条约退出权研究
摘要
一般认为,国际法制度是建立在条约必须信守这一基本原则基础之上的。但是,无论是条约自身,还是条约所处的地缘政治外部条件,都不可能是静止不变的。当政治形势的变化或者各国外交偏好的变化使得条约的目的难以实现,或使得条约的条款略显过时,又抑或造成缔约方不恰当的负担时,国际法往往会引导有关缔约方更为可取地先与其他缔约伙伴进行重新谈判,并设法对条约进行修订。一旦变更条约未果,缔约方甚至是不惜行使条约退出权以实现其目的。虽然条约退出权的行使在国际社会条约法实践中已是屡见不鲜的现象,并且各条约中退出权条款的设计也称得上是多式多样,但是令人感到奇怪的就是,条约退出权课题在国际法学研究领域却只受到了极少的关注。
条约退出权的历史形成与发展可以1969年《维也纳条约法公约》的通过为标志,分为三个阶段：即《维也纳条约法公约》制定前阶段、《维也纳条约法公约》制定阶段与《维也纳条约法公约》制定后阶段。按照不同的分类标准,条约退出权可划分为明示退出权与默示退出权、约定退出权与一般国际法退出权、单方退出权与集体退出权以及全部退出权与部分退出权。
从本质上讲,条约退出权属于主权的一种发散与特权。条约退出权的主权属性决定了这种权利的正当性。条约法实践中的条约退出权类似于国际习惯法的背离权与国内私法领域的合同解除权。其实,通过行使条约退出权,缔约方所表现出的是对合作价值、协调价值、正义价值、保障价值、实用价值和适变价值的追求。在承认条约退出权对维护缔约方利益具有重要积极作用的同时,也要兼顾考虑国际社会的整体利益。
条约退出权的行使条件有实质条件与程序条件之分。其中,实质条件包括条约当事方共同同意、情势重大变更、其他缔约方的重大违约与条约履行不能等。在程序方面,一些条约会对缔约方行使退出权的时间予以限制。一般地,条约都要求退出方做出退出通知。而通知须经过一段时期后,条约退出权方可生效。在通知做出与退出权生效之间应有一段异议期,但异议期的时间长度以及退出通知中退出理由的说明并不具有国际习惯法性质。
条约退出权的主权属性决定了退出权具有相对性的一面。条约退出权的行使应受到条约必须信守原则的约束。而且,条约退出权的行使还应受到国际社会本位原则的约束。
必须注意的是,退出国在退出权生效后,相对于所退出的条约而言,其地位则回复到第三方的位置,退出的条约不再对其产生新的权利与义务。但是,退出国就其在退出权生效前就已产生的条约内义务,应该是不能解除的。另外,对于退出国先前参加的条约中所载的无论是强行法规则,还是国际习惯法规范,均应保持对退出国的约束效力。
1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第五编第四节规定了缔约方解决退出权争端所应遵循的程序。这一争端解决程序分为两个阶段：第一阶段是公约第65条第3款所规定的任意程序；第二阶段是公约第66条和附录所规定的强制程序。考虑到《维也纳条约法公约》的条约退出权争端解决机制不具备国际习惯法性质,因而对非缔约国缺乏必然的约束力,因此具体条约的退出权争端应优先适用该条约自身所包含的争端解决机制或方法。
It is generally recognized that the international legal system is grounded on a fundamental principle:pacta sunt servanda—treaties must be obeyed. However, neither treaties themselves nor the geostrategic context in which treaties are embedded are static, of course. When shifts in the political landscape or domestic preferences undermine a treaty's objectives or render its terms unduly burdensome or obsolete, international law directs states to prefer re-negotiations with their treaty partners, attempting to revise the treaty. In case of achieving no effect of revision, the contracting parties even spare no efforts to exercise the exit right of treaty in order to fulfill its goal. Given the prevalent use of exit rights in international practice of treaties and the diverse design of exit right clauses, it is surprising that the research on exit rights of treaties has received so little attention in international law scholarship.
With the symbolic adoption of the1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the historic emergence and development of treaty exit rights can be divided into three phases:the pre-drafting phase of VCLT, the drafting phase of VCLT and the post drafting phase of VCLT. In Accordance with different classification standards, treaty exit rights fall within the categories of express exit right vs. implied exit right, agreed exit right vs. exit right under general international law, unilateral exit right vs. group exit right and complete exit right vs. partial exit right.
Essentially, treaty exit right is the emanation and prerogative of sovereignty. The sovereign attribute determines the legitimacy of treaty exit right. The treaty exit right in the practice of treaty law is analogous to the derogation right of customary international law and the rescission right of contract in domestic private law. The exercise of treaty exit rights actually reflects the pursuit of cooperation value, coordination value, justice value, safeguard value, pragmatic value and the value of adaptability to changes. While recognizing the exit rights'significance of protecting the interests of contracting parties, the overall interests of the international community as a whole should also be taken into account.
The conditions of exercising treaty exit rights can be categorized into the substantive conditions and the procedural conditions. The substantive conditions include the mutual agreement of the contracting parties, rebus sic stantibus, other parties'material breach and impossibility of treaty performance. In the aspect of procedures, some treaties impose limitations on the time of exercising exit rights. Generally, treaties require the exiting parties to make notice of exit. However, the treaty exit rights will not take effect until a period of time elapses after the notice. There should exist a moratorium between the notice making and the entry into force of the exit rights. But the length of the moratorium and the elaboration of the reasons for treaty exit in the notice do not possess the nature of customary international law.
The sovereign attribute of treaty exit rights determines the rights' property of relativity. The exercise of treaty exit rights should be bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Moreover, the exercise of the treaty exit rights should also be restrained by the doctrine of international-community-orientation.
Attentively, the exiting country, relative to the treaty which it exits, will become a third party to the treaty after the exit, thus no new rights and obligations within the treaty regime arise. But the obligations which have incurred within the framework of the treaty before the exit right enters into force can not be released. Moreover, either the jus cogens norms or the customary international law rules which are stipulated in the exited treaty that the exited country once participated in maintain their binding forces upon the exited country.
In the practice of treaties, if, at any time during the moratorium, an objection is lodged by another party to the treaty, a dispute is initiated. Section4Part V of1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes the procedures which must be followed by the parties to settle the relevant disputes. The dispute settlement procedures can be divided into two stages:the first stage is the optional procedure provided in Article65paragraph3of the Convention; and the second stage is the compulsory procedure set up in Article66and the Annex of the Convention. Given the non-customary nature of the settlement mechanism in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning the exit right disputes, therefore it lacks the inescapable binding force on the non-parties, hence the dispute settlement of a specific treaty's exit right is supposed to apply the dispute settlement mechanism or methods contained in the treaty itself priorly.
条约退出权的历史形成与发展可以1969年《维也纳条约法公约》的通过为标志,分为三个阶段：即《维也纳条约法公约》制定前阶段、《维也纳条约法公约》制定阶段与《维也纳条约法公约》制定后阶段。按照不同的分类标准,条约退出权可划分为明示退出权与默示退出权、约定退出权与一般国际法退出权、单方退出权与集体退出权以及全部退出权与部分退出权。
从本质上讲,条约退出权属于主权的一种发散与特权。条约退出权的主权属性决定了这种权利的正当性。条约法实践中的条约退出权类似于国际习惯法的背离权与国内私法领域的合同解除权。其实,通过行使条约退出权,缔约方所表现出的是对合作价值、协调价值、正义价值、保障价值、实用价值和适变价值的追求。在承认条约退出权对维护缔约方利益具有重要积极作用的同时,也要兼顾考虑国际社会的整体利益。
条约退出权的行使条件有实质条件与程序条件之分。其中,实质条件包括条约当事方共同同意、情势重大变更、其他缔约方的重大违约与条约履行不能等。在程序方面,一些条约会对缔约方行使退出权的时间予以限制。一般地,条约都要求退出方做出退出通知。而通知须经过一段时期后,条约退出权方可生效。在通知做出与退出权生效之间应有一段异议期,但异议期的时间长度以及退出通知中退出理由的说明并不具有国际习惯法性质。
条约退出权的主权属性决定了退出权具有相对性的一面。条约退出权的行使应受到条约必须信守原则的约束。而且,条约退出权的行使还应受到国际社会本位原则的约束。
必须注意的是,退出国在退出权生效后,相对于所退出的条约而言,其地位则回复到第三方的位置,退出的条约不再对其产生新的权利与义务。但是,退出国就其在退出权生效前就已产生的条约内义务,应该是不能解除的。另外,对于退出国先前参加的条约中所载的无论是强行法规则,还是国际习惯法规范,均应保持对退出国的约束效力。
1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第五编第四节规定了缔约方解决退出权争端所应遵循的程序。这一争端解决程序分为两个阶段：第一阶段是公约第65条第3款所规定的任意程序；第二阶段是公约第66条和附录所规定的强制程序。考虑到《维也纳条约法公约》的条约退出权争端解决机制不具备国际习惯法性质,因而对非缔约国缺乏必然的约束力,因此具体条约的退出权争端应优先适用该条约自身所包含的争端解决机制或方法。
It is generally recognized that the international legal system is grounded on a fundamental principle:pacta sunt servanda—treaties must be obeyed. However, neither treaties themselves nor the geostrategic context in which treaties are embedded are static, of course. When shifts in the political landscape or domestic preferences undermine a treaty's objectives or render its terms unduly burdensome or obsolete, international law directs states to prefer re-negotiations with their treaty partners, attempting to revise the treaty. In case of achieving no effect of revision, the contracting parties even spare no efforts to exercise the exit right of treaty in order to fulfill its goal. Given the prevalent use of exit rights in international practice of treaties and the diverse design of exit right clauses, it is surprising that the research on exit rights of treaties has received so little attention in international law scholarship.
With the symbolic adoption of the1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the historic emergence and development of treaty exit rights can be divided into three phases:the pre-drafting phase of VCLT, the drafting phase of VCLT and the post drafting phase of VCLT. In Accordance with different classification standards, treaty exit rights fall within the categories of express exit right vs. implied exit right, agreed exit right vs. exit right under general international law, unilateral exit right vs. group exit right and complete exit right vs. partial exit right.
Essentially, treaty exit right is the emanation and prerogative of sovereignty. The sovereign attribute determines the legitimacy of treaty exit right. The treaty exit right in the practice of treaty law is analogous to the derogation right of customary international law and the rescission right of contract in domestic private law. The exercise of treaty exit rights actually reflects the pursuit of cooperation value, coordination value, justice value, safeguard value, pragmatic value and the value of adaptability to changes. While recognizing the exit rights'significance of protecting the interests of contracting parties, the overall interests of the international community as a whole should also be taken into account.
The conditions of exercising treaty exit rights can be categorized into the substantive conditions and the procedural conditions. The substantive conditions include the mutual agreement of the contracting parties, rebus sic stantibus, other parties'material breach and impossibility of treaty performance. In the aspect of procedures, some treaties impose limitations on the time of exercising exit rights. Generally, treaties require the exiting parties to make notice of exit. However, the treaty exit rights will not take effect until a period of time elapses after the notice. There should exist a moratorium between the notice making and the entry into force of the exit rights. But the length of the moratorium and the elaboration of the reasons for treaty exit in the notice do not possess the nature of customary international law.
The sovereign attribute of treaty exit rights determines the rights' property of relativity. The exercise of treaty exit rights should be bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Moreover, the exercise of the treaty exit rights should also be restrained by the doctrine of international-community-orientation.
Attentively, the exiting country, relative to the treaty which it exits, will become a third party to the treaty after the exit, thus no new rights and obligations within the treaty regime arise. But the obligations which have incurred within the framework of the treaty before the exit right enters into force can not be released. Moreover, either the jus cogens norms or the customary international law rules which are stipulated in the exited treaty that the exited country once participated in maintain their binding forces upon the exited country.
In the practice of treaties, if, at any time during the moratorium, an objection is lodged by another party to the treaty, a dispute is initiated. Section4Part V of1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes the procedures which must be followed by the parties to settle the relevant disputes. The dispute settlement procedures can be divided into two stages:the first stage is the optional procedure provided in Article65paragraph3of the Convention; and the second stage is the compulsory procedure set up in Article66and the Annex of the Convention. Given the non-customary nature of the settlement mechanism in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning the exit right disputes, therefore it lacks the inescapable binding force on the non-parties, hence the dispute settlement of a specific treaty's exit right is supposed to apply the dispute settlement mechanism or methods contained in the treaty itself priorly.
引文
①本文中,《维也纳条约法公约》均指1969年《维也纳条约法公约》。
② Galligan, David M.. Wrapping Up the UNCLOS Ⅲ "Package":At Long Last the Final Clauses[J], Va. J. Int'l L.,1980, (20):347-384; Weiler, Joseph H. H.. Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization:The Case of the European Economic Community[J], Israel L. Rev.,1985, (20):283.
① Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
② Jenks, C. Wilfred. A New World of Law? A Study of the Creative Imagination in International Law[M]. London:Longmans,1969:180.
③在第二次世界大战前的十年期间,德国、意大利、日本和其他几个国联成员国分别行使了条约退出权,退出了国联盟约,以此来逃避这个世界性的机构曾试图施加的哪怕是较温
①沃尔多克在其第二份报告中指出,对条约退出权问题的探讨开始于1871年《伦敦宣言》所阐述的那条有关条约约束性质的著名规则。沃氏承认,1871年宣言特别适用那一类寻求稳定和永久解决争端的条约。但同时他又认为,宣言通常也被视为给那些并未表达任何固定有效期的条约以及不含任何退出权条款的条约阐述了一条普遍规则。沃尔多克还提到,这日益增多的条约退出权条款,首先出现在技术性条约中,然后扩展至多边条约,到如今已变得非常普遍了。Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p.1-8.
② Bederrnan, D.. The 1871 London Declaration, rebus sic stantibus and a primitivist view of the Law of Nations[J]. AJIL.1988. (82):3.
③ Schwebel. On Soviet Practice[J]. American Journal of International Law,1964, (58):660.
④事实上,在1871年《伦敦宣言》中,缔约方全体并没有明确提出“退出”这一术语,但该宣言一直被视为国际社会正式讨论条约退出权问题的开山之作——而这似乎也印证了本文所主张的条约退出权是从“背离”、“废止”、“废除”、“废约”与“解除”等术语逐渐演变而来的观点。
①Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：460.
① Schindler, Dietrich. The Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court in International Disputes[J]. American Journal of International Law.1921, (15):149-188.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：460-461.
① Phillimore, Walter George Frank. Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching[M]. London:John Murray,1917:45.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：459.
①The American Journal International Law (Supplement),1935:1173.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：459.
③王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：21.
① Giraud, E.. Report at the Institute of International Law[J]. YIIL (book 1),1961, (49):73.
② Haraszti, Gyorgy. Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Jozsef Decsenyi trans.) [M].Budapest:Akademiai Kiado,1973:264.
③ Kiss, Alexandre-Charles. Repertoire de la pratique francaise (vol. Ⅰ)[M]. Paris:Editions due Centre national de la a recherche scientifique,1962:367.
① Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise[M]. London:Longmans, Green & Co.,1905:549.事实上,1861年当Halleck谈到同盟条约时,他首次表达了类似的观点。但1680年Textor却表达了相反的看法。Textor, Woflgang. Law of Nations[M]. Baltimore:The Lord Baltimore Press,1680:269.
② Oppenheim, L.. International Law (vol.Ⅰ) [M]. London:Longmans,1954:382-383.
③ Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise (8th edn.)[M]. H. Lauterpacht ed.. London: Longmans,1955:843.
① Higgins, Pearce. A Treatise on International Law (8th edn.) [M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1924:405.
② Stewart, Robert Burgess. Treaty Relations of the British Commonwealth of Nations[M]. London: Macmillan,1939:920.
① Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:493-494.
② Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:504.
③其实,这一事件只不过是承认与贸易和商事有关的情况在战争期间不可避免地会产生巨大变化的一个证据而已。
④ Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:511.
① Brierly. Some Consideration on the Obsolescence of Treaties[J]. Transactions of the Grotius Society,1926,(Ⅱ):11 ff.
② Ross, Alf. A Textbook of International Law[M]. London:Lawbook Exchange,1947:218; Green, N. A. Maryan. International Law:Law of Peace[M]. London:Macdonald and Evans,1973: 174; Delupis, Ingrid Detter. Essays on the Law of Treaties[M]. Engelska:Norstedt,1967:83; Elias, Taslim Olawale. The Modern Law of Treaties[M]. New York:Oceana Publications, 1974:165.
③ Rousseau, Charles E.. Droit international public (vol.Ⅰ) [M]. Paris:Sirey,1970:213; Satow, Ernest. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (4th edn.) [M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1957:385; Jennings, Robert. Recueil des cours(Ⅱ) [M]. Hague:Hachette,1967:565.
④ Kozhevnikov. International Law[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961:121; Guggenheim, Paul. Traite de droit international public (vol.Ⅰ) [M]. Paris:Librairie de l'Universite,1967: 219; Strupp, K.. Recueil des cours(Ⅰ) [M]. Hague:Hachette,1934:263; Jurisclasseur. Sources de droit international[M]. Paris:Juris-classeur,1960:47.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：459.
①Fitzmaurice Ⅱ, A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission.1957. vol.2. p.22.
② Fitzmaurice Ⅱ, A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1957, vol.2, pp 21t.
①Fitzmaurice Ⅳ, A/CN.4/I20, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1959, vol.2, p. 38.
② Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p.39.
①Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p. 64-70.
①Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, pp.63f.
① Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, pp.64f.
② Giraud, E.. Report at the Institute of International Law[J]. YIIL,1961, (49):75.
① Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p.67.
②《外交关系维也纳公约》；《领事关系维也纳公约》；《联合国人权公约》；《联合国特别使团公约》；《关于国家在其对国际组织关系上的代表权公约》；《国家在条约方面继承的维也纳公约》；《联合国关于防止和惩处侵害应受国际保护人员公约》等。
③《联合国禁止并惩治种族隔离罪行国际公约》；《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》；以及在国际统一私法协会,联合国国际贸易法委员会与海牙国际私法会议主持下订立的如《关于制止非法劫持航空器海牙公约》等有关民用航空的蒙特利尔公约。
④ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, pp.2,94f.
⑤ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.101-102
① Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.102.
② Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.104.
③ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.99.
④ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.106.
①Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.241.
①Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1966, vol.Ⅱ,p.122.
②Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1966, vol.Ⅱ, p.250-251.
① U.N. General Assembly Official Records,20th Session, Sixth Committee, p.57.
② U.N. General Assembly Official Records,22nd Session, Sixth Committee, pp.94-95.
③ U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 Ⅰ, pp.335 ff.
①Off. Rec.,1st sess.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at 336-343.
②Official Records, Summary Records,1st sess.and 2nd session,1969,21st meeting, p.177.
③《维也纳条约法公约》第56条(相当于最后条文草案第53条)包含两款规定,其第一款是最后条文草案第53条原有的规定,而第2款是由于英国代表团所提出的修正案而增入的。这个修正的结果,增加了单方解约或退出的可能性。
①A/CONF.39/Ⅱ/Add.I,pp.108ff.
①最近国际法院却在Nuclear Tests案与Aegean Sea Continental Shelf案中两度对这一问题避而不谈。
② Jennings, Robert. Recueil des cours(Ⅱ)[M]. Hague:Hachette,1967:565.
①Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
② Bardonnet, D.. La Denunciation par le Gouvernement Senegalais de la Convention sur la mer territoriale... [J]. Annuaire francais de droit international,1972, (18):123 ff.
① Greig, D. W.. International Law (2nd edn.) [M]. London:Butterworths Law,1976:498.
② United Nations Note CN.89 (1976) TRE1.
③ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
① Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2011, (21):1-30.
① Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein. The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2011:1254.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：465.
② Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:290-291; Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties [M]. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009:703.
③ Schwelb, Egon. The Law of Treaties and Human Rights[A]. In Reisman & Westort (eds.). Toward World Order and Human Dignity[C].1976:58-73; Weis. The Denunciation of Human Rights Treaties[J]. Humam Rights Journal,1975, (8):3-7.
④ McDougal, Myres. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law[M]. New York: Oxford University Press,1967:205.
⑤ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
① Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1266.
① UN Conference on International Organizations—Dcocuments, vol.Ⅶ, Commission Ⅰ—General Provisions (doc.1160,Ⅰ/2/76).
② Kelsen, H.. Du droit de se retirer de l'Organisation des Nations Unies[M]. Cambridge:RGDIP, 1948:5-19.
③在联合国成员国的唯一退出事例,即1965年印尼退出《联合国宪章》问题上,一些国家坚持认为印尼援引的退出理由并不属于旧金山宣言设定的“例外情况”的标准范围。
① Bardonnet, D.. La Denunciation par le Gouvernement Senegalais de la Convention sur la mer territoriale... [J]. Annuaire francais de droit international,1972, (18):151.
② Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.26:Continuity of obligations,08/12/97, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.8/Rev.1.
③ Giraud, E.. Report at the Institute of International Law[J]. YIIL, vol.49, book 1,1961:72.
① Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.1963,(39)：202ff.然而,也有学者认为,在这些情形下,不存在条约退出的一般权利。(Schachter, Development of International Law through the Legal Opinions of the U.N. Secretariat[J]. Year Book,1948, (25):125.)类似的有关世界卫生组织退出问题的各种观点在国际法委员会的条款草案的一个注释中做了阐释。(General Assembly Official Records, 21st Session, Annexes, Item 86, p.19)
② Schachter, O.. The development of international law through the legal opinions of the United Nations Secretariat[J]. BYBIL,1948:122-127.
③ Ago, R.. YILC,1966, (Ⅰ):47.
① Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56"[A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1269.
①1968年国际法委员会在整个第56条的草拟过程中,该条第1款第2项就经过单独投票,结果表明意见分歧依然存在：56票赞成对10票反对,13票弃权。随后,整个第56条以73票对2票,4票反对的投票结果得以通过。1969年在条约法公约草案最终定稿时,澳大利亚建议,针对该条各款项部分再进行一次单独投票的提议没有被采纳,整个第56条以95票对0票,6票弃权最终获得国际法委员会的通过(Official Records, Summary Records,2nd session,1969,21st meeting, p 110, para.8)。
② Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56"[A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1271.
① Rudolf, W.. "Modus Vivendi" [Z]. In R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International Law(vol.3)[M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1984:443.
② Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:511; Nolde, Baron. Droit et technique des traites de commerce [J]. RCADI,1924, (4):327.
③ Rudolf, W.. "Modus Vivendi" [Z]. In R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International Law (vol.3)[M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1984:443.
④ Fitzmaurice, G. The Second Report on the Law of Treaties [J]. YILC,1957, (Ⅱ):39; Waldock, H.. The Second Report on the Law of Treaties[J]. YILC,1963, (Ⅱ):71.
① Leca, J.. Les techniques de revision des conventions internationales [M]. Paris:LGDJ,1961: 113.
② Leca, J.. Les techniques de revision des conventions internationales [M]. Paris:LGDJ,1961: 112; Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
③《建立世界贸易组织协议》第15条。
④ A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers (1713-1748); Mowat, Select Treaties and Documents (1815-1916); Hertslet's Commercial Treaties.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
② Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Handbook of Commercial Treaties with Foreign Powers(4th edn.) [M]. London:H. M. Stationery off.,1931:47.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):71.
② Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
①I.C.J. Reports,1973, pp.14-16, paras.25-29.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):96.
③Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, pp.85f.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):98.
② Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56"[C]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traites, Commentaire article par article (vol.Ⅲ)[A]. Brussels: Bruylant,2007:2001-2006.
③ P.C.I.J., Series C, No. IS, p.227.
① Waldock, H.. The Second Report on the Law of Treaties, YILC,1963, vol.Ⅱ, p 69.
② Peaslee, Amos Jenkins. International Governmental Organizations[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff,1956:38.
③ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause[J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
④ Singh, N.. Termination of Membership of International Organizations[M]. London:Stevens & Sons,1958:80ff; Hoyt, E.. The Unanimity Rule in the Revision of Treaties[M]. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1959:161.
⑤至于多长的一段时间才称得上是合理的通知期,这取决于当时的环境、具体条约的主题以及该条约下每一缔约国的地位。
①Singh, N.. Termination of Membership of International Organizations[M]. London:Stevens & Sons,1958:80-81.
②饶戈平.国际组织法[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1996：257.
③ Schermers, H. & N. Blokker. International Institutional Law (3rd edn.) [M]. Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1995:85ff.
④ Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an international organization[J]. BYBIL,1963, (39): 215; Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause[J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):102.
⑤ Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L., 1963, (39):193.
①理兰德·古德里奇.联合国宪章(第3版)fMl.哥伦比亚：哥伦比亚大学出版社,1969：74-79.
② Livingstone, S.. Withdrawal from the United Nations — Indonesia[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly,1965, (14):637-645.
③苏联的这一观点似乎一般局限于创建国际组织的条约,尽管在磋商《禁止核试验条约》的过程中也曾被提起。
④在North Sea Continental Shelf案例中,国际法院法官的附带意见指出,还未成为国际公约成员方的一国不要轻易地被假定为应承担接受那些传统规则的义务,这可能是持该种解释观点的一股力量。因为人们不禁要问,如果各国有意认可退出权,那么为何这种权利却没有在条约本身得以确立呢?
③ Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations:The Indonesian Intermezzo[J]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1967, (61):661; Schermers, H. G. International Institutional Law[M]. Hague:Sijthoff & Noodhof,1980:49.
③ Stein, E. & D. Carreau. Law and Peaceful Change in a Subsystem:"Withdrawal" of France from the North Atlantic Treaty[J]. American Journal of International Law,1968, (62): 577-640.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause[J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
① ICJ Reports 1980, pp 94-95, paras 47-49.
① Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade. Actualite et droit international, http:www.ridi. Org/adi/200002al.htm.
①YILC,1963,vol,Ⅰ.698th meeting,P101:para.24.
① Official Records, Summary Records,2nd session,1969,20th meeting, p 109, para.86.
② Akehurst, M. "Treaties, Termination" [Z]. In R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public Internatioal Law (vol.3) [M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1984:507; Dinh, Nguyen Quoc & A. Pellet. Droit international public(7th edn) [M]. Paris:LGD,2002:307.
③ Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1257.
④ Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traites, Commentaire article par article (vol.Ⅲ)[C]. Brussels:Bruylant,2007:1961-1964.
① Klabbers, Jan. An Introduction to International Institutional Law[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002:95-96.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：421.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
②王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：6.
③缔约方退出权的生效对于双边条约或多边条约的影响,最大区别在于：双边条约终止；而多边条约并不必然产生终止的效果,条约在其他缔约方间继续有效。
④1957年《有关商标注册用商品和服务国际分类的尼斯协定》第12条第3款；2006年《海事劳工公约》第9条第2款；等等。
⑤1973年《商标注册条约》第43条第3款；等等。
⑥1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第56条第1款；等等。
⑦ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010, (120):202-265.
⑧ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2010, (21):1-30.
① Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1578,1582.
② Tobin, H.The termination of multipartite treaties[M]. New York:Columbia University Press, 1933:200.
③ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
④ Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1593.
⑤这些公约的第14条、第21条和第16条分别规定了退出权。另《欧洲人权公约》第58条以及《美洲人权公约》第78条也有类似的退出权规定。
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
① Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
② Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:290-291.
③李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社.2003：464.
④当条约含有关于终止的规定却未含单边退出条款时,总地说来,从该条约中退出被认为是不可能的。菲茨摩里斯在其关于条约法的第二份报告中强调说“当条约明文规定在固定期限内维持效力,这就暗示了在该期限内任何缔约方都不得解约或退出,除非通过共同同意’(YILC,1957, vol.Ⅱ, p 39).沃尔多克也在其关于条约法的第二份报告中多次重复该观点(参见YILC,1963, vol. Ⅱ, p 64)。这些学说似乎在该点上未经讨论却也取得了一致意见(又比如Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961: 512).
①王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：11-20.
① Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,66.
② Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2010:564.
①国际法院在1951年5月28日对《预防与惩罚灭种罪公约》保留案发表咨询意见时指出,这一风险对于那些禁止保留的条约是最严重的；但即使是明文或暗示允许保留的条约也只是规定特定的条款才许可保留或者保留须与条约的宗旨和目的相一致。
② Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice[M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:159-160; Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design[J]. Yale J. Int'L L.2006, (31):367,371-372.
① Sykes, Alan O.. Protectionism as a "Safeguard":A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations[J]. U. Chi. L. Rev.,1991, (58):255,256.
②王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：31-32.
① Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations:The Indonesian IntermezzofJ]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1967, (61):661; Weiler, Joseph H. H.. Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization:The Case of the European Economic Community [J]. Israel L.Rev., 1985(20):282-288; Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing No Denunciation Clause[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.1982, (53):83.
②这一立场的思想根源来自国际常设法院在1927年9月7日法国诉土耳其的“莲花号”轮船案中所作的重要论断：“法律规则对各国的约束力发源于这些国家自.己的自由意志……对各国的独立进行限制因而是不能被推定的。”Haraszti, Gyorgy. Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties [M]. Jozsef Decsenyi trans.. Budapest:Akademiai Kiado,1973:264.
③ Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization [J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):189,215-217; Franck,Thomas M., Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution? [A]. In Jochen Abr. Frowein(eds.). Negotiating for Peace [C]. Berlin:Springer,2003:95-96; Weiler, Joseph H. H.. Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization:The Case of the European Economic Community [J]. Israel L.Rev.,1985, (20):284-87.
① Brierly, J. L.. The Law of Nations:An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (6th edn.)[M]. Humphrey Waldock ed.. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1963:331; Oppenheim, L. International Law:A Treatise (8th edn.)[M]. H. Lauterpacht ed.. London:Longmans,1955: 938.
② Galligan, David M.. Wrapping up the UNCLOS Ⅲ "Package":At Long Last the Final Clauses [J]. Va. J, Int'l L,1980, (20):347,382; Haraszti, Gyorgy. Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties [M]. Jozsef Decsenyi trans.. Budapest:Akademiai Kiado,1973:268.
③ Evatt, Elizabeth. Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ICCPR:Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence? [J]. Austl. J. Hum. Rts.,1999, (5):215-217; Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations:The Indonesian Intermezzo[J]. Am. J. Int'l L., 1967, (61):666-671; Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):99-102; Feinberg, N. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):204-211.
④当然,其他缔约国的反应也值得一提。在上述的几个国家退出联合国教科文组织后,美国就成功地在该组织的章程中引入一个修正案,授权单边退出。Feinberg, N. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization [J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):211.
④ Akehurst, Michael. Withdrawal from International Organisations[J]. Current Legal Prob.1979, (32):143,146-149; Feinberg, N. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization [J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):205-211; Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian Intermezzo [J]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1967, (61):667-670.
①樊静.经济全球化趋势下的国家主权原则[J].法学杂志,2002,(6)：19-20.
②塞缪尔·巴金和布鲁斯·克洛林主张,对主权的阐释应该建立在“国家相互联系”的基础之上。他们特别关注“政治主权”(强调在主权权威和既定领土间明确的联系)和“民族主权”(强调主权权威和既定居民之间的联系)两者之间存在的历史性的冲突。转引子[英]约翰·霍夫曼.主权[M].陆彬译.长春：吉林人民出版社,2005：140-141.
③王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：11.
④ Nincic, Djura. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations[M]. Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1970:286.
① Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:351.
② Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise (8th edn.)[M]. H. Lauterpacht ed.. London: Longmans,1955:411.
③ Singh, N.. Termination of Membership of International Organizations[M]. London:Stevens & Sons,1958:85-86.
① Nincic, Djura. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations[M]. Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1970:286.
② Overstreet, A. V.. Sovereignty in the Constitution of Some International Organizations, A Comparative Study of Certain Aspects of the League of Nations, UNRRA and the UN[D]. Cambridge:Mass.,1948.
③ UNCIO doc.619.
①主权是一个极富争议性的词语。不仅仅是政治家们在讨论它,在学理的层面上它也常常引起人们的争议。问题的起因在于主权和国家的联系。为了把其定义为一个具有启发性而不是迷惑性的概念,主权应该同国家分离开来。参见[英]约翰·霍夫曼.主权[M].陆彬译.长春：吉林人民出版社,2005：1.
① Norman, George & Joel P. Trachtman. The Customary International Law Game[J]. Am. J. Int'L L.,2005, (99):541,544.
③ 1969 I.C.J. Rep., p.38.
④ Charney, Jonathan L. The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law[J]. Brit. Y. B. Int'L L.,1985, (56):1.
⑤有学者就认为,尽管条约制度已经比较全面了,但同时存在另一种国际习惯法制度的好处之一就是国际习惯法在应对变化的条件时更容易产生演变。Kontou, Nancy. The Termination and Revision of Treaties in Light of New Customary International Law[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994:69.
① Guzman, Andrew T.. Saving Customary International Law[J]. Mich. J. Int'L L.,2005, (27): 115-171.
② Scott, Gary L. & Craig L. Carr. Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary International Law[J]. Denv. J. Int'L L.& Pol'Y.,1996, (25):71; Weisburd, Arthur M.. Customary International Law:The Problem of Treaties[J]. Vand. J. Transnat'L L.,1988, (21): 1.
③有学者认为,“条约,尤其是多边条约,通常被作为国际习惯法的证据使用’'.Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner. The Limits of International Law[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2005：23；也有学者主张,“无论是多边条约还是双边条约都被频繁作为各国实践国际习惯法的证据引用”。Baxter, R. R.. Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law[J]. Brit. Y. B. Int'L L.,1965-1966, (41):275.
① Vattel, Emmerich De.. The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns[M]. Charles G. Fenwick transl.. Philadelphia:T. & J. W. Johnson& Co., Law Booksellers,1916:9.
② Bynkershoek, Cornelius Van. De Foro Legatorum Liber Singularis:A Monograph on the Jurisdiction over Ambassadors in Both Civil and Criminal Cases[M]. Gordon J. Laing trans.. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1946:106-107; Martens, Georg F.. A Compendium of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe[M]. William Cobbett transl.. London:Cobbett and Morgan, Pall-Mall,1802:356.
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⑤ Baker, Sherston. First Steps in International Law[M]. Oxford:Gale, Making of Modern Law, 1899:16; Phillimore, Robert. Commentaries Upon International Law (3d ed.) [M]. Philadelphia:T. & J.W. Johnson & Co.,1879:39; Poison, Archer. Principles of the Law of Nations[M]. London:J. J. Griffin and Co.,1860:12.
⑥ Lang, Daniel G.. Foreign Policy in the Early Republic[M]. Baton Rouge, LA:Louisiana State University Press,1985:13-33; Fenwick, Charles G. The Authority of Vattel[J]. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.,1913, (7):395.
⑦ 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199(1796).
① 11U.S.(7Cranch)116(1812).
② The Santissima Trinidad,20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283,352-54 (1822)引用Schooner Exchange案来证明这一论断,即外国船舶从一国管辖范围的豁免“是建立在公共礼让与便利原则的基础上,并产生于各国的推定同意或许可。”而且“这样的同意与许可仅从各国的一般习惯法隐含出来并且可在任何时候退出,而无需承担责任”。
③ "default"含有“不履行义务、违约”等意思。但作者赞成使用"Derogation View"这一术语,因为‘"derogation"准确地表示了“背离,偏离(规则,行为准则)”的含义,这更符合国际习惯法的特征。另外,对于国际社会对国际习惯法的违反(或不履行)行为,Laurence R. Helfer和Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati分别在其论文中使用了"exiting"与"withdrawing"来表示对国际习惯法的“退出”。至于上升到一种权利,作者倾向于使用“背离权”,而不是“退出权”。Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Custom:Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2010, (21):65-80; Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010, (120):202-265. Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Custom:Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2010, (21):65-80.
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① Estreicher, Samuel. A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary Interntaional Law?: Some Cautionary Notes[J]. Duke J. Comp.& Int'L L.,2010, (21):57.
②Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru),1950 I.C.J. Rep.266,277-78 (Nov.20).
③ Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.),1951 I.C.J. Rep.116,131 (Dec.18).
④ Fitzmaurice, Gerald. General Principles and Sources of Law[J]. Brit. Y. B. Int'L L.,1953, (30): 26.
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⑧ International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law. Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law[M].2000:27. (www.ila-hq.org/pdf/customarylaw.pdf.)
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③ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010 (120):202-265.
④ Guzman, Andrew T.. Saving Customary International Law[J]. Mich. J. Int'L L.,2005, (27): 115-171.
⑤ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010 (120):202-265.
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② Ochoa, Christiana. Disintegrating Customary International Law. Reactions to Withdrawing from International Custom[J]. Duke J. Comp.& Int'L L.,2010, (21):157-159.
③ U.C.C., §2-309(3) (1977).
④ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2011, (21):1-30.
① Hirsch, Moshe. Game Theory, International Law, and Future Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East [J]. Denv. J. Int'l L.& Pol'y,1998, (27):75,78-94; Snidal, Duncan. Rational Choice and International Relations [A]. In Walter Carlsnaes (eds.) Handbook of International Relations [C]. London:SAGE Publications Ltd.,2002, pp.73-76.
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①各缔约国对条约义务非常隐秘地予以违反的行为必须与“聒噪的”违约行为区分开来,在后一种情况下缔约方利用一种不履约策略来促使进行条约修订或改革。然而,该策略付出的代价极有可能比退出与威胁退出的要高,因为涉及对条约的公然违反行为,往往会触发一系列的制裁,包括受到不利影响的缔约伙伴的对等的不履约行动。
① Jinks, Derek & David Sloss. Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions? [J]. Cornell L. Rev.,2004, (90):97,154-157.
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①协调博弈的命名来自一个通常的例子。一对夫妇希望共同渡过一晚,但是两者却倾向于不同的娱乐方式,比如一个想去看电影,而另一个则希望去欣赏歌剧。Hasenclever, Andreas. Theories of International Regimes [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1997:47.
② Stein, Arthur A.. Coordination and Collaboration:Regimes in an Anarchic World [A]. In Stephen D. Krasner(ed.). International Regimes[C]. Cornell:Cornell University Press,1983, p.125.
③ Martin, Lisa L.. The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism[A]. In John Gerard Ruggie (ed.). Multilateralism Matters:The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form [C]. Columbia: Columbia University Press,1993:102.
① Helfer, Laurence R.. Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking[J]. Yale J. Int'l L.,2004, (29):1,55-59.
① Brewster, Rachel. The Domestic Origins of International Agreements[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,2004, (44):501,518-519.
②国际社会现实中,各国有时永久性地退出条约,而有时却在几年后就重新恢复了成员资格。
③ Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
④因此,当面对这些压力时,一国是否选择退出不能孤立地进行分析。比如,若条约许可保留或授权背离(当情势重大变更时)的话,退出也许就不会如此频繁了。
⑤若缔约方可在任何时点基于任何理由就可自由退出一种条约关系的话,他们就会显得对条约信赖不够——也即不会用更有效的方式去信赖条约关系的永久性。Swaine, Edward T. Unsigning[J]. Stan. L. Rev.,2003,(55):2074.
⑥ Paul Stephan一针见血地提出质问：“人们怎样才能将一国按照国际法原则声称有权从一
②约翰·罗尔斯.正义论[M].何怀宏等译.北京：中国社会科学出版社,1988：3.
③这里巧合的是,表示条约“解约”意思的"denounce"有时也被学者译为“废除”。
① Laurence R. Helfer认为,退出行为的合法性有两种例外情况：(1)退出明确禁止退出的条约或不含退出条款的条约；(2)退出与国际习惯法重叠的条约。(Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.)本文不太赞同该观点。对于第一种情形,既然条约禁止退出,而缔约方又想解除条约义务,在这种场合下,就只能违约了,并不是本文所称的退出行为。而条约不含退出条款,并不能说此类条约就不能退出,对此维也纳公约第56条有明确规定。至于第二种情形,也不能一概而论。有些条约,尽管可能会与国际习惯法重叠,但是只要此类条约含有明文退出条款,仍然是可以退出的——只是退出后仍受有关国际习惯法的约束。更何况鉴于国际习惯法的模糊性与各种学说的不统一,国际习惯法在某些情况下也是可背离的。关于这点,上文已经讨论过。
②《维也纳条约法公约》第60条规定了当多边条约当事国有重大违约时,终止或暂停施行该条约的条件。
③ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010, (120):202-265.
①[美]博登海默.法理学：法律哲学与法律方法[M].邓正来译.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004：267-268.
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①Estreicher, Samuel. A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary Interntaional Law?: Some Cautionary Notes[J]. Duke J. Comp. & Int'L L.,2010, (21):59.
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①Official Records, Summary Records,1st session, pp 337-338, para.29,38.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社.2003：464.
③2007年4月,“美洲玻利瓦尔替代计划(ALBA)”的成员国,即玻利维亚、委内瑞拉、尼加拉瓜和古巴宣称将退出国际货币基金组织和世界银行。
①余劲松.国际投资条约仲裁中投资者与东道国权益保护平衡问题研究[J].中国法学,2011(2)：132-143.
②ICSID in crisis:Straight-jacket or investment protection?[EB/OL]. http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564878.2011-12-10.
③Gaillard, Emmanuel. Anti-Arbitration Trends in Latin America[J]. New York Law Journal,2008, (108):239-241.
④南美国家联盟(UNASUR)是试图融合《安第斯共同体条约》与南锥共同市场的区域性的多边组织。http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com.2011-12-13.
① http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/10/16/en_pol_esp_for-the-tsj,-all-ca 16A2073343.shtml.2012-01-13
② Szasz, Paul C.. The Investment Disputes Convention and Latina America [J]. Va.J.Int'l L.,1971, (11):263-266.
③ Morales在总统就职演说中就明确表示“没错,玻利维亚需要合作伙伴,但并非我们自然资源的所有者……我们确保外国公司收回其投资的权利,还有些许盈利的权利；但我们仅仅希望我国人民能从这些资源中获益”。Pinto, Lindsay Sykes. Resolving the Bolivian Gas Crisis:Lessons from Bolivia's Brush with International Arbitration [J]. Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.,2007, (39):947-951.
①条约退出其实也可称得上是一种广义的条约终止,但终止的效果只是发生在退出方与其他缔约方之间,对于整个条约并非产生真正意义上的终止。
② Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:510.
③联合国条约部门的法律事务办公室将条约的最后条款解释为“通常出现在条约末尾且包含诸如争端解决、条约的修正与修订、缔约国名单、条约签字、批准、加入、生效、退出与终止、保留、保管机关指定以及作准文本等内容”的条款。U. N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Handbook, at 57, U.N. Sales No. E.02.V.2 (2001).
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/107,19.
① IYbk. I.L.C.1980:21.
②郑曦林,桂宾.论条约法上的单方解约或退出权——兼评《核不扩散条约》的退出条款[J].法学评论,1995(1)：25.
③ Henkin, Louis. International Law:Politics and Values [M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff,1995:27; Janis, Mark W.. International Law(5th ed.) [M]. Kluwer:Wolters Kluwer,2008:44.
④S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),1927 P. C. I. J. (ser. A) No.10, at 18 (Sept.7).
⑤一般而言,国际习惯法对于新国家而言,不管其同意与否都能产生约束效力,而对于已存的国家,约束力只需建立在这些国家保持沉默的基础上。强行法规范则更不需要各国的同意。
①银红武.人类基本价值的确信——国际条约效力基础之语步结构实证研究[J].时代法学,2012(3)：109-113.
① Off. Rec.,1st session& 2nd session,60th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,176; Off. Rec.,2nd session,25th Plenary Meeting,108.
②[美]凯尔森.国际法原理[M].王铁崖译.北京：华夏出版社,1989：359-360.
Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(2nd edn.)[M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:192-96; Haraszti, Gyorgy. Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances[A]. In The Hague Academy of International Law (ed.). Recuil des Cours:Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law[C]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1977, pp.1,16-37.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社.2003：433.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：433-437.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：446-448.
①33 UNTS, pp.197-223.
②国际法院判决、咨询意见和裁定集[M].1971：18.
③ Vagts, Detlev F.. Book Review[J]. Am. J. Int'l L.2004, (98):614,615; Setear, John K.. An Iterative Perspective on Treaties:A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, Harv. Int'l L.J.,1996, (37):171,209-10.
④ Bederman, David J.. The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations[J].Am. J. Int'l L.,1988, (82):1,38.
⑤ Bederman教授在讨论维也纳公约第62条时解释说：维也纳公约规定的情势重大变更原则不能被作为终止或退出条约的一个理由来援引,除非主张的情况变化(1)是缔约方同意的一个重要基础……；(2)在条约磋商时不可预见；(3)彻底改变了缔约方的义务.(4) 并非是主张该原则的缔约国的违约结果；与(5)不会影响一国国界的确立。Bederman, David J.. The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations[J]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1988, (82):1,28.
① Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:297-298; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.),1997 I.C.J. Rep.7,61 (Sept.25).
② Bederrnan, D.. The 1871 London Declaration, rebus sic stantibus and a primitivist view of the Law of Nations[J]. AJIL,1988, (82):2.
①国际法院判决、咨询意见和裁定集[M].1971：47.
①郑曦林,桂宾.论条约法上的单方解约或退出权——兼评《核不扩散条约》的退出条款[J].法学评论,1995(1)：25-26.
②1966 ILC Reports,P.84.
①郑曦林,桂宾.论条约法上的单方解约或退出权——兼评《核不扩散条约》的退出条款[J].法学评论,1995(1)：26-27.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：491.
③ U.N. Div. of Immunities and Treaties, Legal Dep't, Handbook of Final Clauses, at v, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/1 (1951); U.N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook of Final Clauses, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/6 (1957); U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook, at 109, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003) at vi.; The Treaty Maker's Handbook (Hans Blix & Jirina H. Emerson eds.,1973).
④ Com. of Ministers, Council of Europe, Model Final Clauses for Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe (Feb.1980), at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ Treaties/Html/ClausesFinales.htm.
⑤ Possible Improvements in the Standard-setting Activities of the ILO, at 2,7-10, ILO Doc. GB.286/LILS/1/2 (Mar.2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ gb/docs/gb286/pdf/lils-1-2.pdf.
① U.N. Div. of Immunities and Treaties, Legal Dep't, Handbook of Final Clauses, at v, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/1 (1951), at 119-36; U.N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook of Final Clauses, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/6 (1957), at 59-73; Com. of Ministers, Council of Europe, Model Final Clauses for Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe (Feb.1980),at art. f; U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook, at 109, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003), at 109-111.
② Bilder, Richard B.. Managing the Risks of International Agreement[M]. Madison:University of Wisconsin Press,1981:ix-x; Raustiala, Kal. Form & Substance in International Agreements[J].Am. J. Int'l L.,2005, (99):605-609.
① Stephan, Paul B.. The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order[J]. U. Colo. L. Rev.,1999, (70):1555,1583; Swaine, Edward T.. Unsigning[J]. Stan. L. Rev.,2003, (55):2061,2074.
②出自唐朝元稹诗句“有迎新送故之困,朝令夕改之烦,自非有为而为。”摘自《授马总检校刑部尚书天平军节度使制》。
③饶戈平.国际组织法[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1996：77.
①如2006年《海事劳工公约》第9条第2款规定,在本条第1款所述10年期满后的1年内未行使本条所规定之退出权利的成员国,即需再遵守10年,此后每当新的10年期满,可依本条的规定退出本公约。
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：421-422.
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,21-22.
①早在1935年,哈佛条约法研究小组就已发现“允许退出的条约一致要求退出条约的缔约方通知其退出的意图”。AJIL Suppl.1935(29):1179.
①Comments by Paul Reuter in(1982),Ⅰ YbK.I.L.C.153.
②Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock,UN Doc.A/CN.4/156,89.
① Comments by Paul Reuter in (1980) Ⅰ Ybk. I.L.C.21.
②塞内加尔(Off. Rec.,1st session,60th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,349)与印度的发言(Off. Rec.,2nd session,25th Plenary Meeting,134)。
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,31; 66.
④ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156,89.
⑤沃尔多克在维也纳会议上所作的解释(Off. Rec.,1 st session,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,441).
①日本(Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,403)与利比里亚的陈述(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,412).
② (1966) Ⅰ Ybk. I.L. C.158.
③ (1966) Ⅱ Ybk. I.L.C.255.
④瑞士国(Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,404);德意志联邦共和国(ibid,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,409);英国(ibid,71st meeting of the Committee of the Whole,420);芬兰(ibid.,423)与爱尔兰的发言(ibid.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,440).
① Cosnard, Michel. "Article 65" [A]. In Corten, O. & Klein, P. (eds). Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traites-Commentaire Article par Article[C]. Brussels:Bruylant,2006, p.2378.
② Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,32.
③ Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/115 and Corr.1,29.
④比如乌拉圭提议的修正案规定,主张将实质性违约作为终止条约理由之一的缔约方可单方面全部或部分暂停施行该条约(A/CONF.39/C.1/L.343)。
⑤ (1982)ⅡYbk. I.L.C.63.
⑥授权即时的暂停施行条约的唯一情形似乎只有维也纳公约第60条第2款第1项才予以了规定,即多边条约当事国得重大违约情事可使其他当事国有权以“一致协议”全部或局部暂停施行该条约,无须“援引”暂停施行或终止条约的理由。
① North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep.3 para.71.
②在Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta)一案中([1985] ICJ Rep.13 para.27),国际法院认为,1982年《联合国海洋法公约》在国际习惯法的发展方面起到了非常重要的作用,“因为该公约被压倒性多数的国家所接受”
③然而,这些国家中的一部分已经宣称他们视《维也纳条约法公约》——至少对于其大部分的条款——反映了国际习惯法。如布什政府时期国务卿William Rogers在1971年向美国参议院作的报告中声称“尽管仍未生效,但《维也纳条约法公约》已经普遍被承认为当今条约法与实践的权威指南”。
④North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep.3 para.74.
⑤如美国于2001年首先提出终止1972年《反弹道导弹条约》,随后俄罗斯赞同美国的退出行为。当2002年5月24日两国于莫斯科通过新的《削减战略性进攻武器条约》后,条约退出得以最终生效。Rein Mullerson.'The ABM Treaty:Changed Circumstances, Extraordinary Events, Supreme Interests and International Law'(2001) 50 I.C.L.Q.509.
⑥在Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia)案中,国际法院发现匈牙利的终止条约行为提前生效了,因为终止发生在匈牙利遭受任何损失前,并且终止须在通知后六天才可生效。supra note 26 para.109.
⑦美国国务卿Condoleezza Rice在寄交给联合国秘书长Kofi Annan的一封信表示,美国退出《领事关系维也纳公约任择议定书》立即生效。该信写道：“此信构成美国立即退出该议定书的通知。作为该项退出的结果,美国将不再承认该项议定书所反映的国际法院管辖权”。Quigley, John.'The United States'Withdrawal From International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in Consular Cases:Reasons and Consequences'[J]. Duke J. Comp.& Int'l L., 2009, (19):263.
① WTO, Korea-Measures Affecting Government Procurement (1 May 2000) WT/DS163/R para. 7.120-126.
② Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(2nd edn.) [M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:10-22.
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156,39-89.
④ Commentary to draft article 62, ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Y.I.L.C. (Ⅱ) 1966:262.
① Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Operations In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility [1984] ICJ Rep.392 para.63.
② Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep.7 para.109.
③ Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR 1-3655 para.59.
④1997年12月4日Jacobs总检察长发表的意见。Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655 para.96.
① Y.I.L.C. (Ⅰ),1966:158.
② Chayes, Abram. An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements[J]. Harv. L. Rev.,1972,(85)：905,957-58.如1997年《禁止使用、储存、生产和转让杀伤人员地雷及销毁此种武器的公约》第20条“期限和退出”承认“每一缔约国为行使国家主权,有权退出本公约”,但要求退出国在“退出书中应对引起退约的理由做出充分说明”。(Sept.18, 1997,2056 U.N.T.S.211.)
③如1972年5月26日美苏《限制反弹道导弹系统条约》(23 U.S.T.3435)第XV条认可退出权,若每一缔约国“倘断定本条约事项有关之非常事件危害其本国最高权益”,并要求向对方国通知“自己认为非常事件已危害其本国最高权益”。然而,问题是,该事件是否为“非常事件”,它们是否与“条约主题相关”,以及它们是否“已经危害该国最高权益”都唯一地取决于退出方的单方决定。Chayes, Abram. An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements[J]. Harv. L. Rev.,1972, (85):957-958.
④国际劳工组织理事会全体一致通过一项决议,要求已退出一国际劳工组织公约的国家提供‘导致其退出决定的理由指示”。Widdows, Kelvin. The Denunciation of International Labour Conventions[J]. Int'l & Comp. L.Q.,1984, (33):1052,1055.
① Abram Chayes解释说,单边退出武器控制条约的理由都“无一例外地被指为退出方的单边决定”。Chayes, Abram. An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements[J]. Harv. L. Rev.,1972, (85):905,957-58.
② UN Docs. S/25405; S/25515; S/RES/825(1993).
①如《国际复兴开发银行协定》第6条第1节和《国际货币基金协定》第26条第1节规定,任何退出会员国得随时以书面通知退出,接到该项通知之日起,退出即应生效。退出的及时生效能维护各成员国的经济独立性。但在大多数情况下,退出国和该国际组织是以协议的方式达成一致意见的。另外,《联合国海洋法公约》附件9也规定“当—国际组织的成员国无意为缔约国时或该国际组织不再具备海洋法公约附件9第1条所指的资格时,应退出公约,这种退出应立即生效。”
② Stein, Arthur A.. Coordination and Collaboration:Regimes in an Anarchic World[A]. In Stephen D. Krasner (ed.). International Regimes [C]. Cornell:Cornell University Press,1983: 130-156.
①如《世界气象组织章程》第29条；《非洲统一组织章程》第32条规定。
②《国际劳工组织章程》第1条第5款和《美洲国家组织章程》第148条都规定了两年。
③此类条约一般是在1969年《维也纳条约法公约》通过前签订的。如1958年《国际咖啡协定》第65条规定,退出在九十天后生效。1965年ICSID公约第71条规定,退出自收到通知六个月后开始生效。1968年《禁止核扩散条约》第10条规定,退出国应在退出前三个月将此事通知所有其他缔约国和联合国安全理事会。
④《联合国工业发展组织章程》第6条规定,在向联合国秘书长交存退出通知书以后的财政年度的最后一天生效,以留出足够的时间使该组织能调整其预算。
① Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009:704.
②1949年四个日内瓦公约都在第63条规定,退出通常在通知后一年生效。除此规定外,以《改善战地武装伤病员待遇日内瓦公约》第63条为例,该条继续规定,当退出通知是“在退出国仍卷入武装冲突时做出,退出须等到和平协议签署以及关涉本公约保护人员的释放与遣返行动终结后才可生效。”6 U.S.T. at 3152,75 U.N.T.S. at 68.
① Combacau, Jean. Le droit des traites[M]. Paris:PUF,1991:117.
② Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S),1984 I.C. J.63 (Nov.26).
① Rosenne, Shabtai. Breach of Treaty[M]. Cambridge:Grotius,1985:117-125; Moore, John Norton. Enhancing Compliance with International Law:A Neglected Remedy[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999,(39):881.
②在合作博弈中限制退出以增强合作的作用也有助于解释为何国际法学者一直以来强调多边条约隐含禁止退出的意思。
③ Sandler, Todd. Global Challenges:An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1997:30-32; Setear, John K... Ozone, Iteration, and International Law[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999, (40):193-200.
①对于臭氧层问题,国际制度采取一个主要公约与后来一系列议定书与修正书的形式反复强调其重要性。各国通过批准这些名称与效力等级不一的条约来显示遵守具体层次条约义务的决心,从而促进该项主题方面更持久的国际合作与更高的履约水平。Setear, John K., Ozone, Iteration, and International Law[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999,(40):203-226.
② Setear, John K.. Ozone, Iteration, and International Law[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999, (40):223.
① Chayes, Abram & Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1995:28.
② Ratner, Steven R.. Think Again:Geneva Conventions [J]. Foreign Policy,2008, (165):26; Roberts, Adam. Geneva Conventions Sixty Years On:Changing War, Changing Law[J]. The World Today,2009, (65):6.
①YILC,1966, vol. Ⅱ, p 236.
②Fourth Report, A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2, YILC,1965, vol. Ⅱ, p 65.
③李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：286.
①郑曦林,桂宾.论条约法上的单方解约或退出权——兼评《核不扩散条约》的退出条款[J].法学评论,1995(1)：25.
② Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,1996 I.C.J 226,267 (July 8) (advisory opinion); Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009:769.
③ Guzman提出的“后来反对者原则”是针对“持久(先前)反对者原则”而提出的。
④ Villiger, Mark E.. Customary International Law and Treaties (2nd edn.)[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1997:36.
⑤ Guzman, Andrew T.. Saving Customary International Law[J]. Mich. J. Int'L L.,2005, (27): 115-169.
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② Raustiala, Kal. Form and Substance in International Agreements [J]. Am. J. Int'L L.2005, (99): 581.
③ Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn.)[M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:162.
①王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：4.
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① General Comment No.26, at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/06b6d70077b4df2c 8025655400387939?Opendocument.
② U. N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No.26:Continuity of Obligations, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1, para.1-5 (Dec.8,1997).
③就连许多联合国的专门人权条约也包含了许可退出并对退出的影响进行明确规定的明示退出权条款,如《反酷刑公约》第31条,《消除种族歧视公约》第21条以及《儿童权利公约》第52条等。
① A/AC. I05/C.2/SR.69, A/AC.105/35.
② A/AC.105/21/Add.2.
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⑤国际法委员会《国际不法行为国家责任条款》第4-11条。
⑥国际法委员会《国际不法行为国家责任条款》第50条与第51条。
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①《维也纳条约法公约》第70条第2款规定,倘一国解约或退出多边条约,自解约或退出生效之日起,在该国与条约每一其他当事国之关系上(甲)解除当事国继续履行条约之义务。
②《维也纳条约法公约》第70条第2款又规定,倘一国解约或退出多边条约,自解约或退出生效之日起,在该国与条约每一其他当事国之关系上(乙)不影响当事国在条约终止前经由实施条约而产生之任何权利、义务或法律情势。
①Y.I.L.C.,1964,(Ⅱ):46.
④李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：303.
① Wilson, Richard J. & Jan Perlin. The Inter-American Human Rights System:Activities from Late 2000 Through October 2002[J]. Am. U. Int'L L. Rev.,2003, (18):651,688-689; Concepcion, Natasha Parassram. The Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago's Withdrawal From the American Convention on Human Rights[J]. Am. U. Int'L L. Rev.,2001,(16):847, 872-873.
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② Report No.3/87, Case No 9647, Jay Pinkerton and James Terry Roach, Inter-Am Comm. H.R., para.54(1987).
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⑤日内瓦公约Ⅰ第63条；日内瓦公约Ⅱ第62条；日内瓦公约Ⅲ第142条；与日内瓦公Ⅳ第158条。
① Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein. The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2011:1032-1033.
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④这里排除了与同一制度下的最新或修订过条约的批准有正式或非正式联系的退出。这些退出本质上是非常合作的,并未标志着避免与其他国家进行多边交往的意图。
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③ 2004 Model BIT art.22, at 22-23[EB/OL]. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710. pdf,2012-2-25.
④ Release, Press. U.S. Dep't of State, Top U.S. Official Calls on U.N. To Act To Curb Proliferation (Sept.26,2003) [EB/OL]. http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html? p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=September&x=20030926170536alretnuh0.8621027&t=xarc hives/xarchitem.html,2011-12-6.
① Thranert, Oliver. The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:Perspectives in Advance of the 2005 Review Conference, SWP Research Paper (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany), Aug.2004, at 27 n.52,28-29[EB/OL]. http://www.swpberlin. org/common/get_document.php?id=1062,2011-12-18.
② Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making\M\. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:160.
③ Morrison, Richard. Efficient Breach of International Agreements[J]. Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 1994,(23):189.
④ Steinberg, Richard H.. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. Int'l Org.,2002, (56):360.
① Kirgis, Frederic L.. President Bush's Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, ASIL Insight (Mar.9,2005) [EB/OL]. http://www.asil.org/insights/ 2005/03/insights050309.html,2011-12-1.
① Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Mar.10,2005) [EB/OL]. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/43225.htm,2012-1-23.
①如玻利维亚与阿根廷、比利时、德国、秘鲁、乌拉圭等的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与阿根廷、加拿大、哥斯达黎加、英国等的双边投资保护条约。
②如玻利维亚与意大利、西班牙、瑞士等的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与罗马尼亚、西班牙、委内瑞拉等的双边投资保护条约。
③如玻利维亚与韩国双边投资保护条约。
① Garibaldi, O. M.. On the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction, and the Limits of the Contract Analogy[A]. In C. Binder (eds.). International Investment Law for the 21st century:essays in honour of Christoph Schreuer[C]. Oxford:OUP,2009, pp. 262-278; Nolan, M. D. & F. Sourgens. The Interplay between State Consent to ICSID Arbitration and Denunciation of the Convention:The (Possible) Venezuela Case Study[J]. Transnational Dispute Management,2007, (9):15-45.; Tietje, C.. Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID[J]. Transnational Dispute Management,2009, (6): 8-28.
②chnabl, E. & J. Bedard. The Wrong Kind of Interesting[J]. The National Law Journal,2007, (7): 51-65; Schreuer, Christoph. Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration[A]. In Michael Waibel & Asha Kaushal (eds.). The Backlash against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and Reality[C]. Kluwer:Kluwer Law International,2010, pp.353-368.
⑥遗憾的是,应申请人要求,该案仲裁程序已于2009年10月21日中断。
① Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/8,于2010年4月12日在ICSID登记。
②如玻利维亚与智利、厄瓜多尔、法国、英国、美国、委内瑞拉等国的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与玻利维亚、德国、秘鲁、瑞典等国的双边投资保护条约。
③ Gaillard, Emmanuel. Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored-Nation Clause[J]. New York Law Journal,2005, (105):1-4.
①http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc_en-archive/ICSID_English.pdf.
① AAPL v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (Jun.27,1990), paras.2-4.
② Ch. Schreuer认为,在东道国做出退出通知前,投资争端双方受中心管辖的同意必须“达成(perfected) "。 (Schreuer, Ch.. The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M]. Cambridge Cambridge University Press,2001:1286.)
③ Gaillard, Emmanuel. The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention[J]. New York Law Journal, 2007,(237):122-145.
④ Rosenn, Keith. The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America[R]. Miami:University of Miami School of Law,2009:1-35.
① Documents concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention, Memorandum of the Meeting of the Whole, Feb.25,1965, Vol.Ⅱ, Part 2, ICSID Publications,1968, pp.1010-1011.
①如玻利维亚与中国、古巴、瑞典等国的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与中国、瑞士等国的双边投资保护条约。
②如玻利维亚与智利的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与法国、德国、秘鲁和英国的双边投资保护条约。
① Vuylsteke, Charles. Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration[J]. Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.,1974, (4):343-345.
① Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn.) [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:300; Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Fifteenth Session (6 May-12 July 1963) UN Doc. A/CN.4/163,215.
②'Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole'United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties-First Session (Vienna 26 March-24 May 1968) UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11,472-73.
③ ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966) Ⅱ Ybk. I. L.C.236.
④ Y.I. L.C.,1963, (Ⅱ):214.
⑤ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156,88.
① Kohen, Marcelo G. "Article 45" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011, p.1065.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：486.
③ Waldock, Humphrey. "Commentary to article 4:'Loss of a Right to Avoid or Denounce a Treaty through Waiver or Preclusion'" in Second Report on the Law of Treaties[J]. YILC,1963, (Ⅱ): 39.
① Official Records, Summary Records,1st and 2nd sessions,1966, vol. I, p 103.
② Official Records, Summary Records,1st and 2nd sessions,1966, vol. I, p 105.
③ Kohen, Marcelo G. "Article 45" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.1079-1084.
① Official Records, Summary Records,1st session,1963, p.239.
② Rosenne, Shabtai. Developments in the Law of Treaties (1945-1986)[M]. Cambridge:CUP, 1989:304.
③Rosenne, Shabtai.'The Settlement of Treaty Disputes under the Vienna Convention of 1969'[J]. Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht,1971, (31):1,2-3.
① Y. I. L.C.,1966, (Ⅱ):262-263.
② Off. Rec.,1st sess.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at 441.
③ Gabon (Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,405);土耳其(ibid.,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,412);黎巴嫩(ibid.,71 th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,418);与锡兰的意见(ibid.,419).
④日本(Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,402);瑞典(ibid., 69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,407);英国(ibid.,71th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,421)以及由中非共和国发起的十三国提议案(ibid.,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,405),
⑤美国的提案(Off. Rec,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,406)。
①如波兰(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,411);苏联(ibid.,412)；捷克斯洛伐克(ibid.,70th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,415);保加利亚(ibid.,71st meeting of the Committee of the Whole,423);白俄罗斯(ibid.,73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,434);马来西亚(2nd session,24th Plenary Meeting,140);与匈牙利的声明等(ibid.,147).
②乌克兰(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,411);印度(ibid., 73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,435);与摩洛哥的声明(2nd session,24th Plenary Meeting,151).
③中非共和国(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,410-11);利比里亚(ibid.,412);坦桑尼亚(ibid.,72nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,430);与肯尼亚的报告(ibid.,431-432)。
④ Off. Rec.,1st sess.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at 402-415,418-425,429-441.
①Official Records,Summary Records,2nd.session,1969,21st meeting,p.193.
②Y.I.L.C.,1980,(Ⅱ):85.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：305.
① Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(2nd edn.) [M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:141-142.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：476-480.
① Cosnard, Michel. "Article 65"[A]. In Corten, O. & Klein, P. (eds.). Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traites-Commentaire Article par Article[C]. Brussels:Bruylant,2006, pp. 2382-2383.
②Off. Rec.,1st session,73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,438.
③ Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/183 and Add.1-4,46-8.
④丹麦的评论(Off. Rec.,1st session,73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,433)。
①本宪章应无限期有效,但任何会员国得以书面通知向泛美联盟声明退出；联盟应将接到的每一退出通知书转知所有其他会员国。
②本协定有效期五年,除非一方在协定失效前六个月以书面形式宣布废止本协定,本协定有效期自动以一年为单位逐年延长。
① Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2010:873-874.
②譬如,美洲人权委员会仍在继续接纳宣称受1999年5月26日(即特立尼达和多巴哥国退出条约行为生效的日期)前所发生的违反《美洲人权公约》行为损害的请愿书。Ramlogan v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case 12.355, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No.48/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/Ⅱ.117, doc.5 at 426 (2002) [EB/OL]. http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/ TT.12355.htm,2011-11-5.
③ Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, Int'L Ct. of Justice [EB/OL]. http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3,2012-8-9.
①条约内制裁与对等的不遵守条约行为同样地会产生集体行动问题。但是这些问题在条约外制裁的情形下变得更加严重,因为该种制裁缺乏任何制度与规则来确定制裁的必要性与合法性、制裁的类型与大小以及实施制裁的机制。(Chayes, Abram & Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1995:63-67.)
① Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:73.
② Belcher, Emma. Electing the Path Ahead[J]. Fletcher F. WorldAff.,2004, (28):29-39.
① Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:160-172.
②美国威胁将减少捕鱼权或者限制鱼类进口在最初阻碍了非成员国的商业捕鲸行为,但是随着时间的推移这些威胁变得不再那么奏效。冰岛已经退出了《禁止捕鲸国际公约》,挪威建议商业捕鲸,日本和俄罗斯则威胁称将付诸这两项行动。DeSombre, Elizabeth R.. Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy:Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power [M]. Cambridge:The MIT Press,2000:208-213; Mitchell, Ronald B. & Patricia M. Keilbach. Situation Structure and'Institutional Design:Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange[J], Int'l Org.,2001, (55):891-908.
③ Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:69-71; Charnovitz, Steve. Encouraging Environmental Cooperation Through the Pelly Amendment[J]. J. Env't & Dev.,1994, (3): 3-19.
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[1]郑曦林,桂宾.论条约法上的单方解约或退出权——兼评《核不扩散条约》的退出条款[J].法学评论,1995(1)：25-30.
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③在第二次世界大战前的十年期间,德国、意大利、日本和其他几个国联成员国分别行使了条约退出权,退出了国联盟约,以此来逃避这个世界性的机构曾试图施加的哪怕是较温
①沃尔多克在其第二份报告中指出,对条约退出权问题的探讨开始于1871年《伦敦宣言》所阐述的那条有关条约约束性质的著名规则。沃氏承认,1871年宣言特别适用那一类寻求稳定和永久解决争端的条约。但同时他又认为,宣言通常也被视为给那些并未表达任何固定有效期的条约以及不含任何退出权条款的条约阐述了一条普遍规则。沃尔多克还提到,这日益增多的条约退出权条款,首先出现在技术性条约中,然后扩展至多边条约,到如今已变得非常普遍了。Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p.1-8.
② Bederrnan, D.. The 1871 London Declaration, rebus sic stantibus and a primitivist view of the Law of Nations[J]. AJIL.1988. (82):3.
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④事实上,在1871年《伦敦宣言》中,缔约方全体并没有明确提出“退出”这一术语,但该宣言一直被视为国际社会正式讨论条约退出权问题的开山之作——而这似乎也印证了本文所主张的条约退出权是从“背离”、“废止”、“废除”、“废约”与“解除”等术语逐渐演变而来的观点。
①Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：460.
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① Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise[M]. London:Longmans, Green & Co.,1905:549.事实上,1861年当Halleck谈到同盟条约时,他首次表达了类似的观点。但1680年Textor却表达了相反的看法。Textor, Woflgang. Law of Nations[M]. Baltimore:The Lord Baltimore Press,1680:269.
② Oppenheim, L.. International Law (vol.Ⅰ) [M]. London:Longmans,1954:382-383.
③ Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise (8th edn.)[M]. H. Lauterpacht ed.. London: Longmans,1955:843.
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② Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:504.
③其实,这一事件只不过是承认与贸易和商事有关的情况在战争期间不可避免地会产生巨大变化的一个证据而已。
④ Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:511.
① Brierly. Some Consideration on the Obsolescence of Treaties[J]. Transactions of the Grotius Society,1926,(Ⅱ):11 ff.
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④ Kozhevnikov. International Law[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961:121; Guggenheim, Paul. Traite de droit international public (vol.Ⅰ) [M]. Paris:Librairie de l'Universite,1967: 219; Strupp, K.. Recueil des cours(Ⅰ) [M]. Hague:Hachette,1934:263; Jurisclasseur. Sources de droit international[M]. Paris:Juris-classeur,1960:47.
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①Fitzmaurice Ⅱ, A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission.1957. vol.2. p.22.
② Fitzmaurice Ⅱ, A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1957, vol.2, pp 21t.
①Fitzmaurice Ⅳ, A/CN.4/I20, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1959, vol.2, p. 38.
② Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p.39.
①Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p. 64-70.
①Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, pp.63f.
① Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, pp.64f.
② Giraud, E.. Report at the Institute of International Law[J]. YIIL,1961, (49):75.
① Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, p.67.
②《外交关系维也纳公约》；《领事关系维也纳公约》；《联合国人权公约》；《联合国特别使团公约》；《关于国家在其对国际组织关系上的代表权公约》；《国家在条约方面继承的维也纳公约》；《联合国关于防止和惩处侵害应受国际保护人员公约》等。
③《联合国禁止并惩治种族隔离罪行国际公约》；《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》；以及在国际统一私法协会,联合国国际贸易法委员会与海牙国际私法会议主持下订立的如《关于制止非法劫持航空器海牙公约》等有关民用航空的蒙特利尔公约。
④ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, pp.2,94f.
⑤ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.101-102
① Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.102.
② Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.104.
③ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.99.
④ Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.106.
①Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol. Ⅰ, p.241.
①Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1966, vol.Ⅱ,p.122.
②Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1966, vol.Ⅱ, p.250-251.
① U.N. General Assembly Official Records,20th Session, Sixth Committee, p.57.
② U.N. General Assembly Official Records,22nd Session, Sixth Committee, pp.94-95.
③ U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 Ⅰ, pp.335 ff.
①Off. Rec.,1st sess.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at 336-343.
②Official Records, Summary Records,1st sess.and 2nd session,1969,21st meeting, p.177.
③《维也纳条约法公约》第56条(相当于最后条文草案第53条)包含两款规定,其第一款是最后条文草案第53条原有的规定,而第2款是由于英国代表团所提出的修正案而增入的。这个修正的结果,增加了单方解约或退出的可能性。
①A/CONF.39/Ⅱ/Add.I,pp.108ff.
①最近国际法院却在Nuclear Tests案与Aegean Sea Continental Shelf案中两度对这一问题避而不谈。
② Jennings, Robert. Recueil des cours(Ⅱ)[M]. Hague:Hachette,1967:565.
①Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
② Bardonnet, D.. La Denunciation par le Gouvernement Senegalais de la Convention sur la mer territoriale... [J]. Annuaire francais de droit international,1972, (18):123 ff.
① Greig, D. W.. International Law (2nd edn.) [M]. London:Butterworths Law,1976:498.
② United Nations Note CN.89 (1976) TRE1.
③ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
① Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2011, (21):1-30.
① Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein. The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2011:1254.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：465.
② Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:290-291; Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties [M]. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009:703.
③ Schwelb, Egon. The Law of Treaties and Human Rights[A]. In Reisman & Westort (eds.). Toward World Order and Human Dignity[C].1976:58-73; Weis. The Denunciation of Human Rights Treaties[J]. Humam Rights Journal,1975, (8):3-7.
④ McDougal, Myres. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law[M]. New York: Oxford University Press,1967:205.
⑤ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
① Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1266.
① UN Conference on International Organizations—Dcocuments, vol.Ⅶ, Commission Ⅰ—General Provisions (doc.1160,Ⅰ/2/76).
② Kelsen, H.. Du droit de se retirer de l'Organisation des Nations Unies[M]. Cambridge:RGDIP, 1948:5-19.
③在联合国成员国的唯一退出事例,即1965年印尼退出《联合国宪章》问题上,一些国家坚持认为印尼援引的退出理由并不属于旧金山宣言设定的“例外情况”的标准范围。
① Bardonnet, D.. La Denunciation par le Gouvernement Senegalais de la Convention sur la mer territoriale... [J]. Annuaire francais de droit international,1972, (18):151.
② Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.26:Continuity of obligations,08/12/97, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.8/Rev.1.
③ Giraud, E.. Report at the Institute of International Law[J]. YIIL, vol.49, book 1,1961:72.
① Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.1963,(39)：202ff.然而,也有学者认为,在这些情形下,不存在条约退出的一般权利。(Schachter, Development of International Law through the Legal Opinions of the U.N. Secretariat[J]. Year Book,1948, (25):125.)类似的有关世界卫生组织退出问题的各种观点在国际法委员会的条款草案的一个注释中做了阐释。(General Assembly Official Records, 21st Session, Annexes, Item 86, p.19)
② Schachter, O.. The development of international law through the legal opinions of the United Nations Secretariat[J]. BYBIL,1948:122-127.
③ Ago, R.. YILC,1966, (Ⅰ):47.
① Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56"[A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1269.
①1968年国际法委员会在整个第56条的草拟过程中,该条第1款第2项就经过单独投票,结果表明意见分歧依然存在：56票赞成对10票反对,13票弃权。随后,整个第56条以73票对2票,4票反对的投票结果得以通过。1969年在条约法公约草案最终定稿时,澳大利亚建议,针对该条各款项部分再进行一次单独投票的提议没有被采纳,整个第56条以95票对0票,6票弃权最终获得国际法委员会的通过(Official Records, Summary Records,2nd session,1969,21st meeting, p 110, para.8)。
② Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56"[A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1271.
① Rudolf, W.. "Modus Vivendi" [Z]. In R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International Law(vol.3)[M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1984:443.
② Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:511; Nolde, Baron. Droit et technique des traites de commerce [J]. RCADI,1924, (4):327.
③ Rudolf, W.. "Modus Vivendi" [Z]. In R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International Law (vol.3)[M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1984:443.
④ Fitzmaurice, G. The Second Report on the Law of Treaties [J]. YILC,1957, (Ⅱ):39; Waldock, H.. The Second Report on the Law of Treaties[J]. YILC,1963, (Ⅱ):71.
① Leca, J.. Les techniques de revision des conventions internationales [M]. Paris:LGDJ,1961: 113.
② Leca, J.. Les techniques de revision des conventions internationales [M]. Paris:LGDJ,1961: 112; Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
③《建立世界贸易组织协议》第15条。
④ A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers (1713-1748); Mowat, Select Treaties and Documents (1815-1916); Hertslet's Commercial Treaties.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
② Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Handbook of Commercial Treaties with Foreign Powers(4th edn.) [M]. London:H. M. Stationery off.,1931:47.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):71.
② Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
①I.C.J. Reports,1973, pp.14-16, paras.25-29.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):96.
③Waldock Ⅱ, A/CN.4/156, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1963, vol.2, pp.85f.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):98.
② Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56"[C]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traites, Commentaire article par article (vol.Ⅲ)[A]. Brussels: Bruylant,2007:2001-2006.
③ P.C.I.J., Series C, No. IS, p.227.
① Waldock, H.. The Second Report on the Law of Treaties, YILC,1963, vol.Ⅱ, p 69.
② Peaslee, Amos Jenkins. International Governmental Organizations[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff,1956:38.
③ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause[J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
④ Singh, N.. Termination of Membership of International Organizations[M]. London:Stevens & Sons,1958:80ff; Hoyt, E.. The Unanimity Rule in the Revision of Treaties[M]. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1959:161.
⑤至于多长的一段时间才称得上是合理的通知期,这取决于当时的环境、具体条约的主题以及该条约下每一缔约国的地位。
①Singh, N.. Termination of Membership of International Organizations[M]. London:Stevens & Sons,1958:80-81.
②饶戈平.国际组织法[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1996：257.
③ Schermers, H. & N. Blokker. International Institutional Law (3rd edn.) [M]. Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1995:85ff.
④ Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an international organization[J]. BYBIL,1963, (39): 215; Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause[J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):102.
⑤ Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L., 1963, (39):193.
①理兰德·古德里奇.联合国宪章(第3版)fMl.哥伦比亚：哥伦比亚大学出版社,1969：74-79.
② Livingstone, S.. Withdrawal from the United Nations — Indonesia[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly,1965, (14):637-645.
③苏联的这一观点似乎一般局限于创建国际组织的条约,尽管在磋商《禁止核试验条约》的过程中也曾被提起。
④在North Sea Continental Shelf案例中,国际法院法官的附带意见指出,还未成为国际公约成员方的一国不要轻易地被假定为应承担接受那些传统规则的义务,这可能是持该种解释观点的一股力量。因为人们不禁要问,如果各国有意认可退出权,那么为何这种权利却没有在条约本身得以确立呢?
③ Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations:The Indonesian Intermezzo[J]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1967, (61):661; Schermers, H. G. International Institutional Law[M]. Hague:Sijthoff & Noodhof,1980:49.
③ Stein, E. & D. Carreau. Law and Peaceful Change in a Subsystem:"Withdrawal" of France from the North Atlantic Treaty[J]. American Journal of International Law,1968, (62): 577-640.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause[J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):83-114.
① ICJ Reports 1980, pp 94-95, paras 47-49.
① Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade. Actualite et droit international, http:www.ridi. Org/adi/200002al.htm.
①YILC,1963,vol,Ⅰ.698th meeting,P101:para.24.
① Official Records, Summary Records,2nd session,1969,20th meeting, p 109, para.86.
② Akehurst, M. "Treaties, Termination" [Z]. In R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public Internatioal Law (vol.3) [M]. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1984:507; Dinh, Nguyen Quoc & A. Pellet. Droit international public(7th edn) [M]. Paris:LGD,2002:307.
③ Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011:1257.
④ Christakis, Theodore. "Article 56" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traites, Commentaire article par article (vol.Ⅲ)[C]. Brussels:Bruylant,2007:1961-1964.
① Klabbers, Jan. An Introduction to International Institutional Law[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002:95-96.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：421.
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
②王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：6.
③缔约方退出权的生效对于双边条约或多边条约的影响,最大区别在于：双边条约终止；而多边条约并不必然产生终止的效果,条约在其他缔约方间继续有效。
④1957年《有关商标注册用商品和服务国际分类的尼斯协定》第12条第3款；2006年《海事劳工公约》第9条第2款；等等。
⑤1973年《商标注册条约》第43条第3款；等等。
⑥1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第56条第1款；等等。
⑦ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010, (120):202-265.
⑧ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2010, (21):1-30.
① Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1578,1582.
② Tobin, H.The termination of multipartite treaties[M]. New York:Columbia University Press, 1933:200.
③ Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
④ Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1593.
⑤这些公约的第14条、第21条和第16条分别规定了退出权。另《欧洲人权公约》第58条以及《美洲人权公约》第78条也有类似的退出权规定。
① Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J].BYBIL,1983, (2):95.
① Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
② Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:290-291.
③李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社.2003：464.
④当条约含有关于终止的规定却未含单边退出条款时,总地说来,从该条约中退出被认为是不可能的。菲茨摩里斯在其关于条约法的第二份报告中强调说“当条约明文规定在固定期限内维持效力,这就暗示了在该期限内任何缔约方都不得解约或退出,除非通过共同同意’(YILC,1957, vol.Ⅱ, p 39).沃尔多克也在其关于条约法的第二份报告中多次重复该观点(参见YILC,1963, vol. Ⅱ, p 64)。这些学说似乎在该点上未经讨论却也取得了一致意见(又比如Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961: 512).
①王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：11-20.
① Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,66.
② Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2010:564.
①国际法院在1951年5月28日对《预防与惩罚灭种罪公约》保留案发表咨询意见时指出,这一风险对于那些禁止保留的条约是最严重的；但即使是明文或暗示允许保留的条约也只是规定特定的条款才许可保留或者保留须与条约的宗旨和目的相一致。
② Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice[M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:159-160; Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design[J]. Yale J. Int'L L.2006, (31):367,371-372.
① Sykes, Alan O.. Protectionism as a "Safeguard":A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations[J]. U. Chi. L. Rev.,1991, (58):255,256.
②王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：31-32.
① Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations:The Indonesian IntermezzofJ]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1967, (61):661; Weiler, Joseph H. H.. Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization:The Case of the European Economic Community [J]. Israel L.Rev., 1985(20):282-288; Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing No Denunciation Clause[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.1982, (53):83.
②这一立场的思想根源来自国际常设法院在1927年9月7日法国诉土耳其的“莲花号”轮船案中所作的重要论断：“法律规则对各国的约束力发源于这些国家自.己的自由意志……对各国的独立进行限制因而是不能被推定的。”Haraszti, Gyorgy. Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties [M]. Jozsef Decsenyi trans.. Budapest:Akademiai Kiado,1973:264.
③ Feinberg, N.. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization [J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):189,215-217; Franck,Thomas M., Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution? [A]. In Jochen Abr. Frowein(eds.). Negotiating for Peace [C]. Berlin:Springer,2003:95-96; Weiler, Joseph H. H.. Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization:The Case of the European Economic Community [J]. Israel L.Rev.,1985, (20):284-87.
① Brierly, J. L.. The Law of Nations:An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (6th edn.)[M]. Humphrey Waldock ed.. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1963:331; Oppenheim, L. International Law:A Treatise (8th edn.)[M]. H. Lauterpacht ed.. London:Longmans,1955: 938.
② Galligan, David M.. Wrapping up the UNCLOS Ⅲ "Package":At Long Last the Final Clauses [J]. Va. J, Int'l L,1980, (20):347,382; Haraszti, Gyorgy. Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties [M]. Jozsef Decsenyi trans.. Budapest:Akademiai Kiado,1973:268.
③ Evatt, Elizabeth. Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ICCPR:Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence? [J]. Austl. J. Hum. Rts.,1999, (5):215-217; Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations:The Indonesian Intermezzo[J]. Am. J. Int'l L., 1967, (61):666-671; Widdows, Kelvin. The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause [J]. BYBIL,1983, (2):99-102; Feinberg, N. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization[J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):204-211.
④当然,其他缔约国的反应也值得一提。在上述的几个国家退出联合国教科文组织后,美国就成功地在该组织的章程中引入一个修正案,授权单边退出。Feinberg, N. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization [J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):211.
④ Akehurst, Michael. Withdrawal from International Organisations[J]. Current Legal Prob.1979, (32):143,146-149; Feinberg, N. Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization [J]. Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.,1963, (39):205-211; Schwelb, Egon. Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian Intermezzo [J]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1967, (61):667-670.
①樊静.经济全球化趋势下的国家主权原则[J].法学杂志,2002,(6)：19-20.
②塞缪尔·巴金和布鲁斯·克洛林主张,对主权的阐释应该建立在“国家相互联系”的基础之上。他们特别关注“政治主权”(强调在主权权威和既定领土间明确的联系)和“民族主权”(强调主权权威和既定居民之间的联系)两者之间存在的历史性的冲突。转引子[英]约翰·霍夫曼.主权[M].陆彬译.长春：吉林人民出版社,2005：140-141.
③王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：11.
④ Nincic, Djura. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations[M]. Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1970:286.
① Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:351.
② Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise (8th edn.)[M]. H. Lauterpacht ed.. London: Longmans,1955:411.
③ Singh, N.. Termination of Membership of International Organizations[M]. London:Stevens & Sons,1958:85-86.
① Nincic, Djura. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations[M]. Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1970:286.
② Overstreet, A. V.. Sovereignty in the Constitution of Some International Organizations, A Comparative Study of Certain Aspects of the League of Nations, UNRRA and the UN[D]. Cambridge:Mass.,1948.
③ UNCIO doc.619.
①主权是一个极富争议性的词语。不仅仅是政治家们在讨论它,在学理的层面上它也常常引起人们的争议。问题的起因在于主权和国家的联系。为了把其定义为一个具有启发性而不是迷惑性的概念,主权应该同国家分离开来。参见[英]约翰·霍夫曼.主权[M].陆彬译.长春：吉林人民出版社,2005：1.
① Norman, George & Joel P. Trachtman. The Customary International Law Game[J]. Am. J. Int'L L.,2005, (99):541,544.
③ 1969 I.C.J. Rep., p.38.
④ Charney, Jonathan L. The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law[J]. Brit. Y. B. Int'L L.,1985, (56):1.
⑤有学者就认为,尽管条约制度已经比较全面了,但同时存在另一种国际习惯法制度的好处之一就是国际习惯法在应对变化的条件时更容易产生演变。Kontou, Nancy. The Termination and Revision of Treaties in Light of New Customary International Law[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994:69.
① Guzman, Andrew T.. Saving Customary International Law[J]. Mich. J. Int'L L.,2005, (27): 115-171.
② Scott, Gary L. & Craig L. Carr. Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary International Law[J]. Denv. J. Int'L L.& Pol'Y.,1996, (25):71; Weisburd, Arthur M.. Customary International Law:The Problem of Treaties[J]. Vand. J. Transnat'L L.,1988, (21): 1.
③有学者认为,“条约,尤其是多边条约,通常被作为国际习惯法的证据使用’'.Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner. The Limits of International Law[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2005：23；也有学者主张,“无论是多边条约还是双边条约都被频繁作为各国实践国际习惯法的证据引用”。Baxter, R. R.. Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law[J]. Brit. Y. B. Int'L L.,1965-1966, (41):275.
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④ Chitty, Joseph. Joseph Chitty on Vattel [M]. Philadelphia:T. & J.W. Johnson & Co.,1856:xv.
⑤ Baker, Sherston. First Steps in International Law[M]. Oxford:Gale, Making of Modern Law, 1899:16; Phillimore, Robert. Commentaries Upon International Law (3d ed.) [M]. Philadelphia:T. & J.W. Johnson & Co.,1879:39; Poison, Archer. Principles of the Law of Nations[M]. London:J. J. Griffin and Co.,1860:12.
⑥ Lang, Daniel G.. Foreign Policy in the Early Republic[M]. Baton Rouge, LA:Louisiana State University Press,1985:13-33; Fenwick, Charles G. The Authority of Vattel[J]. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.,1913, (7):395.
⑦ 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199(1796).
① 11U.S.(7Cranch)116(1812).
② The Santissima Trinidad,20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283,352-54 (1822)引用Schooner Exchange案来证明这一论断,即外国船舶从一国管辖范围的豁免“是建立在公共礼让与便利原则的基础上,并产生于各国的推定同意或许可。”而且“这样的同意与许可仅从各国的一般习惯法隐含出来并且可在任何时候退出,而无需承担责任”。
③ "default"含有“不履行义务、违约”等意思。但作者赞成使用"Derogation View"这一术语,因为‘"derogation"准确地表示了“背离,偏离(规则,行为准则)”的含义,这更符合国际习惯法的特征。另外,对于国际社会对国际习惯法的违反(或不履行)行为,Laurence R. Helfer和Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati分别在其论文中使用了"exiting"与"withdrawing"来表示对国际习惯法的“退出”。至于上升到一种权利,作者倾向于使用“背离权”,而不是“退出权”。Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Custom:Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2010, (21):65-80; Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010, (120):202-265. Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Custom:Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2010, (21):65-80.
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① Estreicher, Samuel. A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary Interntaional Law?: Some Cautionary Notes[J]. Duke J. Comp.& Int'L L.,2010, (21):57.
②Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru),1950 I.C.J. Rep.266,277-78 (Nov.20).
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⑧ International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law. Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law[M].2000:27. (www.ila-hq.org/pdf/customarylaw.pdf.)
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② Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner. The Limits of International Law[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2005:3.
③ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010 (120):202-265.
④ Guzman, Andrew T.. Saving Customary International Law[J]. Mich. J. Int'L L.,2005, (27): 115-171.
⑤ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010 (120):202-265.
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② Ochoa, Christiana. Disintegrating Customary International Law. Reactions to Withdrawing from International Custom[J]. Duke J. Comp.& Int'L L.,2010, (21):157-159.
③ U.C.C., §2-309(3) (1977).
④ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties [J]. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,2011, (21):1-30.
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①各缔约国对条约义务非常隐秘地予以违反的行为必须与“聒噪的”违约行为区分开来,在后一种情况下缔约方利用一种不履约策略来促使进行条约修订或改革。然而,该策略付出的代价极有可能比退出与威胁退出的要高,因为涉及对条约的公然违反行为,往往会触发一系列的制裁,包括受到不利影响的缔约伙伴的对等的不履约行动。
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①协调博弈的命名来自一个通常的例子。一对夫妇希望共同渡过一晚,但是两者却倾向于不同的娱乐方式,比如一个想去看电影,而另一个则希望去欣赏歌剧。Hasenclever, Andreas. Theories of International Regimes [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1997:47.
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②国际社会现实中,各国有时永久性地退出条约,而有时却在几年后就重新恢复了成员资格。
③ Helfer, Laurence R... Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.
④因此,当面对这些压力时,一国是否选择退出不能孤立地进行分析。比如,若条约许可保留或授权背离(当情势重大变更时)的话,退出也许就不会如此频繁了。
⑤若缔约方可在任何时点基于任何理由就可自由退出一种条约关系的话,他们就会显得对条约信赖不够——也即不会用更有效的方式去信赖条约关系的永久性。Swaine, Edward T. Unsigning[J]. Stan. L. Rev.,2003,(55):2074.
⑥ Paul Stephan一针见血地提出质问：“人们怎样才能将一国按照国际法原则声称有权从一
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③这里巧合的是,表示条约“解约”意思的"denounce"有时也被学者译为“废除”。
① Laurence R. Helfer认为,退出行为的合法性有两种例外情况：(1)退出明确禁止退出的条约或不含退出条款的条约；(2)退出与国际习惯法重叠的条约。(Helfer, Laurence R.. Exiting Treaties[J]. Virginia Law Review,2005, (91):1579-1648.)本文不太赞同该观点。对于第一种情形,既然条约禁止退出,而缔约方又想解除条约义务,在这种场合下,就只能违约了,并不是本文所称的退出行为。而条约不含退出条款,并不能说此类条约就不能退出,对此维也纳公约第56条有明确规定。至于第二种情形,也不能一概而论。有些条约,尽管可能会与国际习惯法重叠,但是只要此类条约含有明文退出条款,仍然是可以退出的——只是退出后仍受有关国际习惯法的约束。更何况鉴于国际习惯法的模糊性与各种学说的不统一,国际习惯法在某些情况下也是可背离的。关于这点,上文已经讨论过。
②《维也纳条约法公约》第60条规定了当多边条约当事国有重大违约时,终止或暂停施行该条约的条件。
③ Bradley, Curtis A. & Mitu Gulati. Withdrawing from International Custom [J]. Yale Law Journal,2010, (120):202-265.
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③2007年4月,“美洲玻利瓦尔替代计划(ALBA)”的成员国,即玻利维亚、委内瑞拉、尼加拉瓜和古巴宣称将退出国际货币基金组织和世界银行。
①余劲松.国际投资条约仲裁中投资者与东道国权益保护平衡问题研究[J].中国法学,2011(2)：132-143.
②ICSID in crisis:Straight-jacket or investment protection?[EB/OL]. http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564878.2011-12-10.
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④南美国家联盟(UNASUR)是试图融合《安第斯共同体条约》与南锥共同市场的区域性的多边组织。http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com.2011-12-13.
① http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/10/16/en_pol_esp_for-the-tsj,-all-ca 16A2073343.shtml.2012-01-13
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③ Morales在总统就职演说中就明确表示“没错,玻利维亚需要合作伙伴,但并非我们自然资源的所有者……我们确保外国公司收回其投资的权利,还有些许盈利的权利；但我们仅仅希望我国人民能从这些资源中获益”。Pinto, Lindsay Sykes. Resolving the Bolivian Gas Crisis:Lessons from Bolivia's Brush with International Arbitration [J]. Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.,2007, (39):947-951.
①条约退出其实也可称得上是一种广义的条约终止,但终止的效果只是发生在退出方与其他缔约方之间,对于整个条约并非产生真正意义上的终止。
② Mcnair, Arnold Duncan. The Law of Treaties[M]. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961:510.
③联合国条约部门的法律事务办公室将条约的最后条款解释为“通常出现在条约末尾且包含诸如争端解决、条约的修正与修订、缔约国名单、条约签字、批准、加入、生效、退出与终止、保留、保管机关指定以及作准文本等内容”的条款。U. N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Handbook, at 57, U.N. Sales No. E.02.V.2 (2001).
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/107,19.
① IYbk. I.L.C.1980:21.
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④S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),1927 P. C. I. J. (ser. A) No.10, at 18 (Sept.7).
⑤一般而言,国际习惯法对于新国家而言,不管其同意与否都能产生约束效力,而对于已存的国家,约束力只需建立在这些国家保持沉默的基础上。强行法规范则更不需要各国的同意。
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①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：433-437.
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①33 UNTS, pp.197-223.
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⑤ Bederman教授在讨论维也纳公约第62条时解释说：维也纳公约规定的情势重大变更原则不能被作为终止或退出条约的一个理由来援引,除非主张的情况变化(1)是缔约方同意的一个重要基础……；(2)在条约磋商时不可预见；(3)彻底改变了缔约方的义务.(4) 并非是主张该原则的缔约国的违约结果；与(5)不会影响一国国界的确立。Bederman, David J.. The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations[J]. Am. J. Int'l L.,1988, (82):1,28.
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②1966 ILC Reports,P.84.
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③ U.N. Div. of Immunities and Treaties, Legal Dep't, Handbook of Final Clauses, at v, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/1 (1951); U.N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook of Final Clauses, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/6 (1957); U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook, at 109, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003) at vi.; The Treaty Maker's Handbook (Hans Blix & Jirina H. Emerson eds.,1973).
④ Com. of Ministers, Council of Europe, Model Final Clauses for Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe (Feb.1980), at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ Treaties/Html/ClausesFinales.htm.
⑤ Possible Improvements in the Standard-setting Activities of the ILO, at 2,7-10, ILO Doc. GB.286/LILS/1/2 (Mar.2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ gb/docs/gb286/pdf/lils-1-2.pdf.
① U.N. Div. of Immunities and Treaties, Legal Dep't, Handbook of Final Clauses, at v, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/1 (1951), at 119-36; U.N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook of Final Clauses, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/6 (1957), at 59-73; Com. of Ministers, Council of Europe, Model Final Clauses for Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe (Feb.1980),at art. f; U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook, at 109, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003), at 109-111.
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②出自唐朝元稹诗句“有迎新送故之困,朝令夕改之烦,自非有为而为。”摘自《授马总检校刑部尚书天平军节度使制》。
③饶戈平.国际组织法[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1996：77.
①如2006年《海事劳工公约》第9条第2款规定,在本条第1款所述10年期满后的1年内未行使本条所规定之退出权利的成员国,即需再遵守10年,此后每当新的10年期满,可依本条的规定退出本公约。
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：421-422.
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,21-22.
①早在1935年,哈佛条约法研究小组就已发现“允许退出的条约一致要求退出条约的缔约方通知其退出的意图”。AJIL Suppl.1935(29):1179.
①Comments by Paul Reuter in(1982),Ⅰ YbK.I.L.C.153.
②Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock,UN Doc.A/CN.4/156,89.
① Comments by Paul Reuter in (1980) Ⅰ Ybk. I.L.C.21.
②塞内加尔(Off. Rec.,1st session,60th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,349)与印度的发言(Off. Rec.,2nd session,25th Plenary Meeting,134)。
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,31; 66.
④ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156,89.
⑤沃尔多克在维也纳会议上所作的解释(Off. Rec.,1 st session,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,441).
①日本(Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,403)与利比里亚的陈述(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,412).
② (1966) Ⅰ Ybk. I.L. C.158.
③ (1966) Ⅱ Ybk. I.L.C.255.
④瑞士国(Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,404);德意志联邦共和国(ibid,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,409);英国(ibid,71st meeting of the Committee of the Whole,420);芬兰(ibid.,423)与爱尔兰的发言(ibid.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,440).
① Cosnard, Michel. "Article 65" [A]. In Corten, O. & Klein, P. (eds). Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traites-Commentaire Article par Article[C]. Brussels:Bruylant,2006, p.2378.
② Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107,32.
③ Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/115 and Corr.1,29.
④比如乌拉圭提议的修正案规定,主张将实质性违约作为终止条约理由之一的缔约方可单方面全部或部分暂停施行该条约(A/CONF.39/C.1/L.343)。
⑤ (1982)ⅡYbk. I.L.C.63.
⑥授权即时的暂停施行条约的唯一情形似乎只有维也纳公约第60条第2款第1项才予以了规定,即多边条约当事国得重大违约情事可使其他当事国有权以“一致协议”全部或局部暂停施行该条约,无须“援引”暂停施行或终止条约的理由。
① North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep.3 para.71.
②在Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta)一案中([1985] ICJ Rep.13 para.27),国际法院认为,1982年《联合国海洋法公约》在国际习惯法的发展方面起到了非常重要的作用,“因为该公约被压倒性多数的国家所接受”
③然而,这些国家中的一部分已经宣称他们视《维也纳条约法公约》——至少对于其大部分的条款——反映了国际习惯法。如布什政府时期国务卿William Rogers在1971年向美国参议院作的报告中声称“尽管仍未生效,但《维也纳条约法公约》已经普遍被承认为当今条约法与实践的权威指南”。
④North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep.3 para.74.
⑤如美国于2001年首先提出终止1972年《反弹道导弹条约》,随后俄罗斯赞同美国的退出行为。当2002年5月24日两国于莫斯科通过新的《削减战略性进攻武器条约》后,条约退出得以最终生效。Rein Mullerson.'The ABM Treaty:Changed Circumstances, Extraordinary Events, Supreme Interests and International Law'(2001) 50 I.C.L.Q.509.
⑥在Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia)案中,国际法院发现匈牙利的终止条约行为提前生效了,因为终止发生在匈牙利遭受任何损失前,并且终止须在通知后六天才可生效。supra note 26 para.109.
⑦美国国务卿Condoleezza Rice在寄交给联合国秘书长Kofi Annan的一封信表示,美国退出《领事关系维也纳公约任择议定书》立即生效。该信写道：“此信构成美国立即退出该议定书的通知。作为该项退出的结果,美国将不再承认该项议定书所反映的国际法院管辖权”。Quigley, John.'The United States'Withdrawal From International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in Consular Cases:Reasons and Consequences'[J]. Duke J. Comp.& Int'l L., 2009, (19):263.
① WTO, Korea-Measures Affecting Government Procurement (1 May 2000) WT/DS163/R para. 7.120-126.
② Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(2nd edn.) [M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:10-22.
③ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156,39-89.
④ Commentary to draft article 62, ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Y.I.L.C. (Ⅱ) 1966:262.
① Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Operations In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility [1984] ICJ Rep.392 para.63.
② Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep.7 para.109.
③ Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR 1-3655 para.59.
④1997年12月4日Jacobs总检察长发表的意见。Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655 para.96.
① Y.I.L.C. (Ⅰ),1966:158.
② Chayes, Abram. An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements[J]. Harv. L. Rev.,1972,(85)：905,957-58.如1997年《禁止使用、储存、生产和转让杀伤人员地雷及销毁此种武器的公约》第20条“期限和退出”承认“每一缔约国为行使国家主权,有权退出本公约”,但要求退出国在“退出书中应对引起退约的理由做出充分说明”。(Sept.18, 1997,2056 U.N.T.S.211.)
③如1972年5月26日美苏《限制反弹道导弹系统条约》(23 U.S.T.3435)第XV条认可退出权,若每一缔约国“倘断定本条约事项有关之非常事件危害其本国最高权益”,并要求向对方国通知“自己认为非常事件已危害其本国最高权益”。然而,问题是,该事件是否为“非常事件”,它们是否与“条约主题相关”,以及它们是否“已经危害该国最高权益”都唯一地取决于退出方的单方决定。Chayes, Abram. An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements[J]. Harv. L. Rev.,1972, (85):957-958.
④国际劳工组织理事会全体一致通过一项决议,要求已退出一国际劳工组织公约的国家提供‘导致其退出决定的理由指示”。Widdows, Kelvin. The Denunciation of International Labour Conventions[J]. Int'l & Comp. L.Q.,1984, (33):1052,1055.
① Abram Chayes解释说,单边退出武器控制条约的理由都“无一例外地被指为退出方的单边决定”。Chayes, Abram. An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements[J]. Harv. L. Rev.,1972, (85):905,957-58.
② UN Docs. S/25405; S/25515; S/RES/825(1993).
①如《国际复兴开发银行协定》第6条第1节和《国际货币基金协定》第26条第1节规定,任何退出会员国得随时以书面通知退出,接到该项通知之日起,退出即应生效。退出的及时生效能维护各成员国的经济独立性。但在大多数情况下,退出国和该国际组织是以协议的方式达成一致意见的。另外,《联合国海洋法公约》附件9也规定“当—国际组织的成员国无意为缔约国时或该国际组织不再具备海洋法公约附件9第1条所指的资格时,应退出公约,这种退出应立即生效。”
② Stein, Arthur A.. Coordination and Collaboration:Regimes in an Anarchic World[A]. In Stephen D. Krasner (ed.). International Regimes [C]. Cornell:Cornell University Press,1983: 130-156.
①如《世界气象组织章程》第29条；《非洲统一组织章程》第32条规定。
②《国际劳工组织章程》第1条第5款和《美洲国家组织章程》第148条都规定了两年。
③此类条约一般是在1969年《维也纳条约法公约》通过前签订的。如1958年《国际咖啡协定》第65条规定,退出在九十天后生效。1965年ICSID公约第71条规定,退出自收到通知六个月后开始生效。1968年《禁止核扩散条约》第10条规定,退出国应在退出前三个月将此事通知所有其他缔约国和联合国安全理事会。
④《联合国工业发展组织章程》第6条规定,在向联合国秘书长交存退出通知书以后的财政年度的最后一天生效,以留出足够的时间使该组织能调整其预算。
① Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009:704.
②1949年四个日内瓦公约都在第63条规定,退出通常在通知后一年生效。除此规定外,以《改善战地武装伤病员待遇日内瓦公约》第63条为例,该条继续规定,当退出通知是“在退出国仍卷入武装冲突时做出,退出须等到和平协议签署以及关涉本公约保护人员的释放与遣返行动终结后才可生效。”6 U.S.T. at 3152,75 U.N.T.S. at 68.
① Combacau, Jean. Le droit des traites[M]. Paris:PUF,1991:117.
② Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S),1984 I.C. J.63 (Nov.26).
① Rosenne, Shabtai. Breach of Treaty[M]. Cambridge:Grotius,1985:117-125; Moore, John Norton. Enhancing Compliance with International Law:A Neglected Remedy[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999,(39):881.
②在合作博弈中限制退出以增强合作的作用也有助于解释为何国际法学者一直以来强调多边条约隐含禁止退出的意思。
③ Sandler, Todd. Global Challenges:An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1997:30-32; Setear, John K... Ozone, Iteration, and International Law[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999, (40):193-200.
①对于臭氧层问题,国际制度采取一个主要公约与后来一系列议定书与修正书的形式反复强调其重要性。各国通过批准这些名称与效力等级不一的条约来显示遵守具体层次条约义务的决心,从而促进该项主题方面更持久的国际合作与更高的履约水平。Setear, John K., Ozone, Iteration, and International Law[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999,(40):203-226.
② Setear, John K.. Ozone, Iteration, and International Law[J]. Va. J. Int'l L.,1999, (40):223.
① Chayes, Abram & Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1995:28.
② Ratner, Steven R.. Think Again:Geneva Conventions [J]. Foreign Policy,2008, (165):26; Roberts, Adam. Geneva Conventions Sixty Years On:Changing War, Changing Law[J]. The World Today,2009, (65):6.
①YILC,1966, vol. Ⅱ, p 236.
②Fourth Report, A/CN.4/177 and Add.1 and 2, YILC,1965, vol. Ⅱ, p 65.
③李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：286.
①郑曦林,桂宾.论条约法上的单方解约或退出权——兼评《核不扩散条约》的退出条款[J].法学评论,1995(1)：25.
② Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,1996 I.C.J 226,267 (July 8) (advisory opinion); Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2009:769.
③ Guzman提出的“后来反对者原则”是针对“持久(先前)反对者原则”而提出的。
④ Villiger, Mark E.. Customary International Law and Treaties (2nd edn.)[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1997:36.
⑤ Guzman, Andrew T.. Saving Customary International Law[J]. Mich. J. Int'L L.,2005, (27): 115-169.
① Aaken, Anne Van. International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility:A Contract Theory Analysis[J]. J. Int'L Econ. L.2009, (12):507,527.
① Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S),1984 I.C. J.392 (Nov.26).
② Raustiala, Kal. Form and Substance in International Agreements [J]. Am. J. Int'L L.2005, (99): 581.
③ Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn.)[M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:162.
①王震宇.条约退出机制的若干问题[D].北京：北京大学,2004：4.
① Henkin, Louis. International Law:Politics and Values [M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff,1995: 12.
②Evatt, Elizabeth. Democratic Republic of Korea and the ICCPR:Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defense[J]. Australian J. Hum. Rts.,1999, (5):215,219-220.
① General Comment No.26, at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/06b6d70077b4df2c 8025655400387939?Opendocument.
② U. N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No.26:Continuity of Obligations, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1, para.1-5 (Dec.8,1997).
③就连许多联合国的专门人权条约也包含了许可退出并对退出的影响进行明确规定的明示退出权条款,如《反酷刑公约》第31条,《消除种族歧视公约》第21条以及《儿童权利公约》第52条等。
① A/AC. I05/C.2/SR.69, A/AC.105/35.
② A/AC.105/21/Add.2.
③ Pictet, Jean. Les Conventions de Geneve de 1949 (I.C.R.C.) [M]. Geneva:Comite intrnationale de la Croix-Rouge,1952:48.
④ Fenwick, C. G. The Denunciation of the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles[J]. AJIL,1935, (218):676.
⑤国际法委员会《国际不法行为国家责任条款》第4-11条。
⑥国际法委员会《国际不法行为国家责任条款》第50条与第51条。
①李双元,李赞.21世纪法学大视野——国际经济一体化进程中的国内法与国际规则[M].长沙：湖南人民出版社,2006：112.
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③ Oppenheim, L.. International Law:A Treatise[M]. London:Longmans, Green. & Co.,1905:18.
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①《维也纳条约法公约》第70条第2款规定,倘一国解约或退出多边条约,自解约或退出生效之日起,在该国与条约每一其他当事国之关系上(甲)解除当事国继续履行条约之义务。
②《维也纳条约法公约》第70条第2款又规定,倘一国解约或退出多边条约,自解约或退出生效之日起,在该国与条约每一其他当事国之关系上(乙)不影响当事国在条约终止前经由实施条约而产生之任何权利、义务或法律情势。
①Y.I.L.C.,1964,(Ⅱ):46.
④李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：303.
① Wilson, Richard J. & Jan Perlin. The Inter-American Human Rights System:Activities from Late 2000 Through October 2002[J]. Am. U. Int'L L. Rev.,2003, (18):651,688-689; Concepcion, Natasha Parassram. The Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago's Withdrawal From the American Convention on Human Rights[J]. Am. U. Int'L L. Rev.,2001,(16):847, 872-873.
② Roodal v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 12.342, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.89/01, OEA/Ser. L./Ⅴ/Ⅱ.114, doc.5 rev.4 (2001) [EB/OL]. http://cidh.org/annualrep/2001eng/ TT12342.htm.
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② Report No.3/87, Case No 9647, Jay Pinkerton and James Terry Roach, Inter-Am Comm. H.R., para.54(1987).
③[美]凯尔森.国际法原理[M].王铁崖译.北京：华夏出版社,1989：347-348.
④李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：246-249.
⑤日内瓦公约Ⅰ第63条；日内瓦公约Ⅱ第62条；日内瓦公约Ⅲ第142条；与日内瓦公Ⅳ第158条。
① Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein. The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2011:1032-1033.
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② Koh, Harold Hongju. The 1998 Frankel Lecture:Bringing International Law Home [J]. Hous. L. Rev.,1998, (35):623,641.
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④这里排除了与同一制度下的最新或修订过条约的批准有正式或非正式联系的退出。这些退出本质上是非常合作的,并未标志着避免与其他国家进行多边交往的意图。
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① Sanger, David E.. Threats Shadow Talks on Nuclear Arms:Iran and North Korea[N]. N.Y. Times, 2005-5-1(A 1).
② Veugelers, Reinhilde. Reputation as a Mechanism Alleviating Opportunistic Host Government Behavior Against MNEs[J]. J. Indus. Econ.1,1993, (41):1; Lake, David A.. Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations [J]. Int'l Org.,1996, (50):1,14.
③ 2004 Model BIT art.22, at 22-23[EB/OL]. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710. pdf,2012-2-25.
④ Release, Press. U.S. Dep't of State, Top U.S. Official Calls on U.N. To Act To Curb Proliferation (Sept.26,2003) [EB/OL]. http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html? p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=September&x=20030926170536alretnuh0.8621027&t=xarc hives/xarchitem.html,2011-12-6.
① Thranert, Oliver. The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:Perspectives in Advance of the 2005 Review Conference, SWP Research Paper (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany), Aug.2004, at 27 n.52,28-29[EB/OL]. http://www.swpberlin. org/common/get_document.php?id=1062,2011-12-18.
② Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making\M\. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:160.
③ Morrison, Richard. Efficient Breach of International Agreements[J]. Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 1994,(23):189.
④ Steinberg, Richard H.. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. Int'l Org.,2002, (56):360.
① Kirgis, Frederic L.. President Bush's Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, ASIL Insight (Mar.9,2005) [EB/OL]. http://www.asil.org/insights/ 2005/03/insights050309.html,2011-12-1.
① Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Mar.10,2005) [EB/OL]. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/43225.htm,2012-1-23.
①如玻利维亚与阿根廷、比利时、德国、秘鲁、乌拉圭等的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与阿根廷、加拿大、哥斯达黎加、英国等的双边投资保护条约。
②如玻利维亚与意大利、西班牙、瑞士等的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与罗马尼亚、西班牙、委内瑞拉等的双边投资保护条约。
③如玻利维亚与韩国双边投资保护条约。
① Garibaldi, O. M.. On the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction, and the Limits of the Contract Analogy[A]. In C. Binder (eds.). International Investment Law for the 21st century:essays in honour of Christoph Schreuer[C]. Oxford:OUP,2009, pp. 262-278; Nolan, M. D. & F. Sourgens. The Interplay between State Consent to ICSID Arbitration and Denunciation of the Convention:The (Possible) Venezuela Case Study[J]. Transnational Dispute Management,2007, (9):15-45.; Tietje, C.. Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID[J]. Transnational Dispute Management,2009, (6): 8-28.
②chnabl, E. & J. Bedard. The Wrong Kind of Interesting[J]. The National Law Journal,2007, (7): 51-65; Schreuer, Christoph. Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration[A]. In Michael Waibel & Asha Kaushal (eds.). The Backlash against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and Reality[C]. Kluwer:Kluwer Law International,2010, pp.353-368.
⑥遗憾的是,应申请人要求,该案仲裁程序已于2009年10月21日中断。
① Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/8,于2010年4月12日在ICSID登记。
②如玻利维亚与智利、厄瓜多尔、法国、英国、美国、委内瑞拉等国的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与玻利维亚、德国、秘鲁、瑞典等国的双边投资保护条约。
③ Gaillard, Emmanuel. Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored-Nation Clause[J]. New York Law Journal,2005, (105):1-4.
①http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc_en-archive/ICSID_English.pdf.
① AAPL v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (Jun.27,1990), paras.2-4.
② Ch. Schreuer认为,在东道国做出退出通知前,投资争端双方受中心管辖的同意必须“达成(perfected) "。 (Schreuer, Ch.. The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M]. Cambridge Cambridge University Press,2001:1286.)
③ Gaillard, Emmanuel. The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention[J]. New York Law Journal, 2007,(237):122-145.
④ Rosenn, Keith. The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America[R]. Miami:University of Miami School of Law,2009:1-35.
① Documents concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention, Memorandum of the Meeting of the Whole, Feb.25,1965, Vol.Ⅱ, Part 2, ICSID Publications,1968, pp.1010-1011.
①如玻利维亚与中国、古巴、瑞典等国的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与中国、瑞士等国的双边投资保护条约。
②如玻利维亚与智利的双边投资保护条约；厄瓜多尔与法国、德国、秘鲁和英国的双边投资保护条约。
① Vuylsteke, Charles. Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration[J]. Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.,1974, (4):343-345.
① Aust, Anthony. Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn.) [M]. Cambridge:CUP,2007:300; Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Fifteenth Session (6 May-12 July 1963) UN Doc. A/CN.4/163,215.
②'Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole'United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties-First Session (Vienna 26 March-24 May 1968) UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11,472-73.
③ ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966) Ⅱ Ybk. I. L.C.236.
④ Y.I. L.C.,1963, (Ⅱ):214.
⑤ Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156,88.
① Kohen, Marcelo G. "Article 45" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011, p.1065.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：486.
③ Waldock, Humphrey. "Commentary to article 4:'Loss of a Right to Avoid or Denounce a Treaty through Waiver or Preclusion'" in Second Report on the Law of Treaties[J]. YILC,1963, (Ⅱ): 39.
① Official Records, Summary Records,1st and 2nd sessions,1966, vol. I, p 103.
② Official Records, Summary Records,1st and 2nd sessions,1966, vol. I, p 105.
③ Kohen, Marcelo G. "Article 45" [A]. In Corten, Olivier & Pierre Klein (eds.). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:A Commentary[C]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.1079-1084.
① Official Records, Summary Records,1st session,1963, p.239.
② Rosenne, Shabtai. Developments in the Law of Treaties (1945-1986)[M]. Cambridge:CUP, 1989:304.
③Rosenne, Shabtai.'The Settlement of Treaty Disputes under the Vienna Convention of 1969'[J]. Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht,1971, (31):1,2-3.
① Y. I. L.C.,1966, (Ⅱ):262-263.
② Off. Rec.,1st sess.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at 441.
③ Gabon (Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,405);土耳其(ibid.,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,412);黎巴嫩(ibid.,71 th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,418);与锡兰的意见(ibid.,419).
④日本(Off. Rec.,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,402);瑞典(ibid., 69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,407);英国(ibid.,71th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,421)以及由中非共和国发起的十三国提议案(ibid.,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,405),
⑤美国的提案(Off. Rec,1st session,68th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,406)。
①如波兰(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,411);苏联(ibid.,412)；捷克斯洛伐克(ibid.,70th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,415);保加利亚(ibid.,71st meeting of the Committee of the Whole,423);白俄罗斯(ibid.,73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,434);马来西亚(2nd session,24th Plenary Meeting,140);与匈牙利的声明等(ibid.,147).
②乌克兰(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,411);印度(ibid., 73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,435);与摩洛哥的声明(2nd session,24th Plenary Meeting,151).
③中非共和国(Off. Rec.,1st session,69th meeting of the Committee of the Whole,410-11);利比里亚(ibid.,412);坦桑尼亚(ibid.,72nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,430);与肯尼亚的报告(ibid.,431-432)。
④ Off. Rec.,1st sess.,74th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at 402-415,418-425,429-441.
①Official Records,Summary Records,2nd.session,1969,21st meeting,p.193.
②Y.I.L.C.,1980,(Ⅱ):85.
①李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：305.
① Sinclair, Ian. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(2nd edn.) [M]. Manchester: Manchester University Press,1984:141-142.
②李浩培.条约法概论[M].北京：法律出版社,2003：476-480.
① Cosnard, Michel. "Article 65"[A]. In Corten, O. & Klein, P. (eds.). Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traites-Commentaire Article par Article[C]. Brussels:Bruylant,2006, pp. 2382-2383.
②Off. Rec.,1st session,73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,438.
③ Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/183 and Add.1-4,46-8.
④丹麦的评论(Off. Rec.,1st session,73rd meeting of the Committee of the Whole,433)。
①本宪章应无限期有效,但任何会员国得以书面通知向泛美联盟声明退出；联盟应将接到的每一退出通知书转知所有其他会员国。
②本协定有效期五年,除非一方在协定失效前六个月以书面形式宣布废止本协定,本协定有效期自动以一年为单位逐年延长。
① Villiger, Mark E.. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[M]. Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2010:873-874.
②譬如,美洲人权委员会仍在继续接纳宣称受1999年5月26日(即特立尼达和多巴哥国退出条约行为生效的日期)前所发生的违反《美洲人权公约》行为损害的请愿书。Ramlogan v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case 12.355, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No.48/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/Ⅱ.117, doc.5 at 426 (2002) [EB/OL]. http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/ TT.12355.htm,2011-11-5.
③ Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, Int'L Ct. of Justice [EB/OL]. http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3,2012-8-9.
①条约内制裁与对等的不遵守条约行为同样地会产生集体行动问题。但是这些问题在条约外制裁的情形下变得更加严重,因为该种制裁缺乏任何制度与规则来确定制裁的必要性与合法性、制裁的类型与大小以及实施制裁的机制。(Chayes, Abram & Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty:Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1995:63-67.)
① Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:73.
② Belcher, Emma. Electing the Path Ahead[J]. Fletcher F. WorldAff.,2004, (28):29-39.
① Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:160-172.
②美国威胁将减少捕鱼权或者限制鱼类进口在最初阻碍了非成员国的商业捕鲸行为,但是随着时间的推移这些威胁变得不再那么奏效。冰岛已经退出了《禁止捕鲸国际公约》,挪威建议商业捕鲸,日本和俄罗斯则威胁称将付诸这两项行动。DeSombre, Elizabeth R.. Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy:Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power [M]. Cambridge:The MIT Press,2000:208-213; Mitchell, Ronald B. & Patricia M. Keilbach. Situation Structure and'Institutional Design:Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange[J], Int'l Org.,2001, (55):891-908.
③ Barrett, Scott. Environment and Statecraft:The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2003:69-71; Charnovitz, Steve. Encouraging Environmental Cooperation Through the Pelly Amendment[J]. J. Env't & Dev.,1994, (3): 3-19.
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