风电设备供应链竞合系统熵变及其动态联盟研究
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摘要
近年来,我国风电产业异军突起,走出了一个前所未有的高速增长时期。在此期间,我国风电装备水平也取得了长足进步,大型风电设备的制造能力迅速提升。这种超高速的增长,既使风电设备制造业成为社会各界强烈关注的新经济增长点,同时也给行业长期可持续发展带来了巨大的潜在风险,主要表现在我国的风电设备制造设计能力还比较薄弱,厂商之间缺乏良好的合作共赢机制,在国家保护政策逐步退出之后有可能出现风电设备制造业竞争环境恶化、竞争力下降等方面。因此,风电设备制造业的重组整合已经势在必行。
目前,我国风电设备制造业在经历了依靠引进国外成套图纸以迅速形成批量生产能力的初始发展阶段之后,已经进入到了市场占有率迅速提高,设计能力显著提升,行业发展水平初步具备国际竞争能力的新阶段,国内风电设备领先企业已经有3家跻身全球前十强,其中华锐风电的行业排名已跃升中国第一,全球第二。站在这样一个新的发展平台上,仅停留在技术引进上是远远不够的,必须高度重视依靠内生力量以驱动我国风电设备制造水平的进一步提升。在风电产业的不断整合过程中加强供应链管理,就是内生力量的重要来源之一
风电设备供应链上下游环节各成员之间的关系实质上是一种既有竞争又有合作的“竞合关系”,从系统论的角度看这些厂商在相互竞争和合作中形成了一个特殊的“竞合系统”。借用热力学中的“熵”及“耗散结构”理论分析,这一系统不仅具有开放系统的特征,需要与外界环境不断进行物质、能量和信息的交换,而且其运行过程还时刻面对着众多异议、矛盾和信息不对称,处在远离平衡态,同时各成员之间的相互制约、相互推动作用,还会形成正反馈的倍增效应及负反馈的饱和效应等非线性关系,从而使缘于成员之间矛盾和冲突的小涨落,有可能通过非线性相干作用与连锁效应而迅速放大,当达到临界状态时便形成了具有强大力量的巨涨落,进而推动原系统状态跃迁到新的、稳定有序的状态。显然,风电设备供应链厂商间的“竞合”是一个耗散结构的演进过程,是在不断与外界环境发生物质、能源、信息的交换过程中,汲取负熵流,实现系统熵减,不断从低级有序向高级有序进化的过程。
构造“交易费用产出率”指标用来表征风电设备供应链厂商竞合系统的“熵”,具有诸多方面优良的品质,如“交易费用产出率”能较好地反映风电设备供应链的可持续成长状态,深入刻画风电设备供应链系统总熵变的构成,有效分析风电设备供应链系统内外部熵变,全面解析风电设备供应链系统产出结构熵变路径等。在此基础上,通过风电设备供应链系统熵变路径和影响因素的分析,为我们揭示出加强风电设备供应链动态联盟建设的重要性,只有加强联盟建设才能更好地实现系统的熵变,促进产业的健康成长和发展。
风电设备供应链联盟方式的选择,是风电项目动态联盟组建的第一步,其内涵包括两个方面：一是单个风电企业对市场机遇的识别问题；二是联盟合作伙伴的选择问题。不同的风电企业因其自身性质和对机遇的判别标准的不同,将导致不同的风电项目动态联盟组织的产生,因此,基于META通路搜索算法的风电设备供应链联主导厂商导厂商选择分析,修正了指定供应链主导厂商的主观偏颇,同时运用模糊多属性决策方法对风电设备供应链联盟合作伙伴的核心竞争力进行识别,有效解决了在风电设备制造业的不同发展时期,以及在不同的外部环境下联盟厂商的动态选择问题。
另外,风电设备供应链动态联盟是一个以市场为主要驱动力的、动态的组织结构,对参与联盟的成员来说,其根本目的是为了取得一定的经济收益(或成本节约),成员间能否合理分配这些利益(或成本节约)是风电设备供应链厂商之间能否实现有效竞合的一个重要内容。因此,依据生态学领域中的共生理论和风电设备供应链厂商之间的投入产出关系,以联盟的竞合交易费用节约为待分配量,以合作和非合作博弈模型为分析手段,求解各成员的最优分配配额的研究,探索了风电设备供应链有效运作的可行路径。
最后,根据耗散结构的熵变原理,以风电供应链联盟获得持续的熵减为目标,从风电设备供应链联盟在运行过程中的知识溢出现象出发,以知识溢出率、合作意愿函数、合作稳定度等为基础,分析风电项目动态联盟合作稳定度随知识溢出率变化的关系,以及构建风电设备供应链联盟敏捷信息系统的研究,对稳定风电设备供应链联盟的运作具有重要的参考价值。
总之,本文从我国风电设备制造业发展现状和供应链结构分析出发,基于耗散结构理论、熵变原理、共生理论等,综合运用结构分解技术、博弈模型、多属性决策等方法,从动态角度把握我国风电设备供应链厂商竞争合作关系的演化,并在此基础上分析与之对应的风电供应链动态联盟方式的选择和运作方式的优化等问题,不仅对理清风电设备供应链厂商间竞合系统的熵变机理,把握风电设备供应链厂商竞合关系的动态演化过程,具有重要的理论指导意义,同时也为建立高效的风电设备供应链厂商动态联盟,解决联主导厂商导厂商和成员的动态选择问题找到了可行的解决方案,对促进动态联盟的稳定有着重要的实践指导价值。
In recent years, the sudden emergence of China's wind power industry, out of a period of unprecedented growth. During this period, China's wind power equipment levels have also made considerable progress, large-scale wind power equipment manufacturing capacity rapidly. This super-fast growth, even if wind power equipment manufacturing industry to become a strong community focus of the new economic growth points, but also to the industry long-term sustainable development has brought a huge potential risk, mainly in China's wind power equipment manufacturing design capacity is still relatively weak, firms win-win cooperation between the lack of good mechanisms for the protection of national policy to phase out after a possible wind power equipment manufacturing industry competitive environment degradation, declining competitiveness, and so on. Therefore, wind power equipment manufacturing industry restructuring and integration is imperative.
At present, China's wind power equipment manufacturing industry experienced a complete set of drawings to rely on the rapid introduction of foreign mass production capacity after the initial stage of development, has entered into a rapidly increasing market share, ability to significantly improve the design, development of the industry internationally competitive level of the initial conditions ability of the new phase. (?) Leader in the domestic wind power equipment has three among the global top 10; the Chinese wind power industry sharp jump in China has been ranked first, second in the world. Stand on such a new development platform, just stay on the introduction of technology is not enough; we must attach great importance to rely on endogenous forces to drive the level of China's wind power equipment manufacturers to further improve. In the wind power industry continues to strengthen the integration process of supply chain management is an important endogenous source of power.
Wind power equipment in the supply chain upstream and downstream links between the members is essentially a both competition and cooperation "competing relationship", from the perspective of systems theory in these companies competition and cooperation with each other to form a special the "competing systems." Borrow thermodynamics, "entropy" and "dissipative structure" theory, this system not only has the characteristics of open systems need continuous material with the external environment, energy and information exchange, and its running time also faced a number of objections, conflicts and asymmetric information, in a far from equilibrium, while among the members of mutual restraint, mutual role in promoting, but also the multiplier effect of the formation of positive feedback and negative feedback effects of such non-linear relationship between saturated, so due to the contradictions and conflicts between members of the small fluctuations, it is possible through nonlinear coherent effect and chain reaction and rapid amplification, when they reached a critical state with a strong force to form a giant fluctuation, thus promoting the transition state of the original system to a new, stable and orderly state. Clearly, wind power equipment manufacturers supply chain between "competing" is an evolution of dissipative structures, is in constant matter with the external environment, energy, information exchange process, drawing negative entropy flow, entropy reduction to achieve the system, been ordered from junior to senior orderly evolutionary process.
Structure "transaction costs yield" indicators used to characterize the wind power equipment manufacturers competing supply chain system "entropy", with many aspects of excellent quality, such as "transaction costs yield" to better reflect the supply of wind power equipment chain condition for sustainable growth, in-depth characterization of wind power equipment supply chain system the composition of the total entropy change, effective analysis of wind power equipment supply chain system of internal and external entropy change, a comprehensive analysis of wind power equipment supply chain entropy change of the structure of output paths. On this basis, wind power equipment through the supply chain entropy change, and factors influencing the path analysis, we reveal the wind power equipment to strengthen the supply chain the importance of building dynamic alliance, only strengthen the alliance-building in order to better achieve the entropy of the system change, and promote the industry's healthy growth and development.
Wind power equipment supply chain alliances choice, wind power project is the first step in the formation of dynamic alliance, its meaning has two aspects: First, a single wind power business-to-market opportunities of the identification problem; the second is the choice of coalition partners. Different wind power companies because of their nature and their own criterion for the different opportunities, will lead to different wind power projects generate dynamic alliance organization, therefore, path search algorithm based on META wind power equipment manufacturers choose Union-led supply chain analysis, Fixed supply chain leading manufacturers specify the subjective bias, while the use of fuzzy multi-attribute decision making method for wind power equipment supply chain alliance partners to identify core competencies, effective solution to the wind power equipment manufacturing industry in the different period of development, and different external environment the partners of dynamic choice.
In addition, wind power equipment supply chain is a dynamic alliance to market as the main driving force, a dynamic organizational structure, participation in the Alliance's members, its fundamental purpose is to achieve a certain economic benefits (or cost savings), members whether a reasonable allocation of these benefits (or cost savings) is wind power equipment supply chain between manufacturers can achieve an important part of competing effectively. Therefore, according to the symbiotic theory of ecology in the field of wind power equipment manufacturers supply chain relationship between the input and output to the League of competing transaction cost savings for the amount to be allocated to cooperative and non-cooperative game model for the analysis of means, to solve optimal allocation of quotas for each member of the research, to explore the wind power equipment supply chain, the effective functioning of a feasible path.
Finally, based on the entropy theory of dissipative structure in order to get wind power supply chain alliance continued entropy reduction as the goal, from the wind power supply chain alliances in the operation process of knowledge spillover phenomenon starting to knowledge spillover rate, cooperation will function and cooperation as the basis for stability, the dynamic analysis of wind power projects with the knowledge alliance stability of the relationship between the overflow rate of change, and building wind power equipment supply chain alliance agile information systems research, wind power equipment to stabilize the operation of a supply chain alliance important reference value.
In short, this article from China's wind power equipment manufacturing industry development status departure and supply chain structure analysis, based on dissipative structure theory, entropy theory, the symbiotic theory, structure of decomposition of the integrated use of technology, game model, multi-attribute decision-making methods, from the dynamic perspective and the supply chain of China's wind power equipment manufacturers the evolution of competitive and cooperative relations, and on this basis, analysis of the corresponding wind power supply chain dynamic alliance mode selection and operation of the optimization problem, not only for the breeze power equipment supply chain management between the competing system vendors entropy mechanism to grasp the wind power equipment manufacturers competing supply chain relationship dynamics of evolution, has important theoretical significance, but also for the establishment of efficient wind power equipment manufacturers supply chain dynamic alliance to address the Union-led makers and members of the dynamic selection to find viable solutions to promote the stability of dynamic alliance has important practical guidance value.
目前,我国风电设备制造业在经历了依靠引进国外成套图纸以迅速形成批量生产能力的初始发展阶段之后,已经进入到了市场占有率迅速提高,设计能力显著提升,行业发展水平初步具备国际竞争能力的新阶段,国内风电设备领先企业已经有3家跻身全球前十强,其中华锐风电的行业排名已跃升中国第一,全球第二。站在这样一个新的发展平台上,仅停留在技术引进上是远远不够的,必须高度重视依靠内生力量以驱动我国风电设备制造水平的进一步提升。在风电产业的不断整合过程中加强供应链管理,就是内生力量的重要来源之一
风电设备供应链上下游环节各成员之间的关系实质上是一种既有竞争又有合作的“竞合关系”,从系统论的角度看这些厂商在相互竞争和合作中形成了一个特殊的“竞合系统”。借用热力学中的“熵”及“耗散结构”理论分析,这一系统不仅具有开放系统的特征,需要与外界环境不断进行物质、能量和信息的交换,而且其运行过程还时刻面对着众多异议、矛盾和信息不对称,处在远离平衡态,同时各成员之间的相互制约、相互推动作用,还会形成正反馈的倍增效应及负反馈的饱和效应等非线性关系,从而使缘于成员之间矛盾和冲突的小涨落,有可能通过非线性相干作用与连锁效应而迅速放大,当达到临界状态时便形成了具有强大力量的巨涨落,进而推动原系统状态跃迁到新的、稳定有序的状态。显然,风电设备供应链厂商间的“竞合”是一个耗散结构的演进过程,是在不断与外界环境发生物质、能源、信息的交换过程中,汲取负熵流,实现系统熵减,不断从低级有序向高级有序进化的过程。
构造“交易费用产出率”指标用来表征风电设备供应链厂商竞合系统的“熵”,具有诸多方面优良的品质,如“交易费用产出率”能较好地反映风电设备供应链的可持续成长状态,深入刻画风电设备供应链系统总熵变的构成,有效分析风电设备供应链系统内外部熵变,全面解析风电设备供应链系统产出结构熵变路径等。在此基础上,通过风电设备供应链系统熵变路径和影响因素的分析,为我们揭示出加强风电设备供应链动态联盟建设的重要性,只有加强联盟建设才能更好地实现系统的熵变,促进产业的健康成长和发展。
风电设备供应链联盟方式的选择,是风电项目动态联盟组建的第一步,其内涵包括两个方面：一是单个风电企业对市场机遇的识别问题；二是联盟合作伙伴的选择问题。不同的风电企业因其自身性质和对机遇的判别标准的不同,将导致不同的风电项目动态联盟组织的产生,因此,基于META通路搜索算法的风电设备供应链联主导厂商导厂商选择分析,修正了指定供应链主导厂商的主观偏颇,同时运用模糊多属性决策方法对风电设备供应链联盟合作伙伴的核心竞争力进行识别,有效解决了在风电设备制造业的不同发展时期,以及在不同的外部环境下联盟厂商的动态选择问题。
另外,风电设备供应链动态联盟是一个以市场为主要驱动力的、动态的组织结构,对参与联盟的成员来说,其根本目的是为了取得一定的经济收益(或成本节约),成员间能否合理分配这些利益(或成本节约)是风电设备供应链厂商之间能否实现有效竞合的一个重要内容。因此,依据生态学领域中的共生理论和风电设备供应链厂商之间的投入产出关系,以联盟的竞合交易费用节约为待分配量,以合作和非合作博弈模型为分析手段,求解各成员的最优分配配额的研究,探索了风电设备供应链有效运作的可行路径。
最后,根据耗散结构的熵变原理,以风电供应链联盟获得持续的熵减为目标,从风电设备供应链联盟在运行过程中的知识溢出现象出发,以知识溢出率、合作意愿函数、合作稳定度等为基础,分析风电项目动态联盟合作稳定度随知识溢出率变化的关系,以及构建风电设备供应链联盟敏捷信息系统的研究,对稳定风电设备供应链联盟的运作具有重要的参考价值。
总之,本文从我国风电设备制造业发展现状和供应链结构分析出发,基于耗散结构理论、熵变原理、共生理论等,综合运用结构分解技术、博弈模型、多属性决策等方法,从动态角度把握我国风电设备供应链厂商竞争合作关系的演化,并在此基础上分析与之对应的风电供应链动态联盟方式的选择和运作方式的优化等问题,不仅对理清风电设备供应链厂商间竞合系统的熵变机理,把握风电设备供应链厂商竞合关系的动态演化过程,具有重要的理论指导意义,同时也为建立高效的风电设备供应链厂商动态联盟,解决联主导厂商导厂商和成员的动态选择问题找到了可行的解决方案,对促进动态联盟的稳定有着重要的实践指导价值。
In recent years, the sudden emergence of China's wind power industry, out of a period of unprecedented growth. During this period, China's wind power equipment levels have also made considerable progress, large-scale wind power equipment manufacturing capacity rapidly. This super-fast growth, even if wind power equipment manufacturing industry to become a strong community focus of the new economic growth points, but also to the industry long-term sustainable development has brought a huge potential risk, mainly in China's wind power equipment manufacturing design capacity is still relatively weak, firms win-win cooperation between the lack of good mechanisms for the protection of national policy to phase out after a possible wind power equipment manufacturing industry competitive environment degradation, declining competitiveness, and so on. Therefore, wind power equipment manufacturing industry restructuring and integration is imperative.
At present, China's wind power equipment manufacturing industry experienced a complete set of drawings to rely on the rapid introduction of foreign mass production capacity after the initial stage of development, has entered into a rapidly increasing market share, ability to significantly improve the design, development of the industry internationally competitive level of the initial conditions ability of the new phase. (?) Leader in the domestic wind power equipment has three among the global top 10; the Chinese wind power industry sharp jump in China has been ranked first, second in the world. Stand on such a new development platform, just stay on the introduction of technology is not enough; we must attach great importance to rely on endogenous forces to drive the level of China's wind power equipment manufacturers to further improve. In the wind power industry continues to strengthen the integration process of supply chain management is an important endogenous source of power.
Wind power equipment in the supply chain upstream and downstream links between the members is essentially a both competition and cooperation "competing relationship", from the perspective of systems theory in these companies competition and cooperation with each other to form a special the "competing systems." Borrow thermodynamics, "entropy" and "dissipative structure" theory, this system not only has the characteristics of open systems need continuous material with the external environment, energy and information exchange, and its running time also faced a number of objections, conflicts and asymmetric information, in a far from equilibrium, while among the members of mutual restraint, mutual role in promoting, but also the multiplier effect of the formation of positive feedback and negative feedback effects of such non-linear relationship between saturated, so due to the contradictions and conflicts between members of the small fluctuations, it is possible through nonlinear coherent effect and chain reaction and rapid amplification, when they reached a critical state with a strong force to form a giant fluctuation, thus promoting the transition state of the original system to a new, stable and orderly state. Clearly, wind power equipment manufacturers supply chain between "competing" is an evolution of dissipative structures, is in constant matter with the external environment, energy, information exchange process, drawing negative entropy flow, entropy reduction to achieve the system, been ordered from junior to senior orderly evolutionary process.
Structure "transaction costs yield" indicators used to characterize the wind power equipment manufacturers competing supply chain system "entropy", with many aspects of excellent quality, such as "transaction costs yield" to better reflect the supply of wind power equipment chain condition for sustainable growth, in-depth characterization of wind power equipment supply chain system the composition of the total entropy change, effective analysis of wind power equipment supply chain system of internal and external entropy change, a comprehensive analysis of wind power equipment supply chain entropy change of the structure of output paths. On this basis, wind power equipment through the supply chain entropy change, and factors influencing the path analysis, we reveal the wind power equipment to strengthen the supply chain the importance of building dynamic alliance, only strengthen the alliance-building in order to better achieve the entropy of the system change, and promote the industry's healthy growth and development.
Wind power equipment supply chain alliances choice, wind power project is the first step in the formation of dynamic alliance, its meaning has two aspects: First, a single wind power business-to-market opportunities of the identification problem; the second is the choice of coalition partners. Different wind power companies because of their nature and their own criterion for the different opportunities, will lead to different wind power projects generate dynamic alliance organization, therefore, path search algorithm based on META wind power equipment manufacturers choose Union-led supply chain analysis, Fixed supply chain leading manufacturers specify the subjective bias, while the use of fuzzy multi-attribute decision making method for wind power equipment supply chain alliance partners to identify core competencies, effective solution to the wind power equipment manufacturing industry in the different period of development, and different external environment the partners of dynamic choice.
In addition, wind power equipment supply chain is a dynamic alliance to market as the main driving force, a dynamic organizational structure, participation in the Alliance's members, its fundamental purpose is to achieve a certain economic benefits (or cost savings), members whether a reasonable allocation of these benefits (or cost savings) is wind power equipment supply chain between manufacturers can achieve an important part of competing effectively. Therefore, according to the symbiotic theory of ecology in the field of wind power equipment manufacturers supply chain relationship between the input and output to the League of competing transaction cost savings for the amount to be allocated to cooperative and non-cooperative game model for the analysis of means, to solve optimal allocation of quotas for each member of the research, to explore the wind power equipment supply chain, the effective functioning of a feasible path.
Finally, based on the entropy theory of dissipative structure in order to get wind power supply chain alliance continued entropy reduction as the goal, from the wind power supply chain alliances in the operation process of knowledge spillover phenomenon starting to knowledge spillover rate, cooperation will function and cooperation as the basis for stability, the dynamic analysis of wind power projects with the knowledge alliance stability of the relationship between the overflow rate of change, and building wind power equipment supply chain alliance agile information systems research, wind power equipment to stabilize the operation of a supply chain alliance important reference value.
In short, this article from China's wind power equipment manufacturing industry development status departure and supply chain structure analysis, based on dissipative structure theory, entropy theory, the symbiotic theory, structure of decomposition of the integrated use of technology, game model, multi-attribute decision-making methods, from the dynamic perspective and the supply chain of China's wind power equipment manufacturers the evolution of competitive and cooperative relations, and on this basis, analysis of the corresponding wind power supply chain dynamic alliance mode selection and operation of the optimization problem, not only for the breeze power equipment supply chain management between the competing system vendors entropy mechanism to grasp the wind power equipment manufacturers competing supply chain relationship dynamics of evolution, has important theoretical significance, but also for the establishment of efficient wind power equipment manufacturers supply chain dynamic alliance to address the Union-led makers and members of the dynamic selection to find viable solutions to promote the stability of dynamic alliance has important practical guidance value.
引文
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