共同治理模式下的劳动关系研究
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摘要
大多数经济学者通常把公司治理与劳动关系看作是两个不相关的研究领域。认为公司治理仅仅是所有者与经营者的权利和义务，劳动关系则是雇主与雇员(或用人单位与工人)之间的利益关系。在企业科层中，工人只能服从经营者的强制性权威，最多也不过是参与民主化管理。笔者认为，公司治理实际上就是企业内部各种劳动关系的协调，是人力资本产权与物质资本产权的相互制衡。从契约的治理效率上来看，企业就是一种劳动关系的治理结构。因此，公司治理与劳动关系在实践中是紧密联系在一起的，劳动关系是影响企业效率的重要因素。这方面，原社会主义国有制企业似乎认识更深刻一些。鼓励工人发扬主人翁的精神，团结合作，允许工会对公司的重大决策享有投票权和执行监督权。但这种认识并没有给社会主义企业带来高效率，原因是多方面的，例如“所有者缺位”造成的激励不相容，软预算约束，收入分配上的平均主义等。这种认识无疑是非常深刻的，而且西方发达国家正在积极地推进工人参与公司治理制度，改善资本主义传统的对抗性劳动关系。
本文从社会劳动分工理论入手，认为合作是组织分工存在的基础，交易是社会分工深化的根本。企业不仅仅是由人力资本与物质资本达成的契约束组成的、代替市场价格机制从而节约交易费用的安排。如果仅仅这样理解企业的性质，就不能够把它同社会其它组织制度区别开来，如货币制度、度量衡、协会等；企业的性质还表现在弥补市场分工的不完备性，在组织内部形成专业化的劳动分工；因为专业化的劳动分工必须进行合作，形成稳定协调的关系性契约，才能够产生剩余，进而实现某种规模经济。正是基于此种意义，企业才得以存在和发展。但是，这种合作生产需要有机地组织起来，以避免出现严重的双向道德风险。于是，科层制在企业内部建立了，以便指挥和监督生产。但是，强制性权威通常是建立在财产所有权基础之上，即“资本雇佣劳动”的资本主义契约模式，人力资本产权的剩余权利被剥夺，从而形成了劳资之间激烈的对抗性关系。因此，要改变这种状况，就必须改革传统的公司治理模式，实现资本与劳动的共同治理。利益相关者理论已经被理论界认同，然而这种广义的共同治理在现实中难以生存。笔者认为，关键利益相关者共同治理模式便是职工持股制度，所有劳动者都可以凭借其人力资本从组织剩余收益中获得股份，参与公司治理，从而实现人力资本产权的两项基本经济权利：剩余控制权和剩余索取权，形成一种激励相容的机制，降低了企业与职工的双向机会主义行为。
劳动关系是企业的一项基本合约。随着社会分工的发展，现代劳动关系的核心内容逐渐演变为人力资本产权与物质资本产权之间的复杂契约，其签约方式是
共同治理模式下的劳动关系研究
由劳动力所有权(人力资本产权)性质决定的。改革开放之后，我国劳动关系变
革的契约化过程，其本质就是入力资本产权实现了个人所有制，人力资本逐步市
场化实现了生产要素的优化配置。从宏观层面上，在劳动关系转型的过程中出现
了许多劳动问题，国家需要纠正市场失灵。既要制止雇主侵犯工人的权利、救助
市场自由谈判中的弱者，又要制定政策合理规范劳动力流动行为。从微观层次上，
要杜绝劳动关系中的双向道德风险，则要承认人力资本产权的经济收益权利，建
立一种基于职工持股共同治理模式下的分享制，实现人力资本与物质资本在企业
范围内的直接结合，减少了双方的机会主义行为，降低了劳动契约的不完全程度。
劳动关系是一项非正式契约，也可以用正式的成文契约来加以规范。劳动关
系具有不完全性、重复作用和社会交换机会等重要特征。复杂交易都表现为契约
不完全性，而劳动契约的不完全特性是与人力资本及其产权特征紧密相关的。职
工持股计划给予了人力资本产权同物质资本产权同等的地位，显著地提高了劳动
契约的自我强制实施能力，改善了双方的关系。笔者通过对数十家改制企业的调
查发现，这些企业的经营绩效都较产权改革以前有所提高，劳动关系在产权改革
过程中基本保持稳定，一个重要的原因就在于实行了职工持股的所有权安排形
式。应用odered Logit模型对503项有效样本数据进行估计分析，发现改制企业的
劳动关系的满意程度与工资奖金、持股数量、职位、工龄、对管理经营的态度、
对工会的态度成显著的正相关关系。对于新近改制的企业，劳动关系满意度也与
工人改制方案的态度、对协会是否信任、对企业的长远发展是否有信心等成显著
的正相关关系。然而，我国改制企业实行的职工持股制度与笔者倡导的基于职工
持股共同治理模式下的分享制存在着重大差别:职工股份来自于工龄补偿和现金
购买，是劳动者的物质资本投入，而不是其凭借人力资本从组织剩余中获得，因
此，这种职工持股方式仍然没有真正实现人力资本产权的剩余权利。虽然职工持
股可以增加劳动者的谈判势力，提高合同收入，而组织剩余往往仍然是根据物质
资本多少进行分配的，除非物质资本所有者愿意让渡更多的剩余。调查发现产权
改革过程中存在三个严重的问题:一是许多职工是被迫购买股份的，工人不愿意
购买股份的原因不外乎缺少资金或者怕承?
Most economists think that the corporate governance research fields are largely different from labor relations. They regard the corporate governance as the rights of shareholders and commitments of managements. Labor relations are thought as the benefit relationships between the employer and employee (or workers and the firms). In the hierarchical organization of the firm, workers only submit themselves to the compulsive authorities of the managements. The best plans of workers participations are only the managerial democratization too. We think that corporate governance is essentially the coordination among the different labor relations inside firms. In the other words, it is the mutual equilibrium between the human capital rights and physical capital rights. The firms are really the governance structures of labor relations in the view of contractual governance efficiency. Then the corporate governance is connected closely with labor relations in true world. Labor relations are the crucial influencing facto
rs to the firm efficiency. The State-Owned Enterprises of socialism were seemed to understand better the above aspect than the capitalism. They encouraged workers to solidify and cooperate as the owners of the firms. The union was also allowed to share voting rights on the momentous decisions and monitors rights on the executions. However this cognition did not bring the high efficiency to SOEs. There were many causes such as the incentives incompatibility as a result of owner departure, the soft budget constraints, the evenness principles of allocation etc. It is no doubt that the foregoing knowledge is profound. Further the west advanced countries are carrying out the employee participations so that conventional antagonism is ameliorated.
The paper starts with social labor division. Cooperation is considered as the basis of organization division and the transaction is the fundamentality of social division. The firm is not only the lens of contracts between human capital and physical capital, the arrangement of transaction cost thrifts instead of market price mechanism. If the natures of the firm were only understood partly, we cannot distinguish it from another organizations, such as monetary institution, metrology, guild etc. The nature of the firm manifest that it remedies the market division imperfection, then specific authority division is formed inside the organization. Because the specific labor division must cooperate and bring about steady relational contract, the "surplus" can be created so that certain scale economy is implemented. The firm can survive and develop just on the previous means, however, this cooperation need building organically up in order to avoid double-sided moral hazard. Hierarchy is constructed to direct and moni
tor the production, but the compulsive authority is basis on the asset ownership, namely capitalistic contractual mode of "capital employing labor". The residual rights of the property of human capital rights are deprived; therefore a hostile relation between capitalists and workers is fashioned. In
order to change the situation, the traditional corporate governance models have to be altered. The mutual governance of capital and labor should be actualized. The theory of stake-holders is gradually approved, but that extensive mutual governance is too difficult to last in fact. This paper thinks the ideal mutual governance among the pivotal stake-holders is Employee Stock Ownership Plans. All labors gain stocks from the firm surplus and participate management through their human capital; so two residual rights of human capital property rights are really achieved. Incentives compatibility mechanisms take shape; the double-sided opportunism between managers and workers is reduced consequently.
Labor relations are the most contracts of the firm. The core of contemporary labor relations evolved the multiple contracts between the property rights of human capital and the property rights of physical capital along with the development of social division. The pattern of labor
本文从社会劳动分工理论入手，认为合作是组织分工存在的基础，交易是社会分工深化的根本。企业不仅仅是由人力资本与物质资本达成的契约束组成的、代替市场价格机制从而节约交易费用的安排。如果仅仅这样理解企业的性质，就不能够把它同社会其它组织制度区别开来，如货币制度、度量衡、协会等；企业的性质还表现在弥补市场分工的不完备性，在组织内部形成专业化的劳动分工；因为专业化的劳动分工必须进行合作，形成稳定协调的关系性契约，才能够产生剩余，进而实现某种规模经济。正是基于此种意义，企业才得以存在和发展。但是，这种合作生产需要有机地组织起来，以避免出现严重的双向道德风险。于是，科层制在企业内部建立了，以便指挥和监督生产。但是，强制性权威通常是建立在财产所有权基础之上，即“资本雇佣劳动”的资本主义契约模式，人力资本产权的剩余权利被剥夺，从而形成了劳资之间激烈的对抗性关系。因此，要改变这种状况，就必须改革传统的公司治理模式，实现资本与劳动的共同治理。利益相关者理论已经被理论界认同，然而这种广义的共同治理在现实中难以生存。笔者认为，关键利益相关者共同治理模式便是职工持股制度，所有劳动者都可以凭借其人力资本从组织剩余收益中获得股份，参与公司治理，从而实现人力资本产权的两项基本经济权利：剩余控制权和剩余索取权，形成一种激励相容的机制，降低了企业与职工的双向机会主义行为。
劳动关系是企业的一项基本合约。随着社会分工的发展，现代劳动关系的核心内容逐渐演变为人力资本产权与物质资本产权之间的复杂契约，其签约方式是
共同治理模式下的劳动关系研究
由劳动力所有权(人力资本产权)性质决定的。改革开放之后，我国劳动关系变
革的契约化过程，其本质就是入力资本产权实现了个人所有制，人力资本逐步市
场化实现了生产要素的优化配置。从宏观层面上，在劳动关系转型的过程中出现
了许多劳动问题，国家需要纠正市场失灵。既要制止雇主侵犯工人的权利、救助
市场自由谈判中的弱者，又要制定政策合理规范劳动力流动行为。从微观层次上，
要杜绝劳动关系中的双向道德风险，则要承认人力资本产权的经济收益权利，建
立一种基于职工持股共同治理模式下的分享制，实现人力资本与物质资本在企业
范围内的直接结合，减少了双方的机会主义行为，降低了劳动契约的不完全程度。
劳动关系是一项非正式契约，也可以用正式的成文契约来加以规范。劳动关
系具有不完全性、重复作用和社会交换机会等重要特征。复杂交易都表现为契约
不完全性，而劳动契约的不完全特性是与人力资本及其产权特征紧密相关的。职
工持股计划给予了人力资本产权同物质资本产权同等的地位，显著地提高了劳动
契约的自我强制实施能力，改善了双方的关系。笔者通过对数十家改制企业的调
查发现，这些企业的经营绩效都较产权改革以前有所提高，劳动关系在产权改革
过程中基本保持稳定，一个重要的原因就在于实行了职工持股的所有权安排形
式。应用odered Logit模型对503项有效样本数据进行估计分析，发现改制企业的
劳动关系的满意程度与工资奖金、持股数量、职位、工龄、对管理经营的态度、
对工会的态度成显著的正相关关系。对于新近改制的企业，劳动关系满意度也与
工人改制方案的态度、对协会是否信任、对企业的长远发展是否有信心等成显著
的正相关关系。然而，我国改制企业实行的职工持股制度与笔者倡导的基于职工
持股共同治理模式下的分享制存在着重大差别:职工股份来自于工龄补偿和现金
购买，是劳动者的物质资本投入，而不是其凭借人力资本从组织剩余中获得，因
此，这种职工持股方式仍然没有真正实现人力资本产权的剩余权利。虽然职工持
股可以增加劳动者的谈判势力，提高合同收入，而组织剩余往往仍然是根据物质
资本多少进行分配的，除非物质资本所有者愿意让渡更多的剩余。调查发现产权
改革过程中存在三个严重的问题:一是许多职工是被迫购买股份的，工人不愿意
购买股份的原因不外乎缺少资金或者怕承?
Most economists think that the corporate governance research fields are largely different from labor relations. They regard the corporate governance as the rights of shareholders and commitments of managements. Labor relations are thought as the benefit relationships between the employer and employee (or workers and the firms). In the hierarchical organization of the firm, workers only submit themselves to the compulsive authorities of the managements. The best plans of workers participations are only the managerial democratization too. We think that corporate governance is essentially the coordination among the different labor relations inside firms. In the other words, it is the mutual equilibrium between the human capital rights and physical capital rights. The firms are really the governance structures of labor relations in the view of contractual governance efficiency. Then the corporate governance is connected closely with labor relations in true world. Labor relations are the crucial influencing facto
rs to the firm efficiency. The State-Owned Enterprises of socialism were seemed to understand better the above aspect than the capitalism. They encouraged workers to solidify and cooperate as the owners of the firms. The union was also allowed to share voting rights on the momentous decisions and monitors rights on the executions. However this cognition did not bring the high efficiency to SOEs. There were many causes such as the incentives incompatibility as a result of owner departure, the soft budget constraints, the evenness principles of allocation etc. It is no doubt that the foregoing knowledge is profound. Further the west advanced countries are carrying out the employee participations so that conventional antagonism is ameliorated.
The paper starts with social labor division. Cooperation is considered as the basis of organization division and the transaction is the fundamentality of social division. The firm is not only the lens of contracts between human capital and physical capital, the arrangement of transaction cost thrifts instead of market price mechanism. If the natures of the firm were only understood partly, we cannot distinguish it from another organizations, such as monetary institution, metrology, guild etc. The nature of the firm manifest that it remedies the market division imperfection, then specific authority division is formed inside the organization. Because the specific labor division must cooperate and bring about steady relational contract, the "surplus" can be created so that certain scale economy is implemented. The firm can survive and develop just on the previous means, however, this cooperation need building organically up in order to avoid double-sided moral hazard. Hierarchy is constructed to direct and moni
tor the production, but the compulsive authority is basis on the asset ownership, namely capitalistic contractual mode of "capital employing labor". The residual rights of the property of human capital rights are deprived; therefore a hostile relation between capitalists and workers is fashioned. In
order to change the situation, the traditional corporate governance models have to be altered. The mutual governance of capital and labor should be actualized. The theory of stake-holders is gradually approved, but that extensive mutual governance is too difficult to last in fact. This paper thinks the ideal mutual governance among the pivotal stake-holders is Employee Stock Ownership Plans. All labors gain stocks from the firm surplus and participate management through their human capital; so two residual rights of human capital property rights are really achieved. Incentives compatibility mechanisms take shape; the double-sided opportunism between managers and workers is reduced consequently.
Labor relations are the most contracts of the firm. The core of contemporary labor relations evolved the multiple contracts between the property rights of human capital and the property rights of physical capital along with the development of social division. The pattern of labor
引文
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