审计契约的自我履行机制研究
摘要
我国资本市场建立十几年以来,审计行业作为企业财务信息的鉴证人是不可或缺的,为经济建设发挥了巨大的作用,同时也出现了很多震荡整个资本市场的财务欺诈与审计失败案件,投资者的信心为之一挫再挫,使审计质量和行业的信誉受到严重质疑。
审计是保证受托经济责任有效履行的一种机制,它涉及对受托经济责任履行情况的确认与解除,是一种可以减少企业代理成本并通过减少代理成本提高企业价值的制度安排。只有在市场投资者预期审计师会报告已经发现的管理者的违约行为时,审计才具有价值,其报告已发现的违约行为的概率越高价值越大。
究竟什么因素是决定审计质量的关键?迈考莱(Macaulay,1963)认为“相对非正式的、没有法律强制力的契约安排统治着市场中的商业关系,而对明确法律制裁的依赖是极为少见的。”因此市场的自我履约机制才是使交易顺利完成的决定因素,法律与制度规制的作用最终都要通过市场机制自身来体现。我国的资本市场脱胎于计划经济体制,但十几年来经过多项改革措施正在逐步走向市场化,这一趋势是不可逆转的。审计作为一种在资本市场中进行交易的服务,当前的市场是否已经显现出一些促进审计契约自我履行的功能?其作用发挥到了何种程度,是否已经可以激励和约束审计师使其自动履行审计契约,提供高质量服务?本研究根据一般产品市场交易契约自我履行机制理论构建了审计契约的自我履行机制理论,并对理论的相关命题在我国当前资本市场中的有效性进行了一系列的验证,在此基础上做出总结性的评价并提出了相应的政策建议。
本研究分为八章共五部分,分别为导论、理论分析、制度背景分析、实证检验和结论。
第一部分:第1章,导论。介绍了论文的研究背景、研究目的、相关的核心概念和基础理论、文献综述与本研究的视角、研究的意义、思路结构、方法、创新点和不足。
第二部分:理论部分,本部分包括交易契约自我履行机制的一般理论和审计契约自我履行机制理论。
第2章,审计契约的自我履行机制理论。本章以交易费用经济学为基础,对一般产品与服务交易契约的自我履行机制进行了系统梳理。首先,对于具有专用性投资特征的契约,一旦投资到位,就易于出现被对方挤占未来交易准租金的违约现象,市场是通过私人惩罚来解决此类问题的,即由于违约方的失信行为,一方面交易伙伴将终止与违约方的契约关系,另一方面市场中其他的参与者也会加大违约者未来的交易成本。私人惩罚导致违约者的损失大于违约收益并借此防止违约行为的发生。
为了防止交易者的违约行为,除了在其违约后进行私人惩罚以外,为了增加交易者的个人履约资本,市场往往以“质量溢价”给高质量产品的提供者以激励,这一机制不仅会有效防止违约行为,还可以使交易者自觉提供高质量的产品。
在无法区分产品提供者身份的市场中,企业为了得到溢价,会对声誉进行投资以将自己与其他产品提供者区分开来,这一投资在后期会以溢价的形式收回,在企业违约时可以作为产品质量的担保,一旦违约将无法收回,而且这一投资在竞争性的市场均衡状态下可以阻止竞争者进入市场。
利用交易费用经济学契约自我履行机制理论对审计契约的自我履行机制进行了剖析和阐述。首先,从审计关系契约的构成入手,分别分析了受托经济责任契约、隐性审计契约和显性审计契约交易中的特征及审计契约自我履行的障碍。其次,构建审计契约自我履行机制理论框架,对审计契约的市场惩罚机制与溢价激励机制、声誉专用性投资的担保机制通过模型进行了分析。
最后,从历史角度对审计契约的自我履行机制进行了考察。审计师在最初形态的公司中产生到股份公司中的普及,可以看出审计师这一角色产生于市场内部,其独立性也主要依靠契约各方的制约来维持,说明审计行业的质量问题主要应依靠市场自身的力量来解决。
第三部分:第3章,制度背景部分,对我国资本市场中审计契约关系人的市场化改革及结果进行了分析,总结出我国当前资本市场虽然在向市场化过渡但由于某些市场化制度尚未到位及一些过度的监管措施构成了审计契约自我履行的市场机制的障碍。
第四部分,实证检验部分,本部分包括三章,分别对我国资本市场中审计契约的私人惩罚机制、激励机制和专用性投资担保机制进行了检验。
第4章,我国资本市场对审计师的惩罚机制研究。以2004-2005财政部对审计行业的质量检查及公告为背景,通过对受到批评的事务所客户市场价值、客户量和审计费用的变动进行检验,考察了审计师声誉下降的负面影响和审计师的执业质量问题被投资者察觉后的市场惩罚机制的有效性。发现市场的惩罚机制只对具有国际声誉的事务所产生了一些负面效果。
第5章,我国资本市场对审计师的激励机制研究。按照声誉等级将我国的审计师分为国际所、国内大所和地方所,假设国际所和国内大所能够提升客户的市场价值,用多元回归分析方法考察了这两类审计师的声誉与企业价值之间的关系,发现国内大所未能提高企业价值,但国际所的声誉与企业价值具有显著的正相关关系。
第6章,审计契约的担保机制研究――审计师的初期折价投资,兼论企业对审计师的溢价激励。本章的实证检验包括两个内容,企业对高声誉的审计师是否支付了费用溢价以及审计师在初期是否进行了折价投资。虽然第6章并未得到国内大所可以提升客户价值的证据,但本章的实证结果表明企业对国际所和国内大所都支付了溢价。同时发现,在进行初期折价投资方面,已经建立起市场声誉的国际所折价较少,而对于未建立起声誉的国内大所和地方所,竞争更为激烈,还主要以折价作为竞争手段。
第五部分,第7章,主要结论和政策建议。本章对一系列的实证结论进行了总括分析,提出我国当前资本市场中三类审计契约自我履行机制对国际所而言具有激励和约束作用,这些机制成为国际所提供高质量审计服务的保证。但是对于本土的事务所而言,无论规模大小我们都难以观察到契约得到自我履行的证据,得出我国的资本市场制度存在较为严重的缺陷,不足以催生高质量的审计师等结论,认为市场本身不够完善,市场化改革还有待于深入和优化。基于此,本研究提出了两个改革的大方向,今后应主要处理好政府与市场、法律与市场两方面的关系。
本研究主要的创新点在于:
第一,本研究根据市场本身对交易的主导作用理论,以审计契约的自我履行机制为独特的研究视角,对当前我国资本市场对审计行业的制约与激励机制进行了系统研究。
目前我国对于审计质量问题的研究有种种不同的研究角度,例如从审计需求、法律风险及审计契约的失衡等角度分析审计市场与行业存在的症结,提出不同的政策建议,但根据经济学理论,交易契约的顺利进行主要依赖于市场本身的激励和约束机制,本研究以此为切入点,探讨了我国资本市场对审计行业的激励与约束作用及作用程度,对我国资本市场的运行状况做出了客观的评价并提出了改革的政策建议。
第二,根据交易费用经济学中契约自我履行机制理论,构建了审计契约自我履行机制理论。以受托经济责任契约为基点,将审计契约分为投资者与审计师之间的隐性契约和企业与审计师之间的显性契约,对各个契约关系人的利益特征及其对审计契约的自我履行构成的障碍进行了分析,提出保证契约自我履行的机制体系,包括私人惩罚的惩罚机制、质量溢价的激励机制和声誉专用性投资的担保机制,三种机制相辅相成,逻辑一致地结合起来,构成对审计师的履约和违约行为的约束机制,保证审计契约的自我履行。
第三,以我国当前资本市场的市场化改革趋势为背景,以审计契约自我履行机制为实证命题,分别对三类机制进行了实证检验。对资本市场惩罚机制的检验,第一次用我国A股市场的数据对中国资本市场制度背景下的私人惩罚机制进行了实证考察,为资本市场中审计师的声誉下降研究增加了新的经验证据。将我国的审计师按照声誉分为三个不同的等级,对审计师与企业的价值关系进行了深入的考察,发现只有具有国际声誉的事务所可以增加企业的价值;对我国审计行业的专用性投资――初期折价投资,依据审计师变更的不同角度、不同层次分别进行了详细深入的验证,得出国际所的折价相对较少,而国内所的折价更加显著的结论。
Auditing has played an tremendous and indispensable role to identify the corporation financial information in more than 10 years’history of China's capital market. But at the same time, a series of financial fraud and audit failure cases extremely disappointed the investors, and the audit quality and the auditor reputation are seriously doubted.
Auditing is a kind of mechanism which ensures the effective performance of accountability, involving the confirmation and release of accountability fulfilling. It is an institutional arrangement which can rise enterprise value through reducing agency costs. Auditing is valuable only when the investors expect that auditors would report violations of managers that have been found. The value of auditing increases as the probability of reproting the founded default behavior increases.
What's the key factor to determine the audit quality? Macaulay (1963) stated that“The comparative informal and non-legal coercive contractual arrangements dominates commercial relationships in the market, and it’s extremely rare to rely on the explicit legal sanctions" So the self-enforcing mechanism is the determining factor for successful completion of transactions. The legal system and regulations will ultimately work through the market mechanism itself. China's capital market was born out of the planned economic system, but it is gradually moving towards to the market economy after a number of reformations during the recent years. This trend is inevitable. As a kind of service traded in the capital market, does the current market institutional background show some self-enforcing function for audit contracts? To hw much extent it can play its role? Has it already incented and restrained auditors to automatically perform audit contracts and provide high-quality service? This study constructs a self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts according to the self-enforcing mechanism theory of normal products transaction contracts and verifies the effectiveness of the relevant topics in China's capital market. And on this basis it gives some summarized evaluation and corresponding policy recommendations.
This study is divided into eight chapters of five parts, namely, introduction, theoretical analysis, and system background analysis, empirical tests and conclusions.
Part I: Chapter 1, Introduction. This chapter introduces the background and purposes of the research, as well as the relevant core concepts, basic theories, literature review and the perspective, significance, structure, methods, innovation and inadequacy of this study.
Part II: Theoretical analysis. This part includes self-enforcing mechanism theory of transaction contract and self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contacts.
Chapter 2, self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contacts. This chapter is based on transaction cost economics and systematically goes through the self-enforcing mechanism theory of general product and service transaction contract. Firstly, for the specific investment contract, once the investment is in place, default behavior of appropriable quasi-rents may happen. This problem is solved by private punishment of the market, that is, on one hand, trading partners will terminate the contractual relationship with the violators, on the other hand, the private punishment will led to greater loss than benefits on the violators to prevent violations from occurring.
In order to prevent the violation of the transaction, in addition to the private punishment after violation, the market tends to give a "quality premium" to the high-quality products providers in order to increase the personal private contractual enforcement capital. This mechanism will not only effectively prevent violations, but also enable traders consciously provide high-quality products.
In the market where we are unable to distinguish the identity of the product providers, enterprises will invest in the reputation to separate their products from other providers’in order to receive premium. This investment will be recovered in the form of a premium in latter period and in the event of default, it can be a security of product quality, once non-compliance will not be able to recover. This investment can stop competitors to enter the market in the equilibrium state of a competitive market. The chapter also analysis and illustrates self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts using self-enforcing mechanism theory of transaction cost economics. Firstly, it begins with the construction of audit relationship contract, analyzing the characteristics of implicit and explicit accountability audit contracts separately and the obstacles of audit contracts self-enforcing.
Secondly, it constructs the theoretical framework of audit contracts self-enforcing mechanism theory, and analyzes the penalties mechanism, premium incentive mechanism and the reputation specific investment collateral mechanism of audit contracts market through the model.
Finally, it studies the self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts from a historical perspective. Auditor was produced in the initial form of corporation and becomes universal in joint-stock companies. Auditor is produce inside the market and its independence is maintained by constraints of contract parties. So the quality problem of the audit industry major problem can be solved mainly by own strength of the market.
Part III: Chapter 3, the system background. This chapter analyses the market-oriented reforms and the results of audit contracts relations in China's capital market. The conclusion are as follows: China's current capital market is on transition to market-oriented, however, there are obstacles on market mechanism for the self-enforcing mechanism of audit contracts due to the incompleteness of market-oriented system and some excessive supervision measures.
Part IV, empirical testing. This part includes three chapters, and it tests the private punishment mechanism of audit contracts, incentive mechanism and specific investment collateral mechanism in China's capital market separately.
Chapter 4, it studies the punishment mechanism for auditors in China's capital market. Based on the 2004-2005 bulletin of quality inspection to audit industry of the Finance Ministry, this chapter analyzes the impact of auditors reputation declining and the effectiveness of the market punishment mechanism after investor aware of the quality problem through testing the changes of corporation’s market value whose auditor has been criticized, numbers of clients and audit fees. Evidences indicate that market punishment mechanism only have some negative effects on world reputation audit firms.
Chapter 5, it tests the incentive mechanisms for auditors in China's capital market. Audit firms are divided into international, large domestic and local ones in accordance with the reputation hierarchy. We assume that the international and domestic large ones can increase customers’market value, and we analyze the relationship between the reputation of audit firms and corporations’market value using multiple regression analysis method. We find that large domestic audit firms don’t increase corporations’market value but the reputation of international firms and corporations’market value have a significant positive correlation.
Chapter 6, it test the collateral system of audit contracts, including auditors initial discount investments and the corporate premium motivation to auditors. The empirical testing of this chapter includes two elements, whether corporations pay premium costs to high reputation auditors and whether auditors have a discount investment in initial period. Though from Chapter 6 we don’t get evidence that large domestic audit firms don’t increase corporations’market value, the empirical results from this chapter show that most corporations pay premium to international firms and large domestic firms . At the same time we found that the international firms already establishing a reputation get less discount, but for large domestic and local firms which haven’t established reputation, the competition is more severe and discount is the main mean of competition.
Part V, Chapter 7, the main conclusions and policy recommendations. This chapter is a conclusion of series of empirical analysis .It brings forward that the three kinds of self-enforcing mechanisms theory of audit contracts in China’s current capital market play an incentive and restrictive role for international audit firms and they are the guarantees of their high-quality audit services. But for local firms, regardless of their size, we find it difficult to find the mechanisms have been self-enforced. This conclusion shows that China's capital market system has some serious defects, hardly to give birth to high quality auditors, and the market itself is not perfect enough, the market-oriented reform have yet to be thoroughly and optimization. According to these, this research proposes two reform aspects on the proper relationship management between government and market, laws and market.
The major innovations of this research:
First, the paper systematically studies the constraints and incentive mechanism of audit industry in China's current capital market in perspective of the self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts
There are several research aspects on audit quality, such as from the perspective of audit requirements, legal risks and imbalances of audit contractss, we analyze the problems of audit market and audit industry, giving different policy suggestions. But according to economic theories, the smooth progress of transaction contracts mainly depends on incentive and restraint mechanisms of market itself. So this study take it as a starting point to explore the incentive and restraint to audit industry by China’s capital market and gives objective evaluation and policy recommendation for reformation about the operation of China’s capital market.
Secondly, this paper constructs a self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts according to the self-enforcing mechanism theory of product market transaction contract. Based on accountability contract, audit contracts are divided into implicit contracts between investors and auditors and explicit contracts between enterprises and auditors. It analyzes the interest characters of each contractor and the obstacles to self-enforcing mechanism of audit contracts. It then gives forward a self-enforcing mechanism system including private punishment mechanism, quality premium incentive mechanism and specific investment collateral mechanism. The three mechanisms complete each other, consisting in logic, and constitute a restraining mechanism on auditors’contracts compliance and violations behaviors, in order to ensure the self-implementation of audit contracts.
Thirdly, based on the market-oriented reform background and self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts as the empirical proposition, this paper tests these three mechanisms. In the test of punishment mechanism in capital market, the A class share market data was first used to investigate the self-enforcing mechanism theory, providing new empirical evidence for the studies on the degrading of the auditor’reputation. Our country’s auditors were divided into three classes based on their reputation. After an in-depth analysis, it was found that only the auditing firms with international reputation can add value to the enterprise. The investment specialized for auditing industry, the discount investment in initial period, was tested from the perspectives of the change of auditor and different levels. The results indicate that the discount of the international auditing firm was smaller, and the discount of the domestic auditing firm is more significant.
审计是保证受托经济责任有效履行的一种机制,它涉及对受托经济责任履行情况的确认与解除,是一种可以减少企业代理成本并通过减少代理成本提高企业价值的制度安排。只有在市场投资者预期审计师会报告已经发现的管理者的违约行为时,审计才具有价值,其报告已发现的违约行为的概率越高价值越大。
究竟什么因素是决定审计质量的关键?迈考莱(Macaulay,1963)认为“相对非正式的、没有法律强制力的契约安排统治着市场中的商业关系,而对明确法律制裁的依赖是极为少见的。”因此市场的自我履约机制才是使交易顺利完成的决定因素,法律与制度规制的作用最终都要通过市场机制自身来体现。我国的资本市场脱胎于计划经济体制,但十几年来经过多项改革措施正在逐步走向市场化,这一趋势是不可逆转的。审计作为一种在资本市场中进行交易的服务,当前的市场是否已经显现出一些促进审计契约自我履行的功能?其作用发挥到了何种程度,是否已经可以激励和约束审计师使其自动履行审计契约,提供高质量服务?本研究根据一般产品市场交易契约自我履行机制理论构建了审计契约的自我履行机制理论,并对理论的相关命题在我国当前资本市场中的有效性进行了一系列的验证,在此基础上做出总结性的评价并提出了相应的政策建议。
本研究分为八章共五部分,分别为导论、理论分析、制度背景分析、实证检验和结论。
第一部分:第1章,导论。介绍了论文的研究背景、研究目的、相关的核心概念和基础理论、文献综述与本研究的视角、研究的意义、思路结构、方法、创新点和不足。
第二部分:理论部分,本部分包括交易契约自我履行机制的一般理论和审计契约自我履行机制理论。
第2章,审计契约的自我履行机制理论。本章以交易费用经济学为基础,对一般产品与服务交易契约的自我履行机制进行了系统梳理。首先,对于具有专用性投资特征的契约,一旦投资到位,就易于出现被对方挤占未来交易准租金的违约现象,市场是通过私人惩罚来解决此类问题的,即由于违约方的失信行为,一方面交易伙伴将终止与违约方的契约关系,另一方面市场中其他的参与者也会加大违约者未来的交易成本。私人惩罚导致违约者的损失大于违约收益并借此防止违约行为的发生。
为了防止交易者的违约行为,除了在其违约后进行私人惩罚以外,为了增加交易者的个人履约资本,市场往往以“质量溢价”给高质量产品的提供者以激励,这一机制不仅会有效防止违约行为,还可以使交易者自觉提供高质量的产品。
在无法区分产品提供者身份的市场中,企业为了得到溢价,会对声誉进行投资以将自己与其他产品提供者区分开来,这一投资在后期会以溢价的形式收回,在企业违约时可以作为产品质量的担保,一旦违约将无法收回,而且这一投资在竞争性的市场均衡状态下可以阻止竞争者进入市场。
利用交易费用经济学契约自我履行机制理论对审计契约的自我履行机制进行了剖析和阐述。首先,从审计关系契约的构成入手,分别分析了受托经济责任契约、隐性审计契约和显性审计契约交易中的特征及审计契约自我履行的障碍。其次,构建审计契约自我履行机制理论框架,对审计契约的市场惩罚机制与溢价激励机制、声誉专用性投资的担保机制通过模型进行了分析。
最后,从历史角度对审计契约的自我履行机制进行了考察。审计师在最初形态的公司中产生到股份公司中的普及,可以看出审计师这一角色产生于市场内部,其独立性也主要依靠契约各方的制约来维持,说明审计行业的质量问题主要应依靠市场自身的力量来解决。
第三部分:第3章,制度背景部分,对我国资本市场中审计契约关系人的市场化改革及结果进行了分析,总结出我国当前资本市场虽然在向市场化过渡但由于某些市场化制度尚未到位及一些过度的监管措施构成了审计契约自我履行的市场机制的障碍。
第四部分,实证检验部分,本部分包括三章,分别对我国资本市场中审计契约的私人惩罚机制、激励机制和专用性投资担保机制进行了检验。
第4章,我国资本市场对审计师的惩罚机制研究。以2004-2005财政部对审计行业的质量检查及公告为背景,通过对受到批评的事务所客户市场价值、客户量和审计费用的变动进行检验,考察了审计师声誉下降的负面影响和审计师的执业质量问题被投资者察觉后的市场惩罚机制的有效性。发现市场的惩罚机制只对具有国际声誉的事务所产生了一些负面效果。
第5章,我国资本市场对审计师的激励机制研究。按照声誉等级将我国的审计师分为国际所、国内大所和地方所,假设国际所和国内大所能够提升客户的市场价值,用多元回归分析方法考察了这两类审计师的声誉与企业价值之间的关系,发现国内大所未能提高企业价值,但国际所的声誉与企业价值具有显著的正相关关系。
第6章,审计契约的担保机制研究――审计师的初期折价投资,兼论企业对审计师的溢价激励。本章的实证检验包括两个内容,企业对高声誉的审计师是否支付了费用溢价以及审计师在初期是否进行了折价投资。虽然第6章并未得到国内大所可以提升客户价值的证据,但本章的实证结果表明企业对国际所和国内大所都支付了溢价。同时发现,在进行初期折价投资方面,已经建立起市场声誉的国际所折价较少,而对于未建立起声誉的国内大所和地方所,竞争更为激烈,还主要以折价作为竞争手段。
第五部分,第7章,主要结论和政策建议。本章对一系列的实证结论进行了总括分析,提出我国当前资本市场中三类审计契约自我履行机制对国际所而言具有激励和约束作用,这些机制成为国际所提供高质量审计服务的保证。但是对于本土的事务所而言,无论规模大小我们都难以观察到契约得到自我履行的证据,得出我国的资本市场制度存在较为严重的缺陷,不足以催生高质量的审计师等结论,认为市场本身不够完善,市场化改革还有待于深入和优化。基于此,本研究提出了两个改革的大方向,今后应主要处理好政府与市场、法律与市场两方面的关系。
本研究主要的创新点在于:
第一,本研究根据市场本身对交易的主导作用理论,以审计契约的自我履行机制为独特的研究视角,对当前我国资本市场对审计行业的制约与激励机制进行了系统研究。
目前我国对于审计质量问题的研究有种种不同的研究角度,例如从审计需求、法律风险及审计契约的失衡等角度分析审计市场与行业存在的症结,提出不同的政策建议,但根据经济学理论,交易契约的顺利进行主要依赖于市场本身的激励和约束机制,本研究以此为切入点,探讨了我国资本市场对审计行业的激励与约束作用及作用程度,对我国资本市场的运行状况做出了客观的评价并提出了改革的政策建议。
第二,根据交易费用经济学中契约自我履行机制理论,构建了审计契约自我履行机制理论。以受托经济责任契约为基点,将审计契约分为投资者与审计师之间的隐性契约和企业与审计师之间的显性契约,对各个契约关系人的利益特征及其对审计契约的自我履行构成的障碍进行了分析,提出保证契约自我履行的机制体系,包括私人惩罚的惩罚机制、质量溢价的激励机制和声誉专用性投资的担保机制,三种机制相辅相成,逻辑一致地结合起来,构成对审计师的履约和违约行为的约束机制,保证审计契约的自我履行。
第三,以我国当前资本市场的市场化改革趋势为背景,以审计契约自我履行机制为实证命题,分别对三类机制进行了实证检验。对资本市场惩罚机制的检验,第一次用我国A股市场的数据对中国资本市场制度背景下的私人惩罚机制进行了实证考察,为资本市场中审计师的声誉下降研究增加了新的经验证据。将我国的审计师按照声誉分为三个不同的等级,对审计师与企业的价值关系进行了深入的考察,发现只有具有国际声誉的事务所可以增加企业的价值;对我国审计行业的专用性投资――初期折价投资,依据审计师变更的不同角度、不同层次分别进行了详细深入的验证,得出国际所的折价相对较少,而国内所的折价更加显著的结论。
Auditing has played an tremendous and indispensable role to identify the corporation financial information in more than 10 years’history of China's capital market. But at the same time, a series of financial fraud and audit failure cases extremely disappointed the investors, and the audit quality and the auditor reputation are seriously doubted.
Auditing is a kind of mechanism which ensures the effective performance of accountability, involving the confirmation and release of accountability fulfilling. It is an institutional arrangement which can rise enterprise value through reducing agency costs. Auditing is valuable only when the investors expect that auditors would report violations of managers that have been found. The value of auditing increases as the probability of reproting the founded default behavior increases.
What's the key factor to determine the audit quality? Macaulay (1963) stated that“The comparative informal and non-legal coercive contractual arrangements dominates commercial relationships in the market, and it’s extremely rare to rely on the explicit legal sanctions" So the self-enforcing mechanism is the determining factor for successful completion of transactions. The legal system and regulations will ultimately work through the market mechanism itself. China's capital market was born out of the planned economic system, but it is gradually moving towards to the market economy after a number of reformations during the recent years. This trend is inevitable. As a kind of service traded in the capital market, does the current market institutional background show some self-enforcing function for audit contracts? To hw much extent it can play its role? Has it already incented and restrained auditors to automatically perform audit contracts and provide high-quality service? This study constructs a self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts according to the self-enforcing mechanism theory of normal products transaction contracts and verifies the effectiveness of the relevant topics in China's capital market. And on this basis it gives some summarized evaluation and corresponding policy recommendations.
This study is divided into eight chapters of five parts, namely, introduction, theoretical analysis, and system background analysis, empirical tests and conclusions.
Part I: Chapter 1, Introduction. This chapter introduces the background and purposes of the research, as well as the relevant core concepts, basic theories, literature review and the perspective, significance, structure, methods, innovation and inadequacy of this study.
Part II: Theoretical analysis. This part includes self-enforcing mechanism theory of transaction contract and self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contacts.
Chapter 2, self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contacts. This chapter is based on transaction cost economics and systematically goes through the self-enforcing mechanism theory of general product and service transaction contract. Firstly, for the specific investment contract, once the investment is in place, default behavior of appropriable quasi-rents may happen. This problem is solved by private punishment of the market, that is, on one hand, trading partners will terminate the contractual relationship with the violators, on the other hand, the private punishment will led to greater loss than benefits on the violators to prevent violations from occurring.
In order to prevent the violation of the transaction, in addition to the private punishment after violation, the market tends to give a "quality premium" to the high-quality products providers in order to increase the personal private contractual enforcement capital. This mechanism will not only effectively prevent violations, but also enable traders consciously provide high-quality products.
In the market where we are unable to distinguish the identity of the product providers, enterprises will invest in the reputation to separate their products from other providers’in order to receive premium. This investment will be recovered in the form of a premium in latter period and in the event of default, it can be a security of product quality, once non-compliance will not be able to recover. This investment can stop competitors to enter the market in the equilibrium state of a competitive market. The chapter also analysis and illustrates self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts using self-enforcing mechanism theory of transaction cost economics. Firstly, it begins with the construction of audit relationship contract, analyzing the characteristics of implicit and explicit accountability audit contracts separately and the obstacles of audit contracts self-enforcing.
Secondly, it constructs the theoretical framework of audit contracts self-enforcing mechanism theory, and analyzes the penalties mechanism, premium incentive mechanism and the reputation specific investment collateral mechanism of audit contracts market through the model.
Finally, it studies the self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts from a historical perspective. Auditor was produced in the initial form of corporation and becomes universal in joint-stock companies. Auditor is produce inside the market and its independence is maintained by constraints of contract parties. So the quality problem of the audit industry major problem can be solved mainly by own strength of the market.
Part III: Chapter 3, the system background. This chapter analyses the market-oriented reforms and the results of audit contracts relations in China's capital market. The conclusion are as follows: China's current capital market is on transition to market-oriented, however, there are obstacles on market mechanism for the self-enforcing mechanism of audit contracts due to the incompleteness of market-oriented system and some excessive supervision measures.
Part IV, empirical testing. This part includes three chapters, and it tests the private punishment mechanism of audit contracts, incentive mechanism and specific investment collateral mechanism in China's capital market separately.
Chapter 4, it studies the punishment mechanism for auditors in China's capital market. Based on the 2004-2005 bulletin of quality inspection to audit industry of the Finance Ministry, this chapter analyzes the impact of auditors reputation declining and the effectiveness of the market punishment mechanism after investor aware of the quality problem through testing the changes of corporation’s market value whose auditor has been criticized, numbers of clients and audit fees. Evidences indicate that market punishment mechanism only have some negative effects on world reputation audit firms.
Chapter 5, it tests the incentive mechanisms for auditors in China's capital market. Audit firms are divided into international, large domestic and local ones in accordance with the reputation hierarchy. We assume that the international and domestic large ones can increase customers’market value, and we analyze the relationship between the reputation of audit firms and corporations’market value using multiple regression analysis method. We find that large domestic audit firms don’t increase corporations’market value but the reputation of international firms and corporations’market value have a significant positive correlation.
Chapter 6, it test the collateral system of audit contracts, including auditors initial discount investments and the corporate premium motivation to auditors. The empirical testing of this chapter includes two elements, whether corporations pay premium costs to high reputation auditors and whether auditors have a discount investment in initial period. Though from Chapter 6 we don’t get evidence that large domestic audit firms don’t increase corporations’market value, the empirical results from this chapter show that most corporations pay premium to international firms and large domestic firms . At the same time we found that the international firms already establishing a reputation get less discount, but for large domestic and local firms which haven’t established reputation, the competition is more severe and discount is the main mean of competition.
Part V, Chapter 7, the main conclusions and policy recommendations. This chapter is a conclusion of series of empirical analysis .It brings forward that the three kinds of self-enforcing mechanisms theory of audit contracts in China’s current capital market play an incentive and restrictive role for international audit firms and they are the guarantees of their high-quality audit services. But for local firms, regardless of their size, we find it difficult to find the mechanisms have been self-enforced. This conclusion shows that China's capital market system has some serious defects, hardly to give birth to high quality auditors, and the market itself is not perfect enough, the market-oriented reform have yet to be thoroughly and optimization. According to these, this research proposes two reform aspects on the proper relationship management between government and market, laws and market.
The major innovations of this research:
First, the paper systematically studies the constraints and incentive mechanism of audit industry in China's current capital market in perspective of the self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts
There are several research aspects on audit quality, such as from the perspective of audit requirements, legal risks and imbalances of audit contractss, we analyze the problems of audit market and audit industry, giving different policy suggestions. But according to economic theories, the smooth progress of transaction contracts mainly depends on incentive and restraint mechanisms of market itself. So this study take it as a starting point to explore the incentive and restraint to audit industry by China’s capital market and gives objective evaluation and policy recommendation for reformation about the operation of China’s capital market.
Secondly, this paper constructs a self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts according to the self-enforcing mechanism theory of product market transaction contract. Based on accountability contract, audit contracts are divided into implicit contracts between investors and auditors and explicit contracts between enterprises and auditors. It analyzes the interest characters of each contractor and the obstacles to self-enforcing mechanism of audit contracts. It then gives forward a self-enforcing mechanism system including private punishment mechanism, quality premium incentive mechanism and specific investment collateral mechanism. The three mechanisms complete each other, consisting in logic, and constitute a restraining mechanism on auditors’contracts compliance and violations behaviors, in order to ensure the self-implementation of audit contracts.
Thirdly, based on the market-oriented reform background and self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts as the empirical proposition, this paper tests these three mechanisms. In the test of punishment mechanism in capital market, the A class share market data was first used to investigate the self-enforcing mechanism theory, providing new empirical evidence for the studies on the degrading of the auditor’reputation. Our country’s auditors were divided into three classes based on their reputation. After an in-depth analysis, it was found that only the auditing firms with international reputation can add value to the enterprise. The investment specialized for auditing industry, the discount investment in initial period, was tested from the perspectives of the change of auditor and different levels. The results indicate that the discount of the international auditing firm was smaller, and the discount of the domestic auditing firm is more significant.
引文
4科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999:p2-3.
5埃瑞克. G.菲吕博顿,鲁道夫.瑞切特编,孙经纬译,新制度经济学[M],上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998:p69-70.
6科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999:p189-192.
10科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999:p185.
11奥利弗. E.威廉姆森著.资本主义经济制度[M].北京:商务印书馆, 2004: p85-89.
12盛洪主编.现代制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社. 2003, p206-207.
13张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[C].北京:生活.读书.新知.三联书店,2001:p17-18.
14 Ross L. Watts; Jerold L. Zimmerman . Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Oct., 1983), pp. 613-633.
15 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling. Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), pp305-354.
16蔡春.审计理论结构研究.东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001,P42。
17蔡春.审计理论结构研究.东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001,P42。
18瓦茨,齐默尔曼著,陈少华,黄世忠,陈光,陈箭深译.实证会计理论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社. 1999, p280-281.
19 Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Zhaoyang Gu. Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, 1998(October), p533-555.
20 Benston,G.J.. Accountant’s Integrity and Financial Reproting. Financial Executive (August 1975), p10-14.
21 Ross L. Watts; Jerold L. Zimmerman . Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Oct., 1983), p. 613-633.
22 Fama,and M.C.Jensen. Agency Problems and ResidualClaims. Journal of Law and Economics. 26 (June 1983),p327-350.
23 DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Independence,‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 3(1981), p113-127.
24 DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 3(1981), p183-199.
25 Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Zhaoyang Gu. Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, 1998(October), p533-555.
26李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海三联书店,2000.
27刘峰,许菲,风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量――兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为,会计研究,2002年第2期,p21-27。
28郝振平,审计关系的代理理论分析,审计研究,2000年第1期,p20-25。
29余玉苗,我国上市公司注册会计师审计关系研究,审计研究,2000年第5期,p1-6。
30冯均科,审计委托人制度改革的重新思考,开发研究,2005年第5期,p37-39。
31 Macaulay. Non-contractual Relation: A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review, 1963, Vol.28, February, P56-67.
34蔡春,《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001,P32。
35同上。
36蔡春,《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001, P43。
37 Klein, B, and Leffler, K, B.,The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,Vol.89, pp.615-641.
38 Shapiro, C., Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983,Vol.98, pp.659-679.
39泰勒尔著,张维迎总译校.产业组织理论. 1997版.北京:中国人民出版社, p149-151.
40 Kreps,D.,and R. Wilson.Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Econonmic Theory. .1982, Vol.27:p253-279.
41 Milgrom,P., and J. Roberts. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory. 1982, Vol. 27:p280-312.
42在外文文献中,对“初期折价”有多种不同的说法,以上是应用较多的两种,在文中不做区分,随文献而定。
43尽管DeAngelo并未将“低价揽客”明确地作为声誉投资,她根据Klein and Leffler(1981)的观点认为这是一种生产性专用投资,但根据Shapiro(1983)的理论模型,初期折价是一种典型的声誉投资,而且随后针对审计行业初期折价的实证研究(Allen T. Craswell and Jere R. Francis,1999)也是根据Shapiro的理论进行解释,因此本文的观点是将初期折价作为声誉的专用性投资来研究。
44 DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Independence,‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 3(1981), p113-127.
45 Ross L. Watts; Jerold L. Zimmerman . Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Oct., 1983), pp. 613-633.
46 Firth, Michael,Auditor Reputation: the Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors, RAND Journal of Economics, 1990,Vol.21,pp. 374-387.
47 Moreland, Keith A., 1995, Criticisms of Auditors and the Association Between Earnings and Returns of Client Firms, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol.14,pp. 94-104.
48 Wilson, T., R. Grimlund, 1990, An Examination of the Importance of an Auditor’s Reputation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory: pp.43-59.
49 Davis L., D. Simon, 1992, The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Action on Audit Fees [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory: pp.58-68.
50 Franz, Diana R., Dean Crawford, Eric N. Johnson. The Impact of Litigation Against an audit Firm on the market Value of nonlitigating Clients [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. summer, 1998,vol.13, pp.117-134.
51 Chaney,Paul K. ,Kirk L. Philipich. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research .2002,40: pp.1221-1245.
52 Asthana, Sharad C., Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan, Audit Reputation and Client Stock Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience, Working Paper. 2003.
53 Asthana, Sharad C., Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan, Audit Reputation and Client Stock Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience, Working Paper. 2003.
54Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan,Jian Zhou, Nan Zhou. Audit Reputation, Auditor Independence and the Stock Market Reaction to Andersen’s Clients. Working Paper. 2002.
57 DeAngelo,Linda Elizerbeth. Audit Size and Audit Quality [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics .1981,3: pp.183-189.
58 Beatty. R. and J. Ritter. Investment banking, reputation, and the under pricing of Initial public offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1986(15).
59 Titman. R. and B.Trueman. Information quality and the value of new issues [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986 (2).
60陈明海,李东,我国新股短期发行抑价的会计师事务所声誉假设实证研究[J],审计与经济研究. 2004.1。
61李常青,林文荣.会计师事务所声誉与IPO折价关系的实证研究[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版).2004.5.
62朱红军,夏立军,陈信元.转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究.审计研究. 2004.5,p53-62。
63杨丹,上市公司壳资源价值与新股定价实证研究,经济学家,2004(2),108-116。
64刘煜辉,熊鹏,股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价,经济研究,2005(5),85-95。
65蒋顺才,蒋永明,我国新股发行制度变迁与IPO高抑价的实证研究,海南大学学报人文社会科学版,2005(3),337-344.
66 Teoh, S., and T. Wong, 1993, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient [J], The Accounting Review, Vol.63, pp. 663-682.
67 GUL, F.A., Sun, S. and TSUI, J.S.L., TRACKS: Audit Quality, Earnings, and the Shanghai Stock Market Reaction, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 18, No.3, Summer 2003, pp. 411-427.
68 Nichols, Donald R. and David B. Smith. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Changes. Journal of Accounting Research .Vol. 21, No. 2 Autumn 1983pp534-544.
69 Li,Chuntao, Frank M. Song and Sonia ML Wong.Audit Firm Size Effects in China’s Emerging Audit Markets.Working Paper.2004.
70张奇峰.政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?———来自中国证券市场的经验证据.管理世界.2005.12,p14-23.
71于李胜,王艳艳.事务所选择与权益资本成本.工作文稿.2006.
73李心丹,肖斌卿,张兵,朱洪亮,投资者关系管理能提升上市公司价值吗?——基于中国A股上市公司投资者关系管理调查的实证研究,工作文稿,2005。
74宋敏,张俊喜,李春涛.股权结构的陷阱.南开管理评论. 2004(1),P9-23.
75 Dye, R.. Informationally motivated auditor replacement. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1991,14: pp347-374.
76 Simon, Daniel T., Jere R. Francis.The Effects of Auditor Change on Audit Fees: Tests of Price Cutting and Price Recovery. The Accounting Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Apr., 1988), pp. 255-269.
77 Ettredge, Michael; Robert Greenberg.Determinants of Fee Cutting on Initial Audit Engagements.Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Spring, 1990), pp. 198-210.
78 Turpen, Richard A. Differential Pricing on Auditors' Initial Engagements: Further Evidence.Auditing:A Journal of Practice& Theory.1990,Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring) pp60-77.
79 Craswell,Allen T.; Jere R. Francis.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories.The Accounting Review, Vol. 74, No. 2. (April., 1999), pp. 201-216.
80 Pong C, Whittington G. The Determinants of AuditFees: Some EmpiricalModels. Journal of BusinessFinance and Accounting, 1994, 21 (8) :pp1071 - 1095.
81 Gregory A, Collier P. Audit Fees and Auditor Change:An Investigation of the Persistence of Fee Reduction by Type of Change. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1996, 23 (1) : pp13 - 28.
82 Sankaraguruswamy, Srinivasan; Scott Whisenant.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements:Empirical Evidence Following Public Disclosure of Audit Fees.Working Paper.October 2003.
83 Ghosh ,Aloke, Steven Lustgarten, Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements by Large and Small Audit Firms. Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 23 No. 2 (Summer 2006),pp333-368.
84刘斌,叶建中,廖莹毅.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证研究――深沪市2001年报的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2003.1, p44-47。
85漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量――“国际四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究.2004.3. p59-65.
86李连军.会计师事务所品牌声誉实证研究[M].复旦大学出版社. 2006.
87李爽,吴溪.审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据[M ].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004: 24 - 51.
88刘成立,张继勋.审计师变更与审计收费——两种理论的检验.管理科学[J].2006.12,p89-96.
89 Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Zhaoyang Gu. Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, 1998(October), p533-555.
90夏立军,陈信元.有限政府、有效政府与股票市场.工作文稿,2006.
91张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[C].北京:生活.读书.新知.三联书店,2001:p17-18.
[1]埃瑞克. G.菲吕博顿,鲁道夫.瑞切特编,孙经纬译.新制度经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[2]奥利弗. E.威廉姆森著.资本主义经济制度[M].北京:商务印书馆, 2004.
[3]蔡春.审计理论结构研究[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2001.
[4]蔡春,黄益建,赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2005.2.
[5]陈关亭,高晓明.审计意见及其变通行为分析——来自2001—2002年的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2004.3.
[6]陈关亭,兰凌.操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较[J].审计与经济研究.2004.7.
[7]陈梅花.股票市场审计意见信息含量研究:来自1995—1999上市公司年报的实证证据[J].中国财务与会计评论.2002,No.1.
[8]陈明海,李东,我国新股短期发行抑价的会计师事务所声誉假设实证研究[J],审计与经济研究. 2004.1.
[9]陈武朝,张泓,盈余管理、审计师变更与审计师独立性[J].会计研究. 2004.8.
[9]陈晓,陈小悦,刘钊. A股盈余报告的有用性研究――来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据[J].经济研究. 1999.6.
[10]陈晓,王鑫,股票市场对保留审计意见报告公告的反应[J].经济科学.2001.3.
[11]陈晓,肖星,王永胜.税收竞争及其在我国资本市场中的表现[J].税务研究. 2003.6.
[12]冯均科,审计委托人制度改革的重新思考[J].开发研究. 2005.5.
[13]耿建新,杨鹤.中国上市公司变更会计师事务所情况的分析[J].会计研究.2001.4.
[14]郝振平.审计关系的代理理论分析[J],审计研究,2000. 1.
[15]何红渠,张志红.有关审计意见识别盈余管理能力的研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践. 2003.11.
[16]何涛,陈晓.现金股利能否提高企业的市场价值――1997-1999年上市公司会计年度报告期间的实证分析[J].金融研究. 2002.8.
[17]胡旭阳.“五大”的声誉是否具有显著信息含量?――来自我国IPOs的经验证据[J].证券市场导报.2002.3.
[18]蒋顺才,蒋永明,我国新股发行制度变迁与IPO高抑价的实证研究[J],海南大学学报人文社会科学版,2005.3.
[19]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999.
[20]李常青,林文荣.会计师事务所声誉与IPO折价关系的实证研究[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版).2004.5.
[21]李东平,黄德华,王振林.“不清洁”审计意见、盈余管理与会计师事务所变更[J].会计研究.2001.6.
[22]李连军.会计师事务所品牌声誉实证研究[M].复旦大学出版社. 2006.
[23]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海三联书店. 2000.
[24]李增泉.实证分析:审计意见的信息含量[J].会计研究. 1999.8.
[25]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更研究——中国证券市场的初步证据北京[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社.2002.
[26]李爽,吴溪.中国证券市场的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社. 2003.4.
[27]李爽,吴溪.补充审计模式与审计独立性:中国B股市场的证据[J].中国会计与财务研究. 2003.9.
[28]李爽,吴溪.审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[29]李爽,吴溪.签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响[J].会计研究.2006.1.
[30]李弢,薛祖云.董事会结构与会计师事务所解聘行为关系的实证研究———来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济评论. 2005.3.
[31]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理与审计意见关系的实证研究———基于非经营性收益的分析[J].财经研究. 2004.11.
[32]李心丹,肖斌卿,张兵,朱洪亮,投资者关系管理能提升上市公司价值吗?——基于中国A股上市公司投资者关系管理调查的实证研究.工作文稿,2005。
[33]刘斌,叶建中,廖莹毅.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证研究――深沪市2001年报的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2003.1.
[34]刘成立,张继勋.审计师变更与审计收费——两种理论的检验[J].管理科学.2006.12.
[35]刘峰,周福源.国际五大意味着高审计质量吗?——来自我国A股市场的初步证据.工作文稿. 2005.1.
[36]刘峰,许菲.风险导向型审计·法律风险·审计质量――兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为[J].会计研究. 2002.2.
[37]刘煜辉,熊鹏,股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价[J].经济研究. 2005.5.
[38]梅因.古代法[M].商务印书馆.1984.
[39]漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量――“国际四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究.2004.3.
[40]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社. 2003,
[41]宋常,恽碧琰.上市公司首次披露的非标准审计意见信息含量研究[J].审计研究. 2005. 1.
[42]宋建波,陈华昀.我国注册会计师审计与上市公司盈余管理研究[J].财经问题研究. 2005.3.
[43]宋敏,张俊喜,李春涛.股权结构的陷阱[J].南开管理评论. 2004(1),P9-23.
[44]孙铮、王跃堂.说明段与变更审计意见的实证分析,中国证券市场财务与会计透视[M],孙铮、李增泉主编.上海:上海财经大学出版社出版.2000.
[45]泰勒尔著,张维迎总译校.产业组织理论. 1997版.北京:中国人民出版社.
[46]王跃堂,陈世敏.脱钩改制对审计独立性影响的实证研究[J].审计研究. 2001.3.
[47]夏恩.桑德著,方红星等译.会计与控制理论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[48]夏立军,杨海斌,注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反应[J],审计研究. 2002.4。
[49]徐浩萍.会计盈余管理与独立审计质量[J].会计研究.2004.1.
[50]伍丽娜.盈余管理对审计费用的影响分析[J].会计研究. 2003.12.
[51]杨丹,上市公司壳资源价值与新股定价实证研究[J].经济学家.2004.2.
[52]杨志国,吴溪.证券市场信息披露:一个案例分析[M],见鲁桐主编:公司治理改革:中国与世界.北京:经济管理出版社,2002.
[53]杨忠莲,徐政旦.我国公司成立审计委员会动机的实证研究[J].审计研究.2004.1.
[54]于李胜,王艳艳.事务所选择与权益资本成本.工作文稿.2006.
[55]余玉苗,我国上市公司注册会计师审计关系研究[J]..审计研究. 2000.5.
[56]张奇峰.政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?———来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界.2005.12.
[57]张为国,王霞.中国上市公司会计差错的动因分析[J].会计研究.2004.4.
[58]张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[C].北京:生活.读书.新知.三联书店,2001.
[59]章永奎,刘峰.盈余管理与意见相关性实证研究[J].中国财务与会计研究. 2004.1.
[60]中国证券监督委员会首席会计师办公室,上海证券交易所.注册会计师说“不”――中国上市公司审计意见分析:1992-2000[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[61]朱红军,夏立军,陈信元.转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究.审计研究. 2004.5,p53-62。
[62] Allen F.Reputation and Product Quality. The Rand Journal of Economics [J],.1984, Vol.15, p. 311-327.
[63] Asthana, Sharad C., Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan, Audit Reputation and Client Stock Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience, Working Paper. 2003.
[64] Balvers. R. and J. B. McDonald. Under pricing of new issues and the choice of auditor as a signal of investment reputation [J]. The accounting review,October,1988.
[65] Beatty. R. P.Auditor reputation and the pricing of Initial public offerings [J].The Accounting Review, October,1989.
[66] Beatty. R. and J. Ritter. Investment banking, reputation, and the under pricing of Initial public offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1986(15).
[67] Benston,G.J.. Accountant’s Integrity and Financial Reproting. Financial Executive (August 1975), p10-14.
[68] Carcello, Joseph V. and Neal,Terry L.Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals Following New Going-Concern Reports [J].The Accounting Review, No.1, 2003.
[69] Chaney,Paul K. ,Kirk L. Philipich. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research .2002,40: pp.1221-1245.
[70] Chen. C., X. Su. and R.Zhao. Market reaction to initial qualified audit opinions in emerging market: Evidence from the Shanghai stock exchange [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, fall, 2000.
[71] Chen, K . and H Yuan. Earnings management and resource misallocation:Evidence from China’s accounting-based regulation of rights issue. Working paper. ,2000.
[72] Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts. A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts, p18. American Accounting Association, 1973.
[73]Craswell,Allen T.; Jere R. Francis.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories[J].The Accounting Review, Vol. 74, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 201-216.
[74] Davis L., D. Simon. The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Action on AuditFees [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory: 1992, p.58-68.
[75] David M.Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law. Oxford University Press, 1980.
[76] DeAngelo,Linda Elizerbeth. Audit Size and Audit Quality [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics .1981,3: p.183-189.
[77] DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Independence,‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation[J]. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 1981,3, p113-127.
[78] Defond,M.,T. Wong. and S. Li.,The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000(28).
[79] Dye, R. 1991. Informationally motivated auditor replacement[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.14: 347-374.
[80] Ettredge, Michael; Robert Greenberg.Determinants of Fee Cutting on Initial Audit Engagements[J].Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Spring, 1990), pp. 198-210.
[81] Fama,and M.C.Jensen. Agency Problems and ResidualClaims. Journal of Law and Economics. 26 (June 1983),p327-350.
[82] Firth, Michael. Auditor Reputation: the Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors [J]. RAND Journal of Economics.1990, 21: p.374-387.
[83] Franz, Diana R., Dean Crawford, Eric N. Johnson. The Impact of Litigation Against an audit Firm on the market Value of nonlitigating Clients [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. summer, 1998,vol.13, pp.117-134.
[84] Francis,J.R.,Wang,D.,and Nikitkov,A..The Effect of Legal Environment on Big Five Auditor Conservatism Around the World. University of Missouri-Columbia.Working paper(November version),2002.
[85]Ghosh ,Aloke, Steven Lustgarten, Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements by Large and Small Audit Firms[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 23 No. 2 (Summer 2006),pp333-368.
[86]Gregory A, Collier P. Audit Fees and Auditor Change:An Investigation of the Persistence of Fee Reduction by Type of Change [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1996, 23 (1) : 13 - 28.
[87]GUL, F.A., Sun, S. and TSUI, J.S.L., TRACKS: Audit Quality, Earnings, and the Shanghai Stock Market Reaction[J], Journal of Accounting, Auditing andFinance, Vol. 18, No.3, Summer 2003, pp. 411-427.
[88] Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), pp305-354.
[89] Klein, B, and Leffler, K, B. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance [J],. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,Vol.89, pp.615-641.
[90] Kreps,D.,and R. Wilson.Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Econonmic Theory. .1982, Vol.27:p253-279
[91] Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan,Jian Zhou, Nan Zhou. Audit Reputation, Auditor Independence and the Stock Market Reaction to Andersen’s Clients. Working Paper. 2002.
[92] Lee, HoYoung, Mande, Vivekand Ortman, Richard, The Effect of Audit Committee and Board of Director Independence on Auditor Resignation, Working Paper,2004.
[93] Li,Chuntao, Frank M. Song and Sonia ML Wong.Audit Firm Size Effects in China’s Emerging Audit Markets.Working Paper.2004.
[94] Littleton and Zimmerman, Accounting Theory: Continuity and Change [M], Prentice-Hall, INC., 1962. p267.
[95] Macaulay. Non-contractual Relation: A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review, 1963, Vol.28, February, P56-67.
[96] Milgrom,P., and J. Roberts. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory. 1982, Vol. 27:p280-312.
[97] Moreland,Keith A. Criticisms of Auditors and the Association Between Earnings and Returns of Client Firms [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory .1995,14: p.94-104.
[98] Nichols, Donald R. and David B. Smith. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Changes [J]. Journal of Accounting Research .Vol. 21, No. 2 Autumn 1983, pp534-544
[99]Pong C, Whittington G. ,The Determinants of AuditFees: Some Emp iricalModels [J]. Journal of BusinessFinance and Accounting, 1994, 21 (8) :pp 1071 - 1095.
[100] Rogerson, W,P. Reputation and Product Quality [J]. Bell Journal ofEconomics. 1983,Vol.14, pp.508-516.
[101] Sankaraguruswamy, Srinivasan; Scott Whisenant.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements:Empirical Evidence Following Public Disclosure of Audit Fees.Working Paper.October 2003.
[102] Shapiro, C., Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, Vol.98, pp.659-679.
[103] Simon, Daniel T., Jere R. Francis.The Effects of Auditor Change on Audit Fees: Tests of Price Cutting and Price Recovery[J]. The Accounting Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Apr., 1988), pp. 255-269.
[104] Srinivasan Krishnamurthy, Jian Zhou, Nan Zhou. Audit Reputation, Auditor Independence and the Stock Market Reaction to Andersen’s Clients, Working Paper. 2002.
[105] Teoh, S., and T. Wong, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient [J], The Accounting Review, 1993,Vol.63, pp. 663-682.
[106] Titman. R. and B.Trueman. Information quality and the value of new issues [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986 (2).
[107]Turpen, Richard A. Differential Pricing on Auditors' Initial Engagements: Further Evidence[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice& Theory.1990,Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring) pp60-77.
[108] Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L., Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence [J],Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, Vol.26, pp 613-633.
[109]Wilson, G. Peter. The incremental information content of the accrual and funds components of earnings after controlling for earnings [J]. Accounting Research.1987, April.
[110] Wilson, T., R. Grimlund, An Examination of the Importance of an Auditor’s Reputation [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory. 1990, p.43-59.
5埃瑞克. G.菲吕博顿,鲁道夫.瑞切特编,孙经纬译,新制度经济学[M],上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998:p69-70.
6科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999:p189-192.
10科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999:p185.
11奥利弗. E.威廉姆森著.资本主义经济制度[M].北京:商务印书馆, 2004: p85-89.
12盛洪主编.现代制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社. 2003, p206-207.
13张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[C].北京:生活.读书.新知.三联书店,2001:p17-18.
14 Ross L. Watts; Jerold L. Zimmerman . Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Oct., 1983), pp. 613-633.
15 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling. Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), pp305-354.
16蔡春.审计理论结构研究.东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001,P42。
17蔡春.审计理论结构研究.东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001,P42。
18瓦茨,齐默尔曼著,陈少华,黄世忠,陈光,陈箭深译.实证会计理论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社. 1999, p280-281.
19 Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Zhaoyang Gu. Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, 1998(October), p533-555.
20 Benston,G.J.. Accountant’s Integrity and Financial Reproting. Financial Executive (August 1975), p10-14.
21 Ross L. Watts; Jerold L. Zimmerman . Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Oct., 1983), p. 613-633.
22 Fama,and M.C.Jensen. Agency Problems and ResidualClaims. Journal of Law and Economics. 26 (June 1983),p327-350.
23 DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Independence,‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 3(1981), p113-127.
24 DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 3(1981), p183-199.
25 Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Zhaoyang Gu. Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, 1998(October), p533-555.
26李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海三联书店,2000.
27刘峰,许菲,风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量――兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为,会计研究,2002年第2期,p21-27。
28郝振平,审计关系的代理理论分析,审计研究,2000年第1期,p20-25。
29余玉苗,我国上市公司注册会计师审计关系研究,审计研究,2000年第5期,p1-6。
30冯均科,审计委托人制度改革的重新思考,开发研究,2005年第5期,p37-39。
31 Macaulay. Non-contractual Relation: A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review, 1963, Vol.28, February, P56-67.
34蔡春,《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001,P32。
35同上。
36蔡春,《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,大连:2001, P43。
37 Klein, B, and Leffler, K, B.,The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,Vol.89, pp.615-641.
38 Shapiro, C., Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983,Vol.98, pp.659-679.
39泰勒尔著,张维迎总译校.产业组织理论. 1997版.北京:中国人民出版社, p149-151.
40 Kreps,D.,and R. Wilson.Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Econonmic Theory. .1982, Vol.27:p253-279.
41 Milgrom,P., and J. Roberts. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory. 1982, Vol. 27:p280-312.
42在外文文献中,对“初期折价”有多种不同的说法,以上是应用较多的两种,在文中不做区分,随文献而定。
43尽管DeAngelo并未将“低价揽客”明确地作为声誉投资,她根据Klein and Leffler(1981)的观点认为这是一种生产性专用投资,但根据Shapiro(1983)的理论模型,初期折价是一种典型的声誉投资,而且随后针对审计行业初期折价的实证研究(Allen T. Craswell and Jere R. Francis,1999)也是根据Shapiro的理论进行解释,因此本文的观点是将初期折价作为声誉的专用性投资来研究。
44 DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Independence,‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 3(1981), p113-127.
45 Ross L. Watts; Jerold L. Zimmerman . Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Oct., 1983), pp. 613-633.
46 Firth, Michael,Auditor Reputation: the Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors, RAND Journal of Economics, 1990,Vol.21,pp. 374-387.
47 Moreland, Keith A., 1995, Criticisms of Auditors and the Association Between Earnings and Returns of Client Firms, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol.14,pp. 94-104.
48 Wilson, T., R. Grimlund, 1990, An Examination of the Importance of an Auditor’s Reputation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory: pp.43-59.
49 Davis L., D. Simon, 1992, The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Action on Audit Fees [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory: pp.58-68.
50 Franz, Diana R., Dean Crawford, Eric N. Johnson. The Impact of Litigation Against an audit Firm on the market Value of nonlitigating Clients [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. summer, 1998,vol.13, pp.117-134.
51 Chaney,Paul K. ,Kirk L. Philipich. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research .2002,40: pp.1221-1245.
52 Asthana, Sharad C., Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan, Audit Reputation and Client Stock Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience, Working Paper. 2003.
53 Asthana, Sharad C., Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan, Audit Reputation and Client Stock Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience, Working Paper. 2003.
54Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan,Jian Zhou, Nan Zhou. Audit Reputation, Auditor Independence and the Stock Market Reaction to Andersen’s Clients. Working Paper. 2002.
57 DeAngelo,Linda Elizerbeth. Audit Size and Audit Quality [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics .1981,3: pp.183-189.
58 Beatty. R. and J. Ritter. Investment banking, reputation, and the under pricing of Initial public offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1986(15).
59 Titman. R. and B.Trueman. Information quality and the value of new issues [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986 (2).
60陈明海,李东,我国新股短期发行抑价的会计师事务所声誉假设实证研究[J],审计与经济研究. 2004.1。
61李常青,林文荣.会计师事务所声誉与IPO折价关系的实证研究[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版).2004.5.
62朱红军,夏立军,陈信元.转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究.审计研究. 2004.5,p53-62。
63杨丹,上市公司壳资源价值与新股定价实证研究,经济学家,2004(2),108-116。
64刘煜辉,熊鹏,股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价,经济研究,2005(5),85-95。
65蒋顺才,蒋永明,我国新股发行制度变迁与IPO高抑价的实证研究,海南大学学报人文社会科学版,2005(3),337-344.
66 Teoh, S., and T. Wong, 1993, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient [J], The Accounting Review, Vol.63, pp. 663-682.
67 GUL, F.A., Sun, S. and TSUI, J.S.L., TRACKS: Audit Quality, Earnings, and the Shanghai Stock Market Reaction, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 18, No.3, Summer 2003, pp. 411-427.
68 Nichols, Donald R. and David B. Smith. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Changes. Journal of Accounting Research .Vol. 21, No. 2 Autumn 1983pp534-544.
69 Li,Chuntao, Frank M. Song and Sonia ML Wong.Audit Firm Size Effects in China’s Emerging Audit Markets.Working Paper.2004.
70张奇峰.政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?———来自中国证券市场的经验证据.管理世界.2005.12,p14-23.
71于李胜,王艳艳.事务所选择与权益资本成本.工作文稿.2006.
73李心丹,肖斌卿,张兵,朱洪亮,投资者关系管理能提升上市公司价值吗?——基于中国A股上市公司投资者关系管理调查的实证研究,工作文稿,2005。
74宋敏,张俊喜,李春涛.股权结构的陷阱.南开管理评论. 2004(1),P9-23.
75 Dye, R.. Informationally motivated auditor replacement. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1991,14: pp347-374.
76 Simon, Daniel T., Jere R. Francis.The Effects of Auditor Change on Audit Fees: Tests of Price Cutting and Price Recovery. The Accounting Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Apr., 1988), pp. 255-269.
77 Ettredge, Michael; Robert Greenberg.Determinants of Fee Cutting on Initial Audit Engagements.Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Spring, 1990), pp. 198-210.
78 Turpen, Richard A. Differential Pricing on Auditors' Initial Engagements: Further Evidence.Auditing:A Journal of Practice& Theory.1990,Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring) pp60-77.
79 Craswell,Allen T.; Jere R. Francis.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories.The Accounting Review, Vol. 74, No. 2. (April., 1999), pp. 201-216.
80 Pong C, Whittington G. The Determinants of AuditFees: Some EmpiricalModels. Journal of BusinessFinance and Accounting, 1994, 21 (8) :pp1071 - 1095.
81 Gregory A, Collier P. Audit Fees and Auditor Change:An Investigation of the Persistence of Fee Reduction by Type of Change. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1996, 23 (1) : pp13 - 28.
82 Sankaraguruswamy, Srinivasan; Scott Whisenant.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements:Empirical Evidence Following Public Disclosure of Audit Fees.Working Paper.October 2003.
83 Ghosh ,Aloke, Steven Lustgarten, Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements by Large and Small Audit Firms. Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 23 No. 2 (Summer 2006),pp333-368.
84刘斌,叶建中,廖莹毅.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证研究――深沪市2001年报的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2003.1, p44-47。
85漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量――“国际四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究.2004.3. p59-65.
86李连军.会计师事务所品牌声誉实证研究[M].复旦大学出版社. 2006.
87李爽,吴溪.审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据[M ].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004: 24 - 51.
88刘成立,张继勋.审计师变更与审计收费——两种理论的检验.管理科学[J].2006.12,p89-96.
89 Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Zhaoyang Gu. Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, 1998(October), p533-555.
90夏立军,陈信元.有限政府、有效政府与股票市场.工作文稿,2006.
91张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[C].北京:生活.读书.新知.三联书店,2001:p17-18.
[1]埃瑞克. G.菲吕博顿,鲁道夫.瑞切特编,孙经纬译.新制度经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[2]奥利弗. E.威廉姆森著.资本主义经济制度[M].北京:商务印书馆, 2004.
[3]蔡春.审计理论结构研究[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2001.
[4]蔡春,黄益建,赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2005.2.
[5]陈关亭,高晓明.审计意见及其变通行为分析——来自2001—2002年的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2004.3.
[6]陈关亭,兰凌.操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较[J].审计与经济研究.2004.7.
[7]陈梅花.股票市场审计意见信息含量研究:来自1995—1999上市公司年报的实证证据[J].中国财务与会计评论.2002,No.1.
[8]陈明海,李东,我国新股短期发行抑价的会计师事务所声誉假设实证研究[J],审计与经济研究. 2004.1.
[9]陈武朝,张泓,盈余管理、审计师变更与审计师独立性[J].会计研究. 2004.8.
[9]陈晓,陈小悦,刘钊. A股盈余报告的有用性研究――来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据[J].经济研究. 1999.6.
[10]陈晓,王鑫,股票市场对保留审计意见报告公告的反应[J].经济科学.2001.3.
[11]陈晓,肖星,王永胜.税收竞争及其在我国资本市场中的表现[J].税务研究. 2003.6.
[12]冯均科,审计委托人制度改革的重新思考[J].开发研究. 2005.5.
[13]耿建新,杨鹤.中国上市公司变更会计师事务所情况的分析[J].会计研究.2001.4.
[14]郝振平.审计关系的代理理论分析[J],审计研究,2000. 1.
[15]何红渠,张志红.有关审计意见识别盈余管理能力的研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践. 2003.11.
[16]何涛,陈晓.现金股利能否提高企业的市场价值――1997-1999年上市公司会计年度报告期间的实证分析[J].金融研究. 2002.8.
[17]胡旭阳.“五大”的声誉是否具有显著信息含量?――来自我国IPOs的经验证据[J].证券市场导报.2002.3.
[18]蒋顺才,蒋永明,我国新股发行制度变迁与IPO高抑价的实证研究[J],海南大学学报人文社会科学版,2005.3.
[19]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等著,李风圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京:经济科学出版社. 1999.
[20]李常青,林文荣.会计师事务所声誉与IPO折价关系的实证研究[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版).2004.5.
[21]李东平,黄德华,王振林.“不清洁”审计意见、盈余管理与会计师事务所变更[J].会计研究.2001.6.
[22]李连军.会计师事务所品牌声誉实证研究[M].复旦大学出版社. 2006.
[23]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海三联书店. 2000.
[24]李增泉.实证分析:审计意见的信息含量[J].会计研究. 1999.8.
[25]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更研究——中国证券市场的初步证据北京[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社.2002.
[26]李爽,吴溪.中国证券市场的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社. 2003.4.
[27]李爽,吴溪.补充审计模式与审计独立性:中国B股市场的证据[J].中国会计与财务研究. 2003.9.
[28]李爽,吴溪.审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[29]李爽,吴溪.签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响[J].会计研究.2006.1.
[30]李弢,薛祖云.董事会结构与会计师事务所解聘行为关系的实证研究———来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济评论. 2005.3.
[31]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理与审计意见关系的实证研究———基于非经营性收益的分析[J].财经研究. 2004.11.
[32]李心丹,肖斌卿,张兵,朱洪亮,投资者关系管理能提升上市公司价值吗?——基于中国A股上市公司投资者关系管理调查的实证研究.工作文稿,2005。
[33]刘斌,叶建中,廖莹毅.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证研究――深沪市2001年报的经验证据[J].审计研究. 2003.1.
[34]刘成立,张继勋.审计师变更与审计收费——两种理论的检验[J].管理科学.2006.12.
[35]刘峰,周福源.国际五大意味着高审计质量吗?——来自我国A股市场的初步证据.工作文稿. 2005.1.
[36]刘峰,许菲.风险导向型审计·法律风险·审计质量――兼论“五大”在我国审计市场的行为[J].会计研究. 2002.2.
[37]刘煜辉,熊鹏,股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价[J].经济研究. 2005.5.
[38]梅因.古代法[M].商务印书馆.1984.
[39]漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳,事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量――“国际四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究.2004.3.
[40]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社. 2003,
[41]宋常,恽碧琰.上市公司首次披露的非标准审计意见信息含量研究[J].审计研究. 2005. 1.
[42]宋建波,陈华昀.我国注册会计师审计与上市公司盈余管理研究[J].财经问题研究. 2005.3.
[43]宋敏,张俊喜,李春涛.股权结构的陷阱[J].南开管理评论. 2004(1),P9-23.
[44]孙铮、王跃堂.说明段与变更审计意见的实证分析,中国证券市场财务与会计透视[M],孙铮、李增泉主编.上海:上海财经大学出版社出版.2000.
[45]泰勒尔著,张维迎总译校.产业组织理论. 1997版.北京:中国人民出版社.
[46]王跃堂,陈世敏.脱钩改制对审计独立性影响的实证研究[J].审计研究. 2001.3.
[47]夏恩.桑德著,方红星等译.会计与控制理论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[48]夏立军,杨海斌,注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反应[J],审计研究. 2002.4。
[49]徐浩萍.会计盈余管理与独立审计质量[J].会计研究.2004.1.
[50]伍丽娜.盈余管理对审计费用的影响分析[J].会计研究. 2003.12.
[51]杨丹,上市公司壳资源价值与新股定价实证研究[J].经济学家.2004.2.
[52]杨志国,吴溪.证券市场信息披露:一个案例分析[M],见鲁桐主编:公司治理改革:中国与世界.北京:经济管理出版社,2002.
[53]杨忠莲,徐政旦.我国公司成立审计委员会动机的实证研究[J].审计研究.2004.1.
[54]于李胜,王艳艳.事务所选择与权益资本成本.工作文稿.2006.
[55]余玉苗,我国上市公司注册会计师审计关系研究[J]..审计研究. 2000.5.
[56]张奇峰.政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?———来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界.2005.12.
[57]张为国,王霞.中国上市公司会计差错的动因分析[J].会计研究.2004.4.
[58]张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[C].北京:生活.读书.新知.三联书店,2001.
[59]章永奎,刘峰.盈余管理与意见相关性实证研究[J].中国财务与会计研究. 2004.1.
[60]中国证券监督委员会首席会计师办公室,上海证券交易所.注册会计师说“不”――中国上市公司审计意见分析:1992-2000[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[61]朱红军,夏立军,陈信元.转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究.审计研究. 2004.5,p53-62。
[62] Allen F.Reputation and Product Quality. The Rand Journal of Economics [J],.1984, Vol.15, p. 311-327.
[63] Asthana, Sharad C., Steven Balsam, Jagan Krishnan, Audit Reputation and Client Stock Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience, Working Paper. 2003.
[64] Balvers. R. and J. B. McDonald. Under pricing of new issues and the choice of auditor as a signal of investment reputation [J]. The accounting review,October,1988.
[65] Beatty. R. P.Auditor reputation and the pricing of Initial public offerings [J].The Accounting Review, October,1989.
[66] Beatty. R. and J. Ritter. Investment banking, reputation, and the under pricing of Initial public offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1986(15).
[67] Benston,G.J.. Accountant’s Integrity and Financial Reproting. Financial Executive (August 1975), p10-14.
[68] Carcello, Joseph V. and Neal,Terry L.Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals Following New Going-Concern Reports [J].The Accounting Review, No.1, 2003.
[69] Chaney,Paul K. ,Kirk L. Philipich. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research .2002,40: pp.1221-1245.
[70] Chen. C., X. Su. and R.Zhao. Market reaction to initial qualified audit opinions in emerging market: Evidence from the Shanghai stock exchange [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, fall, 2000.
[71] Chen, K . and H Yuan. Earnings management and resource misallocation:Evidence from China’s accounting-based regulation of rights issue. Working paper. ,2000.
[72] Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts. A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts, p18. American Accounting Association, 1973.
[73]Craswell,Allen T.; Jere R. Francis.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories[J].The Accounting Review, Vol. 74, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 201-216.
[74] Davis L., D. Simon. The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Action on AuditFees [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory: 1992, p.58-68.
[75] David M.Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law. Oxford University Press, 1980.
[76] DeAngelo,Linda Elizerbeth. Audit Size and Audit Quality [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics .1981,3: p.183-189.
[77] DeAngelo, L.E.. Auditor Independence,‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation[J]. Juornal of Accounting and Economics. 1981,3, p113-127.
[78] Defond,M.,T. Wong. and S. Li.,The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000(28).
[79] Dye, R. 1991. Informationally motivated auditor replacement[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.14: 347-374.
[80] Ettredge, Michael; Robert Greenberg.Determinants of Fee Cutting on Initial Audit Engagements[J].Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Spring, 1990), pp. 198-210.
[81] Fama,and M.C.Jensen. Agency Problems and ResidualClaims. Journal of Law and Economics. 26 (June 1983),p327-350.
[82] Firth, Michael. Auditor Reputation: the Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors [J]. RAND Journal of Economics.1990, 21: p.374-387.
[83] Franz, Diana R., Dean Crawford, Eric N. Johnson. The Impact of Litigation Against an audit Firm on the market Value of nonlitigating Clients [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. summer, 1998,vol.13, pp.117-134.
[84] Francis,J.R.,Wang,D.,and Nikitkov,A..The Effect of Legal Environment on Big Five Auditor Conservatism Around the World. University of Missouri-Columbia.Working paper(November version),2002.
[85]Ghosh ,Aloke, Steven Lustgarten, Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements by Large and Small Audit Firms[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 23 No. 2 (Summer 2006),pp333-368.
[86]Gregory A, Collier P. Audit Fees and Auditor Change:An Investigation of the Persistence of Fee Reduction by Type of Change [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1996, 23 (1) : 13 - 28.
[87]GUL, F.A., Sun, S. and TSUI, J.S.L., TRACKS: Audit Quality, Earnings, and the Shanghai Stock Market Reaction[J], Journal of Accounting, Auditing andFinance, Vol. 18, No.3, Summer 2003, pp. 411-427.
[88] Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), pp305-354.
[89] Klein, B, and Leffler, K, B. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance [J],. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,Vol.89, pp.615-641.
[90] Kreps,D.,and R. Wilson.Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Econonmic Theory. .1982, Vol.27:p253-279
[91] Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan,Jian Zhou, Nan Zhou. Audit Reputation, Auditor Independence and the Stock Market Reaction to Andersen’s Clients. Working Paper. 2002.
[92] Lee, HoYoung, Mande, Vivekand Ortman, Richard, The Effect of Audit Committee and Board of Director Independence on Auditor Resignation, Working Paper,2004.
[93] Li,Chuntao, Frank M. Song and Sonia ML Wong.Audit Firm Size Effects in China’s Emerging Audit Markets.Working Paper.2004.
[94] Littleton and Zimmerman, Accounting Theory: Continuity and Change [M], Prentice-Hall, INC., 1962. p267.
[95] Macaulay. Non-contractual Relation: A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review, 1963, Vol.28, February, P56-67.
[96] Milgrom,P., and J. Roberts. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory. 1982, Vol. 27:p280-312.
[97] Moreland,Keith A. Criticisms of Auditors and the Association Between Earnings and Returns of Client Firms [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory .1995,14: p.94-104.
[98] Nichols, Donald R. and David B. Smith. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Changes [J]. Journal of Accounting Research .Vol. 21, No. 2 Autumn 1983, pp534-544
[99]Pong C, Whittington G. ,The Determinants of AuditFees: Some Emp iricalModels [J]. Journal of BusinessFinance and Accounting, 1994, 21 (8) :pp 1071 - 1095.
[100] Rogerson, W,P. Reputation and Product Quality [J]. Bell Journal ofEconomics. 1983,Vol.14, pp.508-516.
[101] Sankaraguruswamy, Srinivasan; Scott Whisenant.Pricing Initial Audit Engagements:Empirical Evidence Following Public Disclosure of Audit Fees.Working Paper.October 2003.
[102] Shapiro, C., Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, Vol.98, pp.659-679.
[103] Simon, Daniel T., Jere R. Francis.The Effects of Auditor Change on Audit Fees: Tests of Price Cutting and Price Recovery[J]. The Accounting Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Apr., 1988), pp. 255-269.
[104] Srinivasan Krishnamurthy, Jian Zhou, Nan Zhou. Audit Reputation, Auditor Independence and the Stock Market Reaction to Andersen’s Clients, Working Paper. 2002.
[105] Teoh, S., and T. Wong, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient [J], The Accounting Review, 1993,Vol.63, pp. 663-682.
[106] Titman. R. and B.Trueman. Information quality and the value of new issues [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986 (2).
[107]Turpen, Richard A. Differential Pricing on Auditors' Initial Engagements: Further Evidence[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice& Theory.1990,Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring) pp60-77.
[108] Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L., Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence [J],Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, Vol.26, pp 613-633.
[109]Wilson, G. Peter. The incremental information content of the accrual and funds components of earnings after controlling for earnings [J]. Accounting Research.1987, April.
[110] Wilson, T., R. Grimlund, An Examination of the Importance of an Auditor’s Reputation [J], Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory. 1990, p.43-59.