论控股股东权利规制
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摘要
我国多数上市公司股权结构存在着一个问题,即国有股“一股独大”,国家在大多数上市公司中拥有高度集中的股权。这样的股权结构固然保证了国有股的控制地位,但国有股比重过高的情况是有悖于市场经济的基本原则,它决定了我国公司治理结构基础的不合理,出现了一系列控制股东利用自身特殊地位损害其它中小股东的利益问题。当前,如何规制控制股东的权利已成为我国一项紧迫而又重要的课题,而国有上市公司中所有者虚位及股权分置问题是任何一个发达市场经济国家不曾遇到的难题。中国的这种特殊国情决定了其与西方国家公司治理中的委托代理为核心的理论有着实践性差异。
本文以中国国有上市公司的治理实践为背景,论文从比较法的角度具体分析三种不同模式下控股股东权利规制的不同立法例,在此基础上明确我国特殊国情下不同于上述模式下面临的特殊具体问题一所有者虚位及股权分置问题。由于“国有上市公司中所有者到位”是一个伪命题,则只有对股权进行分置改革,实行全流通和国有股减持。并运用托宾的Q值理论,对控股股东及法人股东控股区间进行了实证的分析,计算出了控股股东的最佳持股比例与累计持股区间。文章此举在于以量化方式探究限制控制权的可能与现实,以实证分析结果为基础,作者认为即使在股权分置改革完成后,在国有股减持短期内无法完全实现的情况下,应适度支持其他法人股东适度增加持股比例,适度减少国有股比例,并以此确定大股东表决权的区间。
从外围结构上对控制股东进行规制后其全部运行内容将集中于董事会上,由于所有权虚位导致的控制股东责、权、利不清晰,作者重新构建一种以董事长全面负责制的公司内部组织关系模型,并对该模型进行绩效分析。文章并选择我国公司实践中最为典型和普遍的几种控股股东义务--公平交易义务、竞业禁止义务、控制权转让中的义务、信息公开义务进行规制和完善,力图对国有上市公司控制股东构建一个相对完善的规制体系。
There is a problem at structure of stock ownership in most of quoted company in our country that state-owned shares is a only most large shares all of shares,our country hold most of high centralized stock ownership.That structure of stock ownership no doubt guarantee the driver's seat of state-owned shares,but the instance of exorbitant proportion of state-owned shares operate against the basic principles of market economy,so it decides inconsequence in company father configuration foundation, it came forth a series of problem that controlling shareholders damage Medium and Small Shareholders's benefit. Currently, how to regulate controlling shareholders's droit has being a hot and significant subject,moreover the problem of owners phantom and nontradable shares is anyone developed market economy country never falling across puzzle. This special situation of a country of China decides this practical diversity with theory of Principal-agent as the core in west country company governance.
This dissertation is the background of father practice of ChinaState-owned Listed Company, concretely analyse different legislationexamples under the three distinct mode controlling shareholders rightregulation with comparative method angle,and on the basis nails downespecial idiographic issue other than so you say mode on the situationof our country—the problem of owners phantom and nontradableshares. As a result of "the presence of owners in the state-owned listedcompanies" is a False Proposition , so none but carry through Equitydivision reform,put into practice full currency and reduction ofstate-owned shares.And bringing to bear Tobin's Q Value Theory carry through demonstrational analysis of holding shares interval of controlling shareholders and corporate shareholder,figure out topgallant share proportion of controlling shareholders and accumulated holding shares interval.This disquisition delve likelihood and reality of limited control rights by the mode of quantization, based on demonstration analysis, author consider that on the condition of reduction of state-owned shares incapable completeness realization in a short time, should moderately sustain other corporate shareholder moderately increase proportion of stock ownership, moderately reduce proportion of state-owned shares,and so ascertain interval of large shareholders voting rights.
All circulated content should fasten on board of directors after carried through rulation of cntrolling sareholders from periphery structure, because owners phantom make for not legibility of controlling shareholders's duty、right、behalf,author rebuilds a sort of model of company interior structure relation of boar chairman comprehensive services, and puts up performance analysis for this modle. And this dissertation putes up regulation and c improvement by choosing several kinds of best representative and universal controlling shareholders's duty—the duty of fair exchange、the duty of prohibition of competition、the duty of corporate control transfer、the duty of information publicity, force diagram to construct one of relatively perfect regulation system to controlling shareholders of state-owned listed companies.
本文以中国国有上市公司的治理实践为背景,论文从比较法的角度具体分析三种不同模式下控股股东权利规制的不同立法例,在此基础上明确我国特殊国情下不同于上述模式下面临的特殊具体问题一所有者虚位及股权分置问题。由于“国有上市公司中所有者到位”是一个伪命题,则只有对股权进行分置改革,实行全流通和国有股减持。并运用托宾的Q值理论,对控股股东及法人股东控股区间进行了实证的分析,计算出了控股股东的最佳持股比例与累计持股区间。文章此举在于以量化方式探究限制控制权的可能与现实,以实证分析结果为基础,作者认为即使在股权分置改革完成后,在国有股减持短期内无法完全实现的情况下,应适度支持其他法人股东适度增加持股比例,适度减少国有股比例,并以此确定大股东表决权的区间。
从外围结构上对控制股东进行规制后其全部运行内容将集中于董事会上,由于所有权虚位导致的控制股东责、权、利不清晰,作者重新构建一种以董事长全面负责制的公司内部组织关系模型,并对该模型进行绩效分析。文章并选择我国公司实践中最为典型和普遍的几种控股股东义务--公平交易义务、竞业禁止义务、控制权转让中的义务、信息公开义务进行规制和完善,力图对国有上市公司控制股东构建一个相对完善的规制体系。
There is a problem at structure of stock ownership in most of quoted company in our country that state-owned shares is a only most large shares all of shares,our country hold most of high centralized stock ownership.That structure of stock ownership no doubt guarantee the driver's seat of state-owned shares,but the instance of exorbitant proportion of state-owned shares operate against the basic principles of market economy,so it decides inconsequence in company father configuration foundation, it came forth a series of problem that controlling shareholders damage Medium and Small Shareholders's benefit. Currently, how to regulate controlling shareholders's droit has being a hot and significant subject,moreover the problem of owners phantom and nontradable shares is anyone developed market economy country never falling across puzzle. This special situation of a country of China decides this practical diversity with theory of Principal-agent as the core in west country company governance.
This dissertation is the background of father practice of ChinaState-owned Listed Company, concretely analyse different legislationexamples under the three distinct mode controlling shareholders rightregulation with comparative method angle,and on the basis nails downespecial idiographic issue other than so you say mode on the situationof our country—the problem of owners phantom and nontradableshares. As a result of "the presence of owners in the state-owned listedcompanies" is a False Proposition , so none but carry through Equitydivision reform,put into practice full currency and reduction ofstate-owned shares.And bringing to bear Tobin's Q Value Theory carry through demonstrational analysis of holding shares interval of controlling shareholders and corporate shareholder,figure out topgallant share proportion of controlling shareholders and accumulated holding shares interval.This disquisition delve likelihood and reality of limited control rights by the mode of quantization, based on demonstration analysis, author consider that on the condition of reduction of state-owned shares incapable completeness realization in a short time, should moderately sustain other corporate shareholder moderately increase proportion of stock ownership, moderately reduce proportion of state-owned shares,and so ascertain interval of large shareholders voting rights.
All circulated content should fasten on board of directors after carried through rulation of cntrolling sareholders from periphery structure, because owners phantom make for not legibility of controlling shareholders's duty、right、behalf,author rebuilds a sort of model of company interior structure relation of boar chairman comprehensive services, and puts up performance analysis for this modle. And this dissertation putes up regulation and c improvement by choosing several kinds of best representative and universal controlling shareholders's duty—the duty of fair exchange、the duty of prohibition of competition、the duty of corporate control transfer、the duty of information publicity, force diagram to construct one of relatively perfect regulation system to controlling shareholders of state-owned listed companies.
引文
[1]Black's law dictionary,Fifth Edition,West Publishing,Co.,1979,p908
[2]Shleifer,Andrei and Robert Vishny,"Large Shareholder and Corporate Control",Journal of Political Economy,94,1986,p759
[3]覃红.试论我国公司法如何提高对中小股东的保护:www.civillaw.com
[4]顾功耘,井涛.论股东平等原则,公司治理与资本市场监管.2003
[5]吴晓球.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[6]Black's law dictionary,Fifth Edition,West Publishing,Co.,1979,p908
[7]何自力.论控股股东的权利.天津社会科学出版社,1997(6)
[8]剧锦文.董事会治理模式.上市公司.北京大学出版社.2001(10)
[9]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[10]刘彤.小股东权益与公司治理绩效改善-基于产权理论分析.经济科学,2000(2)
[11]何自力.论公司权力结构与公司治理.经济学家,1998(3)
[12]郑或.论股东的权利.公司法律评论,上海人民出版社,2002
[13]Shleifer,A.And.R.Vishny,A Survey of Coporate.Governance.Journal of Finance.1997(52)
[14]Cochrance,John.H,Corporate Govemance,1994,Working papet,University of Chicago
[15]Zingales,luigi,eorporate governance,Journal of Finance Economics,1977,(11),4
[16]Tricker.R,Coporate Governance,Gover Publishing Co,1984
[17]Keasy.Kevin,Wright,Mike·Issues in Coporate accountability and Governance,Accounting and Buiness Reaserch,1993(23)
[18]Newman,peter and murray milgate(ed),1992,The New palgrave pictianary of Finance London Themancmillan.press.Ltd
[19]Oliver E·williamson:The nature of the Firm,Oxford University press,1993
[20]张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托代关系-兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点.经济研究,1996(9)10
[21]Henery·Hansman:The ownership of enterprise,Harvard University press,1996
[22]Shleifer,A·And·R.Vishny,A Survey of Coporate.Governance.Journal of Finance.1997,52(2):737-783
[23]李德文,刘定华.股东权配置探讨.财经理论与实践,2006(1)
[24]青木昌彦,钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构.中国经济出版社,1995
[25]P.I.Blumberg,Corporate Groups:Procedure Law,§22.01.1(1983).转自殷召良著.公司控制权法律问题研究.法律出版社2001,1
[26]吴淑琨,席酉民.公司治理模式探讨.经济学动态,1999,1
[27]林晓镍.股东利益的冲突与平衡--探寻股东关系和基本原则.法学评诊,2001(1)
[28]John L·Colley,George.logan,Corporate.Governance,copyright 2003 by the McGran·Will Companies.inc
[29]吴晓求.股权流动性分裂的八大危害.财贸经济,2004(5)
[30][德]罗伯特·霍恩,楚建译.德国民商法.中国大百科全书出版社,1996,293
[31]何孝量.独立董事制度与监事制度的优劣比较及制度安排.经济学动态,2001(8)
[32]张屹山.关于有效推进国有企业改革的思考.经济研究,1999(6)
[33]徐卫东.商法基本问题研究.法律出版社,2002
[34]Hubert Ooghe and Tine De Langhe(2002):The Anglo-American versus the Continental European corporate governance model:empirical evidence of board composition in Belgium,European Business Review,Vol14,No 6,437-449
[35]郎咸平,易宪容等译.公司治理.社会科学文献出版社,2004
[36]Berle.A,and G.MEANS,The Modern Corporation and Price Proporty MacMillan.New Youk,1932
[37]汤欣.公司治理与上市公司收购.中国人民大学出版社,2001
[38]刘俊海.股东权法律保护概论.人民法院出版社,1995
[39]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[40]宁向东.公司治理理论.中国发展出版社,2005
[41]Brian·R·Cheffins:Company law:Theory Structure,and Operation,Oxford University press,1997
[42]王伟杰.资本市场二元结构难题及破解.当代经济研究,2004(8)
[43]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[44]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[45]The Measurement of Relatedness:An Application to Corporate Diversification:J.Fan,LARRY H.P-LANG,Journal of Business 73,2000,629-660
[46]李德文、曾德明.股东权治理.公司治理本质.湘潭大学学报,2003(4)
[47][美]罗伯特·蒙克斯、尼尔·米诺.公司治理.中国财政经济出版社,2004
[48]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护.法律出版社,1997
[49]林晓镍.股东利益的冲突与平衡--探寻股东关系和基本原则.法学评论,2001(1)
[50]韩志国.全流通:决定中国股市命运的制度性跨越.人大2004一季度经济类专题
[51]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[52]吴晓求.股权流动性分裂的八大危害.财贸经济,2004(5)
[53][美]罗伯特·C·克拉克.公司法则.工商出版杜,1999,73
[54]郑德程,沈华洲.股权结构与公司治理.中山大学学报(哲社版),2002(1)
[55]余颖.公司治理:本土企业的解决方案.经济科学出版社,2005
[56]朱慈蕴.中国引入独立董事制度应注意的若干问题.北京大学出版社,2003
[57]吴淑琨,席酉民.公司治理模式探讨.经济学动态,1999(1)
[58]李建伟.公司制度.公司治理与公司管理-法律在公司管理中的地位与作用.人民法院出版社,2005
[59]The Measurement of Relatedness:An Application to Corporate Diversification:J.Fan,LARRY H·P·LANG,Journal of Business 73,2000,629-660
[2]Shleifer,Andrei and Robert Vishny,"Large Shareholder and Corporate Control",Journal of Political Economy,94,1986,p759
[3]覃红.试论我国公司法如何提高对中小股东的保护:www.civillaw.com
[4]顾功耘,井涛.论股东平等原则,公司治理与资本市场监管.2003
[5]吴晓球.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[6]Black's law dictionary,Fifth Edition,West Publishing,Co.,1979,p908
[7]何自力.论控股股东的权利.天津社会科学出版社,1997(6)
[8]剧锦文.董事会治理模式.上市公司.北京大学出版社.2001(10)
[9]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[10]刘彤.小股东权益与公司治理绩效改善-基于产权理论分析.经济科学,2000(2)
[11]何自力.论公司权力结构与公司治理.经济学家,1998(3)
[12]郑或.论股东的权利.公司法律评论,上海人民出版社,2002
[13]Shleifer,A.And.R.Vishny,A Survey of Coporate.Governance.Journal of Finance.1997(52)
[14]Cochrance,John.H,Corporate Govemance,1994,Working papet,University of Chicago
[15]Zingales,luigi,eorporate governance,Journal of Finance Economics,1977,(11),4
[16]Tricker.R,Coporate Governance,Gover Publishing Co,1984
[17]Keasy.Kevin,Wright,Mike·Issues in Coporate accountability and Governance,Accounting and Buiness Reaserch,1993(23)
[18]Newman,peter and murray milgate(ed),1992,The New palgrave pictianary of Finance London Themancmillan.press.Ltd
[19]Oliver E·williamson:The nature of the Firm,Oxford University press,1993
[20]张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托代关系-兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点.经济研究,1996(9)10
[21]Henery·Hansman:The ownership of enterprise,Harvard University press,1996
[22]Shleifer,A·And·R.Vishny,A Survey of Coporate.Governance.Journal of Finance.1997,52(2):737-783
[23]李德文,刘定华.股东权配置探讨.财经理论与实践,2006(1)
[24]青木昌彦,钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构.中国经济出版社,1995
[25]P.I.Blumberg,Corporate Groups:Procedure Law,§22.01.1(1983).转自殷召良著.公司控制权法律问题研究.法律出版社2001,1
[26]吴淑琨,席酉民.公司治理模式探讨.经济学动态,1999,1
[27]林晓镍.股东利益的冲突与平衡--探寻股东关系和基本原则.法学评诊,2001(1)
[28]John L·Colley,George.logan,Corporate.Governance,copyright 2003 by the McGran·Will Companies.inc
[29]吴晓求.股权流动性分裂的八大危害.财贸经济,2004(5)
[30][德]罗伯特·霍恩,楚建译.德国民商法.中国大百科全书出版社,1996,293
[31]何孝量.独立董事制度与监事制度的优劣比较及制度安排.经济学动态,2001(8)
[32]张屹山.关于有效推进国有企业改革的思考.经济研究,1999(6)
[33]徐卫东.商法基本问题研究.法律出版社,2002
[34]Hubert Ooghe and Tine De Langhe(2002):The Anglo-American versus the Continental European corporate governance model:empirical evidence of board composition in Belgium,European Business Review,Vol14,No 6,437-449
[35]郎咸平,易宪容等译.公司治理.社会科学文献出版社,2004
[36]Berle.A,and G.MEANS,The Modern Corporation and Price Proporty MacMillan.New Youk,1932
[37]汤欣.公司治理与上市公司收购.中国人民大学出版社,2001
[38]刘俊海.股东权法律保护概论.人民法院出版社,1995
[39]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[40]宁向东.公司治理理论.中国发展出版社,2005
[41]Brian·R·Cheffins:Company law:Theory Structure,and Operation,Oxford University press,1997
[42]王伟杰.资本市场二元结构难题及破解.当代经济研究,2004(8)
[43]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[44]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[45]The Measurement of Relatedness:An Application to Corporate Diversification:J.Fan,LARRY H.P-LANG,Journal of Business 73,2000,629-660
[46]李德文、曾德明.股东权治理.公司治理本质.湘潭大学学报,2003(4)
[47][美]罗伯特·蒙克斯、尼尔·米诺.公司治理.中国财政经济出版社,2004
[48]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护.法律出版社,1997
[49]林晓镍.股东利益的冲突与平衡--探寻股东关系和基本原则.法学评论,2001(1)
[50]韩志国.全流通:决定中国股市命运的制度性跨越.人大2004一季度经济类专题
[51]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[52]吴晓求.股权流动性分裂的八大危害.财贸经济,2004(5)
[53][美]罗伯特·C·克拉克.公司法则.工商出版杜,1999,73
[54]郑德程,沈华洲.股权结构与公司治理.中山大学学报(哲社版),2002(1)
[55]余颖.公司治理:本土企业的解决方案.经济科学出版社,2005
[56]朱慈蕴.中国引入独立董事制度应注意的若干问题.北京大学出版社,2003
[57]吴淑琨,席酉民.公司治理模式探讨.经济学动态,1999(1)
[58]李建伟.公司制度.公司治理与公司管理-法律在公司管理中的地位与作用.人民法院出版社,2005
[59]The Measurement of Relatedness:An Application to Corporate Diversification:J.Fan,LARRY H·P·LANG,Journal of Business 73,2000,629-660