战略稳定性中的相互依赖因素
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摘要
当前，国际核裁军进程遇到的一个主要问题，是美俄两个核大国能否在新的《战略武器削减条约》（新START条约）基础上进一步削减战略核武器数量。其主要的障碍是，美俄难以突破“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性概念的束缚。
冷战时期发展起来的战略稳定性理论，从防御性现实主义和结构现实主义出发，以“国家理性”假定和“不可接受损失”概念，构筑起以损失计算为核心的“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性分析方法，结论是：只要两个国家的核武器数量达到“相互确保摧毁”的水平（即可以在“报复还击”中给对方造成“不可接受损失”），双方就可以实现战略稳定（被称作“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性）。这在冷战时期及冷战后美苏（俄）拥有大量核武器的时候，指导了双方的核军备控制与裁军谈判，但却没有回答低于这一核武器数量水平时可否实现战略稳定的问题。
本论文从传统战略稳定性理论用比较“首先核攻击”与“报复还击”两种策略下所遭受损失来评价战略稳定性的基本逻辑出发，吸收自由主义相互依赖理论的思路，在核战争损失计算时考虑相互依赖因素所带来的损失（传统战略稳定性计算中没有计入这部分损失）。首先，从核武器的毁伤效应出发，分析了环境、经济和政治相互依赖因素的构成，讨论了环境（“核冬天”、“大气臭氧层破坏”和“全球放射性尘降”）及经济（直接投资、相互间货物/服务贸易和金融资产）等相互依赖因素在核战争中造成损失的计算方法；然后，在高、低两种核战争规模下进行了模拟案例的定量计算，分别评估了相互依赖因素造成损失对传统战略稳定性计算结果的影响程度。得到的结论是：在大数量核武器情况下，“核冬天”环境相互依赖因素对“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性的计算会产生明显影响；在小数量核武器情况下，经济相互依赖因素对战略稳定性计算有重要影响，环境相互依赖因素也具有一定作用。从而证明了在战略稳定性分析中考虑相互依赖因素造成损失的必要性，说明考虑相互依赖因素有助于战略稳定性的提高。
从上述结论可以看出，如果美俄在战略稳定性计算时考虑相互依赖因素所带来的损失，则不仅达到“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性所需的核武器数量可以明显减少，而且还可能突破“相互确保摧毁”的核武器数量水平实现大幅度削减。这对美俄实现深度核裁军有明显的促进作用。之后，如果美俄（包括其他核国家）不断发展相互间的经贸关系，使各自经济相互依赖因素在战略稳定性分析中的比重增大，则可以进一步推动国际核裁军进程。
At present, one of the major problems facing international nuclear disarmament iswhether or not the two nuclear powers the United States and Russia will be able tocontinue to reduce their number of nuclear weapons based on the foundation of the newStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Among the primary obstacles is thatthe United States and Russia have been unable to break the bonds of “Mutually AssuredDestruction”(MAD) under the concept of strategic stability.
The theory of strategic stability that developed during the Cold War arose fromdefensive realism and structural realism, along with the hypothesis of “nationalrationalism” and the concept of “unacceptable losses,” to build an analytical method forcalculating loss as the core of MAD-based strategic stability. Its conclusion was thatonly when two countries’ numbers of nuclear weapons reach a level of “MutuallyAssured Destruction”(the ability to inflict “unacceptable losses” with a “second strike”)would the two sides be able to achieve strategic stability (known as “Mutually AssuredDestruction” strategic stability). When the United States and Soviet Union confrontedeach other’s large number of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, this strategicstability construct led to each side undertaking controls on their nuclear arsenals andarms reduction negotiations. However, when facing the realities of reducing thesenuclear arsenals under the demands of the21st century, there remain questions as towhether or not strategic stability can be maintained when the level of these nuclearweapons numbers is lowered.
This paper based on the primary logic of traditional strategic stability theory tocompare and contrast first strike and second strike losses to evaluate the strategicstability, and absorbing the ideas of the new interdependent liberalism theory, tocalculate the damages incurred from the interdependence element when calculatingnuclear war losses (traditional strategic stability analysis does not factor in this part oflosses). First, from the damage effect of nuclear weapons, the paper analyzed thecomposing of environmental, economic and political interdependent factors, discussedthe method for calculating interdependent losses such as environmental (“nuclear winter,”“atmospheric ozone depletion,” and “radioactive fallout”) and economic (directinvestment, mutual trade, and financial assets of goods and services); Then, usingsimulated quantitative calculation in cases of high and low number nuclear weapons ofthe nuclear war respectively, assessed the degree of influence ofinterdependence-inflicted losses on traditional strategic stability calculations. Theconclusion is: under the condition of a large number of nuclear weapons, theenvironmental interdependent impact of a “nuclear winter” will have an evidentinfluence on loss calculations associated with “Mutually Assured Destruction” strategicstability. Under the condition of a low numbers of nuclear weapons, the economicinterdependence factor will have an important impact on strategic stability calculationsand the environmental interdependent factor will play certain role. This proves thenecessity of taking into account losses from interdependence when analyzing strategicstability, and considering interdependent factors could help to improve the stability ofthe strategy.
From the conclusion of this paper, it can be observed that if the United States andRussia factor in interdependence losses into their calculations of strategic stability, thetwo parties could significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons needed toachieve “Mutually Assured Destruction” strategic stability, and would allow the UnitedStates and Russia to significantly reduce their numeric level of nuclear weapons tobreak through the construct of “Mutually Assured Destruction”. This is helpful torealize the deep reduction of United States and Russia nuclear weapons. Later, if theUnited States and Russia, including other nuclear-weapon states, are able tocontinuously promote the development of economic and trade relations, this wouldincrease the proportion of economic interdependence losses factored into the calculationof strategic stability analysis, international nuclear disarmament process could befurther promoted.
冷战时期发展起来的战略稳定性理论，从防御性现实主义和结构现实主义出发，以“国家理性”假定和“不可接受损失”概念，构筑起以损失计算为核心的“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性分析方法，结论是：只要两个国家的核武器数量达到“相互确保摧毁”的水平（即可以在“报复还击”中给对方造成“不可接受损失”），双方就可以实现战略稳定（被称作“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性）。这在冷战时期及冷战后美苏（俄）拥有大量核武器的时候，指导了双方的核军备控制与裁军谈判，但却没有回答低于这一核武器数量水平时可否实现战略稳定的问题。
本论文从传统战略稳定性理论用比较“首先核攻击”与“报复还击”两种策略下所遭受损失来评价战略稳定性的基本逻辑出发，吸收自由主义相互依赖理论的思路，在核战争损失计算时考虑相互依赖因素所带来的损失（传统战略稳定性计算中没有计入这部分损失）。首先，从核武器的毁伤效应出发，分析了环境、经济和政治相互依赖因素的构成，讨论了环境（“核冬天”、“大气臭氧层破坏”和“全球放射性尘降”）及经济（直接投资、相互间货物/服务贸易和金融资产）等相互依赖因素在核战争中造成损失的计算方法；然后，在高、低两种核战争规模下进行了模拟案例的定量计算，分别评估了相互依赖因素造成损失对传统战略稳定性计算结果的影响程度。得到的结论是：在大数量核武器情况下，“核冬天”环境相互依赖因素对“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性的计算会产生明显影响；在小数量核武器情况下，经济相互依赖因素对战略稳定性计算有重要影响，环境相互依赖因素也具有一定作用。从而证明了在战略稳定性分析中考虑相互依赖因素造成损失的必要性，说明考虑相互依赖因素有助于战略稳定性的提高。
从上述结论可以看出，如果美俄在战略稳定性计算时考虑相互依赖因素所带来的损失，则不仅达到“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性所需的核武器数量可以明显减少，而且还可能突破“相互确保摧毁”的核武器数量水平实现大幅度削减。这对美俄实现深度核裁军有明显的促进作用。之后，如果美俄（包括其他核国家）不断发展相互间的经贸关系，使各自经济相互依赖因素在战略稳定性分析中的比重增大，则可以进一步推动国际核裁军进程。
At present, one of the major problems facing international nuclear disarmament iswhether or not the two nuclear powers the United States and Russia will be able tocontinue to reduce their number of nuclear weapons based on the foundation of the newStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Among the primary obstacles is thatthe United States and Russia have been unable to break the bonds of “Mutually AssuredDestruction”(MAD) under the concept of strategic stability.
The theory of strategic stability that developed during the Cold War arose fromdefensive realism and structural realism, along with the hypothesis of “nationalrationalism” and the concept of “unacceptable losses,” to build an analytical method forcalculating loss as the core of MAD-based strategic stability. Its conclusion was thatonly when two countries’ numbers of nuclear weapons reach a level of “MutuallyAssured Destruction”(the ability to inflict “unacceptable losses” with a “second strike”)would the two sides be able to achieve strategic stability (known as “Mutually AssuredDestruction” strategic stability). When the United States and Soviet Union confrontedeach other’s large number of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, this strategicstability construct led to each side undertaking controls on their nuclear arsenals andarms reduction negotiations. However, when facing the realities of reducing thesenuclear arsenals under the demands of the21st century, there remain questions as towhether or not strategic stability can be maintained when the level of these nuclearweapons numbers is lowered.
This paper based on the primary logic of traditional strategic stability theory tocompare and contrast first strike and second strike losses to evaluate the strategicstability, and absorbing the ideas of the new interdependent liberalism theory, tocalculate the damages incurred from the interdependence element when calculatingnuclear war losses (traditional strategic stability analysis does not factor in this part oflosses). First, from the damage effect of nuclear weapons, the paper analyzed thecomposing of environmental, economic and political interdependent factors, discussedthe method for calculating interdependent losses such as environmental (“nuclear winter,”“atmospheric ozone depletion,” and “radioactive fallout”) and economic (directinvestment, mutual trade, and financial assets of goods and services); Then, usingsimulated quantitative calculation in cases of high and low number nuclear weapons ofthe nuclear war respectively, assessed the degree of influence ofinterdependence-inflicted losses on traditional strategic stability calculations. Theconclusion is: under the condition of a large number of nuclear weapons, theenvironmental interdependent impact of a “nuclear winter” will have an evidentinfluence on loss calculations associated with “Mutually Assured Destruction” strategicstability. Under the condition of a low numbers of nuclear weapons, the economicinterdependence factor will have an important impact on strategic stability calculationsand the environmental interdependent factor will play certain role. This proves thenecessity of taking into account losses from interdependence when analyzing strategicstability, and considering interdependent factors could help to improve the stability ofthe strategy.
From the conclusion of this paper, it can be observed that if the United States andRussia factor in interdependence losses into their calculations of strategic stability, thetwo parties could significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons needed toachieve “Mutually Assured Destruction” strategic stability, and would allow the UnitedStates and Russia to significantly reduce their numeric level of nuclear weapons tobreak through the construct of “Mutually Assured Destruction”. This is helpful torealize the deep reduction of United States and Russia nuclear weapons. Later, if theUnited States and Russia, including other nuclear-weapon states, are able tocontinuously promote the development of economic and trade relations, this wouldincrease the proportion of economic interdependence losses factored into the calculationof strategic stability analysis, international nuclear disarmament process could befurther promoted.
引文
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