苏北地区农村信用社改革绩效的实证研究
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摘要
随着农村信用社作为“金融企业”的目标确定,如何加强经营管理,转换经营机制,提高盈利能力,提升服务水平便成为信用社发展的重要问题。从2000年作为试点开始,江苏省农村信用社改革在产权制度和管理体制等方面进行了积极的探索.2003年8月,中央政府在全国8个省市(江苏、浙江、山东、江西、贵州、吉林、重庆、陕西)范围启动了新一轮的信用社改革,允许各地因地制宜选择产权模式和组织形式,并在产权明晰的基础上积极构建有效的公司治理框架,以改善信用社的内部管理和服务水平。新一轮改革至今,江苏农村信用社整体发展势头不错,经营水平逐步改善,产权改革也取得了阶段性的进展。江苏省区域经济发展差异较大,既有城乡一体化程度较高的苏南发达地区,也有发展比较滞后的苏北传统农区,新一轮农村信用社改革在江苏不同地区的具体目标和传导机制也存在较大差异;以苏北地区为例,全面评价该地区新一轮农村信用社改革的绩效,将有利于进一步推进全国农村信用社改革,进而为农村金融配套改革提供思路.
本文的研究即围绕苏北农村信用社的改革绩效问题展开,通过本文的研究,希望能够解决三个问题:一是定量衡量信用社改革对苏北农村信用社整体效率和资产质量的影响;二是基于农业贷款和农户贷款两个维度,定量衡量农村信用社改革对其支农行为的影响;三是对农村信用社公司治理问题进行理论剖析,基于委托代理理论构建降低农村信用社代理成本的可能路径。
本研究的总体目标是用理论及实证方法,系统分析苏北地区农村信用社改革绩效,为深化全国信用社改革及促进农村金融体系的发展提供政策制定的依据。针对研究目标,设定以下研究内容:
第一,回顾国内外有关农村金融机构改革和发展的理论和实践,了解苏北农村信用社目前的经营管理和服务水平现状,分析农村信用社改革的理论依据以及在苏北传统农区改革的具体政策目标;
第二,定量分析农村信用社改革对经营绩效的影响:综合运用DEA和一般性DID模型测定产权改革对农村信用社整体效率的净影响,并从农信社人均收入和人均费用两个渠道分解信用社改革的作用机制;同时分析信用社改革对信用社不良贷款率和资本充足率的影响,衡量改革的各项措施对信用社资产质量的动态影响;
第三,定量分析农村信用社改革对自身支农力度的影响:基于农业贷款和农户贷款的两个研究维度,厘清苏北地区县联社和农村合作银行支农行为差异的作用机制;
第四,设计合理的制度框架,解决新一轮改革申依旧存在的突出问题。
研究主要得出如下结论:
(1)相对于不参加改革的县联社来说,改革使得农村合作银行的整体效率得到更大程度上提升,说明了在苏北地区将农信社改革成为农村合作银行的在一定程度上达到了改善经营状况的目的,但增长幅度不大却又说明改革效果并不十分显著;信用社在股份合作制的情况下,其人均营业收入有了显著的提高,平均比改制前提高了约1.97万元;同时该变量通过了显著性检验;同时信用社人均营业费用也显著提高,平均比改制前提高了约0.74万元。
(2)苏北农信社改革后不良贷款率存在下降的趋势,资本充足率存在上升的趋势;可以推断通过农信社自身采取的措施和信用社改革的种种优惠政策带来了信用社资产质量的改善;苏北地区农村信用社发生产权改革以后,农信社不良贷款率平均比改制前减少12%,农信社资本充足率平均比改制前提高10%。
(3)改革后农信社减少了农业贷款的投入,在支农力度上,县联社的支农力度大于农村合作银行;通过信贷资金配置效率模型说明农村信用社农业贷款总体上是有效率的;邹检验的结果来看,这种改善是不明显的,但是随着改革的继续,这种促进农村信用社农业贷款配置效率的作用将会逐渐增强.
(4)使用联立离散选择模型估计方法,较为准确和客观地评价了样本农户受到的金融抑制程度;实证结果表明农户金融抑制的程度P(Y_2~*＞Y_1~*/Y_2~*＞0)(需求额度没有被满足的程度)为66.7%;在样本农户其余控制变量不变的情况下,农村合作银行覆盖下的信贷农户反而更难以获得贷款,新一轮农村信用社改革的支农绩效在该调研地区值得怀疑。
(5)委托代理模型说明省联社应减小对农信社监督管理力度的方差,避免使用幅度过大或过小的干预,可使用大体持久不变、力度恒常的监督管理,在降低代理成本、提高分成比例的同时,并结合农信社的利润目标,在逐利和支农之间求得平衡;在农信社管理层努力动力不足的情况下,外部股东可以增加管理层的分成比例β,以使其风险偏好与股东相近,在促进管理层努力的同时,能增加产出,降低代理成本.
With the confirmation of rural cooperatives' role as "financial enterprises", how to advance business management, shift managing mechanism, strengthen profitability and increase service level have become important issues in the development of rural cooperatives. Since 2000 when Jiangsu Province was set as a pilot region, the rural cooperatives there have carried out active exploration in its property rights system as well as managing mechanism. The central government initiated a new round of reform among rural cooperatives in eight provinces and cities (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Jilin, Chongqing, Shaanxi) in August of 2003, allowing these cooperatives to choose property rights mode and organizing form by themselves according to local situation and actively construct effective corporate governance frame based on clearly defined property rights in order to improve the internal management and service level of cooperatives. Up to now, the rural cooperatives in Jiangsu Province have generally developed well with gradually improved management level and progressive headway in property rights reform. The regional economic development differs tremendously in Jiangsu Province, which not only has the developed southern region with advanced integration between urban and suburban areas, but also the less developed traditional farming region in the north. So in different parts of Jiangsu Province, the specific objective and conduction mechanism are not the same in the new round rural cooperatives reform. Take northern traditional fanning region as an example, a comprehensive performance assessment of the new round reform will promote rural cooperatives reform further on a national basis and then offer ideas for supporting reforms in rural finance.
This dissertation is based on the issue of performance of rural cooperatives reform in northern Jiangsu Province, aiming at answering three questions through research: First, to quantitatively measure the influence that this reform has on the overall efficiency of rural cooperatives and the asset quality in northern Jiangsu Province; Second, to quantitatively measure the influence this reform has on the behavior of supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households from two perspectives including agricultural loans and farming households loans; Third, to theoretically analyze the corporate governance in rural cooperatives and establish possible path to reduce their acting costs and realize the balance between profitability and supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households.
The overall objective of this research is to systematically analyze the reform performance of rural cooperatives in northern Jiangsu Province with theoretical and positive methods so as to offer reference for deepening the rural cooperatives reform nationwide and making policy for improving the development of rural finance system. According to the objective, the contents of research are as follows:
First, to review relative theories and practices concerning institutional reform and development of rural finance both at home and abroad and analyze the theoretical basis of rural cooperatives reform as well as the specific policy objective of reform in northern traditional farming regions;
Second, quantitatively analyze the reform's influence on the overall efficiency and asset quality of itself: to evaluate property rights reform's net influence on the overall efficiency of rural cooperatives with DEA and general DID model and break down the working mechanism of reform through the channels of income per capita and cost per capita in rural cooperatives; and anlysis the reform's net influence on bad loan and capitalism;
Third, quantitatively analyze the reform's influence on the intensity of rural cooperatives' role in supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households: to clarify the mechanism of difference between credit cooperative unions in counties and rural cooperative banks in northern Jiangsu based on three research perspectives including rural funds outflow, agricultural loans and farming households' loans;
Forth, to design proper institutional frame and solve the tough problems that still exist in the new round reform.
The conclusions are as follows:
(1)The reform leads to an overall efficiency net increment of rural cooperative banks of 0.0072, which means reform has helped rural cooperative banks enjoy a greater increment in overall efficiency, compared with credit cooperative unions which haven't participated in the reform. This indicate that the transformation from rural cooperatives to rural cooperative banks in traditional fanning regions has reached the original goal of improving management to some extent though the improvement isn't great enough, which means the effect of reform still isn't significant; Under the joint-stock cooperative system, the operating income per capita in rural cooperatives has significantly increased with an average increment of 19700 yuan compared with the level before the movement of reform; At the same time this variable has passed the significance test; Under the non-joint-stock cooperative system, the operating income per capita in rural cooperatives has significantly increased as well, with an increment of approximately 7400 yuan compared with the level before the reform.
(2)The bad loan and capitalism ascends according to the reform; After the property rights reform, the bad loan rate decreased by 12%; the capitalism rate increased by 10%.
(3)The rural cooperatives have reduced the input of agricultural loans after the reform and the credit cooperative unions in counties play a greater role in supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households; Generally the agricultural loans of rural cooperatives are efficient from 1996 to 2006 through allocation efficiency model of credit funds; According to the results of Chow-test, the improvement is not significant while with the continuation of reform, the effect of promoting allocation efficiency of agricultural loans in rural cooperatives will gradually be strengthened.
(4)This dissertation accurately and objectively assesses the extent of financial depression of sampling farming households using simultaneous discrete choice model; Results from positive analysis show that the extent of financial depression offarming households P(Y_2~* >Y_1~* /Y_2~* > 0) (the extent to which demanding amount isnot satisfied) is 66.7%; Under the circumstance when other control variables of sampling farming households remain the same, it is more difficult for the credit fanning households under the cover of rural cooperative banks to obtain loans and the performance of new round rural cooperative reform in supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households is doubtable in the surveyed area.
(5)The agency model show the provincial credit cooperative union should reduce the variance of supervision intensity towards rural cooperatives and avoid using improper intervention that is either too great or too small, instead, it can adopt constant supervision and pursue balance between profitability and supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households by reducing acting costs, increasing share ratio in combination with profit objective of rural cooperatives; When there isn't enough incentive for managers, the external shareholders can increase the shareratioβfor managers so as to make their risk reference become similar to that ofshareholders and increase output, reduce acting costs while promoting the striving force of managers.
本文的研究即围绕苏北农村信用社的改革绩效问题展开,通过本文的研究,希望能够解决三个问题:一是定量衡量信用社改革对苏北农村信用社整体效率和资产质量的影响;二是基于农业贷款和农户贷款两个维度,定量衡量农村信用社改革对其支农行为的影响;三是对农村信用社公司治理问题进行理论剖析,基于委托代理理论构建降低农村信用社代理成本的可能路径。
本研究的总体目标是用理论及实证方法,系统分析苏北地区农村信用社改革绩效,为深化全国信用社改革及促进农村金融体系的发展提供政策制定的依据。针对研究目标,设定以下研究内容:
第一,回顾国内外有关农村金融机构改革和发展的理论和实践,了解苏北农村信用社目前的经营管理和服务水平现状,分析农村信用社改革的理论依据以及在苏北传统农区改革的具体政策目标;
第二,定量分析农村信用社改革对经营绩效的影响:综合运用DEA和一般性DID模型测定产权改革对农村信用社整体效率的净影响,并从农信社人均收入和人均费用两个渠道分解信用社改革的作用机制;同时分析信用社改革对信用社不良贷款率和资本充足率的影响,衡量改革的各项措施对信用社资产质量的动态影响;
第三,定量分析农村信用社改革对自身支农力度的影响:基于农业贷款和农户贷款的两个研究维度,厘清苏北地区县联社和农村合作银行支农行为差异的作用机制;
第四,设计合理的制度框架,解决新一轮改革申依旧存在的突出问题。
研究主要得出如下结论:
(1)相对于不参加改革的县联社来说,改革使得农村合作银行的整体效率得到更大程度上提升,说明了在苏北地区将农信社改革成为农村合作银行的在一定程度上达到了改善经营状况的目的,但增长幅度不大却又说明改革效果并不十分显著;信用社在股份合作制的情况下,其人均营业收入有了显著的提高,平均比改制前提高了约1.97万元;同时该变量通过了显著性检验;同时信用社人均营业费用也显著提高,平均比改制前提高了约0.74万元。
(2)苏北农信社改革后不良贷款率存在下降的趋势,资本充足率存在上升的趋势;可以推断通过农信社自身采取的措施和信用社改革的种种优惠政策带来了信用社资产质量的改善;苏北地区农村信用社发生产权改革以后,农信社不良贷款率平均比改制前减少12%,农信社资本充足率平均比改制前提高10%。
(3)改革后农信社减少了农业贷款的投入,在支农力度上,县联社的支农力度大于农村合作银行;通过信贷资金配置效率模型说明农村信用社农业贷款总体上是有效率的;邹检验的结果来看,这种改善是不明显的,但是随着改革的继续,这种促进农村信用社农业贷款配置效率的作用将会逐渐增强.
(4)使用联立离散选择模型估计方法,较为准确和客观地评价了样本农户受到的金融抑制程度;实证结果表明农户金融抑制的程度P(Y_2~*＞Y_1~*/Y_2~*＞0)(需求额度没有被满足的程度)为66.7%;在样本农户其余控制变量不变的情况下,农村合作银行覆盖下的信贷农户反而更难以获得贷款,新一轮农村信用社改革的支农绩效在该调研地区值得怀疑。
(5)委托代理模型说明省联社应减小对农信社监督管理力度的方差,避免使用幅度过大或过小的干预,可使用大体持久不变、力度恒常的监督管理,在降低代理成本、提高分成比例的同时,并结合农信社的利润目标,在逐利和支农之间求得平衡;在农信社管理层努力动力不足的情况下,外部股东可以增加管理层的分成比例β,以使其风险偏好与股东相近,在促进管理层努力的同时,能增加产出,降低代理成本.
With the confirmation of rural cooperatives' role as "financial enterprises", how to advance business management, shift managing mechanism, strengthen profitability and increase service level have become important issues in the development of rural cooperatives. Since 2000 when Jiangsu Province was set as a pilot region, the rural cooperatives there have carried out active exploration in its property rights system as well as managing mechanism. The central government initiated a new round of reform among rural cooperatives in eight provinces and cities (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Jilin, Chongqing, Shaanxi) in August of 2003, allowing these cooperatives to choose property rights mode and organizing form by themselves according to local situation and actively construct effective corporate governance frame based on clearly defined property rights in order to improve the internal management and service level of cooperatives. Up to now, the rural cooperatives in Jiangsu Province have generally developed well with gradually improved management level and progressive headway in property rights reform. The regional economic development differs tremendously in Jiangsu Province, which not only has the developed southern region with advanced integration between urban and suburban areas, but also the less developed traditional farming region in the north. So in different parts of Jiangsu Province, the specific objective and conduction mechanism are not the same in the new round rural cooperatives reform. Take northern traditional fanning region as an example, a comprehensive performance assessment of the new round reform will promote rural cooperatives reform further on a national basis and then offer ideas for supporting reforms in rural finance.
This dissertation is based on the issue of performance of rural cooperatives reform in northern Jiangsu Province, aiming at answering three questions through research: First, to quantitatively measure the influence that this reform has on the overall efficiency of rural cooperatives and the asset quality in northern Jiangsu Province; Second, to quantitatively measure the influence this reform has on the behavior of supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households from two perspectives including agricultural loans and farming households loans; Third, to theoretically analyze the corporate governance in rural cooperatives and establish possible path to reduce their acting costs and realize the balance between profitability and supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households.
The overall objective of this research is to systematically analyze the reform performance of rural cooperatives in northern Jiangsu Province with theoretical and positive methods so as to offer reference for deepening the rural cooperatives reform nationwide and making policy for improving the development of rural finance system. According to the objective, the contents of research are as follows:
First, to review relative theories and practices concerning institutional reform and development of rural finance both at home and abroad and analyze the theoretical basis of rural cooperatives reform as well as the specific policy objective of reform in northern traditional farming regions;
Second, quantitatively analyze the reform's influence on the overall efficiency and asset quality of itself: to evaluate property rights reform's net influence on the overall efficiency of rural cooperatives with DEA and general DID model and break down the working mechanism of reform through the channels of income per capita and cost per capita in rural cooperatives; and anlysis the reform's net influence on bad loan and capitalism;
Third, quantitatively analyze the reform's influence on the intensity of rural cooperatives' role in supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households: to clarify the mechanism of difference between credit cooperative unions in counties and rural cooperative banks in northern Jiangsu based on three research perspectives including rural funds outflow, agricultural loans and farming households' loans;
Forth, to design proper institutional frame and solve the tough problems that still exist in the new round reform.
The conclusions are as follows:
(1)The reform leads to an overall efficiency net increment of rural cooperative banks of 0.0072, which means reform has helped rural cooperative banks enjoy a greater increment in overall efficiency, compared with credit cooperative unions which haven't participated in the reform. This indicate that the transformation from rural cooperatives to rural cooperative banks in traditional fanning regions has reached the original goal of improving management to some extent though the improvement isn't great enough, which means the effect of reform still isn't significant; Under the joint-stock cooperative system, the operating income per capita in rural cooperatives has significantly increased with an average increment of 19700 yuan compared with the level before the movement of reform; At the same time this variable has passed the significance test; Under the non-joint-stock cooperative system, the operating income per capita in rural cooperatives has significantly increased as well, with an increment of approximately 7400 yuan compared with the level before the reform.
(2)The bad loan and capitalism ascends according to the reform; After the property rights reform, the bad loan rate decreased by 12%; the capitalism rate increased by 10%.
(3)The rural cooperatives have reduced the input of agricultural loans after the reform and the credit cooperative unions in counties play a greater role in supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households; Generally the agricultural loans of rural cooperatives are efficient from 1996 to 2006 through allocation efficiency model of credit funds; According to the results of Chow-test, the improvement is not significant while with the continuation of reform, the effect of promoting allocation efficiency of agricultural loans in rural cooperatives will gradually be strengthened.
(4)This dissertation accurately and objectively assesses the extent of financial depression of sampling farming households using simultaneous discrete choice model; Results from positive analysis show that the extent of financial depression offarming households P(Y_2~* >Y_1~* /Y_2~* > 0) (the extent to which demanding amount isnot satisfied) is 66.7%; Under the circumstance when other control variables of sampling farming households remain the same, it is more difficult for the credit fanning households under the cover of rural cooperative banks to obtain loans and the performance of new round rural cooperative reform in supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households is doubtable in the surveyed area.
(5)The agency model show the provincial credit cooperative union should reduce the variance of supervision intensity towards rural cooperatives and avoid using improper intervention that is either too great or too small, instead, it can adopt constant supervision and pursue balance between profitability and supporting agriculture, rural areas and farming households by reducing acting costs, increasing share ratio in combination with profit objective of rural cooperatives; When there isn't enough incentive for managers, the external shareholders can increase the shareratioβfor managers so as to make their risk reference become similar to that ofshareholders and increase output, reduce acting costs while promoting the striving force of managers.
引文
1 池茂传主编:《合作银行经营指南》,浙江人民出版社1996年6月版,第15页。
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22. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, and David F. Larcker: "Exectuive Equity Compensation and Incentives: a Survey", FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 2003.
23. James R. Booth, Marcia Millon Cornett and Hassan Tehranian: "Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation", Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 26, Issue 10, Pages 1973-1996, 2002.
24. Joel F. Houston and Christopher James: "CEO compensation and bank risk: Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking? ", Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Pages 405-431, 1995.
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29.Michael C.Jensen,Kevin J.Murphy:"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives",Journal of Political Economy,1990,vol.98,No.21.
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31.Milind Sathye:"X-efficiency in Australian banking:An empirical investigation",Jouranl of Banking & Fiance 25,pp613-630,2001.
32.Penny Ciancanelli and Jose Antonio Reyes Gonzalez:"Corporate Governance in Banking:A Conceptual Framework",http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=253714,2000.
33.Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny:"Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation",NBER Working Paper Series 7403,October 1999.
34.Randall Morck,Andrei Shleifer and Robert W.Vishny:"Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control",The American Economic Review,Vol.79 No.4,September 1989.
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36.Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes,and Andrei Shleifer:"Government Ownership of Banks",The Journal of Finance Vol.LⅦ,No.1,FEB.2002.
37.Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes,Guillermo Zamarripa:"Related Lending ",NBER Working Paper 8848,March 2002.
38.Yaron:"The Corporate Governance of Banks:A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence",World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3404,September 2004.
39.Sang-Woo Nam and Chee Soon Lure:"Corporate Governance of Banks in Asia",ADBI Policy Papers No.10,2006.
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19. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., Ross Levine: "Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?" Policy Research Working Paper,2325, April 2000.
20. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., Ross Levine: "Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?" The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2725, November 2001.
21. J. Harold Mulherin, Annette B. Poulsen: "Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth", Journal of Financial Economics 47, pp279-313, 1998.
22. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, and David F. Larcker: "Exectuive Equity Compensation and Incentives: a Survey", FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 2003.
23. James R. Booth, Marcia Millon Cornett and Hassan Tehranian: "Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation", Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 26, Issue 10, Pages 1973-1996, 2002.
24. Joel F. Houston and Christopher James: "CEO compensation and bank risk: Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking? ", Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Pages 405-431, 1995.
25. Kenneth J. Martin and John J. Mcconnell: "Corporate Performance, Corporate Takerovers, and Management Turnover", The Journal of Finance, Vol.XLVL No.2, June 1991.
26. Kenneth J. Button and Thomas G Weyman-Jones: "Ownership Structure , Institutional Organization and Measured X-Efficiency", AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol.82, No.2, May 1992.
27. Luc Renneboog: "Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange", Forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance. pp2-12, 1998.
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29.Michael C.Jensen,Kevin J.Murphy:"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives",Journal of Political Economy,1990,vol.98,No.21.
30.Michael K.Fung:"Scale economies,X-efficiency,and convergence of productivity among bank holding companies",Journal of Banking & Finance 30,pp2857-2874,2006.
31.Milind Sathye:"X-efficiency in Australian banking:An empirical investigation",Jouranl of Banking & Fiance 25,pp613-630,2001.
32.Penny Ciancanelli and Jose Antonio Reyes Gonzalez:"Corporate Governance in Banking:A Conceptual Framework",http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=253714,2000.
33.Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny:"Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation",NBER Working Paper Series 7403,October 1999.
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38.Yaron:"The Corporate Governance of Banks:A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence",World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3404,September 2004.
39.Sang-Woo Nam and Chee Soon Lure:"Corporate Governance of Banks in Asia",ADBI Policy Papers No.10,2006.
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42.Emanuel Melichar:"Condition of Rural Financial Intermediaries,Financial Stress and Rural Communities",ADBI Policy Papers No.5,2005.
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