巴塞尔协议下商业银行资本充足率调整行为研究
|
摘要
资本充足率是衡量商业银行综合经营能力和风险抵御能力的最重要指标之一。2010年巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ的出台进一步强化了资本充足监管在全球金融市场的核心地位,确立了全面整体的风险观,风险计量也从定性分析发展到了全面的定量分析。我国银监会于2004年颁布的《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》体现了与国际接轨进行审慎资本监管的思想,而2009年8月发布的《商业银行资本充足率监督检查指引》等七个监管文件修订后的征求意见稿使得加强和完善资本充足率管理,适应国际国内监管环境的变化,走向资本约束的现代商业银行理性经营时代成为摆在我国商业银行面前的现实课题。
自巴塞尔协议问世以来,鉴于其“神圣公约”般的权威性和影响力,立即吸引了各国商业银行和监管者的关注,并纷纷主动将巴塞尔协议的原则和精神纳入其国内监管加以实施。巴塞尔协议通过资本充足率标准降低银行风险机制的内涵非常丰富,银行对各种调整资本充足率方式的选择,会产生不同的效果,例如调整分子和分母等不同方式对银行资本成本和风险偏好的影响效果有着很大差异。我国的商业银行在分子和分母策略上是如何选择的?调整行为上有何规律?背后的原因是什么?什么样的资本充足率调整机制适合我国银行业?这正是本文研究并试图解释的。
本文首先简要介绍了商业银行资本充足率的一般界定与涵义,接下来进一步讨论了资本充足率计算方法的演变及巴塞尔协议的大体框架。2004年发布的《巴塞尔新资本协议》坚持了以资本充足率为核心的监管思路,形成了新资本协议的三大支柱。《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》的出台也标志着我国银行业资本监管不断强化,并开始与国际银行业接轨。无论新旧巴塞尔协议还是2010年的《巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ》,按照其规定的资本充足率基本计算方式,商业银行提高资本充足率大体有调整分子和调整分母两种途径,即通过增加核心资本或附属资本以提高资本金总额,或通过各类金融技术和方法降低银行的总量风险暴露。本文对商业银行不同资金来源进行了比较,建立了一般均衡模型,提出了全球银行业资本约束不断加强的长期趋势使得监管逐渐成为了一种不可忽视的风险,即“监管风险”会导致银行的事前资本成本上升。银行资本缺乏流动性产生的额外交易成本和不确定性带来了“柠檬折扣”的出现。由于柠檬折扣的存在,使得银行股权资本的成本高于债权成本(存款),结合啄食理论,银行会持有一定数量的额外资本,即持有比当前资本需求更多的资本金以应对可能出现的新的资本需要。若资本金不足,银行短时间内会优先选择内源资本策略来满足资本金的需求,但长期来看应注重采用调整分母的方式,尤其面对监管当局的硬性资本充足率要求。论文还继续推导出资本充足率监管要求的变化对资本金成本的高低以及对银行经营风险偏好的影响。
接着论文在介绍了我国商业银行资本充足率现状后,重点对我国商业银行调整资本充足率的方式,反应速度及其对银行风险偏好的影响进行了实证。首先采用面板模型回归和统计指数因素分析法分析我国商业银行提高资本充足率的主要方式,发现目前我国银行主要采取的是调整分子；接着采用均值方差分析和增量分解分析进一步分解分子策略,结果发现我国银行在资本的补充方式上个体差异较为明显,但大体上仍以核心资本的补充为主。本文分析后指出原因不外乎：第一,国有银行由于其特殊地位,本身几乎不受资本成本的约束；第二,2004年开始高涨的股市使得银行股权资本成本大幅下降：最后,也是最大的困难,就是来自我国商业银行全面推行风险管理理念的高昂成本。接着本文运用部分调整模型和压力测试验证了我国不同类别以及不同资本充足率水平的商业银行面对资本充足性监管要求的反应速度以及不同的调整方式对其风险偏好的影响。
论文进一步分析了我国银行充足率调整行为背后的深层根源,并与国际上各大银行的调整行为尤其是次贷危机后的资本充足率调整方式进行了比较之后指出,由于资本金成本的特性,运用分子策略不仅成本较高,而且在降低银行总体风险暴露上效率较低,具有一定的局限性；相反,在我国,调整分母的方式有利于我国商业银行通过先进金融技术来调整资本充足率,提高它们的风险管理水平。最后论文建议从长远角度出发,整个银行业应建立一套持续完善的以巴塞尔协议思想为核心的资本充足率调整机制,通过内在动力和外在压力使商业银行创新并运用经营管理方法及手段以提高抵御风险能力和国际竞争力。这也是我国银行在激烈的国际竞争中争取优势地位的牢固根基之一。
Capital adequacy ratio is one of the most important indicators for measuring commercial banks'comprehensive operating capacity and the risk-resisting ability. The introduction of the Basel Capital AccordⅢin 2010 further strengthened the core position of capital adequacy regulation in the global financial markets, established a comprehensive view of risk and developed the risk measurement from a qualitative analysis to an overall quantitative analysis. In 2004, China Banking Regulatory Commission promulgated the "Measures for the Management of Capital Adequacy Ratios of Commercial Banks" which reflects the the ideas of international practice and a prudential supervision of capital. Moreover, in August 2009, seven regulatory guide documents after revising lay a real subject before China's commercial banks concerning how to improve the capital adequacy management and how to adapt to changes in an international and a domestic regulatory environment, as well as stepping into a rational operating under the capital constraints.
Since the advent of the Basel Accord, owing to its authority and influence as a "sacred conventions", Basel Accord immediately had the attention of commercial banks and regulators. They have taken the principles and spirit of the Basel Accord into their domestic regulation and put into implementation. Basel Accord has a very subtle and delicate risk reduction mechanism and different choices of adjusting methods will have different effects on the cost of bank capital and risk preferences, such as numerator strategies and denominator strategies. How do China's commercial banks select between the numerator and denominator strategies? What is the law of their adjusting behavior and reasons behind? What kind of adjustment mechanism is suitable for China's commercial banks? These are what this paper tried to research and explain.
This paper firstly gives a general definition of commercial bank's capital adequacy ratio, followed by a summary discussion of evolution of capital adequacy calculations and the formation and development of Basel Accord. New Basel Accord issued in 2004 upheld the core position of capital adequacy ratio regulation and formed three pillars of the accord. "Measures for the Management of Capital Adequacy Ratios of Commercial Banks" also marked the intensifying of capital regulation and its integration with the international standards. In accordance with "Basel Accord", no matter the old, new orⅢin 2010, banks raise their capital adequacy ratio in two ways:numerator strategies by increasing the core capital or supplementary capital to increase the total amount of capital, and denominator strategies through various financial techniques to reduce the total risk exposure. In this paper, different capital sources are compared to establish a general equilibrium model. The increasingly strengthened banking capital constraints around the world make regulation to be a risk to be reckoned, namely "regulatory risk", which will raise the capital cost. The additional transaction costs and uncertainty out of lack of liquidity for bank capital cost bring a "lemon discount" to happen. The cost of bank equity will be higher than debt costs (deposits) because of lemon discount. Combined with pecking order theory, banks would hold a certain amount of additional capital, which is more than current capital adequacy requirements for a possible new capital needs. In case of a capital shortage, banks will give priority to the internal source to meet the capital requirements within a short time. However, in a long term, denominator strategies should be used. The paper also continues to derive how the change in capital adequacy requirements will affect the cost of capital and the risk preference of banks.
After the introduction of current situation of capital adequacy for China's commercial banks, this paper focuses on how China's commercial banks adjust the ratio and its impact on risk preference. For that, panel data regression models and improved factors analysis of statistical index are employed to analyze the main strategies that banks in China adopt, and then this paper uses mean-variance analysis and increment decomposition of the tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital to make a further investigation. It is found that, although individual differences are obvious for adjusting method, numerator strategies still dominate for our banks. The paper points out that the reasons are:first of all, the state-owned banks are almost beyond the constraints of capital costs; secondly, in 2004, the bull stock market causes a substantial decline in bank equity capital cost; Finally, the biggest difficulty is from huge cost to fully implement a overall risk management. Next, a partial adjustment model and a stress test are conducted to verify the speed of response and the impact on banks'risk preference, based on different bank categories and different levels of capital adequacy ratio.
After a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the adjustment of capital ratio for China's banks and a comparison with international large banks, especially the post-subprime crisis adjusting behavios, the paper concludes that, because of the characteristics of the capital cost, the numerator strategies entail great expense. Moreover, they are difficult to sustain due to the low efficiency in reducing the overall risk exposure. On the contrary, in China, the use of the denominator strategies makes domestic commercial banks improve the capital adequacy ratio and to enhance their risk management by taking advantage of advanced financial techniques.Finanlly, the paper suggests that based on Basel Accord, in the long term, a constant and sophisticated capital adequacy adjusting mechanism should be established. A mechanism like that will urge banks to improve the ability to resist risks and international competitiveness through internal motivation and external pressure, which is also one of the solid foundation for China's banks to fight for dominace in the fierce international competition.
自巴塞尔协议问世以来,鉴于其“神圣公约”般的权威性和影响力,立即吸引了各国商业银行和监管者的关注,并纷纷主动将巴塞尔协议的原则和精神纳入其国内监管加以实施。巴塞尔协议通过资本充足率标准降低银行风险机制的内涵非常丰富,银行对各种调整资本充足率方式的选择,会产生不同的效果,例如调整分子和分母等不同方式对银行资本成本和风险偏好的影响效果有着很大差异。我国的商业银行在分子和分母策略上是如何选择的?调整行为上有何规律?背后的原因是什么?什么样的资本充足率调整机制适合我国银行业?这正是本文研究并试图解释的。
本文首先简要介绍了商业银行资本充足率的一般界定与涵义,接下来进一步讨论了资本充足率计算方法的演变及巴塞尔协议的大体框架。2004年发布的《巴塞尔新资本协议》坚持了以资本充足率为核心的监管思路,形成了新资本协议的三大支柱。《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》的出台也标志着我国银行业资本监管不断强化,并开始与国际银行业接轨。无论新旧巴塞尔协议还是2010年的《巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ》,按照其规定的资本充足率基本计算方式,商业银行提高资本充足率大体有调整分子和调整分母两种途径,即通过增加核心资本或附属资本以提高资本金总额,或通过各类金融技术和方法降低银行的总量风险暴露。本文对商业银行不同资金来源进行了比较,建立了一般均衡模型,提出了全球银行业资本约束不断加强的长期趋势使得监管逐渐成为了一种不可忽视的风险,即“监管风险”会导致银行的事前资本成本上升。银行资本缺乏流动性产生的额外交易成本和不确定性带来了“柠檬折扣”的出现。由于柠檬折扣的存在,使得银行股权资本的成本高于债权成本(存款),结合啄食理论,银行会持有一定数量的额外资本,即持有比当前资本需求更多的资本金以应对可能出现的新的资本需要。若资本金不足,银行短时间内会优先选择内源资本策略来满足资本金的需求,但长期来看应注重采用调整分母的方式,尤其面对监管当局的硬性资本充足率要求。论文还继续推导出资本充足率监管要求的变化对资本金成本的高低以及对银行经营风险偏好的影响。
接着论文在介绍了我国商业银行资本充足率现状后,重点对我国商业银行调整资本充足率的方式,反应速度及其对银行风险偏好的影响进行了实证。首先采用面板模型回归和统计指数因素分析法分析我国商业银行提高资本充足率的主要方式,发现目前我国银行主要采取的是调整分子；接着采用均值方差分析和增量分解分析进一步分解分子策略,结果发现我国银行在资本的补充方式上个体差异较为明显,但大体上仍以核心资本的补充为主。本文分析后指出原因不外乎：第一,国有银行由于其特殊地位,本身几乎不受资本成本的约束；第二,2004年开始高涨的股市使得银行股权资本成本大幅下降：最后,也是最大的困难,就是来自我国商业银行全面推行风险管理理念的高昂成本。接着本文运用部分调整模型和压力测试验证了我国不同类别以及不同资本充足率水平的商业银行面对资本充足性监管要求的反应速度以及不同的调整方式对其风险偏好的影响。
论文进一步分析了我国银行充足率调整行为背后的深层根源,并与国际上各大银行的调整行为尤其是次贷危机后的资本充足率调整方式进行了比较之后指出,由于资本金成本的特性,运用分子策略不仅成本较高,而且在降低银行总体风险暴露上效率较低,具有一定的局限性；相反,在我国,调整分母的方式有利于我国商业银行通过先进金融技术来调整资本充足率,提高它们的风险管理水平。最后论文建议从长远角度出发,整个银行业应建立一套持续完善的以巴塞尔协议思想为核心的资本充足率调整机制,通过内在动力和外在压力使商业银行创新并运用经营管理方法及手段以提高抵御风险能力和国际竞争力。这也是我国银行在激烈的国际竞争中争取优势地位的牢固根基之一。
Capital adequacy ratio is one of the most important indicators for measuring commercial banks'comprehensive operating capacity and the risk-resisting ability. The introduction of the Basel Capital AccordⅢin 2010 further strengthened the core position of capital adequacy regulation in the global financial markets, established a comprehensive view of risk and developed the risk measurement from a qualitative analysis to an overall quantitative analysis. In 2004, China Banking Regulatory Commission promulgated the "Measures for the Management of Capital Adequacy Ratios of Commercial Banks" which reflects the the ideas of international practice and a prudential supervision of capital. Moreover, in August 2009, seven regulatory guide documents after revising lay a real subject before China's commercial banks concerning how to improve the capital adequacy management and how to adapt to changes in an international and a domestic regulatory environment, as well as stepping into a rational operating under the capital constraints.
Since the advent of the Basel Accord, owing to its authority and influence as a "sacred conventions", Basel Accord immediately had the attention of commercial banks and regulators. They have taken the principles and spirit of the Basel Accord into their domestic regulation and put into implementation. Basel Accord has a very subtle and delicate risk reduction mechanism and different choices of adjusting methods will have different effects on the cost of bank capital and risk preferences, such as numerator strategies and denominator strategies. How do China's commercial banks select between the numerator and denominator strategies? What is the law of their adjusting behavior and reasons behind? What kind of adjustment mechanism is suitable for China's commercial banks? These are what this paper tried to research and explain.
This paper firstly gives a general definition of commercial bank's capital adequacy ratio, followed by a summary discussion of evolution of capital adequacy calculations and the formation and development of Basel Accord. New Basel Accord issued in 2004 upheld the core position of capital adequacy ratio regulation and formed three pillars of the accord. "Measures for the Management of Capital Adequacy Ratios of Commercial Banks" also marked the intensifying of capital regulation and its integration with the international standards. In accordance with "Basel Accord", no matter the old, new orⅢin 2010, banks raise their capital adequacy ratio in two ways:numerator strategies by increasing the core capital or supplementary capital to increase the total amount of capital, and denominator strategies through various financial techniques to reduce the total risk exposure. In this paper, different capital sources are compared to establish a general equilibrium model. The increasingly strengthened banking capital constraints around the world make regulation to be a risk to be reckoned, namely "regulatory risk", which will raise the capital cost. The additional transaction costs and uncertainty out of lack of liquidity for bank capital cost bring a "lemon discount" to happen. The cost of bank equity will be higher than debt costs (deposits) because of lemon discount. Combined with pecking order theory, banks would hold a certain amount of additional capital, which is more than current capital adequacy requirements for a possible new capital needs. In case of a capital shortage, banks will give priority to the internal source to meet the capital requirements within a short time. However, in a long term, denominator strategies should be used. The paper also continues to derive how the change in capital adequacy requirements will affect the cost of capital and the risk preference of banks.
After the introduction of current situation of capital adequacy for China's commercial banks, this paper focuses on how China's commercial banks adjust the ratio and its impact on risk preference. For that, panel data regression models and improved factors analysis of statistical index are employed to analyze the main strategies that banks in China adopt, and then this paper uses mean-variance analysis and increment decomposition of the tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital to make a further investigation. It is found that, although individual differences are obvious for adjusting method, numerator strategies still dominate for our banks. The paper points out that the reasons are:first of all, the state-owned banks are almost beyond the constraints of capital costs; secondly, in 2004, the bull stock market causes a substantial decline in bank equity capital cost; Finally, the biggest difficulty is from huge cost to fully implement a overall risk management. Next, a partial adjustment model and a stress test are conducted to verify the speed of response and the impact on banks'risk preference, based on different bank categories and different levels of capital adequacy ratio.
After a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the adjustment of capital ratio for China's banks and a comparison with international large banks, especially the post-subprime crisis adjusting behavios, the paper concludes that, because of the characteristics of the capital cost, the numerator strategies entail great expense. Moreover, they are difficult to sustain due to the low efficiency in reducing the overall risk exposure. On the contrary, in China, the use of the denominator strategies makes domestic commercial banks improve the capital adequacy ratio and to enhance their risk management by taking advantage of advanced financial techniques.Finanlly, the paper suggests that based on Basel Accord, in the long term, a constant and sophisticated capital adequacy adjusting mechanism should be established. A mechanism like that will urge banks to improve the ability to resist risks and international competitiveness through internal motivation and external pressure, which is also one of the solid foundation for China's banks to fight for dominace in the fierce international competition.
引文
[1][美]唐纳德.R.弗雷泽等著,商业银行业务——对风险的管理[M]中国金融出版社,2002年.
[2]巴塞尔银行业监管委员会.统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议：修订框架[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2004年.中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译.
[3]巴塞尔银行业监督委员会.增强银行体系稳健性(征求意见稿),2009年.中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译.
[4]巴曙松.巴塞尔新资本协议研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2003年.
[5]陈忠阳.金融风险分析与管理研究——市场和机构的理论、模型和技术[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001年.
[6]姜波.商业银行资本充足率管理[M].北京：中国金融出版社2004年.
[7]江曙霞.银行监督管理和资本充足性管制[M].北京：中国发展出版社.1994年.
[8]江志流.商业银行资本补充理论与实务[M].北京：中国金融出版社2009年.
[9]李霁友.商业银行资本金制度[M].北京：科学出版社,2004年.
[10]李志辉.中国银行业风险控制和资本充足性管制研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社2007年.
[11]刘明康.商业银行资本充足率管理办法释义[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2002年.
[12]罗平.巴塞尔新资本协议——研究文献及评述[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2004年.
[13]彭茂吾康以同刘军等.西方银行资本管理——银行内部资本最佳资本配置方法[M].北京：企业管理出版社,2003年.
[14]王胜邦.资本约束与信贷扩张[M].北京：中国金融出版社2008年.
[15]王学龙.有效银行监管研究[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社2008年.
[16]章彰.解读巴塞尔新资本协议[M].中国经济出版社.2005年.
[17]赵先信.商业银行内部模型与监管模型[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004年.
[18]刘明康.中国银监会对新巴塞尔资本协议的意见和建议(N).国际金融报,2003-08-01.
[19]2006-2007中国银行业上市银行研究报告[R]水清木华研究中心2007年.
[20]2009-2010年中国银行业发展报告[R]交通银行金融研究中心2009年.
[21]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率管理办法[S].2004年.
[22]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行次级债券发行管理办法[S].2004年.
[23]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行市场风险管理指引[S].2004年.
[24]中国银行业监督管理委员会.关于商业银行发行混合资本债券补充附属资本有关问题的通知[S].2005年.
[25]中国银行业监督管理委员会.中国银行业实施新资本协议指导意见[S].2007年.
[26]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行操作风险管理指引[S].2007年.
[27]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率监督检查指引[S].2009年.
[28]中国银行业监督管理委员会.关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知[S].2009年.
[29]巴曙松.巴塞尔新资本协议框架中的市场约束[[J].财经问题研究,2003年04期.
[30]巴曙松刘清涛牛播坤.中国资本充足监管框架的形成及其市场影响[J].财经科学,2005年01期.
[31]巴曙松王文强.次级债市场发展与中国商业银行资本金结构调整[J]中国人民大学学报 2005年01期.
[32]陈德胜 姚伟峰 冯宗宪.极端波动情景中的压力测试和极值理论方法研究[J]价值工程,2004年07期.
[33]陈国辉 李婷.中国银行控股公司资本充足率管理的实证研究[J]财务与金融2009年02期.
[34]陈海勇 姚先国.资本充足监管与银行破产概率的数理模型分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究2006年,03期.
[35]陈卫东.新巴塞尔资本协议评析[J].国际金融研究,2001年03期.
[36]陈小宪.中国商业银行风险管理的认识与实践[J].中国金融,2004年03期.
[37]陈燕玲.新巴塞尔协议及其对我国银行的影响[J].中央财经大学学报,2002年07期.
[38]陈正虎.国有商业银行改造的股权结构选择[J]经济学家,,2001年04期
[39]陈忠阳.风险的国际协议与国际协议的风险——评巴塞尔新资本协议正式出台[J].国际金融研究,2004年08期.
[40]财政部财政科学研究所课题组.防范宏观金融风险的财政政策[J].经济研究参考2006年27期.
[41]曹俊 勇张兰.我国银行业资本充足性监管效应研究[J].浙江学刊,2006年05期.
[42]崔明峰 国外商业银行的资本金补充机制[J]中国金融2007年21期.
[43]邓杨丰 麦仲山.提高我国银行资本充足率的途径分析[J].南方金融,2006年05期.
[44]范东君.对我国上市银行资本充足率的研究[J].财会月刊(综合).2007年10期.
[45]耿群.我国商业银行发行次级债补充资本金的路径选择[J].中国金融半月刊.2004年04期.
[46]黄辉.《巴塞尔协议》的演变：银行监管新问题与新对策[J].环球法律评论,2006年01期.
[47]黄宪 马理 代军勋.资本充足率监管下银行信贷风险偏好与选择分析[J].金融研究2005年07期.
[48]李松涛.《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》实施的影响与对策分析[J].新金融.2004年06期.
[49]李雪莲 李永辉 巴塞尔协议对银行经营行为的影响分析[J].财经研究,2003年05期.
[50]刘安荣 黎明.新巴塞尔资本协议中若干焦点问题的探讨[[J].沈阳农业大学学报(社会科学版),2005年03期.
[51]刘明康 推动新资本协议实施提升银行业风险管理水平[J].中国金融,2007年02期.
[52]刘杨.混合资本工具与商业银行资本充足率[J].东北财经大学学报.2007年02期.
[53]卢鸿.中国商业银行资本充足比率的探讨[J].经济评论,2000年06期.
[54]罗平 王胜邦.商业银行资本充足率监管的国际经验[J].国际金融报.2004年04期.
[55]马蔚华 强化资本约束对商业银行的影响及应对策略[J].中国金融.2004年14期.
[56]毛晓威 巴曙松巴塞尔委员会资本协议的演变与国际银行业风险管理的新进展[J].国际金融研究,2001年04期.
[57]牛鸿 詹俊义 试论上市银行补充资本金的意义和形式[J]金融论坛2004年09期.
[58]庞东 杜婷 混合型资本工具与商业银行资本结构优化[J]国际金融研究2006年10期.
[59]沈沛龙 任若恩 新巴塞尔协议资本充足率计算方法剖析[J]金融研究.2002年06期.
[60]史亚荣 中外银行提高资本充足率的比较[J]科技与经济2006年22期.
[61]孙健夫 王海燕.强化中央银行金融监管问题研讨综述[J].经济学动态,1997年10期.
[62]唐斌 赵洁 资本充足率与银行治理[J] 南方金融2004年09期.
[63]唐国储 李选举.新巴塞尔协议的风险新理念与我国国有商业银行全面风险管理体系的构建[J].金融研究,2003年01期.
[64]唐双宁 商业银行利用金融债券提高资本充足率的实践[J]银行家2005年11期.
[65]陶烁 刘榕俊 陈斌.巴塞尔新协议资本金计算方法评述[J].国际金融研究,2001年07期.
[66]滕赶远 潭方东.从巴塞尔新资本协议看国有商业银行的资本金管理[[J].经济与管理研究,2002年02期.
[67]童频 张勇 金静.国有商业银行资本充足率研究[J].金融研究,2001年11期.
[68]童勇 我国上市公司资本结构部分调整的实证研究[J]产业经济研究2006年02期.
[69]王川.强化资本约束走向理性经营明[[J].中国金融,2004年14期.
[70]王亮.《新巴塞尔协议》框架下对中国国有银行资本充足率水平及对策的研究[J].统计研究,2003年01期.
[71]王胜邦.商业银行资本结构：存在一个具体的比例吗[J].财经科学,2006年03期.
[72]王晓枫.我国商业银行资本充足率的研究[J].财经问题研究,2003年10期.
[73]王晓雷 美国的银行资本监管与商业银行资本充足率[J]金融与经济2005年12期.
[74]王晓龙 周好文 银行资本监管与商业银行风险[[J].金融论坛,2007年07期.
[75]王玉雄 资本金缺口及各种补充方式利弊分析[J]金融论坛2005年10期.
[76]王卓怀 陈海勇 叶红.监管误差对资本充足监管有效性的影响[J].南方金融,2007年01期.
[77]王自力.国有独资商业银行充实资本金的可行性研究[[J].金融研究,2002年11期.
[78]吴敬琏.银行改革：当前中国金融改革的重中之重[J].世界经济文汇,2002年04期.
[79]吴俊 康继军 张宗益.中国经济转型期商业银行资本与风险行为研究——兼论巴塞尔协议在我国的实施效果[J].财经研究,2008年01期.
[80]吴俊 张宗益 徐磊.资本充足率监管下的银行资本与风险行为——《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》实施后的实证分析[J].财经论从,2008年03期.
[81]武剑.我国商业银行内部评级体系的建立与应用——花旗银行风险评级模式的借鉴和思考[J].新金融,2002年07期.
[82]武剑.中国实施巴塞尔新协议的战略构想[J].海南金融.2005年05期.
[83]夏淑琴 指数因素分析法的优化[J]宁夏大学学报(自然科学版) 2006年04期.
[84]许多 蒋正军.多渠道提高国有商业银行的资本充足率[J].中国金融半月刊.2004年04期.
[85]许慧资本结构部分调整自回归模型与其内生性变量的实证分析[J]广西财经学院学报2007年04期.
[86]杨传东.资本充足率约束与我国商业银行经营转型的关联性分析[J].上海金融,2008年02规
[87]尹中立.中国银行业的重大难题之一：补充资本金[J].国际经济评论.2005年09期.
[88]于立勇 曹凤岐.新巴塞尔协议与我国银行资本率水平[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004年01期.
[89]张海峰 许允.引入外资和民间资本充实国有商业银行资本金的途径.中国金融.2004年04期.
[90]张杰.中国国有银行资本金迷团.经济研究,2003年01期.
[91]张丽华 我国商业银行资本充足现状及提高比率的路径选择[J]金融研究2004年04期.
[92]张丽华.我国商业银行资本现状及提高比率的路径选择[J].金融研究,2004年10期.
[93]张琳.我国国有商业银行资本充足率的现状分析[J].中山大学学报论从.2006年03期.
[94]张强 武次冰 中国商业银行资本充足性管制有效性的实证分析[J]湖南大学学报(自然科学版),2007年11期.
[95]张兆杰.作为监管资本的次级债及国外商业银行的实践[J].国际金融研究.2004年10期.
[96]张宗益 吴俊.银行效率研究中的前沿分析方法及其比较[J].经济学动态,2003年04期.
[97]邹平 王鹏许培我国中小商业银行资本充足率问题比较研究[J].新金融,2005年10期.
[98]郑鸣 陈捷琼.国有商业银行发行次级债券补充资本金研究[J].国际金融研究.2002年10期.
[99]郑宇婴.我国商业银行资本金不足问题新解[[J].新金融,2005年07期.
[100]朱建武 监管压力下的中小银行资本与风险调整行为分析[J]当代财经2006年01期.
[101]Aggarwal R., K. Jacques. A simultaneous equations estimation of the impact of prompt corrective action on bank capitalmand risk[C] Financial Services at the Crossroads:Capital Regulation in the 21st Century, Conference. New York:Federal Reserve Bank of New York,1998.
[102]Allen F., Carletti E., Marquez R. Credit market competition and capital regulation. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board,2006(11).
[103]Allen N. Berger, Robert DeYoung, Mark J.Flannery, David Lee, Ozde Oztekin. How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?[J] Financial Services Research,2008(34):123-149.
[104]B.arth, James.R.Gerard Caprio, Ross Levine, Bank Regulation and Supervision:What Works Best? [J] Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004(13):205-248..
[105]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards [Z].1988.
[106]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards:A Revised Framework[Z] 2006.
[107]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Banks' Internal Rating Systems:Main Practice in Non-G10 Countries[R]. November 2001.
[108]Besanko D., G. Katanas, Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risk in Banking?[R] Journal of Financial Itermediation,1996(5):160-183.
[109]Bhattacharya, S., Boot A. WA., A. V. Thakor. The Economics of Bank Regulation[J]. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 1998(30):745-770.
[110]Bliss Robert, George Kaufman. Bank procyclicality, credit crunches, and asymmetric monetary policy effects:a unifying model [J]. Journal of Applied Finance,2003, Fall/Winter:23-31.
[111]Blum J., Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?[J] Journal of Banking and Finance 1999(23):755-771.
[112]Blum J., M. Hellwing, the macroeconomic Impact of Bank capital requirement in emerging economies[J] Journal of Banking & Finance,1995(26):881-901.
[113]Boot A. W. A. and S. I. Greenbaum. Bank Regulation, Reputation and Rents:Theory and Policy Implications [M]. Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation.1993.
[114]Calem P. S., R. Rob. The impact of capital-based regulation on bank risk-taking [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation,1999(8):317-352.
[115]Campbell, Tim, Yuk-Shee Chan, Anthony Marino. An incentive-based theory of bank regulation [J]Journal of Financial Intermediation,1992(2):255-276.
[116]Capital Requirement and Bank Behavior:the Impact of the Basel Accord.[R] Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland,1999.
[117]Catarieneu Rabell, Eva, Patricia Jackson, Dimitrios Tsomocos. Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord:Banks'choice of loan rate system [Z]. Bank of England Working paper,2003, No.181.
[118]Cooke P. International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Measurement and Standards[A]. in The Future of Financial Systems and Services:Essays in Honor of Jack Revel, eds. E. P. M. Garden, New York:St Martin's Press,1990,310-335.
[119]Diamond Douglas. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1984(51):393-414.
[120]Diamond Douglas. Monitoring and regulation:The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1991(99):689-721.
[121]Diamond D., P. H. Dybvig. Banking theory, deposit insurance, and bank capital regulation [J]. Journal of Business,1986(59):55-67.
[122]Diamond Douglas, Ragharam Rajan. Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility:A theory of banking [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2001(109):287-327.
[123]Dietrich J, K, James C. Regulation and the Determination of Bank Capital Changes[J]. Journal of Finance,1983,38(5):1651-1658.
[124]Flannery M, Rangan.K. Partial.adjustment toward target capital structures[J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006(79):469-506.
[125]Flannery, M. Capital Regulation and Insured Banks. [J] Journal of Monetary Economics 1989(24):235-258.
[126]Furlong F. T., M. C. Keeley, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking:A Note.[J] Journal of Banking and Finance 1989(13):883-891.
[127]Furlong Frederick. Changes in bank risk-taking [J]. Economics Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,1988, Spring:45-56.
[128]Gennotte G., D. Pyle. Capital controls and bank risk [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1991(15):805-824.
[129]Ghosh S., Nachane D.M., Narain A., et al. Capital requirements and bank Behaviour:an empirical analysis of indian public sector banks [J]. Journal of International Development,2003, 15(2):145-156.
[130]Gorton G., G. Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation.[J] Journal of Finance 1990(45):49-71.
[131]Gorton G., A. Winton, Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital and the Macroeconomy.[J] Working Paper 9806, University of Minnesota, Institute of Financial Studies,2000.
[132]Gorton G., A. Winton, Bank Capital Regulation in General Equilibrium[J] NBER Working paper, 1995(8):2-43.
[133]Gorton G., A. Winton, Banking in Transition Economies:Does Efficiency Require Inatability? [J] Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,1998(30):622-648.
[134]Grout P.,The Cost of Capital in Regulated Industries.[M] Oxford University Press, Chapter 16 pp.386-407.
[135]Hancock, Diana, Andrew J Laing, James A Wilcox. Bank Capital Shocks:Dynamic Effects on Securities, Loans, and Capital[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance 1995(19):661-677.
[136]Heid F, Porath D., Stloz S. Does capital regulation matter for bank behavior? evidence for German savings banks[C] Discussion paper, Series 2:Banking and Financial Supervision,2004.
[137]Hoggarth G., R. Reis, V. Saporta, Costs of Banking System Instability:Some Empirical Evidence. [J] Working Paper, Bank of England,2001.
[138]Hovakimian A., Kane E.J., Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks,1985 to1994[J] Journal of Finance,2000(02):451-468.
[139]Hovakimian A., Kane E.J., The macroeconomic impact of bank capital requirements in emerging economies:past evidence to assess the future[J] Journal of Banking & Finance,2000 (26):871-904.
[140]Jackson, Patricia C., Furfine H., Groeneveld D., Hancock D., Jones W., Perraudin L., Radecki M., Yoneyama. Capital requirements and bank behavior:The impact of the Basel accord [R]. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,1999, Working Paper No.1, April.
[141]Jacques K., P. Nigro. Risk-based capital, portfolio risk, and bank capital:A simultaneous equations approach [J]. Journal of Economics and Business,1997(49):533-547.
[142]Kahane Y. Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance 1977(01):207-218.
[143]Kaoru Hosono, Hiroko Iwaki, Kotaro Tsuru, Bank Regulation and Market Displine around the World[J] RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-031,2004.
[144]Kim D., A. M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation.[J] Journal of Finance 1988(35):1219-1233.
[145]Klein, Michael. A theory of the banking firm[J]. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1971(03):205-218.
[146]Koehn, M., A. M. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk. [J] Journal of Finance 1980(35):1235-1250.
[147]Marcus A. J. The bank capital decision:A time series cross-section analysis [J]. Journal of Finance,1983(38):1217-1232.
[148]Maria Concetta Chiuri, Giovanni Ferri, Giovanni Majnoni, The Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Emerging Economies:Past Evidence to Assess the Future[J] the World Bank, working paper,2001.
[149]Mark Flannery, Kasturi Rangan. Market forces at work in the banking industry:evidence from the capital buildup of the 1990s[R] Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May,2002.
[150]Milne A.. Bank Capital Regulation as an Incentive Mechanism:Implications for Portfolio choice [J].Journal and Finance,2002(26):1-23.
[151]Modigliani F., M. H. Miller. The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment [J]. American Economic Review 1958(48):261-297.
[152]Myer S.C.. New Issues in Corporate Finance[J]. European Economic Review 1988, (32):1167-1188.
[153]Myers S.C. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 1977(05):147-175.
[154]Peltzman S., Capital investment in commercial banking and its relationship to portfolio regulation. Journal of Political Economy,1970(78):1-26.
[155]Peltzman S., Towards a More General Theory of Regulation. [J] Journal of Law and Economics, 1976(20):229-263.
[156]Phong T. H. Ngo, nternational Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Bank Capital. [J] Working Paper, The Australian National University 2006, No.463.
[157]Prescott E. S. The Pre-Commitment in a Model of Regulatory Capital[J]. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 1997(83):23-50.
[158]Rime B. Capital requirements and bank behaviour:Empirical evidence for Switzerland[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2001(25):789-805.
[159]Rochet J., Capital Requirements and Behaviour of Commercial Banks. [J] European Economic Review 1992(36):1137-1178.
[160]Sharpe W F. Bank capital adequacy, deposit insurance and security values[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1978,13(4):701-718.
[161]Sheldon, George. Capital adequacy rules and the risk-seeking behavior of banks:A firm-level analysis[J]. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,1996(132):709-734.
[162]Shrieves R. E., Dahl D. The impact of regulation on bank equity infusions[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,1990 (14):1209-1228.
[163]Shrieves R., E.,.Dahl D. The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,1992 (16):439-457.
[164]Thomas Hellmann, Kevin Murdock, Joseph Stiglitz. Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation:Are Capital Requirements Enough?[J] American Economic Review 2000(3):147-165.
[165]Thakor A.V. Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending[J] Journal of Finance 1996(51):279-324.
[166]T. Ediz, I. Michael, W. Perraudin. The impact of capital requirements on UK Bank behaviour[R].New York:Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,1998.
[167]Wall D., Peterson D. R. The Effect of Capital Adequacy Guidelines on Large Bank Holding Companies[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,1987,11(4):581-600.
[168]Winton A. Delegated Monitoring and Bank Structure in A Finite Economy [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation 1995(04):158-187.
[189]Yudistira D. The Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Indonesia. Working Paper, Loughborough University, Leicestershire,U.K.,2003.
[2]巴塞尔银行业监管委员会.统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议：修订框架[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2004年.中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译.
[3]巴塞尔银行业监督委员会.增强银行体系稳健性(征求意见稿),2009年.中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译.
[4]巴曙松.巴塞尔新资本协议研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2003年.
[5]陈忠阳.金融风险分析与管理研究——市场和机构的理论、模型和技术[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001年.
[6]姜波.商业银行资本充足率管理[M].北京：中国金融出版社2004年.
[7]江曙霞.银行监督管理和资本充足性管制[M].北京：中国发展出版社.1994年.
[8]江志流.商业银行资本补充理论与实务[M].北京：中国金融出版社2009年.
[9]李霁友.商业银行资本金制度[M].北京：科学出版社,2004年.
[10]李志辉.中国银行业风险控制和资本充足性管制研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社2007年.
[11]刘明康.商业银行资本充足率管理办法释义[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2002年.
[12]罗平.巴塞尔新资本协议——研究文献及评述[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2004年.
[13]彭茂吾康以同刘军等.西方银行资本管理——银行内部资本最佳资本配置方法[M].北京：企业管理出版社,2003年.
[14]王胜邦.资本约束与信贷扩张[M].北京：中国金融出版社2008年.
[15]王学龙.有效银行监管研究[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社2008年.
[16]章彰.解读巴塞尔新资本协议[M].中国经济出版社.2005年.
[17]赵先信.商业银行内部模型与监管模型[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004年.
[18]刘明康.中国银监会对新巴塞尔资本协议的意见和建议(N).国际金融报,2003-08-01.
[19]2006-2007中国银行业上市银行研究报告[R]水清木华研究中心2007年.
[20]2009-2010年中国银行业发展报告[R]交通银行金融研究中心2009年.
[21]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率管理办法[S].2004年.
[22]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行次级债券发行管理办法[S].2004年.
[23]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行市场风险管理指引[S].2004年.
[24]中国银行业监督管理委员会.关于商业银行发行混合资本债券补充附属资本有关问题的通知[S].2005年.
[25]中国银行业监督管理委员会.中国银行业实施新资本协议指导意见[S].2007年.
[26]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行操作风险管理指引[S].2007年.
[27]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率监督检查指引[S].2009年.
[28]中国银行业监督管理委员会.关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知[S].2009年.
[29]巴曙松.巴塞尔新资本协议框架中的市场约束[[J].财经问题研究,2003年04期.
[30]巴曙松刘清涛牛播坤.中国资本充足监管框架的形成及其市场影响[J].财经科学,2005年01期.
[31]巴曙松王文强.次级债市场发展与中国商业银行资本金结构调整[J]中国人民大学学报 2005年01期.
[32]陈德胜 姚伟峰 冯宗宪.极端波动情景中的压力测试和极值理论方法研究[J]价值工程,2004年07期.
[33]陈国辉 李婷.中国银行控股公司资本充足率管理的实证研究[J]财务与金融2009年02期.
[34]陈海勇 姚先国.资本充足监管与银行破产概率的数理模型分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究2006年,03期.
[35]陈卫东.新巴塞尔资本协议评析[J].国际金融研究,2001年03期.
[36]陈小宪.中国商业银行风险管理的认识与实践[J].中国金融,2004年03期.
[37]陈燕玲.新巴塞尔协议及其对我国银行的影响[J].中央财经大学学报,2002年07期.
[38]陈正虎.国有商业银行改造的股权结构选择[J]经济学家,,2001年04期
[39]陈忠阳.风险的国际协议与国际协议的风险——评巴塞尔新资本协议正式出台[J].国际金融研究,2004年08期.
[40]财政部财政科学研究所课题组.防范宏观金融风险的财政政策[J].经济研究参考2006年27期.
[41]曹俊 勇张兰.我国银行业资本充足性监管效应研究[J].浙江学刊,2006年05期.
[42]崔明峰 国外商业银行的资本金补充机制[J]中国金融2007年21期.
[43]邓杨丰 麦仲山.提高我国银行资本充足率的途径分析[J].南方金融,2006年05期.
[44]范东君.对我国上市银行资本充足率的研究[J].财会月刊(综合).2007年10期.
[45]耿群.我国商业银行发行次级债补充资本金的路径选择[J].中国金融半月刊.2004年04期.
[46]黄辉.《巴塞尔协议》的演变：银行监管新问题与新对策[J].环球法律评论,2006年01期.
[47]黄宪 马理 代军勋.资本充足率监管下银行信贷风险偏好与选择分析[J].金融研究2005年07期.
[48]李松涛.《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》实施的影响与对策分析[J].新金融.2004年06期.
[49]李雪莲 李永辉 巴塞尔协议对银行经营行为的影响分析[J].财经研究,2003年05期.
[50]刘安荣 黎明.新巴塞尔资本协议中若干焦点问题的探讨[[J].沈阳农业大学学报(社会科学版),2005年03期.
[51]刘明康 推动新资本协议实施提升银行业风险管理水平[J].中国金融,2007年02期.
[52]刘杨.混合资本工具与商业银行资本充足率[J].东北财经大学学报.2007年02期.
[53]卢鸿.中国商业银行资本充足比率的探讨[J].经济评论,2000年06期.
[54]罗平 王胜邦.商业银行资本充足率监管的国际经验[J].国际金融报.2004年04期.
[55]马蔚华 强化资本约束对商业银行的影响及应对策略[J].中国金融.2004年14期.
[56]毛晓威 巴曙松巴塞尔委员会资本协议的演变与国际银行业风险管理的新进展[J].国际金融研究,2001年04期.
[57]牛鸿 詹俊义 试论上市银行补充资本金的意义和形式[J]金融论坛2004年09期.
[58]庞东 杜婷 混合型资本工具与商业银行资本结构优化[J]国际金融研究2006年10期.
[59]沈沛龙 任若恩 新巴塞尔协议资本充足率计算方法剖析[J]金融研究.2002年06期.
[60]史亚荣 中外银行提高资本充足率的比较[J]科技与经济2006年22期.
[61]孙健夫 王海燕.强化中央银行金融监管问题研讨综述[J].经济学动态,1997年10期.
[62]唐斌 赵洁 资本充足率与银行治理[J] 南方金融2004年09期.
[63]唐国储 李选举.新巴塞尔协议的风险新理念与我国国有商业银行全面风险管理体系的构建[J].金融研究,2003年01期.
[64]唐双宁 商业银行利用金融债券提高资本充足率的实践[J]银行家2005年11期.
[65]陶烁 刘榕俊 陈斌.巴塞尔新协议资本金计算方法评述[J].国际金融研究,2001年07期.
[66]滕赶远 潭方东.从巴塞尔新资本协议看国有商业银行的资本金管理[[J].经济与管理研究,2002年02期.
[67]童频 张勇 金静.国有商业银行资本充足率研究[J].金融研究,2001年11期.
[68]童勇 我国上市公司资本结构部分调整的实证研究[J]产业经济研究2006年02期.
[69]王川.强化资本约束走向理性经营明[[J].中国金融,2004年14期.
[70]王亮.《新巴塞尔协议》框架下对中国国有银行资本充足率水平及对策的研究[J].统计研究,2003年01期.
[71]王胜邦.商业银行资本结构：存在一个具体的比例吗[J].财经科学,2006年03期.
[72]王晓枫.我国商业银行资本充足率的研究[J].财经问题研究,2003年10期.
[73]王晓雷 美国的银行资本监管与商业银行资本充足率[J]金融与经济2005年12期.
[74]王晓龙 周好文 银行资本监管与商业银行风险[[J].金融论坛,2007年07期.
[75]王玉雄 资本金缺口及各种补充方式利弊分析[J]金融论坛2005年10期.
[76]王卓怀 陈海勇 叶红.监管误差对资本充足监管有效性的影响[J].南方金融,2007年01期.
[77]王自力.国有独资商业银行充实资本金的可行性研究[[J].金融研究,2002年11期.
[78]吴敬琏.银行改革：当前中国金融改革的重中之重[J].世界经济文汇,2002年04期.
[79]吴俊 康继军 张宗益.中国经济转型期商业银行资本与风险行为研究——兼论巴塞尔协议在我国的实施效果[J].财经研究,2008年01期.
[80]吴俊 张宗益 徐磊.资本充足率监管下的银行资本与风险行为——《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》实施后的实证分析[J].财经论从,2008年03期.
[81]武剑.我国商业银行内部评级体系的建立与应用——花旗银行风险评级模式的借鉴和思考[J].新金融,2002年07期.
[82]武剑.中国实施巴塞尔新协议的战略构想[J].海南金融.2005年05期.
[83]夏淑琴 指数因素分析法的优化[J]宁夏大学学报(自然科学版) 2006年04期.
[84]许多 蒋正军.多渠道提高国有商业银行的资本充足率[J].中国金融半月刊.2004年04期.
[85]许慧资本结构部分调整自回归模型与其内生性变量的实证分析[J]广西财经学院学报2007年04期.
[86]杨传东.资本充足率约束与我国商业银行经营转型的关联性分析[J].上海金融,2008年02规
[87]尹中立.中国银行业的重大难题之一：补充资本金[J].国际经济评论.2005年09期.
[88]于立勇 曹凤岐.新巴塞尔协议与我国银行资本率水平[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004年01期.
[89]张海峰 许允.引入外资和民间资本充实国有商业银行资本金的途径.中国金融.2004年04期.
[90]张杰.中国国有银行资本金迷团.经济研究,2003年01期.
[91]张丽华 我国商业银行资本充足现状及提高比率的路径选择[J]金融研究2004年04期.
[92]张丽华.我国商业银行资本现状及提高比率的路径选择[J].金融研究,2004年10期.
[93]张琳.我国国有商业银行资本充足率的现状分析[J].中山大学学报论从.2006年03期.
[94]张强 武次冰 中国商业银行资本充足性管制有效性的实证分析[J]湖南大学学报(自然科学版),2007年11期.
[95]张兆杰.作为监管资本的次级债及国外商业银行的实践[J].国际金融研究.2004年10期.
[96]张宗益 吴俊.银行效率研究中的前沿分析方法及其比较[J].经济学动态,2003年04期.
[97]邹平 王鹏许培我国中小商业银行资本充足率问题比较研究[J].新金融,2005年10期.
[98]郑鸣 陈捷琼.国有商业银行发行次级债券补充资本金研究[J].国际金融研究.2002年10期.
[99]郑宇婴.我国商业银行资本金不足问题新解[[J].新金融,2005年07期.
[100]朱建武 监管压力下的中小银行资本与风险调整行为分析[J]当代财经2006年01期.
[101]Aggarwal R., K. Jacques. A simultaneous equations estimation of the impact of prompt corrective action on bank capitalmand risk[C] Financial Services at the Crossroads:Capital Regulation in the 21st Century, Conference. New York:Federal Reserve Bank of New York,1998.
[102]Allen F., Carletti E., Marquez R. Credit market competition and capital regulation. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board,2006(11).
[103]Allen N. Berger, Robert DeYoung, Mark J.Flannery, David Lee, Ozde Oztekin. How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?[J] Financial Services Research,2008(34):123-149.
[104]B.arth, James.R.Gerard Caprio, Ross Levine, Bank Regulation and Supervision:What Works Best? [J] Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004(13):205-248..
[105]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards [Z].1988.
[106]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards:A Revised Framework[Z] 2006.
[107]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Banks' Internal Rating Systems:Main Practice in Non-G10 Countries[R]. November 2001.
[108]Besanko D., G. Katanas, Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risk in Banking?[R] Journal of Financial Itermediation,1996(5):160-183.
[109]Bhattacharya, S., Boot A. WA., A. V. Thakor. The Economics of Bank Regulation[J]. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 1998(30):745-770.
[110]Bliss Robert, George Kaufman. Bank procyclicality, credit crunches, and asymmetric monetary policy effects:a unifying model [J]. Journal of Applied Finance,2003, Fall/Winter:23-31.
[111]Blum J., Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?[J] Journal of Banking and Finance 1999(23):755-771.
[112]Blum J., M. Hellwing, the macroeconomic Impact of Bank capital requirement in emerging economies[J] Journal of Banking & Finance,1995(26):881-901.
[113]Boot A. W. A. and S. I. Greenbaum. Bank Regulation, Reputation and Rents:Theory and Policy Implications [M]. Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation.1993.
[114]Calem P. S., R. Rob. The impact of capital-based regulation on bank risk-taking [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation,1999(8):317-352.
[115]Campbell, Tim, Yuk-Shee Chan, Anthony Marino. An incentive-based theory of bank regulation [J]Journal of Financial Intermediation,1992(2):255-276.
[116]Capital Requirement and Bank Behavior:the Impact of the Basel Accord.[R] Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland,1999.
[117]Catarieneu Rabell, Eva, Patricia Jackson, Dimitrios Tsomocos. Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord:Banks'choice of loan rate system [Z]. Bank of England Working paper,2003, No.181.
[118]Cooke P. International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Measurement and Standards[A]. in The Future of Financial Systems and Services:Essays in Honor of Jack Revel, eds. E. P. M. Garden, New York:St Martin's Press,1990,310-335.
[119]Diamond Douglas. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1984(51):393-414.
[120]Diamond Douglas. Monitoring and regulation:The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1991(99):689-721.
[121]Diamond D., P. H. Dybvig. Banking theory, deposit insurance, and bank capital regulation [J]. Journal of Business,1986(59):55-67.
[122]Diamond Douglas, Ragharam Rajan. Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility:A theory of banking [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2001(109):287-327.
[123]Dietrich J, K, James C. Regulation and the Determination of Bank Capital Changes[J]. Journal of Finance,1983,38(5):1651-1658.
[124]Flannery M, Rangan.K. Partial.adjustment toward target capital structures[J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006(79):469-506.
[125]Flannery, M. Capital Regulation and Insured Banks. [J] Journal of Monetary Economics 1989(24):235-258.
[126]Furlong F. T., M. C. Keeley, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking:A Note.[J] Journal of Banking and Finance 1989(13):883-891.
[127]Furlong Frederick. Changes in bank risk-taking [J]. Economics Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,1988, Spring:45-56.
[128]Gennotte G., D. Pyle. Capital controls and bank risk [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1991(15):805-824.
[129]Ghosh S., Nachane D.M., Narain A., et al. Capital requirements and bank Behaviour:an empirical analysis of indian public sector banks [J]. Journal of International Development,2003, 15(2):145-156.
[130]Gorton G., G. Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation.[J] Journal of Finance 1990(45):49-71.
[131]Gorton G., A. Winton, Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital and the Macroeconomy.[J] Working Paper 9806, University of Minnesota, Institute of Financial Studies,2000.
[132]Gorton G., A. Winton, Bank Capital Regulation in General Equilibrium[J] NBER Working paper, 1995(8):2-43.
[133]Gorton G., A. Winton, Banking in Transition Economies:Does Efficiency Require Inatability? [J] Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,1998(30):622-648.
[134]Grout P.,The Cost of Capital in Regulated Industries.[M] Oxford University Press, Chapter 16 pp.386-407.
[135]Hancock, Diana, Andrew J Laing, James A Wilcox. Bank Capital Shocks:Dynamic Effects on Securities, Loans, and Capital[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance 1995(19):661-677.
[136]Heid F, Porath D., Stloz S. Does capital regulation matter for bank behavior? evidence for German savings banks[C] Discussion paper, Series 2:Banking and Financial Supervision,2004.
[137]Hoggarth G., R. Reis, V. Saporta, Costs of Banking System Instability:Some Empirical Evidence. [J] Working Paper, Bank of England,2001.
[138]Hovakimian A., Kane E.J., Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks,1985 to1994[J] Journal of Finance,2000(02):451-468.
[139]Hovakimian A., Kane E.J., The macroeconomic impact of bank capital requirements in emerging economies:past evidence to assess the future[J] Journal of Banking & Finance,2000 (26):871-904.
[140]Jackson, Patricia C., Furfine H., Groeneveld D., Hancock D., Jones W., Perraudin L., Radecki M., Yoneyama. Capital requirements and bank behavior:The impact of the Basel accord [R]. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,1999, Working Paper No.1, April.
[141]Jacques K., P. Nigro. Risk-based capital, portfolio risk, and bank capital:A simultaneous equations approach [J]. Journal of Economics and Business,1997(49):533-547.
[142]Kahane Y. Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance 1977(01):207-218.
[143]Kaoru Hosono, Hiroko Iwaki, Kotaro Tsuru, Bank Regulation and Market Displine around the World[J] RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-031,2004.
[144]Kim D., A. M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation.[J] Journal of Finance 1988(35):1219-1233.
[145]Klein, Michael. A theory of the banking firm[J]. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1971(03):205-218.
[146]Koehn, M., A. M. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk. [J] Journal of Finance 1980(35):1235-1250.
[147]Marcus A. J. The bank capital decision:A time series cross-section analysis [J]. Journal of Finance,1983(38):1217-1232.
[148]Maria Concetta Chiuri, Giovanni Ferri, Giovanni Majnoni, The Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Emerging Economies:Past Evidence to Assess the Future[J] the World Bank, working paper,2001.
[149]Mark Flannery, Kasturi Rangan. Market forces at work in the banking industry:evidence from the capital buildup of the 1990s[R] Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May,2002.
[150]Milne A.. Bank Capital Regulation as an Incentive Mechanism:Implications for Portfolio choice [J].Journal and Finance,2002(26):1-23.
[151]Modigliani F., M. H. Miller. The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment [J]. American Economic Review 1958(48):261-297.
[152]Myer S.C.. New Issues in Corporate Finance[J]. European Economic Review 1988, (32):1167-1188.
[153]Myers S.C. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 1977(05):147-175.
[154]Peltzman S., Capital investment in commercial banking and its relationship to portfolio regulation. Journal of Political Economy,1970(78):1-26.
[155]Peltzman S., Towards a More General Theory of Regulation. [J] Journal of Law and Economics, 1976(20):229-263.
[156]Phong T. H. Ngo, nternational Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Bank Capital. [J] Working Paper, The Australian National University 2006, No.463.
[157]Prescott E. S. The Pre-Commitment in a Model of Regulatory Capital[J]. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 1997(83):23-50.
[158]Rime B. Capital requirements and bank behaviour:Empirical evidence for Switzerland[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2001(25):789-805.
[159]Rochet J., Capital Requirements and Behaviour of Commercial Banks. [J] European Economic Review 1992(36):1137-1178.
[160]Sharpe W F. Bank capital adequacy, deposit insurance and security values[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1978,13(4):701-718.
[161]Sheldon, George. Capital adequacy rules and the risk-seeking behavior of banks:A firm-level analysis[J]. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,1996(132):709-734.
[162]Shrieves R. E., Dahl D. The impact of regulation on bank equity infusions[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,1990 (14):1209-1228.
[163]Shrieves R., E.,.Dahl D. The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,1992 (16):439-457.
[164]Thomas Hellmann, Kevin Murdock, Joseph Stiglitz. Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation:Are Capital Requirements Enough?[J] American Economic Review 2000(3):147-165.
[165]Thakor A.V. Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending[J] Journal of Finance 1996(51):279-324.
[166]T. Ediz, I. Michael, W. Perraudin. The impact of capital requirements on UK Bank behaviour[R].New York:Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,1998.
[167]Wall D., Peterson D. R. The Effect of Capital Adequacy Guidelines on Large Bank Holding Companies[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,1987,11(4):581-600.
[168]Winton A. Delegated Monitoring and Bank Structure in A Finite Economy [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation 1995(04):158-187.
[189]Yudistira D. The Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Indonesia. Working Paper, Loughborough University, Leicestershire,U.K.,2003.