治理与管理融合视角下上市公司内部监控机制研究
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摘要
作为上市公司内部运行机制中的重要组成部分,内部监控机制因其在限制公司内部权力泛化,促进公司战略达成、保障公司所有者权益方面发挥的重要作用而受到理论和实践界的关注,近年来上市公司成功或失败的众多案例均证明了构建合理有效的公司内部监控机制不仅是公司发展的必然保障,也是公司存续以实现其个体价值的立足之本。综合从管理学和经济学的方法来分析,内部监控机制是一个涉及多方利益相关者和公司内部多层次的宏观制度安排统称,监控分别对应着监督和控制职能,两种职能的发挥也分别侧重在治理视角和管理视角并延伸出不同内涵。
公司内部监控机制专题性研究较少,但理论界对于如何约束公司治理界限和规范管理控制行为作了一定的研究工作,本文对前人的理论进行了分析并将之作为研究的铺垫。从治理视角以股东会、董事会和监事会的结构设计及职能发挥为重点对前人理论进行了述评,从管理视角以管理控制和内部控制领域的理论起源和制度安排进行了综述。在结合现有理论的基础上,本文选取治理和管理融合视角来作为上市公司内部监控机制的研究视角,以公司治理和管理视角分别诠释公司内部监控机制的运行框架,并以二者融合的视角构建理论框架,这一主线贯穿全文,是对理论界单独以某个局限性视角解读内部监控机制的弥合性回应,也是研究上市公司运行机制的全新视角。
公司治理层不涉及具体操作类业务,因此公司治理视角下的公司内部监控机制主要体现为公司内部监督结构安排与制度设计,以内部监督的形式表现出来。公司内部监控在治理层的运行要以现有《公司法》和OECD《公司治理原则》为法律依据,结合上市公司治理实践和运行经验,作为公司内部治理机构的有机组成部分发挥作用。股东会、董事会和监事会依照信任托管和委托代理的关系进行监督,并在内部监控机制中分别发挥相应的监督作用,形成制衡机制,保证公司治理结构井然有序,公司战略制定得当。
公司管理视角下的公司内部监控机制要显得更加具体和明确,涉及公司具体运营层面的监控以控制为主,在与内部控制、会计控制和管理控制的相互融合过程中形成了以内部控制为框架的管理控制体系,确立了计划、执行、检测、评估和修正的循环模式,以人、财、物、信息四大要素作为管理控制的对象,形成了人力资源、财务管理、资产管理和信息管理四个核心方面、检测环节围绕工作流程和控制点进行分别采用显性和隐性的手段加以控制,保证管理层各层次、各组织均能围绕公司目标加以运行。
正如公司治理与公司管理是公司制度相互依存的特性类似,治理层监控和管理层监控由于研究视角的不同也存在着委托代理层次、解决的问题对象、侧重点、主体和法律范畴、所使用的手段五个方面的分野和比较。二者同时存在于公司这一组织之内,公司的边界决定了监控机制无论是治理层还是管理层都是公司内部运行机制的一部分,在目标、载体、原则、主体上存在一致性,并在战略、内部审计、组织结构和文化层次方面实现契合,此基础上以统合组织目标、优化组织结构为基础提出公司治理与管理融合视角下的内部监控框架。
评价上市公司内部监控是否有效可以使用内部监控评价值这一指标,构建这一指标体系需要在前文分析的基础上,通过理论分析和实践经验,形成了融合治理与管理视角的指标体系。在此基础上,本文利用因子分析法进行指标净化,并利用熵值取权法确定每一指标的权重值,建立起内部监控效率的评价体系和量化方法。通过实证研究,结果表明,我国上市公司治理层监控力度主要集中于股东会和董事会,监事会存在缺乏独立性和发挥作用不明显的缺陷；管理层监控中组织目标监控和资产安全监控对内部监控效率影响较大；综合样本指标,我国上市公司总体内部监控效果仍然处于较低水平且不均衡,仍然有提高的余地。
上市公司内部监控机制也存在路径选择和跨文化比较问题,文化因素产生于人类实践行为,又反作用于包括公司制企业在内的社会经济要素。文化对于内部监控机制的影响集中体现在治理层,依据各地文化因素的不同在世界上形成了元内部监控、二元内部监控和家族内部监控三种类型。本文用霍夫斯泰德提出的文化维度理论比较明确的比较分析了三者之间在治理层监控机制的不同并分析其文化渊源。在此基础上,结合我国文化渊源和我国上市公司内部监控机制起源和成长来探索优化和改进目前内部监控机制的路径。
在对我国上市公司内部监控机制理论分析的基础上,结合内部监控效率评价的现实,本文提出了相关政策性建议。在公司治理层面,应从规范和完善股东会制度,发挥董事会轴心作用,树立监事会专业角色入手,从制度完善和规范建设角度完善公司内部治理结构,为内部监控机制有效发挥作用营造制度保障；在公司管理层面,应从建构权责明晰的组织结构、充分发挥内部审计的作用、规划合理的人力资源体系、塑造诚信为本的公司内部监控文化出发,使内部监控的触手能够抵达组织内部的各层次,贯穿于公司运营的每一笔业务。同时还应实现内部监控和外部监控机制的融合与超越,共同建立适合我国上市公司的监控机制。
As an important constituent part of the internal operating mechanism of listed companies, internal monitoring mechanism has received extensive attention from the theoretical and practical circle due to the vital role it plays in restricting generalization of corporate internal power, facilitating the realization of strategic targets and guaranteeing ownership equity. In recent years, all the successful or failing cases of listed companies have demonstrated that constructing a reasonable and effective internal monitoring mechanism is not only an evitable guarantee in company development, but also the base of corporate existence and realization of the individual values. Based on the analysis from Management and Economics, internal monitoring mechanism is a joint name of macroscopic institutional arrangements with many stakeholders and multiple internal levels involved. Monitoring can be comprehended as supervision function and controlling function respectively. The exertion of these two functions highlights the perspectives of governance and management respectively, both of which extend different connotations.
Although there are few exclusive studies on corporate internal monitoring mechanism, the theoretical circle has done certain research on how to restrain the boundaries of corporate governance and regularize management control behaviors. After analyzing the established theories, this thesis takes the result of analysis as the basis of study. From the perspective of governance, this thesis takes the structural design and function exertion as the focus to review the established theories. Furthermore, it summarizes the theoretical origin and institutional arrangements of management control and internal control from the perspective of management. By combining the established theories, this thesis selects the integrated perspective of governance and management as the perspective of studying internal monitoring mechanism of listed companies and interpreting the operation framework of internal monitoring mechanism from corporate governance and management respectively. Moreover, it constructs a theoretical framework from the integrated perspective. This core penetrates through the whole thesis and constitutes a redeeming response to the theoretical circle's interpretation of internal monitoring mechanism from a certain limited perspective independently and a brand-new perspective of studying listed companies' operation mechanism.
Since the governance level in a company does not involve specific operation-based business, internal monitoring mechanism under the perspective of corporate governance is mainly reflected as structural arrangements and system design of internal monitoring in the form of internal monitoring mechanism. The operation of internal monitoring in the governance level shall take the existing Corporation Law and OECD Corporate Governance Rules as legal basis, learn from listed companies' practice in governance and experience in operation and play its role as a dynamic constituent part of corporate internal governance institution. The Board of Shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors shall supervise in accordance with the relations between entrusted trusteeship and agency by agreement, and exert corresponding supervision function in internal monitoring mechanism respectively to form a check and balance mechanism. This mechanism aims at guaranteeing an orderly corporate governance structure and proper formulation of strategies.
Under the perspective of corporate management, internal monitoring mechanism seems to be more specific and explicit. It involves monitoring in the specific operation level, which is centralized on control. In the process of integrating with internal control, accounting control and management control, it forms a management control system whose framework is internal control and a cyclical pattern, namely, planning, execution, detection, evaluation and correction. Furthermore, the four elements, people, finance, material and information, are regarded as the targets of management control to form four core aspects as human resource, financial management, assets management and information management. Dominant and recessive means are adopted respectively to control the detection link which is centralized on working procedure and control point, with the aim to guarantee that all levels and organizations in the management level can operate toward corporate objectives.
Just like corporate governance and corporate management are the characters of interdependent corporate systems, monitoring in the governance level and management level will be divided and compared in five aspects due to different perspectives of study: level of entrustment and agency, target of solutions, highlights, subjects and legal category, as well as the adopted means. As both of them exist in this organization at the same time, the boundary determines that monitoring mechanism, either in the governance level or the management level, is a part of internal corporate operation mechanism which shows consistency in objectives, carriers, principles and subjects and realizes coincidence in strategies, internal audit, organizational structure and cultural levels. It is on this basis that the integration of organization objectives and optimization of organization structures are taken as a basis in the proposal of internal monitoring framework under the integrated perspective of corporate governance and management.
The index internal control efficiency can be used to evaluate if internal monitoring of listed companies is effective. The establishment of this index system bases on the previous analysis. Through theoretical analysis and practical experience, an index system which integrates the perspectives of governance and management is formed. On this basis, this thesis purifies index with factor analysis and determines the weighted value of each index with weight decision by entropy, and establishes an evaluation system of internal monitoring efficiency and quantitative methods. It is suggested by the result of empirical research that monitoring in the governance level of Chinese listed companies is mainly focused on the Board of Shareholders and the Board of Directors, and the Board of Supervisors is not independent enough and fails to exert significant functions as it is expected to. In addition, organizational objective monitoring and assets safety monitoring in the monitoring of the management level has bigger influence on internal monitoring efficiency. Although internal monitoring in Chinese listed companies has yielded good effect as a whole, it is not balanced and still needs further improvement.
Path selection and cross-cultural comparison also exist in internal monitoring mechanism of listed companies. Cultural factors derive from human beings'practice and then react upon social elements, including enterprise. The influence of culture on internal monitoring mechanism is centrally reflected in the governance level. In line with different cultural factors in the locality, three types of internal monitoring---unitary, binary and family monitoring are formed in the world. By virtue of the cultural dimensions theory put forward by Geert Hofstede, this thesis is able to specifically compare and analyze the differences of these three types in monitoring mechanism in the governance layer and their cultural origins. On this basis, this thesis explores paths of optimizing and improving the current internal monitoring mechanism by combining Chinese cultural origins and the origins and growth of internal monitoring mechanism in Chinese listed companies.
On the basis of theoretical analysis of internal monitoring mechanism of Chinese listed companies, this thesis combines the facts of internal monitoring efficiency evaluation and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. In the corporate governance level, companies should start by standardizing and perfecting the system of the Board of Shareholders, exerting the core function of the Board of Directors and establishing a specialized role for the Board of Supervisors. Next, they should perfect internal corporate governance structure by perfecting the system and standardizing the construction, so as to create system guarantee for the effective exertion of internal monitoring mechanism. In the corporate management level, companies should start by constructing an organization structure with clear rights and liabilities, fully exerting the role of internal auditing, making plans for a reasonable human resource system and creating integrity-oriented internal monitoring culture. The objective is to make internal monitoring available to each level inside the organization and each business of the companies. In the meanwhile, the integration and transcendence of internal and external monitoring mechanism should be realized to establish a monitoring mechanism together that is suitable for Chinese listed companies.
公司内部监控机制专题性研究较少,但理论界对于如何约束公司治理界限和规范管理控制行为作了一定的研究工作,本文对前人的理论进行了分析并将之作为研究的铺垫。从治理视角以股东会、董事会和监事会的结构设计及职能发挥为重点对前人理论进行了述评,从管理视角以管理控制和内部控制领域的理论起源和制度安排进行了综述。在结合现有理论的基础上,本文选取治理和管理融合视角来作为上市公司内部监控机制的研究视角,以公司治理和管理视角分别诠释公司内部监控机制的运行框架,并以二者融合的视角构建理论框架,这一主线贯穿全文,是对理论界单独以某个局限性视角解读内部监控机制的弥合性回应,也是研究上市公司运行机制的全新视角。
公司治理层不涉及具体操作类业务,因此公司治理视角下的公司内部监控机制主要体现为公司内部监督结构安排与制度设计,以内部监督的形式表现出来。公司内部监控在治理层的运行要以现有《公司法》和OECD《公司治理原则》为法律依据,结合上市公司治理实践和运行经验,作为公司内部治理机构的有机组成部分发挥作用。股东会、董事会和监事会依照信任托管和委托代理的关系进行监督,并在内部监控机制中分别发挥相应的监督作用,形成制衡机制,保证公司治理结构井然有序,公司战略制定得当。
公司管理视角下的公司内部监控机制要显得更加具体和明确,涉及公司具体运营层面的监控以控制为主,在与内部控制、会计控制和管理控制的相互融合过程中形成了以内部控制为框架的管理控制体系,确立了计划、执行、检测、评估和修正的循环模式,以人、财、物、信息四大要素作为管理控制的对象,形成了人力资源、财务管理、资产管理和信息管理四个核心方面、检测环节围绕工作流程和控制点进行分别采用显性和隐性的手段加以控制,保证管理层各层次、各组织均能围绕公司目标加以运行。
正如公司治理与公司管理是公司制度相互依存的特性类似,治理层监控和管理层监控由于研究视角的不同也存在着委托代理层次、解决的问题对象、侧重点、主体和法律范畴、所使用的手段五个方面的分野和比较。二者同时存在于公司这一组织之内,公司的边界决定了监控机制无论是治理层还是管理层都是公司内部运行机制的一部分,在目标、载体、原则、主体上存在一致性,并在战略、内部审计、组织结构和文化层次方面实现契合,此基础上以统合组织目标、优化组织结构为基础提出公司治理与管理融合视角下的内部监控框架。
评价上市公司内部监控是否有效可以使用内部监控评价值这一指标,构建这一指标体系需要在前文分析的基础上,通过理论分析和实践经验,形成了融合治理与管理视角的指标体系。在此基础上,本文利用因子分析法进行指标净化,并利用熵值取权法确定每一指标的权重值,建立起内部监控效率的评价体系和量化方法。通过实证研究,结果表明,我国上市公司治理层监控力度主要集中于股东会和董事会,监事会存在缺乏独立性和发挥作用不明显的缺陷；管理层监控中组织目标监控和资产安全监控对内部监控效率影响较大；综合样本指标,我国上市公司总体内部监控效果仍然处于较低水平且不均衡,仍然有提高的余地。
上市公司内部监控机制也存在路径选择和跨文化比较问题,文化因素产生于人类实践行为,又反作用于包括公司制企业在内的社会经济要素。文化对于内部监控机制的影响集中体现在治理层,依据各地文化因素的不同在世界上形成了元内部监控、二元内部监控和家族内部监控三种类型。本文用霍夫斯泰德提出的文化维度理论比较明确的比较分析了三者之间在治理层监控机制的不同并分析其文化渊源。在此基础上,结合我国文化渊源和我国上市公司内部监控机制起源和成长来探索优化和改进目前内部监控机制的路径。
在对我国上市公司内部监控机制理论分析的基础上,结合内部监控效率评价的现实,本文提出了相关政策性建议。在公司治理层面,应从规范和完善股东会制度,发挥董事会轴心作用,树立监事会专业角色入手,从制度完善和规范建设角度完善公司内部治理结构,为内部监控机制有效发挥作用营造制度保障；在公司管理层面,应从建构权责明晰的组织结构、充分发挥内部审计的作用、规划合理的人力资源体系、塑造诚信为本的公司内部监控文化出发,使内部监控的触手能够抵达组织内部的各层次,贯穿于公司运营的每一笔业务。同时还应实现内部监控和外部监控机制的融合与超越,共同建立适合我国上市公司的监控机制。
As an important constituent part of the internal operating mechanism of listed companies, internal monitoring mechanism has received extensive attention from the theoretical and practical circle due to the vital role it plays in restricting generalization of corporate internal power, facilitating the realization of strategic targets and guaranteeing ownership equity. In recent years, all the successful or failing cases of listed companies have demonstrated that constructing a reasonable and effective internal monitoring mechanism is not only an evitable guarantee in company development, but also the base of corporate existence and realization of the individual values. Based on the analysis from Management and Economics, internal monitoring mechanism is a joint name of macroscopic institutional arrangements with many stakeholders and multiple internal levels involved. Monitoring can be comprehended as supervision function and controlling function respectively. The exertion of these two functions highlights the perspectives of governance and management respectively, both of which extend different connotations.
Although there are few exclusive studies on corporate internal monitoring mechanism, the theoretical circle has done certain research on how to restrain the boundaries of corporate governance and regularize management control behaviors. After analyzing the established theories, this thesis takes the result of analysis as the basis of study. From the perspective of governance, this thesis takes the structural design and function exertion as the focus to review the established theories. Furthermore, it summarizes the theoretical origin and institutional arrangements of management control and internal control from the perspective of management. By combining the established theories, this thesis selects the integrated perspective of governance and management as the perspective of studying internal monitoring mechanism of listed companies and interpreting the operation framework of internal monitoring mechanism from corporate governance and management respectively. Moreover, it constructs a theoretical framework from the integrated perspective. This core penetrates through the whole thesis and constitutes a redeeming response to the theoretical circle's interpretation of internal monitoring mechanism from a certain limited perspective independently and a brand-new perspective of studying listed companies' operation mechanism.
Since the governance level in a company does not involve specific operation-based business, internal monitoring mechanism under the perspective of corporate governance is mainly reflected as structural arrangements and system design of internal monitoring in the form of internal monitoring mechanism. The operation of internal monitoring in the governance level shall take the existing Corporation Law and OECD Corporate Governance Rules as legal basis, learn from listed companies' practice in governance and experience in operation and play its role as a dynamic constituent part of corporate internal governance institution. The Board of Shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors shall supervise in accordance with the relations between entrusted trusteeship and agency by agreement, and exert corresponding supervision function in internal monitoring mechanism respectively to form a check and balance mechanism. This mechanism aims at guaranteeing an orderly corporate governance structure and proper formulation of strategies.
Under the perspective of corporate management, internal monitoring mechanism seems to be more specific and explicit. It involves monitoring in the specific operation level, which is centralized on control. In the process of integrating with internal control, accounting control and management control, it forms a management control system whose framework is internal control and a cyclical pattern, namely, planning, execution, detection, evaluation and correction. Furthermore, the four elements, people, finance, material and information, are regarded as the targets of management control to form four core aspects as human resource, financial management, assets management and information management. Dominant and recessive means are adopted respectively to control the detection link which is centralized on working procedure and control point, with the aim to guarantee that all levels and organizations in the management level can operate toward corporate objectives.
Just like corporate governance and corporate management are the characters of interdependent corporate systems, monitoring in the governance level and management level will be divided and compared in five aspects due to different perspectives of study: level of entrustment and agency, target of solutions, highlights, subjects and legal category, as well as the adopted means. As both of them exist in this organization at the same time, the boundary determines that monitoring mechanism, either in the governance level or the management level, is a part of internal corporate operation mechanism which shows consistency in objectives, carriers, principles and subjects and realizes coincidence in strategies, internal audit, organizational structure and cultural levels. It is on this basis that the integration of organization objectives and optimization of organization structures are taken as a basis in the proposal of internal monitoring framework under the integrated perspective of corporate governance and management.
The index internal control efficiency can be used to evaluate if internal monitoring of listed companies is effective. The establishment of this index system bases on the previous analysis. Through theoretical analysis and practical experience, an index system which integrates the perspectives of governance and management is formed. On this basis, this thesis purifies index with factor analysis and determines the weighted value of each index with weight decision by entropy, and establishes an evaluation system of internal monitoring efficiency and quantitative methods. It is suggested by the result of empirical research that monitoring in the governance level of Chinese listed companies is mainly focused on the Board of Shareholders and the Board of Directors, and the Board of Supervisors is not independent enough and fails to exert significant functions as it is expected to. In addition, organizational objective monitoring and assets safety monitoring in the monitoring of the management level has bigger influence on internal monitoring efficiency. Although internal monitoring in Chinese listed companies has yielded good effect as a whole, it is not balanced and still needs further improvement.
Path selection and cross-cultural comparison also exist in internal monitoring mechanism of listed companies. Cultural factors derive from human beings'practice and then react upon social elements, including enterprise. The influence of culture on internal monitoring mechanism is centrally reflected in the governance level. In line with different cultural factors in the locality, three types of internal monitoring---unitary, binary and family monitoring are formed in the world. By virtue of the cultural dimensions theory put forward by Geert Hofstede, this thesis is able to specifically compare and analyze the differences of these three types in monitoring mechanism in the governance layer and their cultural origins. On this basis, this thesis explores paths of optimizing and improving the current internal monitoring mechanism by combining Chinese cultural origins and the origins and growth of internal monitoring mechanism in Chinese listed companies.
On the basis of theoretical analysis of internal monitoring mechanism of Chinese listed companies, this thesis combines the facts of internal monitoring efficiency evaluation and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. In the corporate governance level, companies should start by standardizing and perfecting the system of the Board of Shareholders, exerting the core function of the Board of Directors and establishing a specialized role for the Board of Supervisors. Next, they should perfect internal corporate governance structure by perfecting the system and standardizing the construction, so as to create system guarantee for the effective exertion of internal monitoring mechanism. In the corporate management level, companies should start by constructing an organization structure with clear rights and liabilities, fully exerting the role of internal auditing, making plans for a reasonable human resource system and creating integrity-oriented internal monitoring culture. The objective is to make internal monitoring available to each level inside the organization and each business of the companies. In the meanwhile, the integration and transcendence of internal and external monitoring mechanism should be realized to establish a monitoring mechanism together that is suitable for Chinese listed companies.
引文
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① 用脚投票权是一种非直接的退出方式,公司控制权的丧失取决于退出股东持股规模大小、资本市场活跃程度、新资本注入等因素制约,如果退出的股东数量规模不够,股票价格不会下降,无法撼动原有代理人的控制权。
① 如美国证券监督委员会建议董事会年度会议次数平均是7次,资产总额小于5000万美元的公司一年不超过4次,资产总额超过1.5亿美元的大公司应在8—13次。
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① 关于人性假说的理论由来已久,并已成为管理学人本管理理论方面的代表性学说,成为对人员开展控制的重要借鉴,这四种假说包括：一是以亚当斯密(Adam Smith)为代表的“经济人”假说,以经济诱因来满足人的利益从而操纵人的思想成为现代管理中工作方法标准化、劳动定额、计件考核工作中的理论起源;二是以梅奥霍桑试验为代表的社会人假说,关注员工中对士气有重大影响的非正式组织,引发了社会需要与经济需要的辩证探讨；三是以Y理论为代表的自我实现人假说,强调个人目标与集体目标的一致性,使企业文化的关注和研究成为热点；四是以沙因(Edgar H. Schein)为代表的复杂人假说,主张以权变理论来研究对员工的控制,根据员工的动机、能力及工作性质做出不同的管理方式。
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① 孙利娟,邢小军，周德群.熵值赋权法的改进[J1.统计与决策,2010(21)：153-154.
① [美]吉尔特·霍夫斯泰德,格特·杨·霍夫斯泰德.文化与组织：心理软件的力量.李原等译.中国人民大学出版社.20]0.
① Ho,K.L.Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia:Economics, Politics and Regulations[M].Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,2005..
① 神田秀树,朱大明.日本上市公司的公司治理[J].清华法学.2012(5)：167-175.
① 王勤,许望.东盟公司治理结构的现状j前景[J].东南亚纵横.2008(11)：40.43.
① 中国银监会2009年向商业银行下发的《关于规范银行理财业务投资管理的征求意见稿》提出,商业银行理财资金不得直接投资A股二级市场的股票和基金,严禁直接或间接投资于未,上市公司股权和上市公司非公开发行或交易的股份。
① 民政部办公厅于2000年7月7日印发《关于暂停对企业内部职工持股会进行社团法人登记的函》,否认职工持股会的法人资格,不再对职工持股会给与登记。2000年12月11日中国证监会印发《关于职工持股会及工会能否作为上市公司股东的复函》,认为职工持股会不能成为上市公司的股东,同时对工会作为股东或发起人的公司公开发行股票的申请暂时不予受理。
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① 如美国证券监督委员会建议董事会年度会议次数平均是7次,资产总额小于5000万美元的公司一年不超过4次,资产总额超过1.5亿美元的大公司应在8—13次。
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① 中国银监会2009年向商业银行下发的《关于规范银行理财业务投资管理的征求意见稿》提出,商业银行理财资金不得直接投资A股二级市场的股票和基金,严禁直接或间接投资于未,上市公司股权和上市公司非公开发行或交易的股份。
① 民政部办公厅于2000年7月7日印发《关于暂停对企业内部职工持股会进行社团法人登记的函》,否认职工持股会的法人资格,不再对职工持股会给与登记。2000年12月11日中国证监会印发《关于职工持股会及工会能否作为上市公司股东的复函》,认为职工持股会不能成为上市公司的股东,同时对工会作为股东或发起人的公司公开发行股票的申请暂时不予受理。
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