水库移民补偿合约的理论
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摘要
水库移民可视为一种特殊的交换合约。本文从合约的视角,以交易费用为分析工具,研究了水库移民补偿问题。
     水库移民合约是社会在自由自愿的市场交换的交易费用过高的情况下,所选择的合约形式。这类合约引入国家,通过国家的力量,减低交换的交易费用,以保证社会改进的项目得到执行。
     达成补偿合约的费用与执行补偿合约的费用,是国家选择补偿合约形式的主要权衡因素。给定私有产权的界定,则影响补偿合约形式选择的交易费用决定于信息费用的约束状况。论文研究表明,信息费用约束较小时,在市价的基础上协商确定交换价格是将补偿合约交易费用减至最低的主要方式。信息费用约束较高时,则政府单方面确定交换价格,并以协助性合约协助移民补偿的执行,是将补偿合约交易费用减至最低的主要方式。
     协助性合约不仅协助减低补偿合约的费用,而且同时协助减低维持强制产权交换后的产权界定的费用。论文研究表明,此费用的变化来源于移民使用不同资产获取收入时交易费用的变化,交易费用升高会减低移民收入水平,增加政府维持产权制度的费用。国家作为既定产权制度的执行者,将努力减低此类费用。对水库移民而言,为减低使用新资产的较高的交易费用对收入享受的侵蚀,其对协助性合约持欢迎的态度。这就是可以观察到的“土地换保障”、“补偿资金入股”等合约现象的解释。
     国家拥有“唯一合法的暴力”,作为产权交换的一方,其在交换中充分保护私有产权的立场并不是一定能够满足的。这含义着补偿合约的不完善程度因此加大,减小合约的不完善程度要求私有产权能够约束国家行为。对中国水库移民补偿合约变迁的经验研究,可以发现移民对政府施加的交易费用约束,是水库移民补偿合约变迁的重要原因。即交易费用可充当保护私有产权的手段,也可充当修改社会不合意的产权界定的手段。交易费用约束的大小取决于水库移民补偿合约的执行结果,因为结果传递了合约完善程度的信息,会改变新的水库移民对合约的成本-收益的衡量。
Reservoir resettlement can be regarded as property transactions. A perspective of contract and a conception of transaction cost are used in this dissertation to study the compensation contract of reservoir resettlement.
     Reservoir resettlement is a kind of contract that is used when the transaction cost of free market exchange is too high. With the support of state power, this kind of contract can reduce the cost of property transaction to facilitate social improvement.
     The cost of reaching agreement and the cost of implementation are the main factors the state neads to consider when choosing contract. As the state protects the private property rights, the transaction cost that determines the choice of compesation contract is constrained by information cost. According to this research, when information cost is relatively low, the transaction cost of the contract determined by negotiation can be low. When information cost is relatively high, the government would determine the price, to ensure the transaction cost can be reduced, additional contract would be applied.
     Additional contract not only helps to reduce the cost of compensation, but also helps to reduce the cost of maintaining the definition of property right. According to this research, the variation of the cost of maintaining the definition of property right is the result of the alteration of the transaction cost when different kinds of assets are used to provide income for immigrants. The increase of transaction cost could reduce the income of the immigrants and increase the cost of maintaining the definition of property right of the state. As the enforcer of property right system, the state would try to reduce this cost. For the immigrants, the income could decrease as the transaction cost increases, so the additional contract could be accepted relatively easy. This can explain of‘compensation for security’, or‘compensation as investment fund’.
     As one part of the property transaction, the state has‘the only legitimate violence’, the state may not protect the private property right all the time. This means the compensation contract may not be perfect, so acts of state should be constrained in some circumstances to ensure the private property right. According to the case study of the reservoir resettlement compensation in china, the transaction cost is one of the most important causes in the compensation contract change. Transaction cost can be used as both the way of protecting property right and the way of modify property right system. The transaction cost is determined by the results of the implementation of reservoir resettlement compensation contract, as the feedbacks of results could change the evaluation of the cost-benefit of new reservoir immigrants.
引文
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