风险条件下收费公路PPP项目特许定价研究
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摘要
收费公路PPP项目是指政府和私人投资者以经济战略合作伙伴关系为前提,用某个公路项目为基础而形成的合作模式。它的实质是通过价格调节机制增加公共产品的有效供给,特许定价的合理性就成为收费公路PPP项目决策的关键问题。在我国的实践中,因为PPP项目特许定价不合理而导致项目失败,引发政府、项目公司、社会公众冲突的案例不胜枚举,同时说明现有的收费公路PPP项目定价理论无法与项目实践相适应。本文结合收费公路PPP项目的自身特点,对导致PPP项目定价难的影响因素进行系统化分析,在政府、项目公司和出行者之间寻求利益平衡点,深入探究实用性更强的收费公路PPP项目定价理论,目的是更好地推动我国公路基础的建设。
在解决收费公路PPP项目特许定价的合理性把控难的问题时,提出两个需要解决的关键问题：(1)如何衡量风险在收费公路PPP项目中的影响。在漫长的特许经营期内,PPP项目的运营状况受到不确定性风险因素的影响。本研究从风险角度入手,分析风险对关键定价要素影响情况并给出概率分布假设,把风险对收费公路PPP项目特许定价问题的影响程度定量化。(2)如何根据PPP项目的自身特点建立特许定价模式。根据PPP项目融资模式中的利益相关者,政府、项目公司和出行者所要求的不同定价目标,把特许定价模式分为：控制特许期定价模式、控制特许收益定价模式和控制特许价格定价模式。
本文从收费公路PPP项目融资模式、风险识别和特许定价方法三个方面进行相关文献的归纳总结,并指出当前的收费公路PPP项目定价理论日趋成熟,但不能完全解决实践中由于公路PPP项目的定价不准确产生的矛盾,主要局限性在于：当前的定价理论针对一般收费公路,缺乏一种有效适应收费公路PPP项目自身特点的定价理论。
首先,本文针对PPP项目特点,分析出风险条件的变化是项目成败的关键。通过综合集成研讨厅的方法,对PPP项目风险进行情景分析、利益相关群体分析并列出问题清单。研究风险对关键定价要素的影响途径,并根据风险变动情况,假设关键定价要素的概率分布,从而实现不确定性风险的量化分析。
其次,本文对PPP项目中的利益相关者进行分析,发现政府、项目公司和出行者由于角色不同拥有不同的定价目标,政府定价目标是在追求社会福利的最大化、项目公司的定价目标为追求项目利益最大化、出行者的定价目标为追求使用效用最大化。在此基础上建立了控制特许期定价模式、控制特许收益定价模式、控制特许价格定价模式的三种不同定价模式。
再次,本文从工程经济学角度出发,在对PPP项目特许定价理论进行全面分析之后,结合收费公路PPP项目分阶段的特点,分别从建设期、运营期、移交期三个阶段构建函数,其中包括：建设期成本函数、运营期收入函数、运营期支出函数、移交后期支出函数。并引用巴拉特定价模型,构建收费公路PPP项目特许定价决策模型。
然后,依据收费公路PPP项目在实践运营中出现的各种情况,找出适用收费公路PPP项目特许定价决策模型的边界条件。风险的不确定性对项目所产生的影响最终都以交通量的变化趋势来反映,在特许定价调整模型中,从定性分析角度,对特许价格调整的原则和调整的周期进行了分析；从定量的角度,首先进行了交通量的变动分析、净现值变动分析、价格与交通量变动分析。
最后,以个旧至大屯收费公路PPP项目为案例进行分析,建立特许定价决策模型和特许定价调整模型,验证了模型的有效性,为类型收费公路PPP项目的特许定价研究提供范本。
The Public-Private-Partnership (called "PPP" for short) model which is based on the cooperation between the government and the private sector is to increase effective public goods supply through the price adjustment mechanism. Pricing is the key to toll road PPP project decision. There is no lack of examples existed in the current project practice, which made conflicts among government, private sector and public,and produced adverse effects to the project because of improper pricing. In theory, there is not even an effective pricing theory corresponded with toll road PPP project characteristics. In this paper, considering the own characteristics of toll road PPP project, analyse the factors which lead to the difficult pricing systematically, achieve benefit equilibrium among government, private sector and user and delve into more practical toll road PPP project pricing theory to better promote the construction of our toll road infrastructure.
This dissertation takes toll road PPP project pricing problem under uncertain environments is the difficult problem, puts forward two key problems to be solved, including:The first, how to control the Risk? In this study, starting from a risk perspective, analyses the influence of risks to the critical pricing factors and gives the probability distribution of the assumption of risk on the toll road PPP project license pricing quantify the degree of influence. The second, How to establish the pricing model? Based on the pricing targets of government, private sector and user, pricing mode is classified as to control the term pricing mode, the profit pricing mode and the price pricing mode.
In this paper, the conclusion of the relative references is summarized of three aspects including toll road PPP project financeing model, risk recognization and concession pricing method. And it indicates that the current toll road PPP project pricing theory becomes mature day by day, but can not completely solve the contradiction caused by inaccurate pricing in practice. The main limitation is that the current pricing theory aiming at the common toll road lacks a theory which effectively adopts the own feature of toll road PPP project.
Firstly, this paper aims at the features of PPP project, and concludes the key point of success or failure is the change of the risk condition. Through the comprehensive integration discussing method, the scenario analysis and benefit relative group analysis are carried out for PPP project risk, and list the questions. Based on studying the risk how to affect the key pricing means, assumes the probability distribution by the change of the risk condition, then the quantitative analysis of the nondeterminacy risk is realized.
Secondly, by analysing the stakeholder in PPP project, it indicates that different roles have different pricing targets among the government, project company and pedestrain. The pricing target of the government is to pursue the maximum benefit of the society, and maximum benefit of the project for project company, maximum effectiveness for pedestrain. Based on these situations, three different pricing models named as the control concession pricing model, control concession profit pricing model and control concession price pricing model are established.
Thirdly, based on the engineering economics, after the entirely analysis to PPP project concession pricing theory combined with the staged features of the toll road PPP project, make the functions of construction period, operating period and transfering period. including construction period cost function, operating period profit function, operating period expenditure function and later transfer period expenditure function. And use the Balate pricing model to establish the toll road PPP project concession pricing decision-making model.
Then, according to the all kinds of conditions occurred during the operating and practicing period of PPP project, the boundary conditions used for toll road PPP project concession pricing dicision-making model should be determined. The effect caused by nondeterminacy of the risk is always reflected by the change of the amount of traffic. In the concession pricing adjusting model, through qualitative analysis, the adjusting principle and period of the concession price is analyzed; through quantitative analysis, the changing of the amount of traffic, the changing of net present value, the changing of the price and the amount of traffic are analyzed.
Finally, in the case of GJZDT toll road PPP project, the concession pricing decision-making model and concession pricing adjusting model are established to verify the validity of the models which will be the template for the projects like PPP project.
在解决收费公路PPP项目特许定价的合理性把控难的问题时,提出两个需要解决的关键问题：(1)如何衡量风险在收费公路PPP项目中的影响。在漫长的特许经营期内,PPP项目的运营状况受到不确定性风险因素的影响。本研究从风险角度入手,分析风险对关键定价要素影响情况并给出概率分布假设,把风险对收费公路PPP项目特许定价问题的影响程度定量化。(2)如何根据PPP项目的自身特点建立特许定价模式。根据PPP项目融资模式中的利益相关者,政府、项目公司和出行者所要求的不同定价目标,把特许定价模式分为：控制特许期定价模式、控制特许收益定价模式和控制特许价格定价模式。
本文从收费公路PPP项目融资模式、风险识别和特许定价方法三个方面进行相关文献的归纳总结,并指出当前的收费公路PPP项目定价理论日趋成熟,但不能完全解决实践中由于公路PPP项目的定价不准确产生的矛盾,主要局限性在于：当前的定价理论针对一般收费公路,缺乏一种有效适应收费公路PPP项目自身特点的定价理论。
首先,本文针对PPP项目特点,分析出风险条件的变化是项目成败的关键。通过综合集成研讨厅的方法,对PPP项目风险进行情景分析、利益相关群体分析并列出问题清单。研究风险对关键定价要素的影响途径,并根据风险变动情况,假设关键定价要素的概率分布,从而实现不确定性风险的量化分析。
其次,本文对PPP项目中的利益相关者进行分析,发现政府、项目公司和出行者由于角色不同拥有不同的定价目标,政府定价目标是在追求社会福利的最大化、项目公司的定价目标为追求项目利益最大化、出行者的定价目标为追求使用效用最大化。在此基础上建立了控制特许期定价模式、控制特许收益定价模式、控制特许价格定价模式的三种不同定价模式。
再次,本文从工程经济学角度出发,在对PPP项目特许定价理论进行全面分析之后,结合收费公路PPP项目分阶段的特点,分别从建设期、运营期、移交期三个阶段构建函数,其中包括：建设期成本函数、运营期收入函数、运营期支出函数、移交后期支出函数。并引用巴拉特定价模型,构建收费公路PPP项目特许定价决策模型。
然后,依据收费公路PPP项目在实践运营中出现的各种情况,找出适用收费公路PPP项目特许定价决策模型的边界条件。风险的不确定性对项目所产生的影响最终都以交通量的变化趋势来反映,在特许定价调整模型中,从定性分析角度,对特许价格调整的原则和调整的周期进行了分析；从定量的角度,首先进行了交通量的变动分析、净现值变动分析、价格与交通量变动分析。
最后,以个旧至大屯收费公路PPP项目为案例进行分析,建立特许定价决策模型和特许定价调整模型,验证了模型的有效性,为类型收费公路PPP项目的特许定价研究提供范本。
The Public-Private-Partnership (called "PPP" for short) model which is based on the cooperation between the government and the private sector is to increase effective public goods supply through the price adjustment mechanism. Pricing is the key to toll road PPP project decision. There is no lack of examples existed in the current project practice, which made conflicts among government, private sector and public,and produced adverse effects to the project because of improper pricing. In theory, there is not even an effective pricing theory corresponded with toll road PPP project characteristics. In this paper, considering the own characteristics of toll road PPP project, analyse the factors which lead to the difficult pricing systematically, achieve benefit equilibrium among government, private sector and user and delve into more practical toll road PPP project pricing theory to better promote the construction of our toll road infrastructure.
This dissertation takes toll road PPP project pricing problem under uncertain environments is the difficult problem, puts forward two key problems to be solved, including:The first, how to control the Risk? In this study, starting from a risk perspective, analyses the influence of risks to the critical pricing factors and gives the probability distribution of the assumption of risk on the toll road PPP project license pricing quantify the degree of influence. The second, How to establish the pricing model? Based on the pricing targets of government, private sector and user, pricing mode is classified as to control the term pricing mode, the profit pricing mode and the price pricing mode.
In this paper, the conclusion of the relative references is summarized of three aspects including toll road PPP project financeing model, risk recognization and concession pricing method. And it indicates that the current toll road PPP project pricing theory becomes mature day by day, but can not completely solve the contradiction caused by inaccurate pricing in practice. The main limitation is that the current pricing theory aiming at the common toll road lacks a theory which effectively adopts the own feature of toll road PPP project.
Firstly, this paper aims at the features of PPP project, and concludes the key point of success or failure is the change of the risk condition. Through the comprehensive integration discussing method, the scenario analysis and benefit relative group analysis are carried out for PPP project risk, and list the questions. Based on studying the risk how to affect the key pricing means, assumes the probability distribution by the change of the risk condition, then the quantitative analysis of the nondeterminacy risk is realized.
Secondly, by analysing the stakeholder in PPP project, it indicates that different roles have different pricing targets among the government, project company and pedestrain. The pricing target of the government is to pursue the maximum benefit of the society, and maximum benefit of the project for project company, maximum effectiveness for pedestrain. Based on these situations, three different pricing models named as the control concession pricing model, control concession profit pricing model and control concession price pricing model are established.
Thirdly, based on the engineering economics, after the entirely analysis to PPP project concession pricing theory combined with the staged features of the toll road PPP project, make the functions of construction period, operating period and transfering period. including construction period cost function, operating period profit function, operating period expenditure function and later transfer period expenditure function. And use the Balate pricing model to establish the toll road PPP project concession pricing decision-making model.
Then, according to the all kinds of conditions occurred during the operating and practicing period of PPP project, the boundary conditions used for toll road PPP project concession pricing dicision-making model should be determined. The effect caused by nondeterminacy of the risk is always reflected by the change of the amount of traffic. In the concession pricing adjusting model, through qualitative analysis, the adjusting principle and period of the concession price is analyzed; through quantitative analysis, the changing of the amount of traffic, the changing of net present value, the changing of the price and the amount of traffic are analyzed.
Finally, in the case of GJZDT toll road PPP project, the concession pricing decision-making model and concession pricing adjusting model are established to verify the validity of the models which will be the template for the projects like PPP project.
引文
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