地方预算监督法律机制研究
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摘要
地方预算监督是地方公共财政体制中的重要领域,对政府收支行为与财政活动半径起着主要牵制作用。作为地方公共财政监督的载体和基础性管理制度,地方预算监督是伴随着我国民主法治建设的深入推进,适应建立和发展地方公共财政制度的实践需要而提出的。从各国地方预算监督发展来看,不断强化预算监督是实现公共预算的有效方式之一。从我国现状来看,虽然分税制的财政体制已经建立,地方拥有了一定的自主权,地方预算监督也具有了相对独立性与自主权。但是由于地方不拥有完全而充分的产权,加之国家对地方政府负债融资予以严格限制,地方政府的财力无法满足地方日益增长的经济需要。而且,近几年,审计风暴席卷全国。挤占、截留、挪用公共资金的现象在各级政府审计工作报告中频频曝光,一些问题甚至触目惊心。如何规范地方预算行为,提高公共资金使用效率,成为推动地方预算监督的源动力。正是在这样的背景下,本文试图从法律机制的视角来研究地方预算监督的问题,通过框定地方预算监督的基本理论范畴,考察域外地方预算监督模式,以及区间分析地方预算决策分析模型,从法律约束和机制约束两方面系统性地构建了地方预算监督法律机制,为促进公共预算的民主化和法治化建设具有一定现实指导意义。本文主要研究内容如下：
一、框定地方预算监督的基本理论范畴。本文通过追溯西方和我国地方预算监督的历史因由探寻地方预算监督法律机制的理论基础。从经济学的公共产品与公共选择理论、政治学的宪政分权与制衡理论、法学的民主理论角度,阐释了加强对地方预算监督权力制约与监督的必要性。在我国尚未建立起专门的预算监督理论时,吸取这些理论精华,从中得出地方预算监督的有效价值,其主要包括地方财政秩序、公共资金合理配置和地方预算公平正义等。对更为深刻和系统认识地方预算监督法律机制具有重要启示。
二、考察域外地方预算监督模式。本文采取列表格的形式,从纵向的角度比较分析了以美国、法国为代表的联邦制国家和单一制国家中央对地方预算监督的模式；从横向的角度分析了以美国、瑞士法国、日本为代表的分属立法机关、行政机关、司法机关为主体的地方预算监督模式和独立型的地方预算监督模式,得出各国地方预算监督模式的选择皆依托于各自特定的民主法治和地方财政体制框架,并适合各自国情的结论。我国地方预算监督法律机制建立和完善,可以从上述国家的立法实践中寻求一定的借鉴。
三、建立基于区间分析的地方预算决策分析模型。为验证监督对地方预算决策具有一定程度的影响这一命题,本文考虑到概率统计方法在实际分析中受样本量限制难以获得不确定量的精确概率分布的局限性,创新性地采用区间分析技术,建立了两个地方预算决策分析模型。第一个模型将部门预算申请数描述为前一年度预算拨款数的函数。第二个模型将部门预算申请数描述为前一年度拨款数以及部门申请数和拨款数之间差额的函数。在两个模型中,假定各时期特殊环境下的预算拨款为不确定性量,并给定变化区间。最终通过区间数学理论,定量获得预算监督对于部门预算申请行为的影响程度。
四、优化地方预算监督立法。本文通过对宪法、预算法等相关法律的规范分析,以及对35个省、市地方预算监督法规的实证分析,得出我国法律法规对地方预算监督有不同程度的规定,但是仍然存有局限性,如中央与地方预算审批权力的配置存有冲突、地方预算收入监督缺乏约束、强制性预算支出与收支平衡的规定相互矛盾等。在此基础上,从加强地方预算监督的宪法约束、克服预算法中的地方软肋、完善相关法律法规三个方面提出优化地方预算立法建议,为构建地方预算监督法律机制提供了法律依据。
五、构建地方预算制衡性监督机制。本文将经济学中的公共产品与公共选择理论、政治学中的宪政分权与制衡理论,引入地方预算制衡性监督主体间的行为分析中,从而可以发现地方预算制衡性监督主体各自的利益诉求以及彼此之间行为约束的连接点,提出设计地方预算制衡性监督机制的总体思路：一是加强政府内部监督,通过设置预算编制委员会、增强财政内部监督、审计监督以及增加对相关人员的预算问责制,建立健全地方预算监督的内在运行机制；二是规范政府外部监督,通过提高预算审查监督人员素质,设立预算专家咨询库、优化人大预算审批程序、赋予公民预算监督权利,促进地方预算的透明度和公开化。
The local budget supervision is an important aspect of the public finance mechanism, which places a main role for restricting the income and expense behaviors and financing activity radius of the government. As a carrier of the public finance supervision of local governments and also a fundamental management mechanism, the local budget supervision was proposed for practical requirements of creating and developing public finance system of local governments, and it has been moved forward with the developing of our democracy and legal system. From the histories of local budget supervision of various countries, to growingly strengthen the budget supervision is one of the effective ways to realize the public finance budget. From the current status of our country, the finance system based on the "revenue-sharing-scheme" has come into being and hence the local government has begun to have certain autonomy, and the local budget supervision also has relative independence and autonomy. However, because the local government does not have full property right and additionally our country places a strict restriction to the local debt financing, the financial resources of local governments thus can not satisfy its increasing economical requirements. Furthermore, in recent years the auditing storm swept the whole country. The phenomena of squeezing, intercepting and misappropriating public funds were often found in the auditing work reports of various levels of governments, and some of them were even fearful and horrible. How to regulate the local budget behaviors and whereby improve the use efficiency of public funds has become an original power to push the local budget supervision. Just under such a background, this dissertation attempts to investigate the local budget supervision from an angle of legal mechanism. Through framing the basic theoretical concepts of local budget supervision, exploring different supervision modes of foreign countries and additionally analyzing the decision-making behaviors of local budgets by using the interval approach, this dissertation systematically constitutes the legal mechanism for local budget supervision from two aspects of the legal and mechanism constraints. The present work seems helpful for improving the democratization and legalization of public budgets. The following main contents are included in this dissertation:
1. Framing the fundamental theoretical concepts for local budget supervision. The theoretical basis of the legal mechanism of local budget supervision has been explored through tracing the histories of western and our countries of the local budget supervision. From several different angles, namely, the public product and public choice theory in economics, the constitutional separation of powers and balance theories in politics, and the democratic theory in law, the necessity of strengthening the restriction and supervision to the local budget supervision power has been addressed. Through absorbing the inherent merits of these theories, effective values have been obtained for local budget supervision, which mainly include the local financial order, reasonable arrangement of public funds, fairness and justice of local budgets, etc. The above concepts can provide some important clues for recognizing the legal mechanism of local budget supervision more deeply and systematically.
2. Exploring the local budget modes of foreign countries. Through a tabular analysis, the budget supervision modes from the central government to local units are longitudinally compared and analyzed for federal system countries represented by America and France and also the simplex system countries. The independent local budget mode and the mode with a main body composed by the grouping legislature, administrative agency and judicial departments are horizontally analyzed, and the latter is represented by America, Swiss, France and Japan. A conclusion is then summarized through the above analysis that the selection of the budget supervision mode for each country all depends on its own special democracy and legal system and also its local finance system. The legislation practice of the above mentioned countries can be used for reference in the creating and improving process of our country's budget supervision legal mechanism.
3. Creating the decision-making models for local budgets based on the interval analysis. To investigate the effects of the supervision to local budgets, two decision-making models are constructed for local budgets by innovatively introducing the interval analysis technique, which to a certain extent can overcome the deficiency of the traditional probability approach that the precise distributions sometimes can not be obtained due to the limited information on the uncertainty. In the first model, the applying amount of a department budget is described as a function of the appropriated funds of the previous year. In the second model, the difference between the applying amount of a department budget and the appropriated funds in the previous year is also considered in the function. In these two models, the budget appropriation under different circumstances is treated as an uncertain factor and furthermore given a variation interval. By using the interval mathematical theory, the effects of the budget supervision to the budget behaviors of a department then can be quantitatively achieved.
4. Optimizing the local budget supervision legislation. Through normative analysis to the constitution, budget law and other relevant laws, and empirical analysis to the local budget supervision regulations of35provinces and cities, we find that though relevant laws and regulations have different degrees of restrictions to local budget supervision they still exist limitations. For examples, the approval rights of the central and local budgets have certain conflicts, the revenue supervision for local budgets lacks constraints, and the mandatory budgetary expenditure contradicts to the balance of payment. Based on the above work, some suggestions are provided in this dissertation for optimizing the budget legislation from three aspects, namely, strengthening constitutional constraints to local budget supervision, overcoming the deficiency existing in the budget law, and improving relevant laws and regulations. Thus a law foundation has been created for constructing the legal mechanism of local budget supervision.
5. Constructing a balancing supervision mechanism for local budgets. In this dissertation, the public product and public choice theory in economics as well as the constitutional separation of powers and balance theories in politics are introduced into the behavior analysis of the balancing supervisors of the local budget, based on which the interest demands of the supervisors and also the connecting points of their mutual behavior restrictions can be found. A general thought is then proposed to design a balancing supervision mechanism for local budgets as follows. The first one is to strengthen the interval supervision of the government, and simultaneously establish and improve its interval operational mechanism through setting up the budgeting board, strengthening the financial and auditing supervision, and adding the responsibility system for relevant personnel. The second one is to regulate the external supervision of the government and whereby improve the transparency and disclosure of the local budget, through promoting the personnel quality of the budget supervisors, creating the consulting expert tank, optimizing the vetting process of the people's congress, entitling a budget supervision right to the citizens, and finally improve the transparency and disclosure of local budgets.
一、框定地方预算监督的基本理论范畴。本文通过追溯西方和我国地方预算监督的历史因由探寻地方预算监督法律机制的理论基础。从经济学的公共产品与公共选择理论、政治学的宪政分权与制衡理论、法学的民主理论角度,阐释了加强对地方预算监督权力制约与监督的必要性。在我国尚未建立起专门的预算监督理论时,吸取这些理论精华,从中得出地方预算监督的有效价值,其主要包括地方财政秩序、公共资金合理配置和地方预算公平正义等。对更为深刻和系统认识地方预算监督法律机制具有重要启示。
二、考察域外地方预算监督模式。本文采取列表格的形式,从纵向的角度比较分析了以美国、法国为代表的联邦制国家和单一制国家中央对地方预算监督的模式；从横向的角度分析了以美国、瑞士法国、日本为代表的分属立法机关、行政机关、司法机关为主体的地方预算监督模式和独立型的地方预算监督模式,得出各国地方预算监督模式的选择皆依托于各自特定的民主法治和地方财政体制框架,并适合各自国情的结论。我国地方预算监督法律机制建立和完善,可以从上述国家的立法实践中寻求一定的借鉴。
三、建立基于区间分析的地方预算决策分析模型。为验证监督对地方预算决策具有一定程度的影响这一命题,本文考虑到概率统计方法在实际分析中受样本量限制难以获得不确定量的精确概率分布的局限性,创新性地采用区间分析技术,建立了两个地方预算决策分析模型。第一个模型将部门预算申请数描述为前一年度预算拨款数的函数。第二个模型将部门预算申请数描述为前一年度拨款数以及部门申请数和拨款数之间差额的函数。在两个模型中,假定各时期特殊环境下的预算拨款为不确定性量,并给定变化区间。最终通过区间数学理论,定量获得预算监督对于部门预算申请行为的影响程度。
四、优化地方预算监督立法。本文通过对宪法、预算法等相关法律的规范分析,以及对35个省、市地方预算监督法规的实证分析,得出我国法律法规对地方预算监督有不同程度的规定,但是仍然存有局限性,如中央与地方预算审批权力的配置存有冲突、地方预算收入监督缺乏约束、强制性预算支出与收支平衡的规定相互矛盾等。在此基础上,从加强地方预算监督的宪法约束、克服预算法中的地方软肋、完善相关法律法规三个方面提出优化地方预算立法建议,为构建地方预算监督法律机制提供了法律依据。
五、构建地方预算制衡性监督机制。本文将经济学中的公共产品与公共选择理论、政治学中的宪政分权与制衡理论,引入地方预算制衡性监督主体间的行为分析中,从而可以发现地方预算制衡性监督主体各自的利益诉求以及彼此之间行为约束的连接点,提出设计地方预算制衡性监督机制的总体思路：一是加强政府内部监督,通过设置预算编制委员会、增强财政内部监督、审计监督以及增加对相关人员的预算问责制,建立健全地方预算监督的内在运行机制；二是规范政府外部监督,通过提高预算审查监督人员素质,设立预算专家咨询库、优化人大预算审批程序、赋予公民预算监督权利,促进地方预算的透明度和公开化。
The local budget supervision is an important aspect of the public finance mechanism, which places a main role for restricting the income and expense behaviors and financing activity radius of the government. As a carrier of the public finance supervision of local governments and also a fundamental management mechanism, the local budget supervision was proposed for practical requirements of creating and developing public finance system of local governments, and it has been moved forward with the developing of our democracy and legal system. From the histories of local budget supervision of various countries, to growingly strengthen the budget supervision is one of the effective ways to realize the public finance budget. From the current status of our country, the finance system based on the "revenue-sharing-scheme" has come into being and hence the local government has begun to have certain autonomy, and the local budget supervision also has relative independence and autonomy. However, because the local government does not have full property right and additionally our country places a strict restriction to the local debt financing, the financial resources of local governments thus can not satisfy its increasing economical requirements. Furthermore, in recent years the auditing storm swept the whole country. The phenomena of squeezing, intercepting and misappropriating public funds were often found in the auditing work reports of various levels of governments, and some of them were even fearful and horrible. How to regulate the local budget behaviors and whereby improve the use efficiency of public funds has become an original power to push the local budget supervision. Just under such a background, this dissertation attempts to investigate the local budget supervision from an angle of legal mechanism. Through framing the basic theoretical concepts of local budget supervision, exploring different supervision modes of foreign countries and additionally analyzing the decision-making behaviors of local budgets by using the interval approach, this dissertation systematically constitutes the legal mechanism for local budget supervision from two aspects of the legal and mechanism constraints. The present work seems helpful for improving the democratization and legalization of public budgets. The following main contents are included in this dissertation:
1. Framing the fundamental theoretical concepts for local budget supervision. The theoretical basis of the legal mechanism of local budget supervision has been explored through tracing the histories of western and our countries of the local budget supervision. From several different angles, namely, the public product and public choice theory in economics, the constitutional separation of powers and balance theories in politics, and the democratic theory in law, the necessity of strengthening the restriction and supervision to the local budget supervision power has been addressed. Through absorbing the inherent merits of these theories, effective values have been obtained for local budget supervision, which mainly include the local financial order, reasonable arrangement of public funds, fairness and justice of local budgets, etc. The above concepts can provide some important clues for recognizing the legal mechanism of local budget supervision more deeply and systematically.
2. Exploring the local budget modes of foreign countries. Through a tabular analysis, the budget supervision modes from the central government to local units are longitudinally compared and analyzed for federal system countries represented by America and France and also the simplex system countries. The independent local budget mode and the mode with a main body composed by the grouping legislature, administrative agency and judicial departments are horizontally analyzed, and the latter is represented by America, Swiss, France and Japan. A conclusion is then summarized through the above analysis that the selection of the budget supervision mode for each country all depends on its own special democracy and legal system and also its local finance system. The legislation practice of the above mentioned countries can be used for reference in the creating and improving process of our country's budget supervision legal mechanism.
3. Creating the decision-making models for local budgets based on the interval analysis. To investigate the effects of the supervision to local budgets, two decision-making models are constructed for local budgets by innovatively introducing the interval analysis technique, which to a certain extent can overcome the deficiency of the traditional probability approach that the precise distributions sometimes can not be obtained due to the limited information on the uncertainty. In the first model, the applying amount of a department budget is described as a function of the appropriated funds of the previous year. In the second model, the difference between the applying amount of a department budget and the appropriated funds in the previous year is also considered in the function. In these two models, the budget appropriation under different circumstances is treated as an uncertain factor and furthermore given a variation interval. By using the interval mathematical theory, the effects of the budget supervision to the budget behaviors of a department then can be quantitatively achieved.
4. Optimizing the local budget supervision legislation. Through normative analysis to the constitution, budget law and other relevant laws, and empirical analysis to the local budget supervision regulations of35provinces and cities, we find that though relevant laws and regulations have different degrees of restrictions to local budget supervision they still exist limitations. For examples, the approval rights of the central and local budgets have certain conflicts, the revenue supervision for local budgets lacks constraints, and the mandatory budgetary expenditure contradicts to the balance of payment. Based on the above work, some suggestions are provided in this dissertation for optimizing the budget legislation from three aspects, namely, strengthening constitutional constraints to local budget supervision, overcoming the deficiency existing in the budget law, and improving relevant laws and regulations. Thus a law foundation has been created for constructing the legal mechanism of local budget supervision.
5. Constructing a balancing supervision mechanism for local budgets. In this dissertation, the public product and public choice theory in economics as well as the constitutional separation of powers and balance theories in politics are introduced into the behavior analysis of the balancing supervisors of the local budget, based on which the interest demands of the supervisors and also the connecting points of their mutual behavior restrictions can be found. A general thought is then proposed to design a balancing supervision mechanism for local budgets as follows. The first one is to strengthen the interval supervision of the government, and simultaneously establish and improve its interval operational mechanism through setting up the budgeting board, strengthening the financial and auditing supervision, and adding the responsibility system for relevant personnel. The second one is to regulate the external supervision of the government and whereby improve the transparency and disclosure of the local budget, through promoting the personnel quality of the budget supervisors, creating the consulting expert tank, optimizing the vetting process of the people's congress, entitling a budget supervision right to the citizens, and finally improve the transparency and disclosure of local budgets.
引文
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