易腐农产品供应链中博弈分析
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摘要
供应链理论在全球的实践和运用均呈日益深化之势,特别是供应链管理中成员之间的利益协调问题,成为供应链研究领域中富有意义的研究方向,并取得了丰硕的研究成果。近年来,供应链管理的思想、理论和方法开始向农业领域延伸,目前我国对农产品供应链的研究,主要是从宏观的角度加以阐述,理论界对涉农供应链这一特定领域在建模方面的研究相对薄弱。
作者通过对河南省生鲜易腐农产品市场的实际调研中发现,“公司+农户”供需模式是目前我国生鲜易腐农产品供应链最主要的组织模式。在实际中,公司和农户之间的双重违约行为严重制约着易腐农产品供应链的发展,对此一些理论和实际工作者只定性的提出了理论上的解释和应采取的措施。因此,急需定量地从更深层次分析易腐农产品供应链成员之间复杂的利益关系,找到科学的协调方法,使他们之间真正建立合理的行之有效的风险共担,利益共享关系,从而使供应链整体绩效达到最优。
目前在供应链的研究中,对于不确定对象的描述基本上都是假设服从某种典型的概率分布的,然而,在易腐农产品供应链中,实际生鲜农产品市场价格和市场需求具有很强的不确定性,这样的强不确定性基本上都是不服从某种典型的概率分布的,仅能知其变化的上下界,而难于知其变化的规律。而这恰恰是灰色系统理论着重研究的对象。
本文从系统工程和控制论的角度,把灰色系统理论和博弈论相结合,应用于易腐农产品供应链管理中,主要以二级链式易腐农产品供应链为研究对象,围绕“公司+农户”供需模式占主导地位的易腐农产品供应链的博弈问题,分别从以下4个方面进行了研究。
首先针对易腐农产品市场价格的动态特性,分析了灰色动态市场价格下“公司+农户',一对一的二级链式系统中的博弈问题,提出基于灰色系统理论的研究思路和方法,建立了“公司+农户”一对一的灰色博弈模型,探讨了影响农户和公司博弈结果的各种因素,并通过实例验证了该模型的合理性与有效性。
又因为在实际的易腐农产品供应链中,市场需求还存在很强不确定性的情况,进一步研究了“公司+农户”一对一的易腐农产品二级链式系统中在灰色动态市场需求下的博弈问题,建立了灰色动态市场需求下的灰色博弈模型,在此基础上,分析了影响公司和农户灰博弈结果的各种因素。并通过实例对分析结果进行了验证。
其次针对实际的易腐农产品供应链中一次签约多次交易情况下的博弈问题,构建了双方单次交易的灰博弈模型,分析了各种博弈结果下的灰色收益,把灰博弈转化为灰色动态规划问题,研究在灰色不确定市场需求下,一次签约多次交易的灰博弈问题的最优均衡策略。
最后分析了易腐农产品供应链中“农户+公司”多对一形式下的博弈问题。建立了公司和多个农户在灰色市场价格下多个农户具有竞争关系下的灰博弈模型,分析了各种博弈结果下的灰色收益。研究了影响公司和多个农户在灰色市场价格下博弈结果的各种因素。并通过实例对分析结果进行了验证。
把灰色系统理论应用于易腐农产品供应链管理中,目前无论在理论上还是在实践上都是一种全新的尝试。作者希望也相信今后在这个方向上能深入的研究下去,取得进一步的成就。
The practice & application of supply chain theory are both deepened in the world every day . Especially, the benefit coordination between the members in supply chain management has become an important research direction in the supply chain research field and has gained great study achievement.Recently, the thought、theory and method in supply chain management began to extend to the agriculture field , the research for agriculture supply chain in china is main to described in macroscopic angle. The study in modeling aspects of agriculture supply chain is very weak in the theory circle.
By the practical investigation in market of fresh agricultural perishable products, The author found that the mode of supply and demand is the main organization mode of Chinese fresh agricultural perishable products supply chain at present. The dual breaking contract behavior of company & peasant household seriously restrict the improvement of agricultural perishable products supply chain in practice. Some theorists and practitioners put forward some qualitative expiations and measures that should be adopted. It is urgent need for the supply chain system of perishable agricultural products to analyse the complex interests relationship between the supply chain members from deeplying and quantitatively and to find the scientific coordination method and to set up the reasonable and effectual cooperative relationship between them to realize risk sharing and revenue sharing.
At present, the assumption of uncertain objects description obeys a typical probability distribution in the supply chain research of the retail and manufacturing industry. However, the market price and market demand of fresh agricultural products have sorely change and strong uncertainty in the agricultural products supply chain. This strong uncertainty don't obey any typical probability distribution and only can be known the maximums and minimums of its parameter variations and it is difficult to know its rule of change. This is just the object which is mainly researched in the grey system theory .
This paper combine the grey system theory with game theory and apply them to the supply chain management of perishable agricultural products from the point of view of system engineering and cybernetics. By taking the two-stage chain of perishable agricultural products supply chain as the research object and around the game problem of perishable agricultural products supply chain which company & farmer mode play a dominant role, the next four aspects are studied.
Firstly, according to the dynamic characteristics of perishable agricultural products, the game problem of the two-stage chain system for "one company -to-one farmer" is first analyzed in grey market price. The research idea and method based on grey system theory are proposed. Then the grey game model of "one to one of company & farmer" is established and the grey incomes under various decisions are analyzed. Finally the factors of influencing the game result between company and farmer are studiedd and the reasonable and effective of the model are verified by an example.
Furthermore, because there is strong uncertainty in the actual supply chain of perishable agricultural products, the game problem of the two-stage chain system for "one company -to -one farmer" is studied in grey market demand . Base on setting up the grey game model under grey market demand, the various factors of influencing the game result between company and farmer are analyzed. Finally, the analyzed results are verified by an example.
According to the game problem in the case of one period signing contract and more periods transactions during finishing the contract in the actual supply chain of perishable agricultural products, the grey game model of both sides under once-transaction is first setting up. Then, the grey incomes under various game results are analyzed . The problem of grey game is transformed into the problem of grey dynamic programming. Finally, The optimum balanced tactic of grey game in the case of one period signing contract and more periods transactions under grey dynamic market demand is studied.
The paper analyzes the problem of grey game in the case of many farmers -to-one company in the supply chain of agricultural perishable products at last. The grey game model in the grey market price, which multi-farmer have competition relations, is first established. And then, the grey incomes under various game results are analyzed as well.
The various factors of influencing the game result between many farmers -to-one company in the grey market price are studied. Finally, the analyzed results are verified by an example.
This paper applies the grey system theory to supply chain management of perishable agricultural products . It is a new try for supply chain management to use grey system theory either in theory or in practice. The author hope and believe to make progress in the next study in the future .
作者通过对河南省生鲜易腐农产品市场的实际调研中发现,“公司+农户”供需模式是目前我国生鲜易腐农产品供应链最主要的组织模式。在实际中,公司和农户之间的双重违约行为严重制约着易腐农产品供应链的发展,对此一些理论和实际工作者只定性的提出了理论上的解释和应采取的措施。因此,急需定量地从更深层次分析易腐农产品供应链成员之间复杂的利益关系,找到科学的协调方法,使他们之间真正建立合理的行之有效的风险共担,利益共享关系,从而使供应链整体绩效达到最优。
目前在供应链的研究中,对于不确定对象的描述基本上都是假设服从某种典型的概率分布的,然而,在易腐农产品供应链中,实际生鲜农产品市场价格和市场需求具有很强的不确定性,这样的强不确定性基本上都是不服从某种典型的概率分布的,仅能知其变化的上下界,而难于知其变化的规律。而这恰恰是灰色系统理论着重研究的对象。
本文从系统工程和控制论的角度,把灰色系统理论和博弈论相结合,应用于易腐农产品供应链管理中,主要以二级链式易腐农产品供应链为研究对象,围绕“公司+农户”供需模式占主导地位的易腐农产品供应链的博弈问题,分别从以下4个方面进行了研究。
首先针对易腐农产品市场价格的动态特性,分析了灰色动态市场价格下“公司+农户',一对一的二级链式系统中的博弈问题,提出基于灰色系统理论的研究思路和方法,建立了“公司+农户”一对一的灰色博弈模型,探讨了影响农户和公司博弈结果的各种因素,并通过实例验证了该模型的合理性与有效性。
又因为在实际的易腐农产品供应链中,市场需求还存在很强不确定性的情况,进一步研究了“公司+农户”一对一的易腐农产品二级链式系统中在灰色动态市场需求下的博弈问题,建立了灰色动态市场需求下的灰色博弈模型,在此基础上,分析了影响公司和农户灰博弈结果的各种因素。并通过实例对分析结果进行了验证。
其次针对实际的易腐农产品供应链中一次签约多次交易情况下的博弈问题,构建了双方单次交易的灰博弈模型,分析了各种博弈结果下的灰色收益,把灰博弈转化为灰色动态规划问题,研究在灰色不确定市场需求下,一次签约多次交易的灰博弈问题的最优均衡策略。
最后分析了易腐农产品供应链中“农户+公司”多对一形式下的博弈问题。建立了公司和多个农户在灰色市场价格下多个农户具有竞争关系下的灰博弈模型,分析了各种博弈结果下的灰色收益。研究了影响公司和多个农户在灰色市场价格下博弈结果的各种因素。并通过实例对分析结果进行了验证。
把灰色系统理论应用于易腐农产品供应链管理中,目前无论在理论上还是在实践上都是一种全新的尝试。作者希望也相信今后在这个方向上能深入的研究下去,取得进一步的成就。
The practice & application of supply chain theory are both deepened in the world every day . Especially, the benefit coordination between the members in supply chain management has become an important research direction in the supply chain research field and has gained great study achievement.Recently, the thought、theory and method in supply chain management began to extend to the agriculture field , the research for agriculture supply chain in china is main to described in macroscopic angle. The study in modeling aspects of agriculture supply chain is very weak in the theory circle.
By the practical investigation in market of fresh agricultural perishable products, The author found that the mode of supply and demand is the main organization mode of Chinese fresh agricultural perishable products supply chain at present. The dual breaking contract behavior of company & peasant household seriously restrict the improvement of agricultural perishable products supply chain in practice. Some theorists and practitioners put forward some qualitative expiations and measures that should be adopted. It is urgent need for the supply chain system of perishable agricultural products to analyse the complex interests relationship between the supply chain members from deeplying and quantitatively and to find the scientific coordination method and to set up the reasonable and effectual cooperative relationship between them to realize risk sharing and revenue sharing.
At present, the assumption of uncertain objects description obeys a typical probability distribution in the supply chain research of the retail and manufacturing industry. However, the market price and market demand of fresh agricultural products have sorely change and strong uncertainty in the agricultural products supply chain. This strong uncertainty don't obey any typical probability distribution and only can be known the maximums and minimums of its parameter variations and it is difficult to know its rule of change. This is just the object which is mainly researched in the grey system theory .
This paper combine the grey system theory with game theory and apply them to the supply chain management of perishable agricultural products from the point of view of system engineering and cybernetics. By taking the two-stage chain of perishable agricultural products supply chain as the research object and around the game problem of perishable agricultural products supply chain which company & farmer mode play a dominant role, the next four aspects are studied.
Firstly, according to the dynamic characteristics of perishable agricultural products, the game problem of the two-stage chain system for "one company -to-one farmer" is first analyzed in grey market price. The research idea and method based on grey system theory are proposed. Then the grey game model of "one to one of company & farmer" is established and the grey incomes under various decisions are analyzed. Finally the factors of influencing the game result between company and farmer are studiedd and the reasonable and effective of the model are verified by an example.
Furthermore, because there is strong uncertainty in the actual supply chain of perishable agricultural products, the game problem of the two-stage chain system for "one company -to -one farmer" is studied in grey market demand . Base on setting up the grey game model under grey market demand, the various factors of influencing the game result between company and farmer are analyzed. Finally, the analyzed results are verified by an example.
According to the game problem in the case of one period signing contract and more periods transactions during finishing the contract in the actual supply chain of perishable agricultural products, the grey game model of both sides under once-transaction is first setting up. Then, the grey incomes under various game results are analyzed . The problem of grey game is transformed into the problem of grey dynamic programming. Finally, The optimum balanced tactic of grey game in the case of one period signing contract and more periods transactions under grey dynamic market demand is studied.
The paper analyzes the problem of grey game in the case of many farmers -to-one company in the supply chain of agricultural perishable products at last. The grey game model in the grey market price, which multi-farmer have competition relations, is first established. And then, the grey incomes under various game results are analyzed as well.
The various factors of influencing the game result between many farmers -to-one company in the grey market price are studied. Finally, the analyzed results are verified by an example.
This paper applies the grey system theory to supply chain management of perishable agricultural products . It is a new try for supply chain management to use grey system theory either in theory or in practice. The author hope and believe to make progress in the next study in the future .
引文
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