风投引入后的主体行为与创业企业成长
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摘要
改革开放的30年,中国经历了四次创业浪潮,每一次创业浪潮都比前一次有更广泛的覆盖和更重大的影响。与创业浪潮相伴随的是风险投资机构的迅速发展。本土风险投资机构经历了实践探索、逐步兴起、快速增长等阶段。如今,无论是风险投资总量还是风险投资机构数量都有了非常明显的提升。风险投资机构的蓬勃发展和创业浪潮的不断涌现相互促进。宏观上,风险投资机构给创业企业提供了新的融资渠道,创业企业的蓬勃发展也增强了风险投资机构的可持续性成长。微观上,风险投资介入创业企业后,其资金支持和增值服务也成为促进企业成长的重要力量。尽管风险投资者和创业企业家有很多共同利益,但角度、立场不同,也必然存在分歧,风投引入并不总是能给创业企业带来福音。风险投资者和创业企业家的控制权之争,两大主体的双边道德风险的存在都使得风投引入后,风险投资者对企业成长的作用机制显得更为复杂。现有的研究对企业家的创新行为、风险投资者的增值服务等积极行为给予了较多关注,也积累了丰富的研究结论；委托代理理论也对企业家的道德风险行为给予了较多剖析。然而,现有研究对风险投资者的道德风险行为给予关注不够,且将两大主体行为纳入统一分析框架更为鲜见。此外,风投引入后,创业企业的控制权结构必然发生变化,尽管现有研究对控制权的内涵及最优配置已作了丰富探讨,但控制权在企业成长中的作用机制的探讨仍相对匮乏。由此,深入剖析主体行为对企业成长的影响机理；挖掘控制权在企业成长中的作用机制,在理论研究和实践层面均显得较为迫切。
本研究以控制权理论、最优契约设计理论、企业成长理论、行为理论等为理论基础,围绕控制权配置、主体行为与企业成长的研究框架,采用文献研究、问卷调查、案例研究等三种主要方式进行资料和数据的搜集。综合应用定性分析与定量分析方法,对研究主题进行了深层次的分析和探讨。
(1)理论基础与文献综述,围绕主体行为如何影响创业企业成长这一核心问题展开研究,对所涉及的行为理论、企业成长理论、控制权理论等进行了梳理；对于各个领域的研究视角、新近研究成果、研究争议进行了综述。并在此基础上重点关注了主体行为与创业企业成长的关系研究、控制权与创业企业成长的关系研究等国内外文献,这些文献的梳理为剖析主体行为对创业企业成长、控制权对创业企业成长的内在影响机理奠定了基础,也为本研究的模型构建和研究假设的提出提供了文献支撑。
(2)探索性案例研究,通过对三家案例企业——奇虎360、京东商城、红孩子母婴的探索性案例研究,分析了主体行为对创业企业成长的影响机制及控制权在其中的作用发挥。案例研究显示企业家的生产行为对创业企业的成长有重要的积极影响；企业家的非生产行为会对创业企业成长带来消极影响；风险投资者的支持行为对创业企业成长也有明显促进,而其对创业企业的过多干预的消极作用也很明显；不同的控制权结构与创业企业成长也有一定的关联性。受案例所在行业及素材的约束,探索性案例研究未能囊括本研究预期设想的所有变量,也未能验证所有变量间的关系,但研究结论仍颇有价值。
(3)理论模型的构建与研究假设的明确。在相关文献梳理的基础上,结合探索性案例的研究结论,构建了主体行为与企业成长的研究框架,尝试挖掘企业家行为的中介作用和控制权结构的调节作用。在此基础上,本研究提出了二十四个研究假设。
(4)问卷调研与实证检验。对本研究所涉及的重要变量——企业家的生产行为、非生产行为、代理行为,风险投资者的监督行为、支持行为、投机行为,创业企业的竞争绩效、潜力绩效,控制权等进行了概念界定和操作化,在此基础上设计量表和调研问卷。通过对回收的121份问卷的描述性统计分析、因子分析、信度与效度检验、多元回归分析及结构方程模型检验等对模型和假设进行了验证。
通过上述的研究工作,本文得出如下结论：
(1)企业家行为对潜力绩效的影响均得到验证,企业家生产行为对竞争绩效的影响得到验证。具体来说,企业家的生产行为对创业企业潜力绩效有显著正向影响；企业家的非生产行为和代理行为对创业企业潜力绩效有显著的负向影响。企业家生产行为对竞争绩效有显著正向影响；企业家的非生产行为和代理行为对企业竞争绩效的影响并不显著。
(2)风险投资者行为对潜力绩效的影响均得到验证,风险投资者行为对竞争绩效的影响均未得到验证。具体来说,风险投资者的监督行为和支持行为对创业企业潜力绩效均有显著正向影响,风险投资者的投机行为对创业企业潜力绩效有显著负向影响。风险投资者的支持行为和投机行为对创业企业竞争绩效影响并不显著,而风险投资者的监督行为对创业企业竞争绩效有显著负向影响,此分析结果与预期假设相反。
(3)企业家行为在风险投资者行为对创业企业成长的影响中发挥中介作用。具体来说,企业家的生产行为在风险投资者的监督行为和支持行为对潜力绩效的影响中起部分中介作用;企业家的非生产行为和代理行为在风险投资者的投机行对企业潜力绩效的影响中起部分中介作用。
(4)控制权结构的调节作用。在聚类分析的基础上,将创业企业控制权结构划分为风投干预型、风投信任型、企业家主导型和风投主导型。通过分组回归分析检验了控制权结构的调节效应,分组回归结果显示,控制权结构在主体行为对创业企业成长的影响中发挥调节作用。
本文在继承前人研究成果的基础上,可能存在以下几方面的创新：
(1)识别并提炼了主体行为类型。明确主体行为的内涵及其类型是本研究的前提和基础。本文基于大量文献的梳理和案例资料的整理,分别抽取出三类企业家行为：生产行为、非生产行为、代理行为,和三类风险投资者行为：监督行为、支持行为、投机行为。在探索性因子分析和验证性因子分析的基础上,最终分别形成了企业家行为测量的12个类目和风险投资者行为测量的12个类目。相关指标检验结果表明开发的量表具有较好的信度和效度,可为进一步量化研究提供支持。
(2)构建并验证了控制权的结构类型。众多的实证研究中,控制权多用股权比例、董事会席位等予以测量。这对成熟企业相对合适,因为股权通常与控制权对等,董事会席位也与控制权有很强的相关性。然而对于创业企业却未必合适,创业企业的高度不确定性使得控制权与股权分配往往不对等。且本研究中的创业企业绝大多数还未上市,公开披露的信息有限,股权比例和董事会席位更不可得。在此背景下,作者尝试构建控制权测量量表,并通过因子分析和聚类分析,归纳了控制权结构的四种类型。这为控制权的研究提供了一个新的研究角度。
(3)发掘并厘清了主体行为对企业成长的作用机制。企业家行为与企业成长的关系,及投资者行为与企业成长的关系研究均积累了丰富的研究结论。但已有文献多对企业家行为或风险投资者行为进行单独探讨,本研究将两者同时放入研究框架；已有文献对主体的积极行为,如企业家的创新行为、风险投资者的支持行为和增值服务给予较多探讨,但对主体的消极行为,特别是风险投资者的投机行为探讨甚少。本文从双边道德风险的角度,将主体双方的积极行为、消极行为均纳入研究框架,大大增加了对主体行为考察的全面性。此外,本研究深入挖掘主体间行为的相互作用,实证研究显示风险投资者的行为对企业潜力绩效的影响主要通过企业家行为的中介而发挥作用。论文的研究为透视主体行为对企业绩效的影响机制提供了新的视角。
(4)探讨并验证了控制权结构的调节作用。已有文献关注了控制权对企业价值的作用,然而研究结论并不一致,有学者认为控制权与企业价值是正相关关系,也有学者认为两者是U型相关。诸多研究控制权与企业价值的文献采用了博弈和模型推导的方法,其研究结论的得出还需实证支持。本文基于对样本数据的实证分析,验证了控制权结构的调节作用。这对现有研究做了一定的补充和完善,为后续研究奠定了基础。
In the past30years of reform and opening up, China has experienced four waves of entrepreneurship. Each wave has more extensive coverage and more significant effect than the last. Along with the wave of entrepreneurship, it is the rapid development of venture capitalists. The local venture capitalists experienced four stages, including practice exploration, gradual rising, rapid growth. Nowadays, both the total amount of investment and the number of venture capitalists increase obviously. The vigorous development of venture capitalists and the continuous emergence of entrepreneur wave promote each other. In macro, venture capitalists provide a new financing channel for enterprises, and the booming of new ventures enhanced the sustainable development of venture capitaists. In Micro, after the introduction of venture capital, the financial support and value-added services are important forces to promote business growth. Although venture capitaists and entrepreneurs have many common interests, they are divided in opinion and perspective. Venture capitaists don't always bring good news to the enterprise. The battle for control rights and bilateral moral hazard between capitalists and entrepreneurs makes the mechanism of enterprise growth more complex. The literatures give more attention to active behavior, such as innovation behavior of entrepreneurs and value-added services of investors. The principal-agent theory also have abundant research on moral hazard behaviors of the entrepreneurs. While the moral hazard behavior of investors has not be discussed enough, and it is rare to incorporate the two subject behaviors into a unified analysis framework. In addition, after the introduction of venture capitaists, the structure of control rights is bound to change. Although the existing research has rich discussion on the connotation and the optimal allocation of control rights, it is rare to explore the mechanism of control rights affecting business growth. Thus, it becomes urgent in theory and practice to analyze the influence mechanism of subject behaviors to business growth and explore the influence mechanism of control rights to business growth.
Based on theory of control rights, optimal contract design, business growth, and behavior, this paper constructs the framework of control rights, subject behaviors and business growth. This paper uses the methods of literature research, questionnaire survey and case study to gather material and collect data. With qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper discusses the research topic deeply.
Firstly, literature review. This paper combs related theories, including behavior theory, business growth theory, and control rights theory, and summarizes the research perspectives, research findings, and research dispute. This paper focus on literatures about the relationship between subject behavior and business growth, and the relationship between control rights and business growth, literature review helps lay foundation for analysis of influence mechanism, and provides literature support to model construction and hypothesis proposing.
Secondly, exploratory case study. Through the exploratory case study of three firms-Qihoo360. Jingdong Mall, Red Maternal and Infant Children, this paper analyzes the mechanism of subject behavior effect on business growth, and the effect of control rights. The case study shows that, productive behavior of entrepreneur has positive effects on business growth, and unproductive behavior of entrepreneur has negative influence on business growth. It also indicates that the support of investors has obvious promotion on business growth, while excessive intervention has negative effect. In addition, there is a strong correlation between structure of control rights and business growth. Because of industry limited and material constraints, the exploratory case study fails to include all variables assumed, and fails to verify the relationship among all the variables, but the conclusion is still valuable.
Thirdly, construct theoretical model and propose research hypothesis. Based on literature review and combined with the results of exploratory case study, this paper construct research framework about subject behavior and business growth, and try to unearth the mediating effects of entrepreneur behavior and the moderating effect of control rights. And then, this paper proposes twenty-four hypotheses.
Forthly, questionnaire survey and empirical analysis. This paper definites the important variables involved, such as productive behavior, unproductive behavior and agent behavior of entrepreneurs, supervision, support, speculation behavior of investors, competitive performance and potential performance. This paper design scale and questionnaire to measure them. Through descriptive statistics analysis, factor analysis, reliability and validity analysis, and multiple regression analysis of datas from121questionnaires, this paper verify the model and hypotheses.
Based above research work, this paper draws the following conclusion:
Firstly, it is verified that entrepreneurial behaviors have significant infulence on potential performance, and the productive behavior has significant infulence on competitive performance. Specifically, the productive behavior of entrepreneurs have a significant positive impact on potential performance, while unproductive and agent behavior has significant negative impact on potential performance. The productive behavior of entrepreneurs have a significant positive impact on competitive performance, while the effect of unproductive and agent behavior is not significant.
Secondly, it is verified that investors'behavior have significant infulence on potential performance, but the effects of investors'behavior on competitive performance have not been verified. Specifically, supervision and support behavior have significant positive influence on potential performance, and speculation has significant negative impact on potential performance. The effect of support behavior and speculation on competitive performance is not significant. Contrary to expectation, the supervision behavior has significant negative effects on competitive performance.
Thirdly, entrepreneur behaviors are metavariable between investors'behavior and business growth. Specifically, the productive behavior of entrepreneur plays a part intermediary role in supervision and support of investor effect on potential performance. Unproductive behavior and agent behavior of entrepreneur act a part intermediary role in speculation of investor effect on potential performance in enterprises.
Forthly, the structure of control rights have moderating effect. Based on cluster analysis, the structure of control rights is divided into four types, including interference, trust, investor dominated and entrepreneur dominated. The regression analysis by grouping shows the structure of control rights plays moderating role in subject behavior effect on business growth.
Compared with the literature, there are several innovations in this paper:
Firstly, identify and extract several types of subject behavior. It is premise and foundation to clearify connotation and types of subject behavior. Based on literature reviews and case study, this paper extracts three types of entrepreneurs'behavior, including productive, unproductive and agent behavior, and three types of investors'behavior, including supervision, support, speculation. Then, this paper forms12items to measure entrepreneur behavior and investor behavior respectively. Analysis of exploratory factor and confirmatory factor shows the exploitation of scale has good reliability and validity, which can provide support for further quantitative study.
Secondly, construct and verify the structure of control rights. Most empirical studies measure control rights using the proportion of equity, board seats and so on. It is relatively appropriate for mature enterprises, in which the shares are usually associated with control rights equivalently, and board seats have strong correlation with trie control right. But it may be not appropriate for new ventures, in which there are high degree of uncertainty, and the allocation of equity and control rights are not equal. In addition, the new ventures studied are not listed, so it is hard to collect disclosed information, such as the proportion of equity and board seats. Under this background, the author attempts to design a scale to measure control rights, and summarizes four types of structures by means of factor analysis and cluster analysis. The study provides a new research perspective for control rights. Thirdly, explore and clarify the mechanism of subject behavior effect on business growth. There are abundant research in the relationship between entrepreneurial behavior and business growth, and relationship between investors'behavior and business growth. Yet, literatures discuss investors'behavior and entrepreneurs'behavior separately, and give more attention to positive behavior, such as innovation of entrepreneurs, and support and value-added service of investors. This paper incorporates both entrepreneurs'behavior and investors'behavior, both positive and negative behavior into the research framework, which increase the comprehensive investigation of subject behavior greatly. In addition, this study digs into the interaction of subject behaviors. The research provides a new perspective to discuss the mechanism of subject behavior effect on business growth.
Forthly, discuss and verify the moderating effect of structure of control rights. Literatures pay attention to the effect of control rights on business value, while there is no consensus in emperical researches. Some scholars believe that there is positive correlation between control rights and business value, while others think there are nonlinear relationship. In addition, some research conclusion from models need empirical support. Based on questionair and survey data, this empirical analysis strengthen and complete the literatures, and lay foundation for following research.
本研究以控制权理论、最优契约设计理论、企业成长理论、行为理论等为理论基础,围绕控制权配置、主体行为与企业成长的研究框架,采用文献研究、问卷调查、案例研究等三种主要方式进行资料和数据的搜集。综合应用定性分析与定量分析方法,对研究主题进行了深层次的分析和探讨。
(1)理论基础与文献综述,围绕主体行为如何影响创业企业成长这一核心问题展开研究,对所涉及的行为理论、企业成长理论、控制权理论等进行了梳理；对于各个领域的研究视角、新近研究成果、研究争议进行了综述。并在此基础上重点关注了主体行为与创业企业成长的关系研究、控制权与创业企业成长的关系研究等国内外文献,这些文献的梳理为剖析主体行为对创业企业成长、控制权对创业企业成长的内在影响机理奠定了基础,也为本研究的模型构建和研究假设的提出提供了文献支撑。
(2)探索性案例研究,通过对三家案例企业——奇虎360、京东商城、红孩子母婴的探索性案例研究,分析了主体行为对创业企业成长的影响机制及控制权在其中的作用发挥。案例研究显示企业家的生产行为对创业企业的成长有重要的积极影响；企业家的非生产行为会对创业企业成长带来消极影响；风险投资者的支持行为对创业企业成长也有明显促进,而其对创业企业的过多干预的消极作用也很明显；不同的控制权结构与创业企业成长也有一定的关联性。受案例所在行业及素材的约束,探索性案例研究未能囊括本研究预期设想的所有变量,也未能验证所有变量间的关系,但研究结论仍颇有价值。
(3)理论模型的构建与研究假设的明确。在相关文献梳理的基础上,结合探索性案例的研究结论,构建了主体行为与企业成长的研究框架,尝试挖掘企业家行为的中介作用和控制权结构的调节作用。在此基础上,本研究提出了二十四个研究假设。
(4)问卷调研与实证检验。对本研究所涉及的重要变量——企业家的生产行为、非生产行为、代理行为,风险投资者的监督行为、支持行为、投机行为,创业企业的竞争绩效、潜力绩效,控制权等进行了概念界定和操作化,在此基础上设计量表和调研问卷。通过对回收的121份问卷的描述性统计分析、因子分析、信度与效度检验、多元回归分析及结构方程模型检验等对模型和假设进行了验证。
通过上述的研究工作,本文得出如下结论：
(1)企业家行为对潜力绩效的影响均得到验证,企业家生产行为对竞争绩效的影响得到验证。具体来说,企业家的生产行为对创业企业潜力绩效有显著正向影响；企业家的非生产行为和代理行为对创业企业潜力绩效有显著的负向影响。企业家生产行为对竞争绩效有显著正向影响；企业家的非生产行为和代理行为对企业竞争绩效的影响并不显著。
(2)风险投资者行为对潜力绩效的影响均得到验证,风险投资者行为对竞争绩效的影响均未得到验证。具体来说,风险投资者的监督行为和支持行为对创业企业潜力绩效均有显著正向影响,风险投资者的投机行为对创业企业潜力绩效有显著负向影响。风险投资者的支持行为和投机行为对创业企业竞争绩效影响并不显著,而风险投资者的监督行为对创业企业竞争绩效有显著负向影响,此分析结果与预期假设相反。
(3)企业家行为在风险投资者行为对创业企业成长的影响中发挥中介作用。具体来说,企业家的生产行为在风险投资者的监督行为和支持行为对潜力绩效的影响中起部分中介作用;企业家的非生产行为和代理行为在风险投资者的投机行对企业潜力绩效的影响中起部分中介作用。
(4)控制权结构的调节作用。在聚类分析的基础上,将创业企业控制权结构划分为风投干预型、风投信任型、企业家主导型和风投主导型。通过分组回归分析检验了控制权结构的调节效应,分组回归结果显示,控制权结构在主体行为对创业企业成长的影响中发挥调节作用。
本文在继承前人研究成果的基础上,可能存在以下几方面的创新：
(1)识别并提炼了主体行为类型。明确主体行为的内涵及其类型是本研究的前提和基础。本文基于大量文献的梳理和案例资料的整理,分别抽取出三类企业家行为：生产行为、非生产行为、代理行为,和三类风险投资者行为：监督行为、支持行为、投机行为。在探索性因子分析和验证性因子分析的基础上,最终分别形成了企业家行为测量的12个类目和风险投资者行为测量的12个类目。相关指标检验结果表明开发的量表具有较好的信度和效度,可为进一步量化研究提供支持。
(2)构建并验证了控制权的结构类型。众多的实证研究中,控制权多用股权比例、董事会席位等予以测量。这对成熟企业相对合适,因为股权通常与控制权对等,董事会席位也与控制权有很强的相关性。然而对于创业企业却未必合适,创业企业的高度不确定性使得控制权与股权分配往往不对等。且本研究中的创业企业绝大多数还未上市,公开披露的信息有限,股权比例和董事会席位更不可得。在此背景下,作者尝试构建控制权测量量表,并通过因子分析和聚类分析,归纳了控制权结构的四种类型。这为控制权的研究提供了一个新的研究角度。
(3)发掘并厘清了主体行为对企业成长的作用机制。企业家行为与企业成长的关系,及投资者行为与企业成长的关系研究均积累了丰富的研究结论。但已有文献多对企业家行为或风险投资者行为进行单独探讨,本研究将两者同时放入研究框架；已有文献对主体的积极行为,如企业家的创新行为、风险投资者的支持行为和增值服务给予较多探讨,但对主体的消极行为,特别是风险投资者的投机行为探讨甚少。本文从双边道德风险的角度,将主体双方的积极行为、消极行为均纳入研究框架,大大增加了对主体行为考察的全面性。此外,本研究深入挖掘主体间行为的相互作用,实证研究显示风险投资者的行为对企业潜力绩效的影响主要通过企业家行为的中介而发挥作用。论文的研究为透视主体行为对企业绩效的影响机制提供了新的视角。
(4)探讨并验证了控制权结构的调节作用。已有文献关注了控制权对企业价值的作用,然而研究结论并不一致,有学者认为控制权与企业价值是正相关关系,也有学者认为两者是U型相关。诸多研究控制权与企业价值的文献采用了博弈和模型推导的方法,其研究结论的得出还需实证支持。本文基于对样本数据的实证分析,验证了控制权结构的调节作用。这对现有研究做了一定的补充和完善,为后续研究奠定了基础。
In the past30years of reform and opening up, China has experienced four waves of entrepreneurship. Each wave has more extensive coverage and more significant effect than the last. Along with the wave of entrepreneurship, it is the rapid development of venture capitalists. The local venture capitalists experienced four stages, including practice exploration, gradual rising, rapid growth. Nowadays, both the total amount of investment and the number of venture capitalists increase obviously. The vigorous development of venture capitalists and the continuous emergence of entrepreneur wave promote each other. In macro, venture capitalists provide a new financing channel for enterprises, and the booming of new ventures enhanced the sustainable development of venture capitaists. In Micro, after the introduction of venture capital, the financial support and value-added services are important forces to promote business growth. Although venture capitaists and entrepreneurs have many common interests, they are divided in opinion and perspective. Venture capitaists don't always bring good news to the enterprise. The battle for control rights and bilateral moral hazard between capitalists and entrepreneurs makes the mechanism of enterprise growth more complex. The literatures give more attention to active behavior, such as innovation behavior of entrepreneurs and value-added services of investors. The principal-agent theory also have abundant research on moral hazard behaviors of the entrepreneurs. While the moral hazard behavior of investors has not be discussed enough, and it is rare to incorporate the two subject behaviors into a unified analysis framework. In addition, after the introduction of venture capitaists, the structure of control rights is bound to change. Although the existing research has rich discussion on the connotation and the optimal allocation of control rights, it is rare to explore the mechanism of control rights affecting business growth. Thus, it becomes urgent in theory and practice to analyze the influence mechanism of subject behaviors to business growth and explore the influence mechanism of control rights to business growth.
Based on theory of control rights, optimal contract design, business growth, and behavior, this paper constructs the framework of control rights, subject behaviors and business growth. This paper uses the methods of literature research, questionnaire survey and case study to gather material and collect data. With qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper discusses the research topic deeply.
Firstly, literature review. This paper combs related theories, including behavior theory, business growth theory, and control rights theory, and summarizes the research perspectives, research findings, and research dispute. This paper focus on literatures about the relationship between subject behavior and business growth, and the relationship between control rights and business growth, literature review helps lay foundation for analysis of influence mechanism, and provides literature support to model construction and hypothesis proposing.
Secondly, exploratory case study. Through the exploratory case study of three firms-Qihoo360. Jingdong Mall, Red Maternal and Infant Children, this paper analyzes the mechanism of subject behavior effect on business growth, and the effect of control rights. The case study shows that, productive behavior of entrepreneur has positive effects on business growth, and unproductive behavior of entrepreneur has negative influence on business growth. It also indicates that the support of investors has obvious promotion on business growth, while excessive intervention has negative effect. In addition, there is a strong correlation between structure of control rights and business growth. Because of industry limited and material constraints, the exploratory case study fails to include all variables assumed, and fails to verify the relationship among all the variables, but the conclusion is still valuable.
Thirdly, construct theoretical model and propose research hypothesis. Based on literature review and combined with the results of exploratory case study, this paper construct research framework about subject behavior and business growth, and try to unearth the mediating effects of entrepreneur behavior and the moderating effect of control rights. And then, this paper proposes twenty-four hypotheses.
Forthly, questionnaire survey and empirical analysis. This paper definites the important variables involved, such as productive behavior, unproductive behavior and agent behavior of entrepreneurs, supervision, support, speculation behavior of investors, competitive performance and potential performance. This paper design scale and questionnaire to measure them. Through descriptive statistics analysis, factor analysis, reliability and validity analysis, and multiple regression analysis of datas from121questionnaires, this paper verify the model and hypotheses.
Based above research work, this paper draws the following conclusion:
Firstly, it is verified that entrepreneurial behaviors have significant infulence on potential performance, and the productive behavior has significant infulence on competitive performance. Specifically, the productive behavior of entrepreneurs have a significant positive impact on potential performance, while unproductive and agent behavior has significant negative impact on potential performance. The productive behavior of entrepreneurs have a significant positive impact on competitive performance, while the effect of unproductive and agent behavior is not significant.
Secondly, it is verified that investors'behavior have significant infulence on potential performance, but the effects of investors'behavior on competitive performance have not been verified. Specifically, supervision and support behavior have significant positive influence on potential performance, and speculation has significant negative impact on potential performance. The effect of support behavior and speculation on competitive performance is not significant. Contrary to expectation, the supervision behavior has significant negative effects on competitive performance.
Thirdly, entrepreneur behaviors are metavariable between investors'behavior and business growth. Specifically, the productive behavior of entrepreneur plays a part intermediary role in supervision and support of investor effect on potential performance. Unproductive behavior and agent behavior of entrepreneur act a part intermediary role in speculation of investor effect on potential performance in enterprises.
Forthly, the structure of control rights have moderating effect. Based on cluster analysis, the structure of control rights is divided into four types, including interference, trust, investor dominated and entrepreneur dominated. The regression analysis by grouping shows the structure of control rights plays moderating role in subject behavior effect on business growth.
Compared with the literature, there are several innovations in this paper:
Firstly, identify and extract several types of subject behavior. It is premise and foundation to clearify connotation and types of subject behavior. Based on literature reviews and case study, this paper extracts three types of entrepreneurs'behavior, including productive, unproductive and agent behavior, and three types of investors'behavior, including supervision, support, speculation. Then, this paper forms12items to measure entrepreneur behavior and investor behavior respectively. Analysis of exploratory factor and confirmatory factor shows the exploitation of scale has good reliability and validity, which can provide support for further quantitative study.
Secondly, construct and verify the structure of control rights. Most empirical studies measure control rights using the proportion of equity, board seats and so on. It is relatively appropriate for mature enterprises, in which the shares are usually associated with control rights equivalently, and board seats have strong correlation with trie control right. But it may be not appropriate for new ventures, in which there are high degree of uncertainty, and the allocation of equity and control rights are not equal. In addition, the new ventures studied are not listed, so it is hard to collect disclosed information, such as the proportion of equity and board seats. Under this background, the author attempts to design a scale to measure control rights, and summarizes four types of structures by means of factor analysis and cluster analysis. The study provides a new research perspective for control rights. Thirdly, explore and clarify the mechanism of subject behavior effect on business growth. There are abundant research in the relationship between entrepreneurial behavior and business growth, and relationship between investors'behavior and business growth. Yet, literatures discuss investors'behavior and entrepreneurs'behavior separately, and give more attention to positive behavior, such as innovation of entrepreneurs, and support and value-added service of investors. This paper incorporates both entrepreneurs'behavior and investors'behavior, both positive and negative behavior into the research framework, which increase the comprehensive investigation of subject behavior greatly. In addition, this study digs into the interaction of subject behaviors. The research provides a new perspective to discuss the mechanism of subject behavior effect on business growth.
Forthly, discuss and verify the moderating effect of structure of control rights. Literatures pay attention to the effect of control rights on business value, while there is no consensus in emperical researches. Some scholars believe that there is positive correlation between control rights and business value, while others think there are nonlinear relationship. In addition, some research conclusion from models need empirical support. Based on questionair and survey data, this empirical analysis strengthen and complete the literatures, and lay foundation for following research.
引文
② 资料来源：《巴尔格雷夫经济大词典》
④ 参与约束(participation constraint,简称PC),指代理人接受契约要比不接受契约好；激励相容约束(incentive compatibility constraint,简称IC),指代理人干的好要比干的不好时收获的更多。
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④ 参与约束(participation constraint,简称PC),指代理人接受契约要比不接受契约好；激励相容约束(incentive compatibility constraint,简称IC),指代理人干的好要比干的不好时收获的更多。
⑤ "The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration"(1986), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm"
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