中国电力产业厂商市场力量的防范研究
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摘要
本文是一篇从产业组织理论的视角分析电力产业市场化改革问题的尝试之作。本文的主题是,在当前我国联营体模式的电力市场中,如何防范和抑制发电厂商的市场力量。本文通过实证分析,发现了我国电力市场中存在发电厂商施用市场力量的迹象。本文对于防范发电厂商市场力量的建议是,在供给侧实施差别价格拍卖并在需求侧实施可中断负荷服务。
电力产业曾被认为是一个典型的自然垄断产业,维持了一百余年的发电、输电、配电和售电一体化的模式。上世纪九十年代以来,以英国为发端,出现了一个世界性的电力产业拆分与重组的浪潮,我国也于2002年末实现了“厂网分开”。然而电力市场并非是自发演进形成的,而是一个人工设计的市场,其运营规则和竞价机制难免存在这样或那样的纰漏。面对市场的疏漏、受到利益的驱使,从原一体化结构中剥离出来的独立的发电厂商,一定会最大限度地掘取潜在的利润。电力产业市场化的历程表明,各国的电力市场几乎都遇到了由发电厂商的市场力量所引发的电价波动的困扰。市场力量的行使不仅损害消费者的利益,同时还将危害电力市场的正常运行与健康发展,美国加州的电力危机就是一个很好的例证。由于新组建的电力市场特别容易受到市场力量的袭扰,一些西方学者将其列为电力市场的头号治理对象。
我国经济学界对电力市场的研究到目前仍处于起步阶段,已有的分析都未能很好地结合电力产业的特性。作为一篇尝试之作,本文首先分析了电力产业的一些独有技术特征,如负荷具有不确定性、电力传输会受到线路容量的限制、存在短期的供给约束等。基于对这些技术特征的理解,通过理论借鉴与本文的实证,笔者发现不同于传统的产业组织理论中市场力量的观念,电力市场中的发电厂商并非自始至终地都在行使市场力量来抬高电价,它们行使市场力量需要一个适合的供需环境。凭借市场力量抬高电价的手法主要有两类:一是向联营体直接申报高价,二是采取容量囤积的策略。而无论发电厂商采取何种策略,都将造成电价的巨幅波动,这是发电厂商获取超额利润的载体。本文的实证分析表明,与其它一些初级电力市场类似,我国的试点市场中也存在发电厂商申报高价和囤积容量的现象。
由于电价的巨幅波动是超额利润的载体,同时趸售市场规则的纰漏有可能导致市场力量的滥用,因此,笔者将分析的重点集中于市场规则、需求弹性和市场结构等三个方面。实际上本文抑制市场力量的出发点,就是在市场设计中尽量减少可能导致价格巨幅波动的那些因素。
已有的拍卖研究成果显示,在不同的拍卖方式下价格的波动幅度是不相同的。受此启发,笔者在第五章通过对两种拍卖方式下供给函数的推导与对比分析,发现差别价格拍卖的供给曲线具有较高的价格弹性,因而笔者认为,在供给侧将目前的统一价格拍卖转换为差别价格拍卖将有助于抑制发电厂商的市场力量。
电力需求的价格弹性过低,是发电厂商拥有市场力量的一个重要方面。一旦在需求侧建立起响应定价,发电侧的价格尖峰就可以及时地传递给消费者,这将使用户的需求得到抑制,从而削弱发电厂商行使市场力量的激励。但由于需求侧响应定价的实施首先应当有一个完善的峰谷电价体系平台,而目前我国的零售电价体系与一个科学的电价制度还相差甚远,同时还面临一个激励两难,因此应当考虑其它的方式来增加需求曲线的弹性。本文证明,在需求侧实施可中断负荷服务,可以增加需求曲线的价格弹性,起到与需求侧实时电价同样的抑制发电厂商市场力量的效果。而可中断负荷服务又避免了上面提到的缺陷,因而是一个非常理想的替代方案。
本文在对电力市场的空间把握与市场集中度的度量方面,以及在对发电厂商的容量囤积策略的实证等方面具有创新性的贡献。本文的不足之处在于数理模型和计量工具的运用还不够深入。此外,由于各公司对数据的封锁,没有获得一些更加核心的信息。
电力市场是一个新生事物,直至目前世界各国仍处于探索和完善的阶段。就当前我国的具体国情来分析,对联营体中市场力量的防范除了供给侧和需求侧两方面的措施外,还需要多种措施的配合,如继续拆分发电厂商、在长期中扩充发电装机容量与输电能力,以及行之有效的规制等。
This dissertation tries to discuss some of the main issues of the power market-oriented reform in a framework of the industrial organization theory. The main objective of this dissertation is to find how to mitigate market power in the electricity power pool in our country. Through an empirical study we find some evidences of exercising market power by some of the generators in China. This dissertation gives some advices on preventing market power, including discriminatory price auction on supply side and interruptible services on demand side.
Traditionally, the electric power industry has been regarded as a natural monopoly with generation, transmission and distribution integrated vertically well for 100 years. Since 1990, beginning in the U.K., there is a worldwide trend of restructuring in the electric power industry. China also unbundled its generation sector from the grid in 2002. However, the power market is not a direct result of independent actions by generators, distributors and customers, but an artificial market of a deliberate government policy. For this reason, oversights are hard to avoid in the market rules governing the operation. Prompted by profits, the independent producers separated from the vertically structure will attempt to exploit any profitable opportunities presented by the market rules. The course of the power market-oriented reform shows that high prices caused by the market power of the producers emerged in almost all areas after the supply side separated from the network. The Californian electricity crisis provides a stark evidence that market power will jeopardize the interest of the customers and impair power markets. Susceptible to the exercise of market power in the new power markets, mitigating them is therefore high on the agenda for regulators by some western scholars' consideration.
In our economics academic circles, power market is pending for further research. Many literatures can hardly discuss market power in the light of specific technologies. This dissertation tries to combine some characteristic such as system load indetermination, transmission capacity limitation and short-run generation constraints into the analyses. Based on the technique analysis and an empirical study, we find that generators in a power market are not exercising their market power all the time, as is different from the classic IO theory. When conditions exogenous to the behavior of the generators favor it, they will abuse their potential market power.
Generators have two strategic weapons to exercise their market power: (1) the price bid for each generation set and (2) the capacity for each generation set made available to supply the market. Our empirical study shows that bidding and withholding strategy both can be found in our pilot power market, as is similar to the foreign markets.
Market rules, market structure, and elasticity of demand are the important features of the power Pool which contribute to the ability of generators to abuse market power, so we focus on these factors in our analyses. In fact, the starting point of this dissertation is to minimize those market rules that can bring out wholesale price spikes.
Auction studies suggest that price volatilities are differences between the uniform price auction and discriminatory price auction. Following their suggestion, we compare two supply functions using a uniform price and a discriminatory price auction for an electricity market, and find that the supply curves will typically be more price elastic using a DPA than UPA. Therefore, DPA is a better form for a power market to control the market power.
Another source of generators' market power is the low elasticity of the demand side. Responsive pricing can dampen the incentive of excising market power because price spikes in the wholesale market can curb the customs' demand in time. However, responsive pricing needs a basis of complete peak-load pricing system. In our country, there is a long way for a reasonable retail price system to be achieved, and there is a incentive dilemma of the responsive pricing, so we should considering some other way to enhance the demand side elasticity. This dissertation shows that interruptible load service has the same effect as responsive pricing in building an elastic demand side and mitigating market power. However, interruptible load service avoids those shortcomings mentioned above, so it is an ideal scheme.
This dissertation brings some original ideas on defining the range and measuring the concentration of the power market, and creates a new approach to study empirically of the capacity withholding strategy. There are some inadequacies in our analysis such as a plain model and simple econometric methods. Furthermore, we can't get some core data because of the hard blockade of the information in the electric power industry in our country.
Power market is still in its initial stage, and the market rules and structures still need to be investigated and improved. According to our national conditions, we should adopt various measures to prevent market power including newly installed capacity investments, transmission expansion and an effective regulation, besides methods mentioned above.
电力产业曾被认为是一个典型的自然垄断产业,维持了一百余年的发电、输电、配电和售电一体化的模式。上世纪九十年代以来,以英国为发端,出现了一个世界性的电力产业拆分与重组的浪潮,我国也于2002年末实现了“厂网分开”。然而电力市场并非是自发演进形成的,而是一个人工设计的市场,其运营规则和竞价机制难免存在这样或那样的纰漏。面对市场的疏漏、受到利益的驱使,从原一体化结构中剥离出来的独立的发电厂商,一定会最大限度地掘取潜在的利润。电力产业市场化的历程表明,各国的电力市场几乎都遇到了由发电厂商的市场力量所引发的电价波动的困扰。市场力量的行使不仅损害消费者的利益,同时还将危害电力市场的正常运行与健康发展,美国加州的电力危机就是一个很好的例证。由于新组建的电力市场特别容易受到市场力量的袭扰,一些西方学者将其列为电力市场的头号治理对象。
我国经济学界对电力市场的研究到目前仍处于起步阶段,已有的分析都未能很好地结合电力产业的特性。作为一篇尝试之作,本文首先分析了电力产业的一些独有技术特征,如负荷具有不确定性、电力传输会受到线路容量的限制、存在短期的供给约束等。基于对这些技术特征的理解,通过理论借鉴与本文的实证,笔者发现不同于传统的产业组织理论中市场力量的观念,电力市场中的发电厂商并非自始至终地都在行使市场力量来抬高电价,它们行使市场力量需要一个适合的供需环境。凭借市场力量抬高电价的手法主要有两类:一是向联营体直接申报高价,二是采取容量囤积的策略。而无论发电厂商采取何种策略,都将造成电价的巨幅波动,这是发电厂商获取超额利润的载体。本文的实证分析表明,与其它一些初级电力市场类似,我国的试点市场中也存在发电厂商申报高价和囤积容量的现象。
由于电价的巨幅波动是超额利润的载体,同时趸售市场规则的纰漏有可能导致市场力量的滥用,因此,笔者将分析的重点集中于市场规则、需求弹性和市场结构等三个方面。实际上本文抑制市场力量的出发点,就是在市场设计中尽量减少可能导致价格巨幅波动的那些因素。
已有的拍卖研究成果显示,在不同的拍卖方式下价格的波动幅度是不相同的。受此启发,笔者在第五章通过对两种拍卖方式下供给函数的推导与对比分析,发现差别价格拍卖的供给曲线具有较高的价格弹性,因而笔者认为,在供给侧将目前的统一价格拍卖转换为差别价格拍卖将有助于抑制发电厂商的市场力量。
电力需求的价格弹性过低,是发电厂商拥有市场力量的一个重要方面。一旦在需求侧建立起响应定价,发电侧的价格尖峰就可以及时地传递给消费者,这将使用户的需求得到抑制,从而削弱发电厂商行使市场力量的激励。但由于需求侧响应定价的实施首先应当有一个完善的峰谷电价体系平台,而目前我国的零售电价体系与一个科学的电价制度还相差甚远,同时还面临一个激励两难,因此应当考虑其它的方式来增加需求曲线的弹性。本文证明,在需求侧实施可中断负荷服务,可以增加需求曲线的价格弹性,起到与需求侧实时电价同样的抑制发电厂商市场力量的效果。而可中断负荷服务又避免了上面提到的缺陷,因而是一个非常理想的替代方案。
本文在对电力市场的空间把握与市场集中度的度量方面,以及在对发电厂商的容量囤积策略的实证等方面具有创新性的贡献。本文的不足之处在于数理模型和计量工具的运用还不够深入。此外,由于各公司对数据的封锁,没有获得一些更加核心的信息。
电力市场是一个新生事物,直至目前世界各国仍处于探索和完善的阶段。就当前我国的具体国情来分析,对联营体中市场力量的防范除了供给侧和需求侧两方面的措施外,还需要多种措施的配合,如继续拆分发电厂商、在长期中扩充发电装机容量与输电能力,以及行之有效的规制等。
This dissertation tries to discuss some of the main issues of the power market-oriented reform in a framework of the industrial organization theory. The main objective of this dissertation is to find how to mitigate market power in the electricity power pool in our country. Through an empirical study we find some evidences of exercising market power by some of the generators in China. This dissertation gives some advices on preventing market power, including discriminatory price auction on supply side and interruptible services on demand side.
Traditionally, the electric power industry has been regarded as a natural monopoly with generation, transmission and distribution integrated vertically well for 100 years. Since 1990, beginning in the U.K., there is a worldwide trend of restructuring in the electric power industry. China also unbundled its generation sector from the grid in 2002. However, the power market is not a direct result of independent actions by generators, distributors and customers, but an artificial market of a deliberate government policy. For this reason, oversights are hard to avoid in the market rules governing the operation. Prompted by profits, the independent producers separated from the vertically structure will attempt to exploit any profitable opportunities presented by the market rules. The course of the power market-oriented reform shows that high prices caused by the market power of the producers emerged in almost all areas after the supply side separated from the network. The Californian electricity crisis provides a stark evidence that market power will jeopardize the interest of the customers and impair power markets. Susceptible to the exercise of market power in the new power markets, mitigating them is therefore high on the agenda for regulators by some western scholars' consideration.
In our economics academic circles, power market is pending for further research. Many literatures can hardly discuss market power in the light of specific technologies. This dissertation tries to combine some characteristic such as system load indetermination, transmission capacity limitation and short-run generation constraints into the analyses. Based on the technique analysis and an empirical study, we find that generators in a power market are not exercising their market power all the time, as is different from the classic IO theory. When conditions exogenous to the behavior of the generators favor it, they will abuse their potential market power.
Generators have two strategic weapons to exercise their market power: (1) the price bid for each generation set and (2) the capacity for each generation set made available to supply the market. Our empirical study shows that bidding and withholding strategy both can be found in our pilot power market, as is similar to the foreign markets.
Market rules, market structure, and elasticity of demand are the important features of the power Pool which contribute to the ability of generators to abuse market power, so we focus on these factors in our analyses. In fact, the starting point of this dissertation is to minimize those market rules that can bring out wholesale price spikes.
Auction studies suggest that price volatilities are differences between the uniform price auction and discriminatory price auction. Following their suggestion, we compare two supply functions using a uniform price and a discriminatory price auction for an electricity market, and find that the supply curves will typically be more price elastic using a DPA than UPA. Therefore, DPA is a better form for a power market to control the market power.
Another source of generators' market power is the low elasticity of the demand side. Responsive pricing can dampen the incentive of excising market power because price spikes in the wholesale market can curb the customs' demand in time. However, responsive pricing needs a basis of complete peak-load pricing system. In our country, there is a long way for a reasonable retail price system to be achieved, and there is a incentive dilemma of the responsive pricing, so we should considering some other way to enhance the demand side elasticity. This dissertation shows that interruptible load service has the same effect as responsive pricing in building an elastic demand side and mitigating market power. However, interruptible load service avoids those shortcomings mentioned above, so it is an ideal scheme.
This dissertation brings some original ideas on defining the range and measuring the concentration of the power market, and creates a new approach to study empirically of the capacity withholding strategy. There are some inadequacies in our analysis such as a plain model and simple econometric methods. Furthermore, we can't get some core data because of the hard blockade of the information in the electric power industry in our country.
Power market is still in its initial stage, and the market rules and structures still need to be investigated and improved. According to our national conditions, we should adopt various measures to prevent market power including newly installed capacity investments, transmission expansion and an effective regulation, besides methods mentioned above.
引文
1supply side和demand side在经济学文献中一般被译为供给方和需求方。但在电力产业中,这两者不再是抽象的供需双方,而是居于电网两端的发电厂商和用户群体。本文按照电力产业的习惯,将这两个词汇称为供给侧和需求侧。
2根据其英文名称和特征,我国也有学者将power pool译为电力库。
3两家电网公司是:国家电网公司和中国南方电网有限公司;五家发电集团公司分别是:中国华能集团公司、中国大唐集团公司、中国华电集团公司、中国国电集团公司和中国电力投资集团公司;四家辅业集团公司分别是:中国电力工程顾问集团公司、中国水电工程顾问集团公司、中国水利水电建设集团公司和中国葛洲坝集团公司。
4Joskow P.L.,and Schmalensee R.1983,Markets for Power,Cambridge:MIT Press,p.53.
5Peltzman S.1976,"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.19,No.2,pp.211-240.
6Averch H.,and Johnson L.L.1962,"Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint," The American Economic Review,Vol.52,No.5,pp.1053-1069.
7Viscusi,W.K.,Vernon,J.M.,and Harrington,J.E.2000,Economics of Regulation and Antitrust(3rd ed.),Cambridge:MIT Press,pp.457-459.
8Wolak Frank A.,and Patrick Robert H.1997,"The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market," NBER Working Paper 8248,available at http://www.nber.org/papers.
9文福拴:加州电力市场失败的教训[J],《电力系统自动化》,2001年第3期,第1-5页。
10朱成章:美国加州电力危机和美加大停电对世界电力的影响[J],《中国电力》,2003年第11期,第1-6页。
11林伯强:中国电力发展:提高电价和限电的经济影响[J],经济研究,2006年第5期,第115-126页。
12Gilbert Richard,Neuhoff Karsten and Newbery D.2004,"Allocating transmission to mitigate Market Power in Electricity Networks," The RAND Journal of Economics,Vol.35,No.4,pp.691-709.
13Wolak Frank A.2006,"Unilateral market power in wholesale Electricity Markets," CESifo DICE Report,Vol.2006,No.2 pp.10-15.
14Paul A.Samuelson,William D.Nordhaus.Economics-16th ed.McGraw-Hill Companies,Inc.1998,p.303。
15Robert S.Pindyck,Daniel L.Rubinfeld.Microeconomics-3rd ed.Prentice-Hall International Inc1995,p320。
16马西莫.莫塔:《竞争政策--理论与实践》,上海:上海财经大学出版社2006年版,第33页。
17FERC,"State of the Market 2000:Measuring performance in energy market regulation." http://www.ferc.fed.us.
18U.S.Department of Energy(2000),"Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity Markets",http://www.pi.energy.gov.
19市场绩效指标还包括基于利润率的贝恩指数(Bain Index)等指标。
20英国电力市场实际上仅仅是英格兰和爱尔兰地区的市场,详见本文第二章第二节。
21电力产业的有关特征参见本文第二章第一节。
22从1993年12月起,英国市场正式启动需求侧竞价机制。而目前我国电力市场的用户还不能参与报价,除了2006年刚起动的两家大用户直供电试点企业外,国内所有的用户均不能选择发电厂商。
23Viscusi W.K.,Vernon,J.M.,and Harrington,J.E.,2000,Economics of Regulation and Antitrust(3rd ed.),Cambridge:MIT Press,pp.314-316.
24从2006年起,《中国电力年鉴》不再出版,而是由《国家电网公司年鉴》取代。各年的年鉴实际上反映的是上一年度的有关数据。
1Joskow,Paul L.1989,"Regulatory Failure,Regulatory Reform and Structural Change In The Electric Power Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:Microeconomics,Vol.1989.pp.125-208.
2根据2006年的统计,我国火力发电和水力发电的(年末)装机容量的比重分别为77.82%和20.67%,全年发电量的比重分别为83.2%和14.7%。而长期以来我国火电、水电的装机容量和年发电量的份额基本上也都维持在这一水平左右。
3水力、风能和太阳能等发电技术对选址条件要求较高,因此它们在我国不具有普适性。而最适宜充当基荷电源的核电站目前我国投入运营的仅有两座,因而它们完全可以被忽略。假定市场中所有的发电技术皆为火力发电并不影响分析结论,实际上几乎所有的模型都是基于这一前提而构建的。
4Joskow,P.L.,and R.Schmalensee,1983,Markets for Power,Cambridge:MIT Press,p.53.
5刘阳平、叶元煦:论电力市场的有效竞争,《管理世界》1999年第2期,第112-114页。
6萨莉.亨特:《电力市场竞争》,中信出版社2004年版,第17页。
7许志义,陈泽义:《电力经济学:理论与应用》,台北:华泰书局1988年版,第41页。
8因此许多非同步电网之间的电力输送采用的是没有频率变化的直流技术。
9由于电网中一般都有自动控制的变压器,因而目前负荷不足的调整都是由频率调整来完成的,即失荷只会引起频率的降低。
10刘安平:规制经济的理论及实践,见田国强主编《现代经济学与金融学前沿发展》,北京:商务印书馆2002年版,第510页。
11Wolak Frank A.2006."Unilateral market power in wholesale Electricity Markets," CESifo DICE Report,Vol.2006,No.2 pp.10-15.
12本节的这三种模式参考了萨莉.亨特所著的《电力市场竞争》(北京:中信出版社,2004年版)第35-50页。
13“1+N”模式是我国对Pool模式的称谓。在“1+N”模式中,“1”是指电网,N是指N家竞争的发电企业。
14由于英国的特殊国情,各类文献中所称的英国电力市场或英国电力联营体实际上仅仅是英格兰和爱尔兰地区的市场,本文有时也将其简写为E&W市场或E&W Pool。
15所谓的联络线交易商是指发电机组不在该联营体的区域内,但由于有输电线路联结而能够参与联营体竞价交易的发电厂商。E&W的联络线交易商主要有苏格兰电力公司和法国电力公司(EDF)。
16可参见本文第三章的有关文献。
17也称宾-新-马电力市场。PJM是宾西法尼亚州、新泽西州和马里兰州的首字母的组合。
18考虑到我国目前的供需矛盾,在吸取了前些年几个省级电力市场经验教训的基础上,东北和华东区域市场只是模拟运行(华东市场仅模拟月度竞价)而不结算,因而并不是真正意义的市场。
19从我国已有的几个市场来看,除了东北市场执行了两部电价制外,其它市场均采用单一电价的统一价格拍卖。
1由于电力产业在市场份额方面习惯上用容量来刻划,而很少用到产量(即发电量,它等于容量乘以发电时间),故本文也遵从这一惯用法,多数地方用“容量约束”来代替产业组织理论中的“产量约束”一词。
2Vickers J.,Yarrow G.,1991,"The British electricity Experiment." Economic Policy,Vol.6,No.12,pp.187-232.
3例如,可以参见[法]泰勒尔所著的《产业组织理论》第5章,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997年版。
4Np和PG是英国电力市场中两个最大发电厂商的缩写,NP指全国电力公司(National Power),PG指电力生产公司(Power Generation)。1990年,NP和PG的装机容量分别占E&W市场全部装机容量的52%和36%。此后,随着进一步的拆分和机组的退役,近年来两者的份额已显著降低。
5G为发电设备和用电负荷的容量单位,1G=1000兆瓦=100万千瓦。
6这是因为在单一价格拍卖规则下,联营体中获准上网发电的所有机组得到的支付都是边际机组的报价,只要边际机组(不论是属于本发电厂商还是其它发电厂商)的报价高于这些机组的报价,那么这些机组仍然可以获得高于边际成本的支付。参见Von der Fehr(1993)。
7Von der Fehr,N.M.and D.Harbord,1993,"Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry," The Economic Journal,1993,Vol.103.pp.531-546.
8Wolfram,Catherine D.1995."Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," MIT Working Paper.经过四年的讨论和修改,该文最终发表在1999年第4期的《美国经济评论》上(Vol.89,No.4,pp.805-826.)。
9Green,Richard J."The Electricity Contract Market." Journal of Industrial Economics,1999,Vol.47,No.1,pp.107-124.
10Wolak,Frank A.2001,"A Model of Optimal Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market." CSEM working paper(114).available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF.
11Wolak,Frank A.2003,"Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets:The California Market,1998-2000." The American Economic Review,Vol.93,No.2,pp.425-430.
12该参数有时也被写作(1+r_(it))的形式,其中r_(it)=∑_(j≠i)dq_(it)/dq_(it)。参见Schmalensee和Willig主编的Handbook of industrial organization,Volume Ⅱ,Chapter 17。
13Von der Fehr,Nils-Henrik Morch and Harbord,David(1993)"Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry." The Economic Journal,Vol.103,pp.531-546.
14Wolfram C.D.1998,"Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction:An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales." The Rand Journal of Economics,Vol.29,No.4,pp.703-725.
15Rothkopf M.H.1999,"Daily Repetition:A neglected Factor in Analyzing Electricity Auctions." The Electricity Journal,Vol.12,No.3,pp.60-70.
16Ausubel Lawrence M.and Cramton Peter."Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," University of Maryland working Paper,2002,avalable at http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers.
17Kahn Alfred E.,Peter C.Cramton,Robert H.Poter,and Richard D.Tabors,2001,"Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing:A Dilemma for California and Beyond," The Electricity Journal,Vol.14,No.6,pp.70-79.
18Rassenti Stephen J.,Vernon L.Smith,Wilson Bart J.2003,"Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets:Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of regulatory Economics,Vol.23,No.2,pp.109-123.
19Vickrey W.,1961,"Counterspeculation,Auctions,and Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance,Vol.16,No.1,pp.8-37.
20Swinkels,Jeroen M.,1999,"Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," The Review of Economic studies,Vol.66,No.3,pp.509-528.
21Von der Fehr,N.H.and Harbord D.1997,"Capacity investment and dynamic efficiency in market-based electricity industries," University of Oslo Working Paper,available at http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/memo.
22Vickrey W.,1971,"Responsive Pricing of Public Utility Services." The Bell Journal of Economics and management science,1971,Vol.1,No.2,pp.337-346.
23Bohn R.E.,Caramanis,M.C.,Schweppe F.C.,1984,"Optimal pricing in electrical networks over space and time." The RAND Journal of Economics,Vol.15,No.3,pp.360-376.
24Borenstein,S.2002,"The Trouble with Electricity Markets:Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster," The Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.16,No.1,pp.191-211.
25Hirshleifer,J.1958,"Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing:Comment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.72,No.3,pp.451-462.
26Boiteux,M.1960,"Peak Load Pricing," The Journal of Business,Vol.33,No.2,pp.157-179.
27也就是说在v＞Z/X(P)的情况下。
28王俊豪:《政府管制经济学导论》,北京:商务印书馆2001年版。
29王俊豪:《中国垄断性产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策》,北京:商务印书馆2005年版。
30夏大慰、范斌:电力定价:理论、经验与改革模式,见:夏大慰主编:《产业组织:竞争与规制》,上海:上海财经大学出版社2002年版,第162-188页。
31孙建国、李文溥:管制产业中的产权制度变革,《厦门大学学报(哲学和社会科学版)》2003年第6期,第86-93页;电力行业管制改革与市场风险防范,《经济学家》2004年第1期,第95-101页。
32叶泽:《电力竞争》,北京:中国电力出版社2004年版。
33李虹:电力市场设计:理论与中国的改革,《经济研究》2004年第11期,第119-128页。
34林伯强:电力短缺、短期措施与长期战略,《经济研究》2004年第3期,第28-36页。
35胡恩同:电力市场双边垄断最优拍卖模型的建立与分析,《现代电力》2005年第2期,第77-81页。
36郭磊:需求侧管理的困境与需求侧响应定价,《价格理论与实践》2007年第5期,第33-34页。
37言茂松:《当量电价与融资重组》,北京:中国电力出版社2000年版。
38李晓刚、谢亚贤、言茂松:发电厂商策略性报价的行为特性初探,《电力系统自动化》2003年第20期,第21-25页。
39祁达才、夏清、卢强等:发电侧竞争中价格垄断力的判据,《电力系统自动化》,2003年第5期,第26-30页。
40魏学好、周浩:用利润空间法实现从价格上限到利润上限的转变,《电网技术》2003年第5期,第15-20页。
41李道强:浙江发电侧电力市场发电商的电价操纵行为分析,《电力系统自动化》,2005年第6期,第29-34页。
11999年之前,我国仪有葛洲坝到华东这一条跨大区输电线路。
2言茂松:谋划我国区域电力市场由两级过渡到一级之路,电力系统自动化,2004年第9期,第1-4页。
3冯飞:深化我国电力体制改革的基本设想,国务院发展研究中心调研报告,2006。
4当然,笔者也注意到2003年国家电监会颁布的《关于区域电力市场建设指导意见》,以及近来开始升温的三级电力市场的讨论。在此必须说明,在本文中笔者分析的是当前我国短期的市场结构和市场力问题,并没有否认中长期的建设目标。
1Ausubel Lawrence M.and Cramton Peter,2002,"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," University of Maryland Working Paper,available at http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers.
2Rassenti Stephen J.,Vernon L.Smith,Wilson Bart J.2003,"Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets:Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of regulatory Economics,2003,Vol.23,No.2,pp.109-123.
3Cattarelli,Carlo and Bartolini Leonardo 1997,"Treasury Bill Auctions:Issues and Uses," IMF Working Papers,available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs.
4网损是指电力传输中的能量损耗,该损耗一般与输电电压成反比。高压输电一般会有3%-5%的损耗,而低压输电的损耗可高达10%以上。
5本节发电厂商短期成本曲线的形式参考了:[1]高波,张小东等,火电厂发电成本与上网电价的研究[J],热力发电,2003年第5期第6-9页;[2]赵会茹,李春杰等,电力产业管制与竞争的经济学分析[M],北京:中国电力出版社2007,第116-117页。
6在电力市场交易中,为了保证交易结果的唯一性,通常要求整个交易计划求解是一个凸规划问题。因此会要求发电厂商的报价曲线为单调非递减函数。有关这一点可以参见一些电力专业方面的文献,例如本文参考文献中的祁达才和夏清(2003)。
1我国主要运用行政手段来干预,各地均有一份由发改委批准的拉闸限电顺序表。
2Borenstein,S.,Bushnell J.and Wolak F.2002,"Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," The American Economic Review,Vol.92,No.5,pp.1376-1405.
3Borenstein S.2005,"Wealth Transfers from Implementing Real-Time Retail Electricity Pricing," CSEM working paper(147).available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDE
4为便于阅读,本节中电价单位将电力公司资料中的“元/兆瓦时”换算为“元/千瓦时”。
5这里需要说明的是,2003年夏季因罕见高温的出现,上海市曾试行过季节性电价,即当年的7-9月的峰谷电价有±0.05元/千瓦时的浮动。当考虑这一因素时,基本用电负荷在100千瓦以上的工商业大用户峰谷价比最高为4.5:1;而基本用电负荷在100千瓦以下的普通工商业用户的峰谷价比最高为2.8:1。
62003年缺口为350亿千瓦时,2004年仅国家电网公司因拉闸限电即失电388亿千瓦时以上。参见《中国电力年鉴》2004、2005两卷。
7参见近年来各期《中国电力年鉴》及各大区域电网公司网站的负荷特性分析。
8两部电价由电度电价和基本电价两部分构成。电度电价是指按照用户用电度数计算的电价;基本电价是指按照用户用电容量计算的电价。见《销售电价管理暂行办法》第三章第十一条(发改价格[2005]第514号文件)。
1魏学好,周浩:利润空间法在电力市场中的应用,《价格理论与实践》2002年第10期,第31-33页。
2夏清,黎灿兵等:国外电力市场的监管办法、指标与手段,《电网技术》2003第3期,第1-4页。
3王俊豪:《中国垄断性产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策》,北京:商务印书馆2005年版,第205-212页。
4任晓红,任玉珑,张渝:中国电力产业价格管制模型,《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》,2005年第2期,第146-150页。
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2根据其英文名称和特征,我国也有学者将power pool译为电力库。
3两家电网公司是:国家电网公司和中国南方电网有限公司;五家发电集团公司分别是:中国华能集团公司、中国大唐集团公司、中国华电集团公司、中国国电集团公司和中国电力投资集团公司;四家辅业集团公司分别是:中国电力工程顾问集团公司、中国水电工程顾问集团公司、中国水利水电建设集团公司和中国葛洲坝集团公司。
4Joskow P.L.,and Schmalensee R.1983,Markets for Power,Cambridge:MIT Press,p.53.
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6Averch H.,and Johnson L.L.1962,"Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint," The American Economic Review,Vol.52,No.5,pp.1053-1069.
7Viscusi,W.K.,Vernon,J.M.,and Harrington,J.E.2000,Economics of Regulation and Antitrust(3rd ed.),Cambridge:MIT Press,pp.457-459.
8Wolak Frank A.,and Patrick Robert H.1997,"The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market," NBER Working Paper 8248,available at http://www.nber.org/papers.
9文福拴:加州电力市场失败的教训[J],《电力系统自动化》,2001年第3期,第1-5页。
10朱成章:美国加州电力危机和美加大停电对世界电力的影响[J],《中国电力》,2003年第11期,第1-6页。
11林伯强:中国电力发展:提高电价和限电的经济影响[J],经济研究,2006年第5期,第115-126页。
12Gilbert Richard,Neuhoff Karsten and Newbery D.2004,"Allocating transmission to mitigate Market Power in Electricity Networks," The RAND Journal of Economics,Vol.35,No.4,pp.691-709.
13Wolak Frank A.2006,"Unilateral market power in wholesale Electricity Markets," CESifo DICE Report,Vol.2006,No.2 pp.10-15.
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15Robert S.Pindyck,Daniel L.Rubinfeld.Microeconomics-3rd ed.Prentice-Hall International Inc1995,p320。
16马西莫.莫塔:《竞争政策--理论与实践》,上海:上海财经大学出版社2006年版,第33页。
17FERC,"State of the Market 2000:Measuring performance in energy market regulation." http://www.ferc.fed.us.
18U.S.Department of Energy(2000),"Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity Markets",http://www.pi.energy.gov.
19市场绩效指标还包括基于利润率的贝恩指数(Bain Index)等指标。
20英国电力市场实际上仅仅是英格兰和爱尔兰地区的市场,详见本文第二章第二节。
21电力产业的有关特征参见本文第二章第一节。
22从1993年12月起,英国市场正式启动需求侧竞价机制。而目前我国电力市场的用户还不能参与报价,除了2006年刚起动的两家大用户直供电试点企业外,国内所有的用户均不能选择发电厂商。
23Viscusi W.K.,Vernon,J.M.,and Harrington,J.E.,2000,Economics of Regulation and Antitrust(3rd ed.),Cambridge:MIT Press,pp.314-316.
24从2006年起,《中国电力年鉴》不再出版,而是由《国家电网公司年鉴》取代。各年的年鉴实际上反映的是上一年度的有关数据。
1Joskow,Paul L.1989,"Regulatory Failure,Regulatory Reform and Structural Change In The Electric Power Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:Microeconomics,Vol.1989.pp.125-208.
2根据2006年的统计,我国火力发电和水力发电的(年末)装机容量的比重分别为77.82%和20.67%,全年发电量的比重分别为83.2%和14.7%。而长期以来我国火电、水电的装机容量和年发电量的份额基本上也都维持在这一水平左右。
3水力、风能和太阳能等发电技术对选址条件要求较高,因此它们在我国不具有普适性。而最适宜充当基荷电源的核电站目前我国投入运营的仅有两座,因而它们完全可以被忽略。假定市场中所有的发电技术皆为火力发电并不影响分析结论,实际上几乎所有的模型都是基于这一前提而构建的。
4Joskow,P.L.,and R.Schmalensee,1983,Markets for Power,Cambridge:MIT Press,p.53.
5刘阳平、叶元煦:论电力市场的有效竞争,《管理世界》1999年第2期,第112-114页。
6萨莉.亨特:《电力市场竞争》,中信出版社2004年版,第17页。
7许志义,陈泽义:《电力经济学:理论与应用》,台北:华泰书局1988年版,第41页。
8因此许多非同步电网之间的电力输送采用的是没有频率变化的直流技术。
9由于电网中一般都有自动控制的变压器,因而目前负荷不足的调整都是由频率调整来完成的,即失荷只会引起频率的降低。
10刘安平:规制经济的理论及实践,见田国强主编《现代经济学与金融学前沿发展》,北京:商务印书馆2002年版,第510页。
11Wolak Frank A.2006."Unilateral market power in wholesale Electricity Markets," CESifo DICE Report,Vol.2006,No.2 pp.10-15.
12本节的这三种模式参考了萨莉.亨特所著的《电力市场竞争》(北京:中信出版社,2004年版)第35-50页。
13“1+N”模式是我国对Pool模式的称谓。在“1+N”模式中,“1”是指电网,N是指N家竞争的发电企业。
14由于英国的特殊国情,各类文献中所称的英国电力市场或英国电力联营体实际上仅仅是英格兰和爱尔兰地区的市场,本文有时也将其简写为E&W市场或E&W Pool。
15所谓的联络线交易商是指发电机组不在该联营体的区域内,但由于有输电线路联结而能够参与联营体竞价交易的发电厂商。E&W的联络线交易商主要有苏格兰电力公司和法国电力公司(EDF)。
16可参见本文第三章的有关文献。
17也称宾-新-马电力市场。PJM是宾西法尼亚州、新泽西州和马里兰州的首字母的组合。
18考虑到我国目前的供需矛盾,在吸取了前些年几个省级电力市场经验教训的基础上,东北和华东区域市场只是模拟运行(华东市场仅模拟月度竞价)而不结算,因而并不是真正意义的市场。
19从我国已有的几个市场来看,除了东北市场执行了两部电价制外,其它市场均采用单一电价的统一价格拍卖。
1由于电力产业在市场份额方面习惯上用容量来刻划,而很少用到产量(即发电量,它等于容量乘以发电时间),故本文也遵从这一惯用法,多数地方用“容量约束”来代替产业组织理论中的“产量约束”一词。
2Vickers J.,Yarrow G.,1991,"The British electricity Experiment." Economic Policy,Vol.6,No.12,pp.187-232.
3例如,可以参见[法]泰勒尔所著的《产业组织理论》第5章,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997年版。
4Np和PG是英国电力市场中两个最大发电厂商的缩写,NP指全国电力公司(National Power),PG指电力生产公司(Power Generation)。1990年,NP和PG的装机容量分别占E&W市场全部装机容量的52%和36%。此后,随着进一步的拆分和机组的退役,近年来两者的份额已显著降低。
5G为发电设备和用电负荷的容量单位,1G=1000兆瓦=100万千瓦。
6这是因为在单一价格拍卖规则下,联营体中获准上网发电的所有机组得到的支付都是边际机组的报价,只要边际机组(不论是属于本发电厂商还是其它发电厂商)的报价高于这些机组的报价,那么这些机组仍然可以获得高于边际成本的支付。参见Von der Fehr(1993)。
7Von der Fehr,N.M.and D.Harbord,1993,"Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry," The Economic Journal,1993,Vol.103.pp.531-546.
8Wolfram,Catherine D.1995."Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," MIT Working Paper.经过四年的讨论和修改,该文最终发表在1999年第4期的《美国经济评论》上(Vol.89,No.4,pp.805-826.)。
9Green,Richard J."The Electricity Contract Market." Journal of Industrial Economics,1999,Vol.47,No.1,pp.107-124.
10Wolak,Frank A.2001,"A Model of Optimal Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market." CSEM working paper(114).available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF.
11Wolak,Frank A.2003,"Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets:The California Market,1998-2000." The American Economic Review,Vol.93,No.2,pp.425-430.
12该参数有时也被写作(1+r_(it))的形式,其中r_(it)=∑_(j≠i)dq_(it)/dq_(it)。参见Schmalensee和Willig主编的Handbook of industrial organization,Volume Ⅱ,Chapter 17。
13Von der Fehr,Nils-Henrik Morch and Harbord,David(1993)"Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry." The Economic Journal,Vol.103,pp.531-546.
14Wolfram C.D.1998,"Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction:An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales." The Rand Journal of Economics,Vol.29,No.4,pp.703-725.
15Rothkopf M.H.1999,"Daily Repetition:A neglected Factor in Analyzing Electricity Auctions." The Electricity Journal,Vol.12,No.3,pp.60-70.
16Ausubel Lawrence M.and Cramton Peter."Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," University of Maryland working Paper,2002,avalable at http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers.
17Kahn Alfred E.,Peter C.Cramton,Robert H.Poter,and Richard D.Tabors,2001,"Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing:A Dilemma for California and Beyond," The Electricity Journal,Vol.14,No.6,pp.70-79.
18Rassenti Stephen J.,Vernon L.Smith,Wilson Bart J.2003,"Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets:Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of regulatory Economics,Vol.23,No.2,pp.109-123.
19Vickrey W.,1961,"Counterspeculation,Auctions,and Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance,Vol.16,No.1,pp.8-37.
20Swinkels,Jeroen M.,1999,"Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," The Review of Economic studies,Vol.66,No.3,pp.509-528.
21Von der Fehr,N.H.and Harbord D.1997,"Capacity investment and dynamic efficiency in market-based electricity industries," University of Oslo Working Paper,available at http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/memo.
22Vickrey W.,1971,"Responsive Pricing of Public Utility Services." The Bell Journal of Economics and management science,1971,Vol.1,No.2,pp.337-346.
23Bohn R.E.,Caramanis,M.C.,Schweppe F.C.,1984,"Optimal pricing in electrical networks over space and time." The RAND Journal of Economics,Vol.15,No.3,pp.360-376.
24Borenstein,S.2002,"The Trouble with Electricity Markets:Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster," The Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.16,No.1,pp.191-211.
25Hirshleifer,J.1958,"Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing:Comment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.72,No.3,pp.451-462.
26Boiteux,M.1960,"Peak Load Pricing," The Journal of Business,Vol.33,No.2,pp.157-179.
27也就是说在v＞Z/X(P)的情况下。
28王俊豪:《政府管制经济学导论》,北京:商务印书馆2001年版。
29王俊豪:《中国垄断性产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策》,北京:商务印书馆2005年版。
30夏大慰、范斌:电力定价:理论、经验与改革模式,见:夏大慰主编:《产业组织:竞争与规制》,上海:上海财经大学出版社2002年版,第162-188页。
31孙建国、李文溥:管制产业中的产权制度变革,《厦门大学学报(哲学和社会科学版)》2003年第6期,第86-93页;电力行业管制改革与市场风险防范,《经济学家》2004年第1期,第95-101页。
32叶泽:《电力竞争》,北京:中国电力出版社2004年版。
33李虹:电力市场设计:理论与中国的改革,《经济研究》2004年第11期,第119-128页。
34林伯强:电力短缺、短期措施与长期战略,《经济研究》2004年第3期,第28-36页。
35胡恩同:电力市场双边垄断最优拍卖模型的建立与分析,《现代电力》2005年第2期,第77-81页。
36郭磊:需求侧管理的困境与需求侧响应定价,《价格理论与实践》2007年第5期,第33-34页。
37言茂松:《当量电价与融资重组》,北京:中国电力出版社2000年版。
38李晓刚、谢亚贤、言茂松:发电厂商策略性报价的行为特性初探,《电力系统自动化》2003年第20期,第21-25页。
39祁达才、夏清、卢强等:发电侧竞争中价格垄断力的判据,《电力系统自动化》,2003年第5期,第26-30页。
40魏学好、周浩:用利润空间法实现从价格上限到利润上限的转变,《电网技术》2003年第5期,第15-20页。
41李道强:浙江发电侧电力市场发电商的电价操纵行为分析,《电力系统自动化》,2005年第6期,第29-34页。
11999年之前,我国仪有葛洲坝到华东这一条跨大区输电线路。
2言茂松:谋划我国区域电力市场由两级过渡到一级之路,电力系统自动化,2004年第9期,第1-4页。
3冯飞:深化我国电力体制改革的基本设想,国务院发展研究中心调研报告,2006。
4当然,笔者也注意到2003年国家电监会颁布的《关于区域电力市场建设指导意见》,以及近来开始升温的三级电力市场的讨论。在此必须说明,在本文中笔者分析的是当前我国短期的市场结构和市场力问题,并没有否认中长期的建设目标。
1Ausubel Lawrence M.and Cramton Peter,2002,"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," University of Maryland Working Paper,available at http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers.
2Rassenti Stephen J.,Vernon L.Smith,Wilson Bart J.2003,"Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets:Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of regulatory Economics,2003,Vol.23,No.2,pp.109-123.
3Cattarelli,Carlo and Bartolini Leonardo 1997,"Treasury Bill Auctions:Issues and Uses," IMF Working Papers,available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs.
4网损是指电力传输中的能量损耗,该损耗一般与输电电压成反比。高压输电一般会有3%-5%的损耗,而低压输电的损耗可高达10%以上。
5本节发电厂商短期成本曲线的形式参考了:[1]高波,张小东等,火电厂发电成本与上网电价的研究[J],热力发电,2003年第5期第6-9页;[2]赵会茹,李春杰等,电力产业管制与竞争的经济学分析[M],北京:中国电力出版社2007,第116-117页。
6在电力市场交易中,为了保证交易结果的唯一性,通常要求整个交易计划求解是一个凸规划问题。因此会要求发电厂商的报价曲线为单调非递减函数。有关这一点可以参见一些电力专业方面的文献,例如本文参考文献中的祁达才和夏清(2003)。
1我国主要运用行政手段来干预,各地均有一份由发改委批准的拉闸限电顺序表。
2Borenstein,S.,Bushnell J.and Wolak F.2002,"Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," The American Economic Review,Vol.92,No.5,pp.1376-1405.
3Borenstein S.2005,"Wealth Transfers from Implementing Real-Time Retail Electricity Pricing," CSEM working paper(147).available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDE
4为便于阅读,本节中电价单位将电力公司资料中的“元/兆瓦时”换算为“元/千瓦时”。
5这里需要说明的是,2003年夏季因罕见高温的出现,上海市曾试行过季节性电价,即当年的7-9月的峰谷电价有±0.05元/千瓦时的浮动。当考虑这一因素时,基本用电负荷在100千瓦以上的工商业大用户峰谷价比最高为4.5:1;而基本用电负荷在100千瓦以下的普通工商业用户的峰谷价比最高为2.8:1。
62003年缺口为350亿千瓦时,2004年仅国家电网公司因拉闸限电即失电388亿千瓦时以上。参见《中国电力年鉴》2004、2005两卷。
7参见近年来各期《中国电力年鉴》及各大区域电网公司网站的负荷特性分析。
8两部电价由电度电价和基本电价两部分构成。电度电价是指按照用户用电度数计算的电价;基本电价是指按照用户用电容量计算的电价。见《销售电价管理暂行办法》第三章第十一条(发改价格[2005]第514号文件)。
1魏学好,周浩:利润空间法在电力市场中的应用,《价格理论与实践》2002年第10期,第31-33页。
2夏清,黎灿兵等:国外电力市场的监管办法、指标与手段,《电网技术》2003第3期,第1-4页。
3王俊豪:《中国垄断性产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策》,北京:商务印书馆2005年版,第205-212页。
4任晓红,任玉珑,张渝:中国电力产业价格管制模型,《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》,2005年第2期,第146-150页。
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