我国风险投资对企业技术创新影响的机理研究
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摘要
从实践中看,科学技术对经济增长的巨大贡献,已得到世人的公认。但是,科学技术并不能直接促成经济增长,或者说,科学技术与经济增长之间并非直接相关的简单线性关系,而技术创新就是其中一个至关重要的连接环节。正如熊彼特在《经济发展理论》中所明确指出的,不是资本和劳动力,而是创新才是资本主义发展的根本原因,“在过去的50年中是新的使用方法（即创新）,而不是储蓄或劳动力数量的增加,改变了经济领域的面貌”。纵观20世纪90年代以来的美国经济发展,给我们感受最强烈的是美国经济的增长基本上是依靠高科技产业带动的,而这又得益于大批高技术企业的技术创新活动,而风险投资在推动这些企业的发展中又发挥了极为关键的作用。
从微观角度研究风险投资与企业技术创新关系及其影响机理成为近几年国际学者研究的焦点和热点问题。由于研究时期较短，各学派之间理论分歧较大，理论和实证冲突也较多。在我国，由于风险投资起步较晚，关于风险投资的样本数据获得较困难，同时采用的研究方法也较落后，因此，关于这一问题的研究尚不深入。但是，深入研究这一问题,不仅有利于形成风险投资与企业技术创新之间的良性的互动机制，同时构建有利于企业技术发展的技术创新生态环境，从而对建立创新型国家具有重要的现实意义。此外，对于促进风险投资发展，建立多层次、全方位的金融市场也具有一定的现实作用和学术价值。
本文在研究过程中主要采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的研究方法，并注重文献梳理与数据分析相结合。本文首先对风险投资对技术创新的影响的研究现状做出剖析，提出研究我国风险投资对技术创新影响的现实意义和理论意义。并系统梳理风险投资和技术创新相关理论及文献。在分别从理论和经济学模型分析的基础上，同时采用倾向得分配对法，运用基础分析、时间序列分析和动态分析等方法分别论证了我国风险投资对企业技术创新具有促进作用。基于这一研究成果，本文进一步深入研究了风险投资的不同特征、不同投资策略及不同参与程度对企业技术创新的影响程度是否有区别。为此本文采用了理论分析和统计分析相结合的方法对其进行讨论，研究发现风险投资的异质特征、投资策略以及参与度的不同，导致对企业技术创新的影响程度存在差异。
本文通过理论分析和实证检验风险投资对企业技术创新的促进作用，并深入研究风险投资的机构特征、投资策略和参与环境对企业技术创新的影响。研究得到以下主要结果：
（1）在引入倾向得分匹配法后消除了研究中“自选择”的问题。首先，从整体样本看，有风险投资参与的企业比无风险投资参与的企业的专利数更多。根据行业比较，制造业、信息技术业中，风险投资参与对企业技术创新有显著的促进作用。其次，从时间序列分析看，在风险投资发展初期，风险投资对技术创新的影响并不显著。随着我国风险投资行业的发展，在2007年度、2010至2012年度，有风险投资参与的企业的专利数显著多于无风险投资参与的企业。最后，借用事件分析法研究了风险投资投资前后企业专利数的变化。在企业获得风险投资前有风险投资参与的企业的专利数比无风险投资参与的企业的专利数显著较少。在风险投资投资当年及之后4年，有风险投资参与的企业其专利数比无风险投资参与的企业的专利数显著更多。特别是在投资后一年，其均值差异最大。
（2）从风险投资出资背景看，国有背景和中外合资背景的风险投资公司对其所投资企业的创新并没有显著影响。但是，外资背景的风险投资公司对其所投资的企业的创新具有显著影响。从风险投资管理的资金规模看，资金规模与企业创新成倒U型关系。这一结果说明对于促进企业创新，存在最优的管理资金规模。并且具有较优资金规模的风险投资在投资一年后对创新有显著的促进作用。从风险投资的投资活跃度看，风险投资公司的活跃度与企业专利总数显著正相关。但是，较活跃的风险投资在投资后，并没有促进企业专利数的增长，甚至出现负相关（虽然并不显著）。由统计结果可以推断投资项目较多、较活跃的风险投资有更强的能力选择创新潜力较强的企业。但是，这些风险投资在投资后并没有表现出对企业创新能力的促进作用。最后，从风险投资的成功经验看，有较多成功通过IPO退出案例的企业，其投资的企业拥有更多的专利数。有较多成功退出经验的风险投资的投资活动与企业的创新的提高虽然正相关但是统计并不显著。因此，推断有较多IPO退出经验的风险投资，其在选择企业时有更多的经验，并且由于其较高的声誉，因此有更强的竞争力选择创新能力强的企业作为投资目标。
（3）风险投资采用不同的投资策略是由于在投资前企业的技术创新能力相比其他企业更弱，风险投资出于规避风险的考虑采用分阶段投资或者联合投资。在投资后，分阶段投资策略反而制约企业的技术创新，而联合投资策略对企业技术创新并无显著影响。
（4）本文从反映风险投资参与度的股权集中度、董事会规模、控制权和所有权与经营权分离度四个参数研究风险投资参与度与企业技术创新的关系。首先,本文得到的结论是董事会规模与技术创新成倒U型关系。并且，由于风险投资的参与，使董事会的最优规模从7-8人变为8-9人。其次,关于企业控制权集中度与技术创新的影响的检验结果推断企业控制权集中度与专利数成倒“U”型关系。而最有利于创新的控制权比例为50%至51%左右。在这一控制权比例下，企业家有绝对掌控权，但是，风险投资的控制权又对其有一定的制约和影响。再次,实证结果还显示,所有权与经营权相分离的企业中，创新数量显著更多。说明在风险投资参与下，由于更多采用股权激励的方式，有效减弱了CEO与股东之间的代理问题，更充分发挥了职业经理人对技术创新的积极作用。最后,研究还发现,企业股权集中度与技术创新并无显著关系.这一结果说明了股权集中度与控制权集中度的差异在于股权集中度影响的是剩余索取权的分配，而控制权影响的是企业决策权。由此可见，专利的申请对企业来说，更是一个决策层面的战略问题。
最后，本文针对研究成果及研究不足，提出了改进方案及未来研究的方向。
From the practice point of view, the contribution of science and technology has alreadybeen recognized for the tremendous economic growth. However, science and technology doesnot automatically lead to economic growth, that is to say, it’s not a simple linear relationshipbetween science technology and economic growth. Innovation is just one of the crucial oneannulus. As Joseph Aloes Schumpeter clearly pointed out in “Theory of EconomicDevelopment", it’s not capital and labor, but innovation is the fundamental reason for thedevelopment of capitalism.“It’s the use of different methods (Innovation) has changed theworld’s economy in the past50years rather than greater savings or moreavailable labor."Throughout the development of the U.S. economy since1990s, whatimpresses us most is that U.S. economic growth is essentially driven on high-tech industries,which in turn benefits from the technological innovation activities. The risk investment hasalso played a crucial role in promoting the development of these enterprises.
Research on the mechanism of the influence to China's venture capital on enterprisetechnological innovation from the microscopic point of view has now become a focus and hotissue in recent years. Butdue to the short study period, there’re differences among diffidentschools, and also many theoretical and empirical conflicts existing. In China, data on sample ofventure capital is difficult to obtain due to the late start. Therefore, research on this issue is notyet in depth. However, study deeply on this issuenot only conducive to the formation of benigninteraction mechanism of venture capital and to technological innovation and technologicaldevelopment of ecological environment, but also has important practical significance to theestablishment of an innovative country. In addition, it also plays a practical role and hasacademic value for the risk of the promotion of investment development, establishment of amulti-level, and comprehensive financial market.
This paper mainly adopts the combination of standardized analysis and empiricalanalysis, combines with literature review and data analysis. Firstly, we make analysis on the research status of impact of venture capital on technological innovation and makeinvestment proposed study of practical and theoretical significance of the impact oftechnology on the risk of investing in innovation. We systematically combinetheory andliterature of venture capital and technology innovation. On the basis of theoretical studyand econometric models, wefind that venture investments were demonstrated to have a rolein promoting technological innovation, using propensity score matching methodcombinedwith a series methods such asmethod based on the analysis, time series analysis anddynamic analysis. Based on the result, we further study the different characteristics ofventure capital, investment strategies and to what extent influences does different degreesof technological innovation has to the level of participation. This paper uses the methodof theoretical analysis and statistical analysis to discuss this issue, and finds thatheterogeneous characteristics of venture capital, and the participation of differentinvestment strategies, would lead to differences in the extent of the impact of technologicalinnovation.
Through theoretical and empirical analysis of the promotion to the role of venturecapital for technological innovation, and the in-depth study of the institutionalcharacteristics of venture capital, investment strategy and participation in environmentalimpact of technological innovation. The main results of this study are as shown below:
(1) After the introduction of propensity score matching method, the problem of"self-selection" is eliminated. Firstly, according to the whole sample, the number of patentsinvolved in the business of venture capital investment is more than those without ones.According to industry comparisons, venture capital companies run betterin manufacturing andinformation technology industry. Secondly, from the time-series analysis, the risk ofinvestment in technological innovation is not significant in the initial investment. With thedevelopment of China's venture capital industry, there are more patents involved in the venturecapital companies a significant excess risk-free investment involved in the enterprise in theyear2007,2010to2012. Finally, we analyze the changes in venture capital firms around thepatent number using event study. There’re significantly fewer risk patents contest beforecorporate venture capital investment involved in those risky investment companies. There arerisks involved in investing in companies whose patents than the risk-free investmentcompanies to participate significantly more in the year and after four years. In particular, aftera year of investment, the mean difference reaches the maximum.
(2) Funding from venture capital background, state-owned background and thebackground of Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms invested enterprises in their innovationshows no significant effect. However, foreign background ventures shows significant impacton its business of innovation. See from the scale of capital investment risk managementperspective, the scale and innovation funds into an inverted U-shaped relationship. This resultsuggests that there is an optimal size of funds management for the promotion of innovation.And the optimal size of funds under management of innovation and investment has asignificant role in promoting after a year. From an investment perspective of venture capitalactivity, business activity and the total number of venture capital firms in the patent have asignificant positive correlation. However, more active in the venture capital investment doesnot promote the growth of corporate patent numbers, or even negative correlation (althoughnot significant). It can be inferred from the statistical results that the more active venture capitalhas a stronger ability to choose a more strong innovation potential business. However, theseventure capital investments do not show role in promoting business innovation capability.Finally, from the successful experience of venture capital perspective, there are more cases ofsuccessful exits by IPO companies, and their business investments have more patents.Although companies that have more experience of successful exits of venture capitalinvestment activity and the improvement of innovative companies have a positive correlationbut the statistics are not significant. Therefore, the more experienced IPO exits companies inferthat they are also more experienced ones in the selection of companies. And because of theirhigh reputation, it calls for more competitive innovation ability of enterprises to select as aninvestment target.
(3) The reason for venturecapital using different investment strategy is that pre-investedenterprises companies compared weaker. Venture capital is considered to be used to avoid therisk of a phased investment or joint investment. After the investment, the investment strategydistinguishing stages would restrict the technological innovation of enterprises, while there wasno significant impact on the investment strategy of the joint enterprise technology innovation.
(4) This paper study the risk of the relationship between company involvement andtechnological innovation using four parameters of the vote reflecting the investment riskinvolved in ownership concentration degree, board size, control and separation ofownership and management. Firstly, we concluded that the board scale and technologicalinnovation have an inverted U-shaped relationship. Also, the participation of venture capital enables the optimal size ofboard change from7-8into8-9people. Second, theimpact of the concentration on the degree of control over the business and technologicalinnovation of the test results to infer the concentration of corporate control and the numberof patents inverted U-shaped relationship, while the most conducive proportion of controlto innovation is about50-51%. Under this proportion of control, entrepreneurs haveabsolute powers. But the control of the risks of their investments would have certainconstraints and impact to them. Again, the empirical result also shows that enterprises haveseparation of ownership and management havesignificantly more innovations. Described inthe venture capital participation, equity incentives is used as to effectively weaken theagency problem between the CEO and shareholders, also giving full play to the positiverole of professional managers of technology innovation. Finally, the study also found nosignificant relationship between corporate ownership concentration and technologicalinnovation. These results illustrate the differences between ownership concentration andcontrol over the degree of concentration of ownership concentration that relationship is toallocate residual claims, and the impact of control the business decisions. Thus, enterprisesthat have patent application have decision-making level of strategic issues.
Finally, this paper put forward further research area according to the research resultsand limitation.
从微观角度研究风险投资与企业技术创新关系及其影响机理成为近几年国际学者研究的焦点和热点问题。由于研究时期较短，各学派之间理论分歧较大，理论和实证冲突也较多。在我国，由于风险投资起步较晚，关于风险投资的样本数据获得较困难，同时采用的研究方法也较落后，因此，关于这一问题的研究尚不深入。但是，深入研究这一问题,不仅有利于形成风险投资与企业技术创新之间的良性的互动机制，同时构建有利于企业技术发展的技术创新生态环境，从而对建立创新型国家具有重要的现实意义。此外，对于促进风险投资发展，建立多层次、全方位的金融市场也具有一定的现实作用和学术价值。
本文在研究过程中主要采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的研究方法，并注重文献梳理与数据分析相结合。本文首先对风险投资对技术创新的影响的研究现状做出剖析，提出研究我国风险投资对技术创新影响的现实意义和理论意义。并系统梳理风险投资和技术创新相关理论及文献。在分别从理论和经济学模型分析的基础上，同时采用倾向得分配对法，运用基础分析、时间序列分析和动态分析等方法分别论证了我国风险投资对企业技术创新具有促进作用。基于这一研究成果，本文进一步深入研究了风险投资的不同特征、不同投资策略及不同参与程度对企业技术创新的影响程度是否有区别。为此本文采用了理论分析和统计分析相结合的方法对其进行讨论，研究发现风险投资的异质特征、投资策略以及参与度的不同，导致对企业技术创新的影响程度存在差异。
本文通过理论分析和实证检验风险投资对企业技术创新的促进作用，并深入研究风险投资的机构特征、投资策略和参与环境对企业技术创新的影响。研究得到以下主要结果：
（1）在引入倾向得分匹配法后消除了研究中“自选择”的问题。首先，从整体样本看，有风险投资参与的企业比无风险投资参与的企业的专利数更多。根据行业比较，制造业、信息技术业中，风险投资参与对企业技术创新有显著的促进作用。其次，从时间序列分析看，在风险投资发展初期，风险投资对技术创新的影响并不显著。随着我国风险投资行业的发展，在2007年度、2010至2012年度，有风险投资参与的企业的专利数显著多于无风险投资参与的企业。最后，借用事件分析法研究了风险投资投资前后企业专利数的变化。在企业获得风险投资前有风险投资参与的企业的专利数比无风险投资参与的企业的专利数显著较少。在风险投资投资当年及之后4年，有风险投资参与的企业其专利数比无风险投资参与的企业的专利数显著更多。特别是在投资后一年，其均值差异最大。
（2）从风险投资出资背景看，国有背景和中外合资背景的风险投资公司对其所投资企业的创新并没有显著影响。但是，外资背景的风险投资公司对其所投资的企业的创新具有显著影响。从风险投资管理的资金规模看，资金规模与企业创新成倒U型关系。这一结果说明对于促进企业创新，存在最优的管理资金规模。并且具有较优资金规模的风险投资在投资一年后对创新有显著的促进作用。从风险投资的投资活跃度看，风险投资公司的活跃度与企业专利总数显著正相关。但是，较活跃的风险投资在投资后，并没有促进企业专利数的增长，甚至出现负相关（虽然并不显著）。由统计结果可以推断投资项目较多、较活跃的风险投资有更强的能力选择创新潜力较强的企业。但是，这些风险投资在投资后并没有表现出对企业创新能力的促进作用。最后，从风险投资的成功经验看，有较多成功通过IPO退出案例的企业，其投资的企业拥有更多的专利数。有较多成功退出经验的风险投资的投资活动与企业的创新的提高虽然正相关但是统计并不显著。因此，推断有较多IPO退出经验的风险投资，其在选择企业时有更多的经验，并且由于其较高的声誉，因此有更强的竞争力选择创新能力强的企业作为投资目标。
（3）风险投资采用不同的投资策略是由于在投资前企业的技术创新能力相比其他企业更弱，风险投资出于规避风险的考虑采用分阶段投资或者联合投资。在投资后，分阶段投资策略反而制约企业的技术创新，而联合投资策略对企业技术创新并无显著影响。
（4）本文从反映风险投资参与度的股权集中度、董事会规模、控制权和所有权与经营权分离度四个参数研究风险投资参与度与企业技术创新的关系。首先,本文得到的结论是董事会规模与技术创新成倒U型关系。并且，由于风险投资的参与，使董事会的最优规模从7-8人变为8-9人。其次,关于企业控制权集中度与技术创新的影响的检验结果推断企业控制权集中度与专利数成倒“U”型关系。而最有利于创新的控制权比例为50%至51%左右。在这一控制权比例下，企业家有绝对掌控权，但是，风险投资的控制权又对其有一定的制约和影响。再次,实证结果还显示,所有权与经营权相分离的企业中，创新数量显著更多。说明在风险投资参与下，由于更多采用股权激励的方式，有效减弱了CEO与股东之间的代理问题，更充分发挥了职业经理人对技术创新的积极作用。最后,研究还发现,企业股权集中度与技术创新并无显著关系.这一结果说明了股权集中度与控制权集中度的差异在于股权集中度影响的是剩余索取权的分配，而控制权影响的是企业决策权。由此可见，专利的申请对企业来说，更是一个决策层面的战略问题。
最后，本文针对研究成果及研究不足，提出了改进方案及未来研究的方向。
From the practice point of view, the contribution of science and technology has alreadybeen recognized for the tremendous economic growth. However, science and technology doesnot automatically lead to economic growth, that is to say, it’s not a simple linear relationshipbetween science technology and economic growth. Innovation is just one of the crucial oneannulus. As Joseph Aloes Schumpeter clearly pointed out in “Theory of EconomicDevelopment", it’s not capital and labor, but innovation is the fundamental reason for thedevelopment of capitalism.“It’s the use of different methods (Innovation) has changed theworld’s economy in the past50years rather than greater savings or moreavailable labor."Throughout the development of the U.S. economy since1990s, whatimpresses us most is that U.S. economic growth is essentially driven on high-tech industries,which in turn benefits from the technological innovation activities. The risk investment hasalso played a crucial role in promoting the development of these enterprises.
Research on the mechanism of the influence to China's venture capital on enterprisetechnological innovation from the microscopic point of view has now become a focus and hotissue in recent years. Butdue to the short study period, there’re differences among diffidentschools, and also many theoretical and empirical conflicts existing. In China, data on sample ofventure capital is difficult to obtain due to the late start. Therefore, research on this issue is notyet in depth. However, study deeply on this issuenot only conducive to the formation of benigninteraction mechanism of venture capital and to technological innovation and technologicaldevelopment of ecological environment, but also has important practical significance to theestablishment of an innovative country. In addition, it also plays a practical role and hasacademic value for the risk of the promotion of investment development, establishment of amulti-level, and comprehensive financial market.
This paper mainly adopts the combination of standardized analysis and empiricalanalysis, combines with literature review and data analysis. Firstly, we make analysis on the research status of impact of venture capital on technological innovation and makeinvestment proposed study of practical and theoretical significance of the impact oftechnology on the risk of investing in innovation. We systematically combinetheory andliterature of venture capital and technology innovation. On the basis of theoretical studyand econometric models, wefind that venture investments were demonstrated to have a rolein promoting technological innovation, using propensity score matching methodcombinedwith a series methods such asmethod based on the analysis, time series analysis anddynamic analysis. Based on the result, we further study the different characteristics ofventure capital, investment strategies and to what extent influences does different degreesof technological innovation has to the level of participation. This paper uses the methodof theoretical analysis and statistical analysis to discuss this issue, and finds thatheterogeneous characteristics of venture capital, and the participation of differentinvestment strategies, would lead to differences in the extent of the impact of technologicalinnovation.
Through theoretical and empirical analysis of the promotion to the role of venturecapital for technological innovation, and the in-depth study of the institutionalcharacteristics of venture capital, investment strategy and participation in environmentalimpact of technological innovation. The main results of this study are as shown below:
(1) After the introduction of propensity score matching method, the problem of"self-selection" is eliminated. Firstly, according to the whole sample, the number of patentsinvolved in the business of venture capital investment is more than those without ones.According to industry comparisons, venture capital companies run betterin manufacturing andinformation technology industry. Secondly, from the time-series analysis, the risk ofinvestment in technological innovation is not significant in the initial investment. With thedevelopment of China's venture capital industry, there are more patents involved in the venturecapital companies a significant excess risk-free investment involved in the enterprise in theyear2007,2010to2012. Finally, we analyze the changes in venture capital firms around thepatent number using event study. There’re significantly fewer risk patents contest beforecorporate venture capital investment involved in those risky investment companies. There arerisks involved in investing in companies whose patents than the risk-free investmentcompanies to participate significantly more in the year and after four years. In particular, aftera year of investment, the mean difference reaches the maximum.
(2) Funding from venture capital background, state-owned background and thebackground of Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms invested enterprises in their innovationshows no significant effect. However, foreign background ventures shows significant impacton its business of innovation. See from the scale of capital investment risk managementperspective, the scale and innovation funds into an inverted U-shaped relationship. This resultsuggests that there is an optimal size of funds management for the promotion of innovation.And the optimal size of funds under management of innovation and investment has asignificant role in promoting after a year. From an investment perspective of venture capitalactivity, business activity and the total number of venture capital firms in the patent have asignificant positive correlation. However, more active in the venture capital investment doesnot promote the growth of corporate patent numbers, or even negative correlation (althoughnot significant). It can be inferred from the statistical results that the more active venture capitalhas a stronger ability to choose a more strong innovation potential business. However, theseventure capital investments do not show role in promoting business innovation capability.Finally, from the successful experience of venture capital perspective, there are more cases ofsuccessful exits by IPO companies, and their business investments have more patents.Although companies that have more experience of successful exits of venture capitalinvestment activity and the improvement of innovative companies have a positive correlationbut the statistics are not significant. Therefore, the more experienced IPO exits companies inferthat they are also more experienced ones in the selection of companies. And because of theirhigh reputation, it calls for more competitive innovation ability of enterprises to select as aninvestment target.
(3) The reason for venturecapital using different investment strategy is that pre-investedenterprises companies compared weaker. Venture capital is considered to be used to avoid therisk of a phased investment or joint investment. After the investment, the investment strategydistinguishing stages would restrict the technological innovation of enterprises, while there wasno significant impact on the investment strategy of the joint enterprise technology innovation.
(4) This paper study the risk of the relationship between company involvement andtechnological innovation using four parameters of the vote reflecting the investment riskinvolved in ownership concentration degree, board size, control and separation ofownership and management. Firstly, we concluded that the board scale and technologicalinnovation have an inverted U-shaped relationship. Also, the participation of venture capital enables the optimal size ofboard change from7-8into8-9people. Second, theimpact of the concentration on the degree of control over the business and technologicalinnovation of the test results to infer the concentration of corporate control and the numberof patents inverted U-shaped relationship, while the most conducive proportion of controlto innovation is about50-51%. Under this proportion of control, entrepreneurs haveabsolute powers. But the control of the risks of their investments would have certainconstraints and impact to them. Again, the empirical result also shows that enterprises haveseparation of ownership and management havesignificantly more innovations. Described inthe venture capital participation, equity incentives is used as to effectively weaken theagency problem between the CEO and shareholders, also giving full play to the positiverole of professional managers of technology innovation. Finally, the study also found nosignificant relationship between corporate ownership concentration and technologicalinnovation. These results illustrate the differences between ownership concentration andcontrol over the degree of concentration of ownership concentration that relationship is toallocate residual claims, and the impact of control the business decisions. Thus, enterprisesthat have patent application have decision-making level of strategic issues.
Finally, this paper put forward further research area according to the research resultsand limitation.
引文
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