利益集团与美国汇率政策调整
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摘要
作为开放条件下的宏观经济政策的重要组成部分，汇率政策原本是国际经济学研究的重要课题。但这些研究未能考虑到政治因素的重要性，因而存在着严重缺陷。事实上，汇率政策本质上是一种收入再分配政策：一方面，它在国内不同利益集团之间产生“收入再分配”效应。面对利益格局的变化，“赢家”和“输家”会动员其经济和政治资源，以寻求对决策当局的汇率政策施加影响，直至达到新的利益平衡。另一方面，一国特别是大国的汇率政策会产生重要的“外溢效果”，从而在国内外不同利益集团之间产生“收入再分配”效应。与之相关的“赢家”和“输家”也会为谋求自身利益的最大化做出努力。可见，汇率政策既是一个经济问题，又是一个政治问题；不仅是一个政治经济学问题，更是一个国际政治经济学问题。
依循这一思路，本文从利益集团的角度，运用理论分析与实证分析相结合、逻辑分析与历史分析相结合、整体分析与案例分析相结合的研究方法，研究布雷顿森林体系以来的美国汇率政策调整，考察的对象包括美国汇率政策的决策机制及特征、美国汇率政策制定与调整中所涉及的利益集团、布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策的调整、后布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团行为与美国汇率政策的调整、利益集团的活动与美国对华汇率外交。本文的根本目的旨在解决三个方面的问题：第一，思考美国汇率政策的决策机制、决策过程的政治经济特征及政策调整的逻辑；第二，思考美国的货币政治和汇率外交；第三，思考美国汇率政策的外溢效果及外围国家的应对策略。
除“导论”外，论文共分为6章。第1章“美国汇率政策的决策机制及特征”，首先利用政治学理论中的结构—功能论和系统论的方法，用“初始条件”、“政策输入”、“政策决策”、“政策输出”、“政治体制”、“国际政治经济格局”六要素，刻画出政府政策制定与决策过程的一般框架。在此基础上，从制度化程度和分权化程度两个方面将美国政治体制的性质简洁地概括为“依托制度代理关系的权力共享”。论文随后给出了美国汇率政策决策过程的政治经济特征：作为立法机构的国会对政府的汇率政策拥有监督权；作为行政机构的财政部与作为独立部门的美联储之间的非对称合作是美国汇率政策决策的最重要的组织动力；作为美国政治经济生活的重要构成，国内多元化经济利益集团对政府汇率政策的影响力正日益凸显；美国政府也面临着来自外国政府和私人经济利益集团的逐渐增长的外部约束。最后，本章总结了美国汇率政策调整的逻辑：首先，作为立法机构的国会选择逼迫（或压迫）财政部和美联储调整汇率政策的时机，主要取决于国会议员所面临的来自国内外不同类型利益集团的压力大小。其次，汇率政策的决策者采取的是一种“双层博弈”策略，即要兼顾到国内和国外两个层次的利益诉求，既不能忽视国内利益集团的诉求，又要考虑国外利益集团的态度。再次，利益集团是否有意愿、有能力推进决策者的汇率政策调整，以及在多大程度上促成该调整朝向其所期望的方向和目标，是多种因素的函数。
第2章“美国汇率政策制定与调整中的利益集团”，首先回顾了前人对利益集团的理解，并据此给出自己的定义：由对共同利益有着明确认知和诉求的成员所组成的，并以增进其成员的共同利益为动机或目的的组织或实体。随后，论文梳理了利益集团理论的演进脉络。在此基础上，论文分析了与美国汇率政策密切相关的利益集团及其汇率政策偏好，并就利益集团围绕汇率政策存在的集体行动困境展开分析。最后，运用翔实的数据分析了利益集团赖以影响美国政府汇率政策的资源和策略。
第3章“布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策调整”，首先考察了布雷顿森林体系初创期内“沉默的”美国利益集团，指出这一“沉默”现象源于五个方面的原因：国际货币政策领域的专业性；国际货币政策决策场所的隔绝性；政府舆论宣传的导向性；集体行动的困境；美国经济的相对封闭性。其次，论文考察了1963-1968年间国内外不同利益集团围绕美国的利息平衡税（IET）、自愿对外信贷限制计划（VFCR）、对外直接投资计划（FDIP）所开展的利益集团政治。最后，分析了1968-1973年间国内外利益集团的行为与尼克松治下的美国汇率政策调整。
第4章“后布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策”，首先考察了第一轮强势美元政策给美国国内相关利益集团带来的强烈冲击，以及这些利益集团为此展开的密集游说。随后，研究了第二轮强势美元政策推行期间美国国内利益集团的集体“失声”现象。此外，论文分析了美国金融部门利益集团在后布雷顿森林体系下对美国汇率政策的“悄然影响”。最后，对外国利益集团在美国汇率政策调整中的作为和作用进行了探讨。
第5章“利益集团与美国对华汇率外交”，首先，回顾了美国对华汇率外交的缘起：人民币低估论和汇率操纵指控；其次，考察了美国对华汇率外交中所涉及的私人经济利益集团，分别分析了保护性经济利益集团的结盟游说和美国反保护经济利益集团——“院外援华集团”的联合抵制行动；再次，研究了中国政府回应美国汇率外交的态度、策略以及对美国政府施压的影响；最后，通过对比美元本位制下中日两国在应对美国汇率外交压力方面的能力强弱，揭示了美国对华汇率外交的短板。
第6章“结论与前瞻”，简要总结了论文前面各章的主要结论，并就今后需要进一步研究的问题进行了初步的探讨。
As one of the most important parts of macroeconomic policy under openconditions, exchange rate policy is originally one important issue of internationaleconomics. Nonetheless, these pure economic analyses do not take the politicalfactors into account so that they have significant shortcomings. In fact, exchange ratepolicy in essence is one kind of policy for income redistribution. On the one hand, itproduces the effect of income redistribution among different domestic interest groups.In response to the change of their interests, winners and losers will wield theireconomic and political resources to seek affect the authorities’ exchange rate policy.These actions will not end until it moves towards one new interest equilibrium. Onthe other hand, one big power’s exchange rate policy has significant spillover effectwhich will produce another income redistribution effect among different interestgroups at home and abroad. Similarly, the relevant winners and losers will takeenough efforts to maximize their own interests. Hence, exchange rate policy is notonly one economic issue, but a political one; it is not only one political economicissue, but one international political economic issue.
Based on these lines, the dissertation studies the adjustment of U.S. exchange ratepolicy since the Bretton Woods system from the interest group perspective, usingmultiple methods such as theoretical and empirical analyses, logic and historicalanalyses, overall and case analyses. The key issues include the decision mechanismand its characteristics of U.S. exchange rate policy; interest groups in the making andadjustment of U.S. exchange rate policy; interest groups under the Bretton Woodssystem and the adjustment of U.S. exchange rate policy; the behavior of interestgroups under the flexible exchange rate system and the adjustment of U.S. exchangerate policy; and the activities of interest groups and U.S. Exchange rate diplomacy on China. The aims of the dissertation are to resolve three issues: First, probing into thedecision mechanism, political and economic characteristics and, the adjustment logicsof U.S. exchange rate policy. Second, thinking about U.S. monetary politics andexchange rate diplomacy. Finally, reflecting on the spillover effect of U.S. exchangerate policy and the corresponding strategies and countermeasures for the peripheralcountries.
Apart from the Introduction, the dissertation consist six chapters. Chapter One isThe Decision Mechanism and Its Characteristics of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy. Inthis chapter, the author uses structure-function theory in political theory and systemtheory to frame the general process of governmental policymaking and decision inwhich initial conditions, policy input, policy decision, policy output, political systemand, international political and economic pattern are six key factors. Following these,this chapter generalizes the nature of American political system as “power sharingbased on institutional agency” in brevity. The author then gives three main politicaland economic characteristics in the process of U.S. exchange rate policy decision.Firstly, the Congress as the country’s legislative institution has the oversightauthorities over the government’s exchange rate policy. Secondly, the asymmetricalcooperation between the Treasury as one administrative branch and the Fed as oneindependent branch is the most important impetus for U.S. exchange rate policydecision. Thirdly, as one of the main aspects of American political and economicareas, domestic multiple economic interest groups are playing more and moreimportant role in the government’s exchange rate policy. Finally, the externalrestraints on U.S. exchange rate policy from foreign governments and their privateeconomic interest groups are increasing. In the last part of Chapter One, the authorlists three main adjustment logics in U.S. exchange rate policy. To begin with, thetiming of the Congress choosing to force the Treasury and the Fed to adjust theirexchange rate policy depends on the pressures from different interest groups at homeand abroad facing the Congressmen. Furthermore, the decision makers accept one double-level game strategy, i.e., they need not only take domestic interest groups’views into account, but consider the possible reaction from foreigners. Finally,whether interest groups have the willing and capacity to make the policymakersadjust their exchange rate policy, and to what extent they can do so are the function ofmultiple factors.
Chapter Two is Interest Groups in the Making and Adjustment of U.S. ExchangeRate Policy. In this part, the author gives her own definition of interest group basedon the predecessors’ understandings, namely, the interest group is one organization orentity whose members have definite recognition and demands for common interestsand the one whose aim is to promote the common interests of its members. Inaddition, the chapter analyzes the evolution of interest group theory. Based on this,the author studies the relevant interest groups and their preferences for U.S. exchangerate policy. What’s more, this chapter thinks over interest groups’ collective actiondilemmas surrounding the exchange rate policy. In the last part, the author uses thedetailed data to analyze main resources and tactics deployed by interest groups toinfluence U.S. government’s exchange rate policy.
Chapter Three is Interest Groups under the Bretton Woods System and theAdjustment of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy. At the beginning, the dissertation probesinto five factors which contribute to the silence of American interest groups in theearly stage of the Bretton Woods: the specialty of international monetary policy area;the insulation nature of the decision arena of international monetary policymaking;the orientation of the propaganda campaign conducted by the Treasury; the dilemmasof collective action; the relative closeness of American economy to the outside world.Additionally, this chapter analyzes the interest group politics surrounding threedifferent capital control programs: IET, VFCR, and FDIP. Finally, the authorresearches on the behavior of different interest groups at home and abroad from1968through1973and the adjustment of U.S. exchange rate policy in the Nixonadministration.
Chapter Four is Interest Groups under the Post-Bretton Woods System and theAdjustment of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy. This chapter mainly analyzes four aspects:First, analyzes the effect of the first bout of strong dollar policy on U.S. domesticinterest groups and their subsequent intensive lobbying activities. Second, studies thecollective silence of U.S. domestic interest groups during the second bout of strongdollar policy. Third, researches the quiet influence of American financial communityon U.S. exchange rate policy. Finally, probes into the behaviors and roles of foreigninterest groups in the adjustment process of U.S. exchange rate policy.
Chapter Five is Interest Groups and American Exchange Rate Diplomacy onChina. In this part, the author firstly looks back the origin of American exchange ratediplomacy on China, viz the underestimated Renminbi and the charge of China’scurrency manipulation. And then the chapter studies main private economic interestgroups in American exchange rate diplomacy on China, in which there are alliedlobbying activities from protectionist interest groups and the united resistantbehaviors of anti-protectionist pro-Sino economic interest groups-China Lobby. In thethird part, the author analyzes the Chinese government’s reaction to Americanpressure and its impact on American government. Finally, the author comparesdifferent capacities of China and Japan under the dollar standard in addressingpressures of exchange rate diplomacy from the United States, from which we canfigure out the short plate of American exchange rate diplomacy on China.
Chapter Six is Conclusion and Prospects. This chapter briefly summarizes themain conclusions of the previous five chapters and gives the preliminary prospects forthe future research.
依循这一思路，本文从利益集团的角度，运用理论分析与实证分析相结合、逻辑分析与历史分析相结合、整体分析与案例分析相结合的研究方法，研究布雷顿森林体系以来的美国汇率政策调整，考察的对象包括美国汇率政策的决策机制及特征、美国汇率政策制定与调整中所涉及的利益集团、布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策的调整、后布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团行为与美国汇率政策的调整、利益集团的活动与美国对华汇率外交。本文的根本目的旨在解决三个方面的问题：第一，思考美国汇率政策的决策机制、决策过程的政治经济特征及政策调整的逻辑；第二，思考美国的货币政治和汇率外交；第三，思考美国汇率政策的外溢效果及外围国家的应对策略。
除“导论”外，论文共分为6章。第1章“美国汇率政策的决策机制及特征”，首先利用政治学理论中的结构—功能论和系统论的方法，用“初始条件”、“政策输入”、“政策决策”、“政策输出”、“政治体制”、“国际政治经济格局”六要素，刻画出政府政策制定与决策过程的一般框架。在此基础上，从制度化程度和分权化程度两个方面将美国政治体制的性质简洁地概括为“依托制度代理关系的权力共享”。论文随后给出了美国汇率政策决策过程的政治经济特征：作为立法机构的国会对政府的汇率政策拥有监督权；作为行政机构的财政部与作为独立部门的美联储之间的非对称合作是美国汇率政策决策的最重要的组织动力；作为美国政治经济生活的重要构成，国内多元化经济利益集团对政府汇率政策的影响力正日益凸显；美国政府也面临着来自外国政府和私人经济利益集团的逐渐增长的外部约束。最后，本章总结了美国汇率政策调整的逻辑：首先，作为立法机构的国会选择逼迫（或压迫）财政部和美联储调整汇率政策的时机，主要取决于国会议员所面临的来自国内外不同类型利益集团的压力大小。其次，汇率政策的决策者采取的是一种“双层博弈”策略，即要兼顾到国内和国外两个层次的利益诉求，既不能忽视国内利益集团的诉求，又要考虑国外利益集团的态度。再次，利益集团是否有意愿、有能力推进决策者的汇率政策调整，以及在多大程度上促成该调整朝向其所期望的方向和目标，是多种因素的函数。
第2章“美国汇率政策制定与调整中的利益集团”，首先回顾了前人对利益集团的理解，并据此给出自己的定义：由对共同利益有着明确认知和诉求的成员所组成的，并以增进其成员的共同利益为动机或目的的组织或实体。随后，论文梳理了利益集团理论的演进脉络。在此基础上，论文分析了与美国汇率政策密切相关的利益集团及其汇率政策偏好，并就利益集团围绕汇率政策存在的集体行动困境展开分析。最后，运用翔实的数据分析了利益集团赖以影响美国政府汇率政策的资源和策略。
第3章“布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策调整”，首先考察了布雷顿森林体系初创期内“沉默的”美国利益集团，指出这一“沉默”现象源于五个方面的原因：国际货币政策领域的专业性；国际货币政策决策场所的隔绝性；政府舆论宣传的导向性；集体行动的困境；美国经济的相对封闭性。其次，论文考察了1963-1968年间国内外不同利益集团围绕美国的利息平衡税（IET）、自愿对外信贷限制计划（VFCR）、对外直接投资计划（FDIP）所开展的利益集团政治。最后，分析了1968-1973年间国内外利益集团的行为与尼克松治下的美国汇率政策调整。
第4章“后布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策”，首先考察了第一轮强势美元政策给美国国内相关利益集团带来的强烈冲击，以及这些利益集团为此展开的密集游说。随后，研究了第二轮强势美元政策推行期间美国国内利益集团的集体“失声”现象。此外，论文分析了美国金融部门利益集团在后布雷顿森林体系下对美国汇率政策的“悄然影响”。最后，对外国利益集团在美国汇率政策调整中的作为和作用进行了探讨。
第5章“利益集团与美国对华汇率外交”，首先，回顾了美国对华汇率外交的缘起：人民币低估论和汇率操纵指控；其次，考察了美国对华汇率外交中所涉及的私人经济利益集团，分别分析了保护性经济利益集团的结盟游说和美国反保护经济利益集团——“院外援华集团”的联合抵制行动；再次，研究了中国政府回应美国汇率外交的态度、策略以及对美国政府施压的影响；最后，通过对比美元本位制下中日两国在应对美国汇率外交压力方面的能力强弱，揭示了美国对华汇率外交的短板。
第6章“结论与前瞻”，简要总结了论文前面各章的主要结论，并就今后需要进一步研究的问题进行了初步的探讨。
As one of the most important parts of macroeconomic policy under openconditions, exchange rate policy is originally one important issue of internationaleconomics. Nonetheless, these pure economic analyses do not take the politicalfactors into account so that they have significant shortcomings. In fact, exchange ratepolicy in essence is one kind of policy for income redistribution. On the one hand, itproduces the effect of income redistribution among different domestic interest groups.In response to the change of their interests, winners and losers will wield theireconomic and political resources to seek affect the authorities’ exchange rate policy.These actions will not end until it moves towards one new interest equilibrium. Onthe other hand, one big power’s exchange rate policy has significant spillover effectwhich will produce another income redistribution effect among different interestgroups at home and abroad. Similarly, the relevant winners and losers will takeenough efforts to maximize their own interests. Hence, exchange rate policy is notonly one economic issue, but a political one; it is not only one political economicissue, but one international political economic issue.
Based on these lines, the dissertation studies the adjustment of U.S. exchange ratepolicy since the Bretton Woods system from the interest group perspective, usingmultiple methods such as theoretical and empirical analyses, logic and historicalanalyses, overall and case analyses. The key issues include the decision mechanismand its characteristics of U.S. exchange rate policy; interest groups in the making andadjustment of U.S. exchange rate policy; interest groups under the Bretton Woodssystem and the adjustment of U.S. exchange rate policy; the behavior of interestgroups under the flexible exchange rate system and the adjustment of U.S. exchangerate policy; and the activities of interest groups and U.S. Exchange rate diplomacy on China. The aims of the dissertation are to resolve three issues: First, probing into thedecision mechanism, political and economic characteristics and, the adjustment logicsof U.S. exchange rate policy. Second, thinking about U.S. monetary politics andexchange rate diplomacy. Finally, reflecting on the spillover effect of U.S. exchangerate policy and the corresponding strategies and countermeasures for the peripheralcountries.
Apart from the Introduction, the dissertation consist six chapters. Chapter One isThe Decision Mechanism and Its Characteristics of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy. Inthis chapter, the author uses structure-function theory in political theory and systemtheory to frame the general process of governmental policymaking and decision inwhich initial conditions, policy input, policy decision, policy output, political systemand, international political and economic pattern are six key factors. Following these,this chapter generalizes the nature of American political system as “power sharingbased on institutional agency” in brevity. The author then gives three main politicaland economic characteristics in the process of U.S. exchange rate policy decision.Firstly, the Congress as the country’s legislative institution has the oversightauthorities over the government’s exchange rate policy. Secondly, the asymmetricalcooperation between the Treasury as one administrative branch and the Fed as oneindependent branch is the most important impetus for U.S. exchange rate policydecision. Thirdly, as one of the main aspects of American political and economicareas, domestic multiple economic interest groups are playing more and moreimportant role in the government’s exchange rate policy. Finally, the externalrestraints on U.S. exchange rate policy from foreign governments and their privateeconomic interest groups are increasing. In the last part of Chapter One, the authorlists three main adjustment logics in U.S. exchange rate policy. To begin with, thetiming of the Congress choosing to force the Treasury and the Fed to adjust theirexchange rate policy depends on the pressures from different interest groups at homeand abroad facing the Congressmen. Furthermore, the decision makers accept one double-level game strategy, i.e., they need not only take domestic interest groups’views into account, but consider the possible reaction from foreigners. Finally,whether interest groups have the willing and capacity to make the policymakersadjust their exchange rate policy, and to what extent they can do so are the function ofmultiple factors.
Chapter Two is Interest Groups in the Making and Adjustment of U.S. ExchangeRate Policy. In this part, the author gives her own definition of interest group basedon the predecessors’ understandings, namely, the interest group is one organization orentity whose members have definite recognition and demands for common interestsand the one whose aim is to promote the common interests of its members. Inaddition, the chapter analyzes the evolution of interest group theory. Based on this,the author studies the relevant interest groups and their preferences for U.S. exchangerate policy. What’s more, this chapter thinks over interest groups’ collective actiondilemmas surrounding the exchange rate policy. In the last part, the author uses thedetailed data to analyze main resources and tactics deployed by interest groups toinfluence U.S. government’s exchange rate policy.
Chapter Three is Interest Groups under the Bretton Woods System and theAdjustment of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy. At the beginning, the dissertation probesinto five factors which contribute to the silence of American interest groups in theearly stage of the Bretton Woods: the specialty of international monetary policy area;the insulation nature of the decision arena of international monetary policymaking;the orientation of the propaganda campaign conducted by the Treasury; the dilemmasof collective action; the relative closeness of American economy to the outside world.Additionally, this chapter analyzes the interest group politics surrounding threedifferent capital control programs: IET, VFCR, and FDIP. Finally, the authorresearches on the behavior of different interest groups at home and abroad from1968through1973and the adjustment of U.S. exchange rate policy in the Nixonadministration.
Chapter Four is Interest Groups under the Post-Bretton Woods System and theAdjustment of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy. This chapter mainly analyzes four aspects:First, analyzes the effect of the first bout of strong dollar policy on U.S. domesticinterest groups and their subsequent intensive lobbying activities. Second, studies thecollective silence of U.S. domestic interest groups during the second bout of strongdollar policy. Third, researches the quiet influence of American financial communityon U.S. exchange rate policy. Finally, probes into the behaviors and roles of foreigninterest groups in the adjustment process of U.S. exchange rate policy.
Chapter Five is Interest Groups and American Exchange Rate Diplomacy onChina. In this part, the author firstly looks back the origin of American exchange ratediplomacy on China, viz the underestimated Renminbi and the charge of China’scurrency manipulation. And then the chapter studies main private economic interestgroups in American exchange rate diplomacy on China, in which there are alliedlobbying activities from protectionist interest groups and the united resistantbehaviors of anti-protectionist pro-Sino economic interest groups-China Lobby. In thethird part, the author analyzes the Chinese government’s reaction to Americanpressure and its impact on American government. Finally, the author comparesdifferent capacities of China and Japan under the dollar standard in addressingpressures of exchange rate diplomacy from the United States, from which we canfigure out the short plate of American exchange rate diplomacy on China.
Chapter Six is Conclusion and Prospects. This chapter briefly summarizes themain conclusions of the previous five chapters and gives the preliminary prospects forthe future research.
引文
①最为典型的当属格罗斯曼（Grossman）和赫尔普曼（Helpman）的合作研究。参见Grossman, Gene M. andHelpman, Elhanan,“Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, Vol.84, No.4,1994, pp.833-850; SpecialInterest Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,2001; Interest Groups and Trade Policy, Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press,2002.
②目前，这方面的集大成之作是佩尔森和塔贝里尼合著的《政治经济学：对经济政策的解释》一书。参见Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: TheMIT Press,2000.
①在弗里登看来，“特定要素模型”意味着，商品相对价格的变动主要对该商品的特定部门生产商而不是整个要素所有者阶层产生影响。参见Frieden, Jeffry A.,“Invested Interests: The Politics of National EconomicPolicies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization, Vol.45, No.4,1991, p.436.
①在分析美国的国际经济政策时，Cohen明确将外国政府作为参与博弈过程的一个重要行为体，用他的话说，“当涉及美国国际经济政策的游说努力时，‘私人部门’是一个很大的、多样化的群体，它包括如下构成：制造部门；农业和原材料部门；服务部门；工会；消费者；外国公司和政府；关心环境、工人权利、人权、经济发展等问题的非政府组织。”参见Cohen, Stephen D., The Making of United States InternationalEconomic Policy: Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform, Fifth Edition, Westport, Connecticut: PraegerPublishers,2000, p.114.
①McNamara, Kathleen R.,“Consensus and Constraint: Ideas and Capital Mobility in European MonetaryIntegration,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.37, No.3,1999, p.462.
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著《联邦党人文集》中译本，商务印书馆2012年版，“第四十七篇”，第246页。
②《联邦党人文集》，“第四十八篇”，第252页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第四十八篇”，第252页。
②《联邦党人文集》，“第五十一篇”，第265-266页。
③美国政治学者杜鲁门清晰地表达了这一观点。参见[美]戴维·杜鲁门著《政治过程——政治利益与公共舆论》中译本，天津人民出版社2005年版，第549页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第五十一篇”，第265页。
②涉及的法案被命名为“布雷顿森林协议法”（Bretton Woods Agreements Act），于1945年7月31号被美国国会批准通过。详见http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/17_01_19450731.pdf.
②需要指出的是，美国国会对1960年代黄金不断流出美国十分担忧，并由此质疑布雷顿森林体系下的美元价值。因此，尼克松在1971年8月15日宣布关闭“黄金窗口”的举动与国会的考虑不谋而合，国会没有反对他的决定。相反，国会在既成事实后认可了该行为以及后来转向浮动汇率的做法。参见Destler, I. M.and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Washington, DC:Institute for International Economics,1989, p.99, f.2.
⑤杰弗里·A.弗里登：《经济一体化与美国的货币政策政治》，载于[美]罗伯特·基欧汉、海伦·米尔纳主编《国际化与国内政治》中译本，北京大学出版社2003年版，第131页。关于美国国会介入美联储货币政策的更为详细的考察，可参见Journal of Monetary Economic（s1978）; Kettl, Donald F., Leadership at the Fed,New Haven: Yale University Press,1986, pp.140-166; Woolley, John T., Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve
②需要指出的是，美国国会对1960年代黄金不断流出美国十分担忧，并由此质疑布雷顿森林体系下的美元价值。因此，尼克松在1971年8月15日宣布关闭“黄金窗口”的举动与国会的考虑不谋而合，国会没有反对他的决定。相反，国会在既成事实后认可了该行为以及后来转向浮动汇率的做法。参见Destler, I. M.and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Washington, DC:Institute for International Economics,1989, p.99, f.2.
and the Politics of Monetary Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1984, pp.144-153.
②美国国会决策的组织结构为议员—小组委员会—委员会—全院大会—两院协商委员会的五级议事结构。参见李巍著《制度变迁与美国国际经济政策》，上海人民出版社2010年版，第117页。
①例如，在一次类似的听证会上，时任美联储主席阿瑟·F·伯恩斯（Arthur F. Burns,1970-1978）承诺，如果财政部和美联储没有解决外汇干预的分歧，他会立即将情形通知给国会。参见U.S. Congress, JointEconomic Committee, How Well Are Fluctuating Exchange Rates Working? Hearings,93rd Cong.,1st sess.,20,
21,26, and27June1973,189.
②戴斯特勒和海宁为我们揭示了一个细节，在1985年一名美联储官员向一个众议院银行子委员会提出建议，美联储应当独立于财政部向国会报告汇率问题，而非在发布其报告之前只能征询财政部的意见。参见Destler, I. M. and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, p.87.
③Putnam, Robert D. and Henning, C. Randall,“The Bonn Summit of1978: A Case Study in Coordination”, inCooper, Richard N. et al, eds., Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation, Washington,DC: The Brookings Institution,1989, pp.84-87; Cohen, Stephen D. and Meltzer, Ronald I., United StatesInternational Economic Policy in Action: Diversity of Decision Making, chapter2; Nickel, Herman,“The InsideStory of the Dollar Rescue”, Fortune,4December1978, pp.40-44; Holmes, Alan R. and Pardee, Scott E.,“Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York QuarterlyReview4, Spring1979, pp.67-87.
④Volcker, Paul A. and Gyohten Toyoo, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to AmericanLeadership, New York, NY: Times Books,1992, pp.238-239.
①《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第46页。需要指出的是，原文为“Faction”一词，作者认为，中译本中的“党争”容易引起歧义，翻译成“派系”较为妥帖。后文将以“派系”一词替代译文中的“党争”。
②《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第46-47页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第47页。
②例如，法国政治思想家德·托克维尔在美国杰克逊政府时期曾这样评价美国的“结社”现象：“美国是世界上最便于组党结社和把这一强大行动手段用于多种多样目的的国家。”“世界上只有一个国家能使人们每天行使政治结社的无限自由。在世界上，也只有这个国家能使公民们想到在社会生活中不断行使结社权，并由此得到文明所能提供的一切好处。”参见[法]托克维尔著《论美国的民主》（上卷），商务印书馆2011年版，第213页；《论美国的民主》（下卷），商务印书馆2011年版，第645页。。
①谈判的结果是，美林公司（Merrill-Lynch）——里甘之前曾担任主席的公司——成为第一家受益的美国金融机构。参见Frankel, Jeffrey, The Yen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing Japanese Financial Markets,Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, December1984, p.47.
①当然，财政部也可以利用国会和国内多元化经济利益集团所施加的压力作为逼迫他国政府就范的杠杆，如20世纪80年代“广场协议（”PlazaAccord）所揭示的情形。详情可参见Destler, I. M. and Henning, C. Randall,Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Chapters3-4; Funabashi, Yoichi, Managing theDollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Second Edition, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,Revised1989.
①转引自李寿祺：《利益集团参政——美国利益集团与政府的关系》，《美国研究》1989年第4期，第28页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第45页。
①中文译本将其翻译为“政治过程”。参见[美]戴维·杜鲁门著《政治过程——政治利益与公共舆论》中译本，天津人民出版社2005年版。
①胡伟：“中译本序”，载于[美]戴维·杜鲁门著《政治过程——政治利益与公共舆论》中译本，天津人民出版社2005年版，第11页。
①但在理论上，即便是小集团也不会有效地行动，因为它们的成员不能就集体行动的成本或收益的分配达成可接受的一致意见。一个小集团也几乎不可避免地会面对“白搭车”问题，这使得集团本身变得不稳定，除非公共物品的贴现率及对物品的估值在其成员之间全然不变。参见Gowa, Joanne,“Public Goods andPolitical Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States”, International Organization, Vol.42, No.1, Winter1988, p.25; Laver, Michael,“Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem”, PoliticalStudies, Vol.28, No.2, June1980, pp.203-204.
①Gowa, Joanne,“Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the UnitedStates”, p.26.
①Public Citizen,“Lobbying Rules: Foreign Agents Registration Act”, July25,2005,http://www.citizen.org/documents/FARA.pdf, accessible on March3,2013.
②Schumer, McCaskill and Obama,“Closing the Foreign Lobbying Loophole Act”, S.3123,110thCongress2ndSession, in the Senate of the United States, June12,2008; OII,“Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)”,www.ofii.org/policy-issues/political-process/238-foreign-agents-registration-act-fara.html, accessible on March3,2013.
①参见Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics: System under Stress, Washington, DC: Institute for InternationalEconomics and New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,1986; Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics, SecondEdition, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,1992;Destler, I. M. and Odell, John S., Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics, Washington,DC: Institute for International Economics, September1987.
①The Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, The International Positionof the Dollar, The Committee for Economic Development,1961, p.21.
②Memorandum for the Record by Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, December6,1960, FRUS1958-1960, Vol.IV, International Financial and Monetary Policy, P.147.
③Kennedy, John F., Special Message on Gold and Balance of Payments Deficit, February6,1961, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
④肯尼迪曾在竞选运动中公开声明，美国将继续履行35美元/1盎司黄金的承诺。并且，他认为，“（美元）贬值将会引发对这个国家的美好信念和稳定以及对其总统能力的怀疑。”参见Sorensen, Ted C., Kennedy,New York: Harper and Row,1965, p.408.
①参见Conybeare, John A. C., United States Foreign Economic Policy and the International Capital Markets:The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, pp.80-83.
②U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy,1963:580.
①United States Government Printing Office, Economic Report of the President,1966, p.165.
②此前，所有的银行贷款是不被征收利息平衡税的。约翰逊总统在为这项举措做辩护时指出，1964年一年期以上的对外银行贷款从15亿美元增至25亿美元。参见New York Times, February11,1965.
③U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson,1965, p.171.
④VFCR的要点体现在“银行和非银行金融机构指南”（Guidelines for Banks and Nonbank FinancialInstitutions）之中，参见Federal Reserve Bulletin, March1965.
⑤Andrew Brimmer’s JEC testimony in Balance of Payments Policies, p.163.
⑥有关“自愿的”天花板规定的细节，可参见Aronson, Jonathan David, Money and Power: Banks and the WorldMonetary System, California: Sage Publications, Inc.,1977, pp.74-75.
①Statement of Secretary Connor; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Balance ofPayments1965, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance,89th Congress,1st session,1965, pp.
186-188.
②“Guidelines Tighten on Foreign Investment”, Business Week, December11,1965, p.12.
③New York Times, November19,1967, p.1; New York Times, January12,1968, p.15.
④Conybeare的研究表明，尽管财政部在约翰逊政府时期仍然在国际收支政策上有着强大的决策权，但政策制定的场所已经转移到白宫，特别是转移到负责国际安全的约翰逊的副助理弗朗西斯·贝特尔（FrancisBator）那里。这一权力转移源于多个原因，主要是由于总统个性的相对力量以及他对国际货币事务感兴趣这一事实。相比之下，当时的新任财政部长亨利·富勒（Henry Fowler）更关心于就集中创造储备的问题扩大欧洲与美国的对话，即他关注的是流动性而非调整问题。参见Conybeare, John A. C., United StatesForeign Economic Policy and the International Capital Markets: The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, pp.91-92, p.186.
①Testimony of C. Stewart of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute; U.S., Congress, House, Committee onForeign Affairs, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign EconomicPolicy,91st Congress,1st session,1969, p.61.
②IMF, Report on Exchange Restrictions,1969, p.498.Monetary Reform, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments,89th Congress,1st session,1965, p.187.
①Joint Economic Committee,1965Joint Economic Report, part4.
②New York Times, July19,1963, p.1.
③New York Times, December9,1963, p.57.
①U.S. Treasury, Recent Changes in Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments, Hearings before theCommittee on Banking and Currency, Congress House of Representatives,88th Congress,1st session,1963, p.169.
②Statement of Secretary Dillon, Recent Changes in Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments, hearingsbefore the Committee on Banking and Currency, Congress House of Representatives,88th Congress,1st session,1963, p.152.
①Kuhn, Loeb&Co., Kuhn, Loeb, New York: NBM Publishing Papercutz,1975, pp.20,27.
②Dillon, Read&Co., Dillon, Read, New York: NBM Publishing Papercutz,1974, pp.14,25-26.
③New York Times, February11,1965, p.57.
①New York Times, July21,1963, p.1; July22,1963, p.1; July25,1963, p.36.
①美国政府给出的豁免原因是：“这一豁免服务于两个目的，一是为日本在其他可能性降低的情况下提供持续进入我国金融市场的渠道，二是作为在需要时容易获得美国救助的标志。我们相信，考虑到日本作为远东的主要金融中心和正在地区发展援助努力中发挥更大作用的国家，一个运转良好的国际货币体系需要日本继续将其货币的国际价值保持在一个合理的基础上。”参见Undersecretary Deming’s written reply toRepresentative Vanik, Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Interest EqualizationTax Extension Act,1967, p.120.
②Testimony of Secretary Dillion, Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, InterestEqualization Tax,1963, p.142.
③Statement of George W. Mitchell, in1963Economic Report, Joint Economic Committee,1963, p.385.
④Testimony of Secretary Dillion, Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, InterestEqualization Tax,1963, p.128.
⑤引自New York Times, March20,1964, p.45.
①狄龙曾在一封回复国会议员科尔蒂斯的信中提到，“欧洲的官方金融人士的回应是，我们已采取了有利于我们国际收支的措施，并且总统在7月18日宣布的这一计划……会提高而非降低对美元的信心。”参见Written reply to Congressman T. B. Curtis from Secretary Dillon, Congress House of Representatives, Committeeon Ways and Means, Interest Equalization Tax,1963, p.106.
①Wall Street Journal, March30,1976.
②哈罗德·泰勒（Harold Taylor）曾写道，“大银行与小银行之间的分立是（阻止有效游说的）第一块绊脚石。除了国内事务，很难把所有银行聚拢到一起，立法者可能觉得，什么都不做或是让双方都失望而不是支持任何一方，会比较好。”参见Harold Taylor,“The Banking Lobby: a papier-mache monster”, BankersMagazine, No.153, Spring1970, p.75.
①Business Week, August5,1967, p.108.
②“艾奇法”（the EdgeAct）是一个在1919年通过的对美国“1913年联邦储备法”的修正案，编号为12U.S.C.§§611-631，它允许美国的全国性银行通过联邦批准设立的子公司从事国际银行业务。该法是以新泽西州参议员瓦尔特·埃文斯·艾奇（Walter Evans Edge）的名字命名的，其动机是给予美国公司在同外国公司竞争时更大的灵活性。“艾奇法公司”（Edge Act Corporation）是一家银行或银行控股公司或金融控股公司的子公司，它是由美联储根据“联邦储备法”第25A部分的规定（1916年和1919年两次被修正）批准设立的从事国外银行业活动的公司。参见维基百科，http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edge_Act, accessible onMarch10,2013.
①即使这一漏洞后来被发现，当局也没有采取任何措施去修正它，以便将管制范围涵盖任何一个月的平均未偿还贷款。美联储只是要求银行不要利用该计划的精神。参见Aronson, Jonathan David, Money and Power:Banks and the World Monetary System, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.,1977, pp.82-83.
②Memo of telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy, February9,1965; Dillon, personal papers, KennedyLibrary;转引自Conybeare, John A. C., United States Foreign Economic Policy and the International CapitalMarkets: The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, p.215.
③Testimony of Secretary Fowler, Balance of Payments-1965, before Congress Senate, Committee on Bankingand Currency, p.1055.
①参见Koszul, J.–P.,“American Banks in Europe”, in Kindleberger, Charles P., ed., The InternationalCorporation, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1970.
②New York Times, April12,1965, p.52.
③New York Times, February11,1965, p.57.
①“Rushing to Span the Globe”, Business Week, August8,1964, pp.19-21.
②Business Week, February20,1965, p.20.
③Andrew Brimmer,“Prospects for commercial banks in international money and capital markets: an Americanperspective”, paper presented before the Conference on World Banking, London, January17,1974:9.
①U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment Program: Selected Statistics,1972:5.
②1963年，加拿大46%的制造业、62%的石油和天然气、52%的采矿业是由美国公司控制的。参见Powrie,T. L.,“Foreign Direct Investment in Canada”, in Rolfe, Sidney E. and Damm, Walter, eds., The MultinationalCorporation in the World Economy, New York: Praeger,1970, p.92.
①Karsten, C. F.,“Should Europe Restrict U.S. Investments?”, in Cohen, Benjamin J., ed., American ForeignEconomic Policy, New York: Praeger, Harper and Row,1968, pp.233-234.
②例如，在美国政府于1965年推出自愿性FDIP计划后，英国财政部对外国公司在英国本土借贷施加了新的限制，美联储向英格兰银行传递抗议的信息，但被以英国的问题更为严峻为由“礼貌”地回绝了。法国政府也采取了类似的行动，逼迫美国企业在德国、荷兰和比利时等国融资。参见Conybeare, JohnA. C., UnitedStates Foreign Economic Policy and the International Capital Markets: The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, pp.201-202.
③参见Boddewyn, Jean J., Western European Policies toward U.S. Investors, New York: Institute of Finance,New York University,1974, pp.93-95.
①Testimonies in Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Direct InvestmentControls,1969.
②美国国际商会理事会曾在1970年3月就FDIP计划的效应对60家主要的美国对外直接投资者做过调查，结果发现，即使是大型的跨国公司也受到了这一计划的有利冲击。参见U.S. Council of the InternationalChamber of Commerce, The Impact of U.S. Controls on Direct Investment, New York: mimeo,1970.
①New York Times, September21,1968, p.49; December3,1968, p.61; December23,1968, p.61.
②U.S. Commerce Department, International Commerce, April21,1969;转引自Congress House ofRepresentatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Direct Investment Controls,1969, pp.100-101.
③Joint Economic Committee, Review of Balance of Payments Policies,1969, p.150.
①霍撒克当时是尼克松总统经济顾问委员会（Council of Economic Advisers, CEA）的成员之一。
①1971年8月15日，尼克松宣布实行“新经济政策”，其主要内容是对工资和物价实行管制、对进口商品征收10%的进口附加税、终止黄金的可兑换。
②Houthakker, Hendrik S.,“Cooling Off the Monetary Crisis”, in Evans, Thomas G., ed., The Monetary Muddle,New York: Dow Jones,1974, p.37.
③New York Times, December28,1971, p.41.
④The Economist, September9,1972, p.48.
①转引自Odell, John S., U. S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change,Princeton: Princeton University Press,1982, p.317.
①值得一提的是，当尼克松政府选择比承诺的时间更早终结VFCR的管制时，美国的银行业感到惊讶。毕竟，这让大银行提前丧失了相对于小银行在对外业务方面的一些优势。参见Aronson, Jonathan David, Moneyand Power: Banks and the World Monetary System, p.78.
①John Williamson, The Exchange Rate System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, June1985, figure A7, p.106.
①Office of the President, Program for Economic Recovery, Washington, DC: Office of the President, February,18,1981.
②“Remarks of the President to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank andInternational Monetary Fund”, Washington Post, September30,1981.
③通货膨胀率的数字是以消费者物价指数的变化给出的。参见Council of the Economic Advisers, EconomicReport of the President, January1989, p.377.
④New York Times, November7,1985, p. D1.
①New York Times, April17,1981.
②值得指出的是，财政部推行的放任美元升值的汇率政策并没有遭到其他政府部门的反对。当时的预算主任戴维·斯托克曼（David Stockman）和经济顾问委员会主席穆雷·维登鲍姆（Murray Weidenbaum）都是自由市场的强烈倡导者，因而他们都拥护财政部在汇率上的放手不管政策。
③“Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York QuarterlyReview, various issues, Autumn1981-Spring1985;转引自Destler, I. M. and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics:Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,1989,pp.22-23.作者将政府连续几天入市干预视为一次干预。
①正是他以及埃兹拉·所罗门（Ezra Solomon）、戴维·默奇逊（David Murchison）三人在1983年9月底对白宫和财政部的游说，成为促使唐纳德·里甘发起日元/美元运动的驱动力。埃兹拉·所罗门是美国斯坦福大学经济学家，戴维·默奇逊是华盛顿律师，两人在摩根的资助下负责起草了题为《美元与日元的错配：问题及解决之道》的研究报告，报告重新了摩根在1982年提出的观点：“美国的制造业企业和工人正遭受因日元和美元的严重错配所带来的重大损害。”参见Murchison, David C., Solomon, Ezra. The Misalignment ofthe United States Dollar and the Japanese Yen: The Problem and Its Solution, September19,1983, p.1.
②H. R.3035,99th Congress,1st sess., sec.103, submitted on July18,1985. Reproduced in US Congress, Houseof Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Trade Emergency and ExportPromotion Act, hearing,99th Conress,1st sess. on September17,1985, p.15.
②当时的参议院国际金融与货币政策小组委员会的主席保罗·萨巴尼斯（Paul Sarbanes）指出，“1988年贸易法案中要求财政部就国际经济和汇率政策的实施向国会提交半年度报告和证词的条款，在很大程度上是对20世纪80年代早期实践的一种回应，当时美元被允许长期稳定地升值到很高的水平，却对使美元与其他货币保持一致没有任何影响。”参见U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, Treasury Department’s Report on InternationalEconomic and Exchange Rate Policy, May16,1991, p.1.
③“Strengthening United States Trade Laws: Recommendations of the Business Roundtable Task Force onInternational Trade and Investment”, October21,1985.
①Business Roundtable,“Background Statement on International Monetary Policy”, January7,1986.
②US Council for International Business,“Statement on Exchange Rates and International Economic PolicyCoordination”, March11,1986.
④希尔克则将美国在1986年对待日本和德国的做法称为“进攻性双边主义”（aggressive bilateralism）。参见Silk, Leonard,“The United States and the World Economy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3,1986, p.468.
④希尔克则将美国在1986年对待日本和德国的做法称为“进攻性双边主义”（aggressive bilateralism）。参见Silk, Leonard,“The United States and the World Economy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3,1986, p.468.
①参见Knight, Sarah Cleeland,“When Exchange Rates Become Political: The Evolving Relationship BetweenExchange Rates and Firm Competitiveness”, Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American PoliticalScience Association, September1-4,2005, Washington, DC, p.6.
①联邦对教育支出的减少只是暂时的，在短暂的1年半后，联邦对教育的支出开始大幅增加，在1995年中-1996年中虽有短暂小幅下降，但总体上呈上升趋势，到2000年，其金额已从1993年中的370亿美元增加至750亿美元。参见Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report of the Council ofEconomic Advisers, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC:2001, p.245.
①1995年后，财政部和美联储再次推行了不干预政策。有资料显示，1995-2000年间，财政部和美联储只入市干预了两次，一次是在1998年6月，另一次是在2000年9月，并且，这两次干预又分别是在日本银行和欧洲央行的合作下进行的。此外，尽管两次操作都涉及到购买外汇，但它们明显都不是为了改善美国国际竞争力而让美元贬值的。参见Knight, Sarah Cleeland,“When Exchange Rates Become Political: TheEvolving Relationship Between Exchange Rates and Firm Competitiveness”, p.9.
①Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers,United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC:2001, p.101.
①[英]彼得·高恩著《华盛顿的全球赌博》中译本，江苏人民出版社2003年版，第27-32页。
②[英]彼得·高恩著《华盛顿的全球赌博》，第54-55页。
①这加速了日本国内的过剩资本向美国的转移，从而资助了美国的经济、货币和军事霸权。参见Gilpin,Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1987, p.328-336.
②而第一家获准进入东京证券交易所的就是里甘曾供职的美林证券公司。参见Frankel, Jeffrey A., TheYen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing Japanese Capital Markets, Washington, DC: Institute for InternationalEconomics, December1984, p.47.
③例如，萨默斯在1997年时就说过：“无论是在国内还是在国际上，金融自由化都是美国议程的一个关键部分。”参见Wade, Robert,“The U.S. Role in the LongAsian Crisis of1990-2000”, in Lukauskas, Arvid John andRivera-Batiz, Francisco L., eds., The Political Economy of the East Asian Crisis and Its Aftermath: Tigers inDistress, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing,2001, p.205.
①这一事件被莱斯特·瑟罗（Lester Thurow）比喻为“华尔街”（Wall Street）与“主街”（Main Street）之争。参见Frankel, Jeffrey A.,“Exchange Rate Policy”, in Feldstein, Martin, ed., American Economic Policy in the1980s, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1994, pp.325-326.
①参见Melamed, Leo, ed., The Merits of Flexible Exchange Rates: An Anthology, Fairfax, VA: George MasonUniversity Press,1988.
①即1971年12月的史密森学会协议（the Smithsonian Agreement）。
②Under Secretary Mulford’s response to questions by Senator Sarbanes. U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs, First Annual Hearing on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy, May5,1989, pp.39-40.
③U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy,October1988, p.19.
①Lindner, Deborah J.,“The Political Economy of the Won: U.S.-Korean Bilateral Negotiations on ExchangeRates”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers No.434, July1992, p.17.
②美国学者肯特·考德尔（Kent Calder）曾对日本作为“反应型国家”（reactive state）的特性做出过出色的描述。参见Calder, Kent E.,“Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State”,World Politics, Vol.40, No.4, Jul.,1988, pp.517-541.
②“The Plaza Accord: The World Intervenes In Currency Markets”, November12,2009,http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/09/plaza-accord.asp, accessible on March20,2013.
③有关“广场协议”的详细描述，可参见Henning, C. Randall and Destler, I. M.,“From Neglect to Activism:American Politics and the1985Plaza Accord”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol.8, No.3/4, International MonetaryCooperation, Domestic Politics, and Policy Ideas, Jul.–Dec.,1988, pp.317-333; Destler, I. M. and Henning, C.Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Chapter3; Funabashi, Yoichi,Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,1988.
①希尔克（Silk）指出，美国在1986年针对日本和西德采取了“进攻性双边主义”的政策，旨在在促进自身经济利益的同时打造它所希望的维持世界经济稳定与增长的联盟，其实质是通过压迫他国分担提供国际公共产品的责任和负担来增进美国的利益。参见Silk, Leonard,“The United States and the World Economy”,Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3,1986, p.468.
①详情请参见U.S. Department of the Treasury,“Semiannual Report on International Economic and ExchangeRate Policies”, various issues; Henning, C. Randall,“Congress, Treasury, and the Accountability of ExchangeRate Policy: How the1988Trade Act Should Be Reformed”, Peterson Institute for International EconomicsWorking Paper Series07-8, September2007.
①Speech by John B. Taylor,“New Directions for U.S. Economic Policy towards Japan and China”, October21,2004, Press Center of U.S. Department of the Treasury,http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2050.aspx, accessible on March13,2013.
①“汇率保护主义”一词见于Malpass, David,“Exchange Rate Protectionism: AHarmful Diversion for Trade andDevelopment Policy”, Cato Journal, Vol.25, No.1, Winter2005, pp.107-110.
①参见Goldstein, Morris,“Currency Manipulation and Enforcing the Rules of the International MonetarySystem”, in Truman, Edwin M., ed., Reforming the IMF for the21st Century, Peterson Institute for InternationalEconomics Special Report19, April2006, pp.141-155; Mussa, Michael,“IMF Surveillance over China’sExchange Rate Policy”, Paper presented at the Conference on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, October19,2007; Scott, Robert E.,“Currency Manipulation: History Shows ThatSanctions Are Needed”, EPI Policy Memorandum#164, April28,2010; Preeg, Ernest H.,“Chinese CurrencyManipulation and IMF/WTO Obligations”,http://americanactionforum.org/files/Chinese%20Currency%20Manipulation%20and%20IMF.pdf; Elizabeth L.Pettis, Esquire,“Challenging Chinese Currency Manipulation under the IMF Agreement”, January2011,http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_pettis/2/.
①International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, Section1(iii), Article Ⅳ,转引自Sanford, Jonathan E.,“Currency Manipulation: The IMF and WTO”, CRS Report for Congress RS22658, January28,2011.
②Denters, Erik,“Manipulation of Exchange Rates in International Law: The Chinese Yuan”, ASIL Insights,November2003.
③这7个指标是：在外汇市场上进行持久的单向的大规模干预、出于国际收支目的而从事的官方或半官方的借款行为、出于国际收支目的而施加的经常账户与资本账户限制、出于国际收支目的而采取的非正常的鼓励或阻碍资本流动的货币或其他金融措施、根本性的汇率错配、大规模和长期的经常账户赤字或顺差、对外部门存在大量的脆弱性等因素。参见International Monetary Fund,“Executive Board’s2007Decision onBilateral Surveillance”, June15,2007.
④从多个指标来看，美国称得上是最切合“汇率操纵”标准的国家，例如大规模和长期的经常账户赤字、故意实施的弱势美元政策。正如斯提坎撒·帕坦艾克所言，“在2007年6月15日‘IMF执行董事会决定’之后，是IMF告诉相关国家其汇率是否以及在多大程度上错配。如果错配的现象没有被消除，美国就会对这些国家的出口诉诸保护主义。因此，它是全球化世界中的单边主义，在这样的世界中，一国的行为通过一个多边组织的分析和影响而变得合法化。美国处理美元的方式——公然宣称的‘它是我们的货币，但是你们的问题’——表明美元的升值或贬值更多地是世界其他国家而非美国所关心的事情。”参见Pattanaik,Sitikantha,“Global Imbalances, Tanking Dollar, and the IMF’s Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies”, CatoJournal, Vol.27, No.3, Fall2007, pp.316-317.
①Muir Macpherson,“A Higher Yuan Would Halve U.S.-China Trade Deficit”, December6,2011, BloombergGovernment, http://about.bgov.com/2011/12/06/bgov-study-higher-yuan-would-halve-u-s-china-trade-deficit/.
②伯格斯腾的这一结论是建立在人民币至少对美元低估40%以及在加权贸易基础上低估25%的假设之上。Bergsten, C. Fred, Testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, March24,2010.2010年9月15日，伯格斯腾在众议院筹款委员会作证时声称，“消除中国人民币汇率的错配会给美国创造50万个工作机会。”参见Bergsten, C. Fred,“Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate”, Testimony beforethe Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives,September15,2010, http://www.iie.com/publications/testimony/bergsten20100915.pdf
①孙哲和刘建华曾从“产业地理”与“结盟游说”的视角分析了美国的对华贸易政策。参见孙哲、刘建华：《产业地理与结盟游说——考察美国对华贸易政策的新视角》，《世界经济与政治》2007年第6期，第28-36页。
①美国彭博新闻社2003年5月15日报道；转引自何兴强：《美国利益集团与人民币升值压力》，《当代亚太》2006年第3期，第51页。
①邓彪、赵维焘：《论美国利益集团在人民币汇率问题上的结盟行动——以“健全美元联盟”、“公平货币联盟”为例》，《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》2010年第4期，第105页。
②National Association of Manufacturers,“The NAM Trade Agenda for China2005”, http://www.nam.org.
③“Review of China’s Compliance with Its WTO Commitments”, Comments Submitted to the Trade Policy StaffCommittee by the National Association of Manufactures, October2010,http://www.nam.org/~/media/037AFCBD3EDF49C5A60509C38BFF1F48/China_WTO_Compliance_NAM_Comments_to_TPSC_2010.pdf.
①“United States-China Economic Relations and China’s Role in the World Economy”, Hearing before theCommittee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,109th Congress,1st Session, April14,2005,Serial No.109-13.
②The Center for Responsive Politics,“Organization Profiles: National Association of Manufacturers”,http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000054156&cycle=A.
①National Association of Manufacturers,“National Public Affairs Steering Committee”,http://www.nam.org/Get-Involved/National-Public-Affairs-Steering-Committee/Landing.aspx.
②National Association of Manufacturers,“Chinese Currency Manipulation Must Stop!”, http://www.nam.org.
③China Currency Coalition,“China’s Undervalued Yuan Pushes Trade Deficit with U.S. to a Staggering$162Billion”, February10,2005, http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org.
①China Currency Coalition White Paper,“U.S. Indebtedness to China and Japan Should Spur, Not Delay or Deter,Efforts to Offset Trade Imbalances Aggravated By Exchange-Rate Misalignment of the Undervalued Yuan andYen”, April20,2007, http://faircurrency.org/econ/SFX1B8E.pdf.
②信的开头说：你们收到申诉四个小时后就作出决定，我们表示极大遗憾，很难相信你们对申诉给予了认真细致的考虑。参见http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org/newsarticles/092404_letter_html.
③“China’s Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact on the United States”, Hearing before theU.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,108thCongress,1stSession, September25,2003, pp.189-191.
①Testimony of Thea Mei Lee, Deputy Chief of Staff of the AFL-CIO, Before the House Committee on ForeignAffairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade China’s Indigenous Innovation Trade andInvestment Policies: How Great a Threat?, September3,2011.
①Jones, Clayton,“Bernanke blasts China for currency manipulation”, November19,2010,http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-Board-Blog/2010/1119/Bernanke-blasts-China-for-currency-manipulation.
②Beattie, Alan and Hille, Kathrin,“Bernanke criticises China over currency”, October4,2011,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1f7be1c-eeaa-11e0-959a-00144feab49a.html.
③Hilsenrath, Jon,“Bernanke Advocates Stronger Currencies”, October15,2012,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443749204578055600111447318.html.
④US Department of Treasury Press Release,“Treasury Secretary Snow Appoints Olin L. Wethington as SpecialEnvoy on China”, May19,2005.
④转引自Lichtervelde, Isabelle De,“Talking Tough: Washington’s Evolving Discourse on China’s CurrencyRegime”, Asia Paper, Vol.6, Issue1, January10,2012, p.9.
⑤US Department of Treasury Press Release,“Treasury Secretary Paulson, Henry, Following the Announcementof The U.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue”, September21,2006.
⑥Hearings on Timothy Geithner’s appointment form the Senate Finance Committee, in response to writtenquestions submitted by the Senators (Charles Schumer, D-NY), January22,2009.
⑦US Department of Treasury Press Release,“Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Release ofSemi-Annual Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies”, April15,2009,http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg90.aspx;“Secretary Geithner’s Remarks on ‘The PathAhead for the U.S.-China Economic Relationship’, January12,2011,http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1019.aspx;”“Remarks by Secretary Timothy Geithnerat a Discussion on the Upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue at U.S.-China Business Council”,May3,2011,http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/05/20110505191406su0.2003072.html#axzz2OjkYhj69.
①The US-China Business Council,“USCBC Statement on Senate Currency Bill”, June13,2007,https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2007/06/uscbc-senate-currency-bill.html.
②The US-China Business Council,“USCBC Statement on US Senate Passage of Currency Legislation”, October
12,2011, https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2011/10/passage-currency-legislation.html.
③The US-China Business Council,“USCBC Statement on US Treasury Department’s Release of theSemi-Annual Exchange Rate Report to Congress”, May25,2012,https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2012/05/may25pressrelease.html.
④参见美国财政部自2007年6月以来向国会提交的历次半年度国际经济与汇率政策报告。
①参见“中国人民银行公告[2012]第4号”，2012年4月14日，http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/bangongting/82/2012/20120414090504815230140/20120414090504815230140_.html.
②参见U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of International Affairs,“Report to Congress on InternationalEconomic and Exchange Rate Policies”, May25,2012, p.15;“Report to Congress on International Economic andExchange Rate Policies”, November27,2012, p.15.http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/Pages/index.aspx.
③本杰明·科恩认为，“货币权力”有两个关键的维度：自主性和影响力。前者是指不受外部压力的影响而按照自身意愿行动的能力，后者则是控制其他行为体的行为并使其按照自己的方式行动的能力。货币权力有两个外在表现：一是通过延迟国际收支失衡调整的过程来避免持续的调整成本的能力（延迟力），二是通过尽可能向他国转嫁而使自身避免国际收支调整的转型成本的能力（扭曲力）。前一种货币权力对应着自主性，后一种货币权力体现了影响力。参见Cohen, Benjamin J.,“The International Monetary System:Diffusion and Ambiguity”, International Affairs, Vol.84, No.3,2008, pp.455-470.
①所谓“日元升值综合症”，是指1971年以来美日两国政府在执行商业政策、汇率政策及货币政策过程中相互影响所造成的现象。其因果关系的链条是从贸易压力到日元汇率，再从汇率到日本货币政策，其结果是日元的阶段性升值引发的日本经济衰退。参见McKinnon, Ronald I. and Ohno, Kenichi, Dollar and Yen:Resolving Economic Conflict between the United States and Japan, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,1997, pp.1-19.
②http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Japan, last modified on4October,2012.
①U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb;转引自Morrison, Wayne M,“China-U.S. Trade Issues”, CRSReport for Congress, RL33536, May21,2012, pp.6-9.
②详情可参见Morrison, Wayne M.,“China-U.S. Trade Issues”, CRS Report for Congress, RL33536, July29,2010, p.27.
②参见Helleiner, Eric,“Money and Influence: Japanese Power in the International Monetary and FinancialSystem”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.18, No.3,1989, pp.343-358;“Japan and theChanging Global Financial Order”, International Journal, Vol.47, No.2,1992, pp.420-444.
①Hong Kong Monetary Authority,“Briefing to the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs”,19November2012, p.65.
②Hong Kong Monetary Authority,“Briefing to the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs”,19November2012, p.66.
③Wong, Jenny Yee,“Development of Dim Sum Bonds in Hong Kong’s Offshore RMB Market”, Iakyara, Vol.152,12November2012, pp.1-6.
①关于1980年代日本精英层金融自由化的雄心和冲动，具体可参见高柏：《日本经济的悖论——繁荣与停滞的制度性根源》，商务印书馆2004年版，第204-207页。
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②目前，这方面的集大成之作是佩尔森和塔贝里尼合著的《政治经济学：对经济政策的解释》一书。参见Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: TheMIT Press,2000.
①在弗里登看来，“特定要素模型”意味着，商品相对价格的变动主要对该商品的特定部门生产商而不是整个要素所有者阶层产生影响。参见Frieden, Jeffry A.,“Invested Interests: The Politics of National EconomicPolicies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization, Vol.45, No.4,1991, p.436.
①在分析美国的国际经济政策时，Cohen明确将外国政府作为参与博弈过程的一个重要行为体，用他的话说，“当涉及美国国际经济政策的游说努力时，‘私人部门’是一个很大的、多样化的群体，它包括如下构成：制造部门；农业和原材料部门；服务部门；工会；消费者；外国公司和政府；关心环境、工人权利、人权、经济发展等问题的非政府组织。”参见Cohen, Stephen D., The Making of United States InternationalEconomic Policy: Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform, Fifth Edition, Westport, Connecticut: PraegerPublishers,2000, p.114.
①McNamara, Kathleen R.,“Consensus and Constraint: Ideas and Capital Mobility in European MonetaryIntegration,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.37, No.3,1999, p.462.
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊著《联邦党人文集》中译本，商务印书馆2012年版，“第四十七篇”，第246页。
②《联邦党人文集》，“第四十八篇”，第252页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第四十八篇”，第252页。
②《联邦党人文集》，“第五十一篇”，第265-266页。
③美国政治学者杜鲁门清晰地表达了这一观点。参见[美]戴维·杜鲁门著《政治过程——政治利益与公共舆论》中译本，天津人民出版社2005年版，第549页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第五十一篇”，第265页。
②涉及的法案被命名为“布雷顿森林协议法”（Bretton Woods Agreements Act），于1945年7月31号被美国国会批准通过。详见http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/17_01_19450731.pdf.
②需要指出的是，美国国会对1960年代黄金不断流出美国十分担忧，并由此质疑布雷顿森林体系下的美元价值。因此，尼克松在1971年8月15日宣布关闭“黄金窗口”的举动与国会的考虑不谋而合，国会没有反对他的决定。相反，国会在既成事实后认可了该行为以及后来转向浮动汇率的做法。参见Destler, I. M.and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Washington, DC:Institute for International Economics,1989, p.99, f.2.
⑤杰弗里·A.弗里登：《经济一体化与美国的货币政策政治》，载于[美]罗伯特·基欧汉、海伦·米尔纳主编《国际化与国内政治》中译本，北京大学出版社2003年版，第131页。关于美国国会介入美联储货币政策的更为详细的考察，可参见Journal of Monetary Economic（s1978）; Kettl, Donald F., Leadership at the Fed,New Haven: Yale University Press,1986, pp.140-166; Woolley, John T., Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve
②需要指出的是，美国国会对1960年代黄金不断流出美国十分担忧，并由此质疑布雷顿森林体系下的美元价值。因此，尼克松在1971年8月15日宣布关闭“黄金窗口”的举动与国会的考虑不谋而合，国会没有反对他的决定。相反，国会在既成事实后认可了该行为以及后来转向浮动汇率的做法。参见Destler, I. M.and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Washington, DC:Institute for International Economics,1989, p.99, f.2.
and the Politics of Monetary Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1984, pp.144-153.
②美国国会决策的组织结构为议员—小组委员会—委员会—全院大会—两院协商委员会的五级议事结构。参见李巍著《制度变迁与美国国际经济政策》，上海人民出版社2010年版，第117页。
①例如，在一次类似的听证会上，时任美联储主席阿瑟·F·伯恩斯（Arthur F. Burns,1970-1978）承诺，如果财政部和美联储没有解决外汇干预的分歧，他会立即将情形通知给国会。参见U.S. Congress, JointEconomic Committee, How Well Are Fluctuating Exchange Rates Working? Hearings,93rd Cong.,1st sess.,20,
21,26, and27June1973,189.
②戴斯特勒和海宁为我们揭示了一个细节，在1985年一名美联储官员向一个众议院银行子委员会提出建议，美联储应当独立于财政部向国会报告汇率问题，而非在发布其报告之前只能征询财政部的意见。参见Destler, I. M. and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, p.87.
③Putnam, Robert D. and Henning, C. Randall,“The Bonn Summit of1978: A Case Study in Coordination”, inCooper, Richard N. et al, eds., Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation, Washington,DC: The Brookings Institution,1989, pp.84-87; Cohen, Stephen D. and Meltzer, Ronald I., United StatesInternational Economic Policy in Action: Diversity of Decision Making, chapter2; Nickel, Herman,“The InsideStory of the Dollar Rescue”, Fortune,4December1978, pp.40-44; Holmes, Alan R. and Pardee, Scott E.,“Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York QuarterlyReview4, Spring1979, pp.67-87.
④Volcker, Paul A. and Gyohten Toyoo, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to AmericanLeadership, New York, NY: Times Books,1992, pp.238-239.
①《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第46页。需要指出的是，原文为“Faction”一词，作者认为，中译本中的“党争”容易引起歧义，翻译成“派系”较为妥帖。后文将以“派系”一词替代译文中的“党争”。
②《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第46-47页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第47页。
②例如，法国政治思想家德·托克维尔在美国杰克逊政府时期曾这样评价美国的“结社”现象：“美国是世界上最便于组党结社和把这一强大行动手段用于多种多样目的的国家。”“世界上只有一个国家能使人们每天行使政治结社的无限自由。在世界上，也只有这个国家能使公民们想到在社会生活中不断行使结社权，并由此得到文明所能提供的一切好处。”参见[法]托克维尔著《论美国的民主》（上卷），商务印书馆2011年版，第213页；《论美国的民主》（下卷），商务印书馆2011年版，第645页。。
①谈判的结果是，美林公司（Merrill-Lynch）——里甘之前曾担任主席的公司——成为第一家受益的美国金融机构。参见Frankel, Jeffrey, The Yen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing Japanese Financial Markets,Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, December1984, p.47.
①当然，财政部也可以利用国会和国内多元化经济利益集团所施加的压力作为逼迫他国政府就范的杠杆，如20世纪80年代“广场协议（”PlazaAccord）所揭示的情形。详情可参见Destler, I. M. and Henning, C. Randall,Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Chapters3-4; Funabashi, Yoichi, Managing theDollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Second Edition, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,Revised1989.
①转引自李寿祺：《利益集团参政——美国利益集团与政府的关系》，《美国研究》1989年第4期，第28页。
①《联邦党人文集》，“第十篇”，第45页。
①中文译本将其翻译为“政治过程”。参见[美]戴维·杜鲁门著《政治过程——政治利益与公共舆论》中译本，天津人民出版社2005年版。
①胡伟：“中译本序”，载于[美]戴维·杜鲁门著《政治过程——政治利益与公共舆论》中译本，天津人民出版社2005年版，第11页。
①但在理论上，即便是小集团也不会有效地行动，因为它们的成员不能就集体行动的成本或收益的分配达成可接受的一致意见。一个小集团也几乎不可避免地会面对“白搭车”问题，这使得集团本身变得不稳定，除非公共物品的贴现率及对物品的估值在其成员之间全然不变。参见Gowa, Joanne,“Public Goods andPolitical Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States”, International Organization, Vol.42, No.1, Winter1988, p.25; Laver, Michael,“Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem”, PoliticalStudies, Vol.28, No.2, June1980, pp.203-204.
①Gowa, Joanne,“Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the UnitedStates”, p.26.
①Public Citizen,“Lobbying Rules: Foreign Agents Registration Act”, July25,2005,http://www.citizen.org/documents/FARA.pdf, accessible on March3,2013.
②Schumer, McCaskill and Obama,“Closing the Foreign Lobbying Loophole Act”, S.3123,110thCongress2ndSession, in the Senate of the United States, June12,2008; OII,“Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)”,www.ofii.org/policy-issues/political-process/238-foreign-agents-registration-act-fara.html, accessible on March3,2013.
①参见Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics: System under Stress, Washington, DC: Institute for InternationalEconomics and New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,1986; Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics, SecondEdition, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,1992;Destler, I. M. and Odell, John S., Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics, Washington,DC: Institute for International Economics, September1987.
①The Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, The International Positionof the Dollar, The Committee for Economic Development,1961, p.21.
②Memorandum for the Record by Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, December6,1960, FRUS1958-1960, Vol.IV, International Financial and Monetary Policy, P.147.
③Kennedy, John F., Special Message on Gold and Balance of Payments Deficit, February6,1961, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
④肯尼迪曾在竞选运动中公开声明，美国将继续履行35美元/1盎司黄金的承诺。并且，他认为，“（美元）贬值将会引发对这个国家的美好信念和稳定以及对其总统能力的怀疑。”参见Sorensen, Ted C., Kennedy,New York: Harper and Row,1965, p.408.
①参见Conybeare, John A. C., United States Foreign Economic Policy and the International Capital Markets:The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,1988, pp.80-83.
②U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy,1963:580.
①United States Government Printing Office, Economic Report of the President,1966, p.165.
②此前，所有的银行贷款是不被征收利息平衡税的。约翰逊总统在为这项举措做辩护时指出，1964年一年期以上的对外银行贷款从15亿美元增至25亿美元。参见New York Times, February11,1965.
③U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson,1965, p.171.
④VFCR的要点体现在“银行和非银行金融机构指南”（Guidelines for Banks and Nonbank FinancialInstitutions）之中，参见Federal Reserve Bulletin, March1965.
⑤Andrew Brimmer’s JEC testimony in Balance of Payments Policies, p.163.
⑥有关“自愿的”天花板规定的细节，可参见Aronson, Jonathan David, Money and Power: Banks and the WorldMonetary System, California: Sage Publications, Inc.,1977, pp.74-75.
①Statement of Secretary Connor; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Balance ofPayments1965, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance,89th Congress,1st session,1965, pp.
186-188.
②“Guidelines Tighten on Foreign Investment”, Business Week, December11,1965, p.12.
③New York Times, November19,1967, p.1; New York Times, January12,1968, p.15.
④Conybeare的研究表明，尽管财政部在约翰逊政府时期仍然在国际收支政策上有着强大的决策权，但政策制定的场所已经转移到白宫，特别是转移到负责国际安全的约翰逊的副助理弗朗西斯·贝特尔（FrancisBator）那里。这一权力转移源于多个原因，主要是由于总统个性的相对力量以及他对国际货币事务感兴趣这一事实。相比之下，当时的新任财政部长亨利·富勒（Henry Fowler）更关心于就集中创造储备的问题扩大欧洲与美国的对话，即他关注的是流动性而非调整问题。参见Conybeare, John A. C., United StatesForeign Economic Policy and the International Capital Markets: The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, pp.91-92, p.186.
①Testimony of C. Stewart of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute; U.S., Congress, House, Committee onForeign Affairs, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign EconomicPolicy,91st Congress,1st session,1969, p.61.
②IMF, Report on Exchange Restrictions,1969, p.498.Monetary Reform, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments,89th Congress,1st session,1965, p.187.
①Joint Economic Committee,1965Joint Economic Report, part4.
②New York Times, July19,1963, p.1.
③New York Times, December9,1963, p.57.
①U.S. Treasury, Recent Changes in Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments, Hearings before theCommittee on Banking and Currency, Congress House of Representatives,88th Congress,1st session,1963, p.169.
②Statement of Secretary Dillon, Recent Changes in Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments, hearingsbefore the Committee on Banking and Currency, Congress House of Representatives,88th Congress,1st session,1963, p.152.
①Kuhn, Loeb&Co., Kuhn, Loeb, New York: NBM Publishing Papercutz,1975, pp.20,27.
②Dillon, Read&Co., Dillon, Read, New York: NBM Publishing Papercutz,1974, pp.14,25-26.
③New York Times, February11,1965, p.57.
①New York Times, July21,1963, p.1; July22,1963, p.1; July25,1963, p.36.
①美国政府给出的豁免原因是：“这一豁免服务于两个目的，一是为日本在其他可能性降低的情况下提供持续进入我国金融市场的渠道，二是作为在需要时容易获得美国救助的标志。我们相信，考虑到日本作为远东的主要金融中心和正在地区发展援助努力中发挥更大作用的国家，一个运转良好的国际货币体系需要日本继续将其货币的国际价值保持在一个合理的基础上。”参见Undersecretary Deming’s written reply toRepresentative Vanik, Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Interest EqualizationTax Extension Act,1967, p.120.
②Testimony of Secretary Dillion, Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, InterestEqualization Tax,1963, p.142.
③Statement of George W. Mitchell, in1963Economic Report, Joint Economic Committee,1963, p.385.
④Testimony of Secretary Dillion, Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, InterestEqualization Tax,1963, p.128.
⑤引自New York Times, March20,1964, p.45.
①狄龙曾在一封回复国会议员科尔蒂斯的信中提到，“欧洲的官方金融人士的回应是，我们已采取了有利于我们国际收支的措施，并且总统在7月18日宣布的这一计划……会提高而非降低对美元的信心。”参见Written reply to Congressman T. B. Curtis from Secretary Dillon, Congress House of Representatives, Committeeon Ways and Means, Interest Equalization Tax,1963, p.106.
①Wall Street Journal, March30,1976.
②哈罗德·泰勒（Harold Taylor）曾写道，“大银行与小银行之间的分立是（阻止有效游说的）第一块绊脚石。除了国内事务，很难把所有银行聚拢到一起，立法者可能觉得，什么都不做或是让双方都失望而不是支持任何一方，会比较好。”参见Harold Taylor,“The Banking Lobby: a papier-mache monster”, BankersMagazine, No.153, Spring1970, p.75.
①Business Week, August5,1967, p.108.
②“艾奇法”（the EdgeAct）是一个在1919年通过的对美国“1913年联邦储备法”的修正案，编号为12U.S.C.§§611-631，它允许美国的全国性银行通过联邦批准设立的子公司从事国际银行业务。该法是以新泽西州参议员瓦尔特·埃文斯·艾奇（Walter Evans Edge）的名字命名的，其动机是给予美国公司在同外国公司竞争时更大的灵活性。“艾奇法公司”（Edge Act Corporation）是一家银行或银行控股公司或金融控股公司的子公司，它是由美联储根据“联邦储备法”第25A部分的规定（1916年和1919年两次被修正）批准设立的从事国外银行业活动的公司。参见维基百科，http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edge_Act, accessible onMarch10,2013.
①即使这一漏洞后来被发现，当局也没有采取任何措施去修正它，以便将管制范围涵盖任何一个月的平均未偿还贷款。美联储只是要求银行不要利用该计划的精神。参见Aronson, Jonathan David, Money and Power:Banks and the World Monetary System, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.,1977, pp.82-83.
②Memo of telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy, February9,1965; Dillon, personal papers, KennedyLibrary;转引自Conybeare, John A. C., United States Foreign Economic Policy and the International CapitalMarkets: The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, p.215.
③Testimony of Secretary Fowler, Balance of Payments-1965, before Congress Senate, Committee on Bankingand Currency, p.1055.
①参见Koszul, J.–P.,“American Banks in Europe”, in Kindleberger, Charles P., ed., The InternationalCorporation, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1970.
②New York Times, April12,1965, p.52.
③New York Times, February11,1965, p.57.
①“Rushing to Span the Globe”, Business Week, August8,1964, pp.19-21.
②Business Week, February20,1965, p.20.
③Andrew Brimmer,“Prospects for commercial banks in international money and capital markets: an Americanperspective”, paper presented before the Conference on World Banking, London, January17,1974:9.
①U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment Program: Selected Statistics,1972:5.
②1963年，加拿大46%的制造业、62%的石油和天然气、52%的采矿业是由美国公司控制的。参见Powrie,T. L.,“Foreign Direct Investment in Canada”, in Rolfe, Sidney E. and Damm, Walter, eds., The MultinationalCorporation in the World Economy, New York: Praeger,1970, p.92.
①Karsten, C. F.,“Should Europe Restrict U.S. Investments?”, in Cohen, Benjamin J., ed., American ForeignEconomic Policy, New York: Praeger, Harper and Row,1968, pp.233-234.
②例如，在美国政府于1965年推出自愿性FDIP计划后，英国财政部对外国公司在英国本土借贷施加了新的限制，美联储向英格兰银行传递抗议的信息，但被以英国的问题更为严峻为由“礼貌”地回绝了。法国政府也采取了类似的行动，逼迫美国企业在德国、荷兰和比利时等国融资。参见Conybeare, JohnA. C., UnitedStates Foreign Economic Policy and the International Capital Markets: The Case of Capital Export Countries,1963-1974, pp.201-202.
③参见Boddewyn, Jean J., Western European Policies toward U.S. Investors, New York: Institute of Finance,New York University,1974, pp.93-95.
①Testimonies in Congress House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Direct InvestmentControls,1969.
②美国国际商会理事会曾在1970年3月就FDIP计划的效应对60家主要的美国对外直接投资者做过调查，结果发现，即使是大型的跨国公司也受到了这一计划的有利冲击。参见U.S. Council of the InternationalChamber of Commerce, The Impact of U.S. Controls on Direct Investment, New York: mimeo,1970.
①New York Times, September21,1968, p.49; December3,1968, p.61; December23,1968, p.61.
②U.S. Commerce Department, International Commerce, April21,1969;转引自Congress House ofRepresentatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Direct Investment Controls,1969, pp.100-101.
③Joint Economic Committee, Review of Balance of Payments Policies,1969, p.150.
①霍撒克当时是尼克松总统经济顾问委员会（Council of Economic Advisers, CEA）的成员之一。
①1971年8月15日，尼克松宣布实行“新经济政策”，其主要内容是对工资和物价实行管制、对进口商品征收10%的进口附加税、终止黄金的可兑换。
②Houthakker, Hendrik S.,“Cooling Off the Monetary Crisis”, in Evans, Thomas G., ed., The Monetary Muddle,New York: Dow Jones,1974, p.37.
③New York Times, December28,1971, p.41.
④The Economist, September9,1972, p.48.
①转引自Odell, John S., U. S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change,Princeton: Princeton University Press,1982, p.317.
①值得一提的是，当尼克松政府选择比承诺的时间更早终结VFCR的管制时，美国的银行业感到惊讶。毕竟，这让大银行提前丧失了相对于小银行在对外业务方面的一些优势。参见Aronson, Jonathan David, Moneyand Power: Banks and the World Monetary System, p.78.
①John Williamson, The Exchange Rate System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, June1985, figure A7, p.106.
①Office of the President, Program for Economic Recovery, Washington, DC: Office of the President, February,18,1981.
②“Remarks of the President to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank andInternational Monetary Fund”, Washington Post, September30,1981.
③通货膨胀率的数字是以消费者物价指数的变化给出的。参见Council of the Economic Advisers, EconomicReport of the President, January1989, p.377.
④New York Times, November7,1985, p. D1.
①New York Times, April17,1981.
②值得指出的是，财政部推行的放任美元升值的汇率政策并没有遭到其他政府部门的反对。当时的预算主任戴维·斯托克曼（David Stockman）和经济顾问委员会主席穆雷·维登鲍姆（Murray Weidenbaum）都是自由市场的强烈倡导者，因而他们都拥护财政部在汇率上的放手不管政策。
③“Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York QuarterlyReview, various issues, Autumn1981-Spring1985;转引自Destler, I. M. and Henning, C. Randall, Dollar Politics:Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,1989,pp.22-23.作者将政府连续几天入市干预视为一次干预。
①正是他以及埃兹拉·所罗门（Ezra Solomon）、戴维·默奇逊（David Murchison）三人在1983年9月底对白宫和财政部的游说，成为促使唐纳德·里甘发起日元/美元运动的驱动力。埃兹拉·所罗门是美国斯坦福大学经济学家，戴维·默奇逊是华盛顿律师，两人在摩根的资助下负责起草了题为《美元与日元的错配：问题及解决之道》的研究报告，报告重新了摩根在1982年提出的观点：“美国的制造业企业和工人正遭受因日元和美元的严重错配所带来的重大损害。”参见Murchison, David C., Solomon, Ezra. The Misalignment ofthe United States Dollar and the Japanese Yen: The Problem and Its Solution, September19,1983, p.1.
②H. R.3035,99th Congress,1st sess., sec.103, submitted on July18,1985. Reproduced in US Congress, Houseof Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Trade Emergency and ExportPromotion Act, hearing,99th Conress,1st sess. on September17,1985, p.15.
②当时的参议院国际金融与货币政策小组委员会的主席保罗·萨巴尼斯（Paul Sarbanes）指出，“1988年贸易法案中要求财政部就国际经济和汇率政策的实施向国会提交半年度报告和证词的条款，在很大程度上是对20世纪80年代早期实践的一种回应，当时美元被允许长期稳定地升值到很高的水平，却对使美元与其他货币保持一致没有任何影响。”参见U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, Treasury Department’s Report on InternationalEconomic and Exchange Rate Policy, May16,1991, p.1.
③“Strengthening United States Trade Laws: Recommendations of the Business Roundtable Task Force onInternational Trade and Investment”, October21,1985.
①Business Roundtable,“Background Statement on International Monetary Policy”, January7,1986.
②US Council for International Business,“Statement on Exchange Rates and International Economic PolicyCoordination”, March11,1986.
④希尔克则将美国在1986年对待日本和德国的做法称为“进攻性双边主义”（aggressive bilateralism）。参见Silk, Leonard,“The United States and the World Economy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3,1986, p.468.
④希尔克则将美国在1986年对待日本和德国的做法称为“进攻性双边主义”（aggressive bilateralism）。参见Silk, Leonard,“The United States and the World Economy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3,1986, p.468.
①参见Knight, Sarah Cleeland,“When Exchange Rates Become Political: The Evolving Relationship BetweenExchange Rates and Firm Competitiveness”, Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American PoliticalScience Association, September1-4,2005, Washington, DC, p.6.
①联邦对教育支出的减少只是暂时的，在短暂的1年半后，联邦对教育的支出开始大幅增加，在1995年中-1996年中虽有短暂小幅下降，但总体上呈上升趋势，到2000年，其金额已从1993年中的370亿美元增加至750亿美元。参见Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report of the Council ofEconomic Advisers, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC:2001, p.245.
①1995年后，财政部和美联储再次推行了不干预政策。有资料显示，1995-2000年间，财政部和美联储只入市干预了两次，一次是在1998年6月，另一次是在2000年9月，并且，这两次干预又分别是在日本银行和欧洲央行的合作下进行的。此外，尽管两次操作都涉及到购买外汇，但它们明显都不是为了改善美国国际竞争力而让美元贬值的。参见Knight, Sarah Cleeland,“When Exchange Rates Become Political: TheEvolving Relationship Between Exchange Rates and Firm Competitiveness”, p.9.
①Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers,United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC:2001, p.101.
①[英]彼得·高恩著《华盛顿的全球赌博》中译本，江苏人民出版社2003年版，第27-32页。
②[英]彼得·高恩著《华盛顿的全球赌博》，第54-55页。
①这加速了日本国内的过剩资本向美国的转移，从而资助了美国的经济、货币和军事霸权。参见Gilpin,Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1987, p.328-336.
②而第一家获准进入东京证券交易所的就是里甘曾供职的美林证券公司。参见Frankel, Jeffrey A., TheYen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing Japanese Capital Markets, Washington, DC: Institute for InternationalEconomics, December1984, p.47.
③例如，萨默斯在1997年时就说过：“无论是在国内还是在国际上，金融自由化都是美国议程的一个关键部分。”参见Wade, Robert,“The U.S. Role in the LongAsian Crisis of1990-2000”, in Lukauskas, Arvid John andRivera-Batiz, Francisco L., eds., The Political Economy of the East Asian Crisis and Its Aftermath: Tigers inDistress, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing,2001, p.205.
①这一事件被莱斯特·瑟罗（Lester Thurow）比喻为“华尔街”（Wall Street）与“主街”（Main Street）之争。参见Frankel, Jeffrey A.,“Exchange Rate Policy”, in Feldstein, Martin, ed., American Economic Policy in the1980s, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1994, pp.325-326.
①参见Melamed, Leo, ed., The Merits of Flexible Exchange Rates: An Anthology, Fairfax, VA: George MasonUniversity Press,1988.
①即1971年12月的史密森学会协议（the Smithsonian Agreement）。
②Under Secretary Mulford’s response to questions by Senator Sarbanes. U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs, First Annual Hearing on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy, May5,1989, pp.39-40.
③U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy,October1988, p.19.
①Lindner, Deborah J.,“The Political Economy of the Won: U.S.-Korean Bilateral Negotiations on ExchangeRates”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers No.434, July1992, p.17.
②美国学者肯特·考德尔（Kent Calder）曾对日本作为“反应型国家”（reactive state）的特性做出过出色的描述。参见Calder, Kent E.,“Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State”,World Politics, Vol.40, No.4, Jul.,1988, pp.517-541.
②“The Plaza Accord: The World Intervenes In Currency Markets”, November12,2009,http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/09/plaza-accord.asp, accessible on March20,2013.
③有关“广场协议”的详细描述，可参见Henning, C. Randall and Destler, I. M.,“From Neglect to Activism:American Politics and the1985Plaza Accord”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol.8, No.3/4, International MonetaryCooperation, Domestic Politics, and Policy Ideas, Jul.–Dec.,1988, pp.317-333; Destler, I. M. and Henning, C.Randall, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States, Chapter3; Funabashi, Yoichi,Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,1988.
①希尔克（Silk）指出，美国在1986年针对日本和西德采取了“进攻性双边主义”的政策，旨在在促进自身经济利益的同时打造它所希望的维持世界经济稳定与增长的联盟，其实质是通过压迫他国分担提供国际公共产品的责任和负担来增进美国的利益。参见Silk, Leonard,“The United States and the World Economy”,Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3,1986, p.468.
①详情请参见U.S. Department of the Treasury,“Semiannual Report on International Economic and ExchangeRate Policies”, various issues; Henning, C. Randall,“Congress, Treasury, and the Accountability of ExchangeRate Policy: How the1988Trade Act Should Be Reformed”, Peterson Institute for International EconomicsWorking Paper Series07-8, September2007.
①Speech by John B. Taylor,“New Directions for U.S. Economic Policy towards Japan and China”, October21,2004, Press Center of U.S. Department of the Treasury,http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2050.aspx, accessible on March13,2013.
①“汇率保护主义”一词见于Malpass, David,“Exchange Rate Protectionism: AHarmful Diversion for Trade andDevelopment Policy”, Cato Journal, Vol.25, No.1, Winter2005, pp.107-110.
①参见Goldstein, Morris,“Currency Manipulation and Enforcing the Rules of the International MonetarySystem”, in Truman, Edwin M., ed., Reforming the IMF for the21st Century, Peterson Institute for InternationalEconomics Special Report19, April2006, pp.141-155; Mussa, Michael,“IMF Surveillance over China’sExchange Rate Policy”, Paper presented at the Conference on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, October19,2007; Scott, Robert E.,“Currency Manipulation: History Shows ThatSanctions Are Needed”, EPI Policy Memorandum#164, April28,2010; Preeg, Ernest H.,“Chinese CurrencyManipulation and IMF/WTO Obligations”,http://americanactionforum.org/files/Chinese%20Currency%20Manipulation%20and%20IMF.pdf; Elizabeth L.Pettis, Esquire,“Challenging Chinese Currency Manipulation under the IMF Agreement”, January2011,http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_pettis/2/.
①International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, Section1(iii), Article Ⅳ,转引自Sanford, Jonathan E.,“Currency Manipulation: The IMF and WTO”, CRS Report for Congress RS22658, January28,2011.
②Denters, Erik,“Manipulation of Exchange Rates in International Law: The Chinese Yuan”, ASIL Insights,November2003.
③这7个指标是：在外汇市场上进行持久的单向的大规模干预、出于国际收支目的而从事的官方或半官方的借款行为、出于国际收支目的而施加的经常账户与资本账户限制、出于国际收支目的而采取的非正常的鼓励或阻碍资本流动的货币或其他金融措施、根本性的汇率错配、大规模和长期的经常账户赤字或顺差、对外部门存在大量的脆弱性等因素。参见International Monetary Fund,“Executive Board’s2007Decision onBilateral Surveillance”, June15,2007.
④从多个指标来看，美国称得上是最切合“汇率操纵”标准的国家，例如大规模和长期的经常账户赤字、故意实施的弱势美元政策。正如斯提坎撒·帕坦艾克所言，“在2007年6月15日‘IMF执行董事会决定’之后，是IMF告诉相关国家其汇率是否以及在多大程度上错配。如果错配的现象没有被消除，美国就会对这些国家的出口诉诸保护主义。因此，它是全球化世界中的单边主义，在这样的世界中，一国的行为通过一个多边组织的分析和影响而变得合法化。美国处理美元的方式——公然宣称的‘它是我们的货币，但是你们的问题’——表明美元的升值或贬值更多地是世界其他国家而非美国所关心的事情。”参见Pattanaik,Sitikantha,“Global Imbalances, Tanking Dollar, and the IMF’s Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies”, CatoJournal, Vol.27, No.3, Fall2007, pp.316-317.
①Muir Macpherson,“A Higher Yuan Would Halve U.S.-China Trade Deficit”, December6,2011, BloombergGovernment, http://about.bgov.com/2011/12/06/bgov-study-higher-yuan-would-halve-u-s-china-trade-deficit/.
②伯格斯腾的这一结论是建立在人民币至少对美元低估40%以及在加权贸易基础上低估25%的假设之上。Bergsten, C. Fred, Testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, March24,2010.2010年9月15日，伯格斯腾在众议院筹款委员会作证时声称，“消除中国人民币汇率的错配会给美国创造50万个工作机会。”参见Bergsten, C. Fred,“Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate”, Testimony beforethe Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives,September15,2010, http://www.iie.com/publications/testimony/bergsten20100915.pdf
①孙哲和刘建华曾从“产业地理”与“结盟游说”的视角分析了美国的对华贸易政策。参见孙哲、刘建华：《产业地理与结盟游说——考察美国对华贸易政策的新视角》，《世界经济与政治》2007年第6期，第28-36页。
①美国彭博新闻社2003年5月15日报道；转引自何兴强：《美国利益集团与人民币升值压力》，《当代亚太》2006年第3期，第51页。
①邓彪、赵维焘：《论美国利益集团在人民币汇率问题上的结盟行动——以“健全美元联盟”、“公平货币联盟”为例》，《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》2010年第4期，第105页。
②National Association of Manufacturers,“The NAM Trade Agenda for China2005”, http://www.nam.org.
③“Review of China’s Compliance with Its WTO Commitments”, Comments Submitted to the Trade Policy StaffCommittee by the National Association of Manufactures, October2010,http://www.nam.org/~/media/037AFCBD3EDF49C5A60509C38BFF1F48/China_WTO_Compliance_NAM_Comments_to_TPSC_2010.pdf.
①“United States-China Economic Relations and China’s Role in the World Economy”, Hearing before theCommittee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,109th Congress,1st Session, April14,2005,Serial No.109-13.
②The Center for Responsive Politics,“Organization Profiles: National Association of Manufacturers”,http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000054156&cycle=A.
①National Association of Manufacturers,“National Public Affairs Steering Committee”,http://www.nam.org/Get-Involved/National-Public-Affairs-Steering-Committee/Landing.aspx.
②National Association of Manufacturers,“Chinese Currency Manipulation Must Stop!”, http://www.nam.org.
③China Currency Coalition,“China’s Undervalued Yuan Pushes Trade Deficit with U.S. to a Staggering$162Billion”, February10,2005, http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org.
①China Currency Coalition White Paper,“U.S. Indebtedness to China and Japan Should Spur, Not Delay or Deter,Efforts to Offset Trade Imbalances Aggravated By Exchange-Rate Misalignment of the Undervalued Yuan andYen”, April20,2007, http://faircurrency.org/econ/SFX1B8E.pdf.
②信的开头说：你们收到申诉四个小时后就作出决定，我们表示极大遗憾，很难相信你们对申诉给予了认真细致的考虑。参见http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org/newsarticles/092404_letter_html.
③“China’s Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact on the United States”, Hearing before theU.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,108thCongress,1stSession, September25,2003, pp.189-191.
①Testimony of Thea Mei Lee, Deputy Chief of Staff of the AFL-CIO, Before the House Committee on ForeignAffairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade China’s Indigenous Innovation Trade andInvestment Policies: How Great a Threat?, September3,2011.
①Jones, Clayton,“Bernanke blasts China for currency manipulation”, November19,2010,http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-Board-Blog/2010/1119/Bernanke-blasts-China-for-currency-manipulation.
②Beattie, Alan and Hille, Kathrin,“Bernanke criticises China over currency”, October4,2011,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1f7be1c-eeaa-11e0-959a-00144feab49a.html.
③Hilsenrath, Jon,“Bernanke Advocates Stronger Currencies”, October15,2012,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443749204578055600111447318.html.
④US Department of Treasury Press Release,“Treasury Secretary Snow Appoints Olin L. Wethington as SpecialEnvoy on China”, May19,2005.
④转引自Lichtervelde, Isabelle De,“Talking Tough: Washington’s Evolving Discourse on China’s CurrencyRegime”, Asia Paper, Vol.6, Issue1, January10,2012, p.9.
⑤US Department of Treasury Press Release,“Treasury Secretary Paulson, Henry, Following the Announcementof The U.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue”, September21,2006.
⑥Hearings on Timothy Geithner’s appointment form the Senate Finance Committee, in response to writtenquestions submitted by the Senators (Charles Schumer, D-NY), January22,2009.
⑦US Department of Treasury Press Release,“Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Release ofSemi-Annual Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies”, April15,2009,http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg90.aspx;“Secretary Geithner’s Remarks on ‘The PathAhead for the U.S.-China Economic Relationship’, January12,2011,http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1019.aspx;”“Remarks by Secretary Timothy Geithnerat a Discussion on the Upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue at U.S.-China Business Council”,May3,2011,http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/05/20110505191406su0.2003072.html#axzz2OjkYhj69.
①The US-China Business Council,“USCBC Statement on Senate Currency Bill”, June13,2007,https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2007/06/uscbc-senate-currency-bill.html.
②The US-China Business Council,“USCBC Statement on US Senate Passage of Currency Legislation”, October
12,2011, https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2011/10/passage-currency-legislation.html.
③The US-China Business Council,“USCBC Statement on US Treasury Department’s Release of theSemi-Annual Exchange Rate Report to Congress”, May25,2012,https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2012/05/may25pressrelease.html.
④参见美国财政部自2007年6月以来向国会提交的历次半年度国际经济与汇率政策报告。
①参见“中国人民银行公告[2012]第4号”，2012年4月14日，http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/bangongting/82/2012/20120414090504815230140/20120414090504815230140_.html.
②参见U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of International Affairs,“Report to Congress on InternationalEconomic and Exchange Rate Policies”, May25,2012, p.15;“Report to Congress on International Economic andExchange Rate Policies”, November27,2012, p.15.http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/Pages/index.aspx.
③本杰明·科恩认为，“货币权力”有两个关键的维度：自主性和影响力。前者是指不受外部压力的影响而按照自身意愿行动的能力，后者则是控制其他行为体的行为并使其按照自己的方式行动的能力。货币权力有两个外在表现：一是通过延迟国际收支失衡调整的过程来避免持续的调整成本的能力（延迟力），二是通过尽可能向他国转嫁而使自身避免国际收支调整的转型成本的能力（扭曲力）。前一种货币权力对应着自主性，后一种货币权力体现了影响力。参见Cohen, Benjamin J.,“The International Monetary System:Diffusion and Ambiguity”, International Affairs, Vol.84, No.3,2008, pp.455-470.
①所谓“日元升值综合症”，是指1971年以来美日两国政府在执行商业政策、汇率政策及货币政策过程中相互影响所造成的现象。其因果关系的链条是从贸易压力到日元汇率，再从汇率到日本货币政策，其结果是日元的阶段性升值引发的日本经济衰退。参见McKinnon, Ronald I. and Ohno, Kenichi, Dollar and Yen:Resolving Economic Conflict between the United States and Japan, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,1997, pp.1-19.
②http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Japan, last modified on4October,2012.
①U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb;转引自Morrison, Wayne M,“China-U.S. Trade Issues”, CRSReport for Congress, RL33536, May21,2012, pp.6-9.
②详情可参见Morrison, Wayne M.,“China-U.S. Trade Issues”, CRS Report for Congress, RL33536, July29,2010, p.27.
②参见Helleiner, Eric,“Money and Influence: Japanese Power in the International Monetary and FinancialSystem”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.18, No.3,1989, pp.343-358;“Japan and theChanging Global Financial Order”, International Journal, Vol.47, No.2,1992, pp.420-444.
①Hong Kong Monetary Authority,“Briefing to the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs”,19November2012, p.65.
②Hong Kong Monetary Authority,“Briefing to the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs”,19November2012, p.66.
③Wong, Jenny Yee,“Development of Dim Sum Bonds in Hong Kong’s Offshore RMB Market”, Iakyara, Vol.152,12November2012, pp.1-6.
①关于1980年代日本精英层金融自由化的雄心和冲动，具体可参见高柏：《日本经济的悖论——繁荣与停滞的制度性根源》，商务印书馆2004年版，第204-207页。
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