股权分置改革、公司财务治理和企业战略转型
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摘要
中国正在从传统的计划经济向市场经济转变,要成长为成熟的市场经济,必然要经历经济演化过程,推动制度变迁。股权分置改革是中国资本市场的一次重大制度变迁,它对中国资本市场和上市公司的影响是深远的。2010年的哥本哈根国际气候大会,更是为企业的发展模式和社会责任施加了约束条件。企业作为微观经济单位,既是构成宏观经济的基础,又受到内外部环境的影响。处于社会经济网络中的企业,如何在外部环境影响企业战略目标转型的情况下,优化公司财务治理是急需解决的新问题。论文选择股权分置改革给中国上市公司财务治理带来的影响为研究课题,一方面有利于客观评价股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理的影响,促使企业选择正确的财务治理结构和机制,提高上市公司财务治理效率;另一方面有利于深化中国资本市场改革,减少中国资本市场在制度变迁中的路径依赖,加强制度创新,促进资本市场健康发展。
本文首先介绍了论文的选题背景、研究目的和意义,并对国内外的研究文献进行了梳理,说明了股权分置改革、企业战略和财务治理的理论基础,阐述了财务治理的内涵、财务治理结构、财务治理机制和财务治理效率。回顾了股权分置改革的三个阶段,剖析了股改前上市公司财务治理结构、机制、效率几方面存在的问题。论文选择2008年底全流通的70家上市公司作为样本,选择了企业绩效和成长的6个指标,以及公司财务治理相关的16个财务指标,通过实证分析,建立多元回归模型,深入分析了股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理的影响程度。在此基础上,运用规模可变的数据包络分析,评价公司的财务治理效率,发现其中的主要影响因素。同时,论文运用灰色关联模型,分三个区域对公司财务治理和外部环境的相互关系进行研究,发现外部环境影响下的企业战略转型对公司财务治理的影响。最终,寻找提高财务治理效率的途径。
论文通过研究得出如下结论:
(1)财务治理是由企业财务和公司治理交叉融合发展而来的,财务治理是公司治理的核心。财务治理理论中财务治理结构是基础和核心,财务治理机制是制度保证,而财务治理效率是最终目标。它们都会受到财务治理内外部环境的影响,并反映在公司治理行为上。
(2)股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理和企业战略的影响遵循如下路径:股权分置改革通过调整股权结构,改变了上市公司财务治理的内外部环境,内部通过上市公司的融资与风险、并购与重组、股利分配和激励约束等多种财务活动,体现了公司财务治理结构和机制的变化;而外部通过企业战略转型,使企业从追求短期目标转向重视长期目标,最终影响上市公司财务治理效率。
(3)中国资本市场股权分置改革的过程分为三个阶段,两个关键点。在股改实施阶段,股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理有较大的促进作用;在股票全流通阶段,股权分置改革对公司财务治理的促进作用有放缓的趋势。
(4)三时期对比计量模型分析表明,股权分置改革中持股主体的组成与持股比例都与经济绩效的指标呈正相关,表明改革的推进改变了股权结构,进而促使公司治理结构实现优化组合。
(5)公司财务治理结构的核心是利益制衡。在中国特色的国情下,机构投资者的介入,有效制约了内部人的控制权,增加了利益制衡机制的作用。
(6)股权分置改革对股东财务治理效率的影响要高于对公司总体财务治理的影响。在内部财务治理环境中,影响公司财务治理的主要因素有:机构持股、第一大股东持股、债权人治理、高管薪酬和独立董事制度。
(7)上市公司财务治理与外部环境密切相关。目前大部分企业的战略目标依然是企业价值最大化或股东价值最大化,采用的是“粗放型”的成长方式。但从发展趋势来看,企业战略目标正在转型,有利于提高公司财务治理效率。
(8)论文从五个方面提出提高上市公司财务治理效率的途径:1)加速企业战略转型,确立利益相关者利益最大化目标,由“粗放型”成长转变为“集约型”成长;2)选择合适的财务治理主体,国有股有进有退,培育机构投资者,加强股东制衡;3)明确股东大会、董事会和监事会等财务治理机构的职责,建立完善的分层决策体系,强化独立董事的监督约束作用;4)加强公司内部的激励约束机制,制定科学的考核评价标准,建立一个综合薪酬、股权等多种激励方式的动态激励机制;5)创新财务治理机制,共同治理与相机治理相结合,进行动态的财务治理,提高财务治理效率。
本文的创新之处在于:(1)运用三时期对比计量模型对股权分置改革不同时段财务治理分别进行前后的对比,研究发现不同阶段股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理的不同影响;(2)使用数据包络法对公司财务治理效率进行分析评价,发现股权分置改革影响财务治理效率的主要因素;(3)用灰色数学模型论证企业的战略转型,创新财务治理机制,从演化经济学和企业网络理论角度提出利益相关者共同治理和相机治理相结合。
Chinese economic model is changing from traditional planned economy to market economy. To be a mature market economy, the economic evolution process not only requires institutional change, but also contributed to institutional change. The split share structure reform is a major institutional change, and the impact on China's capital market is profound. 2010 International Climate Conference in Copenhagen imposed social responsibility constraints on the development model of enterprise. Enterprises as economic units form the basis of macro-economic, while they are also infected by the internal and external environment. As enterprises lie in Social and economic networks, the transformation of strategic objectives and the optimization of corporate finance financial governance are urgently needed to be solved. The paper selects the impact of the split share structure reform to financial governance of Chinese listed companies as issue to be studied. On one side, it is available to give an objective assessment about the impact of the share reform on financial governance of listed companies, encouraging enterprises to choose the right financial governance structures and mechanisms to improve the efficiency of financial governance of listed companies. On the other hand, it is conductive to deepen China's capital market reform and reduce China's capital market dependence on the path of institutional change, while institutional innovation is strengthening and promoting the healthy development of capital market.
The paper first introduces the background, purpose and significance, and studies domestic and abroad literatures, which show that the split share structure reform, corporate strategy and financial governance theory on how to explain the meaning of financial governance, financial governance structure, mechanism and efficiency. By reviewing the three stages of the split share structure reform, the paper analysis the previous problems of listed companies, including that of financial governance structure, mechanism, and efficiency. The paper chooses 70 listed companies as samples that the share can freely circulate at the end of 2008, and selecting six indicators about the business performance and growth, 16 financial indicators which relate to financial management. Through setting up multiple regression models, we can in-depth analysis the impact of the reform on financial governance. On the basis, by the use of scalable data envelopment analysis, we evaluate the efficiency of financial governance and try to find the main factors. Meanwhile, the paper uses the gray relational model, based on three areas, trying to find the relationship between the external environment and the company's financial governance, which we can find the strategic transformation of enterprises on financial governance under the influence of the external environment. Finally, look for ways to improve the efficiency of financial governance.
The research conclusions are:
(1) Financial governance is developed from the cross-integration of corporate finance and corporate governance, and financial governance is the core of corporate governance. In financial governance theory, financial governance structure is the foundation of financial governance and financial governance mechanism is the institution to ensure that, while the efficiency of financial governance is the ultimate goal. They are subjected to internal and external financial environment, and are reflected in corporate governance behaviors.
(2) There is a path that the split share reform impact financial governance and corporate strategy. By adjusting the ownership structure through split share reform, it has changed the internal and external environment of financial governance of listed companies. The internal financing and risk, M & A and restructuring, dividend distribution and incentive constraints and other financial activities reflect corporate financial governance structure and mechanisms change. In the external, through the transformation of corporate strategy, the corporates change their profit orientation from short-term goals to long-term goals, and ultimately affect the efficiency of financial governance.
(3) The process of Chinese split share reform is divided into three stages, and shows two key points. In the implementation phase of the share reform, the share reform of listed companies have a greater financial role in promoting governance; while in the circulation phase, the split share reform in promoting the company's financial governance has a trend of slowing down.
(4) Three times compared econometric model analysis showed that the split share structure reform, the main composition and ownership stake and economic performance indicators are positively correlated, indicating that the reform changed the ownership structure, corporate governance structure so as to promote optimal combination.
(5) The most important factor of financial governance structure is the balances of interests. Under Chinese characteristics, with the institutional investors involved in companies fairs, which have constraints on the internal controllers over others, and increase the role of checks and balances of interests.
(6) The impact of split share structure reform on shareholders financial governance efficiency is bigger than that on company's overall financial governance. The main factors of internal financial governance are institutional ownership, the largest shareholders, creditors, manager, executive compensation and independent directors.
(7) Financial governance of listed companies is closely related to the external environment. Currently, most corporate strategic objections remain to maximize corporate value or shareholder value maximization, meanwhile, using the "extensive" growth mode. However, from development trends, corporate strategic goals are changing, which will be good to improve the efficiency of financial governance.
(8) It proposes five subjects to improve the efficiency of financial governance of listed companies. 1) Accelerating the transformation of business strategy, establishing goals to maximize the interests of stakeholders, change the mode of deevelopment from "extensive" to "intensive". 2) Select appropriate financial governance body, adjusting the main state-owned shares, fostering institutional investors, strengthening checks and balances among shareholders. 3) Making clear the responsibilities of general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and board of supervisors and other financial institutions of governance, establishing a sound system of decision-making, strengthening the role of independent directors. 4) Strengthening the internal incentive and restraint mechanisms, to develop scientific appraisal standards, comprehensive salary, equity incentives and other dynamic incentive mechanism; 5) By innovating financial governance mechanism, combinating shared governance and contingent governance, and getting the dynamic financial governance, we can improve financial governance efficiency.
The innovation of the paper are: (1) by using three times econometric model of the split share structure reform which carried out in different time slots, respectively, before and after comparison, the study found that in different stages the share reform had different impacts on financial governance; (2) by using DEA analysis on assessment of financial governance efficiency, we can find the main factors of the split share structure reform on financial governance efficiency; (3) we demonstrated the strategic business transformation by the gray model, innovating financial governance mechanism, and the combination of stakeholder governance and contingent control.
本文首先介绍了论文的选题背景、研究目的和意义,并对国内外的研究文献进行了梳理,说明了股权分置改革、企业战略和财务治理的理论基础,阐述了财务治理的内涵、财务治理结构、财务治理机制和财务治理效率。回顾了股权分置改革的三个阶段,剖析了股改前上市公司财务治理结构、机制、效率几方面存在的问题。论文选择2008年底全流通的70家上市公司作为样本,选择了企业绩效和成长的6个指标,以及公司财务治理相关的16个财务指标,通过实证分析,建立多元回归模型,深入分析了股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理的影响程度。在此基础上,运用规模可变的数据包络分析,评价公司的财务治理效率,发现其中的主要影响因素。同时,论文运用灰色关联模型,分三个区域对公司财务治理和外部环境的相互关系进行研究,发现外部环境影响下的企业战略转型对公司财务治理的影响。最终,寻找提高财务治理效率的途径。
论文通过研究得出如下结论:
(1)财务治理是由企业财务和公司治理交叉融合发展而来的,财务治理是公司治理的核心。财务治理理论中财务治理结构是基础和核心,财务治理机制是制度保证,而财务治理效率是最终目标。它们都会受到财务治理内外部环境的影响,并反映在公司治理行为上。
(2)股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理和企业战略的影响遵循如下路径:股权分置改革通过调整股权结构,改变了上市公司财务治理的内外部环境,内部通过上市公司的融资与风险、并购与重组、股利分配和激励约束等多种财务活动,体现了公司财务治理结构和机制的变化;而外部通过企业战略转型,使企业从追求短期目标转向重视长期目标,最终影响上市公司财务治理效率。
(3)中国资本市场股权分置改革的过程分为三个阶段,两个关键点。在股改实施阶段,股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理有较大的促进作用;在股票全流通阶段,股权分置改革对公司财务治理的促进作用有放缓的趋势。
(4)三时期对比计量模型分析表明,股权分置改革中持股主体的组成与持股比例都与经济绩效的指标呈正相关,表明改革的推进改变了股权结构,进而促使公司治理结构实现优化组合。
(5)公司财务治理结构的核心是利益制衡。在中国特色的国情下,机构投资者的介入,有效制约了内部人的控制权,增加了利益制衡机制的作用。
(6)股权分置改革对股东财务治理效率的影响要高于对公司总体财务治理的影响。在内部财务治理环境中,影响公司财务治理的主要因素有:机构持股、第一大股东持股、债权人治理、高管薪酬和独立董事制度。
(7)上市公司财务治理与外部环境密切相关。目前大部分企业的战略目标依然是企业价值最大化或股东价值最大化,采用的是“粗放型”的成长方式。但从发展趋势来看,企业战略目标正在转型,有利于提高公司财务治理效率。
(8)论文从五个方面提出提高上市公司财务治理效率的途径:1)加速企业战略转型,确立利益相关者利益最大化目标,由“粗放型”成长转变为“集约型”成长;2)选择合适的财务治理主体,国有股有进有退,培育机构投资者,加强股东制衡;3)明确股东大会、董事会和监事会等财务治理机构的职责,建立完善的分层决策体系,强化独立董事的监督约束作用;4)加强公司内部的激励约束机制,制定科学的考核评价标准,建立一个综合薪酬、股权等多种激励方式的动态激励机制;5)创新财务治理机制,共同治理与相机治理相结合,进行动态的财务治理,提高财务治理效率。
本文的创新之处在于:(1)运用三时期对比计量模型对股权分置改革不同时段财务治理分别进行前后的对比,研究发现不同阶段股权分置改革对上市公司财务治理的不同影响;(2)使用数据包络法对公司财务治理效率进行分析评价,发现股权分置改革影响财务治理效率的主要因素;(3)用灰色数学模型论证企业的战略转型,创新财务治理机制,从演化经济学和企业网络理论角度提出利益相关者共同治理和相机治理相结合。
Chinese economic model is changing from traditional planned economy to market economy. To be a mature market economy, the economic evolution process not only requires institutional change, but also contributed to institutional change. The split share structure reform is a major institutional change, and the impact on China's capital market is profound. 2010 International Climate Conference in Copenhagen imposed social responsibility constraints on the development model of enterprise. Enterprises as economic units form the basis of macro-economic, while they are also infected by the internal and external environment. As enterprises lie in Social and economic networks, the transformation of strategic objectives and the optimization of corporate finance financial governance are urgently needed to be solved. The paper selects the impact of the split share structure reform to financial governance of Chinese listed companies as issue to be studied. On one side, it is available to give an objective assessment about the impact of the share reform on financial governance of listed companies, encouraging enterprises to choose the right financial governance structures and mechanisms to improve the efficiency of financial governance of listed companies. On the other hand, it is conductive to deepen China's capital market reform and reduce China's capital market dependence on the path of institutional change, while institutional innovation is strengthening and promoting the healthy development of capital market.
The paper first introduces the background, purpose and significance, and studies domestic and abroad literatures, which show that the split share structure reform, corporate strategy and financial governance theory on how to explain the meaning of financial governance, financial governance structure, mechanism and efficiency. By reviewing the three stages of the split share structure reform, the paper analysis the previous problems of listed companies, including that of financial governance structure, mechanism, and efficiency. The paper chooses 70 listed companies as samples that the share can freely circulate at the end of 2008, and selecting six indicators about the business performance and growth, 16 financial indicators which relate to financial management. Through setting up multiple regression models, we can in-depth analysis the impact of the reform on financial governance. On the basis, by the use of scalable data envelopment analysis, we evaluate the efficiency of financial governance and try to find the main factors. Meanwhile, the paper uses the gray relational model, based on three areas, trying to find the relationship between the external environment and the company's financial governance, which we can find the strategic transformation of enterprises on financial governance under the influence of the external environment. Finally, look for ways to improve the efficiency of financial governance.
The research conclusions are:
(1) Financial governance is developed from the cross-integration of corporate finance and corporate governance, and financial governance is the core of corporate governance. In financial governance theory, financial governance structure is the foundation of financial governance and financial governance mechanism is the institution to ensure that, while the efficiency of financial governance is the ultimate goal. They are subjected to internal and external financial environment, and are reflected in corporate governance behaviors.
(2) There is a path that the split share reform impact financial governance and corporate strategy. By adjusting the ownership structure through split share reform, it has changed the internal and external environment of financial governance of listed companies. The internal financing and risk, M & A and restructuring, dividend distribution and incentive constraints and other financial activities reflect corporate financial governance structure and mechanisms change. In the external, through the transformation of corporate strategy, the corporates change their profit orientation from short-term goals to long-term goals, and ultimately affect the efficiency of financial governance.
(3) The process of Chinese split share reform is divided into three stages, and shows two key points. In the implementation phase of the share reform, the share reform of listed companies have a greater financial role in promoting governance; while in the circulation phase, the split share reform in promoting the company's financial governance has a trend of slowing down.
(4) Three times compared econometric model analysis showed that the split share structure reform, the main composition and ownership stake and economic performance indicators are positively correlated, indicating that the reform changed the ownership structure, corporate governance structure so as to promote optimal combination.
(5) The most important factor of financial governance structure is the balances of interests. Under Chinese characteristics, with the institutional investors involved in companies fairs, which have constraints on the internal controllers over others, and increase the role of checks and balances of interests.
(6) The impact of split share structure reform on shareholders financial governance efficiency is bigger than that on company's overall financial governance. The main factors of internal financial governance are institutional ownership, the largest shareholders, creditors, manager, executive compensation and independent directors.
(7) Financial governance of listed companies is closely related to the external environment. Currently, most corporate strategic objections remain to maximize corporate value or shareholder value maximization, meanwhile, using the "extensive" growth mode. However, from development trends, corporate strategic goals are changing, which will be good to improve the efficiency of financial governance.
(8) It proposes five subjects to improve the efficiency of financial governance of listed companies. 1) Accelerating the transformation of business strategy, establishing goals to maximize the interests of stakeholders, change the mode of deevelopment from "extensive" to "intensive". 2) Select appropriate financial governance body, adjusting the main state-owned shares, fostering institutional investors, strengthening checks and balances among shareholders. 3) Making clear the responsibilities of general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and board of supervisors and other financial institutions of governance, establishing a sound system of decision-making, strengthening the role of independent directors. 4) Strengthening the internal incentive and restraint mechanisms, to develop scientific appraisal standards, comprehensive salary, equity incentives and other dynamic incentive mechanism; 5) By innovating financial governance mechanism, combinating shared governance and contingent governance, and getting the dynamic financial governance, we can improve financial governance efficiency.
The innovation of the paper are: (1) by using three times econometric model of the split share structure reform which carried out in different time slots, respectively, before and after comparison, the study found that in different stages the share reform had different impacts on financial governance; (2) by using DEA analysis on assessment of financial governance efficiency, we can find the main factors of the split share structure reform on financial governance efficiency; (3) we demonstrated the strategic business transformation by the gray model, innovating financial governance mechanism, and the combination of stakeholder governance and contingent control.
引文
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