风险投资治理结构研究
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摘要
知识经济时代，高新技术产业已成为经济发展的核心和第一支柱，高新技术产业的发展决定着经济的发展。作为高新技术企业发展推进器的风险投资更受到世人的青睐。充分调动风险投资家与创业家的积极性，发挥他们的潜力是风险投资成功的关键，这就需要一个合理的治理结构。
论文在分析风险投资基本要素及其运作机制的基础上，采用博弈论和委托代理理论的方法对风险投资的融资阶段与投资阶段的治理结构进行了深入的分析研究。
风险投资融资阶段，风险资金的来源决定了风险投资机构的组织形式，并进一步影响到风险基金的运作。论文对风险投资机构的两种主要的组织形式——公司制和有限合伙制进行了对比研究，深入分析了有限合伙制的主要制度安排，指出有限合伙制的报酬体系、风险投资家承担无限责任、基金的有限生命周期等机制的设计，有效的筛选了风险投资家并降低了代理成本。
风险投资投资阶段，通过对投资中投资工具的选择、分阶段投资与基于业绩的价值重估以及风险企业控制权的分配等制度安排的研究，指出：
一、投资工具的选择是风险投资契约的核心，在很大程度决定了风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理关系。风险投资投资工具中，可转换优先股投资结合了普通股投资与债权投资的优点，较好的实现了收益分配与风险的匹配；
二、分阶段投资与基于业绩的价值重估是在一定条件下风险投资家与创业家之间的理性选择的结果，它不仅有效的激励了业绩良好的创业家、惩罚了业绩不佳的创业家，还排除了质量低下的项目；
三、风险企业的控制权对于创业家是有价值的，由于企业发展的不确定性，风险投资家一般要求与其股权不成比例的控制权，不确定性越大，信息不对称程度越高，风险投资家要求更多的控制权。而创业家则通过更好的融资，从不对称信息获取更多的好处以及承担更少的风险来弥补失去的更多的控制权。
论文还对风险投资的治理结构进行了实证分析，并对金蝶与海扶两个不同背景公司的融资过程与相应的制度安排进行了案例研究，有力的支持了论文的主要结论。
In the era of knowledge-driven economy, high-tech industry has become the most significicant to economy, and the development of high-tech industry is determining the development of economy. Venture capital which is the propeller to the new high-tech enterprise is favored by people. A critical factor of successful venture capital is fully utilizing the ability and intelligence of venture capitalist and that of entrepreneur, Then a rational contract is essential.
Based on analysing the element and the operation mechanism of venture capital, the paper deeply analyses the principal-agent problem in financing stage and investment stage of venture capital in game theory.
At financing stage of venture capital, the source of venture capital determines the organization of the venture capital institution, then influences the operation of the venture capital fund. The paper compares the company and the limited partnership which is the main forms of the venture capital institution, and analyses the limited partnership deeply on main arrangement. It points out that mechanisms in limited partnership screens risk investor effectively and reduces the agent's cost, such as the pay for venture capitalist, limited life cycle of fund, venture capitalist bearing unlimited liability, etc.
At investment Stage of venture capital, through analysing the arrangement such as the choice of investment tool, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises' value again based on Enterprise's achievement, control distribution etc.
First, choice of investment tool is the core of agreement, and determines the principal-agent relationship between venture capitalist and entrepreneur to a great extent. Convertible preference stocks combines common stock's merit with that of credit and matches the income and the risk well.
Second, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises' value again based on Enterprise's achievement is a bilateral choice under certain conditions. It not only punishes entrepreneur as the failure of venture ,encourages entrepreneur with the good achievement, also gets rid of the venture with low quality.
Third, entrepreneur derives benefits from control over the firm. Because of uncertainty of enterprise, venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control
rights than the size of his equity investment. And the greater uncertainty, the higher the information asymmetry degree, venture capitalist demands higher control .The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.
The thesis has also analyses the real example to the administration structure of venture capital, and analyses Kingdee and Haiku, two typical venture capital backed with different background, about the process they gained venture capital and according institutional arrangements. The finding strongly supports the main conclusion of this thesis.
论文在分析风险投资基本要素及其运作机制的基础上，采用博弈论和委托代理理论的方法对风险投资的融资阶段与投资阶段的治理结构进行了深入的分析研究。
风险投资融资阶段，风险资金的来源决定了风险投资机构的组织形式，并进一步影响到风险基金的运作。论文对风险投资机构的两种主要的组织形式——公司制和有限合伙制进行了对比研究，深入分析了有限合伙制的主要制度安排，指出有限合伙制的报酬体系、风险投资家承担无限责任、基金的有限生命周期等机制的设计，有效的筛选了风险投资家并降低了代理成本。
风险投资投资阶段，通过对投资中投资工具的选择、分阶段投资与基于业绩的价值重估以及风险企业控制权的分配等制度安排的研究，指出：
一、投资工具的选择是风险投资契约的核心，在很大程度决定了风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理关系。风险投资投资工具中，可转换优先股投资结合了普通股投资与债权投资的优点，较好的实现了收益分配与风险的匹配；
二、分阶段投资与基于业绩的价值重估是在一定条件下风险投资家与创业家之间的理性选择的结果，它不仅有效的激励了业绩良好的创业家、惩罚了业绩不佳的创业家，还排除了质量低下的项目；
三、风险企业的控制权对于创业家是有价值的，由于企业发展的不确定性，风险投资家一般要求与其股权不成比例的控制权，不确定性越大，信息不对称程度越高，风险投资家要求更多的控制权。而创业家则通过更好的融资，从不对称信息获取更多的好处以及承担更少的风险来弥补失去的更多的控制权。
论文还对风险投资的治理结构进行了实证分析，并对金蝶与海扶两个不同背景公司的融资过程与相应的制度安排进行了案例研究，有力的支持了论文的主要结论。
In the era of knowledge-driven economy, high-tech industry has become the most significicant to economy, and the development of high-tech industry is determining the development of economy. Venture capital which is the propeller to the new high-tech enterprise is favored by people. A critical factor of successful venture capital is fully utilizing the ability and intelligence of venture capitalist and that of entrepreneur, Then a rational contract is essential.
Based on analysing the element and the operation mechanism of venture capital, the paper deeply analyses the principal-agent problem in financing stage and investment stage of venture capital in game theory.
At financing stage of venture capital, the source of venture capital determines the organization of the venture capital institution, then influences the operation of the venture capital fund. The paper compares the company and the limited partnership which is the main forms of the venture capital institution, and analyses the limited partnership deeply on main arrangement. It points out that mechanisms in limited partnership screens risk investor effectively and reduces the agent's cost, such as the pay for venture capitalist, limited life cycle of fund, venture capitalist bearing unlimited liability, etc.
At investment Stage of venture capital, through analysing the arrangement such as the choice of investment tool, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises' value again based on Enterprise's achievement, control distribution etc.
First, choice of investment tool is the core of agreement, and determines the principal-agent relationship between venture capitalist and entrepreneur to a great extent. Convertible preference stocks combines common stock's merit with that of credit and matches the income and the risk well.
Second, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises' value again based on Enterprise's achievement is a bilateral choice under certain conditions. It not only punishes entrepreneur as the failure of venture ,encourages entrepreneur with the good achievement, also gets rid of the venture with low quality.
Third, entrepreneur derives benefits from control over the firm. Because of uncertainty of enterprise, venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control
rights than the size of his equity investment. And the greater uncertainty, the higher the information asymmetry degree, venture capitalist demands higher control .The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.
The thesis has also analyses the real example to the administration structure of venture capital, and analyses Kingdee and Haiku, two typical venture capital backed with different background, about the process they gained venture capital and according institutional arrangements. The finding strongly supports the main conclusion of this thesis.
引文
[1] 刘曼红.风险投资：创新与金融.第1版.北京.中国人民大学出版社.1998年10月
[2] 俞自由、李松涛、赵荣信.风险投资理论与实践.第1版.上海.上海财经大学出版社.2000年4月
[3] Yuk-Shee Chan. Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts. International Economic Review.1990.V31.365-381
[4] Jeffrey J.Trester. Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Banking & Finance.1998.22.675-699
[5] Dirk Bergemann. Venture Capital Financing,Moral Hazard,and learning. Journal of Banking & Finance.1998.22.703-735
[6] Gompers,Paul Alan. The Theory,Structure,and Performance of Venture Capital. Dissertation for Ph.D.Degree. Harvard University.1993
[7] Sahlman,William A. The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital organizations. Journal of Financial Economics.1991.27.437-521
[8] Bernard S.Black, Ronald J.Gilson. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:Banks Versus Stock Markets.1998.47.243-277
[9] Amit, Glosten and Mull(1990)
[10] Sahlman. Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.1990.1.23-36
[11] Neher,Darwin Victor. Essays on Entrepreneurial Finance: Venture Capital, Financial Contracting, and the Structure of Investment. Dissertation for Ph.D.Degree. Princeton University.1994
[12] Andrel A.Kirileenko. Valuation and Control in Venture Capital Finance. The Journal of Finance.2001.2.565-585
[13] Steven N.Kaplan and Per Stromberg. Venture Capitalst as Principals: Contracting, screening, and Monitoring. The American Economic Review. 2001.5.426-430
[14] Gompers Paul and Lerner Josh. An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital partnership. Journal of Financial Economics. 1999.51.3-44
[15] Admati, Anat R. Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists. The Journal of Finance.1994.2.371-402
J William Callison. Venture capital and corporate governance: Evolving the limited liability
[16] company to finance the entrepreneurial business. Journal of Corporation Law. 2000.26.97-124
[17] Fiet, James. Risk avoidance strategies in venture capital markets. The Journal of Management Studies.1995.32.551-524
[18] Lowell W Busenitz and Douglas D Moesel. The framing of perceptions of fairness in the relationship between venture capitalists and new venture teams. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice.1997.21.5-21
[19] Anne Claire Broughton. Venture capital financing for sustainable companies. BioCycle. 1999. 40.53-54
[20] Lerner, Joshua. The syndication of venture capital investments. Financial Management. 1994.23
[21] Bradford D Jordan. The Venture Capital Cycle. The Journal of Financial Research.2000.23
[22] Anonymous. Not all VCs are created equal. Mit Sloan Management Review. 2001.42.88-92
[23] Josh Lerner. The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program. The Journal of Business.1999.72.285-318
[24] 成思危.科技风险投资公司论文集.北京.民主与建设出版社.1998
[25] 王益、许小松.风险资本市场理论与实践.第1版.北京.中国经济出版社.2000年4月
[26] 田增瑞.创业资本在不对称信息下的博弈的委托代理分析.中国软科学.2001. 6.22-26
[27] 张帏、姜彦福.大企业参与风险投资的动因与机制探讨.中国软科学.2001.1
[28] 任天元.风险投资的运作与评估.第1版.北京.中国经济出版社.2000年2月
[29] 邓乐平.中国创业投资理论探索.第1版.成都.西南财经大学出版社.2002.5
[30] 盛立军.风险投资：操作、机制与策略. 第1版.上海.上海远东出版社.1999.9
[31] 戴维?格莱德斯通.风险投资操作实物. 第1版.太原.山西人民出版社.2001.9
[32] 孙继伟.企业管理视野中的风险投资：模式与案例. 第1版.上海.上海财经大学出版社.2002.2
[33] 王松奇、丁芯.创业投资企业组织形式与代理成本.金融研究.2001.12.73-80
[34] 劳剑东、李湛.非对称信息下的创业投资决策.预测.2001.4.40-43
[35] 姚佐文、陈晓剑.风险资本家与企业家合作的博弈分析.预测.2001.5.24-26
[36] 劳剑东、李湛.论创业投资的治理结构与风险控制机制.当代经济研究. 2001.5.13-18
[37] 谈毅、叶岑.风险投资在公司治理结构中的效率分析.中国软科学.2001.46-51
[38] 冯涛、李青俊.高技术企业人力资本产权化对企业产权结构和绩效的影响分析.当代经济科学.2001.7.38-44
[39] 陈德棉、李刚、张玉臣.关于风险投资者与投资管理机构的关系模型.预测. 2001.6.52-53
[40] 苏晓华、向朝勇.风险投资机构面临的逆向选择风险及其防范.公司理财与上市公司.2001.18.55-62
[41] 余晓东、秦玲.信息不对称与创业资本的核心能力分析.外国经济与管理. 2001.12.8-12
[42] 刘曼红.风险投资的特征.中国创业投资与高科技.2002.1.35-37
[43] 盛军峰.风险投资中双重委托代理的风险治理.投资论坛.2002.1.20-23
[44] 姚佐文、陈晓剑.风险资本家与风险企业家之间的控制权分配和转移.国研网
[45] 奚玉芹. 激励与约束：风险投资中的道德风险防范.国研网.2002
[46] 金融工具在风险投资中的治理机制. 国研网.2002
[47] 王悦.对中国风险投资机构的调查结果分析.中国经营报.2002
[48] 王松奇.中国创业投资体系的现状问题与前景.中国科技产业.2002
[49] 风险投资基金的融投资效率分析.中华企业信息港
[50] 罗海平.美国风险资本运营的微观监控机制及其借鉴.世界经济.2001.7
[51] 王建平.风险投资的不平衡性分析.中国软科学.1999.6
[52] 孟长康.美国风险投资企业运作框架的法律设计.开放导报.1999.10
[53] 张维迎.企业的企业家--契约理论.第1版.上海.上海三联出版社.1995.9
[54] 张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革. 第1版.北京.北京大学出版社.1999.3
[55] 梁能.公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验.第1版.北京.中国人民大学出版社.2000年4月
[2] 俞自由、李松涛、赵荣信.风险投资理论与实践.第1版.上海.上海财经大学出版社.2000年4月
[3] Yuk-Shee Chan. Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts. International Economic Review.1990.V31.365-381
[4] Jeffrey J.Trester. Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Banking & Finance.1998.22.675-699
[5] Dirk Bergemann. Venture Capital Financing,Moral Hazard,and learning. Journal of Banking & Finance.1998.22.703-735
[6] Gompers,Paul Alan. The Theory,Structure,and Performance of Venture Capital. Dissertation for Ph.D.Degree. Harvard University.1993
[7] Sahlman,William A. The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital organizations. Journal of Financial Economics.1991.27.437-521
[8] Bernard S.Black, Ronald J.Gilson. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:Banks Versus Stock Markets.1998.47.243-277
[9] Amit, Glosten and Mull(1990)
[10] Sahlman. Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.1990.1.23-36
[11] Neher,Darwin Victor. Essays on Entrepreneurial Finance: Venture Capital, Financial Contracting, and the Structure of Investment. Dissertation for Ph.D.Degree. Princeton University.1994
[12] Andrel A.Kirileenko. Valuation and Control in Venture Capital Finance. The Journal of Finance.2001.2.565-585
[13] Steven N.Kaplan and Per Stromberg. Venture Capitalst as Principals: Contracting, screening, and Monitoring. The American Economic Review. 2001.5.426-430
[14] Gompers Paul and Lerner Josh. An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital partnership. Journal of Financial Economics. 1999.51.3-44
[15] Admati, Anat R. Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists. The Journal of Finance.1994.2.371-402
J William Callison. Venture capital and corporate governance: Evolving the limited liability
[16] company to finance the entrepreneurial business. Journal of Corporation Law. 2000.26.97-124
[17] Fiet, James. Risk avoidance strategies in venture capital markets. The Journal of Management Studies.1995.32.551-524
[18] Lowell W Busenitz and Douglas D Moesel. The framing of perceptions of fairness in the relationship between venture capitalists and new venture teams. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice.1997.21.5-21
[19] Anne Claire Broughton. Venture capital financing for sustainable companies. BioCycle. 1999. 40.53-54
[20] Lerner, Joshua. The syndication of venture capital investments. Financial Management. 1994.23
[21] Bradford D Jordan. The Venture Capital Cycle. The Journal of Financial Research.2000.23
[22] Anonymous. Not all VCs are created equal. Mit Sloan Management Review. 2001.42.88-92
[23] Josh Lerner. The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program. The Journal of Business.1999.72.285-318
[24] 成思危.科技风险投资公司论文集.北京.民主与建设出版社.1998
[25] 王益、许小松.风险资本市场理论与实践.第1版.北京.中国经济出版社.2000年4月
[26] 田增瑞.创业资本在不对称信息下的博弈的委托代理分析.中国软科学.2001. 6.22-26
[27] 张帏、姜彦福.大企业参与风险投资的动因与机制探讨.中国软科学.2001.1
[28] 任天元.风险投资的运作与评估.第1版.北京.中国经济出版社.2000年2月
[29] 邓乐平.中国创业投资理论探索.第1版.成都.西南财经大学出版社.2002.5
[30] 盛立军.风险投资：操作、机制与策略. 第1版.上海.上海远东出版社.1999.9
[31] 戴维?格莱德斯通.风险投资操作实物. 第1版.太原.山西人民出版社.2001.9
[32] 孙继伟.企业管理视野中的风险投资：模式与案例. 第1版.上海.上海财经大学出版社.2002.2
[33] 王松奇、丁芯.创业投资企业组织形式与代理成本.金融研究.2001.12.73-80
[34] 劳剑东、李湛.非对称信息下的创业投资决策.预测.2001.4.40-43
[35] 姚佐文、陈晓剑.风险资本家与企业家合作的博弈分析.预测.2001.5.24-26
[36] 劳剑东、李湛.论创业投资的治理结构与风险控制机制.当代经济研究. 2001.5.13-18
[37] 谈毅、叶岑.风险投资在公司治理结构中的效率分析.中国软科学.2001.46-51
[38] 冯涛、李青俊.高技术企业人力资本产权化对企业产权结构和绩效的影响分析.当代经济科学.2001.7.38-44
[39] 陈德棉、李刚、张玉臣.关于风险投资者与投资管理机构的关系模型.预测. 2001.6.52-53
[40] 苏晓华、向朝勇.风险投资机构面临的逆向选择风险及其防范.公司理财与上市公司.2001.18.55-62
[41] 余晓东、秦玲.信息不对称与创业资本的核心能力分析.外国经济与管理. 2001.12.8-12
[42] 刘曼红.风险投资的特征.中国创业投资与高科技.2002.1.35-37
[43] 盛军峰.风险投资中双重委托代理的风险治理.投资论坛.2002.1.20-23
[44] 姚佐文、陈晓剑.风险资本家与风险企业家之间的控制权分配和转移.国研网
[45] 奚玉芹. 激励与约束：风险投资中的道德风险防范.国研网.2002
[46] 金融工具在风险投资中的治理机制. 国研网.2002
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