民营企业上市模式、大股东控制与经营绩效
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摘要
在我国特殊的制度背景下,上市是一种稀缺的资源,民营企业直接上市困难重重。同时借壳上市的制度环境相对宽松,于是大部分民营企业通过借壳的方式实现间接上市。因此,与发达资本市场不同,借壳上市取代了直接上市,成为我国民营企业上市的主要模式。不同上市模式使得上市公司及其控股股东在上市成本、资产质量和上市承担的风险等方面都具有不同的特征。这必然影响到上市公司治理结构的安排和控股股东的行为,进而影响到上市公司的经营绩效。
本文首先分析了我国民营企业上市的现状和发展历程,在此基础上对不同上市模式的上市公司的控股股东特征进行了比较分析。然后,对我国440家民营上市公司2003-2006年的数据进行了实证分析,发现上市模式与公司治理结构以及控股股东行为密切相关,是影响上市公司经营绩效的重要因素。本文的研究发现主要包括以下四个方面。
(1)不同上市模式的上市公司治理结构存在显著差异,直接上市公司控股股东持股比例要显著高于借壳上市公司,而控制权和所有权的分离程度要显著低于借壳上市公司,同时直接上市公司的控股股东更倾向于指定上市公司的管理层。
(2)对于直接上市公司,借壳上市公司更容易发生资金占用,且占用程度更高。制衡性股东和独立董事对控股股东的资金占用行为有一定的监督作用,但是总体来说这一监督作用并不明显。
(3)现金股利和资金占用负相关,直接上市公司股利分配率高于借壳上市公司。
(4)公司的经营绩效和资金占用负相关,直接上市公司的经营绩效要好于借壳上市公司。在直接上市公司中,控股股东持股和任命管理层对上市公司的经营绩效有显著的正向影响,在借壳上市公司中影响则不显著。
本文的研究结论,对完善民营上市公司治理结构、促进民营经济的发展有一定的现实意义和理论意义。
Under special institutional situations, such as the arrangement of stock issuing regulation and the strict regulation, it is very difficult for China’s private enterprises to go public directly and going public indirectly by the mode of backdoor listing is much easier. The majority of private enterprises go public by the mode of backdoor listing. So instead of IPO(Initial Public Offerings), backdoor listing becomes the main mode of private enterprises going public which is quite different from the developed capital market. The companies and their controlling shareholders in the two listing modes have different characteristics with respect to asset quality, cost and risk of listing, etc. Those characteristics will certainly affect the governance structure and the behaviors of controlling shareholders, and further cause companies to perform differently.
Firstly, this paper analyses the current status of the private listed companies, and reviews the history of the private enterprise going public, based on that we compared the characteristics of controlling shareholders in the two listing modes. Secondly, using a sample of 440 A-share private listed companies in China from 2003 to 2006, the empirical study of this paper finds that the listing mode is closely related to corporate governance structure and the behaviors of controlling shareholders, and listing mode is also a very important factor that affects corporate performance. Followings are the main research findings.
(1) The corporate governance structure of the firm with different listing mode is significantly different. The ownership structure of direct listed company is more concentrated than that of backdoor listed company and the separation level of control right and cash flow right in backdoor listed company is much higher than that in direct listed companies. Besides, direct listed companies are more inclined to appoint the managers.
(2) Compared to direct listed companies, backdoor listed companies have a higher probability and degree of having fund embezzlement problem. The Empirical study also shows that check-and-balance shareholders and independent directors have some influence on controlling shareholders’behaviors, but the impact is limited.
(3) Cash dividends rate is inversely correlated with fund embezzlement rate, backdoor listed companies pay less cash dividends than direct listed companies.
(4) Corporate performance is negatively correlated with fund embezzlement rate, direct listed companies have significantly better performance than backdoor listed companies. In the direct listed companies, events that the controlling shareholder holds more shares or appoint listed company’s managers have positive effect on corporate performance, but in backdoor listed companies the effect is not significant.
To summarize, this study has its practical meaning and theoretical meaning in promoting the development of the private economy and improving corporate governance of listed private companies.
本文首先分析了我国民营企业上市的现状和发展历程,在此基础上对不同上市模式的上市公司的控股股东特征进行了比较分析。然后,对我国440家民营上市公司2003-2006年的数据进行了实证分析,发现上市模式与公司治理结构以及控股股东行为密切相关,是影响上市公司经营绩效的重要因素。本文的研究发现主要包括以下四个方面。
(1)不同上市模式的上市公司治理结构存在显著差异,直接上市公司控股股东持股比例要显著高于借壳上市公司,而控制权和所有权的分离程度要显著低于借壳上市公司,同时直接上市公司的控股股东更倾向于指定上市公司的管理层。
(2)对于直接上市公司,借壳上市公司更容易发生资金占用,且占用程度更高。制衡性股东和独立董事对控股股东的资金占用行为有一定的监督作用,但是总体来说这一监督作用并不明显。
(3)现金股利和资金占用负相关,直接上市公司股利分配率高于借壳上市公司。
(4)公司的经营绩效和资金占用负相关,直接上市公司的经营绩效要好于借壳上市公司。在直接上市公司中,控股股东持股和任命管理层对上市公司的经营绩效有显著的正向影响,在借壳上市公司中影响则不显著。
本文的研究结论,对完善民营上市公司治理结构、促进民营经济的发展有一定的现实意义和理论意义。
Under special institutional situations, such as the arrangement of stock issuing regulation and the strict regulation, it is very difficult for China’s private enterprises to go public directly and going public indirectly by the mode of backdoor listing is much easier. The majority of private enterprises go public by the mode of backdoor listing. So instead of IPO(Initial Public Offerings), backdoor listing becomes the main mode of private enterprises going public which is quite different from the developed capital market. The companies and their controlling shareholders in the two listing modes have different characteristics with respect to asset quality, cost and risk of listing, etc. Those characteristics will certainly affect the governance structure and the behaviors of controlling shareholders, and further cause companies to perform differently.
Firstly, this paper analyses the current status of the private listed companies, and reviews the history of the private enterprise going public, based on that we compared the characteristics of controlling shareholders in the two listing modes. Secondly, using a sample of 440 A-share private listed companies in China from 2003 to 2006, the empirical study of this paper finds that the listing mode is closely related to corporate governance structure and the behaviors of controlling shareholders, and listing mode is also a very important factor that affects corporate performance. Followings are the main research findings.
(1) The corporate governance structure of the firm with different listing mode is significantly different. The ownership structure of direct listed company is more concentrated than that of backdoor listed company and the separation level of control right and cash flow right in backdoor listed company is much higher than that in direct listed companies. Besides, direct listed companies are more inclined to appoint the managers.
(2) Compared to direct listed companies, backdoor listed companies have a higher probability and degree of having fund embezzlement problem. The Empirical study also shows that check-and-balance shareholders and independent directors have some influence on controlling shareholders’behaviors, but the impact is limited.
(3) Cash dividends rate is inversely correlated with fund embezzlement rate, backdoor listed companies pay less cash dividends than direct listed companies.
(4) Corporate performance is negatively correlated with fund embezzlement rate, direct listed companies have significantly better performance than backdoor listed companies. In the direct listed companies, events that the controlling shareholder holds more shares or appoint listed company’s managers have positive effect on corporate performance, but in backdoor listed companies the effect is not significant.
To summarize, this study has its practical meaning and theoretical meaning in promoting the development of the private economy and improving corporate governance of listed private companies.
引文
[1] Johnson S, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F and Shleifer A. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90: 22~27
[2] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F and Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. Journal of Finance ,1999,54: 471~518
[3] La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny, R. Investor protection and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,2000,58: 3~27
[4] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny R, Investor protection and corporate valuation[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57: 1147~1170
[5]邓建平,曾勇,何佳.改制模式、资金占用和公司绩效[J].中国工业经济, 2007a, (1): 104~112
[6] Faccio M, Lang L H P and Young L. Dividends and expropriation[J]. American Economic Review ,2001, 91:54~71
[7] Claessens S, Djankov S and Lang L H P. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58: 81~112
[8] Shleifer A, and Vishny R W. Large shareholders and corporate control[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1986,94: 461~488
[9] Bennedsen M, Wolfenzon D. The balance of power in closely held corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58: 113~139
[10] Lins K V. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets[J] Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, 38: 159~184
[11] Cleassens S, Djankov S, Fan J P and Lang L H P. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance, 2002,57: 2741~2771
[12] Lemmon M L, Lins K V. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the East Asian financial crisis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58: 1445~1469.
[13] Cheung Y L, Rau P R, Stouraitis A, Tunneling, propping,and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 82: 343~386
[14] Thomsen S, Pedersen T. Ownership structure and economic performance in the largestEuropean companies[J] Strategic Management Journal, 2000, 21: 689~705.
[15] Merck R, Nakamura M and Shivdasani A. Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan[J]. The Journal of Business, 2000, 73(11): 539~567
[16]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2004,(12): 3~13
[17]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值—来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究, 2005, (5): 40~51
[18] Lemmon M L, Lins K V. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the East Asian financial crisis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58: 1445~1469.
[19] Volpin P F. Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,64: 61~90
[20] Benjamin M and Anete P. Multiple large shareholders and firm value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance, 2005,29:1813~1834
[21] Bebchuk L A, Reinier K and George T. Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and the dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights[A]. In: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, Randall K. Morck (ed.) NBER Conference Report University of Chicago Press 2000, 295~315
[22] Attig N, Klaus F and Yoser G. On the determinants of pyramidal ownership : evidence on dilution of minority interests, SSRN Working paper. 2003
[23] Black B S, Hasung J and Woochan K. Does corporate governance predict firm’s market values? Evidence from Korea[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2006, 22(2): 366~413
[24] Bhagat, S, Black, B. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term performance[J]. Journal of Corporation Law, 2002, 27: 231-43.
[25] Hossain M, Andrew K P and Ramesh P R. Corporate governance in new zealand : the effect of the 1993 companies act on the relation between board composition and firm performance[J] Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2001, 9: 119~145
[26] Yeh Y H and Tracie W. Commitment or entrenchment? controlling shareholders and board composition[J]. Journal of banking and finance,2005, 29:1857~1885
[27] Stulz R M. Managerial control of voting rights: financing policies and the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20: 25~54
[28] Hwang J H. Whose private benefits of control: owners or managers? Working Paper Indiana University. 2004
[29] Reese W A and Michael S W. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listing in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 66:65~104
[30] Doidge C, Andrew K and Rene M S. Why do counties matter so much for corporate governance? European Corporate institute-Finance working paper No.50
[31]叶康涛.公司控制权隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究[J].经济科学, 2003, (5): 61~69
[32]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系研究[J].管理世界, 2005, (9): 119~126
[33]高雷,罗洋,张杰.独立董事制度特征与公司绩效—基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究,2007, (3):60~66
[34]朱滔.大股东控制、股权制衡与经营绩效[J].管理科学, 2007, 20(5): 14~21
[35]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究, 2003, 8: 36~45
[36]骨祺,邓德强,路倩.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究, 2006,(4): 30~35
[37]叶新江,石正华,程玉锋,郑健敏,刘建毅.我国民营企业上市“怪现象”探究[N].证券时报, 2004/03/27
[38]甘国屏.在中国特色杜会主义伟大旗帜下不断发展的个体私营经济[J].光彩, 2007, (11): 11~15
[39]邓建平,曾勇.股份制改造、公司治理与效率[D].成都,电子科技大学管理学院博士学位论文, 2007b
[40]肖振红,马瑞先.我国民营企业买壳上市问题及对策分析[J].边疆经济与文化, 2006, (4): 74~76
[41]朱光衢.屯河重组近乎完美[N].中国企业报, 2007/12/28
[42]徐怀业.我国上市公司管理层收购(MBO)问题[J].中国金融, 2007, (14): 61~63
[43]何佳,夏晖.有控制权利益的企业融资工具选择——可转换债券融资的理论思考[J].经济研究, 2005, (4): 66~76
[44]邓建平,曾勇,何佳.利益获取:股利共享还是资金独占?[J].经济研究, 2007c, (4): 112~123
[45] Jian, M., Wong, T. J. Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups[D]. HongKong: the HongKong University of Science and Technology, 2003
[46]王宣喻,李新春,陈凌.资本合作的信任与扩展:一个跨越家族的创业故事[J].管理世界, 2006, (8): 113~125
[47] Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny R W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998, 20: 293~315
[48]许龙德.我国独立董事制度存在的问题及对策[J].东北财经大学学报, 2005, 41(9): 32~35
[49]邓建平,曾勇.上市公司家族控制与股利决策研究[J].管理世界, 2005, (7): 139~147
[50]刘朝晖.外部套利、市场反应与控股股东的非效率投资决策[J].世界经济, 2002, (7): 71~79
[51] Aharony J, Lee C J, Wong T J. Financial packaging of IPO firms in China[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2000, 8: 103~126.
[52]宋衍蘅.中国上市公司的配股行为与业绩表现研究[D].北京:清华大学经济管理学院, 2003
[2] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F and Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. Journal of Finance ,1999,54: 471~518
[3] La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny, R. Investor protection and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,2000,58: 3~27
[4] La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny R, Investor protection and corporate valuation[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57: 1147~1170
[5]邓建平,曾勇,何佳.改制模式、资金占用和公司绩效[J].中国工业经济, 2007a, (1): 104~112
[6] Faccio M, Lang L H P and Young L. Dividends and expropriation[J]. American Economic Review ,2001, 91:54~71
[7] Claessens S, Djankov S and Lang L H P. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58: 81~112
[8] Shleifer A, and Vishny R W. Large shareholders and corporate control[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1986,94: 461~488
[9] Bennedsen M, Wolfenzon D. The balance of power in closely held corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58: 113~139
[10] Lins K V. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets[J] Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, 38: 159~184
[11] Cleassens S, Djankov S, Fan J P and Lang L H P. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance, 2002,57: 2741~2771
[12] Lemmon M L, Lins K V. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the East Asian financial crisis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58: 1445~1469.
[13] Cheung Y L, Rau P R, Stouraitis A, Tunneling, propping,and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 82: 343~386
[14] Thomsen S, Pedersen T. Ownership structure and economic performance in the largestEuropean companies[J] Strategic Management Journal, 2000, 21: 689~705.
[15] Merck R, Nakamura M and Shivdasani A. Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan[J]. The Journal of Business, 2000, 73(11): 539~567
[16]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2004,(12): 3~13
[17]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值—来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究, 2005, (5): 40~51
[18] Lemmon M L, Lins K V. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the East Asian financial crisis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58: 1445~1469.
[19] Volpin P F. Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,64: 61~90
[20] Benjamin M and Anete P. Multiple large shareholders and firm value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance, 2005,29:1813~1834
[21] Bebchuk L A, Reinier K and George T. Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and the dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights[A]. In: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, Randall K. Morck (ed.) NBER Conference Report University of Chicago Press 2000, 295~315
[22] Attig N, Klaus F and Yoser G. On the determinants of pyramidal ownership : evidence on dilution of minority interests, SSRN Working paper. 2003
[23] Black B S, Hasung J and Woochan K. Does corporate governance predict firm’s market values? Evidence from Korea[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2006, 22(2): 366~413
[24] Bhagat, S, Black, B. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term performance[J]. Journal of Corporation Law, 2002, 27: 231-43.
[25] Hossain M, Andrew K P and Ramesh P R. Corporate governance in new zealand : the effect of the 1993 companies act on the relation between board composition and firm performance[J] Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2001, 9: 119~145
[26] Yeh Y H and Tracie W. Commitment or entrenchment? controlling shareholders and board composition[J]. Journal of banking and finance,2005, 29:1857~1885
[27] Stulz R M. Managerial control of voting rights: financing policies and the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20: 25~54
[28] Hwang J H. Whose private benefits of control: owners or managers? Working Paper Indiana University. 2004
[29] Reese W A and Michael S W. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listing in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 66:65~104
[30] Doidge C, Andrew K and Rene M S. Why do counties matter so much for corporate governance? European Corporate institute-Finance working paper No.50
[31]叶康涛.公司控制权隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究[J].经济科学, 2003, (5): 61~69
[32]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系研究[J].管理世界, 2005, (9): 119~126
[33]高雷,罗洋,张杰.独立董事制度特征与公司绩效—基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究,2007, (3):60~66
[34]朱滔.大股东控制、股权制衡与经营绩效[J].管理科学, 2007, 20(5): 14~21
[35]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究, 2003, 8: 36~45
[36]骨祺,邓德强,路倩.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究, 2006,(4): 30~35
[37]叶新江,石正华,程玉锋,郑健敏,刘建毅.我国民营企业上市“怪现象”探究[N].证券时报, 2004/03/27
[38]甘国屏.在中国特色杜会主义伟大旗帜下不断发展的个体私营经济[J].光彩, 2007, (11): 11~15
[39]邓建平,曾勇.股份制改造、公司治理与效率[D].成都,电子科技大学管理学院博士学位论文, 2007b
[40]肖振红,马瑞先.我国民营企业买壳上市问题及对策分析[J].边疆经济与文化, 2006, (4): 74~76
[41]朱光衢.屯河重组近乎完美[N].中国企业报, 2007/12/28
[42]徐怀业.我国上市公司管理层收购(MBO)问题[J].中国金融, 2007, (14): 61~63
[43]何佳,夏晖.有控制权利益的企业融资工具选择——可转换债券融资的理论思考[J].经济研究, 2005, (4): 66~76
[44]邓建平,曾勇,何佳.利益获取:股利共享还是资金独占?[J].经济研究, 2007c, (4): 112~123
[45] Jian, M., Wong, T. J. Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups[D]. HongKong: the HongKong University of Science and Technology, 2003
[46]王宣喻,李新春,陈凌.资本合作的信任与扩展:一个跨越家族的创业故事[J].管理世界, 2006, (8): 113~125
[47] Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny R W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998, 20: 293~315
[48]许龙德.我国独立董事制度存在的问题及对策[J].东北财经大学学报, 2005, 41(9): 32~35
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