国家冲突阴影下的贸易增长：一种社会—国家的分析
摘要
贸易增长和冲突之间的关系已经引起了国际关系学者的广泛关注，不过学者们更多的是从贸易增长会抑制冲突还是容易产生冲突这个角度展开论述的，对反方向的研究——国家间冲突对贸易的影响——则鲜有着墨。但在现实的国际政治中，确实存在着冲突阴影下的贸易增长现象，遗憾的是，这些现象既没有受到应有的重视，也缺乏必要的理论解释。如果能其进行合理阐述，无论是对于提高已有理论的准确度及生命力，还是发展出新的国际关系理论，都大有裨益。
本文构建了“社会-国家”模型以解释冲突阴影下的贸易增长现象。该理论模型从传统的国家中心论的窠臼中跳出，在重视国家行为体继续在国际关系领域发挥重要作用的同时，把社会作为另一个可以与国家行为体相提并论的重要行为体引入国际政治的研究领域，提出在世界政治领域，社会和国家都是具有主体性身份的重要行为体，但由于偏好的不同，社会和国家各自所追求的目标以及其行为存在着相当大的差异。总体上，国家行为遵从安全最大化逻辑，力图建立保持并扩大与它国的安全优势；而社会体的行为依照福利最大化逻辑，以提高经济福利为各种政治活动的出发点。“社会-国家”模型将国内社会力量的作用和国家的外在安全敏感性及战略选择加以结合，强调不仅必须通过社会行为体的视角来了解国家行为，而且也必须在国家属性的基础上把握社会力量。
本文认为，在争夺对政府政策制定的主导权时，社会行为体和国家行为体在竞争中合作和妥协，而非彼此脱离并完全对立，这使得政府的对外贸易政策必须在国家的安全偏好和社会的福利偏好之间寻求某种平衡。平衡并非绝对的对等，而是在安全和福利之间有所侧重，到底侧重于哪方，既取决于不同行为体的力量对比，也取决于一国特定的政治制度和所处的国际安全结构和经济结构。侧重于社会行为体和经济福利的平衡便造成了冲突下的贸易增长现象。
作为对社会-国家模型的检验和运用，本文选取冷战后的美国对华贸易政策的制定为案例进行深入分析。本文认为，和中国开展贸易对美国国内不同社会行为体的经济福利有着不同的影响，这些社会行为体进行了各种政治行动以维护自身利益。在这些行为体的影响下，加之本国政治制度的特点，美国政府最终采取了总体上对华自由贸易的政策。但是由于国家行为体的压力，美国政府同时对中国采取防范措施和歧视政策，其中主要包括出口控制、贸易歧视政策和实行经济制裁等。
More and more scholars have focused on the interaction between trade growth and conflict in international relations. Most of them study this interesting issue from the perspective of trade growth inhibiting interstate conflict or inducing interstate conflict, however, with respect to whether or not conflict will impact trade relations, the existing literature does not provide a convincing explanation despite the facts of trade growth in the shadow of conflict. Therefore, understanding how trade ties and growth can develop even in the shadow of severe political tensions will not only help us better comprehend international relations theory but also facilitate the birth of new theory.
To solve the puzzle, I construct a "society-state" model. "Society-state" model goes beyond traditional "state-centered" theory in terms of not regarding state as the only actor though it still insists that state is actually one of the most important actors in world politics. Meanwhile, "society-state" model posits that we should bring the society into international relations theory and consider its crucial role in world politics seriously. As two most significant actors, however, society and state have different preferences: the former seeks economic welfare while the later strives for national security. Due to their different preferences, society and state pursue different goals and consequently behave differently. The "society-state" approach has many academic merits. The biggest one is that it not only emphasizes the great diversity of preference between society and state but also aims to integrate both into a comprehensive framework in which they interact.
In the struggle to affect the foreign policy, society and state will compromise rather than totally oppose each other, which makes the government balance between economic interest and security concern during the process of foreign policy making. Actually, balancing here does not mean absolute evenness on welfare or security. As to whether society or state will be considered more by government, it depends on both their power balance and the political institutions in which they exist. In addition, the final outcome stems from the international economic structure and security conditions. As a result of more emphasis on the society, trade growth can come into being even in the shadow of conflict.
China-U.S bilateral trade relation and America's trade policy towards China after the cold war are selected as the case to test the "society-state" model. Trading with China has diverse impact on domestic societal actors in U.S.A., some benefit from it while other are hurt. Actors who share the same preference will form political coalitions and take part in all kinds of political activities to present their own interest. Partly because of the power balance of different coalitions, partly because of its particular political institutions, U.S. government eventually adopts a free trade policy toward China. Meanwhile, it takes wary measures and discrimination policies toward China under the realistic pressure from national security.
本文构建了“社会-国家”模型以解释冲突阴影下的贸易增长现象。该理论模型从传统的国家中心论的窠臼中跳出，在重视国家行为体继续在国际关系领域发挥重要作用的同时，把社会作为另一个可以与国家行为体相提并论的重要行为体引入国际政治的研究领域，提出在世界政治领域，社会和国家都是具有主体性身份的重要行为体，但由于偏好的不同，社会和国家各自所追求的目标以及其行为存在着相当大的差异。总体上，国家行为遵从安全最大化逻辑，力图建立保持并扩大与它国的安全优势；而社会体的行为依照福利最大化逻辑，以提高经济福利为各种政治活动的出发点。“社会-国家”模型将国内社会力量的作用和国家的外在安全敏感性及战略选择加以结合，强调不仅必须通过社会行为体的视角来了解国家行为，而且也必须在国家属性的基础上把握社会力量。
本文认为，在争夺对政府政策制定的主导权时，社会行为体和国家行为体在竞争中合作和妥协，而非彼此脱离并完全对立，这使得政府的对外贸易政策必须在国家的安全偏好和社会的福利偏好之间寻求某种平衡。平衡并非绝对的对等，而是在安全和福利之间有所侧重，到底侧重于哪方，既取决于不同行为体的力量对比，也取决于一国特定的政治制度和所处的国际安全结构和经济结构。侧重于社会行为体和经济福利的平衡便造成了冲突下的贸易增长现象。
作为对社会-国家模型的检验和运用，本文选取冷战后的美国对华贸易政策的制定为案例进行深入分析。本文认为，和中国开展贸易对美国国内不同社会行为体的经济福利有着不同的影响，这些社会行为体进行了各种政治行动以维护自身利益。在这些行为体的影响下，加之本国政治制度的特点，美国政府最终采取了总体上对华自由贸易的政策。但是由于国家行为体的压力，美国政府同时对中国采取防范措施和歧视政策，其中主要包括出口控制、贸易歧视政策和实行经济制裁等。
More and more scholars have focused on the interaction between trade growth and conflict in international relations. Most of them study this interesting issue from the perspective of trade growth inhibiting interstate conflict or inducing interstate conflict, however, with respect to whether or not conflict will impact trade relations, the existing literature does not provide a convincing explanation despite the facts of trade growth in the shadow of conflict. Therefore, understanding how trade ties and growth can develop even in the shadow of severe political tensions will not only help us better comprehend international relations theory but also facilitate the birth of new theory.
To solve the puzzle, I construct a "society-state" model. "Society-state" model goes beyond traditional "state-centered" theory in terms of not regarding state as the only actor though it still insists that state is actually one of the most important actors in world politics. Meanwhile, "society-state" model posits that we should bring the society into international relations theory and consider its crucial role in world politics seriously. As two most significant actors, however, society and state have different preferences: the former seeks economic welfare while the later strives for national security. Due to their different preferences, society and state pursue different goals and consequently behave differently. The "society-state" approach has many academic merits. The biggest one is that it not only emphasizes the great diversity of preference between society and state but also aims to integrate both into a comprehensive framework in which they interact.
In the struggle to affect the foreign policy, society and state will compromise rather than totally oppose each other, which makes the government balance between economic interest and security concern during the process of foreign policy making. Actually, balancing here does not mean absolute evenness on welfare or security. As to whether society or state will be considered more by government, it depends on both their power balance and the political institutions in which they exist. In addition, the final outcome stems from the international economic structure and security conditions. As a result of more emphasis on the society, trade growth can come into being even in the shadow of conflict.
China-U.S bilateral trade relation and America's trade policy towards China after the cold war are selected as the case to test the "society-state" model. Trading with China has diverse impact on domestic societal actors in U.S.A., some benefit from it while other are hurt. Actors who share the same preference will form political coalitions and take part in all kinds of political activities to present their own interest. Partly because of the power balance of different coalitions, partly because of its particular political institutions, U.S. government eventually adopts a free trade policy toward China. Meanwhile, it takes wary measures and discrimination policies toward China under the realistic pressure from national security.
引文
1 Immanuel Kant, Perpetural Peace, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957, pp. 97.
2 孟德斯鸠，《论法的精神》(下)，北京：商务印书馆，2004年第1版，第3页。
3 汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著，《联邦党人文集》，程逢如等译，商务印书馆，1995年。
4 弗里德里希·李斯特，《政治经济学的国民体系》，陈万煦译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年。
5 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Free Press. 1986.
6 S. M. McMillan, "Interdependence and Conflict", Mershon International Studies Review, May 1997, pp. 33-58.
7 J. D. Fearson, "Rationalist Explanations for War", International Organization, Summer 1995, pp. 379-414.
8 K. Snitwongse, "Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements Though Political Cooperation", Pacific Review, Summer 1998, pp.183-194.
9 John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.
10 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp.140-141.
11 Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Charles Kindelberger, eds., The International Corporation, Cambridge: MIT Press. 1970, p.205.
12 Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization, Autumn 1984, pp. 597-624.
13 Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations", International Security, Spring 1996, pp. 5-41.
14 如前文所述，有学者也认为冲突会妨碍贸易的进行，但这仅仅是假设或者说前提，而非经过严密论证的结果。所以和那些经过研究后得出冲突抑制贸易的学者不能相提并论。
15 直接武装对抗和冲突——如军事动员和爆发战争——是最为极端的一种冲突方式，但不是唯一的冲突形式。本文所采取的冲突定义要相对泛化和弱化，特指“高级政治”领域两国利益和目标的严重不一致。“高级政治”光谱上的不一致，如从政治冲突、主权冲突、战略冲突、军事冲突直至政府间爆发战争等，属于本文的冲突范围。
16 从微观角度论述冲突对贸易影响的，可参见Brian M．Pollins，“Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, June 1989, pp. 465-480.
17 Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
18 Edward Mansfield, Rachel Bronson, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade", American Political Science Review, March 1997, pp. 94-107.
19 参见Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 45-47; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and The Pattern of International Cooperation", American Political Science Review, September 1991, p. 708; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", American Political Science Review, Oct 1991，pp．1303-1320。不过莫罗认为，即使相对收益因素存在，潜在冲突国之间也会进行贸易，因为国家不可能把其贸易得益全部用做军事目的。James Morrow," When Do 'Relative Gains' Impedes Trade", Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1997, pp. 12-37.
20 引力模型是指两国的双边贸易流量的规模与它们各自的经济总量呈正比，也它们之间的距离呈正比。参见J. Tinbergen, Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for An International Economic Policy, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1962.
21 众所周知，台湾自古属于中国领土不可分割的一部分，不具有主权国家的任何身份。作者在本文中以台湾举例，仅仅是从学术研究的角度探讨问题，没有任何其它含义。——作者按。
22 可参见Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Summer 1996, pp. 147-75; Katherine Barbieri and Jack Levy, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade", Journal of Peace Research, July 1999,463-479; Jack Levy, Katherine Barbieri, "Trading with Enemy During Wartime", Security Studies, Spring 2004, p. 1-47.
23 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People 'Power, Preferences, and Perceptions, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 2000, p. 162.
24 参见Edward Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U. S. Navy", World Politics, Oct 1994, pp. 1-41.
25 P. Diehl, and F. Wayman, "Realpolitik: Dead End, Detour, or Road Map?" In Reconstructing Realpolitik, edited by F. W. Wayman and P. Diehl, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 252.
26 参见Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", International Organization, 1997, pp. 513-553.
27 对于偏好的不生，有结构基础论(structure-based)和行为体中心论(agency-centered)两种解释。两者的最大差别在于前者认为偏好是外生的，而后者坚持偏好是内生的。参见William Roberts Clark，“Agents and Structures：Two Views of Preferences，Two Views of Institutions”，International Studies Quarterly，Summer，1998，pp．245-270．
28 新现实主义者和新自由和义者都接受此种观点。
29 另外，在社会与国家之间发挥媒介作作的制度也扮演着极为重要的角色。制度安排的不同，制约了社会成员以及社会与国家之间的互动。
30 本文是分析冲突之下的贸易行为，那些不存在冲突诱因或冲突现实的国家之间，不应用此模型来推演。
31 关于定量研究法和定性研究法的主要区别，参见Sharan B．Merriam，Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education，San Francisco：Jossey-Bass，2001，p．9．
32 对政治科学研究方法论的探讨，以及定量研究方法学者和定性研究方法学者之间的辩论，请参见Gary King, Unifying Political Methodology: The likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1997.
33 Gary King, Robrt O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. p. 63.
34 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
35 Charles Ragin and David Zaret. "Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies." Social Science, March 1983, pp. 731-754.
36 比如，马丁·莉莎试图解释经济制裁和国际合作之间的因果关系。她先用大数量法检验了99个样本，虽然结果显示两者确实有联系，但缺乏令人信服的因果推论。于是她细致探讨了六个案例，以证明两者的因果性。Lisa Martin，Coercive Cooperation，Princeton：Princeton University Press，1992．
37 Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade", Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1980, pp. 57-78.
38 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, February 1996, pp. 29-49.
39 James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa E. Taberes, "The Political Determinants of international Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-90", American Political Science Review, September 1998, pp. 649-661.
40 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York: Norton, 2001.
41 Anne Uchitel, "Interdependence and Instability", in Jack Snider and Robert Levis edited, Coping With the Complexity in International Systems, Boulder: WestView Press, 1993.
42 在贸易和冲突研究领域，同样出色的案例分析还有Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest", International Security, Autumn 1993, pp.125-153; Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations", International Security, Spring 1996, pp. 5-41; Dale Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Detente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91", Security Studies, Autumn-Winter, 1999/2000, pp. 15-58.
43 李杰普哈特(Lijphart)认为，案例大致上有六种类型：理论无关型(Atheoretical)、阐明理论型(Interpretative)、假设-生成型(Hypothesis-Generating)、肯定理论型(Theory Confirming)、 否定理论型(Theory Infirming)和反常案例型(Deviant)。前两者对理论创造的贡献非常有限，而其余四种都能促进理论的累积或者创造新的理论。参见Arend Lijphart，“Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", American Political Science Review, September 1971, pp. 691-692.
44 John S. Odell, "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy", International Studies Perspective, Summer 2001, pp. 161-176.
1 参见E．H．卡尔：《20年危机：国际关系研究导论》，秦亚青译，北京：世界知识出版社，2005，第1版；汉斯·摩根索：《国家间政治：为权力和和平而斗争》，杨歧鸣等译，北京：商务印书馆，1993年第5版；沃尔兹：国际政治理论》，信强译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003年第1版；约翰·米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅、唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003年第1版。
2 同上。
3 赫德利·布尔：《无政府社会：世界政治秩序研究》，张小明译，北京：世界知识出版社，2003年第1版，第255页。
4 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海：上海人民出版社，1998年第1版，第377页。
5 玛莎·费丽莫，《国际社会中的国家利益》，袁正清译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2001年第1版，第23页。
6 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海：上海人民出版社，1998年第1版，第377页。
7 国际制度理论本身包含着不同的流派，大体上可以分为现实主义流派、自由主义流派和建构主义流派等三种。不过，新自由主义通过与其它流派的争论，逐渐成为主流理论。参见Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, The Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 1.
8 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
9 江忆恩，“国际机制对国家行为的影响”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第12期，第23页。
10 亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第39页。
11 同上，第468页。
12 Robert Cox, "Social Force, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", Millennium: A Journal of International Studies, Summer 1981, p. 128.
13 贾斯廷·罗森伯格，《市民社会的帝国：现实主义国际关系批判》，洪邮生译，南京：江苏人民出版社，2002年第1版，第8页。
14 Liah Greenfeld and Michel Martin eds., Center: Ideas and Institutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.ⅷ.
15 近代以来，在政治学领域，社会和市民社会(civil society)两者经常概念上互换。因此，本文对此两者不做详尽区分。
16 洛克，《政府论》(下篇)，叶启芳、瞿菊农译，商务印书馆，1996年，第105页。
17 黑格尔，《法哲学原理》，范扬等译，商务印书馆，1996年版，第261页。
18 Charles Taylor, "The Models of Civil Society", Public Culture, Vol 3, No. 1, 1991, pp. 95-118.
19 John Keane, Democracy and civil Society, New York: Verso, 1988, p. 46.
20 俞可平，《马克思的市民社会理论及其历史地位》，载《中国社会科学》，1993年，第4期。
21 这种分法参照了哈加尔德等人对商业的分类，不同的是，将协会(associations)变为行业(industry)。参见Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, "Theories of business and business-state relations", in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and The state in developing Countries, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 33-60.
22 经济利益的最大化并不等于追求利润最大化。一般认为，经济组织有三大目标：1、利润最大化；2、提高市场占有率；3、实现股东收益最大化。无论是哪种，都可以将其归为经济利益的最大化。参见泰勒尔著，《产业组织理论》，张维迎总校译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，1997年版，第40-57页。
23 对社会有广义、中观和狭义的理解，不同范围下的社会所包含的内容不尽一致。参见曹沛霖，《政府与市场》，上海人民出版社，1998年，第129页。但是有学者对将经济视为社会的主要特征并不赞同。例如，科恩认为，经济部门和经济活动并非服从于社会，而是在社会和国家之外的第三部门，并构建出社会-经济-国家的三分模型。参见Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992。此外，泰勒认为，社会除了经济属性之外，还有公众和公众意见。该两者的共同存在，是促使社会在政治结构之外达致统一或者协调的两种路向。参见Charles Taylor,“Models of Civil Society”，Public Culture，Vol 3，No．1，1991，pp．95-118．
24 Irving Fisher, Elementary Principles of Economics, New York: Macmillan, 1923, p. 27.
25 所谓私人领域是指私人自主从事商品生产和交换的经济活动的领域。其中市场机制和私人产权构成这种私人领域的两大要素，它们保证个人能够自主地从事经济活动和追求特殊的私人利益。参见何增科，《公民社会与第三部门》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2000年，第4页。
26 这是一种科学实在论的观点。关于这种观点的具体阐述，可参见Austen Clark，“Beliefs and Desires Incorporated”，Journal of Philosophy，August 1994，p．404-425；王顺义，《科学实在论指称本体论承诺的变迁》，《哲学研究》，1995年第8期。
27 不过，卡赞斯坦可能是个例外，他认为国家和社会共同决定了政府的某些对外政策。参见Peter J. Katzenstein eds., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrialized Countries, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, p. 3, 21.
28 关于国家及国家体系在世界历史中的发展，可参见Walter C. Opello, and Stephen Rosow, The National-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, second edition, London: Lynne Rienner Publishiers, 2004.
29 国内结构还涵盖了政治和社会制度中的组织机构及其运行惯例，以及深嵌于政治文化中的价值和规范。参见Thomas Risse-Kappen，eds．，Bringing Transnagonal Relations Back in，Cambridge：Cambridge University Press，1993，p．20．
30 对于国内政治的解释及其效度，可参见James D．Fearon，“Domestic Politics，Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations”，Annual Review of Political Science，June 1998，pp．289-313．
31 这里的社会仅仅只以经济利益为导向和联结的个体的集合，并不包括以意识形态(环境保护、人权等)和知识传播为目标的个人和群体的集合。关于后者住国际关系中的意义，可参见Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., Bringing Transnational Relations Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.3-33.
32 David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, New York: Alfred Norve, 1971, p. 31.
33 Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.
34 Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 171.
35 Kelvin Lancaster, "A New Approach to Consumer Theory", Journal of Political Economy, April, 1966, pp. 132-158.
36 事实上，已有学者指出，在社会科学领域内生-外生的争论反映了一种错误的二分法，或者说是一种结构二元论的谬误。参见Anthony Giddens，The Constitution of Society：Outline of the Theory of Structuration，Cambridge：Polity Press, 1984.
37 Jeffery Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations", in David Lake and Robert Powell eds., Strategic Choice in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 39-76.
38 至于不同的结论，可参见Terry Moe," The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science, Nov 1984, pp.739-777.
39 关于国际贸易对国内行为体偏好的影响，可参见Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Globalization and Domestic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
40 Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and The Politics of International Trade, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
41 Dani Rodrik, "The Rush to Free Trade: Why Now, Why So Late?", In Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb,eds., Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, Oxford: Oxford University, 1994, pp.61-88.
42 Bernard Hoekman and Carlos A. Primo Braga, "Protection and Trade in Services: A Survey", The World Bank, CEPR Discussion Papers 1705, 1997.
43 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages." The Review of Economic Studies, November, 1941, pp. 58-73.
44 生产要素主要有劳动力、土地、资本和技术等等。对赫克歇尔-俄林定理的分析和推导，请参见Paul Krugman, and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, New York: Addison-Wesley, 6th edition, 2003.
45 James Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions", The Journal of Political Philosophy, No.2 1994, pp.166-167.
46 Steven Magee, "Three Simple Testsof the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem", in Peter Oppenheimer eds. International Economics, London: Oriel, 1980, 1919. 138-153.
47 这是一种简单的分法。有学者将生产要素分为资本、熟练劳动、半熟练劳动、不熟练劳动、热带土地、干旱土地、林地、温和土地、煤炭、矿产和石油等11种，参见Edward Leamer，Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984.
48 Ronald Rogowski,, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Institutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
49 该学派的其他重要论文可参见:Paul Mitford, "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments", International Organization, Autumn 1993, pp. 535-564; Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, "What determines individual trade-policy preferences?", Journal of International Economics, 2001(54), pp. 267-292.
50 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press,1985, pp. 41-42.
51 关于该模型的证明和推论，请参见Ronald Jones, "A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History", in Jagdish Bhagwati, Ronald Jones, Robert Mundell eds., Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1971, pp. 3-21.
52 军工行业似乎是个特例。这个行业一方面希望出口增加，这要求一个好的国际交易环境：另一方面，如果形势动荡导致政府军事开支增加，它似乎也能从中受益。不过总体上，可以将其视为一个偏好国家冲突上升的行业。
53 杰弗瑞·弗里登运用要素专有性来判别拉丁美洲国家内部不同行为者的贸易偏好。参见Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
54 也有学者认为不是要素的流动性构成解决问题的关键，而是两种学说适用于不同的时间跨度，从短期内，“行业”分析法要比“要素一阶级”分析法更能解释某一国家内部不同贸易利益集团的构成及游说行为。但长期来看，“专有要素”学说则更有说服力。参见Edward Leamer, and James Leviinsohn, "International Trade Theory: The Evidence", in Gene Grossman, Kenneth Rogoff eds., Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier Press, 1995, pp. 1339-1350.
55 Michael J. Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 20020。关于要素流动性的论述，还可参见Mark Brawley, "Factoral or sectoral conflict: Partially Mobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial Germany", International Studies Quarterly, 1997(41), pp. 633-654.
56 不过不少学者认为，相对于比较清晰的行业或要素偏好而言，单个企业或公司的偏好要模糊得多。因为不少跨国公司在从贸易自由化当中获益的同时，也会遭受伤害。
57 Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism, and Free Trade: International and Politics of International Trade, Princeton University Press, 1988, p.25.
58 Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p.15。在本书中，米尔纳用利益取代了偏好一词，把政策偏好等同于偏好。事实上，最高或最根本利益才是偏好。具体地分析，可参见Jonathan Crystal，“What do Producers Want?On the Origins of Societal Policy Preferences”, European Journal of International Relations, vol.9(3), 2003, pp.407-439.
59 Oona A. Hathaway, "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection", International Organization, Summer 1998, pp.575-612.
60 Scott Gehlbach, "A Political Model of Exit and Voice", unpublished manuscript, 2005
61 I. M. Destler and John S. Odell, Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics, Washington: Institute for International Economics. 1987. p .24.
62 值得注意的是，政治活动和利益集团的游说活动在形式上非常相象。游说活动可以分为直接游说和间接游说，其目标是试图“通过联系(或通过促使他人联系)立法官员或其他政府官员，以保证有利于自身的法案、政策。”但游说和政治活动的最大区别在于主体，游说的主体是各个利益集团，而(本文当中的)政治活动主体是社会成员。如本章第一节所述，社会行为体(各个经济单位)的影响力绝非一般利益集团可比，所以不以游说来描述社会成员的单独或联盟行动。关于社会行为体和利益集团的区别，可参见David Hart，“Business is not an Interest Group: On the Studies of Companies in American National Politics”, Annual Review of American Political Science, 2004, pp.47-69.
63 Paul A.Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economics and Statistics,1954：36，pp．387-389。不过，对于公共产品的定义和分类，存在着一定的争论。由这些争论出发，引出了对集体行动逻辑的更多理解。参见Elinor Ostrom，“How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action", Journal of Theoretical Politics, No. 3, 2003, pp. 239-270.
64 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, p.2; Russell Hardin, Collective Action, Baltimore, MD：Johns Hopkins University Press，1982。另外，苏长和将国际制度看成是公共产品，并对此做了精彩的论述，参见苏长和，《全球公共问题与国际合作：一种制度的分析》，上海人民出版社，2000。
65 Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E.Roberts, "The determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1976-1986", American Political Science Review, December 1994, p.911.
66 Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies", in Kenneth A. Oye eds, Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 19-20.
67 Brain Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy, London: Macmillan Press, 1970, p.25.
68 在利益的激励与动员下，即使这个次级集团成员很多，他们也会为集体利益而行动。次级集团的存在表明相同公共产品所能带来的利益对不同的联盟成员而言并非一致，有些成员会从公共产品中获得更多，而有些成员则会获得较少。可参见Russell Hardin，Collective Action, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p.40-41; Thomas Schelling,Micromotives and Macrobehavior, New York: W.W.Norton &Company, 1978, pp.213-243; Mancur Olson ,The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, p.46.
69 对市场集中度的衡量因此成为重要问题。除了以销售额占全部市场的比重作为衡量指标之外，还可以采用研发费用的比例(R&D)，股票的市场价值等作为指标。对于市场的分类，可以采取四位代码分类(four-digit codes)，也可以采取六位代码分类(six-digit codes)。参见Wendy Hansen, Neil Mitchell and Jeffery Drope, "The Logic of Private and Public Action", American Journal of Political Science, January 2005, pp. 150-167.
70 Robert Dahl, "A Critique of The Ruling Elite Model", American Political Science Review, June 1958, pp. 463-469.
71 Russell Pittman, "Market Structure and Campaign Contributions", Public Choice, Fall 1977, pp. 37-51; Mark S Mizruchi, Thomas Koenig, "Size, Concentration, and Corporate Networks: Determinants of Business Collective Action", Social Science Quarterly, June 1991, pp. 299-313; Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E.Roberts, "The determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1976-1986", American Political Science Review, December 1994,pp．911-924。但有人也认为因为市场集中度高的企业其实不需要政治行动就能达到经济目的，比如通过合谋控制产品产量和价格，或者将赚取的利润用于培训工人或投入研发等手段足以应付来自市场的挑战，并可进一步扩大其领先优势。但问题在于，政治联盟的政治活动并非都是主动去寻求自由贸易政策，相反，有时是被动的去维护自由贸易政策，比如为了反击对立的政治联盟所进行的政治活动。在这种情况下，市场集中度高的企业也必须进行政治活动。另外，这些企业有时会采取隐性的政治活动，如聘请退位的政府高级官员，或通过良好的私人关系和政府官员沟通等等，这些是不易被觉察，但确实存在着的政治活动。参见Ronald W．Cox，Power and Profit：U．S．Policy in Central America，Kentucky：The University Press of Kentucky，pp．5-8．
72 Jeffry Frieden, and Ronald Rogowshi, "The Impact of the International Economy on National Politics: An Analytical Review", in Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 25-47.
73 关于偏好保护贸易的厂商和希望降低关税的消费者之间的博弈情况，可参见Elmer Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures,and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprises in Pressure Politics, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935.
74 Joanne Gowa, "Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monerary Policy Processes in the United States", International Organization, Winter 1988, pp.15-32。在本文中，戈娃用集体行动的逻辑检验了美国政府的对外贸易政策和金融政策。
75 关于此点，将在第三章详细论述。
76 John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, p.226.
77 Chrysostomos Mantzavinos, Douglas C. North, and Syed Shariq, "Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance", Perspectives on Politics, March 2004, pp.75-84.
78 Ibid.
79 道格拉斯·诺斯，《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》，刘守英译，上海：上海三联书店和上海人民出版社，1994年版，第5—6页。另外一个容易混淆的词是regime(体系或政权)。关于institutions、regime和organization三者之间的区别，请参阅苏长和，“重新定义国际制度”，《欧洲》，1999年第6期，第22-27页。
80 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.19.
81 《中国大百科全书(政治学)》，北京：中国大百科全书出版社，1992年版。
82 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
83 John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, pp.226-228.
84 关于政治制度的定义讨论，可参考Bo Rothstein, "Political Institutions: An Overview", in Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds, A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.133-166.
85 Ronald Rogowski and Mark Kayser, "Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price Level Evidence in OECD Countries", American Journal of Political Science, July 2002, pp. 526-539.
86 John Hatfield and William Hauk, "Electoral Regime and Trade Tariff", http://www.stanford.edu/～hatfield/papers/tariffs.pdf
87 Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U. S. Nontariff Barriers", American Journal of Political Science, 1999(43), pp. 1028-1050.
88 Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions", International Organization, Spring 1987, pp.203-223.
89 Helen Milnen and Benjamin Judkins, "Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?", International Studies Quarterly, 2004(48), pp.95-119
90 Sobert Shugart and Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems", in Stephan Haggard and Matthew McCubbins eds, Presidents, Parliaments and Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
91 Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy", International Organization, Autumn 1994, pp.595-632.
92 Edward Mansfield, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade", American Political Science Review, June 2000, pp. 305-321.
93 Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, New York: Cambridge, 1998
94 Daniel Verdier, "Democratic Convergence and Free Trade", International Studies Quarterly, 1998(42):1, p.1.
95 正如第一章所阐述的，不少学者已经注意到了这个问题，认为国家-社会关系是政策制定的关键变量。但他们把这种关系看成是静态的，不仅忽视了国家和社会的互动，更重要的 是，忽视了制度在互动过程中所起的作用。国家“强”或者社会“强”主要就体现在制度的层面。
96 “政策制定权力的集中或分散”这样的表述价值中立，可以避免民主或非民主制度的意 识形态的争论。因为一个政策制定权力集中与否与政治制度的民主或非民主无关。在民主国家，权力也可能高度集中，比如长时间内集中于一个政党(如日本的自民党)，或者按照宪法的规定，权力更集中于总统(法国)。这样，便会更好地扩张理论的解释范围。
97 George Tsebelis, "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Muliticameralism, and Multipartyism", British Journal of Political Science, June 1995, p.293.
98 George Tsebelis, " Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis", American Political Science Review, September 1999, pp.593.
99 这和新制度主义经济学宣称的制度具有“路径依赖”性不谋而合。另外很显然，改变的困难程度和否决者的数量高度相关。否决者的数量越多，改变越为困难；否决者的数量越少，改变越为容易。这解释了为何民主制度比较稳定。因为一般而言，民主制度比非民主制度有着更多的否决者。
100 这是目前制度变迁领域占据主流地位的理性选择制度主义的理论。该理论的基本前提是人是有理性的，理性人有目的地设计出制度来解决特定的问题，当有改变制度的要求时，制度创设者可以通过评估制度改变和维护现存制度之间的收益和成本，来决定是否进行制度变迁。关于理性选择制度主义的分析，参见Baby R．Weingast，“Political Institutions：Rational Choice Perspectives”，in Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds．，A New Handbook of Political Science，Oxford：Oxford University Press，pp．167-190。但是如果根据制度变迁的“间断均衡论”和“自发演化论”，则结果要复杂得多。关于间断均衡论，可参见Sean Kelly,“Punctuated Change and the Era of Divided Government"，New Perspectives on American Politics，Washington，D．C：Congress Quarterly Press，1994；关于制度的自发演化论，可参见韦森，“哈耶克式自发制度生成论的博弈论诠释”，载《中国社会科学》，2003年第6期，第43-57页。
101 值得注意的是，本文的这个结论与内生性关税理论(Endogenous Trade，ET)的结论本质上并不矛盾。这是由于两者观察的视角并不一致。ET关注关税为何产生，为何各国不采取理论上最优的纯粹自由贸易；而本文关注的是关税即使有的话，世界的平均关税水平为何越来越低。关于内生性关税理论，参见Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman，“Protection for Sale”，American Economic Review，1994(84)，pp．833-850．
1 关于现实主义和自由主义对国家在世界政治中的地位认定，请参考Joseph M．Grieco，Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press，1990，pp．27-36；关于建构主义者对国家的态度，参见亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第9-12页。
2 霍布斯，《利维坦》，黎思复等译，商务印书馆，1985年，第92页—第93页。
3 同上，第93页。
4 同上，第131—132页。
5 洛克，《政府论》(下篇)，叶启芳、瞿菊农译，商务印书馆，1996年，第105页。
6 戴维·伊斯顿，《政治生活的系统分析》，王浦劬等译，华夏出版社，1989年版，第3页-第4页。
7 Gabriel A.Almond, "The Return to the State", American Political Science Review, September 1988, p.855.
8 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
9 Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structure and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.21.
10 Ibid, p.23.
11 Ibid, p.23.
12 Andrew Cortell and James Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter: The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms", International Studies Quarterly, September 1996, pp.451-478.
13 关于马克思主义的国家观，可参见王沪宁主编：《政治的逻辑：马克思主义政治学原理》，上海人民出版社，1998年版，第135页-第214页。对于各种国家观的综合性介绍，可参考奇尔科特：《比较政治学理论：新范式的探索》，潘世强等译，北京：社会科学文献出版社，1997年版，第199-第216页；吴惕安，俞可平主编，《当代西方国家理论评析》，陕西人民出版社，1994年版。
14 亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第254页。
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. by Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, vol. 1, p. 54.
16 .David Held, "Central Perspectives on the modern state," in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall ed., The Idea of Modern State, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, pp. 62-64.
17 新现实主义的理论渊源可以追溯至修昔底德在《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》一书所提出的观点，即根本性的人性的自私塑造了国家行为体的精神特质，并因此导致对其它国家的霸权征服，此即“历史的悲观进程”。此后，后来者马基雅维利和摩根索入木三分地剖析了人性当中的“恶”，并据此对国际关系进行了深刻地描述。参见修昔底德：《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》，谢德风译，北京：商务印书馆，1960年版；马基雅维利：《君主论》，潘汉典译，北京：商务印书馆，1985年版；汉斯·摩根索：《大国间政治：为权力和和平而斗争》，杨鸣歧等译，北京：商务印书馆，1993年版。此三人的学术观点可以归结为人性现实主义。关于现实主义的发展脉络，参见Benjamin Frankel, eds, Roots of Realism, London: Frank Cass,
18 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, M.A: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.111
19 Ibid, p.95.
20 米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松泽，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第17页。
21 Ibid, pp.104-105.
22 Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface", in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller eds, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995,p.xi.
23 Jeffrey W.Legro and Andrew Moravcsik ,"Is Anybody Still a Realist ?" International Security, Fall 1999, pp.5-55.
24 新自由主义内部有诸多流派，如共和自由主义、商业自由主义和民主和平论等等。但其中最具影响的是新制度自由主义，所以这里的新自由主义是指新制度自由主义。关于对新自由主义流派的梳理，参见苏长利：“自由主义和世界政治”，载《世界经济与政治》，2004年第7期，第15页-第20页。
25 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
26 David Baldwin,"Neorealism, Neoliberalism and World Politics", in David Baldwin eds..Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
27 Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment", in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003, p.163.
28 Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 107-122.
29 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p.2.
30 Ibid, p.2.
31 Ibid，p．4。如果说在《国际制度和国家权力》一书中基欧汉对国家和政府的接替使用反应了其准备接受国家作为世界政治最重要行为体的早期的不成熟思考，那么在其后的著作中再次出现政府取代国家的行文就不能用偶然来解释了。在《新现实主义和新自由主义》一书中，基欧汉论述到“制度设立的规则对国家行使权力有限制作用。各个政府通过使用政治影响来实现它们的目标，这包括增加它们在合作中的获益份额”。参见(相对收益的条件性一节的上面一段)。在《国际关系：旧的和新的》一文中，基欧汉起先批判了结构现实主义忽视国内政治和国际制度的影响，以及无法发展一套变化的理论，基欧汉笔锋一转，认为新自由主义理论“关注国家行为的变化性而非持久性——这种变化不仅仅是物质能力的变化，而且是政治过程的变化，特别是在国内层面和国际层面制度特征的变化”，“当国家能够从合作中共同获益的时候，我们预期政府将会努力创立这样的制度”。参见Robert Keohane, "International Relations, Old and New", in Robert E .Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.468.
32 罗伯特·基欧汉，“中文版前言”，《霸权之后：世界政治与经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强和何曜译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年，第23页。
33 除了处于国家机构位置上的人以外，政府还可以作为“管理的过程”，还是“权力的行使”，或者指“一个社会中管理的方式、方法和制度”，世界银行，《1997年世界发展报告：变革世界中的政府》，蔡秋生等译，北京：中国财政经济出版社，1997年，第20页。青木吕彦认为，政府是主权国家的一般行为代表，包括立法、行政、司法、官僚部门和统治集团在内的组织。参见青木昌彦：《比较制度分析》，周黎安译，上海：上海远东出版社，2001年版，第158页。
34 国家自身没有利益或者说偏好，其利益和偏好只能又国内政治决定吗?答案是否定的。政府的对外政策也不能认为是国家利益的表现。事实上，政府政策的形成有多个来源，其中有些来自于国家利益的需求，也有来自其他行为体的要求。
35 Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment", in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003, p.163.
36 事实上，不少以“去国家化”为中心论点的自由主义著作都存在这样的重大缺陷：将政府等同于国家。在着重论证了政府对政治、经济等领域控制力降低、或者存在“政府失灵”的现象之后，便得出国家变得越来越不重要，越来越虚弱的结论。特别是在国家和社会关系研究当中，其中的“国家”一词一般都可以刚“政府”一词代替，如“强国家-弱社会”可以毫无疑义地转化为“强政府-弱社会”。这表现了不少西方国家，特别是英、美等国国家概念的长期缺位。参见：Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era, Cambridge, U.K: Polity Press,1998.
37 比如著名的现实主义学者史蒂芬·克拉斯纳。在其成名作《保卫国家利益》一书中，克拉斯纳开宗明义，“将采取国家主义的研究方法，视国家为自主的行为体”。但他坚持要在政策制定的过程理解国家。在美国对外政策的制定过程中，他写到，“国家自主地形成目标，并力图排除国际和国内行为者的反对并贯彻执行”。政府机构，特别是白宫和国务院，“对特定的社会压力集团具有高度的免疫能力”，国防部、财政部、商务部，或者中央情报局“也可以被视为国家的组成部分”，但“它们的行为已经产生了变化。有时会为提升集体目标而奋斗，但有时会扩大特定社会集团的利益以及官僚机构自身的利益”。参见Stephen Krasner,Defending the National Interest：Raw Materials Investments and U．S．Foreign Policy，Princeton：Princeton University Press，1978，p．5，p．10，p．11。另外一个例子是戴维·赖克，他虽然是位体系论者，但也认为国家“从狭隘的意义上讲，是政府中的中央决策者”，“宽泛地说，是政府”。参见David A．Lake，Power, Protection, and Free Trade：International Sources of U．S．Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939，Ithaca：Cornell University Press，1988，p．68．
38 亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第256页。
39 在这个意义上，新自由主义的国家观并非本质国家观。
40 温特认为本质国家具有5个特征，(1)制度一法律秩序；(2)惟一可以合法使用有组织暴力的组织；(3)具有主权的组织；(4)社会；(5)领土。同上，第257页。
41 更准确地说，现代国家是1648年《威斯特伐利亚条约》签定之后的产物。《威斯特伐利亚和约》，是法国、瑞典和德意志新教诸候为一方，哈布斯堡王朝神圣罗马帝国皇帝和德意志天主教诸候为另一方，为结束二十年战争(1618——1648)而缔结的和约。
42 Handrik Spruyt，The Sovereign State and Its Competitors：An Analysis of Systems Change，New Jersey,Princeton：Princeton University Press，1994。关于现代主权国家发展的历史分析，还可参见Martin van Creveld, The rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999和Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
43 关于国家和这些政治体的区别，可参见Friedrich Kratochwil，“Of Systems，Boundaries，and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System", World Politics, October 1986, pp.27-52; Charles Tilly eds., The Formation of National State in Western Europe, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1975.
44 Martin van Creveld, The rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.415-416.
45 Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p.10.
46 关于战争和国家诞生的关系，可参见戴维·赫尔德，《民主和全球秩序》，胡伟等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003年，第58页。
47 汉斯·摩根索：《大国间政治：为权力利和平而斗争》，杨鸣歧等译，北京：商务印书馆，1993年；华尔兹认为，“只有生存得以保障，国家才有可能追求诸如利润和权力等”，参见Kenneth Waltz，Theory of International Politics，M．A：Addison-Wesley,1979，p．126。还有其他一些国家关系学者也赞同此观点。克拉斯纳曾经总结道，“所有的国家都承认国家的最低要求是保持领土和政治完整”。参见Stephen Krasner,Structure Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism，Berkeley：University of California Press，1985，p．26。阿隆问道，“什么是政治体(比如国家)逻辑上地第一选择目标?每个行为体都追求生存。”参见Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1973, p.64.
48 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1950, p.75.
49 Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", Behavioral Science, July 1957, pp.201-205.
50 Joseph Nye, Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990,p.154.
51 Bruce Russet, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000, pp.93-110。另外，还可以参见米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》， 王义桅和唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第84页-104页。
52 Harold Sorout and Margaret Sorout, Toward a Political of the Planet Earth, New York: Van Nostrand，1971，p．165。在这个意义上，米尔斯海默认为“权力不过是国家所能获得的特殊资产或物质资源”是不够全而的，参见米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第81页。另外，吉尔平将权力定义为“一个国家的军事、经济和技术能力”也是片面的，参见Robert Gilpin，War and Change in World Politics，New York：Cambridge University Press，1981，p．13．
53 Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf, 1985, p.31.
54 同上，第42页。
55 Randall L.Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in", International Security, Summer 1994, p.85-88.
56 参见Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons, New York: Oxford University Press 1991; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies, Spring 1992,pp.417-447.
57 也有不少学者将财富列为国家偏好。参见George Alexander and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations", in George Alexander eds., Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder: Westview, 1980, pp.217-238。和权力相似，财富的重要性体现在它是实现国家安全最大化偏好的手段，但非国家偏好本身。
58 Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealism Theory", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Spring 1988, p.616.
59 米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第19页。关于施维勒的论证，参见Randall L. Schweller,"Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?", Security Studies, Spring 1996, pp.90-121.
60 同上，第37页，注46。
61 在这个意义上，严格地说，米尔斯海默眼中的国家是“短期内的权力最大化者”。John J． Mearsheimer,"The False Promise ot International Institutions", International Security, Winter 1994-1995, pp.10.
62 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp.11-12.
63 拉布斯试图将两者整合在一起，因此他的回答是：“两者都要”。参见Eric J Labs,．“Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims", Security Studies, December 1997,pp. 1-49.
64 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 63.
65 拓宽安全研究的著作有: Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security, Summer 1983, pp.129-153; Beverly Crawford, "The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence", Millennium, Spring 1994, pp.25-55; Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morton Kelstrup and Pieere Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter, 1993。深化安全研究的研究可参见Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security", International Studies Review, 2003:5, pp. 203-222; Ken Booth eds, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005; Richard Wyn Jones eds, Critical Theory and World Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
66 参见 Ken Booth eds, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp.12-17。还可参见: Keith Krause and Michael Williams eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
67 John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply: ", International Security, Summer 1995, pp.92.
68 Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International Studies Quarterly, No.2 1991, p.212.
69 Ibid, p.213。另可参见 Harald Muller, "Security Cooperation", in Warter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p.389.
70 Micheal Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005,p.4.
71 Lloyd Pettiford and Melissa Curley, Changing Security Agendas and the Third World, London: Pinter, 1999, p.7.
72 Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security, Summer 1983, p.133.
73 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, HertfordShire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp.57-107。其实，这和本质国家并无太大区别。基本上，地理上的国家类似于领土，观念上的国家类似于主权，而制度上的国家类似于国家的合法性。
74 Ibid，p．87．
75 Ken Booth eds., Critical Security Studies and Workd Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p.21.
76 可参见 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Spring 1990, pp.137-168; Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons, New York: Oxford University Press 1991; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies, Spring 1992,pp.417-447; Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies, Spring 1992, pp.383-416; Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1999.
77 Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and Balance of Power", International Security, Spring 1985,pp.3-43.
78 Brian M Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow The Flag?",American Political Science Review, July 1989, pp.465-480.
79 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making ,and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p.419-420.
80 Joanne Gowa, "Bipoliarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade", American Political Science Review, December 1989, pp.1245-1256.
81 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
82 Ibid.
83 Brett Leeds,;Jeffrey M. Ritter; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Andrew G. Long, "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944", International Interactions, 2002 28(3), p.238.
84 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, M.A: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 168.
85 Joanne Gowa, Edward Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, American Political Science Review, June 1993, p.416-417.
86 Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.105.
87 Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp.10-39.
88 Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs", World Politics, Oct 1984, pp. 1-23.
89 John C. Matthews, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes:When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter", International Security, Summer 1996, pp.112-146.
90 保罗·肯尼迪在其《大国的兴衰》一书中也阐明了类似的观点，他写到，“把国家中生产性的制造力转移至不具生产性的军事领域，长期而言，会损害国家经济的基础”。参见Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers：Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000，New York：Random House，1987,p．539．
91 米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松泽，上海人民出版社，2001年版，第98-104页。
92 关于现实主义理论中的防御-进攻分支，可参见Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann，“What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it? ", International Security, Spring 1998, pp.44-82; Jack Levy, "The offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Historical and Theoretical Analysis", International Studies Quarterly, June 1984, pp.219-238.
93 Albert O.Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p.17.
94 Ibid.
95 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman&Company, 1989, pp.8-9.
96 Ibid.
97 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, October 1996, pp.29-49.
98 David Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", International Organization, Autumn 1980, pp.471-506.
99 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, October 1996, pp.29-49; Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, July 1999, pp.387-404.
100 John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985", International Studies Quarterly, 1997.41(2), pp.267-293; John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, July 1999, pp.423-442; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization, 1885-1992", World Politics, October 1999, pp.1-37.
101 关于经济相互依赖和全球冲突之间的关系，可参见Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Peter Gleditsch, eds, Globalization and Armed Conflict, Lanham Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2003;Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002; Jean-Marc Blanchard, Edward Mansfield, and Norrin Ripsman, Power and Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security, London: Frank Cass, 2000.
102 关于商品类别的差异对国家间冲突的影响，还可参见Rafael Reuvenv and Heeioon Kang， "Bilateral Trade and Political Cortflict/Cooperation: Do Goods Matter?", Journal of Peace Research, No.5, 1998, pp.581-602.
103 Klaus Knorr, "International Economic Leverage and Its Uses", in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security, Lawrence, Kansas: Press of Kansas University,1977，p.102。关于此种观点的表述，还可参见P.T Hopmann, "Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", International Organization, Winter 1978, pp.141-178.
104 并d非所有的学者都认为经济依赖的不对称性将导致政治权力的产生，比如瓦格纳坚持认为“博弈论的结果表明，不对称的贸易依赖并不意味着依赖少的一方将能对另外一方施加影响”参见R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence", International Organization, Summer 1988, pp.461-483.
105 赫契曼认为A国通过贸易支配B国的杠杆主要取决于三大条件：1、B国通过和A国贸易获得的净收益；2、A国施加给B国的调整过程的长度和痛苦；3、A国通过和B国贸易，创造了既得利益集团以及利益集团的实力。参见Albert O. Hirschman,, National Power and The Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p.18．
106 我们甚至可以想象一种极端情况：即使某个霸权国拥有世界上最大的市场，提供最重要商品，但如果一个小国的退出成本很低，同时可供选择的贸易伙伴较多，那么霸权国也很难以贸易作为有效手段对小国施加影响。
107 依赖(dependence)和依附(dependency)不是一回事。依附的结果是外围国家，或者中小国家被中心国家或者大国剥削，着重经济上的不平等；而依赖强调贸易不对称导致不利于国家的政治和安全后果。
108 Paul Papayounou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.12。关于现实主义对外经济政策，参见Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001; Jonathan Kirshner, "The Political Economy of Realism", in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
1 Lars S. Skalnes, Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy: Foreign Economic Policies as Strategic Instruments, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000, p.1.
2 Anne O. Krueger, "Introduction", in Anne O. Krueger, eds., The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p.1.
3 John Ikenberry, David Lake and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, p.3.
4 Robert Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism", in John H. Goldthorpe eds., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.16
5 David A.Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p.33.
6 Ibid. p4.
7 关于霸权稳定论，可参见Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp.31-39.
8 Michael Webb and Stephen Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment", Review of International Studies, April 1989, pp. 183-198.
9 Ibid.
10 Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts ? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, p.6.
11 关于国家中心论，可参见John Ikenberry, David Lake and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988，p．9-14。值得注意的是，这里的“国家中心论”更准确地说，应该是“政府中心论”。关于国家和政府的联系与区别，参见第三章内容。
12 对于贸易政治学中供应方和需求方的理论阐述，可参见Dani Rodrik，“Political Economy of Trade Policy", in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff.eds., Handbook of International Economics，Amsterdam：Elsevier Science，1995，pp．1457-1494。另外可参见盛斌：《中国对外贸易政策的政治经济分析》，上海：上海人民出版社，2002年。
13 关于制度中心论的观点，可参见Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith，"Institutional Determinants of Trade Policy", International Interactions, vol.23,1997, pp. 119-143.
14 Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, pp 179-217; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
15 Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1977(8), pp.281-313.
16 Pietro Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1993.
17 Michael Hiscox, "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization", International Organization, Autumn 1999, pp.669-698.
18 Peter Gourevich, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", International Organization, Autumn 1978, p.883.
19 关于欧美贸易关系的论述，可参见T.E. Josling and T.G. Taylor, Banana Wars: The Anatormy of A Trade Dispute, Cambridge, MA: CABI Publishing, 2003; 关于美日之间的贸易冲突，可参见赵瑾，《全球化与经济摩擦：日美经济摩擦的理论与实证研究》，北京：商务印书馆，2003。
20 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/topO412.html
21 关于美国对苏联的贸易政策，可参见Peter Peterson, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era, Washington D.C: U.S Department of Commerce, 1972; Mose Harvey, East West Trade and U.S Policy, New York: National Association of Manufacturer's, 1966.
22 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p.238。关于美国对苏联的贸易遏制政策，还可参见Michael Mastanduno, "Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union", World Politics, July 1985, pp.503-531.
23 Alan P. Dobson, U.S. Economic Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and Economic Warfare, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp.214-249.
24 1984年到1991年，美苏两国贸易总额分别为：28亿美元、18亿美元、19亿美元、33亿美元、50亿美元、41亿美元和43亿美元。其中，美国出口分别为：24亿美元、12亿美元、15亿美元、27亿美元、42亿美元、30亿美元和35亿美元。美国处于绝对的贸易顺关地位。参见http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4610.html
25 Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, London: Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 95
26 Steven E. Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003,p.76.
27 这和国际关系的层次分析法类似，但不完全相同，主要是加入了社会和政府的关系。关于层次分析法，可参见David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations", in John lkenberry eds, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, Harper Collins Publishers, 1989, pp.67-80.
28 参见Michael Mastanduno, "Economic and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", International Organization, Autumn 1998, pp.827-828。但是要指出，马斯坦丹诺运用极的构成分析一国对外战略中安全和经济的组合运用。这是一种典型的国家中心论观点，忽视了社会行为体的作用。
29 Susan Strange, "Political Economy and International Relations", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds., International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p.165.
30 赖克把国际经济结构定义为“在相对规模和相对劳动生产率两个维度上各个民族国家之间的结构”，参见David A.Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p.11.
31 这个结论主要参照政府做出军事政策的影响因素。关于此点，可参见James Meernik, "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Force", International Studies Quarterly, 1994(38), pp.121-138; Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry", International Studies Quarterly, 1989(33), pp．361-387。马斯坦丹诺也曾经做出类似的结论，参见Michael Mastanduno，“Economic and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", International Organization, Autumn 1998, pp.827-828.
32 Ka Zeng, Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004, p.42.。关于贸易结构的论述，还可参见John A. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp.47-48.
33 这种分析还是比较粗略和静态的，因为没有考虑到要素的流动性问题。关于要素流动性，参见第二章。
34 香博使用同样的组合来分析经济制裁的成功可能性，参见David Shambaugh. States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy, New York: State Univeristy of New York Press, 1999, 19.16.
35 当然，还有更为细致的分法，如考特尔和戴维斯依据决策权威的集中程度与国家-社会关系的紧密程度，将国家／社会关系分为集权式的国家-社会较为紧密型、集权式的国家-社会较为分离型、分权式的国家-社会关系较为分离型和分权式的国家-社会关系较为紧密型，参见Andrew Cortell and James Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter: The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms", International Studies Quarterly, September 1996, pp.451-478；利斯和卡彭则将国家／社会关系分成六种：国家控制型、国家主导型、僵局型、社团主义型、社会主导型以及脆弱型，参见Thomas Risse-Kaooen.eds., Bring Transnational Relations Back In：Non-state Actors,Domestic Structure and International Institutions,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993,pp.23-25。另外，需要指出的是，上述学者所指的社会是社会学意义上的社会，而非本文所讨论的以经济为扭结的社会。
36 关于社会行为体和政府之间的关系，可参见Stephen L. Elkin, "Business-State Relations in the Commercial Repulic", The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 2, 1994, pp.115-139; Ronald Cox, eds., Business and the State in International Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
37 这是因为非民主国家的政策否决点(veto point)更少，因此更容易决策和实施。关于政 策否决点，可参见第二章的相关内容。
38 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986.
39 关于大战略的研究，可参见Barry Posen and Andrews Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", International Security, Winter 1996-1997, pp.5-53; Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
40 根据Conybeare的定义，贸易战是“一种剧烈的国际冲突形式，国家之间主要就直接与贸易的商品和服务相关的经济目标进行谈判和报复，其使用的手段表现为对物品和服务的自由流动进行限制”。参见John A. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.4.
41 参见 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations, New York: Basic Books, 1975; David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985; Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: Cocom and the Politics of East-West Trade, Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press，1992。但最早系统研究使用经济作为外交战略的应该是赫契曼，参见Albert O.Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980(1945).
42 鲍德温是最早提出消极的对外经济战略和积极的对外经济战略的学者，但和其他学者一样，他主要关注消极的一面。参见David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
43 就笔者所见，专门研究积极性的贸易外交理论和实践的，大致上有两本著作。参见Patricia A. Davis, The art of Economic Persuasion: Positive Incentives and German Economic Diplomacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999; William J. Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996.
44 Michael Mastanduno, "The strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice", in Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003, pp.175-186.
45 关于金融手段在一国对外外交战略中的使用，可参见Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
46 David Cortright and George Lopez, Stnart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Oxford: Rowman&Litttlefield Publishers, 2002.
47 1996年，美国国会为制裁古巴所通过的“赫尔姆斯-伯顿法案”(Helms-Burton Bill)，规定美国政府将制裁同这些国家做生意或者进行投资的外国公司。2000年，美国国会又通过了《防止向伊朗扩散法》(Iran Nonproliferation Act)，该法规定将对任何向伊朗提供支持的外国公司进行制裁。
48 Donald Losman, International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia, Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press, 1979.
49 Ibid, pp.128-129.
50 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffery Scott and Kimberly Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Washington D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1990.
51 Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work", International Security, Autumn 1997, pp.90-136.
52 Richard Haass, "Sanctions Madness", Foreign Affairs, Noverber/December 1997, pp.74,75.
53 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 1985.
54 Sidney Weintraub, Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
55 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", International Affairs, Autumn 1979, pp.367-384.
56 Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power, New York: Basic Books, 1973.
57 Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics, April 1967, pp. 26-48.
58 Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Policy, New York: Basic Books, 1975, p.139.
59 Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: Cocom and the Politics of East-West Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p.54.
60 在本案例中，有条件的经济诱使和无条件的经济诱使是互为补充的使用的，这样可以发挥更好的效果。Patricia A. Davis, The art of Economic Persuasion: Positive Incentives and German Economic Diplomacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999.
61 Daniel W. Drezner, "The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expextiations, and Economic Inducements", Security Studies, Autumn 1999-2000, pp.63-75.
62 Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce, "Preferential Trade Agreements and Military Dispute", Security Studies, Autumn 1999-2000, pp.92-118.
63 比如，和美国订立自由贸易协定的国家都是美国的政治盟友。参见宋国友：“试论美国区域贸易协定政策”，《现代国际关系》，2003年第12期。
64 Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: ATheory of Trade Expectations", International Security, Spring 1996, pp.5-41.
65 Paul Papayounou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and The Balance of Power", International Security, Spring 1996, pp.42-76
66 对于自由贸易者的政策偏好，可参见Etel Solingen．Regional Orders at Century's Dawn： Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.26-32; Steven E. Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003,pp.21-24.
67 关于保护贸易者的政策倾向，可参见John Levis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982; Ralph Rotte, "Economics and Peace-Theory on the Eve of World War I", in Jurgen Brauer and William Gissy, Economics of Conflict and Peace, eds, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1997.
68 前面提到过，积极的经济战略受第三国和体系的影响较小，基于理论的概括和简略性，这里对其进行合理地忽略。
69 关于民主和平论的主要观点，可参见Bruce Russett. and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001; James Lee.Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press: 1998.
70 比如伊朗，美国在中东的主要对手之一，属于民主国家，但并不是一个自由的国家。美国对伊朗的外交战略并非使其变为更民主，而是使其经济和民众更为自由。关于自由比民主更能带来和平的论述，，参见John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security, Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1997.
71 Richard Rosecrance, and Jennifer Taw, "Japan and The Theory of International Leadership", World Politics, January 1990, p. 190.
72 Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policy from 1911-1914, New York: Norton, 1975, pp.22-25.
73 关于这段时期的国际关系，可参见Alan C. Lamborn, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany, Boston: Hyman, 1991; Paul Papayounou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War, Ann Arbor: The Univerisy of Michigan Press, 1999.
74 所谓协作物品就是那些对政治对手的协作行动有重大影响但对经济增长相对较小的那些公共物品。关于这种观点，可参见Bruce Bueno de Mesquita，George Downs，“Development and Democracy"，Foreign Affairs，Sep／Oct2005，pp．77-87．
75 关于此种观点，可参见Michelle A. Benson, "Dyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind: State-to-State versus State-to-System Security and Economic Relationships", Journal of Peace Research, No. 6, 2004, pp. 659-676.
1 以中方的统计数据为准。
2 朱丕荣，《中国与美国农产品贸易状况》，载《世界农业》，1994年第4期，第56页。
3 Anne Veigle, "China Syndrome", Washington Times, 2 July 1991, pp.C1, C10.
4 Ibid.
5 Congressional Record, 11 July 1991, p.S7349.
6 Congressional Record, 23 July 1991, p. S10617.
7 关于一点，可参见Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China:An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups, Lanham Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 1998, pp.26-47.
8 Kerry Dumbaugh," Interest Groups: Growing Influence", in Ramon Myers, Michel Oksenberg and David Shambaugh, Making China Policy:Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p.137.
9 笔者根据表5-3计算所得。
10 张任著：《美国对华直接投资，1980-1991))，上海：复旦大学出版社，1993年版，第44页。
11 汪熙、张耀辉，《析美国对华直接投资，1980-1994))，载《复旦学报》，1996年第2期，第8页。
12 魏晓愈，《美国12家企业在我国投资超亿美元》，载《商业世界》，1996年第11期，第36-37页。
13 Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing, 102d Congress, 2th Session, 1992, pp. 158-59.
14 "China Fever Strikes Again", Business Week, March 29, 1993, p.46.
15 批评中国未能保护美国知识产权的软件、电影及工业设计产业在1992年之后要求美国政府对华实行严厉政策，但他们并非对华保护贸易的鼓吹者。事实上，他们更加希望进入中国市场。
16 如根据第四个中美纺织品协议，1994年-1997年对美中国纺织品配额的年增长率为1.63％。
17 “中美双边纺织品贸易协定概况”，载《纺织信息周刊》，1999年9月27日，第13页。
18 值得注意的是，在中国加入WTO、特别是纺织品配额取消之后，纺织品重新成为中美经贸关系的重要问题。
19 Congressional Budget Office, What Accounts for the Decline in Manufacturing Employment? February 18, 2004
20 Robert Scott, "U.S.-China Trade, 1989-2003:Impact on jobs and industries, nationally and State-by-State", Economic Policy Institute Working Paper,270#，2005。这种情况的出现很大程度上是因为中国替代了其它国家对美国的出口。换言之，即使中国不对美国出口，这些工作机会也会丧失。
21 Guy Gugliotta, "Because Pitted in Fight over China's MFN Status", Washington Post, 14 July 1991, p. A6.
22 1992年10月1日参议院的投票结果为59-40票。
23 Congressional Record, 25, February 1992, p.S2151.
24 Peter Behr, "Major U.S. Companies Lobbying Clinton to Renew China's Trade Privileges", Washington Post, 6 May 1994, p.19.
25 波音公司等大企业每年都赞助播放有利于延长对华最惠国待遇的电视广告，宣传经济参与是推动人权事业的积极因素。
26 http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/in dex.html
27 纽约《侨报》，1996年6月8日。转引自王勇，《试论利益集团在美国对华政策中的影响》，载《美国研究》，1998年第2期，第73页。
28 关于跨国公司等对华自由贸易联盟在MFN中的作用，可参见王勇，《最惠国待遇的回合：1989-1997年美国对华贸易政策》，北京：中央编译出版社，1998年；谭融，《美国利益集团政治研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2002年5月；冼国民、张岸元，《跨国公司与美国国会对华政治》，载《世界经济》，2004年第4期。
29 Holly Bailey, "A Passage to China Update: House Approves PNTR", Center for Responsive Politics, May 24, 2000, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china house.htm
30 Steven Greenhouse, "A.F.L-C.I.O Vows to Spend More Money-Than Ever Before on Candidates", New York Times, February 16, 2000.
31 Holly Bailey, Ibid.
32 关于政治制度在美国制定对华政策中的作用，可参见Tan Qingshan，The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 1992; Ramon H.Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg and David Shambaugh, Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2001; Jean A. Garrison, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. W. Bush, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
33 投票数据来源参见当日国会报告(Congressional Record)。
34 Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy", International Organization,Autumn 1994，pp．595-632。该文主要是从地理意义上进行阐述了，没有分析时间差异对政策造成的影响。
35 I.M.Destler, American Trade Policy, 3rd, Washington, D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1995, p.235.
36 笔者自行统计，资料来源http://covenantnews.com/chinahv00-228.htm
37 Ronald L.Rogowshi, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989; Stephen P.Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
38 Ronald Cox eds, Business and the State in International Relations, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996; Timothy Mckeown, "What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?", in Charles F. Doran and Gregory P. Marchildon ed, The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994.
39 这三届中民主党众议员和共和党众议员的比例分别为：260-175，267-176和258-176。资料来源，美国国会众议院网站，http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/index.html
40 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999, p.313.
41 Lori Nitschke and Matthew Tully, "Big victory for China Trade Needs Senate's Blessing", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 27, 2000,1249.
42 David Jackson and Steven Engel, "Don't Bite the PAC that Feeds you: Business Punishment Over the China Vote", American Politics Research, March 2003, pp.138-154.
43 笔者自行统计。数据来源http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china_houseb.htm
44 Holly Bailey, "A Passage to China Update: House Approves PNTR", Center for Responsive Politics, May 24, 2000, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china house.htm
45 这8个州分别是新泽西州、宾西法尼亚州、伊利诺伊州、密歇根州、威斯康星州、康涅狄格州、俄亥俄州和密苏里州。笔者根据众议院投票记录整理。
46 笔者自行统计。http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china housec.htm
47 关于国家安全委员会在对外政策中的作用，可参见夏立平：《美国国家安全委员会在美对外和对华政策中的作用》，《国际观察》，2002年第2期；David J. Rothkopf, Running The World: the Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2005.
48 Selig Harrison and Clyde Prestowitz, "Pacific Agenda: Defense of Economics", Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, pp.56-76.
49 Executive Order 12835, January 25th, 1993.
50 Vincent A. Auger, "The National Security System After the Cold War", in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds, U.S Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, p.56.
51 关于国家经济委员会在外交中的显著作用，可参见Bruce Stocks,"Organizing to Trade", Foreign Affairs, 1992-1993, pp.36-52; Kenneth Juster and Simon Larazus, Making Economic Policy: An assessment of the National Economic Council, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997; Jeffrey Frankel and Peter Orszag, eds,American Economic Policy in the 1990's, Cambridge,. Mass.: MIT Press, 2002.
52 Nancy Tucker, "A Precarious Balance: Clinton and China," Current History, September 1998, pp. 243-249.
53 吴心伯，《论克林顿政府亚太安全战略的形成》，载《国际政治研究》，2003年第2期，第70页。
54 Patrick Tyler, Six Presidents and China: A Great Wall: An Investigative History, New York: Public Affairs, 2000, p.397, 399.
55 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance," Defense Issue, Vol. 10, No. 35.1995, pp.1-4.
56 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999, pp.294-295.
57 "New Preference for Asia Meshes with Clinton's Style", Los Angeles Times, Nov.22, 1992, p.1.
58 Ibid.
59 Jean A. Garrison, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. VV.. Bush, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2005, p. 143.
60 Denny Roy, "Hegemony on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asia Security", International Security, Summer 1994, pp.149-168; Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival", International Security, Winter 1997/98, pp. 54-58; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The coming conflict with China, New York : A.A. Knopf, 1997.
61 刘连第、汪大为，《中美关系的轨迹：建交以来大事纵览》，北京：时事出版社，1995年；黄志平著，《美国巴统是怎样进行出口管制的》，北京：中国对外经济贸易出版社，1992年。
62 美国在1989年之后对中国实行了一系列经济制裁，有些出口管制的限制也被作为经济制裁的重要组成部分而提出。但经济制裁的目标在于“改变对象国的政策”，而包含在此波经济制裁中的出口管制严格来说不具备这样的效用，所以笔者将其中的停止军用品贸易和军民两用品许可证两项列出，作为冷战期间美国对华出口政策的变化性延续。
63 BIS的前身为商务部出口管理局(Bureau of Exhort Administration, BXA)。http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/738spir.pdf。
64 Export Administration, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1988, March, 1989.
65 Adam Segal, "Practical Engagement: Drawing a Fine Line for U.S.-China Trade", Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp.157-173.
66 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, U.S. Exports to China, 1988-1998: Feeling Proliferation, Washington D.C, 1999, Sec 1, p.1.
67 在1988-1998年间，美国年均对华出口98亿美元。笔者自行计算。
68 General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance Computer Controls, Washington D.C: United States Accounting Office, 1998.
69 James Jochum, "Testimony for the Hearing before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission", Jan 17, 2002.
70 Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, p.51.
71 Kathleen Walsh, U.S. Commercial Technology Transfers to the People's Republic of China, Bureau of Export Administration Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, 1999.
72 Roger Cliff, The military potential of China's commercial technology, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, p.62, p.30.
73 《国际先驱导报》，“美国力阻欧盟解除对华军售禁令”，2003年2月6日。
74 Jane Perlez, "Israel Drops Plan to Sell Air Radar to China Military", New York limes, July 13, 2000.
75 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/04/content_430948.htm
76 基于此点，美国指责中国操纵人民币和操控市场导致了美国对华贸易的巨额赤字是没有道理的。
77 例如，中国需要进口先进机床设备，给美国制造厂商带来了良好的贸易机会。由于美国政府严格的出口管制，众多美国公司正常的对华贸易活动难以开展。
78 如未特别标明，本文针对美国关税制度分析的文本和数据全部来自Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States(2006), United States International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
79 因为美国对非洲国家有《非洲发展与机会法案》(African Growth and OpportunityAct)，对于东南亚国家有《东盟发展倡议》(Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative)，这样便把位于这两个地区的所有不享受普惠制待遇国家也包括在内了。
80 根据经济普查资料，中国2004年度的GDP为159878亿人民币，合2万亿美元。http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2OO5-12/21/content 3948745.htm。
81 关于普惠制待遇的情况，可参考http://www.unctad.org。关于美国普惠制的情况，可参见http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/Section Index.html。
82 Dianne E. Rennack, China: U.S. Economic Sanctions, CRS, No. 96-272 F.
83 Lovett, William Anthony, Alferd E.Eckes, U.S Trade Policy: History, Theory and The WTO, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p.95.
84 这六个国家是多米尼加、萨尔瓦多、洪都拉斯、尼加拉瓜、哥斯达黎加和危地马拉。数据来源，美国国际贸易委员会Data Base数据。
85 张汉林著，《WTO反倾销争端案例评析》，北京：人民出版社，2004年版，第15页-第22页。
86 James Brander, Paul Krugman, "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade", Journal of International Economics, Nov.1983, pp. 313-321.
87 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, "A Theory of Managed Trade", American Economic Review, Sep.1990, pp.779-795.
88 Michael Finger, Antidumping, AnnArbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
89 N. Gregory Mankiw and Phillip Swagel, "Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade Policy",Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, p112。关于国际贸易委员会的地位、作用和政治独立性等问题，可参见Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa,"The Economic and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making", Review of International Economics, 1997: 5(2), pp.230-254.
90 宋泓，《非市场经济地位与我国对外贸易的发展》，载《世界经济与政治》，2004年第10期，第7页。
91 周世俭，许肖冰，《论美国对华反倾销的不公平性》，载《矿业管理》，2001年第4期，第14页。
92 虽然出口控制也常被作为美国对华经济制裁的内容而列出，但这里的经济制裁不包括出口控制。这是因为经济制裁的目标在于“改变对象国的政策”，而包含经济制裁中的出口管制严格米说不具备这样的效用。因此，此节所指的经济制裁是排除了“限制商品、技术和服务的出口”和“强制许可证”之外的其它经济制裁方式。关于美国经济制裁的分类，参见U.S. International Trade Committee, Overview and Analysis of Current U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions, August 1998, p.1-7.
93 Dianne E. Rennack, China: U.S. Economic Sanctions, CRS, No. 96-272 F.
94 Department of the Treasury, International Financial Institutions's Transactions, Nov.18, 2003.
95 美国贸易发展署的对华援助禁令在在2001年被取消。参见Compilation of Presidential Documents: Administration of William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting A Report on Funding for the Trade and Development Agency With Respect To China", January 15, 2001, p.128.
96 Shirley A. Kan, "U.S. Policy Regarding Satellite Exports to China", Testimony before A Joint Hearing of the Committees on International Relations and National Security, June 17, 1998.
97 Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospect, New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
98 Elizabeth C. Economy, "Don't Break the Engagement", Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, pp．96-109。关于制度改变论的观点，还可参见David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002
99 George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2004, pp.33-48.
100 Robert Sutter, China s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
101 Ibid, p.80, p.17.
102 Robert Sutter, "Does China Matter?", Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004, pp.87-88.
103 Max Boot, "Project for a New Chinese Century: Beijing Plans for National Greatness", The Weekly Standard, Oct 10, pp.36-40.
104 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs, "Development and Democracy", Foreign Affairs, Seo/Oct2005, pp.77-87.
105 从1993年到2005年，美国对华出口占其出口总额的比重年均增加8.79％，而中国对美国的出口占中国出口总额的比重年均只增加0.49％。按照目前的速度，10.48年之后，两者将会相同。
106 如果采用美方的数据，中国在这个指标上对美国的依赖是下降的，从34.4％降为31.9％。
107 如果采用中方的数据，这个数值则从1993年的2.3％上升为2005年的5.46％，也增长了近2.4倍。
108 到2000年底，中国对美国的直接投资还不足4亿美元。
109 新华社，“美财长否认美国经济受控于中国持有大量美债券”。http://news3.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-01/06/content_4017099.htm
110 美国对中国的依赖还可以从美国企业对中国市场利廉价劳动力的依赖以及美国消费者对中国产品的依赖上得以体现。
111 吴心伯，《论美国亚太安全战略的走向》，载《复旦学报》，2005年第2期，第4页。
112 George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2004, pp.33-48
1 David Skidmore, "Introduction: Bringing Social Orders Back in", in David Skidmore eds., Contested Social Orders and International Politics, Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997, pp.7-8.
2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds, Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
3 Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games", International Organization, Summer 1988, pp.427-460.
4 Ibid, p.436.
5 Ibid. p.437.
6 关于双层次博弈的更详尽描述，可参见Peter Evens, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.
7 Kenneth Waltz, Man, State, and War: A TheoreticalAnalysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
8 自由制度主义和其它自由主义理论流派不同，采取的是一种国际-国家的层次分析法。
9 Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", International Organization, Autumn 1978, pp.881-912.
10 Robert Ross, "Managing the Rise of China: Engagement in US China Policy," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross eds, Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power, Routledge Press, 1999,pp. 196-207.
11 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000, University of California Press, 2001.
12 2000年数据。
13 美国统计署(U．S Census Burear)数据。
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《复旦学报》
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2 孟德斯鸠，《论法的精神》(下)，北京：商务印书馆，2004年第1版，第3页。
3 汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著，《联邦党人文集》，程逢如等译，商务印书馆，1995年。
4 弗里德里希·李斯特，《政治经济学的国民体系》，陈万煦译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年。
5 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Free Press. 1986.
6 S. M. McMillan, "Interdependence and Conflict", Mershon International Studies Review, May 1997, pp. 33-58.
7 J. D. Fearson, "Rationalist Explanations for War", International Organization, Summer 1995, pp. 379-414.
8 K. Snitwongse, "Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements Though Political Cooperation", Pacific Review, Summer 1998, pp.183-194.
9 John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.
10 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp.140-141.
11 Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Charles Kindelberger, eds., The International Corporation, Cambridge: MIT Press. 1970, p.205.
12 Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization, Autumn 1984, pp. 597-624.
13 Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations", International Security, Spring 1996, pp. 5-41.
14 如前文所述，有学者也认为冲突会妨碍贸易的进行，但这仅仅是假设或者说前提，而非经过严密论证的结果。所以和那些经过研究后得出冲突抑制贸易的学者不能相提并论。
15 直接武装对抗和冲突——如军事动员和爆发战争——是最为极端的一种冲突方式，但不是唯一的冲突形式。本文所采取的冲突定义要相对泛化和弱化，特指“高级政治”领域两国利益和目标的严重不一致。“高级政治”光谱上的不一致，如从政治冲突、主权冲突、战略冲突、军事冲突直至政府间爆发战争等，属于本文的冲突范围。
16 从微观角度论述冲突对贸易影响的，可参见Brian M．Pollins，“Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, June 1989, pp. 465-480.
17 Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
18 Edward Mansfield, Rachel Bronson, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade", American Political Science Review, March 1997, pp. 94-107.
19 参见Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 45-47; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and The Pattern of International Cooperation", American Political Science Review, September 1991, p. 708; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", American Political Science Review, Oct 1991，pp．1303-1320。不过莫罗认为，即使相对收益因素存在，潜在冲突国之间也会进行贸易，因为国家不可能把其贸易得益全部用做军事目的。James Morrow," When Do 'Relative Gains' Impedes Trade", Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1997, pp. 12-37.
20 引力模型是指两国的双边贸易流量的规模与它们各自的经济总量呈正比，也它们之间的距离呈正比。参见J. Tinbergen, Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for An International Economic Policy, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1962.
21 众所周知，台湾自古属于中国领土不可分割的一部分，不具有主权国家的任何身份。作者在本文中以台湾举例，仅仅是从学术研究的角度探讨问题，没有任何其它含义。——作者按。
22 可参见Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Summer 1996, pp. 147-75; Katherine Barbieri and Jack Levy, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade", Journal of Peace Research, July 1999,463-479; Jack Levy, Katherine Barbieri, "Trading with Enemy During Wartime", Security Studies, Spring 2004, p. 1-47.
23 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People 'Power, Preferences, and Perceptions, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 2000, p. 162.
24 参见Edward Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U. S. Navy", World Politics, Oct 1994, pp. 1-41.
25 P. Diehl, and F. Wayman, "Realpolitik: Dead End, Detour, or Road Map?" In Reconstructing Realpolitik, edited by F. W. Wayman and P. Diehl, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 252.
26 参见Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", International Organization, 1997, pp. 513-553.
27 对于偏好的不生，有结构基础论(structure-based)和行为体中心论(agency-centered)两种解释。两者的最大差别在于前者认为偏好是外生的，而后者坚持偏好是内生的。参见William Roberts Clark，“Agents and Structures：Two Views of Preferences，Two Views of Institutions”，International Studies Quarterly，Summer，1998，pp．245-270．
28 新现实主义者和新自由和义者都接受此种观点。
29 另外，在社会与国家之间发挥媒介作作的制度也扮演着极为重要的角色。制度安排的不同，制约了社会成员以及社会与国家之间的互动。
30 本文是分析冲突之下的贸易行为，那些不存在冲突诱因或冲突现实的国家之间，不应用此模型来推演。
31 关于定量研究法和定性研究法的主要区别，参见Sharan B．Merriam，Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education，San Francisco：Jossey-Bass，2001，p．9．
32 对政治科学研究方法论的探讨，以及定量研究方法学者和定性研究方法学者之间的辩论，请参见Gary King, Unifying Political Methodology: The likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1997.
33 Gary King, Robrt O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. p. 63.
34 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
35 Charles Ragin and David Zaret. "Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies." Social Science, March 1983, pp. 731-754.
36 比如，马丁·莉莎试图解释经济制裁和国际合作之间的因果关系。她先用大数量法检验了99个样本，虽然结果显示两者确实有联系，但缺乏令人信服的因果推论。于是她细致探讨了六个案例，以证明两者的因果性。Lisa Martin，Coercive Cooperation，Princeton：Princeton University Press，1992．
37 Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade", Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1980, pp. 57-78.
38 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, February 1996, pp. 29-49.
39 James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa E. Taberes, "The Political Determinants of international Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-90", American Political Science Review, September 1998, pp. 649-661.
40 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York: Norton, 2001.
41 Anne Uchitel, "Interdependence and Instability", in Jack Snider and Robert Levis edited, Coping With the Complexity in International Systems, Boulder: WestView Press, 1993.
42 在贸易和冲突研究领域，同样出色的案例分析还有Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest", International Security, Autumn 1993, pp.125-153; Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations", International Security, Spring 1996, pp. 5-41; Dale Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Detente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91", Security Studies, Autumn-Winter, 1999/2000, pp. 15-58.
43 李杰普哈特(Lijphart)认为，案例大致上有六种类型：理论无关型(Atheoretical)、阐明理论型(Interpretative)、假设-生成型(Hypothesis-Generating)、肯定理论型(Theory Confirming)、 否定理论型(Theory Infirming)和反常案例型(Deviant)。前两者对理论创造的贡献非常有限，而其余四种都能促进理论的累积或者创造新的理论。参见Arend Lijphart，“Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", American Political Science Review, September 1971, pp. 691-692.
44 John S. Odell, "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy", International Studies Perspective, Summer 2001, pp. 161-176.
1 参见E．H．卡尔：《20年危机：国际关系研究导论》，秦亚青译，北京：世界知识出版社，2005，第1版；汉斯·摩根索：《国家间政治：为权力和和平而斗争》，杨歧鸣等译，北京：商务印书馆，1993年第5版；沃尔兹：国际政治理论》，信强译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003年第1版；约翰·米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅、唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003年第1版。
2 同上。
3 赫德利·布尔：《无政府社会：世界政治秩序研究》，张小明译，北京：世界知识出版社，2003年第1版，第255页。
4 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海：上海人民出版社，1998年第1版，第377页。
5 玛莎·费丽莫，《国际社会中的国家利益》，袁正清译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2001年第1版，第23页。
6 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海：上海人民出版社，1998年第1版，第377页。
7 国际制度理论本身包含着不同的流派，大体上可以分为现实主义流派、自由主义流派和建构主义流派等三种。不过，新自由主义通过与其它流派的争论，逐渐成为主流理论。参见Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, The Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 1.
8 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
9 江忆恩，“国际机制对国家行为的影响”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第12期，第23页。
10 亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第39页。
11 同上，第468页。
12 Robert Cox, "Social Force, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", Millennium: A Journal of International Studies, Summer 1981, p. 128.
13 贾斯廷·罗森伯格，《市民社会的帝国：现实主义国际关系批判》，洪邮生译，南京：江苏人民出版社，2002年第1版，第8页。
14 Liah Greenfeld and Michel Martin eds., Center: Ideas and Institutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.ⅷ.
15 近代以来，在政治学领域，社会和市民社会(civil society)两者经常概念上互换。因此，本文对此两者不做详尽区分。
16 洛克，《政府论》(下篇)，叶启芳、瞿菊农译，商务印书馆，1996年，第105页。
17 黑格尔，《法哲学原理》，范扬等译，商务印书馆，1996年版，第261页。
18 Charles Taylor, "The Models of Civil Society", Public Culture, Vol 3, No. 1, 1991, pp. 95-118.
19 John Keane, Democracy and civil Society, New York: Verso, 1988, p. 46.
20 俞可平，《马克思的市民社会理论及其历史地位》，载《中国社会科学》，1993年，第4期。
21 这种分法参照了哈加尔德等人对商业的分类，不同的是，将协会(associations)变为行业(industry)。参见Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, "Theories of business and business-state relations", in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and The state in developing Countries, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 33-60.
22 经济利益的最大化并不等于追求利润最大化。一般认为，经济组织有三大目标：1、利润最大化；2、提高市场占有率；3、实现股东收益最大化。无论是哪种，都可以将其归为经济利益的最大化。参见泰勒尔著，《产业组织理论》，张维迎总校译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，1997年版，第40-57页。
23 对社会有广义、中观和狭义的理解，不同范围下的社会所包含的内容不尽一致。参见曹沛霖，《政府与市场》，上海人民出版社，1998年，第129页。但是有学者对将经济视为社会的主要特征并不赞同。例如，科恩认为，经济部门和经济活动并非服从于社会，而是在社会和国家之外的第三部门，并构建出社会-经济-国家的三分模型。参见Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992。此外，泰勒认为，社会除了经济属性之外，还有公众和公众意见。该两者的共同存在，是促使社会在政治结构之外达致统一或者协调的两种路向。参见Charles Taylor,“Models of Civil Society”，Public Culture，Vol 3，No．1，1991，pp．95-118．
24 Irving Fisher, Elementary Principles of Economics, New York: Macmillan, 1923, p. 27.
25 所谓私人领域是指私人自主从事商品生产和交换的经济活动的领域。其中市场机制和私人产权构成这种私人领域的两大要素，它们保证个人能够自主地从事经济活动和追求特殊的私人利益。参见何增科，《公民社会与第三部门》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2000年，第4页。
26 这是一种科学实在论的观点。关于这种观点的具体阐述，可参见Austen Clark，“Beliefs and Desires Incorporated”，Journal of Philosophy，August 1994，p．404-425；王顺义，《科学实在论指称本体论承诺的变迁》，《哲学研究》，1995年第8期。
27 不过，卡赞斯坦可能是个例外，他认为国家和社会共同决定了政府的某些对外政策。参见Peter J. Katzenstein eds., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrialized Countries, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, p. 3, 21.
28 关于国家及国家体系在世界历史中的发展，可参见Walter C. Opello, and Stephen Rosow, The National-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, second edition, London: Lynne Rienner Publishiers, 2004.
29 国内结构还涵盖了政治和社会制度中的组织机构及其运行惯例，以及深嵌于政治文化中的价值和规范。参见Thomas Risse-Kappen，eds．，Bringing Transnagonal Relations Back in，Cambridge：Cambridge University Press，1993，p．20．
30 对于国内政治的解释及其效度，可参见James D．Fearon，“Domestic Politics，Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations”，Annual Review of Political Science，June 1998，pp．289-313．
31 这里的社会仅仅只以经济利益为导向和联结的个体的集合，并不包括以意识形态(环境保护、人权等)和知识传播为目标的个人和群体的集合。关于后者住国际关系中的意义，可参见Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., Bringing Transnational Relations Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.3-33.
32 David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, New York: Alfred Norve, 1971, p. 31.
33 Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.
34 Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 171.
35 Kelvin Lancaster, "A New Approach to Consumer Theory", Journal of Political Economy, April, 1966, pp. 132-158.
36 事实上，已有学者指出，在社会科学领域内生-外生的争论反映了一种错误的二分法，或者说是一种结构二元论的谬误。参见Anthony Giddens，The Constitution of Society：Outline of the Theory of Structuration，Cambridge：Polity Press, 1984.
37 Jeffery Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations", in David Lake and Robert Powell eds., Strategic Choice in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 39-76.
38 至于不同的结论，可参见Terry Moe," The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science, Nov 1984, pp.739-777.
39 关于国际贸易对国内行为体偏好的影响，可参见Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Globalization and Domestic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
40 Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and The Politics of International Trade, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
41 Dani Rodrik, "The Rush to Free Trade: Why Now, Why So Late?", In Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb,eds., Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, Oxford: Oxford University, 1994, pp.61-88.
42 Bernard Hoekman and Carlos A. Primo Braga, "Protection and Trade in Services: A Survey", The World Bank, CEPR Discussion Papers 1705, 1997.
43 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages." The Review of Economic Studies, November, 1941, pp. 58-73.
44 生产要素主要有劳动力、土地、资本和技术等等。对赫克歇尔-俄林定理的分析和推导，请参见Paul Krugman, and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, New York: Addison-Wesley, 6th edition, 2003.
45 James Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions", The Journal of Political Philosophy, No.2 1994, pp.166-167.
46 Steven Magee, "Three Simple Testsof the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem", in Peter Oppenheimer eds. International Economics, London: Oriel, 1980, 1919. 138-153.
47 这是一种简单的分法。有学者将生产要素分为资本、熟练劳动、半熟练劳动、不熟练劳动、热带土地、干旱土地、林地、温和土地、煤炭、矿产和石油等11种，参见Edward Leamer，Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984.
48 Ronald Rogowski,, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Institutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
49 该学派的其他重要论文可参见:Paul Mitford, "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments", International Organization, Autumn 1993, pp. 535-564; Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, "What determines individual trade-policy preferences?", Journal of International Economics, 2001(54), pp. 267-292.
50 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press,1985, pp. 41-42.
51 关于该模型的证明和推论，请参见Ronald Jones, "A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History", in Jagdish Bhagwati, Ronald Jones, Robert Mundell eds., Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1971, pp. 3-21.
52 军工行业似乎是个特例。这个行业一方面希望出口增加，这要求一个好的国际交易环境：另一方面，如果形势动荡导致政府军事开支增加，它似乎也能从中受益。不过总体上，可以将其视为一个偏好国家冲突上升的行业。
53 杰弗瑞·弗里登运用要素专有性来判别拉丁美洲国家内部不同行为者的贸易偏好。参见Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
54 也有学者认为不是要素的流动性构成解决问题的关键，而是两种学说适用于不同的时间跨度，从短期内，“行业”分析法要比“要素一阶级”分析法更能解释某一国家内部不同贸易利益集团的构成及游说行为。但长期来看，“专有要素”学说则更有说服力。参见Edward Leamer, and James Leviinsohn, "International Trade Theory: The Evidence", in Gene Grossman, Kenneth Rogoff eds., Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier Press, 1995, pp. 1339-1350.
55 Michael J. Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 20020。关于要素流动性的论述，还可参见Mark Brawley, "Factoral or sectoral conflict: Partially Mobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial Germany", International Studies Quarterly, 1997(41), pp. 633-654.
56 不过不少学者认为，相对于比较清晰的行业或要素偏好而言，单个企业或公司的偏好要模糊得多。因为不少跨国公司在从贸易自由化当中获益的同时，也会遭受伤害。
57 Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism, and Free Trade: International and Politics of International Trade, Princeton University Press, 1988, p.25.
58 Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p.15。在本书中，米尔纳用利益取代了偏好一词，把政策偏好等同于偏好。事实上，最高或最根本利益才是偏好。具体地分析，可参见Jonathan Crystal，“What do Producers Want?On the Origins of Societal Policy Preferences”, European Journal of International Relations, vol.9(3), 2003, pp.407-439.
59 Oona A. Hathaway, "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection", International Organization, Summer 1998, pp.575-612.
60 Scott Gehlbach, "A Political Model of Exit and Voice", unpublished manuscript, 2005
61 I. M. Destler and John S. Odell, Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics, Washington: Institute for International Economics. 1987. p .24.
62 值得注意的是，政治活动和利益集团的游说活动在形式上非常相象。游说活动可以分为直接游说和间接游说，其目标是试图“通过联系(或通过促使他人联系)立法官员或其他政府官员，以保证有利于自身的法案、政策。”但游说和政治活动的最大区别在于主体，游说的主体是各个利益集团，而(本文当中的)政治活动主体是社会成员。如本章第一节所述，社会行为体(各个经济单位)的影响力绝非一般利益集团可比，所以不以游说来描述社会成员的单独或联盟行动。关于社会行为体和利益集团的区别，可参见David Hart，“Business is not an Interest Group: On the Studies of Companies in American National Politics”, Annual Review of American Political Science, 2004, pp.47-69.
63 Paul A.Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economics and Statistics,1954：36，pp．387-389。不过，对于公共产品的定义和分类，存在着一定的争论。由这些争论出发，引出了对集体行动逻辑的更多理解。参见Elinor Ostrom，“How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action", Journal of Theoretical Politics, No. 3, 2003, pp. 239-270.
64 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, p.2; Russell Hardin, Collective Action, Baltimore, MD：Johns Hopkins University Press，1982。另外，苏长和将国际制度看成是公共产品，并对此做了精彩的论述，参见苏长和，《全球公共问题与国际合作：一种制度的分析》，上海人民出版社，2000。
65 Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E.Roberts, "The determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1976-1986", American Political Science Review, December 1994, p.911.
66 Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies", in Kenneth A. Oye eds, Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 19-20.
67 Brain Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy, London: Macmillan Press, 1970, p.25.
68 在利益的激励与动员下，即使这个次级集团成员很多，他们也会为集体利益而行动。次级集团的存在表明相同公共产品所能带来的利益对不同的联盟成员而言并非一致，有些成员会从公共产品中获得更多，而有些成员则会获得较少。可参见Russell Hardin，Collective Action, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p.40-41; Thomas Schelling,Micromotives and Macrobehavior, New York: W.W.Norton &Company, 1978, pp.213-243; Mancur Olson ,The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, p.46.
69 对市场集中度的衡量因此成为重要问题。除了以销售额占全部市场的比重作为衡量指标之外，还可以采用研发费用的比例(R&D)，股票的市场价值等作为指标。对于市场的分类，可以采取四位代码分类(four-digit codes)，也可以采取六位代码分类(six-digit codes)。参见Wendy Hansen, Neil Mitchell and Jeffery Drope, "The Logic of Private and Public Action", American Journal of Political Science, January 2005, pp. 150-167.
70 Robert Dahl, "A Critique of The Ruling Elite Model", American Political Science Review, June 1958, pp. 463-469.
71 Russell Pittman, "Market Structure and Campaign Contributions", Public Choice, Fall 1977, pp. 37-51; Mark S Mizruchi, Thomas Koenig, "Size, Concentration, and Corporate Networks: Determinants of Business Collective Action", Social Science Quarterly, June 1991, pp. 299-313; Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E.Roberts, "The determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1976-1986", American Political Science Review, December 1994,pp．911-924。但有人也认为因为市场集中度高的企业其实不需要政治行动就能达到经济目的，比如通过合谋控制产品产量和价格，或者将赚取的利润用于培训工人或投入研发等手段足以应付来自市场的挑战，并可进一步扩大其领先优势。但问题在于，政治联盟的政治活动并非都是主动去寻求自由贸易政策，相反，有时是被动的去维护自由贸易政策，比如为了反击对立的政治联盟所进行的政治活动。在这种情况下，市场集中度高的企业也必须进行政治活动。另外，这些企业有时会采取隐性的政治活动，如聘请退位的政府高级官员，或通过良好的私人关系和政府官员沟通等等，这些是不易被觉察，但确实存在着的政治活动。参见Ronald W．Cox，Power and Profit：U．S．Policy in Central America，Kentucky：The University Press of Kentucky，pp．5-8．
72 Jeffry Frieden, and Ronald Rogowshi, "The Impact of the International Economy on National Politics: An Analytical Review", in Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 25-47.
73 关于偏好保护贸易的厂商和希望降低关税的消费者之间的博弈情况，可参见Elmer Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures,and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprises in Pressure Politics, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935.
74 Joanne Gowa, "Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monerary Policy Processes in the United States", International Organization, Winter 1988, pp.15-32。在本文中，戈娃用集体行动的逻辑检验了美国政府的对外贸易政策和金融政策。
75 关于此点，将在第三章详细论述。
76 John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, p.226.
77 Chrysostomos Mantzavinos, Douglas C. North, and Syed Shariq, "Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance", Perspectives on Politics, March 2004, pp.75-84.
78 Ibid.
79 道格拉斯·诺斯，《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》，刘守英译，上海：上海三联书店和上海人民出版社，1994年版，第5—6页。另外一个容易混淆的词是regime(体系或政权)。关于institutions、regime和organization三者之间的区别，请参阅苏长和，“重新定义国际制度”，《欧洲》，1999年第6期，第22-27页。
80 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.19.
81 《中国大百科全书(政治学)》，北京：中国大百科全书出版社，1992年版。
82 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
83 John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, pp.226-228.
84 关于政治制度的定义讨论，可参考Bo Rothstein, "Political Institutions: An Overview", in Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds, A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.133-166.
85 Ronald Rogowski and Mark Kayser, "Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price Level Evidence in OECD Countries", American Journal of Political Science, July 2002, pp. 526-539.
86 John Hatfield and William Hauk, "Electoral Regime and Trade Tariff", http://www.stanford.edu/～hatfield/papers/tariffs.pdf
87 Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U. S. Nontariff Barriers", American Journal of Political Science, 1999(43), pp. 1028-1050.
88 Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions", International Organization, Spring 1987, pp.203-223.
89 Helen Milnen and Benjamin Judkins, "Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?", International Studies Quarterly, 2004(48), pp.95-119
90 Sobert Shugart and Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems", in Stephan Haggard and Matthew McCubbins eds, Presidents, Parliaments and Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
91 Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy", International Organization, Autumn 1994, pp.595-632.
92 Edward Mansfield, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade", American Political Science Review, June 2000, pp. 305-321.
93 Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, New York: Cambridge, 1998
94 Daniel Verdier, "Democratic Convergence and Free Trade", International Studies Quarterly, 1998(42):1, p.1.
95 正如第一章所阐述的，不少学者已经注意到了这个问题，认为国家-社会关系是政策制定的关键变量。但他们把这种关系看成是静态的，不仅忽视了国家和社会的互动，更重要的 是，忽视了制度在互动过程中所起的作用。国家“强”或者社会“强”主要就体现在制度的层面。
96 “政策制定权力的集中或分散”这样的表述价值中立，可以避免民主或非民主制度的意 识形态的争论。因为一个政策制定权力集中与否与政治制度的民主或非民主无关。在民主国家，权力也可能高度集中，比如长时间内集中于一个政党(如日本的自民党)，或者按照宪法的规定，权力更集中于总统(法国)。这样，便会更好地扩张理论的解释范围。
97 George Tsebelis, "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Muliticameralism, and Multipartyism", British Journal of Political Science, June 1995, p.293.
98 George Tsebelis, " Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis", American Political Science Review, September 1999, pp.593.
99 这和新制度主义经济学宣称的制度具有“路径依赖”性不谋而合。另外很显然，改变的困难程度和否决者的数量高度相关。否决者的数量越多，改变越为困难；否决者的数量越少，改变越为容易。这解释了为何民主制度比较稳定。因为一般而言，民主制度比非民主制度有着更多的否决者。
100 这是目前制度变迁领域占据主流地位的理性选择制度主义的理论。该理论的基本前提是人是有理性的，理性人有目的地设计出制度来解决特定的问题，当有改变制度的要求时，制度创设者可以通过评估制度改变和维护现存制度之间的收益和成本，来决定是否进行制度变迁。关于理性选择制度主义的分析，参见Baby R．Weingast，“Political Institutions：Rational Choice Perspectives”，in Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds．，A New Handbook of Political Science，Oxford：Oxford University Press，pp．167-190。但是如果根据制度变迁的“间断均衡论”和“自发演化论”，则结果要复杂得多。关于间断均衡论，可参见Sean Kelly,“Punctuated Change and the Era of Divided Government"，New Perspectives on American Politics，Washington，D．C：Congress Quarterly Press，1994；关于制度的自发演化论，可参见韦森，“哈耶克式自发制度生成论的博弈论诠释”，载《中国社会科学》，2003年第6期，第43-57页。
101 值得注意的是，本文的这个结论与内生性关税理论(Endogenous Trade，ET)的结论本质上并不矛盾。这是由于两者观察的视角并不一致。ET关注关税为何产生，为何各国不采取理论上最优的纯粹自由贸易；而本文关注的是关税即使有的话，世界的平均关税水平为何越来越低。关于内生性关税理论，参见Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman，“Protection for Sale”，American Economic Review，1994(84)，pp．833-850．
1 关于现实主义和自由主义对国家在世界政治中的地位认定，请参考Joseph M．Grieco，Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press，1990，pp．27-36；关于建构主义者对国家的态度，参见亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第9-12页。
2 霍布斯，《利维坦》，黎思复等译，商务印书馆，1985年，第92页—第93页。
3 同上，第93页。
4 同上，第131—132页。
5 洛克，《政府论》(下篇)，叶启芳、瞿菊农译，商务印书馆，1996年，第105页。
6 戴维·伊斯顿，《政治生活的系统分析》，王浦劬等译，华夏出版社，1989年版，第3页-第4页。
7 Gabriel A.Almond, "The Return to the State", American Political Science Review, September 1988, p.855.
8 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
9 Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structure and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.21.
10 Ibid, p.23.
11 Ibid, p.23.
12 Andrew Cortell and James Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter: The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms", International Studies Quarterly, September 1996, pp.451-478.
13 关于马克思主义的国家观，可参见王沪宁主编：《政治的逻辑：马克思主义政治学原理》，上海人民出版社，1998年版，第135页-第214页。对于各种国家观的综合性介绍，可参考奇尔科特：《比较政治学理论：新范式的探索》，潘世强等译，北京：社会科学文献出版社，1997年版，第199-第216页；吴惕安，俞可平主编，《当代西方国家理论评析》，陕西人民出版社，1994年版。
14 亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第254页。
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. by Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, vol. 1, p. 54.
16 .David Held, "Central Perspectives on the modern state," in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall ed., The Idea of Modern State, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, pp. 62-64.
17 新现实主义的理论渊源可以追溯至修昔底德在《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》一书所提出的观点，即根本性的人性的自私塑造了国家行为体的精神特质，并因此导致对其它国家的霸权征服，此即“历史的悲观进程”。此后，后来者马基雅维利和摩根索入木三分地剖析了人性当中的“恶”，并据此对国际关系进行了深刻地描述。参见修昔底德：《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》，谢德风译，北京：商务印书馆，1960年版；马基雅维利：《君主论》，潘汉典译，北京：商务印书馆，1985年版；汉斯·摩根索：《大国间政治：为权力和和平而斗争》，杨鸣歧等译，北京：商务印书馆，1993年版。此三人的学术观点可以归结为人性现实主义。关于现实主义的发展脉络，参见Benjamin Frankel, eds, Roots of Realism, London: Frank Cass,
18 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, M.A: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.111
19 Ibid, p.95.
20 米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松泽，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第17页。
21 Ibid, pp.104-105.
22 Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface", in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller eds, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995,p.xi.
23 Jeffrey W.Legro and Andrew Moravcsik ,"Is Anybody Still a Realist ?" International Security, Fall 1999, pp.5-55.
24 新自由主义内部有诸多流派，如共和自由主义、商业自由主义和民主和平论等等。但其中最具影响的是新制度自由主义，所以这里的新自由主义是指新制度自由主义。关于对新自由主义流派的梳理，参见苏长利：“自由主义和世界政治”，载《世界经济与政治》，2004年第7期，第15页-第20页。
25 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
26 David Baldwin,"Neorealism, Neoliberalism and World Politics", in David Baldwin eds..Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
27 Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment", in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003, p.163.
28 Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 107-122.
29 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p.2.
30 Ibid, p.2.
31 Ibid，p．4。如果说在《国际制度和国家权力》一书中基欧汉对国家和政府的接替使用反应了其准备接受国家作为世界政治最重要行为体的早期的不成熟思考，那么在其后的著作中再次出现政府取代国家的行文就不能用偶然来解释了。在《新现实主义和新自由主义》一书中，基欧汉论述到“制度设立的规则对国家行使权力有限制作用。各个政府通过使用政治影响来实现它们的目标，这包括增加它们在合作中的获益份额”。参见(相对收益的条件性一节的上面一段)。在《国际关系：旧的和新的》一文中，基欧汉起先批判了结构现实主义忽视国内政治和国际制度的影响，以及无法发展一套变化的理论，基欧汉笔锋一转，认为新自由主义理论“关注国家行为的变化性而非持久性——这种变化不仅仅是物质能力的变化，而且是政治过程的变化，特别是在国内层面和国际层面制度特征的变化”，“当国家能够从合作中共同获益的时候，我们预期政府将会努力创立这样的制度”。参见Robert Keohane, "International Relations, Old and New", in Robert E .Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.468.
32 罗伯特·基欧汉，“中文版前言”，《霸权之后：世界政治与经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强和何曜译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年，第23页。
33 除了处于国家机构位置上的人以外，政府还可以作为“管理的过程”，还是“权力的行使”，或者指“一个社会中管理的方式、方法和制度”，世界银行，《1997年世界发展报告：变革世界中的政府》，蔡秋生等译，北京：中国财政经济出版社，1997年，第20页。青木吕彦认为，政府是主权国家的一般行为代表，包括立法、行政、司法、官僚部门和统治集团在内的组织。参见青木昌彦：《比较制度分析》，周黎安译，上海：上海远东出版社，2001年版，第158页。
34 国家自身没有利益或者说偏好，其利益和偏好只能又国内政治决定吗?答案是否定的。政府的对外政策也不能认为是国家利益的表现。事实上，政府政策的形成有多个来源，其中有些来自于国家利益的需求，也有来自其他行为体的要求。
35 Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment", in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003, p.163.
36 事实上，不少以“去国家化”为中心论点的自由主义著作都存在这样的重大缺陷：将政府等同于国家。在着重论证了政府对政治、经济等领域控制力降低、或者存在“政府失灵”的现象之后，便得出国家变得越来越不重要，越来越虚弱的结论。特别是在国家和社会关系研究当中，其中的“国家”一词一般都可以刚“政府”一词代替，如“强国家-弱社会”可以毫无疑义地转化为“强政府-弱社会”。这表现了不少西方国家，特别是英、美等国国家概念的长期缺位。参见：Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era, Cambridge, U.K: Polity Press,1998.
37 比如著名的现实主义学者史蒂芬·克拉斯纳。在其成名作《保卫国家利益》一书中，克拉斯纳开宗明义，“将采取国家主义的研究方法，视国家为自主的行为体”。但他坚持要在政策制定的过程理解国家。在美国对外政策的制定过程中，他写到，“国家自主地形成目标，并力图排除国际和国内行为者的反对并贯彻执行”。政府机构，特别是白宫和国务院，“对特定的社会压力集团具有高度的免疫能力”，国防部、财政部、商务部，或者中央情报局“也可以被视为国家的组成部分”，但“它们的行为已经产生了变化。有时会为提升集体目标而奋斗，但有时会扩大特定社会集团的利益以及官僚机构自身的利益”。参见Stephen Krasner,Defending the National Interest：Raw Materials Investments and U．S．Foreign Policy，Princeton：Princeton University Press，1978，p．5，p．10，p．11。另外一个例子是戴维·赖克，他虽然是位体系论者，但也认为国家“从狭隘的意义上讲，是政府中的中央决策者”，“宽泛地说，是政府”。参见David A．Lake，Power, Protection, and Free Trade：International Sources of U．S．Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939，Ithaca：Cornell University Press，1988，p．68．
38 亚历山大·温特：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年第一版，第256页。
39 在这个意义上，新自由主义的国家观并非本质国家观。
40 温特认为本质国家具有5个特征，(1)制度一法律秩序；(2)惟一可以合法使用有组织暴力的组织；(3)具有主权的组织；(4)社会；(5)领土。同上，第257页。
41 更准确地说，现代国家是1648年《威斯特伐利亚条约》签定之后的产物。《威斯特伐利亚和约》，是法国、瑞典和德意志新教诸候为一方，哈布斯堡王朝神圣罗马帝国皇帝和德意志天主教诸候为另一方，为结束二十年战争(1618——1648)而缔结的和约。
42 Handrik Spruyt，The Sovereign State and Its Competitors：An Analysis of Systems Change，New Jersey,Princeton：Princeton University Press，1994。关于现代主权国家发展的历史分析，还可参见Martin van Creveld, The rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999和Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
43 关于国家和这些政治体的区别，可参见Friedrich Kratochwil，“Of Systems，Boundaries，and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System", World Politics, October 1986, pp.27-52; Charles Tilly eds., The Formation of National State in Western Europe, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1975.
44 Martin van Creveld, The rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.415-416.
45 Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p.10.
46 关于战争和国家诞生的关系，可参见戴维·赫尔德，《民主和全球秩序》，胡伟等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003年，第58页。
47 汉斯·摩根索：《大国间政治：为权力利和平而斗争》，杨鸣歧等译，北京：商务印书馆，1993年；华尔兹认为，“只有生存得以保障，国家才有可能追求诸如利润和权力等”，参见Kenneth Waltz，Theory of International Politics，M．A：Addison-Wesley,1979，p．126。还有其他一些国家关系学者也赞同此观点。克拉斯纳曾经总结道，“所有的国家都承认国家的最低要求是保持领土和政治完整”。参见Stephen Krasner,Structure Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism，Berkeley：University of California Press，1985，p．26。阿隆问道，“什么是政治体(比如国家)逻辑上地第一选择目标?每个行为体都追求生存。”参见Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1973, p.64.
48 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1950, p.75.
49 Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", Behavioral Science, July 1957, pp.201-205.
50 Joseph Nye, Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990,p.154.
51 Bruce Russet, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000, pp.93-110。另外，还可以参见米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》， 王义桅和唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第84页-104页。
52 Harold Sorout and Margaret Sorout, Toward a Political of the Planet Earth, New York: Van Nostrand，1971，p．165。在这个意义上，米尔斯海默认为“权力不过是国家所能获得的特殊资产或物质资源”是不够全而的，参见米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第81页。另外，吉尔平将权力定义为“一个国家的军事、经济和技术能力”也是片面的，参见Robert Gilpin，War and Change in World Politics，New York：Cambridge University Press，1981，p．13．
53 Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf, 1985, p.31.
54 同上，第42页。
55 Randall L.Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in", International Security, Summer 1994, p.85-88.
56 参见Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons, New York: Oxford University Press 1991; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies, Spring 1992,pp.417-447.
57 也有不少学者将财富列为国家偏好。参见George Alexander and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations", in George Alexander eds., Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder: Westview, 1980, pp.217-238。和权力相似，财富的重要性体现在它是实现国家安全最大化偏好的手段，但非国家偏好本身。
58 Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealism Theory", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Spring 1988, p.616.
59 米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2001年版，第19页。关于施维勒的论证，参见Randall L. Schweller,"Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?", Security Studies, Spring 1996, pp.90-121.
60 同上，第37页，注46。
61 在这个意义上，严格地说，米尔斯海默眼中的国家是“短期内的权力最大化者”。John J． Mearsheimer,"The False Promise ot International Institutions", International Security, Winter 1994-1995, pp.10.
62 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp.11-12.
63 拉布斯试图将两者整合在一起，因此他的回答是：“两者都要”。参见Eric J Labs,．“Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims", Security Studies, December 1997,pp. 1-49.
64 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 63.
65 拓宽安全研究的著作有: Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security, Summer 1983, pp.129-153; Beverly Crawford, "The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence", Millennium, Spring 1994, pp.25-55; Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morton Kelstrup and Pieere Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter, 1993。深化安全研究的研究可参见Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security", International Studies Review, 2003:5, pp. 203-222; Ken Booth eds, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005; Richard Wyn Jones eds, Critical Theory and World Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
66 参见 Ken Booth eds, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp.12-17。还可参见: Keith Krause and Michael Williams eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
67 John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply: ", International Security, Summer 1995, pp.92.
68 Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International Studies Quarterly, No.2 1991, p.212.
69 Ibid, p.213。另可参见 Harald Muller, "Security Cooperation", in Warter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p.389.
70 Micheal Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005,p.4.
71 Lloyd Pettiford and Melissa Curley, Changing Security Agendas and the Third World, London: Pinter, 1999, p.7.
72 Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security, Summer 1983, p.133.
73 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, HertfordShire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp.57-107。其实，这和本质国家并无太大区别。基本上，地理上的国家类似于领土，观念上的国家类似于主权，而制度上的国家类似于国家的合法性。
74 Ibid，p．87．
75 Ken Booth eds., Critical Security Studies and Workd Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p.21.
76 可参见 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Spring 1990, pp.137-168; Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons, New York: Oxford University Press 1991; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies, Spring 1992,pp.417-447; Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies, Spring 1992, pp.383-416; Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1999.
77 Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and Balance of Power", International Security, Spring 1985,pp.3-43.
78 Brian M Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow The Flag?",American Political Science Review, July 1989, pp.465-480.
79 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making ,and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p.419-420.
80 Joanne Gowa, "Bipoliarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade", American Political Science Review, December 1989, pp.1245-1256.
81 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
82 Ibid.
83 Brett Leeds,;Jeffrey M. Ritter; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Andrew G. Long, "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944", International Interactions, 2002 28(3), p.238.
84 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, M.A: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 168.
85 Joanne Gowa, Edward Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, American Political Science Review, June 1993, p.416-417.
86 Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.105.
87 Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp.10-39.
88 Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs", World Politics, Oct 1984, pp. 1-23.
89 John C. Matthews, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes:When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter", International Security, Summer 1996, pp.112-146.
90 保罗·肯尼迪在其《大国的兴衰》一书中也阐明了类似的观点，他写到，“把国家中生产性的制造力转移至不具生产性的军事领域，长期而言，会损害国家经济的基础”。参见Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers：Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000，New York：Random House，1987,p．539．
91 米尔斯海默：《大国政治的悲剧》，王义桅和唐小松泽，上海人民出版社，2001年版，第98-104页。
92 关于现实主义理论中的防御-进攻分支，可参见Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann，“What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it? ", International Security, Spring 1998, pp.44-82; Jack Levy, "The offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Historical and Theoretical Analysis", International Studies Quarterly, June 1984, pp.219-238.
93 Albert O.Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p.17.
94 Ibid.
95 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman&Company, 1989, pp.8-9.
96 Ibid.
97 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, October 1996, pp.29-49.
98 David Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", International Organization, Autumn 1980, pp.471-506.
99 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research, October 1996, pp.29-49; Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, July 1999, pp.387-404.
100 John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985", International Studies Quarterly, 1997.41(2), pp.267-293; John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, July 1999, pp.423-442; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization, 1885-1992", World Politics, October 1999, pp.1-37.
101 关于经济相互依赖和全球冲突之间的关系，可参见Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Peter Gleditsch, eds, Globalization and Armed Conflict, Lanham Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2003;Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002; Jean-Marc Blanchard, Edward Mansfield, and Norrin Ripsman, Power and Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security, London: Frank Cass, 2000.
102 关于商品类别的差异对国家间冲突的影响，还可参见Rafael Reuvenv and Heeioon Kang， "Bilateral Trade and Political Cortflict/Cooperation: Do Goods Matter?", Journal of Peace Research, No.5, 1998, pp.581-602.
103 Klaus Knorr, "International Economic Leverage and Its Uses", in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security, Lawrence, Kansas: Press of Kansas University,1977，p.102。关于此种观点的表述，还可参见P.T Hopmann, "Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", International Organization, Winter 1978, pp.141-178.
104 并d非所有的学者都认为经济依赖的不对称性将导致政治权力的产生，比如瓦格纳坚持认为“博弈论的结果表明，不对称的贸易依赖并不意味着依赖少的一方将能对另外一方施加影响”参见R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence", International Organization, Summer 1988, pp.461-483.
105 赫契曼认为A国通过贸易支配B国的杠杆主要取决于三大条件：1、B国通过和A国贸易获得的净收益；2、A国施加给B国的调整过程的长度和痛苦；3、A国通过和B国贸易，创造了既得利益集团以及利益集团的实力。参见Albert O. Hirschman,, National Power and The Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p.18．
106 我们甚至可以想象一种极端情况：即使某个霸权国拥有世界上最大的市场，提供最重要商品，但如果一个小国的退出成本很低，同时可供选择的贸易伙伴较多，那么霸权国也很难以贸易作为有效手段对小国施加影响。
107 依赖(dependence)和依附(dependency)不是一回事。依附的结果是外围国家，或者中小国家被中心国家或者大国剥削，着重经济上的不平等；而依赖强调贸易不对称导致不利于国家的政治和安全后果。
108 Paul Papayounou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.12。关于现实主义对外经济政策，参见Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001; Jonathan Kirshner, "The Political Economy of Realism", in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
1 Lars S. Skalnes, Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy: Foreign Economic Policies as Strategic Instruments, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000, p.1.
2 Anne O. Krueger, "Introduction", in Anne O. Krueger, eds., The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p.1.
3 John Ikenberry, David Lake and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, p.3.
4 Robert Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism", in John H. Goldthorpe eds., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.16
5 David A.Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p.33.
6 Ibid. p4.
7 关于霸权稳定论，可参见Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp.31-39.
8 Michael Webb and Stephen Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment", Review of International Studies, April 1989, pp. 183-198.
9 Ibid.
10 Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts ? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, p.6.
11 关于国家中心论，可参见John Ikenberry, David Lake and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988，p．9-14。值得注意的是，这里的“国家中心论”更准确地说，应该是“政府中心论”。关于国家和政府的联系与区别，参见第三章内容。
12 对于贸易政治学中供应方和需求方的理论阐述，可参见Dani Rodrik，“Political Economy of Trade Policy", in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff.eds., Handbook of International Economics，Amsterdam：Elsevier Science，1995，pp．1457-1494。另外可参见盛斌：《中国对外贸易政策的政治经济分析》，上海：上海人民出版社，2002年。
13 关于制度中心论的观点，可参见Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith，"Institutional Determinants of Trade Policy", International Interactions, vol.23,1997, pp. 119-143.
14 Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy", International Organization, Winter 1988, pp 179-217; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
15 Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1977(8), pp.281-313.
16 Pietro Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1993.
17 Michael Hiscox, "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization", International Organization, Autumn 1999, pp.669-698.
18 Peter Gourevich, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", International Organization, Autumn 1978, p.883.
19 关于欧美贸易关系的论述，可参见T.E. Josling and T.G. Taylor, Banana Wars: The Anatormy of A Trade Dispute, Cambridge, MA: CABI Publishing, 2003; 关于美日之间的贸易冲突，可参见赵瑾，《全球化与经济摩擦：日美经济摩擦的理论与实证研究》，北京：商务印书馆，2003。
20 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/topO412.html
21 关于美国对苏联的贸易政策，可参见Peter Peterson, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era, Washington D.C: U.S Department of Commerce, 1972; Mose Harvey, East West Trade and U.S Policy, New York: National Association of Manufacturer's, 1966.
22 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p.238。关于美国对苏联的贸易遏制政策，还可参见Michael Mastanduno, "Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union", World Politics, July 1985, pp.503-531.
23 Alan P. Dobson, U.S. Economic Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and Economic Warfare, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp.214-249.
24 1984年到1991年，美苏两国贸易总额分别为：28亿美元、18亿美元、19亿美元、33亿美元、50亿美元、41亿美元和43亿美元。其中，美国出口分别为：24亿美元、12亿美元、15亿美元、27亿美元、42亿美元、30亿美元和35亿美元。美国处于绝对的贸易顺关地位。参见http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4610.html
25 Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, London: Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 95
26 Steven E. Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003,p.76.
27 这和国际关系的层次分析法类似，但不完全相同，主要是加入了社会和政府的关系。关于层次分析法，可参见David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations", in John lkenberry eds, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, Harper Collins Publishers, 1989, pp.67-80.
28 参见Michael Mastanduno, "Economic and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", International Organization, Autumn 1998, pp.827-828。但是要指出，马斯坦丹诺运用极的构成分析一国对外战略中安全和经济的组合运用。这是一种典型的国家中心论观点，忽视了社会行为体的作用。
29 Susan Strange, "Political Economy and International Relations", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds., International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p.165.
30 赖克把国际经济结构定义为“在相对规模和相对劳动生产率两个维度上各个民族国家之间的结构”，参见David A.Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p.11.
31 这个结论主要参照政府做出军事政策的影响因素。关于此点，可参见James Meernik, "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Force", International Studies Quarterly, 1994(38), pp.121-138; Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry", International Studies Quarterly, 1989(33), pp．361-387。马斯坦丹诺也曾经做出类似的结论，参见Michael Mastanduno，“Economic and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", International Organization, Autumn 1998, pp.827-828.
32 Ka Zeng, Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004, p.42.。关于贸易结构的论述，还可参见John A. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp.47-48.
33 这种分析还是比较粗略和静态的，因为没有考虑到要素的流动性问题。关于要素流动性，参见第二章。
34 香博使用同样的组合来分析经济制裁的成功可能性，参见David Shambaugh. States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy, New York: State Univeristy of New York Press, 1999, 19.16.
35 当然，还有更为细致的分法，如考特尔和戴维斯依据决策权威的集中程度与国家-社会关系的紧密程度，将国家／社会关系分为集权式的国家-社会较为紧密型、集权式的国家-社会较为分离型、分权式的国家-社会关系较为分离型和分权式的国家-社会关系较为紧密型，参见Andrew Cortell and James Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter: The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms", International Studies Quarterly, September 1996, pp.451-478；利斯和卡彭则将国家／社会关系分成六种：国家控制型、国家主导型、僵局型、社团主义型、社会主导型以及脆弱型，参见Thomas Risse-Kaooen.eds., Bring Transnational Relations Back In：Non-state Actors,Domestic Structure and International Institutions,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993,pp.23-25。另外，需要指出的是，上述学者所指的社会是社会学意义上的社会，而非本文所讨论的以经济为扭结的社会。
36 关于社会行为体和政府之间的关系，可参见Stephen L. Elkin, "Business-State Relations in the Commercial Repulic", The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 2, 1994, pp.115-139; Ronald Cox, eds., Business and the State in International Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
37 这是因为非民主国家的政策否决点(veto point)更少，因此更容易决策和实施。关于政 策否决点，可参见第二章的相关内容。
38 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986.
39 关于大战略的研究，可参见Barry Posen and Andrews Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", International Security, Winter 1996-1997, pp.5-53; Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
40 根据Conybeare的定义，贸易战是“一种剧烈的国际冲突形式，国家之间主要就直接与贸易的商品和服务相关的经济目标进行谈判和报复，其使用的手段表现为对物品和服务的自由流动进行限制”。参见John A. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.4.
41 参见 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations, New York: Basic Books, 1975; David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985; Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: Cocom and the Politics of East-West Trade, Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press，1992。但最早系统研究使用经济作为外交战略的应该是赫契曼，参见Albert O.Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980(1945).
42 鲍德温是最早提出消极的对外经济战略和积极的对外经济战略的学者，但和其他学者一样，他主要关注消极的一面。参见David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
43 就笔者所见，专门研究积极性的贸易外交理论和实践的，大致上有两本著作。参见Patricia A. Davis, The art of Economic Persuasion: Positive Incentives and German Economic Diplomacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999; William J. Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996.
44 Michael Mastanduno, "The strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice", in Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003, pp.175-186.
45 关于金融手段在一国对外外交战略中的使用，可参见Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
46 David Cortright and George Lopez, Stnart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Oxford: Rowman&Litttlefield Publishers, 2002.
47 1996年，美国国会为制裁古巴所通过的“赫尔姆斯-伯顿法案”(Helms-Burton Bill)，规定美国政府将制裁同这些国家做生意或者进行投资的外国公司。2000年，美国国会又通过了《防止向伊朗扩散法》(Iran Nonproliferation Act)，该法规定将对任何向伊朗提供支持的外国公司进行制裁。
48 Donald Losman, International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia, Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press, 1979.
49 Ibid, pp.128-129.
50 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffery Scott and Kimberly Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Washington D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1990.
51 Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work", International Security, Autumn 1997, pp.90-136.
52 Richard Haass, "Sanctions Madness", Foreign Affairs, Noverber/December 1997, pp.74,75.
53 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 1985.
54 Sidney Weintraub, Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
55 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", International Affairs, Autumn 1979, pp.367-384.
56 Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power, New York: Basic Books, 1973.
57 Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics, April 1967, pp. 26-48.
58 Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Policy, New York: Basic Books, 1975, p.139.
59 Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: Cocom and the Politics of East-West Trade, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p.54.
60 在本案例中，有条件的经济诱使和无条件的经济诱使是互为补充的使用的，这样可以发挥更好的效果。Patricia A. Davis, The art of Economic Persuasion: Positive Incentives and German Economic Diplomacy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999.
61 Daniel W. Drezner, "The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expextiations, and Economic Inducements", Security Studies, Autumn 1999-2000, pp.63-75.
62 Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce, "Preferential Trade Agreements and Military Dispute", Security Studies, Autumn 1999-2000, pp.92-118.
63 比如，和美国订立自由贸易协定的国家都是美国的政治盟友。参见宋国友：“试论美国区域贸易协定政策”，《现代国际关系》，2003年第12期。
64 Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: ATheory of Trade Expectations", International Security, Spring 1996, pp.5-41.
65 Paul Papayounou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and The Balance of Power", International Security, Spring 1996, pp.42-76
66 对于自由贸易者的政策偏好，可参见Etel Solingen．Regional Orders at Century's Dawn： Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.26-32; Steven E. Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003,pp.21-24.
67 关于保护贸易者的政策倾向，可参见John Levis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982; Ralph Rotte, "Economics and Peace-Theory on the Eve of World War I", in Jurgen Brauer and William Gissy, Economics of Conflict and Peace, eds, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1997.
68 前面提到过，积极的经济战略受第三国和体系的影响较小，基于理论的概括和简略性，这里对其进行合理地忽略。
69 关于民主和平论的主要观点，可参见Bruce Russett. and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001; James Lee.Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press: 1998.
70 比如伊朗，美国在中东的主要对手之一，属于民主国家，但并不是一个自由的国家。美国对伊朗的外交战略并非使其变为更民主，而是使其经济和民众更为自由。关于自由比民主更能带来和平的论述，，参见John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security, Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1997.
71 Richard Rosecrance, and Jennifer Taw, "Japan and The Theory of International Leadership", World Politics, January 1990, p. 190.
72 Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policy from 1911-1914, New York: Norton, 1975, pp.22-25.
73 关于这段时期的国际关系，可参见Alan C. Lamborn, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany, Boston: Hyman, 1991; Paul Papayounou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War, Ann Arbor: The Univerisy of Michigan Press, 1999.
74 所谓协作物品就是那些对政治对手的协作行动有重大影响但对经济增长相对较小的那些公共物品。关于这种观点，可参见Bruce Bueno de Mesquita，George Downs，“Development and Democracy"，Foreign Affairs，Sep／Oct2005，pp．77-87．
75 关于此种观点，可参见Michelle A. Benson, "Dyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind: State-to-State versus State-to-System Security and Economic Relationships", Journal of Peace Research, No. 6, 2004, pp. 659-676.
1 以中方的统计数据为准。
2 朱丕荣，《中国与美国农产品贸易状况》，载《世界农业》，1994年第4期，第56页。
3 Anne Veigle, "China Syndrome", Washington Times, 2 July 1991, pp.C1, C10.
4 Ibid.
5 Congressional Record, 11 July 1991, p.S7349.
6 Congressional Record, 23 July 1991, p. S10617.
7 关于一点，可参见Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China:An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups, Lanham Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 1998, pp.26-47.
8 Kerry Dumbaugh," Interest Groups: Growing Influence", in Ramon Myers, Michel Oksenberg and David Shambaugh, Making China Policy:Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p.137.
9 笔者根据表5-3计算所得。
10 张任著：《美国对华直接投资，1980-1991))，上海：复旦大学出版社，1993年版，第44页。
11 汪熙、张耀辉，《析美国对华直接投资，1980-1994))，载《复旦学报》，1996年第2期，第8页。
12 魏晓愈，《美国12家企业在我国投资超亿美元》，载《商业世界》，1996年第11期，第36-37页。
13 Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing, 102d Congress, 2th Session, 1992, pp. 158-59.
14 "China Fever Strikes Again", Business Week, March 29, 1993, p.46.
15 批评中国未能保护美国知识产权的软件、电影及工业设计产业在1992年之后要求美国政府对华实行严厉政策，但他们并非对华保护贸易的鼓吹者。事实上，他们更加希望进入中国市场。
16 如根据第四个中美纺织品协议，1994年-1997年对美中国纺织品配额的年增长率为1.63％。
17 “中美双边纺织品贸易协定概况”，载《纺织信息周刊》，1999年9月27日，第13页。
18 值得注意的是，在中国加入WTO、特别是纺织品配额取消之后，纺织品重新成为中美经贸关系的重要问题。
19 Congressional Budget Office, What Accounts for the Decline in Manufacturing Employment? February 18, 2004
20 Robert Scott, "U.S.-China Trade, 1989-2003:Impact on jobs and industries, nationally and State-by-State", Economic Policy Institute Working Paper,270#，2005。这种情况的出现很大程度上是因为中国替代了其它国家对美国的出口。换言之，即使中国不对美国出口，这些工作机会也会丧失。
21 Guy Gugliotta, "Because Pitted in Fight over China's MFN Status", Washington Post, 14 July 1991, p. A6.
22 1992年10月1日参议院的投票结果为59-40票。
23 Congressional Record, 25, February 1992, p.S2151.
24 Peter Behr, "Major U.S. Companies Lobbying Clinton to Renew China's Trade Privileges", Washington Post, 6 May 1994, p.19.
25 波音公司等大企业每年都赞助播放有利于延长对华最惠国待遇的电视广告，宣传经济参与是推动人权事业的积极因素。
26 http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/in dex.html
27 纽约《侨报》，1996年6月8日。转引自王勇，《试论利益集团在美国对华政策中的影响》，载《美国研究》，1998年第2期，第73页。
28 关于跨国公司等对华自由贸易联盟在MFN中的作用，可参见王勇，《最惠国待遇的回合：1989-1997年美国对华贸易政策》，北京：中央编译出版社，1998年；谭融，《美国利益集团政治研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2002年5月；冼国民、张岸元，《跨国公司与美国国会对华政治》，载《世界经济》，2004年第4期。
29 Holly Bailey, "A Passage to China Update: House Approves PNTR", Center for Responsive Politics, May 24, 2000, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china house.htm
30 Steven Greenhouse, "A.F.L-C.I.O Vows to Spend More Money-Than Ever Before on Candidates", New York Times, February 16, 2000.
31 Holly Bailey, Ibid.
32 关于政治制度在美国制定对华政策中的作用，可参见Tan Qingshan，The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 1992; Ramon H.Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg and David Shambaugh, Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2001; Jean A. Garrison, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. W. Bush, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
33 投票数据来源参见当日国会报告(Congressional Record)。
34 Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy", International Organization,Autumn 1994，pp．595-632。该文主要是从地理意义上进行阐述了，没有分析时间差异对政策造成的影响。
35 I.M.Destler, American Trade Policy, 3rd, Washington, D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1995, p.235.
36 笔者自行统计，资料来源http://covenantnews.com/chinahv00-228.htm
37 Ronald L.Rogowshi, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989; Stephen P.Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
38 Ronald Cox eds, Business and the State in International Relations, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996; Timothy Mckeown, "What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?", in Charles F. Doran and Gregory P. Marchildon ed, The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994.
39 这三届中民主党众议员和共和党众议员的比例分别为：260-175，267-176和258-176。资料来源，美国国会众议院网站，http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/index.html
40 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999, p.313.
41 Lori Nitschke and Matthew Tully, "Big victory for China Trade Needs Senate's Blessing", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 27, 2000,1249.
42 David Jackson and Steven Engel, "Don't Bite the PAC that Feeds you: Business Punishment Over the China Vote", American Politics Research, March 2003, pp.138-154.
43 笔者自行统计。数据来源http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china_houseb.htm
44 Holly Bailey, "A Passage to China Update: House Approves PNTR", Center for Responsive Politics, May 24, 2000, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china house.htm
45 这8个州分别是新泽西州、宾西法尼亚州、伊利诺伊州、密歇根州、威斯康星州、康涅狄格州、俄亥俄州和密苏里州。笔者根据众议院投票记录整理。
46 笔者自行统计。http://www.opensecrets.org/news/china housec.htm
47 关于国家安全委员会在对外政策中的作用，可参见夏立平：《美国国家安全委员会在美对外和对华政策中的作用》，《国际观察》，2002年第2期；David J. Rothkopf, Running The World: the Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2005.
48 Selig Harrison and Clyde Prestowitz, "Pacific Agenda: Defense of Economics", Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, pp.56-76.
49 Executive Order 12835, January 25th, 1993.
50 Vincent A. Auger, "The National Security System After the Cold War", in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds, U.S Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, p.56.
51 关于国家经济委员会在外交中的显著作用，可参见Bruce Stocks,"Organizing to Trade", Foreign Affairs, 1992-1993, pp.36-52; Kenneth Juster and Simon Larazus, Making Economic Policy: An assessment of the National Economic Council, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997; Jeffrey Frankel and Peter Orszag, eds,American Economic Policy in the 1990's, Cambridge,. Mass.: MIT Press, 2002.
52 Nancy Tucker, "A Precarious Balance: Clinton and China," Current History, September 1998, pp. 243-249.
53 吴心伯，《论克林顿政府亚太安全战略的形成》，载《国际政治研究》，2003年第2期，第70页。
54 Patrick Tyler, Six Presidents and China: A Great Wall: An Investigative History, New York: Public Affairs, 2000, p.397, 399.
55 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance," Defense Issue, Vol. 10, No. 35.1995, pp.1-4.
56 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999, pp.294-295.
57 "New Preference for Asia Meshes with Clinton's Style", Los Angeles Times, Nov.22, 1992, p.1.
58 Ibid.
59 Jean A. Garrison, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. VV.. Bush, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2005, p. 143.
60 Denny Roy, "Hegemony on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asia Security", International Security, Summer 1994, pp.149-168; Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival", International Security, Winter 1997/98, pp. 54-58; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The coming conflict with China, New York : A.A. Knopf, 1997.
61 刘连第、汪大为，《中美关系的轨迹：建交以来大事纵览》，北京：时事出版社，1995年；黄志平著，《美国巴统是怎样进行出口管制的》，北京：中国对外经济贸易出版社，1992年。
62 美国在1989年之后对中国实行了一系列经济制裁，有些出口管制的限制也被作为经济制裁的重要组成部分而提出。但经济制裁的目标在于“改变对象国的政策”，而包含在此波经济制裁中的出口管制严格来说不具备这样的效用，所以笔者将其中的停止军用品贸易和军民两用品许可证两项列出，作为冷战期间美国对华出口政策的变化性延续。
63 BIS的前身为商务部出口管理局(Bureau of Exhort Administration, BXA)。http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/738spir.pdf。
64 Export Administration, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1988, March, 1989.
65 Adam Segal, "Practical Engagement: Drawing a Fine Line for U.S.-China Trade", Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp.157-173.
66 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, U.S. Exports to China, 1988-1998: Feeling Proliferation, Washington D.C, 1999, Sec 1, p.1.
67 在1988-1998年间，美国年均对华出口98亿美元。笔者自行计算。
68 General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance Computer Controls, Washington D.C: United States Accounting Office, 1998.
69 James Jochum, "Testimony for the Hearing before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission", Jan 17, 2002.
70 Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, p.51.
71 Kathleen Walsh, U.S. Commercial Technology Transfers to the People's Republic of China, Bureau of Export Administration Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, 1999.
72 Roger Cliff, The military potential of China's commercial technology, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, p.62, p.30.
73 《国际先驱导报》，“美国力阻欧盟解除对华军售禁令”，2003年2月6日。
74 Jane Perlez, "Israel Drops Plan to Sell Air Radar to China Military", New York limes, July 13, 2000.
75 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/04/content_430948.htm
76 基于此点，美国指责中国操纵人民币和操控市场导致了美国对华贸易的巨额赤字是没有道理的。
77 例如，中国需要进口先进机床设备，给美国制造厂商带来了良好的贸易机会。由于美国政府严格的出口管制，众多美国公司正常的对华贸易活动难以开展。
78 如未特别标明，本文针对美国关税制度分析的文本和数据全部来自Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States(2006), United States International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
79 因为美国对非洲国家有《非洲发展与机会法案》(African Growth and OpportunityAct)，对于东南亚国家有《东盟发展倡议》(Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative)，这样便把位于这两个地区的所有不享受普惠制待遇国家也包括在内了。
80 根据经济普查资料，中国2004年度的GDP为159878亿人民币，合2万亿美元。http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2OO5-12/21/content 3948745.htm。
81 关于普惠制待遇的情况，可参考http://www.unctad.org。关于美国普惠制的情况，可参见http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/Section Index.html。
82 Dianne E. Rennack, China: U.S. Economic Sanctions, CRS, No. 96-272 F.
83 Lovett, William Anthony, Alferd E.Eckes, U.S Trade Policy: History, Theory and The WTO, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p.95.
84 这六个国家是多米尼加、萨尔瓦多、洪都拉斯、尼加拉瓜、哥斯达黎加和危地马拉。数据来源，美国国际贸易委员会Data Base数据。
85 张汉林著，《WTO反倾销争端案例评析》，北京：人民出版社，2004年版，第15页-第22页。
86 James Brander, Paul Krugman, "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade", Journal of International Economics, Nov.1983, pp. 313-321.
87 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, "A Theory of Managed Trade", American Economic Review, Sep.1990, pp.779-795.
88 Michael Finger, Antidumping, AnnArbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
89 N. Gregory Mankiw and Phillip Swagel, "Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade Policy",Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, p112。关于国际贸易委员会的地位、作用和政治独立性等问题，可参见Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa,"The Economic and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making", Review of International Economics, 1997: 5(2), pp.230-254.
90 宋泓，《非市场经济地位与我国对外贸易的发展》，载《世界经济与政治》，2004年第10期，第7页。
91 周世俭，许肖冰，《论美国对华反倾销的不公平性》，载《矿业管理》，2001年第4期，第14页。
92 虽然出口控制也常被作为美国对华经济制裁的内容而列出，但这里的经济制裁不包括出口控制。这是因为经济制裁的目标在于“改变对象国的政策”，而包含经济制裁中的出口管制严格米说不具备这样的效用。因此，此节所指的经济制裁是排除了“限制商品、技术和服务的出口”和“强制许可证”之外的其它经济制裁方式。关于美国经济制裁的分类，参见U.S. International Trade Committee, Overview and Analysis of Current U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions, August 1998, p.1-7.
93 Dianne E. Rennack, China: U.S. Economic Sanctions, CRS, No. 96-272 F.
94 Department of the Treasury, International Financial Institutions's Transactions, Nov.18, 2003.
95 美国贸易发展署的对华援助禁令在在2001年被取消。参见Compilation of Presidential Documents: Administration of William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting A Report on Funding for the Trade and Development Agency With Respect To China", January 15, 2001, p.128.
96 Shirley A. Kan, "U.S. Policy Regarding Satellite Exports to China", Testimony before A Joint Hearing of the Committees on International Relations and National Security, June 17, 1998.
97 Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospect, New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
98 Elizabeth C. Economy, "Don't Break the Engagement", Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, pp．96-109。关于制度改变论的观点，还可参见David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002
99 George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2004, pp.33-48.
100 Robert Sutter, China s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
101 Ibid, p.80, p.17.
102 Robert Sutter, "Does China Matter?", Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004, pp.87-88.
103 Max Boot, "Project for a New Chinese Century: Beijing Plans for National Greatness", The Weekly Standard, Oct 10, pp.36-40.
104 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs, "Development and Democracy", Foreign Affairs, Seo/Oct2005, pp.77-87.
105 从1993年到2005年，美国对华出口占其出口总额的比重年均增加8.79％，而中国对美国的出口占中国出口总额的比重年均只增加0.49％。按照目前的速度，10.48年之后，两者将会相同。
106 如果采用美方的数据，中国在这个指标上对美国的依赖是下降的，从34.4％降为31.9％。
107 如果采用中方的数据，这个数值则从1993年的2.3％上升为2005年的5.46％，也增长了近2.4倍。
108 到2000年底，中国对美国的直接投资还不足4亿美元。
109 新华社，“美财长否认美国经济受控于中国持有大量美债券”。http://news3.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-01/06/content_4017099.htm
110 美国对中国的依赖还可以从美国企业对中国市场利廉价劳动力的依赖以及美国消费者对中国产品的依赖上得以体现。
111 吴心伯，《论美国亚太安全战略的走向》，载《复旦学报》，2005年第2期，第4页。
112 George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle", Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2004, pp.33-48
1 David Skidmore, "Introduction: Bringing Social Orders Back in", in David Skidmore eds., Contested Social Orders and International Politics, Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997, pp.7-8.
2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds, Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
3 Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games", International Organization, Summer 1988, pp.427-460.
4 Ibid, p.436.
5 Ibid. p.437.
6 关于双层次博弈的更详尽描述，可参见Peter Evens, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.
7 Kenneth Waltz, Man, State, and War: A TheoreticalAnalysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
8 自由制度主义和其它自由主义理论流派不同，采取的是一种国际-国家的层次分析法。
9 Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", International Organization, Autumn 1978, pp.881-912.
10 Robert Ross, "Managing the Rise of China: Engagement in US China Policy," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross eds, Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power, Routledge Press, 1999,pp. 196-207.
11 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000, University of California Press, 2001.
12 2000年数据。
13 美国统计署(U．S Census Burear)数据。
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王沪宁主编：《政治的逻辑：马克思主义政治学原理》，上海：上海人民出版社，1998年版。
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