the highlydependence on land revenue of local government, but also contributed to the arbitraryallocation of land revenue. Therefore, deeply analysis of the income and expenditurechannels of land revenue, transferring the way of extra-budgetary management to budgetmanagement, and building up a new model of land budgetary management have importanttheoretical and practical significance.
The contents mainly included three parts:
Chapter1and Chapter2are the basic study part. Chapter1focuses on the studybackground and significance, the study contents and framework, the definition of keyconcepts, the study methods and samples, as well as the anticipated innovation of theselected topic. Chapter2expounds the theoretical perspectives of the land budgetarymanagement theory, and shows a review on the domestic and foreign literatures.
Chapter3to Chapter7is the main study part. Chapter3includes a deeplyinvestigation on the history of Chinese land budgetary management, empirical analysis onthe status of land budgetary management in China, a detailed analysis on the generalcharacteristics of Chinese land budgetary management, and the international comparisonbetween US,Germany and China Hong Kong. Chapter4discusses the functions of Chinese land budgetary management, such as the plan adjustment function, the incomedistribution function and the reflection&supervision function. Chapter5involves adetailed analysis of the Non-zero-sum game between the central government and thelocal government, an explanation of the economic analysis of the game on the landrevenue between the central and local government and the solution to Nash bargaininggame, the focusing discussion on the building of the pay-matrix of Chinese land budgetarymanagement, and an empirical test on the land revenue to local economic growth effect.Chapter6focuses on how to build land budgetary management mode, posing on theguiding ideology and principles, the land budgetary management processes, and thepreliminary proposals of reconstructing the framework of the land budgetary management.Chapter7describes the performance evaluation of Chinese land budgetary managementfrom there aspects, such as institution organizations, evaluation methods, workingmechanisms, as well as scientific and meticulous management.
Chapter8is the conclusion part. It systematically concludes the study findings in thepaper, and points out the study limitations in the paper and the future research direction.
The main conclusions of the paper are:
（1）The evolution of Chinese land budgetary management is a multi-game process,and this game is also a kind of interdependence, mutual compromise and cooperativeNon-zero-sum game.(Efforts to impose, budgetary management） is dominant strategyequilibrium of the game. In this state, it can maximize the effectiveness of central andlocal government, and thus achieve a Pareto optimal state.
（2）Since2007, the Non-zero-sum game has broaden the central government’sbudget monitoring range, the local land revenue and expenditure has brought into thescope of government funds budget, which resulted to great changes shifting into thesystem from outside the system, into the budget from extra-budgetary.
（3）Using the inter-provincial panel data from2001to2009and fixed effects model in the empirical test, it can be found that the greater the proportion of local land revenueaccounted for the regional GDP, the more chances to promote local economicdevelopment. We can also known that higher fix-assets investment amount, the increasingsocial employment population, and moderate inflation can all be benefit to local economicgrowth.
（4）On the basis of the existing land budgetary management, the mode of new landbudgetary management separate the land budget into a sub-system. Referring the methodof building the state-owned capital management budget and the social security budget, theland revenue and expenditure are included into the budget management to build acomplete and independent budget system, which can promote the integrity of governmentbudget, enhance the force of constraint and transparency and the better to accept thesupervision of the National People's Congress and whole society.
The improvements and innovations of the study are mainly reflected in:
（1）The study is based on the comprehensive use of the theoretical knowledge ofeconomics, management and other multi-disciplinary theoretical knowledge, and thespecial perspective of land budgetary management in China. On this basis, we attempt toestablish a new budget mode and technology system of land budgetary management.
（2）The study uses the method of the event study, the regression model, and the setof indicators to evaluate the influencing factors and performance of the land budgetarymanagement, which is the bold use of the method in this field.
（3）The study in-depth analyzes the origins, current status and problems of landbudgetary management, boldly proposed to separate land budget into a subsystem;meanwhile, some innovative techniques, management processes and performanceevaluation policies are proposed, which have certain valuable references to the practice ofChina’s land budgetary management in the period of social transition.
本文的研究内容主要包括三大部分：
第1章和第2章为基础研究部分。第1章重点介绍了本选题的研究背景、研究目的及意义、研究内容与框架、主要概念界定及研究方法。第2章深入阐述了土地收支预算管理研究的基本理论，并对国内外研究文献进行了综述评析。
第3章至第7章为主体研究部分。第3章深入研究中国土地收支预算管理的历史沿革，实证考察中国土地收支预算管理现状，总结中国土地收支预算管理的总体特征。第4章探讨了中国土地收支预算管理的计划调节功能、收入分配功能和反映监督功能。第5章具体分析了中央地方政府间的“非零和博弈”特征，阐释中央地方政府间利益博弈的经济学分析及Nash讨价还价博弈解，构建中央对地方政府土地出让收支预算管理的博弈支付矩阵，并以省际土地出让收支面板数据实证检验土地出让收入对地方经济增长效应。第6章重点探讨了构建中国土地收支预算管理的目标模式，提出了构建土地收支预算的指导思想与原则、土地收支预算管理流程，以及重构土地收支预算管理框架的初步建议。第7章从体制机制、考评工作机制，以及科学化精细化管理三个方面进行中国土地收支预算绩效评价。
第8章为全文的总结部分。该章节系统归纳了全文研究结论，指出了本文的研究创新与不足之处，同时也提出了未来的研究方向。
本文的研究结论主要有：
（1）土地出让收支预算体制的演进是多方博弈过程，而这种博弈也是一种相互依存、互相妥协与合作的“非零和”博弈。在中央与地方政府间的非零和博弈中，（努力征收，预算内管理）是该博弈的一组占优策略均衡，此时中央与地方政府的效用之和达到最大，由此实现了帕累托最优状态。
（2）自2007年以来，中央与地方政府间的“非零和”博弈，拓宽了中央财政的预算监督范围，地方土地出让收支以政府性基金预算方式纳入了中央财政的监管视线，由此土地出让收支实现了“由体制外走入体制内、由预算外列入预算内”的巨大转变。
（3）利用2001-2009年间省际面板数据的固定效应模型检验发现，土地出让收入占地区GDP的比重越大，越能够促进地方经济发展；较高的固定资产投资能够促进地方经济增长；社会就业人口增长可以推动经济增长，同时适度的通货膨胀率也有效刺激了地方经济增长。
（4）新的土地收支预算管理模式是在现有土地出让收支预算管理的基础上，将土地出让收支预算单列为财政预算结构体系的一个子系统，借鉴国有资本经营预算和社会保障预算的构建模式，将当前的土地出让收支全部纳入预算管理，编制成综合性的土地收支预算，构建成一个完整独立的土地预算体系，有利于提高政府预算的统一性和完整性，同时能够增强土地收支预算的约束力和透明度，以更好地接受人大和社会的监督管理。
本文的研究创新主要体现在：
（1）融合制度经济学、管理学等多学科理论知识，立足土地收支预算管理这一视角，建立将土地收益纳入财政预算的制度模式和技术体系。
（2）首次采取事件研究的分析方法，通过设置指标，采集数据，回归模型分析等步骤，实证评价了我国的土地收支预算管理影响因素和绩效考评。
（3）深入分析土地出让收支预算的起源、现状及问题，突破现有的财政预算体制安排，大胆提出将土地出让收支预算单列成财政预算体系的一个子系统，尤其是设计创新技术方法、管理流程、绩效评价等政策制度，为我国转型期的土地预算管理实践提供重要参考。
William Petty once said: Nature is the mother of wealth and the father of labor.With the deepening and furthering of our country’s reform and opening-up, the wealth ofland continues to emerge, and becomes an important source of funds for economicdevelopment and modernization. At present, China is in a period of social transition, andsocial development is constantly faced with new opportunities and challenges. With theadvance of the process of urbanization, the proportion of land revenue accounted for localfiscal revenue has increased dramatically, but an effective fiscal management model ofland revenue has not been formed yet, which has not only exacerbated the highlydependence on land revenue of local government, but also contributed to the arbitraryallocation of land revenue. Therefore, deeply analysis of the income and expenditurechannels of land revenue, transferring the way of extra-budgetary management to budgetmanagement, and building up a new model of land budgetary management have importanttheoretical and practical significance.
The contents mainly included three parts:
Chapter1and Chapter2are the basic study part. Chapter1focuses on the studybackground and significance, the study contents and framework, the definition of keyconcepts, the study methods and samples, as well as the anticipated innovation of theselected topic. Chapter2expounds the theoretical perspectives of the land budgetarymanagement theory, and shows a review on the domestic and foreign literatures.
Chapter3to Chapter7is the main study part. Chapter3includes a deeplyinvestigation on the history of Chinese land budgetary management, empirical analysis onthe status of land budgetary management in China, a detailed analysis on the generalcharacteristics of Chinese land budgetary management, and the international comparisonbetween US,Germany and China Hong Kong. Chapter4discusses the functions of Chinese land budgetary management, such as the plan adjustment function, the incomedistribution function and the reflection&supervision function. Chapter5involves adetailed analysis of the Non-zero-sum game between the central government and thelocal government, an explanation of the economic analysis of the game on the landrevenue between the central and local government and the solution to Nash bargaininggame, the focusing discussion on the building of the pay-matrix of Chinese land budgetarymanagement, and an empirical test on the land revenue to local economic growth effect.Chapter6focuses on how to build land budgetary management mode, posing on theguiding ideology and principles, the land budgetary management processes, and thepreliminary proposals of reconstructing the framework of the land budgetary management.Chapter7describes the performance evaluation of Chinese land budgetary managementfrom there aspects, such as institution organizations, evaluation methods, workingmechanisms, as well as scientific and meticulous management.
Chapter8is the conclusion part. It systematically concludes the study findings in thepaper, and points out the study limitations in the paper and the future research direction.
The main conclusions of the paper are:
（1）The evolution of Chinese land budgetary management is a multi-game process,and this game is also a kind of interdependence, mutual compromise and cooperativeNon-zero-sum game.(Efforts to impose, budgetary management） is dominant strategyequilibrium of the game. In this state, it can maximize the effectiveness of central andlocal government, and thus achieve a Pareto optimal state.
（2）Since2007, the Non-zero-sum game has broaden the central government’sbudget monitoring range, the local land revenue and expenditure has brought into thescope of government funds budget, which resulted to great changes shifting into thesystem from outside the system, into the budget from extra-budgetary.
（3）Using the inter-provincial panel data from2001to2009and fixed effects model in the empirical test, it can be found that the greater the proportion of local land revenueaccounted for the regional GDP, the more chances to promote local economicdevelopment. We can also known that higher fix-assets investment amount, the increasingsocial employment population, and moderate inflation can all be benefit to local economicgrowth.
（4）On the basis of the existing land budgetary management, the mode of new landbudgetary management separate the land budget into a sub-system. Referring the methodof building the state-owned capital management budget and the social security budget, theland revenue and expenditure are included into the budget management to build acomplete and independent budget system, which can promote the integrity of governmentbudget, enhance the force of constraint and transparency and the better to accept thesupervision of the National People's Congress and whole society.
The improvements and innovations of the study are mainly reflected in:
（1）The study is based on the comprehensive use of the theoretical knowledge ofeconomics, management and other multi-disciplinary theoretical knowledge, and thespecial perspective of land budgetary management in China. On this basis, we attempt toestablish a new budget mode and technology system of land budgetary management.
（2）The study uses the method of the event study, the regression model, and the setof indicators to evaluate the influencing factors and performance of the land budgetarymanagement, which is the bold use of the method in this field.
（3）The study in-depth analyzes the origins, current status and problems of landbudgetary management, boldly proposed to separate land budget into a subsystem;meanwhile, some innovative techniques, management processes and performanceevaluation policies are proposed, which have certain valuable references to the practice ofChina’s land budgetary management in the period of social transition.
引文
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