中国创业投资的资金来源与委托代理问题研究
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摘要
创业投资对于推动更多创业企业的建立和健康发展、对于推动我国高新技术产业的发展和国民经济的产业结构优化升级、对于创造更多的就业机会、对于加强整个社会的创新活动具有十分重要的积极意义。创业投资的发展具有一定的“路径依赖性”,以政府为主导的发展模式与以市场为主导的发展模式相比具有不一样的特征。其中,创业投资的资金来源对创业投资的发展具有重要的影响,但这个问题在国内目前的相关研究还是一个薄弱环节。因此,本文主要从创投资金来源的角度分析我国创业投资产业目前的发展状态及其存在的问题,并尝试提出相关的政策建议。
首先,本文以问卷调查、现场访谈等方法,剖析了我国创投产业目前的发展状态;考察了创投机构、创业企业发展过程中面临的重要问题以及两者之间的协调关系;分析了我国创投产业赖以生存和发展的环境,在政策法规、社会文化、人才队伍、中介机构等多个层面上分析了当前存在的障碍。这些研究取得了一些新的发现,如“技术项目高于创业团队”的投资评价标准在创投业中盛行;政府行为广泛存在于有政府资金背景的创投机构决策过程之中;创业企业将创投等同于普通投资的倾向严重;创投机构存在投资组合分散与集合的矛盾;国有资金的风险承担能力更差,等等。
其次,以现状调查分析为基础,通过对创业投资产业中理论的分析,本文建立一个创业投资与创业企业之间的一个数理模型,分析了在满足一定参与约束与激励相容约束的条件下创业企业的资本结构模型。通过委托—代理理论的分析,对有政府政策影响的情况下,以参与约束与激励相容约束效用为条件,分析了创业投资机构和创业企业家在创业企业中基本工资收入、创业投资机构的投资比例,激励创业企业家的股权比例及创业投资机构管理建议的影响做了数理的分析。得到了以上多个方面因素相互影响到参与人的行为的结论和比例的确定途径。进而本文分析了对风险投资活动的几种政策措施:政府为企业家的培训费用,设备投资的补贴,生产阶段的产品补贴。尽管这些措施都激励了企业家,只有成本-效率式的政府服务可以提高整个社会福利。
最后,本文依据前面从创投资金来源角度对创投产业所进行的分析,运用案例方法,选择了三个典型城市运用财政资金于创业投资事业发展的不同模式进行对比研究,以发现各自的特色,为寻找财政资金在创投中的最佳运行模式奠定科学基础。
Venture capital (VC) is critical to create more and more New venture start-ups, develop China high-technology industry, upgrade industry structure of national economy, create more jobs and encourage innovative activity of whole society. The development of venture capital has“path dependence”in a certain extent. The feature of development pattern is different between VC directed by government and by market. The capital resource of VC has great influence on its development. But domestic research of the capital resource is in its infancy. So we analysis the actual state and defects of China Venture Capital Industry and try to propose some related police based on the angle of VC’s capital resource.
Firstly, in this paper, the actual state of China Venture Capital Industry is analyzed through questionnaire and on-the-spot investigation. The important influence factors and the harmonious relationship of Venture Capital and New venture start-ups development is investigated. In this research, exist and development circumstance of Venture Capital Industry is surveyed in levels of policy and regulation, social culture, practitioner and agency. Some new phenomenon was found in research. Such as: One of the evaluation guide line,”the technology of project is more important than start-up firm team”is accept broadly in Venture Capital Industry; Governmental intervention exit in decision process in almost all of government back-up VC. The New venture start-ups incline to the VC is the same as the common share investment; VC is in a dilemma between invest diversified portfolio and centralization investment; Risk-taking capacity of State-owned capital is more weak than others, etc.
Secondly, based on actual state investigation, a mathematics mode is proposed to analyze the relationship between Venture Capital and New venture start-ups with principal-agent theory. Subject to incentive compatibility (IC) and participation constraints (PC), the VC capital structure is analyzed also. Under the public policy, We analysis the effect of base salary that the VC offers to the entrepreneur, share of VC and entrepreneur, managerial services, etc. In this way, the quantitative ratio of those parameters is acquired. Furthermore, the public policy such as educational program of government, output subsidies, subsidy to equipment investment. While these measures stimulate entrepreneur, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.
Finally, through the angle of VC’s capital resource, using case study, we choice VC development pattern of three city to analysis the feature each other. We try to found a scientific foundation provide for optimization using of financial capital.
首先,本文以问卷调查、现场访谈等方法,剖析了我国创投产业目前的发展状态;考察了创投机构、创业企业发展过程中面临的重要问题以及两者之间的协调关系;分析了我国创投产业赖以生存和发展的环境,在政策法规、社会文化、人才队伍、中介机构等多个层面上分析了当前存在的障碍。这些研究取得了一些新的发现,如“技术项目高于创业团队”的投资评价标准在创投业中盛行;政府行为广泛存在于有政府资金背景的创投机构决策过程之中;创业企业将创投等同于普通投资的倾向严重;创投机构存在投资组合分散与集合的矛盾;国有资金的风险承担能力更差,等等。
其次,以现状调查分析为基础,通过对创业投资产业中理论的分析,本文建立一个创业投资与创业企业之间的一个数理模型,分析了在满足一定参与约束与激励相容约束的条件下创业企业的资本结构模型。通过委托—代理理论的分析,对有政府政策影响的情况下,以参与约束与激励相容约束效用为条件,分析了创业投资机构和创业企业家在创业企业中基本工资收入、创业投资机构的投资比例,激励创业企业家的股权比例及创业投资机构管理建议的影响做了数理的分析。得到了以上多个方面因素相互影响到参与人的行为的结论和比例的确定途径。进而本文分析了对风险投资活动的几种政策措施:政府为企业家的培训费用,设备投资的补贴,生产阶段的产品补贴。尽管这些措施都激励了企业家,只有成本-效率式的政府服务可以提高整个社会福利。
最后,本文依据前面从创投资金来源角度对创投产业所进行的分析,运用案例方法,选择了三个典型城市运用财政资金于创业投资事业发展的不同模式进行对比研究,以发现各自的特色,为寻找财政资金在创投中的最佳运行模式奠定科学基础。
Venture capital (VC) is critical to create more and more New venture start-ups, develop China high-technology industry, upgrade industry structure of national economy, create more jobs and encourage innovative activity of whole society. The development of venture capital has“path dependence”in a certain extent. The feature of development pattern is different between VC directed by government and by market. The capital resource of VC has great influence on its development. But domestic research of the capital resource is in its infancy. So we analysis the actual state and defects of China Venture Capital Industry and try to propose some related police based on the angle of VC’s capital resource.
Firstly, in this paper, the actual state of China Venture Capital Industry is analyzed through questionnaire and on-the-spot investigation. The important influence factors and the harmonious relationship of Venture Capital and New venture start-ups development is investigated. In this research, exist and development circumstance of Venture Capital Industry is surveyed in levels of policy and regulation, social culture, practitioner and agency. Some new phenomenon was found in research. Such as: One of the evaluation guide line,”the technology of project is more important than start-up firm team”is accept broadly in Venture Capital Industry; Governmental intervention exit in decision process in almost all of government back-up VC. The New venture start-ups incline to the VC is the same as the common share investment; VC is in a dilemma between invest diversified portfolio and centralization investment; Risk-taking capacity of State-owned capital is more weak than others, etc.
Secondly, based on actual state investigation, a mathematics mode is proposed to analyze the relationship between Venture Capital and New venture start-ups with principal-agent theory. Subject to incentive compatibility (IC) and participation constraints (PC), the VC capital structure is analyzed also. Under the public policy, We analysis the effect of base salary that the VC offers to the entrepreneur, share of VC and entrepreneur, managerial services, etc. In this way, the quantitative ratio of those parameters is acquired. Furthermore, the public policy such as educational program of government, output subsidies, subsidy to equipment investment. While these measures stimulate entrepreneur, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.
Finally, through the angle of VC’s capital resource, using case study, we choice VC development pattern of three city to analysis the feature each other. We try to found a scientific foundation provide for optimization using of financial capital.
引文
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