零售渠道及零供双方策略选择对产品创新的影响
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摘要
制造业与零售业的专业化分工使专业的制造商和零售商在商品经济的背景下都取得了充分的发展,双方的市场势力不断扩大,此消彼长,并存在一定程度的竞争,在共同利益基础上根据市场势力的对比对零售渠道中的利润进行重新分配。零售市场是直接面对消费者并实现商品最终销售的地方,是制造商实现利润的必经渠道,因此零售市场中的利润可以通过一系列中间变量反向影响上游生产领域的决策。在现有的研究中,大都将产品创新作为既定的事实,研究在特定的创新程度以及某种新产品特定的风险和收益的情况下,零售商应采取何种通道费政策,或者应采取何种自有品牌发展战略,或者怎样发展自建销售渠道。但是实际经济中各种因素都是互为因果的,产品的创新既然能够影响下游零售市场中的均衡状况,那么零售市场中的参数以及相关政策必然也会对生产领域造成一定的影响。近年来中国零售市场上引发零售商与制造商冲突的通道费,以及在通道费作用下进一步强化发展的零售商自有品牌与制造商自建渠道经营,都可以通过影响零供双方的合作意愿、零售商对创新产品的接纳程度以及零售市场结构的变化,对制造商生产过程中的创新投入决策产生影响。本文的研究目的就在于,将以往研究中零售行业中与产品创新有关的因素提炼出来,具体的研究零售过程中各种变量是如何对生产过程中的创新决策产生影响的,尤其是通道费、零售商自有品牌和制造商自建渠道经营对创新决策的影响,并通过借鉴发达国家零售市场的发展经验,为中国零售业的发展提出一定的参考意见。
论文共有八个部分,分别是导论、相关概念及文献综述、零售渠道与产品创新的关系分析、通道费对产品创新的影响、自有品牌对产品创新的影响、自建渠道对产品创新的影响、中国零售业的发展方向及促进产品创新的政策建议,以及最后的结论与研究展望。通过对现有研究中对有关产品创新和零供双方纵向关系的文献进行梳理,找出影响各阶段各种类型产品创新的因素,以及零供纵向约束关系中影响双方利润以及市场绩效的因素,找出两个研究领域中的关联点,并从此关联点入手,通过建立在博弈工具基础上的理论分析,在对实际经济过程合理的简化的基础上,在符合实际情况的假设前提下,对引入通道费前后、引入自有品牌前后、引入自建渠道前后有无创新以及不同类型创新时的市场均衡进行分析,探讨在其他因素不变时某种经济变量的变动是如何影响生产过程决策的,进而在分析零售业的发展方向和相关政策制定的方针怎样才能促进生产过程中的产品创新。
本文的研究成果主要有以下几点：首先,通道费、自有品牌与自建渠道作为零售渠道中相互影响的三种重要因素,都会通过零售市场的相关机制对上游制造商的利润及创新激励产生影响。除了制造商通过零售商平台进行销售的方式外,自有品牌和自建渠道可以作为与之相并列的策略选择。通道费是在传统渠道内部制造商利润向零售商利润的转移,可以通过弥补零售商的风险成本使零售商有激励接纳制造商的新产品,但是过多的通道费却会占用制造商大量的资金,影响其创新能力；零售商要综合考虑销售制造商品牌商品和自有品牌商品两方面的总利润最大化,因此自有品牌的低价和收取通道费都可以成为零售商保持盈利的工具,使零售商的利益得到更好的保证从而提高双方的合作意愿。自建渠道经营方式的引入会对该品牌商品的零售市场结构产生较大的影响,可以有效的打破零售商的垄断,形成竞争的局面,因此制造商为保证其产品的竞争活力,必定会加强产品创新的力度,保持自身产品的多样性。
其次,线性通道费不会影响市场的最终均衡,也不会对零供双方的收益产生影响,但一次性通达道费会将制造商利润转移给零售商。这种利润的转移不会像广告那样造成资金向渠道外的扩散。零售商在制定通道费政策时,要综合考虑自身所处的发展阶段,以及制造商的市场规模。当零售市场趋于竞争或垄断时,降低通道费有利于刺激制造商产品创新,而当零售市场接近垄断竞争的市场结构时,适当提高通道费可以促进产品创新投入。同时,提高零售商的库存管理水平,降低边际储存成本和边际经营成本,减小制造商产品的可替代性,降低产品的需求弹性,都可以促进零供双方的合作,从而是创新产品得以顺利销售。
第三,当存在零售商自有品牌时,产品的创新激励会有所增加。自有品牌的引入会降低原有制造商品牌商品的交易价格,而产品创新又会使两种商品市场交易价格均下降,制造商品牌产品的创新会降低自有品牌商品的交易量,增加制造商品牌商品交易量。零售商销售自有品牌产品会增加自己的利润水平,同时使制造商利润水平下降,但两者利润之和会比没有自有品牌时高。制造商对产品的创新会增加其利润,但是零售商销售品牌产品的利润会减少,进而零售商的总利润会受到影响,因此为保证零售商接纳新产品,制造商有可能会在新产品交易过程中适当的提高一次性通道费水平。而作用于提高产品的感知质量而非降低生产成本的创新,会提高消费者对商品的认知度,从而扩大商品的市场需求量,无论对零售商还是制造商利润都是有利的。更进一步,当放宽本文的假设(零售商自有品牌商品没有能力进行创新)后,即零售商也可以进行产品创新时,双方的利润都会得到提高。
最后,制造商自建渠道有两种效应,一种是对原有渠道中消费者的分流,即对传统渠道的替代效应,另一种是在提高消费者对产品品牌认可的基础上增加市场总需求,即对传统渠道的拓展效应。本文的分析中重点考察自建渠道的拓展作用。制造商对自建渠道中降低边际经营成本的创新可以提高自身的利润以及消费者剩余,但是这种创新仅仅是在流通领域的改善,实质是一种促销手段。作用于生产领域降低边际生产成本的创新在有无自建渠道时对零售商利润的影响是相同的。当制造商有一定的市场势力,可以通过自建渠道实现规模经济和范围经济从而降低边际生产成本和边际销售成本时,其面临的市场规模越大,创新激励也就越强。当制造商的创新结果是生产出一种全新产品时,通道费可能演变成零售商向制造商的支付或者在原有通道费上的优惠,这部分支付或者优惠,可以看做是零售商为购买这项收益率较高的风险资产付出的成本。此外,建立在互联网发展、交通便利、支付手段快捷等科技发展基础上的网络零售可以视为一种新型的自建渠道形式,能够起到促进产品创新的作用。
本文的创新之处在于,第一,从研究视角上有所创新,改变了现有研究中将生产领域与零售领域分开研究的状况,重点研究两个领域之间的相互联系,从零售渠道入手研究其对上游制造企业产品创新投入决策的影响。第二,将当前流行的网络零售作为制造商自建渠道经营的一种新形式,拓展了国内学者对网络零售研究的理论背景。第三,将零供双方合作意愿、产品质量和新产品经营策略的差异化分别作为通道费、自有品牌和自建渠道对产品创新影响的中间变量,比现有对零售领域与生产领域联系的相关研究更符合三者的现实特点。
Both manufacturers and retailers have accomplished great development since the specialization between them. With the enlarging and shifting market powers of the two participants, manufacturers and retailers share the common interests, and at the same time they are competing with each other base on their market powers. Retail market is the place for the final products to face the consumers and obtain their final values, and for the manufacturers to realize their profits, hence the profits made in retail market could effect the decision in the upstream market through a series of intermediate variables. In most of the existing literatures, innovation is considered to be a given condition, based on which the risk and profit are fixed and the retailers take corresponding measures. Nevertheless, under the real economic environment, all the factors interacts with each other, as a result, not only the innovation could effect retail market, but also the situation in the downstream market could effect manufacturers' decision on innovation too. In the recent years, most of the conflicts between manufacturers and retailers are caused by slotting allowances, which reinforce the development of retailers' private brands and manufacturers' self-constructed channels. All of the three aspects could influence manufacturers' innovation decision by impacting the participants' willing to cooperate, retailers' desire for new products and chances in retail market structures. This paper if aimed at the influence of parameters of retail market on innovation decision in the product process, especially how the slotting allowances, retailers' private brand and producers' self-built channels affect the innovation policy. Further more some suggestions are given for the development of Chinese retail business. And considering the open retail market in the environment of economic globalization, we should draw the experiences of developed markets and furthermore improve our laws and rules on retail market.
The paper is consist of the following eight parts, introduction, the relevant concept and literature review, the relationship between retail channel and innovation, the effect of slotting allowances on innovation, the effect of retailers' private brands on innovation, the manufacturers' self-constructed channels on innovation, currents development of China's retail market and suggestions to promote innovation, and finally the conclusion and research prospect.
By reviewing the current literatures on innovation and vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers, factors that effect innovation of different product stages and types, and the ones that effect producers'and retailers' profit, are found. The connections between the factors are the basic of this paper. With reasonable simplified assumption, we could compare the situations with or without the slotting allowances, privation brands and self-built channels before and after innovation. When other parameters are fixed, alteration of some facts may change the innovation decision, based on which the directors of retail market could make relative policies to guarantee the positive influence of retail market on innovation.
There are four mail conclusions of this paper. First of all, slotting allowances, private brands and self-built channels could effect the profits and innovation inspiration of innovation in the upstream market. Define the common retail pattern of producers sell products through specialized retailers as tradition retail channel, and then the private brands and self-constructed channels could be viewed as the expanded form of the traditional channel, namely the outside choice. Slotting allowances are shift of profit from manufacturers to retailers within the channel, and could stimulate manufacturers'innovation by offsetting the potential risks. However an excess of slotting allowance would occupy big amount of the producers'capital and hinder the innovation. Specialized retailer should take into account the profits made by selling both private brand product and manufacturer brand product, and maximize the combination profit. Private brands with low prices and slotting allowances could both be the tools of the retailer to make profit. Self-constructed channels would impact the structure of the retail market by breaking the retailers' monopoly in the industry. To stay profitable in the competition with retailers, producers have to focus on innovation so as to maintain the products'diversity.
Secondly, it is the one-time slotting allowance rather than linear fee that would affect the equilibrium. Such transfer of profit would not cause a waste of capital as advertisement does. When making the decisions, retailers have to take their development stage as well as the manufacturers'scopes in to consideration.
Thirdly, retailers'private brands could stimulate innovation by decrease the prices of manufacturer brand products, and the innovation would lower the prices of both brands in return. When the innovation reduces the marginal cost of production, there could be a chance that manufacturers would like to increase the slotting allowances so as to reinforce the retailers' willing to cooperate. Further more, when relaxing the assumption to allow the retailers' private brand production to innovate, both the manufacturer and the retailer would enjoy more profit.
Finally, there are two effects of manufacturers'self-built channels. On the one hand, they could convert the consumers from the original channels to the new ones, on the other hand, they could attract more customers and increase the demand. This paper mainly focuses on the latter one. Manufacturers'innovation could reduce the marginal cost in production or marketing, or could generate a completely new product. Slotting allowances could become an actual payment from retailers to manufacturers as a cost for the risk assets with relatively high rate of return. Besides, with the development of internet, transportation and electronic commerce, internet retail, which could be considered as a kind of self-built channels, could stimulate innovation more than ever before.
Three innovation ideas could be seen in this paper. First of all, the effect of retail channels on innovation is systematically studied. Although in the existing researches, innovation of products has been taken into account, the retailers'strategies'influence on innovation have seldom been studied. Secondly, internet retail is considered as a new type of innovation with lower costs, lower risks and better chances to succeed. Finally, the willing to cooperate, the quality of products and the differential marketing strategies of new products are considered respectively as the intermediate variables of slotting allowances, private brands and self-built channels effect of innovation. Such assumption is more accordance with the reality.
论文共有八个部分,分别是导论、相关概念及文献综述、零售渠道与产品创新的关系分析、通道费对产品创新的影响、自有品牌对产品创新的影响、自建渠道对产品创新的影响、中国零售业的发展方向及促进产品创新的政策建议,以及最后的结论与研究展望。通过对现有研究中对有关产品创新和零供双方纵向关系的文献进行梳理,找出影响各阶段各种类型产品创新的因素,以及零供纵向约束关系中影响双方利润以及市场绩效的因素,找出两个研究领域中的关联点,并从此关联点入手,通过建立在博弈工具基础上的理论分析,在对实际经济过程合理的简化的基础上,在符合实际情况的假设前提下,对引入通道费前后、引入自有品牌前后、引入自建渠道前后有无创新以及不同类型创新时的市场均衡进行分析,探讨在其他因素不变时某种经济变量的变动是如何影响生产过程决策的,进而在分析零售业的发展方向和相关政策制定的方针怎样才能促进生产过程中的产品创新。
本文的研究成果主要有以下几点：首先,通道费、自有品牌与自建渠道作为零售渠道中相互影响的三种重要因素,都会通过零售市场的相关机制对上游制造商的利润及创新激励产生影响。除了制造商通过零售商平台进行销售的方式外,自有品牌和自建渠道可以作为与之相并列的策略选择。通道费是在传统渠道内部制造商利润向零售商利润的转移,可以通过弥补零售商的风险成本使零售商有激励接纳制造商的新产品,但是过多的通道费却会占用制造商大量的资金,影响其创新能力；零售商要综合考虑销售制造商品牌商品和自有品牌商品两方面的总利润最大化,因此自有品牌的低价和收取通道费都可以成为零售商保持盈利的工具,使零售商的利益得到更好的保证从而提高双方的合作意愿。自建渠道经营方式的引入会对该品牌商品的零售市场结构产生较大的影响,可以有效的打破零售商的垄断,形成竞争的局面,因此制造商为保证其产品的竞争活力,必定会加强产品创新的力度,保持自身产品的多样性。
其次,线性通道费不会影响市场的最终均衡,也不会对零供双方的收益产生影响,但一次性通达道费会将制造商利润转移给零售商。这种利润的转移不会像广告那样造成资金向渠道外的扩散。零售商在制定通道费政策时,要综合考虑自身所处的发展阶段,以及制造商的市场规模。当零售市场趋于竞争或垄断时,降低通道费有利于刺激制造商产品创新,而当零售市场接近垄断竞争的市场结构时,适当提高通道费可以促进产品创新投入。同时,提高零售商的库存管理水平,降低边际储存成本和边际经营成本,减小制造商产品的可替代性,降低产品的需求弹性,都可以促进零供双方的合作,从而是创新产品得以顺利销售。
第三,当存在零售商自有品牌时,产品的创新激励会有所增加。自有品牌的引入会降低原有制造商品牌商品的交易价格,而产品创新又会使两种商品市场交易价格均下降,制造商品牌产品的创新会降低自有品牌商品的交易量,增加制造商品牌商品交易量。零售商销售自有品牌产品会增加自己的利润水平,同时使制造商利润水平下降,但两者利润之和会比没有自有品牌时高。制造商对产品的创新会增加其利润,但是零售商销售品牌产品的利润会减少,进而零售商的总利润会受到影响,因此为保证零售商接纳新产品,制造商有可能会在新产品交易过程中适当的提高一次性通道费水平。而作用于提高产品的感知质量而非降低生产成本的创新,会提高消费者对商品的认知度,从而扩大商品的市场需求量,无论对零售商还是制造商利润都是有利的。更进一步,当放宽本文的假设(零售商自有品牌商品没有能力进行创新)后,即零售商也可以进行产品创新时,双方的利润都会得到提高。
最后,制造商自建渠道有两种效应,一种是对原有渠道中消费者的分流,即对传统渠道的替代效应,另一种是在提高消费者对产品品牌认可的基础上增加市场总需求,即对传统渠道的拓展效应。本文的分析中重点考察自建渠道的拓展作用。制造商对自建渠道中降低边际经营成本的创新可以提高自身的利润以及消费者剩余,但是这种创新仅仅是在流通领域的改善,实质是一种促销手段。作用于生产领域降低边际生产成本的创新在有无自建渠道时对零售商利润的影响是相同的。当制造商有一定的市场势力,可以通过自建渠道实现规模经济和范围经济从而降低边际生产成本和边际销售成本时,其面临的市场规模越大,创新激励也就越强。当制造商的创新结果是生产出一种全新产品时,通道费可能演变成零售商向制造商的支付或者在原有通道费上的优惠,这部分支付或者优惠,可以看做是零售商为购买这项收益率较高的风险资产付出的成本。此外,建立在互联网发展、交通便利、支付手段快捷等科技发展基础上的网络零售可以视为一种新型的自建渠道形式,能够起到促进产品创新的作用。
本文的创新之处在于,第一,从研究视角上有所创新,改变了现有研究中将生产领域与零售领域分开研究的状况,重点研究两个领域之间的相互联系,从零售渠道入手研究其对上游制造企业产品创新投入决策的影响。第二,将当前流行的网络零售作为制造商自建渠道经营的一种新形式,拓展了国内学者对网络零售研究的理论背景。第三,将零供双方合作意愿、产品质量和新产品经营策略的差异化分别作为通道费、自有品牌和自建渠道对产品创新影响的中间变量,比现有对零售领域与生产领域联系的相关研究更符合三者的现实特点。
Both manufacturers and retailers have accomplished great development since the specialization between them. With the enlarging and shifting market powers of the two participants, manufacturers and retailers share the common interests, and at the same time they are competing with each other base on their market powers. Retail market is the place for the final products to face the consumers and obtain their final values, and for the manufacturers to realize their profits, hence the profits made in retail market could effect the decision in the upstream market through a series of intermediate variables. In most of the existing literatures, innovation is considered to be a given condition, based on which the risk and profit are fixed and the retailers take corresponding measures. Nevertheless, under the real economic environment, all the factors interacts with each other, as a result, not only the innovation could effect retail market, but also the situation in the downstream market could effect manufacturers' decision on innovation too. In the recent years, most of the conflicts between manufacturers and retailers are caused by slotting allowances, which reinforce the development of retailers' private brands and manufacturers' self-constructed channels. All of the three aspects could influence manufacturers' innovation decision by impacting the participants' willing to cooperate, retailers' desire for new products and chances in retail market structures. This paper if aimed at the influence of parameters of retail market on innovation decision in the product process, especially how the slotting allowances, retailers' private brand and producers' self-built channels affect the innovation policy. Further more some suggestions are given for the development of Chinese retail business. And considering the open retail market in the environment of economic globalization, we should draw the experiences of developed markets and furthermore improve our laws and rules on retail market.
The paper is consist of the following eight parts, introduction, the relevant concept and literature review, the relationship between retail channel and innovation, the effect of slotting allowances on innovation, the effect of retailers' private brands on innovation, the manufacturers' self-constructed channels on innovation, currents development of China's retail market and suggestions to promote innovation, and finally the conclusion and research prospect.
By reviewing the current literatures on innovation and vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers, factors that effect innovation of different product stages and types, and the ones that effect producers'and retailers' profit, are found. The connections between the factors are the basic of this paper. With reasonable simplified assumption, we could compare the situations with or without the slotting allowances, privation brands and self-built channels before and after innovation. When other parameters are fixed, alteration of some facts may change the innovation decision, based on which the directors of retail market could make relative policies to guarantee the positive influence of retail market on innovation.
There are four mail conclusions of this paper. First of all, slotting allowances, private brands and self-built channels could effect the profits and innovation inspiration of innovation in the upstream market. Define the common retail pattern of producers sell products through specialized retailers as tradition retail channel, and then the private brands and self-constructed channels could be viewed as the expanded form of the traditional channel, namely the outside choice. Slotting allowances are shift of profit from manufacturers to retailers within the channel, and could stimulate manufacturers'innovation by offsetting the potential risks. However an excess of slotting allowance would occupy big amount of the producers'capital and hinder the innovation. Specialized retailer should take into account the profits made by selling both private brand product and manufacturer brand product, and maximize the combination profit. Private brands with low prices and slotting allowances could both be the tools of the retailer to make profit. Self-constructed channels would impact the structure of the retail market by breaking the retailers' monopoly in the industry. To stay profitable in the competition with retailers, producers have to focus on innovation so as to maintain the products'diversity.
Secondly, it is the one-time slotting allowance rather than linear fee that would affect the equilibrium. Such transfer of profit would not cause a waste of capital as advertisement does. When making the decisions, retailers have to take their development stage as well as the manufacturers'scopes in to consideration.
Thirdly, retailers'private brands could stimulate innovation by decrease the prices of manufacturer brand products, and the innovation would lower the prices of both brands in return. When the innovation reduces the marginal cost of production, there could be a chance that manufacturers would like to increase the slotting allowances so as to reinforce the retailers' willing to cooperate. Further more, when relaxing the assumption to allow the retailers' private brand production to innovate, both the manufacturer and the retailer would enjoy more profit.
Finally, there are two effects of manufacturers'self-built channels. On the one hand, they could convert the consumers from the original channels to the new ones, on the other hand, they could attract more customers and increase the demand. This paper mainly focuses on the latter one. Manufacturers'innovation could reduce the marginal cost in production or marketing, or could generate a completely new product. Slotting allowances could become an actual payment from retailers to manufacturers as a cost for the risk assets with relatively high rate of return. Besides, with the development of internet, transportation and electronic commerce, internet retail, which could be considered as a kind of self-built channels, could stimulate innovation more than ever before.
Three innovation ideas could be seen in this paper. First of all, the effect of retail channels on innovation is systematically studied. Although in the existing researches, innovation of products has been taken into account, the retailers'strategies'influence on innovation have seldom been studied. Secondly, internet retail is considered as a new type of innovation with lower costs, lower risks and better chances to succeed. Finally, the willing to cooperate, the quality of products and the differential marketing strategies of new products are considered respectively as the intermediate variables of slotting allowances, private brands and self-built channels effect of innovation. Such assumption is more accordance with the reality.
引文
1陈劲等(2002)
1贝思·罗杰斯(2003)
1李妍姝(2003)
2同4
3甘华鸣(2002)
1本部分资料部分转引自邸智源(2007)
1转引自李飞,程丹,西方零售商自有品牌理论研究综述(2006)
1转引自Cannon & Bloom(1991)
1转引自余晖(2006)：冯昭奎,[日]小山周三,《中日流通业比较》
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