企业合并反垄断法规制经济学分析方法研究
|
摘要
任何一部法律都需要一套行之有效的分析方法,否则这部法律就永远只能停留在纸面上,而无法转化成实实在在的“活法”。反垄断法的目的是维护市场有效竞争,促进市场经济健康发展,因而它与市场经济活动紧密相联。因此,反垄断法自诞生之日起,就与经济学理论和分析方法存在着千丝万缕的联系,尤其是现代反垄断法越来越深刻地受到经济学的影响,许多经济学理论和分析方法已成为反垄断法处理市场竞争问题的理论基础和主要分析手段。
企业合并作为反垄断法的三大组成部分之一,它关注的根本问题是,合并对市场有效竞争的影响,即合并后市场竞争状况如何。如果合并将对市场竞争产生不利影响,则反垄断法就应事前防范,阻止合并行为发生和完成,反之亦然。到底合并会对市场竞争产生什么样的不利影响呢?从反垄断法的规定来看,它主要表现为两个方面：一是产生或加强市场支配地位,即单边效果；二是便利于企业之间达成协调或共谋行为,即协调效果。这一规定看起来似乎非常清晰明了,也易于让人明白和理解,但实践中,要具体操作和分析起来,则复杂得多,因为它背后包含了许多反垄断法的知识和原理,比如相关市场的界定,市场份额的计算,以及效率的评估等,而这些知识和原理又与经济学理论和分析方法密不可分。因此,我们要想正确评估合并的竞争效果,就必须借助于大量经济学理论和分析方法。我国反垄断法虽已颁布有五年之久,但对反垄断法的经济学理论和分析方法尚掌握不够,不能在具体案件中准确娴熟运用这些经济学理论和分析方法,这增加了我国反垄断法的执行和实施难度,尤其是企业合并的反垄断法规制,虽已处理了很多合并案件,但也饱受争议和质疑,这显然不利于实现反垄断法规制企业合并的目的,因而我们应加强企业合并反垄断法规制的经济学分析方法研究。
企业合并竞争效果的分析步骤是,首先要界定相关市场,它包括相关产品市场和相关地理市场两部分。在相关市场的界定过程中,我们应考虑到需求替代性、供应替代性、替代链等因素,这涉及到的经济学分析方法有,价格弹性分析、 Lerner指数、SSNIP测试,以及产品分流比等方法。然后,在所界定的相关市场范围内,考察企业是否具有市场力量。评估市场力量的首要标准是市场份额,但它并不是判定市场力量的惟一标准,即便企业市场份额达到了法律规定的最低门槛,我们还应考虑到买方力量、潜在竞争、创新、互补性产品等因素,这里所涉及的经济学方法有,假定垄断测试、价格相关性分析、效率分析等方法。最后,再分析合并对市场竞争的影响,如果合并不会对市场竞争产生不利影响,则合并不应禁止,反之亦然,这一过程主要有仿真模型、结构模型、回归分析、市场透明度、惩罚报复机制等经济学分析方法。不管在哪个阶段,经济学的实证分析方法都很重要,它能为判定结果提供强有力的证据支持。另外,横向合并、纵向合并,以及混合合并的具体分析方法各有不同,应在考察中区别对待。
Every law needs a set of effective analytical methods, otherwise it would be remained on the paper only, and could not be transformed into a real "living law". The purpose of anti-monopoly law is to maintain market effective competition, and promote the healthy development of the market economy, and thus it is closely linked with the market economic activity. Therefore, since the date of its birth, the anti-monopoly law and economic theory and analytical methods exist inextricably relationship. As the modern anti-monopoly law, more and more deeply influenced by economics, many economic theories and the analysis method has become the theoretical basis and of antitrust laws to deal with the issue of competition in the market, and the main analytical tools of the anti-monopoly law, to deal with the issue of competition in the market.
The merger as the one of the three major components of anti-monopoly law, it focus on the fundamental problem is that, the impact of the merger on the market to compete effectively, namely how to the market competition condition after the merger.If the merger would adversely effects on market competition, the anti-monopoly law should prevent it, and vice versa. What adverse effects on market competition resulted from the merger? From the provisions of the anti-monopoly law, it is mainly manifested in two aspects:one is created or strengthened a dominant market position, namely unilateral effects; two is convenient to reach the coordination or collusion between firms, namely the coordinated effect. This rule seems to be very clear, easy to let people know and understand. But in practice, the concrete operation and analysis is much more complicated, because it contained many anti-monopoly law knowledge and principles, such as the definition of the relevant market, the calculation of the market share of, and the evaluation of efficiency and so on, and these knowledge and principle is inextricably linked with economic theory and analytical methods. Therefore, in order to properly assess the competitive effects of the merger, it must be by means of a large number of economic theory and analytical methods. Although our country's anti-monopoly law has been promulgated five years, but our country has yet not mastered enough of the anti-monopoly laws of economic theory and analytical methods, and could not be used those theory and method in specific cases accurately and skillfully, this increased the difficulty of the implementation and enforcement of our anti-monopoly laws, especially the anti-monopoly regulation of the merger. Although our country has already dealt with a lot of merger cases, but those cases have been faced many Controversy and doubts, this is obviously not conducive to the realization of the anti-monopoly regulation purpose of the merger, and therefore we should strengthen the research of the economic analytical method of the merger anti-monopoly law regulation
The analysis step of the merger competitive effect is:firstly, to define the relevant market, it includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. In the relevant market definition process, we should take into account the demand-side substitution, supply-side substitution, chains of substitution, and other factors. This involves many economic analytical methods, such as price elasticity analyses, Lerner index, SSNIP test, as well as the diversion ratio of product. Secondly, to examine whether the firm or not has the market power. The primary criterion for assessment of market power is market share, but it is not the only standard to determine the market power. Even if the firm's market share reaches the statutory minimum threshold, we should also take account of buyer power, potential competition, innovation, complementary products and other factors. Here, this involves the hypothetical monopoly test, price correlation analysis, efficiency analysis and so on. Finally, to analyze the influence of the merger to market competition, if the merger would not created adverse effects on the market competition, it would not be prohibited, and vice versa. This process involves the economic analytical methods are:simulation models, structure models, regression analysis, market transparency, punishment retaliation mechanism and so on.
Regardless in which stage, the economic empirical analytical.methods are very important, because they could provide the strong evidence to support our analysis results. In addition, the specific analytical method of horizontal merger and vertical merger and conglomerate merger are different, when we examine their competitive effects, they should be treated the same.
企业合并作为反垄断法的三大组成部分之一,它关注的根本问题是,合并对市场有效竞争的影响,即合并后市场竞争状况如何。如果合并将对市场竞争产生不利影响,则反垄断法就应事前防范,阻止合并行为发生和完成,反之亦然。到底合并会对市场竞争产生什么样的不利影响呢?从反垄断法的规定来看,它主要表现为两个方面：一是产生或加强市场支配地位,即单边效果；二是便利于企业之间达成协调或共谋行为,即协调效果。这一规定看起来似乎非常清晰明了,也易于让人明白和理解,但实践中,要具体操作和分析起来,则复杂得多,因为它背后包含了许多反垄断法的知识和原理,比如相关市场的界定,市场份额的计算,以及效率的评估等,而这些知识和原理又与经济学理论和分析方法密不可分。因此,我们要想正确评估合并的竞争效果,就必须借助于大量经济学理论和分析方法。我国反垄断法虽已颁布有五年之久,但对反垄断法的经济学理论和分析方法尚掌握不够,不能在具体案件中准确娴熟运用这些经济学理论和分析方法,这增加了我国反垄断法的执行和实施难度,尤其是企业合并的反垄断法规制,虽已处理了很多合并案件,但也饱受争议和质疑,这显然不利于实现反垄断法规制企业合并的目的,因而我们应加强企业合并反垄断法规制的经济学分析方法研究。
企业合并竞争效果的分析步骤是,首先要界定相关市场,它包括相关产品市场和相关地理市场两部分。在相关市场的界定过程中,我们应考虑到需求替代性、供应替代性、替代链等因素,这涉及到的经济学分析方法有,价格弹性分析、 Lerner指数、SSNIP测试,以及产品分流比等方法。然后,在所界定的相关市场范围内,考察企业是否具有市场力量。评估市场力量的首要标准是市场份额,但它并不是判定市场力量的惟一标准,即便企业市场份额达到了法律规定的最低门槛,我们还应考虑到买方力量、潜在竞争、创新、互补性产品等因素,这里所涉及的经济学方法有,假定垄断测试、价格相关性分析、效率分析等方法。最后,再分析合并对市场竞争的影响,如果合并不会对市场竞争产生不利影响,则合并不应禁止,反之亦然,这一过程主要有仿真模型、结构模型、回归分析、市场透明度、惩罚报复机制等经济学分析方法。不管在哪个阶段,经济学的实证分析方法都很重要,它能为判定结果提供强有力的证据支持。另外,横向合并、纵向合并,以及混合合并的具体分析方法各有不同,应在考察中区别对待。
Every law needs a set of effective analytical methods, otherwise it would be remained on the paper only, and could not be transformed into a real "living law". The purpose of anti-monopoly law is to maintain market effective competition, and promote the healthy development of the market economy, and thus it is closely linked with the market economic activity. Therefore, since the date of its birth, the anti-monopoly law and economic theory and analytical methods exist inextricably relationship. As the modern anti-monopoly law, more and more deeply influenced by economics, many economic theories and the analysis method has become the theoretical basis and of antitrust laws to deal with the issue of competition in the market, and the main analytical tools of the anti-monopoly law, to deal with the issue of competition in the market.
The merger as the one of the three major components of anti-monopoly law, it focus on the fundamental problem is that, the impact of the merger on the market to compete effectively, namely how to the market competition condition after the merger.If the merger would adversely effects on market competition, the anti-monopoly law should prevent it, and vice versa. What adverse effects on market competition resulted from the merger? From the provisions of the anti-monopoly law, it is mainly manifested in two aspects:one is created or strengthened a dominant market position, namely unilateral effects; two is convenient to reach the coordination or collusion between firms, namely the coordinated effect. This rule seems to be very clear, easy to let people know and understand. But in practice, the concrete operation and analysis is much more complicated, because it contained many anti-monopoly law knowledge and principles, such as the definition of the relevant market, the calculation of the market share of, and the evaluation of efficiency and so on, and these knowledge and principle is inextricably linked with economic theory and analytical methods. Therefore, in order to properly assess the competitive effects of the merger, it must be by means of a large number of economic theory and analytical methods. Although our country's anti-monopoly law has been promulgated five years, but our country has yet not mastered enough of the anti-monopoly laws of economic theory and analytical methods, and could not be used those theory and method in specific cases accurately and skillfully, this increased the difficulty of the implementation and enforcement of our anti-monopoly laws, especially the anti-monopoly regulation of the merger. Although our country has already dealt with a lot of merger cases, but those cases have been faced many Controversy and doubts, this is obviously not conducive to the realization of the anti-monopoly regulation purpose of the merger, and therefore we should strengthen the research of the economic analytical method of the merger anti-monopoly law regulation
The analysis step of the merger competitive effect is:firstly, to define the relevant market, it includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. In the relevant market definition process, we should take into account the demand-side substitution, supply-side substitution, chains of substitution, and other factors. This involves many economic analytical methods, such as price elasticity analyses, Lerner index, SSNIP test, as well as the diversion ratio of product. Secondly, to examine whether the firm or not has the market power. The primary criterion for assessment of market power is market share, but it is not the only standard to determine the market power. Even if the firm's market share reaches the statutory minimum threshold, we should also take account of buyer power, potential competition, innovation, complementary products and other factors. Here, this involves the hypothetical monopoly test, price correlation analysis, efficiency analysis and so on. Finally, to analyze the influence of the merger to market competition, if the merger would not created adverse effects on the market competition, it would not be prohibited, and vice versa. This process involves the economic analytical methods are:simulation models, structure models, regression analysis, market transparency, punishment retaliation mechanism and so on.
Regardless in which stage, the economic empirical analytical.methods are very important, because they could provide the strong evidence to support our analysis results. In addition, the specific analytical method of horizontal merger and vertical merger and conglomerate merger are different, when we examine their competitive effects, they should be treated the same.
引文
① 参见欧盟第139/2004号条例(又称合并条例)序言第20段。
② 参见欧盟第139/2004号条例第3条第1款之规定。
③ 参见欧盟的《横向集中评估指南》、《欧盟条例》以及《委员会关于合并概念的通知》等文件。
① 参见欧盟公司法第3号指令之规定。
② 参见《委员会关于合并概念的通知》第6、7条之规定。
① 参见我国《反垄断法》第20条的规定。
① 参见我国《反垄断法》第12条之规定。
② 比如说,《德国反对限制竞争法》第37条第1款规定,如果一个企业取得了另一企业50%或者25%的股份,这两个企业可被视为出现了企业合并。参见孙晋：《反垄断法——制度与原理》,武汉大学出版社2010年版,第132页。
① 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第2款之规定。
② 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第3款之规定。
③ 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第4款之规定。
④ 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第5款之规定。
① 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第5条之规定。
② 对于这一点,委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》又规定了一种例外情况,即拥有某个企业股份的股东或企业,可以否决这个企业的战略性决策,但他自己不能将其决定强加给他人,参见欧盟《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第39点的规定。
③ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第19点的规定。
④ 参见Rh ne Poulenc/SNIA(Case IV/M206)(1992)。
① 参见Renault/Volvo(CaseIV/M004)(1990).
② 参见Credit Lyonnais/BFG Bank(Case IV/M296)(1993); Sarah Lee/BP Food Division(Case IV/M299)(1993)o
③ 参见SCA/Graninge/Scaninge Timber(Case COMP/M1996)(2000); Dupont/Air Products Chemicals/JV(Case COMP/M2250)(2001):Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf/JV(Case COMP/JV54)(2001).
④ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第20点的规定。
⑤ 参见Matra/CAP Gemini/Sogeti(Case IV/M272)(1993); Bertelsmann/Mondadori/BOL Italian S. p.A(Case COMP/JV51)(2000)。
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第14点的规定。
⑦ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第21到28点的规定。
① 参见Lucas/Eaton(Case IV/M149)(1991):Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard(Case IV/M292)(1993)。
② 参见Mederic/Urrprimec/CRI/Munich(Case IV/M949)(1997); WOCO/Michelin(Case COMP/M1907)(2000); Reuters/Equant-Project Proton(Case COMP/1875)(2000)。
③ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第26到29点的规定；Philips/Chevron Chemicals/JV(CaseCOMP/M1996)(2000)。
④ 参见Conagral/Idea(Case IV/M010)(1991); Reuters/Equant-Project Proton(Case COMP/1875)(2000)。
⑤ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第25点的规定；Hicks/Bear Sterns/Johns Manvile(Case COMP/M2133)(2000).
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第27点的规定。
⑦ 参见Bertelmann/News International/Vox(Case IV/M489)(1994); Brambles/Ermewal/JV(Case COMP/M2023) (2000)。
⑧ 参见Philips/Thomson/Sagem(Case IV/M293)(1993); Sita/RPC/Scori(Case IV/M295); McCormick/CPC/ Rabobank/Ostmann(Case IV/M330)(1993).
⑨ 参见委员会1996年颁布的《竞争政策报告》(Vo1.XXVI)第74-75页；UBS/Mister Mint(Case IV/M940)(1997)。
⑩ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第14点第3段之内容。
11 参见Arjomari/Wiggins Teape(Case IV/M025)(1990); Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/Munksjo AB(Case IV/M613)(1995); Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Beverages GB(Case IV/M794)(1997)[1997] OJ L218/15.
12 在具体案件中,委员会判定小股东构成控制所要求的股权不同,如在Societe Generale de Belgique/Generale de Banque案中,小股东拥有25.96%的股权,委员会就认为足以构成控制；在Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/MunksioAB案中, 小股东的股权为29.04%,委员会认为构成控制；在 Coca-Cola-AmalgamatedBeverages GB案,小股东构成控制的股权为45%；在Pirelli/Edizione/Olivetti/Telecom Italia案中,委员会判定构成控制的股权为27%等。参见Societe Generale de Belgique/Generale de Banque(Case IV/M343)(1993); Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/Munksio AB(Case IV/M613)(1995); Coca-Cola-Amalgamated Beverages GB(Case IV/M794)(1997)[1997] OJ L218/15; Pirelli/Edizione/Olivetti/Telecom Italia(Case COMP/M2574)(2001),
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第32-35点；Channel Five (Case IV/M673)(1995); Nokia Corporation/SP Tyres UK Ltd(Case IV/M548)(1995); Swissair/Sabena(Case IV/M616)(1995); Telefonical/Portugal Telecom(Case COMP/JV23)(1999); Johnson & Johnson/Mercury Asset Management/Agora Healthcare Service-JV(Case COMP/M1970)(2000).
① 参见Ericsson/Nokia/Psion/Motorola(Case COMP/Ⅳ/JV12)(1998)。
② 比如说,欧盟某些成员国法律规定,电视台的单个股东不得拥有超过一定比例的股权。
③ 参见Fletcher Challenge/Methanex(Case Ⅳ/M331)(1993); Case T-2/93 Sogecable v. Commission [1996] ECR Ⅱ-797.
④ 参见Philips/Grundig(Case Ⅳ/M382)(1993).
⑤ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第9点第2款。
⑥ 参见McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann(Case Ⅳ/M330)(1993); Telefonical Sogecable/Cable-Visiion(Case Ⅳ/M709);委员会1996年颁布的《竞争政策报告》第XXVL卷,第74-75页。
⑦ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第11点的规定：控制对象可能是一个或多个企业,或者是这些企业全部或部分资产；而资产则是指,能够产生营业额的生产经营活动,它包括商标和许可权。
① 委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998] OJ C66/5第9点第1款和第10点的规定,在考虑交易背后的经济现实时,融资来源或关联关系也作为判定的证据,因为它们间接证明了对目标企业的控制,并披露了集中背后的企业。
② 委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》第23点规定,共同控制并不要求收购方有权对企业日常运营施加决定性影响。
③ 比如说,在Elf Atochem/Rutgers案中,委员会认为,共同控制的概念正确地区别于企业的日常管理。但在Charterhouse/Porterbrook案中,委员会在排除适用第139/2004号条例第3条第5款时,似乎又混淆了决定企业的竞争行为,和参与企业日常管理之间的区别；在Ingersoll Rand/Dresser案中,委员会则认为,如果合营企业赋予母公司某些合同性的否决权,是能对其管理层施加影响的权利,就表明存在共同控制；而在Saint Gobain/Wacker Chemie/Nom案中,委员会还认为,在分析共同控制时,首先应考察合营企业的董事会,然后再考察一个被授权管理合营企业母公司的日常经营。参见Elf Atochem/Rutgers(Case IV/M442)(1994)； Charterhouse/Porterbrook(CaseIV/M669)(1995); Ingersoll Rand/Dresser(CaseIV/M121)(1991)： Saint Gobain/ Wacker Chemie/Nom(CaseIV/M774)(1996)[1997] OJ L247/1.
④ 参见Credit Lyonnais/BFG Bank(CaseIV/M296)(1993)。
⑤ 参见Sara Lee/BP Food Division(CaseIV/M299)(1993)。
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第14条规定。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第15条规定。
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第16条规定。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第18、19条规定。
③ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[19981 OJ C66/5第25条规定。
④ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第37条规定。
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第21条规定。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第26到29点的规定；Philips/Chevron Chemicals/ JV(Case COMP/M1996)(2000)。
③ 比如说,在SITA-RPC/SCORI案中,尽管小股东享有对合营企业发展政策等方面的否决权,已超过了一般意义上对小股东的保护,但委员会却认为,由于小股东不能否决合营企业的商业计划和预算,因而不存在共同控制。参见SITA-RPC/SCORI(CaseIV/M295)(1993)。另外,还可参见Eridania/ISI, Usinor/ASD(Case IV/M073)(1991); Lucas/Eaton(Case IV/M149)(1991).
① 参见Saab Ericsson Space(Case IV/M178)(1992).
② 参见Royal Bank of Scotland/Bank of Ireland(Case IV/M681)(1996).
③ 参见Solvay-Laporte/Interox(Case IV/M197)(1992); British Steel/Europipe(Case IV/ECSC1272) 1998); aytheon/hales/JV(Case COMP/M2079)(2001):The Coca-Cola Company/Nestle/V(Case COMP/M2276)(2001)。
④ 在《有关集中概念的通知》中,委员会并没有明确说明对高管人员任命的否决权本身就足以证明存在共同控制,而且实践中,它也没有单独根据这种否决权来判定存在共同控制,比如说在Hicks/Bear Sterns/Johns Manville案中,委员会最终是根据小股东们对年度预算和高管人员任命的否决权,来判定存在共同控制。参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第25点的规定：Hicks/Bear Sterns/Johns Manville(Case COMP/M2133)(2000)。
⑤ 参见Sonera/Vivendi/Xfera(CaseCOMP/M1954)(2000)。
⑥ 参见Baxter/Nestle/Salvia(CaseIV/M058)(1991).
⑦ 参见Mitsubishi/UCAR(Case IV/M024)(1991).
⑧ 参见Nothern Telecom/Matra Telecommunication(CaseIV/M249)(1992); Avesta/British Steel/NCC/AGA/Axel Johnson(Case IV/M239)(1992)。
⑨ 参见Conagral/Idea(Case IV/M010)(1991); Reuters/Equant-Project Proton(Case COMP/1875)(2000).
① 如,在CCIE/GTE案中,它就规定只有一个股东有权对股东们所任命的多个委员会行使否决权。参见CCIE/TE(CaseⅣ/258)(1992)。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》OJ[1998]C66/14。
① 参见Volkswagen AG/VAG(UK)Ltd(Case Ⅳ/M304)(1993); Accor/Wagons Lits(Case Ⅳ/M126)(1992)[1992] OJ L204/1; ABB/Brel(Case Ⅳ/M221)(1992); Volvo/Procordia(Case Ⅳ/M196)(1993); Philips/Grundig(Case Ⅳ/M382)(1993); Allied Lyons/HWE-Pedro Domecq(Case Ⅳ/M400)(1994); Ferruzi Finanziaria/Fondiaria(Case Ⅳ/M576)(1995):GM/SAAB(Case Ⅳ/M1847)(2000); Toyota Motor Corporation/Toyota GB(Case COMP/ M2120)(2000); Tate & Lyle/Amylum(Case COMP/M2029)(2000); AMO/Air Liberte/Air Littoral(Case COMP/ M2008)(2000); Bertelsmann/Mondadori/BOL Italia S. p.A.(Case COMP/JV51)(2000); Dupont/Sabanci Holdings/JV(Case COMP/M2213)(2001).
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第35-37点的规定。
③ 参见Nordic Capital/Transpool(Case Ⅳ/M625)(1995)。
④ 参见Synthomer/Yule Catto(Case Ⅳ/M376)(1993); Telecom Italia/Eendesa Union Fenosa(Case COMP/ M1973) (2000)、(Case COMP/M2053)(2000)。
⑤ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第43点的规定。
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第38-39点的规定。
① 在BellSouth/Vodafon/E-Plus案中,其中一位享有共同控制权的留存股东增加了对商业计划和预算的权利。参见BellSouth/Vodafon/E-Plus(Case COMP/JV25)(2000).
② 在Avesta II案中,根据股东协议,本有两名股东享有否决权,但其中一名股东退出了企业,因而另一名留存的股东就在事实上享有唯一否决权。参见westa II(Case IV/M452)(1994)。
③ 参见McDermott/ETPM(Case IV/M1154)(1998).
④ 在这里,委员会所指的“资产”是,任何能够在市场上产生营业额的经营活动,如分支机构或企业的某个部门,有时它还包括品牌和许可等。
⑤ 参见Solvay-Laporte/Interox(Case IV/M197)(1992)。
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第46-48点的规定。
⑦ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第49-50点的规定。
⑧ 参见《对理事会第4064/89号条例重述的绿皮书》[2001]745/6第113点和第135点。
⑧ 参见委员会颁布的《有关计算营业额的通知》[1998]C66/25第32-35点；Scandinavian Project(Case IV/M522)(1994)。
① 参见UAP/Vinci(Case IV/M384)(1993); Thomson/Shorts(Case IV/M318)(1993); McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/ stmann(Case IV/M330)(1993); Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada(Case IV/M1025)(1998); BSCH/Banco Totta y CPP/A Champalimaud(Case COMP/M1799)(2000); Brambles/Ermewa JV(Case COMP/M2023) (2000); Telecom Italia/Endesa/Union Fenosa(Case COMP/M1973)(2000); Scottish & Newcastle/Groupe Danone(Case COMP/M1925)(2000); Vivendi/Cannl+/Seagram(Case COMP/M2050) (2000); Canal+/Lagardere/Liberty Media(Case COMP/JV 47)(2000); Hitachi/NEC-DRAM/JV(Case COMP/JV 44)(2000)。
② 参见AOM/Air Liberte/Air Littoral(Case COMP/M2008)(2000)。
③ 参见British Telecom/Banco Santander(Case IV/M425)(1994); Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada(Case IV/ M1025)(1998)。
④ 参见Bell Cable/Medial/Cable & Wireless/Videotron(Case IV/M853)(1996); Cable & Wireless/Nynex/Bell Canada(Case IV/M865)(1996)。
① 参见UGC/Liberty Media(Case COMP/M2222)(2001)。
② 参见Delhaize/PG(Case IV/M47)(1994)。
③ 参见Harrisons & Grosfeld/Akzo(Case IV/M310)(1993).
④ 参见Snecmal/Labinal(CaseCOMP/M2021)(2000);Telia/Telenor/Schibsted(CaseIV/JV1)(1998); Telia/Telenor (Case IV/M1439)(1991)[2001] OJ L40/1; European Aeronautic,Space and Defence Company(EADS)(Case IV/M1745)(2000).
⑤ 参见McDermott/ETPM(CaseIV/M648)(1995)。
⑥ 这里的“政府”是指,所有公法上的实体,它包括成员国本身,以及区域性或地方性的公共机构。参见委员会颁布的《有关相关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14注释21。
⑦ 在Pechiney/Usiono、 CEA Industrie/France Telecom/SGS-Thomson和Siemens/Italel案中,虽然两个公共企业属于同一个控股公司,但委员会却认为,它们构成独立经济实体,尽管在集中后没有协调的风险。参见Pechiney/Usionor(CaseIV/M097)(1991); CEA Industrie/France Telecom/SGS-Thomson(Case IV/M216)(1993); Siemens/Italel(CaseIV/M468)(1994)[1995]OJL161/27; Texaco/NorskHydro(Case IV/M511)(1995).
⑧ 参见Ford/Hertz(Case IV/M397)(1994)。
① 参见Ericsson/Nokia/Psion/Motorola(Case COMP/JV12)(1998); KLM/Air UK(Case IV/M967)(1997).
② 对于这种结果,很多人都表示质疑,如Cowling, Mueller、Jenny、 Weber、 Scherer、 Ross等,而且Scherer
和Ross进一步认为,垄断所造成的福利损失,只占GDP的1-2%。参见Scherer/Ross,1990:661-667.
③ 参见Leibenstein,1966; Frantz于1988年撰写的《X-非效率概述》。
④ 参见Button/Weyman-Jones,1992; NIckell,1996.
⑤ 参见Hart,1983; Scharfstein 1988; Schmidt, KM,1997,
⑥ 参见Posner,1975; Tirole,1987.
① 参见Alchian/Demsetz,1972-
② 参见Schumpete,1950; Schumpeter,1952。
③ Arrow最先指出了这一点,即所谓的“替代效应”。参见Arrow,1962.
④ 参见Tirole,2001:392。
⑤ 参见Roeller/Stenneck/Verboven,2001.
⑥ 参见Scherer,1965; Levin/Reiss,1984; Levin/Cohen/Mowery,1985; Lunn,1986; and Scott,1990。
①Coase这个假设已经被Bulow.Stokey.Gul.Sonnenschein.及Wilson等人所证明。参见Bulow,1982；Stokey, 1981:Gul/Sonnenschein/Wilson,1986.
② 参见Bulow.1986
③ 例如,艺术家们为了向消费者表明,其艺术品的复制版本有限,且以后不会再增加了,而经常故意销毁原始印刷版本。
① Carlton和Perloff对市场总需求和剩余需求进行了区分。参见Carlton/Perloff，2005:66-69.
① 确定合并是否会导致企业市场力量发生变化,对是否应禁止某项合并非常重要。参见Baker/Bresnahan, 2008:15。
② 参见Of.fice Of Fair Trading,2002:43-51；Geroski,2003.
③ 参见Office of Fair Trading,2003b。
④ 如果我们很容易确定竞争性价格,则这时只需比较它与所考察的价格水平,即可得出企业是否具有市场力量。如果所考察的价格水平高出竞争性水平很多,则企业就拥有市场支配地位,即企业有能力使其产品要价明显高出竞争性水平。参见Office of Fair Trading,2001:17。
② Maise、 Simo、 Williams、 Werden等人认为,在假定垄断测试的基本分析框架内,根本不存在次级市场这一概念。如果市场上绝大部分消费者能选择替代产品,则企业的市场力量将受到有效制约,以至于它不能将价格提高到竞争性水平之上,这时相关市场就应该包含这些替代产品。在任何微小的市场上,计算市场份额都有可能导致我们错误地推断,企业控制价格和产出的能力。参见Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases,1983:50; Simon/Williams, The Renaissance of Market Definition,1993:816etseq; Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines,1983:574 et seq。
② 但是,这并不是考察单边效果最好的方法,因为市场界定通常对评估区域竞争的潜在损失,并不是很有用。我认为,既然反托拉斯原则在评价不同产品销售商的合并时,赋予了直接证明竞争损害证据更大的作用,则我们就可以预见,反托拉斯原则在其他情况下也会这么做。参见Baker J, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe:In Qualified Praise of Submarkets,2002:218.
① 但是,Hausman, Leonard、 Vellturo等人认为,在实践中,相关市场界定要证明存在价格歧视很难。参见Hausman/Leonard/Vellturo, Market Definition Under Price Discrimination,1996:386。
① Carlton、 Eiszner、 Hay、 Hoerner、 Rapp等人,都对创新市场概念进行了猛烈批评,Gilbert和Sunshine对这种批评进行回应,而Davis又为这种争论提供一个调查报告。参见Gilbert/Sunshine, The Use of Innovation Markets:A Reply to Hay, Rapp, and Hoerner,1995,75-82; Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective,2003,667-703。
② Evans和Noel将反馈效果区分为短期效果和长期效果。短期效果只考虑价格上涨的直接影响,而长期效果则考虑到了两边消费者群体的反馈效果。但是,Filistrucchi则认为,我们没有必要区分短期效果和长期效果,因为假定垄断测试考察的就是价格持续上涨。参见Evans/Noel, The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multi-sided Platform Business,2008:663-695; Filistrucchi, A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets:Some Theoretical Considerations, Net Institute Working Paper 08-34(2008)。
② 尽管这会面临很多困难,但玻璃纸谬误并不意味着,我们需要一种新的理论框架来界定相关市场。相反,SSNIP测试将继续为我们,提供正确地理论框架,因为它的关注点是竞争约束。参见Office of Fair Trading, 2001:29。
③ 尽管假定垄断测试是用定量方法来阐释的,如它认为产品价格上涨5%到10%将有利可图,但它的价值在于,是一个考察产品间是否存在竞争的概念性框架,而不是一个能严格适用所有情况的正式计量方法。参见Office of Fair Trading,2001:10.
① 相关具体内容可参见Office of Fair Trading, Quantitative Techniques in Competition Analysis, Research Paper 17,1999.
② 目前,这方面研究都只阐述了最著名和最常见的方法,而没有提及那些非常复杂的计量经济学模型,如因果关系分析,协调整合模型等。参见Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law,2002:100。
③ 交叉价格弹性和产品分流比,可作为候选市场追加产品的一个指标。
④ Baker、 Bresnahan、 Froeb、 Werden及Scheffman等人认为,如果我们对合并效果进行定量分析,则还需评估需求系统,这些需求系统也是用来界定市场的。参见Baker/Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm,1988,283-300： Scheffman, Statistical Measures of Market Power:Uses and Abuses,1992,901-919。
⑤ Gujarat、 Greene和Hubler对回归分析进行了基本的介绍,而Bishop和Walker则介绍了,竞争分析中的回归分析。参见Hubler, Okonometrie, Stuttgart; Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement,2003:327-350。
① 在过去十年中,边际弹性和边际损失分析已成为标准的分析工具。目前,绝大多数合并案件的调查和诉讼阶段,都会用到它们。Harris和Simons于1988年提出了术语“边际损失”,而Coate和William则对其进行了详细分析。参见Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, mimeo,2002,14-15; Coate/Williams, Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition, Potomac Law and Economics Paper No 05-01。
② KatZ、 Shapiro、 O'Brian、 Wickelgre、 Scheffman及Simons等人,不仅讨论了边际损失分析适用的相关程序,还对其进行了一些批评性评论。参见Katz/Shapiro, Critical Loss:Let's Tell the Whole Story,2003: 49-56; O'Brian/Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis,2003:161-184; Scheffman/Simons, The State of Critical Loss:Let's Make We Understand the Whole Story,2003:1-9。
③ Coate和Williams考虑了不同成本结构下的边际损失分析。参见Coate/Williams, Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition, Potomac Law and Economics Paper No 05-01。
① O'Brian和Wickelgreen分析了不同产品在需求上的边际损失,这为我们提供了一个很好的参考。参见O'Brian/Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis,2003:161-184.
② 但是,如果需求价格弹性随价格的增加而增加,则会产生没有市场力量的玻璃纸谬误,即边际弹性是根据竞争性价格来计算的,而不是假定垄断者设定的更高价格。这时,相关市场界定就会过窄,市场力量也会被高估。参见Froeb/Werden, The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market Delineation,1992:241-247。
③ 最近用于界定反托拉斯市场的价格测试还采用了,上述内容没有讨论的更先进的技术,如Granger因果关系,单位根检验(unit root tests)等。参见Scheffman/Simons, The State of Critical Loss:Let's Make Sure We Understand the Whole Story, The Antitrust Source, Novemberl-9,2003。
① 要指出的是,这些价格测试不能用来回答,市场力量竞争约束这个基本问题,因而我们在使用它们,应时刻注意这一点。
② StigleR、Sherwin、 Bishop、 Walker Lexecon等人率先运用价格相关性分析来界定相关市场,而Audy和Erutku则运用这些价格测试来界定相关地理市场。参见Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law:Concepts. Application andMeasurement,2002:378-403; Lexecon, An Introduction to Quantitative Tchniques in Competition Analysis,2003:5-8; Audy/Erutku, Price Tests to Define Markets:An Application to Wholesale Gasoline in Canada,2005。
③ 有时,这种情况可以通过一个代表价格系列的图形来表示。参见Office of Fair Trading,1999:55。
① Bishop和Walker对Elzinga-Hogarty测试进行了一个很好的演示,而Werden却于1981年对这种测试进行了批评。参见Elzinga/Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits.1973:45-81; Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law:Concepts, Application and Measurement,2002: 404-418; Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipment Data in Defining Geographic Markets,1981:719-737.
② Haldrup对运用不同实证方法来界定相关地理市场,包括Elzinga-Hogarty测试和各种价格测试,进行了深入讨论。而Schffman和Spiller则运用这些方法,界定了美国东部汽油提炼市场。参见Haldrup, Empirical Analysis of Price Data in the Delineation of the Relevant Geographical Market in Competition Analysis, University of Aarhus, Working Paper No 2003-09; Scheffman/Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under the US Department o f Justice Merger Guidelines,1987:123-147.
① 这时,我们应考虑到定性证据。参见Baker/Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust:Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power, in:Buccirossi(ed), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass,2008: 142.
② 对于这种分析,Sacker提出了适用一种经济计划测试,它是基于Bedarfsmarktkonzept和供应方替代来展开的。参见Sacker, Abschied yom Bedarfsmarktkonzepr, Zeitschrtft fur Wettbewerbsrecht Vol 2,2004:1-27.
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs [1989] ECR 803, para 40:如果测试根据特定属性,来区分一个特定路线的航班和其他可能的替代方案,则会得出其他替代方案与特定路线航班是不能相互交换的,因而这些替代方案不能对特定航班施加重大竞争约束。
① 委员会在该案裁决书第51段说道：由上所述可知,在竞争性评估中,由于进口存在潜在竞争,因而每个成员国市场应构成单独市场。参见Commission Decision of 14.2.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2662-Danish Crown/Steff-Houlberg, recital 51。
① 在斯堪的纳维亚、芬兰、英国及爱尔兰四个欧洲大陆地区中,竞争似乎主要发生在同一地区内,这可通过运输成来来解释,但运输时间也能阻止欧洲大陆绝大部分供应商,在客户要求的最后期限内,将产品供应到边远地区。参见Commission Decision of 6.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3431-Sonoco/Ablstrom. recital61。另外,还可参见Commission Decision of 4.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metso/Aker Kvaerner, recitals 18 and 36.
② 在仔细审查当事人的答复后,委员会指出,尽管西欧需求和供应条件有所不同,但这些不同不足以判定构成单独地理市场。当事人主张,大多数海运供应商只在绝大部分海运地区销售铁矿石,而且大多数海运客户也只从较大的铁矿石生产商那里购买铁矿石,这主要是澳大利亚、巴西和加拿大的公司,因此,只有当铁矿石供应商有能力,也有动力对不同地区客户实行价格歧视时,才能构成单独地理市场。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi, recital 159.
③ 这种方法与通知中第8段所描述的“相关地理市场界定”相一致：相关地理市场包括所涉企业从事供应和需求方面的产品或服务,且竞争条件完全同质,并能与邻近地区相区别的地区,因为这些地区的竞争条件是明显不同的。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi OJ 2004, L92, p 50, recital 158 and fn 32.
① 参见委员会关于Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan第56和57段,以及Case No COMP/M.4215-Glatfelter/Crompton Assets第48段的内容。
② 参见委员会关于Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan第84段,以及Case No COMP/M.4215-Glatfelter/Crompton Assets第105段及以下的内容。
③ 参见委员会关于Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan第84段及以下、第153段和第170段的内容。
④ 在德国判例法中, "Bedarfsmarktkonzep t"是界定市场的决定性测试。根据这种方法,如果消费者认为,所有产品能相互交换,则意味着在消费者看来,所有产品在产品特性、经济用途、及价格等方面能满足某种特定需求,因而它们构成一个市场。参见KG judgment of l8.2.1969-Handpreisauszeichner, WuW/E OLG 995,995 etseq;-BGH judgments of 19.3.1996-Pay-TV-Durchleitung, WuW/E DE-R 3058,3062 and of 7.3.1989-Hampffmeyer-Plange, WuW/E BGH 2575; BGH judgment of 5.10.2004-Staubsaugerbeutelmarkt, WuW/E DE-R 1355,1357。
① GWB第23(5)段第2句第3点关于申请合并义务的内容,明确提到了国内市场份额,这表明在根据GWB第24(1)段来确定是否存在支配地位时,只有国内市场与之相关。参见BGH judgment of 24.10.1995-Backofenmarkt, NJW 1996,597。
① 我们可以从委员会裁决fn17中提炼出这些问卷调查,参见Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M,2187-CVC/Lenzing, OJ 2004,L82, p 20。
② 例如,在Tetra Laval/Sidel案中,委员会询问了市场受访者,如果包装系统的成本持续上涨5%到10%,他们是否会从纸盒包装系统转向PET包装系统,反之亦然。调查结果表明,大多数市场受访者认为,这种程度的涨价不会明显影响他们选择包装系统。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2146-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ 2004, L43, p 13, recital 157.另外,我们还可参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Casn No COMP/M. l882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003, L70, p 35, recital 48; Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M.1313-Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterire,OJ 2000, L20, p1, recital 26; Commission Decision of 17.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2547-Bayr/Aventis Crop Science,OJ 2004, L 107, p 1, recital 561； Commission Decision of 1.12.1999 in Case No IV/M.1578-Sanitec Sphinx,OJ 2000, L 294, p 1, recitals 152, 170, and 213; Commission Decision of 29.3.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3975-Cargill/Degussa Food Ingredients, recitals 24 and 60; Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3796-Omya/Huber PCC, recital 222.
① 委员会根据需求方替代得出了这个结论。换句话说,由于LCV天然气价格上涨5%到10%,德国LCV天然气的消费者,会转向HCV天然气,因而这种涨价将无利可图。但有意思的是,如果我们考虑到其他方面,则产品替代将导致LCV天然气价格上涨将有利可图,所以,根据SSNIP测试一开始就能确定LCV天然气涨价是否有利可图,并推断出LCV天然气和HCV天然气能相互替代。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004, L103, p 1, recital 112。
② 分销商和供应商还必须吸收转换单个住户的成本。根据合并当事人——一个转换单个住户非常有经验的公司——所提供的详细成本评估,每个住户的成本大约在60欧左右。而根据一个典型住户每年消费80MBTU的标准,一个当地分销商的价格为3.4欧/MBTU,一个典型住户的天然气价格为8欧/MBTU.如果一个LCV批发输送公司对LCV价格提高5%,则当地分销商的利润将减少13.5欧；而如果上涨10%,则当地分销商的利润将减少27欧。因此,当地分销商要完全收回转换成本,将需要两到四年时间。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil, OJ 2004, L103, p1, recital 128.
③ 一般说来,天然气批发输送公司与当地分销商所签订的供应合同都为10到20年,所以天然气批发输送公司对LCV涨价5%到10%将无利可图,因为这将导致当地分销商转向HCV天然气供应商,但这也只能作为进一步证明分销商转向意愿的证据。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M..1383-Exxon/ Mobil,OJ 2004, L103, p 1, recital 128。
④ 很多证据表明,根据以上数据,一个以谷物杀菌剂为基础的类杀菌剂的假定垄断者,持续性涨价5%到10%将有利可图。如果类杀菌剂价格上涨5%,则成本价格将增加2.5英镑／每公顷。这时,农民种植小麦的收益为：冬天22.5英镑／每公顷；春天7.5-9.5英镑／每公顷。而如果类杀菌剂价格上涨10%,则农民冬天种植小麦的收益仅为5英镑／每公顷。参见Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M 1806-Astra ZenecO/Novartis, OJ 2004,L110, p 1, recital 34 et seq.
① 对于各种混凝土外加剂是否属于不同市场,委员会并没有进行说明。参见Commission Decision of 18.11. 2002 in Case No COMP/M.2854-RAG/Degussa, recital 20。
① 委员会在该案裁决中,对相关地理市场进行了广泛地评估,它还分析了消费者采购和转换模式、英国的进口水平,以及合并当事人利润聚集(the convergence of the merging parties'margins)等数据。参见 Commission Decision of 30.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling, recitals 84 et seq,90 et seq,106 et seq150。
② 一般说来,价格上涨将对利润产生两方面的影响：一是负面影响,即销售额会降低；二是正面影响,即边际利润会增加。边际损失是正负影响相等,它是以产品数量减少百分比来表示。如果实际损失高于边际损失,则涨价将无利可图,这表明相关地理市场必须界定的更宽一些。
③ 在这里,委员会采纳了NERA顾问的意见,认为一般说来,合并竞争评估所考察的时间至少是一年,在某些情况下应提高到两年……因为这个行业大多数竞争都是以一年为周期的。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi,OJ2004,L92, p50, fn 30 to recital 111。
① “专门用于界定市场的定量测试有很多,它包括各种计量经济学和统计学方法,弹性和交叉价格弹性……”产品X自身需求价格弹性测量的是,产品X的需求对其自身价格变化比率的回应；而产品X和Y的交叉价格弹性则是指,产品X的需求对产品Y价格变化比率的回应,参见Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market,OJ 1997, C372, p 5, para 39,fn5。
② 价格弹性值小于1,意味着其他替代金属的交叉价格弹性很小,即其他金属的竞争影响不是很大。因此,需求价格没有弹性表明,珀金构成一个单独相关产品市场。参见Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho,OJ 1997, L11, p 30, recital 56 et seq, recital 57。
① 尽管委员会在竞争性评估中才确定Kimberly-Clark/Scot案的弹性,但它在市场界定阶段就提到了,名牌产品和自有品牌产品构成一个单一市场。相反在Adidas/Reebok案中,委员会又认为,根据扫描数据所确定的弹性是不确定的。参见Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.622-Kimberly-Clark/Scott,OJ 1996 L183, p 1, recitals 48and 173-177; Commission Decision of 24.1.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3492-Adidas/Reebok, recitals 15,17。
② 有意思的是,委员会在其竞争性评估中,将这个分析视为是不同产品施加竞争约束的证据。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3796-Omya/Huber PCC.recitals 20,171 et seq, recitals 306,313.
① 因此,我们不能仅根据绝对价格差异来界定一个昂贵产品市场：这些产品的一般特征是,价格昂贵、包装独特、广告风格奢华、通过独特时尚的专卖店来销售、以及精致的顾客服务和建议等。参见KG judgment of 24.4.1985, WuW/E OLG 3584=
② 因此,这不需要根据两种产品的价格差异来确定是否属于同一市场。参见BGH judgment of 25.6.1985, WuW/E BGH 2153 et seq,2154.
① 参见Commission Decision of 30.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3149-Procter & Gamble/Wella, recital 27：还可参见Commission Decision of 11.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4314-Johnson & Johnson/Pfzer Consumer Healtbcare, recital 42; Commission Decision of 21.12.2005in Case No COMP/M.3696-E.ON/MOL, recital 263=
② “专门用于界定市场的定量测试有很多,它包括各种计量经济学和统计学方法,弹性和交叉价格弹性……而这些方法都是根据一段时间内价格走势的相似性来测试的……参见Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market,OJ 1997, C372, p 5, para 39.
① 因此,即便铝的价格上涨,铝饮料罐供应商也不能提高产品价格表明,铝饮料罐的价格受到另一种在相同产品市场上竞争的产品制约。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam (PLM)/American National Can, recital 12; Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Annex Ⅲ, recital 1。
② 软饮料和瓶装水市场的定价,似乎遵循了不同的逻辑,这进一步证实了这两个市场供应者所面临的竞争约束不同。参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No Ⅳ/M.190-Nesle/Perrier,OJ 1992, L356, p 1, recital 16。
① 例如,航空线路Dublin至London Stansted、Gatwick及Luton的相关性很重要,因为它们的价格相关系数为0.90,这表明这几条航空线路构成单一市场,而对于这些线路与Dublin至London Heathrow是否存在相关性,委员会并没有予以确定。不过,委员会根据定性证据,认为所有伦敦机场构成一个单一市场。参见Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lings, recitals 73,94; Annex Ⅲ, recital 121, fn 128; Annex Ⅲ, recital 43, recital 154; Annex Ⅲ, recital 42 (Dublin-Glasgow), recital 189; Annex Ⅲ, recital 44 (Dublin-Brussels), recital 210; Annex Ⅲ, recital 42 (Dublin-Frankfurt)。
② 可参见委员会关于相关市场界定的公告,或委员会关于Tetra Laval/Sidel案裁决的第178段内容(Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel,OJ 2004 L43, p 13, recital 178).
① 从委员会有争议裁决中的证据来看,委员会犯了两个错误：一是它的调查结论认为,绝大多数SBM机器能够通用；二是根据最终用途来区分产品。这个有争议的裁决并没有提供足够证据,来证明根据SBM机器最终用途所界定的不同次级市场。因此,我们必须对包括低容量和高容量机器的次级市场进行考虑。参见Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECRⅡ-4381, para 269; Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ 2004 L43, p 13.
② 事实上,绝大多数SBM机器是通用的。不过,PET包装线只是SBM机器上的一个部件,它通常用来生产满足客户特殊要求的产品,这对有阻隔性、灭菌或超洁净要求的敏感性产品,或生产用于Combi机器热罐装或无菌罐装的特殊产品很重要。因此,标准的PET包装线不足以替代,用于生产敏感性产品的PET包装线,特别是那些要求采用非常特殊的PET包装线的敏感性产品。例如,专门用来填充碳酸饮料的Sidel SRS G Combi机器,就不能用于填充果汁饮料,它需要采用无菌SRA Combi机器来填充。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ 2004 L43, p 13, recital 177=
③ 委员在Philips/Origin、 Glatfelter/Crompton Assets、 ON/MOL等案中分析了转换成本及相关性。参见Commission Decision of 22.1.1995 in Case No IV/M..668-Philips/Origin, recital 7; Commission Decision of 20.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4215-Glatfelter/Crompton Assets, recitals 30 and 31; Commission Decision of 21.12.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3696·E. ON/MOL, recital 94。
① 因此,从生产低压电力电缆转换成生产高压电力电缆,需求大量时间和成本。在现有生产设备上转换生产不同类型的电缆,会大幅度地提高生产成本。所以,供应方替代性较低。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003 L70, p 35, recital 20 et seq。
① 委员会认为,不同分销或销售渠道构成不同市场,这是因为不同分销或销售渠道针对的是不同消费群体需求,即使某些消费群体可能通过几种分销或销售渠道获得服务。参见Commission Decision of 14.10.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2965-Staples/Guilbert, recital 9。
② 第四,委员会调查结果表明,一些大型餐饮批发商……不以每公斤的方式,向零售市场出售新鲜猪肉。参见Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case-NoⅣ/M.1313--Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier,OJ 2000 L20, p1, recital 38。另外,委员会在(?)1nilever Bestfoods案中认为,食品服务分销或销售渠道,是它们与零售渠道的重要区别,因而属于不同市场。这种区别包括有：服务维度、单独销售力量、不同价格结构、不同包装尺寸、及不同健康和安全制度等。参见Commission Decision of 28.9.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1990-Unilever Bestfoods,recital 9。
① 委员会在Sony/BMG案的合并评估中证实了这个观点,而在Universal/BMG Music Publishing案中,委员会同样将传统音乐出版权和相应在线出版权,界定为两个不同市场。参见Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG,OJ 2007 L94, p 19, recital 27; Commission Decision of 22.5.2007 in Case No COMP/M.404-Universal/BMG Music Publishing, recital 26 et seq。
② 联线广告的定价机制是,“每次点击成本”(cost per click)和“每次印象成本”(cost per impression)。参见Commission Decision of 11.3.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4731-Google/Doubleclick, recital 46。
③ 如果用户游戏是免费的,则它们不构成一个产品市场。反之,如果不免费,则必须根据电子游戏的收费来确定产品。参见Commission Decision of 5.5.1999 in Case No IV/JV.19-Bertelsmann/Viag/Game Channel,OJ 1999 C186, p8, recital 7。
① 该案当事人进一步认为,由于特别大的岩石破碎机器,比小型岩石破碎机器的价格、重量及生产能力,都要大几乎两倍以上,因而产品替代链将会被中断。参见Commission Decision of 24.1.2001 in Case No Comp/M.2033-Metso/Svedala,OJ 2004 L88, p 1, recital 50 et seq。
① 另外,在BAT/Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni案中,委员会认为,合并后企业的市场份额仍低于25%,因而该项集中不会排除这些市场的有效竞争。参见Commission Decision of 27.6.2008 in Case No COMP/ M.5086-BAT/Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni, recital 24.
② 在Nordic Satellite Distribution案中,委员会根据当事人在挪威有线电视市场上30%的份额以及其他因素,判定存在市场支配地位。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.1995 in Case No IV/M.490-Nordic Satellite Distribution,OJ1996L53, p 20, recital 119 et seq。另外,我们还可参见Commission Decision of 27.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2337-Nestle/Ralston Purina, recitals 44 to 47。
③ 例如,在Krupp/Thyssen.Riva/AST案中,委员会认为,虽然合并双方市场份额相加只有41%,但从竞争者的力量和数量,以及生产能力来看,合并将产生市场支配地位。参见Commission Decision of 21.12.1994 in Case No IV/M.484-Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/AST,OJ 1995,L251, p 18.
④ 例如,在News Corp/Premiere案中,委员会指出,市场份额特别高本身就是证明存在支配地位的证据,特别是当市场上其他经营者的份额非常小时。更具体地说,只要市场份额超过50%,法院就会推定存在市场支配地位。参见Commission Decision of 25.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5121-News Corp/Premiere, recital70。另外,我们还可参见Case T-221/95 Endemol v Commission [1999] ECR Ⅱ-1299, Para 134; Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR 11-5575, para 115.
① 另外,对于结构性因素,委员会在Carnival/P&O Princess案中也进行详细说明：“很明显,合并后企业将在市场上拥有相对较高的份额……但是,仅凭这一点并不足以产生支配地位。英国海洋游轮市场一些具体特征,导致委员会认为合并不会产生竞争问题。参见Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/ M.2706-Carnival/P&O Princess,OJ 2003 L248, p 1, recital 196。
① 横向合并评估指南指出,考察产品是否属于相同市场的因索有：产品特性、地理位置、产品质量、品牌形象、技术规范等。如果产品特性不同,则产品就属于不同市场。即使产品特性相同,但考虑到地理位置、产品质量、品牌形象、技术规范等因素,产品也有可能属于不同市场。因此,相同市场上产品或同质产品,也可能存在上述某个方面差异,这将导致它们的替代性不同。另外,委员会在评估合并时,还根据地理情况来考察相对同质产品的亲密程度。例如,在Kronospan/Constantia案中,委员会认为,考虑到合并双方的相对距离,对它们的消费者而言,合并双方的产品能紧密替代,因此,对斯洛伐克和匈牙利的消费者来说,合并将消除一个最近的竞争者。参见Commission Decision of 19.9.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4525-Kronospan/Constantia, recita155。
② 对于这一点,横向合并指南指出,这个因素对证明低于市场支配地位门槛的单边效果尤为重要。
③ 需求交叉价格弹性测量的是,当所有条件都相同时,产品B价格发生变化对产品A数量变化的影响。参见Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, fn 38。
④ 产品A和B的分流比测试的是,当产品A涨价被产品B发现时,产品A销售额损失的程度。参见Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, fn39。
⑤ 参见Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para 29。
① 在Axalto/Gemplus案中,委员会认为,事实上,对SIM卡生产商来说,创新能力是一种战略。如果创新性SIM卡生产商能推出一种新产品,则它在推出新产品第一年内,就能立刻获得利润。之后,随着越来越多的竞争者能供应这种产品,其价格将急剧下降……在这种背景下,合并双方不可能会减少产品研发。参见Commission Decision of 19.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3998-Axalto/Gemplus, recitals 52,53。
① 在APW/APSA/Nordic Capital/Capio案中,委员会指出,在招投标市场上,如ISTC市场,竞争分析的核心不是当事人的市场份额,而是是否存在一个拥有足够信用度的成熟竞争者,以确保未来合同竞争。参见Commission Decision of 16.3.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4367-APW/APSA/Nordic Capital/Capio, recital 56; Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3436-Continental/Phoenix, recital 126。
② 在BT/INFONET案中,委员会认为,在这个市场上,市场份额的高低,远没有消费者选择替代供应者的能力重要。参见Commission Decision of 25.1.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3641-BT/INFONET, recital 16.
① 在Continental/Phoenix案中,委员会指出,客户和供应者在个人化学团队之间的发展合作关系,是证明现有供应者拥有优势地位的有力证据。参见Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3436-Continental/Phoenix, recital 142。
② 这方面内容,可参见Commission Decision of 30.7.1997 in Case No COMP/M.877-Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas, OJ1997 L336, p16, recital 58; Commission Decision of 2.3.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2256-Philips/ Agilent Health Care Solutions, recital 35; Commission Decision of 2.10.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/ Instrumentarium,recital 125 et seq; Commission Decision of 23.5.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3108-Office Depot/Guibert, recital 21; Commission decision of 13.11.2006in Case No COMP/M.4297-Nokia/ siemens,recital 83。
② 例如,在GE/ENI/Nuovo Pignone (Ⅱ)案中,委员会指出,合并当事人在欧共体燃气涡轮机市场上的产能利用率已超过80%,而在全球燃气涡轮机市场上的产能利用率也达到75到90%。GE和NP的任何涨价行为,都会引起投标合同竞争者使用现有剩余的生产能力。而在Friesland Coberco/Nutritia案中,委员会也指出,乳制品行业剩余的生产能力,将极大地限制合并当事人的涨价行为……参见Commissiom Decision of 6.5.1994 in Case No Ⅳ/M.4494-GE/ENI/Nuovo Pignone (Ⅱ), recital 23; Commission Decision of 10.8.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4094-Ineos/Bp Dormagen, recital 73。
① 在Alcatel/Telettra案中,委员会认为,这里必须要有证据表明,产品提供能迅速扩大,而且这种扩大能达到非常明显的程度……而在Nordic Capital/Convatec案中,委员会也指出,例如,现有竞争者缺乏足够财力来扩大生产,并以此限制合并后企业的市场力量。参见Commission Decision of 12.4.1991 in Case No. IV/M 42-Alcatel/Telettra, recital 23 et seq; Commission Decision of 15.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5190-Nordic Capital/Convatec, recital 64.
① 通过Baumo、 Panza、 Willig、 Spence、 Basumol及Willig等人的努力,可竞争市场理论得到了发展。参见Baumol/Panzar/Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure,1982; Basumol/Willig, Contestability:Developments since the Book,1986:9-36。
② 沉没成本是企业停止生产也不能收回的固定成本,如广告费用。
③ 在技术和规模收益递增的情况下,可竞争市场的特征就不是最优福利结果,即价格等于边际成本,而是次优福利结果,即价格等于平均成本。
④ McAfee、 Mialon、 Williams三人对各种市场进入壁垒的定义进行了概述。参见McAfee/Mialon/Williams, What is a Barrier to Entry? Mimeo,2003.
① Harbord和Hoehn在1994年进行了这样的分类。另外,经济学还使用了其他分类,如法律壁垒、结构性壁垒、及策略性壁垒等。参见Harbord/Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition Policy,1994: 411-435; SchmidtI, Wettbewerbspolitik undKartellrecht,8th edn, Stuttgart,2005:69-73。
① Economides和Priest对竞争政策适用网络效应市场进行了讨论。参见Economides. Competition Policy in Network Industries:An introduction,2004; Priest, Rethinking Antitrust Law in an Age of Network Industries, 2007。
② Baldoni和Masson认为,另一方面,现有企业不愿在市场进入后进行激烈的竞争,因为它将丧失大量从常客那里获得的利润。在这种情况下,广告不能作为市场进入壁垒,因为现有企业不能反应过度。因此,广告等因素是否构成壁垒,要看它们影响程度的高低。参见Schmalensee, Advertising and Entry Deterrence, 1983:636-653。
① 参见横向合并评估指南第68段及以下内容。另外,在Nestle/Perrier案中,委员会也指出,在这里,我们要提出潜在竞争这个问题,首先应考察潜在竞争是否存在竞争性意义,然后再考察是否会发生有效进入,如果发生有效进入,它能否限制两个剩余供应商的市场力量。问题是……它们是否会进入,以及进入到什么样的程度,才能迅速有效限制价格上涨,或阻止维持一个超竞争性的价格……参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1991 inCaseNoIV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier,OJ 1992 L356, P1, recital 91.
② 参见横向合并评估指南第70段的内容。这个定义是经济学家Joe Bain做出来的：一个行业中现有卖家对新进入卖家的竞争优势表现为,现有卖家能在多大程度使其产品价格持续高于竞争性价格,而不会引起新的企业进入到这个行业中来。参见Bain, Barriers to New Competition,1956:P3。
③ 参见Commission Decision of 3.5.2000 in Case No TV/M.1693-Alcoal Reynolds, recital 87; Commission Decision of 11.8.2000 in Case No COMP/M.2016-France Telecom/Orange, recital 33; and Commission Decision of 12.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metsol/Aker Kvaerner, recital 86。
④ 参见Commission Decision of 11.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4691-Schering-Plough/Organon Biosciences, recital 56; Commission Decision of 19.12.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5295-Teva/Barr, recital 25.
⑤ 参见Commission Decision of 23.4.1997 in Case No IV/M.754-Anglo American Corp./Lonrbo (OJ 1998 L149, P21), recital 118 et seq; Commission Decision of 21.12.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3696-E.ON/MOL, recital 286; Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3796-Omya/Huber PCC, recital 356; Case T-282/06-Sun Chemical Group v Commission[2007] ECR II-2149, recital 183.
⑥ 参见Commission Decision of 1.7.1996 in Case No IV/M.774-Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM (OJ 1997 L247, p1), recital 184; Commission Decision of 17.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2547-Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, recital 15; Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvary Montedison/ Aussimont, recital 32; Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvar Montedison/ Ausimont, rectial 32; Commission Decision of 12.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metso/Aker Kvaerner, recital 86; Commission Decision of 11.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4691-Scbering-Plougb/Organon Biosciences, recitals 53 to 55。
① 参见Commission Decision of 11.9.1997 in Case No IV/M.833-The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, recitals 72 to 74; Commission Decision of 15.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4611-Egmont/Bonnier, rectals 39 to 41 ； Commission Decision of 17.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5075-Vienna Insurance Group/EBV, recital 1007; Commission Decision of3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets,recitals 119,121.
② 参见Commision Decision of 21.6.1994 in Case No IV/M.430-Procter Gamble/VP Schickedanz II(OJ 1994 L354,P 32),recital 132; Commission Decision of 26.10.2007 in case No COMP/M4828-Owens Corning/saint-Gobaain Vetrotex,recital 71。
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第71段的内容。
④ 在Nestle/Perrier案中,委员会指出,根据品牌数量和产品种类,法国市场是一个成熟的市场……只有已建立的品牌才有可能长期存在下去,这表明市场进入是一个高风险战略。参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1997in Case No IV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier,OJ1992 L356,P 1.recital 32et seq.
② 参见横向合并评估指南第72段内容,或Commission Decision 14.11.2006 in Case No COMP/M.774-Saz的France/Suez, recital 202。
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第69段内容,或Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No OMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer lingus,recitals 624,626。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第69段内容,或Commission Decision of 1.7.1996 in Case No Ⅳ/M. 774-Saint-Gobain/Wacker-chemie/NOM,OJ 1997 L247,P],recital 184; Commision Decision of 19.11.2004 in Case No COMP.3544-Bayer Healthcare/Roche(OTCBusiness),recital 55; Commission Decision of 7.1.2004 in Case No OMP/M.2978-Lagardere/Natexis/VUP,recital 654; Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer lingus recital 623。
⑤ 参见横向合并评估指南第70段内容。
⑥ 参见横向合并评估指南第74段的内容。
⑦ 参见横向合并评估指南第74段的内容,或Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No Ⅳ/M.315-Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, OJ 1994L 102.P 15, recital 119; Commission Decision of 3.5.2000 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1693-Alcoa/Reynolds, OJ 2002 L58 P 25, recital 32; Commission Decision of 19.9.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4525-kronospan/Constantia,Recital 71.
⑧ 参见横向合并评估指南第74段的内容。
⑨ 参见横向合并评估指南第75段的内容,或Commission Decision of 14.5.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4854-Tom Tom/Tele Atlas recital 161.
① 参见横向合并评估指南第64到67段的内容,或Commission Decision of 11.9.1997 in Case No IV/M.833-The coca-cola Company/Carlsberg A/S,OJ1998 L145 p41,recital 81; Commission decision of 25.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1225-Enso/Stara,OJ 1999 L254 P 9,recital 84 et seq; Commission Decision of 3.8.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4750-Luvata/Eco, recital 44.
② 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容。
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容,或Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerize/Cumerio. recitals 151,152。
⑤ 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容,或Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/m1882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003 L70,p35, recital 76; Commission Decision of 4.12.2007 in Case No COMP/M. 4662-Syniverse/BSG,recital 102。
② 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容,或Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M 1882-Pirelli/BICC, OJ 2003 L70, P 35, recital 76.
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第67段的内容。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第67段的内容,或Commission Decision of 12.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M 4057-Korsnas/Assidoman Cartonboard, recital 52。
① GWB第二次修订草案解释备忘录中提到了,Bundeskatellamt在合并控制中,考察支配地位所采用的解释原则.参见BT-Drs.265/71 p21。
② 参见Explanatory memorandum BT-Drs 365/71 p 22。
③ 参见BGH judgment of 12.12.1978-Erdgas schwaben WuW/E BGH 1533,1535或Kgiudgment of 18.3.1998-Philipp Holzmann/Hochtief Wu W/E DE-R 9496;或BT-Drs on 2nd revision of the GWB VI/2520 p 21。
④ 参见BGH judgments of 3.7.1976-Vitamin B12 WuW/E BGH 1435,1439或BGH judgments of 16.12. 1976-Valium Wu W/E BGH 1445,1449或BGH judgments of 2121978-kfz-kupplungen WuW/E BGH 1501,1506 et seq或BKartA decision of 10.12.2002-Tagesspiegel/Berliner Zeitung WuW/E DE-V 695,697.
① 参见BGH judgments of 2.12.1980.WU E/E BGH 1749,1755或BGH judgments of 13.07.2004-Sanacorp/ ANZAG WU W/E DE-R 1302,1303或BKartA decisions of 14.3.2002-Pfleiderer AG/Hornitex-Werke,B1-20/02, para 26或BKartA decisions of 23.3.2005-Rbon-Klinikum/Krankenbaus Eisenbuttenstadt, B10-109/04, para 113。
② 参见BGH judgments of 28.4.1992-Kaufbf/Saturn, WUW/E BGH 2771,2773或KG judgment of 22.11.1979,Wu W/E OLG 2457，2458或BKartAdecision of 30.6.1978-RWE/Energieversorgung Leverkusen, WuW/E BKartA 1727,1729.
① 另外,对于这方面的论述,我们还可参见BKartA decision of 14.3.2002-Pfleiderer AG/Hornitex-Werke,B1-20/02, papa 26; BKartA decision of 25.8.2005-EDEKA/SPAP B9-27/05, P 30 et seq。
① 例如,在DB Regioiistra案中,BGH指出,事实上,不论DB Regio在印花布市场上的份额是否巨大,它都能赢得49%的合同,这表明相对于其他合同授予而言,DB Regio拥有巨大的竞争优势,因而它的竞争者不能充分限制其自由行动。参见BGH judgment of 7.2.2006-DB Regioiistra, WuW/EDE-R 1681,1689 et seq.
② 对于这方面,我们可参见BKartA decision of 23.12.2005 in Adobe/Macromedia, WuW/E DE-V 1221,1222 et seq; BKartA decision of 11.5.2007 in KLA-Tencor/Therma-Wave,WuW/E DE-V 1425,1428。
① 如果市场上企业存在实质竞争,即便市场集中度很高,企业市场力量也不会很大,有时甚至可能没有市场力量。例如,在同质产品价格竞争的情况下,市场结果就与完全竞争下的相同。
② 关于在横向合并分析中,如何看待市场集中度的问题,Baker进行了全面概述。参见Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Merger,2008.
③ 对于这一点,我们可参见Ivaldi、 Jullien、 Rey、 Seabright、 Tirole等人的论述。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Case T-2/93 Air France v Commission [1994]ECR 11-323, para 78 et seq; Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999]ECR 11-753, paras 170,180,193。
② 例如,在Office Depot/Guilbert案中,委员会指出,如果相关产品市场是全国范围内的文具店,则Office Depot和Guilbert的市场份额相加在0到5%之间,这对正确评估合并的竞争性效果微不足道。但是,委员会认为,我们应着眼的是未来的竞争状况,而不是现在。根据Office Depot和Guilbert的商业计划和销售预测,随着Guilbert的积极扶植,Office Depot现有市场地位极有可能得到明显改善。参见Commission Decision of 23.5.2003.in Case No COMP/M.3108-Office Depot/Guilbert, recital 33.
① 虽然Dutch Toys'R'Us在市场上经营不善,而且还有财政困难,但其产品还是有很大的市场潜力,特别是在Blokker的帮助之下,因为Blokker拥有必要的专业知识。参见Commission Decision of26.6.1997 in Case No COMP/M 890-Blokker/Toys'R'Us,OJ 1998 L316 P 1.recital 95.
② 相关详细内容,我们可参见委员会以下几个裁决中的内容：Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1672-Volvo/Scania,OJ2001 L143, p 74, recital 116 et seq; Commission Decision of 14.2.1995 in Case No IV/M. 477-Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer,OJ 1995 L211, p 1, recital 63 et seq; Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003 L70, p 35, recital 71。
③ 另外,当事人指出,由于一些客户不愿意在审计和会计工作上,与Andersen保持合作伙伴关系,因而即使在合并后,Andersen France现有一些与大型上市公司的合同也将面临解除的威胁。参见Commission Decision of 5.9.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2816-Ernst&Young France/Andersen France, recital 64。
② 在这里,合并后企业所降低的成本必须足够大,以至于它所获得的利润,高于其他企业利润的总和。参见Farell/Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers:An Equilibrium Analysis,1990:107-126。
② FTC press release of 7.7.2000, File No 001-0131,http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/heinz.htm,于2011年12月9日访问。
② 另一个原因是,实质性测试与委员会禁止的GE/Honeywell合并案相矛盾,即便美国竞争机构曾授权委员会这么做。问题是,这种矛盾是否会引起不同禁止合并的实质测试。参见Boge, Reform der Europaischen Fusionskontrolle,2004:138-148。
① 对于这个问题,我们可参见英国贸易和工业部回应的37段内容。http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ mergers/review/comments/ref015 dti.pdf。访问时间：2011年8月15日。
① 参见欧盟2004/139号合并规则的内容。
① 对于linear需求系统而言,需求函数是稍微弯曲的,因而合并将导致产品价格上涨很小。在log-linear或AIDS需求系统中,曲线率将更加明显,因而它们预测价格上涨将更大。这些模型在评估价格弹性时,也会得出相似的结论,即价格弹性越低,产品价格上涨幅度越大。参见Crooke/Froeb/Tshantz/Werden, Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria， 1999:205-217。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 12.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metso/Aker Kuaerner, recital 79; Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lingus, recital 342。
② 可参见Commission Decision of 22.8.2000 in Case No COMP/M.2044-Interbrew/Bass,recital 65 et seq； Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recitals 133 and 138。
① 参见横向合并评估指南第28段及以下内容,或Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M. 4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recitals 110 to 112.
① 为了确定合并双方的市场份额是高估还低估了其市场力量,委员会对招投标市场的竞争特性进行了深入分析。第一,根据这些投标竞争取决于现有竞争者的数量和身份,我们可以仔细审查这些市场主体相互竞标的频率。第二,不同产品市场的竞争远比紧密相互替代竞争者的竞争激烈,因而我们可以从定性和定量方面,进一步分析相互替代的紧密程度。第三,委员会试图根据可用数据来确定合并对价格的影响。参见Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/Instrumentarium,OJ 2004 L109,p1, recital 125。
① 这种分析的数据包括合并双方和竞争者所提供的电子文件,以及一系列发票和工作文件。根据这些有用数据,委员会将运用各种计量经济学模型,主要是多变量线性回归,来测量GE和Instrumentarium合并对价格的影响。参见Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/Instrumentarium,OJ 2004 L109,p1, recital 168。
① 上一个禁止的案件是,委员会于2004年9月禁止的ENI/EDP/GDP案。参见Commission Decision in Case No COMP/M.3440-ENI/EDP/GDP.
① 我们可参见Commission Decision of 2.3.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2256-Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions, recital 36 et seq： Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE Instrumentalism, OJ 2004 L4109, p1, recital 243 et seq。
① 但是,如果一次性博弈产生了多个不同收益的纳什均衡,则表明合作是通过多次反复行为才达成的的。另外,有时信息不对称也有助于合作的达成。参见Benoit/Krishna, Finitely Repeated Games,1985:890-904; Kreps/Milgrom/Wilson/Roberts, Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners,1982,245-252。
① 参见OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 7.5.2008-Cargotec, printed version p 21; OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 26.11.2008-Phonak/Resound, Wu W/E DE-R 2477,2488; OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 3.12.2008-springer/ ProSiebenSatl, printed version p 10。
② 参见OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 7.5.2008-Cargotec, printed version p 21; OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 3.12.2008-Springer/ProSiebenSatl, printed version p 10。
③ 参见KG judgment of 1.7.1983-Morris/Rothmans, WuW/E OLG 3051,2080 et seq; BKartA decision of 23.9.1985-NUR/ITS, AG 1986,377,379; Immenga/Mestmacker/Mestmacker/Veelken, Gesetz gegen Wettbe-werbsbeschriinkungen, Kommentar,4th edn, Munich,2007:Paragraph 36, item 172 et seq.
① 同样,如果市场上的资源稀少,则企业们也很难达成协调行为。OPEC卡特尔一个实证调查表明,石油存储量有限是某些卡特尔成员背离卡特尔协议的主要原因。参见Griffin/Xiong, The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC,1997:289-316。
① 对于这个结论,委员会参照另外两个案件的做法,我们可参见Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3439-AGFA Gevaert/Lastra, recital 110; Commission Decision of 4.12.2007 in Case No COMP/ M.4662-Syniverse/BSG, recital 108.
② 但是,如果一个企业不能确定博弈是否将继续进行,则贴现因素值将会下降。另外,企业对待风险的态度,也将影响到贴现因素值。
① 参见Abreu D,Extremal Equilibria 0f OligOpolistic Supergames.J0urnal 0f Economic Thenrv Vnl39 1986 191-225；on the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting.Econo-metrica Vo156 1988 383-396, Hackner J,Optimal Symmetric Punishments in a Bertrand Differentiated Product Duopoly.International 0fIndustrial Organization Vo14,1996,611-630；Lambsonv E.Optimal Penal Codes in Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints',Review of Economic Studies Vo154.1987.385-397,Some Results on 0ptimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames.Journal 0f Economic Thenrv Vn162 1994 ,444-468, Optimal Penal Codes in Nearly Symmetric Bertrand Supergames with capacity Constraints Journal of Mathematical Economies V0124,1995,1-22。
① 参见横向合并评估指南第52到55段的内容,或Commission Decision of 20.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M. 2533-BP/E.ON, recitals 106 to 115; Commission Decision of 27.10.2000in Case No COMP/M.2111-Alcoa/ British aluminium, recital 14,
② 我们可参见Commission Deision of 28.6.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1741-MCI Worldcom/Snrint. OJ 2003L300, p1, recita1280; Commission Decision of 12.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4057-Korsnas/AssiDoman Cartonboard, recital 80。
③ 我们可参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam/American National Can. recital 24; Commission Decision of 4.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4600-TUI/First Choice, recitals 110.116,124; Commission Decision of 17.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5114-Pernod Ricard/Ves. recital 107。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第54段的内容,或 Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M.1313-Danish Crown.Vestjyske Slagterier,OJ 2000 L20, p 1, recital 177; Commission Decision of 6.6.2006 in Case No COMPM.4141-Linde/BOC, recital 146。
② 尽管委员会承认了市场透明度的这种双重作用,但在实践中,它还是倾向于以一般的方式,来评估市场透明度的结构性因素。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L103, p 1, recital 474.
③ 参见Commission Decision of 4.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4600-TUI/First Choice, recital 112; Commission Decision of 11.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5020-Lesaffre/GBI UK, recital 44.
④ 参见Commission Decision of 23.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5047-REWE/ADEG, recital 74; Commission Decision of 17.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5114-Pernod Ricard/V S, recital 108.
① 参见Commission Decision of 3.2.1994 in Case No IV/M.399-Rhone Poulenc-SNLA/Nordfaser, recital 24; Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.358-Pilkington-Pilkington-Techint/SIV,OJ 1994 L158, p 24, recitals 486,525,588 。
② 参见Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho,OJ 1997 L30, p 1, recital 158; Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L 103, p 1, recital 487; Commission Decision of 18.1.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1630-Air Liquide/BOC, recital 102; Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recital 82；Commission Decision of 19.7.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, recital 114.
① 如果市场上企业多,则它们从共谋中获得的好处就少,因为它们每个企业在共谋利益中的份额更少。因此,企业背离协调行为获得好处就更多,因为企业实施背离行为,将减少其他企业从共谋中获得的好处,并使能获得更多的好处。总之,这意味着将有更多的企业背离协调行为。而不是坚持和履行共谋协议。参见Europe Economics,2001:21。
② 例如,在Exxon/Mobil案的裁决中,委员会指出,总体说来,应注意的是,在一个寡头垄断市场上,如果寡头垄断成员越多,则成员背离或叛逃的风险就越大,这是无可争议的。在这里,我们应该注意的是,委员会将术语“寡头垄断”等同于相关市场上,一群从事默示协调行为的企业。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1393-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L103, p 1, recital 466。
① 但Capuano认为,如果寡头垄断面临竞争边缘,这将使其更容易维持协调行为,即竞争边缘被视为是一个促进共谋的因素。参见Capuano, Abuse of Competitive Fringe同， University of Naples, Nora di Lavoro 91, 2005 。
② 参见Commission Decision of 10.2.1995 in Case No IV/M.533-TWD/Akzo Nobel/Kuagtextil,OJ 1995 C46, p 5, recital 26; Commission Decision of 30.1.2008 in Case NoCOMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling, recital 183。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No iV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil.OJ 2004 L 103, p 1; Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1532-BP Amoco/Amoco/Arco, OJ 2000 L18, p 1; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2499-NorskeSkog/Parenco/Walsum, OJ2002 L233,p38; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,OJ 2002 L233, p 38; Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/Coopers Lybrand,OJ 1999 L50, p 27; Commission Decision of 25.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1225-Enso/Stora,OJ 1999 L254, p 9。
① 但是,如果企业能相互对称,则它们的价格将会趋同,即价格集中在一个点上。参见Scherer/Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,1990:238。
② 这种单向补偿由货币转移支付组成,但如果企业在不同市场上经营,则这种补偿可能通过优惠措施来实现。参见Ivaldi/Jullien/Rey/Seabright/Tirole, The Economics of Unilateral Effects, Interim Report for DG Competition,2003。
③ 很多研究结果已经证实,如果企业成本结构对称,则它们就很有可能进行合作。参见Mason/Philips/ Nowell, Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets:An Experimental Evaluation,1992:662-671。
④ 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier,OJ 1992 L 356, p 1, recital 63; Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrbo, OJ 1997 L 11, p 30, recital 205; Commission Decision of 22.9.2000in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice,OJ 2000 L93, p 1, recital 99; Commission Decision of 13.6.2000 in Case No IV/M.1673-VEBA/VIAG, OJ 2001 L 188, p 1, recital 75; Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/Auwarter, recital 56; Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.315-Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, OJ 1994 L102, p 15, recital 68 et seq; Commission Decision of 28.10.1999 in Case No IV/M.1571-New Holland/Case,recita145; Commission Decision of 28.10.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L 103, p 1, recital 476 et seq; Commission Decision of 11.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Holland/Case, recital 89 to 94。
⑤ 参见Commission Decision of 1.3.1993 in Case No IV/M.331-Fletcher Challenge/Methanex, recital 26; Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/Auwarter, recital 56; Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L103, p1, recital 476。
① 参见Commission Decision of 14.10.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2965-Staples/Guilbert, recital 20; Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4170-LSG Lufthansa Service Holding/Gate Gourmet Switzerland, recital 42。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV.M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L 103, p 1, recital 478; Commission Decision of 21.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue,OJ 2002 L 57, p 1, recital 148,
② Rosenbaum旨出,一项美国铝生产行业的研究表明,生产能力过剩与企业利润的大小呈正对应关系。参见Rosenbaum, An Empirical Test of the Effect of Excess Capacity in Price Setting,1989:231-241。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, recital187; Commission Decision of 21.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice, recital 56; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,OJ 2002 L233, p 38, recital 127 et seq; Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRg/Caemi, recitals 238 to 246.
② 例如,在Rexam/American National Can案件,委员会指出,如果两个企业在生产能力上的对称性很高,则它们将没有动力去背离共谋行为,因而它们能维持较高的共谋价格。参见Conmmission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam/American National Can, recital 18。
③ 例如,在Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam案中,委员会指出,供应商们在产品销售能力上的不对称,以及生产能力过剩表明,不存在一个寡头市场均衡,这将导致共谋行为不可能持续很长时间。参见Commission Decision of 28.9.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2542-Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam, recital 18。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recita158 et seq; Commission Decision of 6.6.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4141-Linde/BOG recital 146; Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-NorddeutscheAffinerie/Cumerio, recital 188。
② 对于合资公司这方面的内容,我们可参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil, OJ 2004 L103, p 1, recital 480; Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No 1V/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recital 58 et seq; Commission Decision of 2 I.11.2000 in Case No COM P/M.2499-Norske Skog/Parenco/Walsum,OJ 2002 L233, p 38, recitals 95 to 99; Commission Decision of 6.6.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4141-Linde/BOC, recital 144 et seq。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision oflS.10.1995 in Case No IV/M.580-ABB/Daimler Benz, recital 97: Commission Decision of 18.10.1995 in Case No IV/M.630-Henkel/Schwarzkopfi recital 32。
② 参见横向合并评估指南第56段的内容。
② Gallice认为,如果产品价格非常分散,则需求函数的形状将会影响到协调均衡的稳定性。参见Gallice, The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion, CPER Discussion Paper No 6975,2008。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No 1V/M.190-Nestlg/Perrier,OJ 1992 L356, p 1, recital 124; Commission Decision of 20.5.1998 in Case No IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/Coopers &Lybrand,OJ 1999 L50, p 27, recital 99; Commission Decision of 22.9.2000 in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice, OJ 2000 L93, p 1, (annulled in Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR Ⅱ-2585); Commission Decision in Case No IV/M.1673-VEBA/VIAG, OJ 2001 L188, p 1, recital 84; Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvay Montedison/Ausimont, recital 49, p83; Commission Decision of24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997 L 11, p 30, recital 50 etseq; Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M.1313-Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ 2000 L20, p 1, recital 28; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl, OJ 2002 L233, p38, recital 88, fn 35.
① 参见Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, OJ 2008 C265, pp 6-25。
② 参见非横向合并评估指南第11到12段的内容。
③ 参见非横向合并评估指南第13到14段的内容。
④ 参见非横向合并评估指南第26段的内容。
⑤ 参见非横向合并评估指南第23、25、27段的内容。
⑥ 参见非横向合并评估指南第31段的内容。
⑦ 参见非横向合并评估指南第34、35、39段的内容。
⑧ 参见非横向合并评估指南第41段的内容。
⑨ 参见非横向合并评估指南第47段和第16段的内容。
⑩ 参见非横向合并评估指南第52段及以下的内容。
11 参见非横向合并评估指南第58段的内容。
① 参见非横向合并评估指南第61、67、68段的内容。
② 参见非横向合并评估指南第77段的内容。
③ 参见非横向合并评估指南第93段的内容。
④ 参见非横向合并评估指南第110、46段的内容。
⑤ 参见非横向合并评估指南第118段的内容。
⑥ 参见非横向合并评估指南第117段的内容。
⑦ 参见非横向合并评估指南第84、86、121段的内容。
[1][美]赫伯特·霍温坎普,许光耀等译.联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践(第3版).北京：法律出版社,2009,3,541
[2][德]卡尔·拉伦茨,陈爱娥译.法学方法论.北京：商务印书馆,2003,2
[3]陈金钊.法律解释的艺术——一种微观的法治实现方式.法商研究,2009(5)： 28-36
[4]“中华人民共和国商务部公告2009年第22号：商务部关于禁止可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司审查决定的公告”.参见http://www.mofcom. go v. cn/ aarticle/b/c/200903/20090306108617.html
[5][荷]伊芙琳·T·菲特丽丝著,张其山等译.法律论证原理——司法裁决之证立理论概览.北京：商务印书馆,2005,1
[6][美]波斯纳,孙秋宁译.反托拉斯法(第2版).北京：中国政法大学出版社,2003,2
[7]陈秀山.现代竞争理论与竞争政策.北京：商务印书馆,1997,36,41,44,49,51,55,56,60
[8]王晓晔.企业合并中的反垄断问题.北京：法律出版社,1996,19
[9][美]约瑟夫·阿洛伊斯·熊彼特,叶华译.经济发展理论——对利润、资本、信贷、利息和经济周期的探究.北京：中国社会科学出版社,2009,209
[10]周茂荣,辜海笑.新产业组织理论的兴起对美国反托拉斯政策的影响.国外社会科学,2003(4)：50-55
[11]任建新.美国反垄断思想的新发展——芝加哥学派与后芝加哥学派的比较.环球法律评论,2004(2),234-245
[12][英]亚当·斯密,郭大力、王亚南译.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上卷).北京：商务印书馆,1997,5
[13]王瑶.斯密定理和规模经济——试论马歇尔冲突是一伪命题.经济学动态,2011(5)：145-150
[14]姜华.对规模经济与企业竞争力理论的再认识.鞍山科技大学学报,2003(3)： 221-224
[15][美]阿尔弗里德·马歇尔,朱志泰译.经济学原理(上卷).北京：商务印书馆,1965,290-291
[16]俞哲、张子饮.基于C-D生产函数模型的商丘市农业要素集中化趋势研究.中国集体经济,2009(3)：92-93
[17][美]阿尔弗里德·马歇尔,陈良壁译.经济学原理(下卷).北京：商务印书馆,1964,155
[18][美]保罗·萨缪尔森、威廉·诺德豪斯,萧琛等译.经济学(第19版).北京：商务印书馆,2012,91
[19]陈勇敢.对科斯《企业的性质》再思考.现代企业教育,2010(8)：90-91
[20]盛宇明.科斯《企业的性质》之质疑.经济学家,2003(1)：70-85
[21][英]安德鲁·坎贝尔,任通海等译.战略协同(第2版).北京：机械工业出版社,2000,77
[22]杨世坤.银行并购协同效应陷阱及防范.商业时代,2009(5)：89-90
[23]王泰铨.欧洲事业法(二)——欧洲竞争规范.台北：五南图书出版公司,2000,257
[24]徐孟洲,孟雁北.竞争法.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008,201-202
[25]McTamney v. Stolt Tankers & Terminals,678 F.Supp. E.D.Pa.1987,118
[26]Lucas Automotive Engineering v. Bridgestone/Firestone.9th Cir.1998,140 F.3d 1228
[27]Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Fed.Cir.1997,114 F.3d 1547,1997-1 Trade Cas. 71824
[28]尚明主编.主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编.北京：法律出版社,2004,186,188
[29]G. Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?.28 J.L.& Econ.77,1985,93
[30][美]欧内斯特·盖尔霍恩、威廉姆·科瓦契奇、斯蒂芬·卡尔金斯,任勇、邓志松等译.反垄断法与经济学(第5版).北京：法律出版社,2009,343
[31]Frederick R. Warren-Boulton. The Contirbution of the Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of Non-Horizontal Mergers, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/ 11709.htm,2011-10-09
[32]孙晋.反垄断法——制度与原理.武汉：武汉大学出版社,2010,127
[33]吕明瑜.竞争法.北京：法律出版社,2004,167-169
[34][日]根岸哲、舟田正之,王为农、陈杰译.日本禁止垄断法概论(第3版).北京：中国法制出版社,2007,86,87,127,129,131
[35]时建中.三十一国竞争法.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2009,163-164
[36][日]村上政博,姜姗译.日本禁止垄断法.北京：法律出版社,2008,179-180
[37]高菲.美国反托拉斯法及域外适用.广州：中山大学出版社,1993,25
[38]许光耀.欧共体竞争法通论.武汉：武汉大学出版社,2006,70
[39][西]安德雷斯·冯特·葛拉雷兹、爱德娜·纳瓦罗·瓦罗纳,解琳、叶军译.欧盟 企业合并控制制度——法律、经济与实践分析(第2版).北京：法律出版社,2009,10,15,24,26,30,31,32
[40]Air France/Sabena. Case IV/M517.1992,1134
[41]Arjomari-Prioux/Wiggings Teape. Case IV/M025.1991,4 C. M. L. R.8
[42]阮方民.欧盟竞争法.北京：中国政法大学出版社,1998，214,225
[43]刘和平.欧盟并购控制法律制度研究.北京：北京大学出版社,2006,55
[44]Pepall L, D J Richards, G Norman. Industrial Organization. Contemporary Theory and Practice (2nd edn).Mason:Ohio Press,2002,605 et seq
[45]Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy, DG Competition, Brussels 2002, available at:http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary en. pdf
[46]The Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. OJ 2004 C31, p 5, para 8
[47]Case T-102/96-Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-973, para 200
[48]Case No IV/M.053-Aerospatiale/De Havilland, OJ 1991 L334, p42, recital 69
[49]Case No COMP/M.2187-CVC/Lenzing, OJ2004L82, p20, recital 161 et seq
[50]Case No COMP/M.3216-Oracle/People Soft, recitals 191,205
[51]George J. Stigler. The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly.72 AM. Econ. REV.19,1982:386-405
[52]Church,Ware. Industrial and Organization.A Strategic Approach. Boston:Boston Press,2000,605-606
[53]Werden.G. Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis. Antitrust Law Journal V0I66,1998:363-414
[54]Scheffman. Statistical Measures of Market Power:Uses and Abuses. Antitrust Law Journal V0I6O,1998,901-919
[55]Motta. Competition Policy. London:Cambridge University Press,2004,107
[56]Van den Bergh, R J. Modern Industrial Organisation Versus Old Fashioned European Competition Law. European Competition Law Review Vol 17,1996, 75-87
[57]Padilla.A J. The Role of Supply-Side Substitution in the Definition of the Relevant Market in Merger Control. Report for DG Enterprise A/4, European Commission,2001,26 et seq
[58]Bishop.The Modernization of DGIV. European Competition Law Review Voll 8, 1997,481-484
[59]Office of Fair Trading. The Role of Market Definition in Monopoly and Dominance Inquiries. Economic Disscussion Paper2,2001,10
[60]Werden. A Closer Analysis of Antitrust Markets. Washington University Law Quarterly Vo162,1984,647-669
[61]Bishop B, M Walker. The Economics of EC Competition Law:Concepts, Application and Measuremen. London:London Press,2002,95,114,122-123, 323-326,382
[62]Camesaasa P D, R J Van den Bergh. Achilles Uncovered:Revisiting the European Commission's 1997 Market Definition Guideliness. Antitrust Bulletin Vol47,2002,143-186
[63]Haldrup N, P Mollhaard, C K Nielsen. Sequential verus Simultaneous Market Delineation:The Relevant Market for Salmon. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol4,2008,893-913
[64]Baker S, A Coscelli. The Role of Market Shares in Differentiated Products Markets. European Competition Law Review Vol 20,1999,412-419
[65]Baker S, L Wu. Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European Commission. European Competition Law Review Vol 19,1998,273-280
[66]Glick M A, D J Cameron, D G Mangum. Importing the Merger Guidelines Market Test in Section 2 Cases:Potential Benefits and Limitations. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 42,1997,121-150
[67]Maisel L C. Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases. Georgetown Law Review Vol 71,1983,39-71
[68]Frankena M W. Geographic Market Delineation for Electric Utility Mergers. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 46,2001,357-401
[69]Bauer J P. Antitrust Implications of Aftermarkets. Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 06-14,2006,743
[70]Klein B. Market Power in Franchise Cases in Wake of Kodak:Applying Post-Contract Hold-Up Analysis to Vertical Relationships. Antitrust Law Journal Vol 70,1999,283-362
[71]Klein B. Market Power in Aftermarkets, in:Mc Chesney, Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs. The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust, Chichester,1998, 47-68
[72]Gilbert R, S C Sunshine. Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis:The Use of Innovation Markets. Antitrust Law Journal Vol 63,1995, 569-601
[73]Filistrucchi L. A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets:Some Theoretical Considerations. Net Institute Working Paper 08-34,2008,516-545
[/4j Evans DS, M D Noel. Defining Antitrust Markets when Firms Operate Multi-Sided Platforms. Columbia Business Law Review Vol 3,2005,667-701
[75]Stocking G W, W F Mueller. The Cellophane Case and the New Competition. American Economic Review Vol 45,1955,29-63
[76]Werden G. Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines:Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches. Review of Industrial Organization Vol 16,2000, 211-218
[77]Office of Fair Trading. The Role of Market Definition in Monopoly and Dominance Inquiries. Economic Disscussion Paper2,2001,20-30
[78]Werden G. Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis. Antitrust Law Journal Vol 66,1998,363-414,389-390
[79]Langefeld J, W Li. Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 46,2001,299-337
[80]Katz M, C Shapiro. Critical Loss:Let's Tell the Whole Story. Antitrust Magazine Vol 17,2003,49-56
[81]Strand N. A Simple Critical Loss Test for the Geographical Market. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 2,2002,697-707
[82]Evans D S, M D Noel. The Analysis of Merger that Involve Multi-sided Platform Businesses. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 4,2008,663-695
[83]Shapiro C. Mergers with Differentiated Products. Antitrust Vol 10,1996,23-30
[84]Lexecon. An Introduction to Quantitative Tchniques in Competition Analysis, Lindsay, A (2006) The EC Merger RegulationSubstantive Issues,2nd edn. London:London Press,2006,7,9-13
;85] Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 495, para 32
86] Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law OJ 1997, C372, p 5, para 7,13,55
87] Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979]ECR 461, para 3 of summary
88] Case 31/80 L'Oreal v DeNieuwe AMCK [1980] ECR 3775, para 25
89] Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 495, para 32
90] Case No IV/36.539-British Interactive Broadcasting/Open OJ 1999, L312, pi, recital 13
91] Case No IV/M.053-Aeropatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, para 8 et seq OJ 1991, L334, p42
[92]Case T-177/04 Easy Jet v Commission [2006] ECR 11-1931, para 104
[93]Case No COMP/M.3280-Air France/KLM, OJ2004, L60, p5, recital 28
[94]Case No COMP/M.2662-Danish Crown/Steff-Houlberg, recital 43
[95]Case No COMP/M.4403-Thales/Finmeccanical/AAS/Telespazio, recitals 56, 62,69,71
[96]Form CO pursuant to the Merger Regulation No 139/2004 OJ 2004, L133, p9, at 15 et seq
[97]Case No COMP/M 2662-Danish Crown/Steff-Houlberg, OJ2002, L14.2, recital 43
[98]Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi OJ 2004, L92, p 50
[99]KG judgment of 1.12.1976-Kfz-Kupplungen, WuW/E OLG 1745,1749
[100]BGH judgment of 26.10.1972-Registrierkassen, WuW/E BGH 1238,1241
[101]BGH judgment of 3.7.1976-Vitamin-B-12, WuW/E BGH 1435,1440
[102]BGH judgment of 16.12.1976-Valium, WuW/E BGH 1445,1447 et seq
[103]KG judgment of 18.2.1969, WuW/EOLG995,1025 et seq
[104]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 27.10.2004-Tagesspiege/Berliner Zeitung II, WuW/EDE-R 1361,1362,1363 et seq
[105]BGH judgment of 24.10.1995-Backofenmarkt, NJW 1996,595,596
[106]KG judgment of 18.3.1998-Philipp Holzmann/Hochtief, AG 1998,483,484
[107]BGH judgment of 5.10.2004-Staubsugerbeutelmarkt, WuW/E DE-R 1355,1357
[108]BGH judgment of 16.1.2007-National Geographic II, WuW/E DE-R 1925,1928
[109]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 27.10.2004-Tagesspiege/Berliner Zeitung II, WuW/E DE-R 1361,1363
[110]BGH judgment of 13.7.2004-Sanacorp/ANZAG, WuW/E DE-R 13011,1302
[111]OLG Dussildorf judgment of 29.9.2006-Sanacorp/ANZAG,WuW/E DE-R 1033, 1987,1988
[112]BGH judgment of 24.10.1995-Backofenmarkt, NJW 1996,595
[113]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 15.11.2000-Fetting, WuW/E DE-R 619,622
[114]Kart A decision of 11.2.2000-Durr/Alstom, WuW/E DE-V 235,237
[115]BGH judgment of 5.10.2004-Staubsaugerbertelmarkt, WuW/E DE-R 1355, 1359,1360
[116]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M,2187-CVC/ Lenzing, OJ2004, L82, p20, recitals 24,32,67,68,136,137
[117]Commission Decision of 30.9.1992 in Case No IV/M.214-Du pont/ICI, recital 23
[118]Commission Decision of 28.10.1999 in Case No IV/M.1571-New Holland/Case, recitals64,65
[119]Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil, OJ 2004, L103, p 1
[120]Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1806-Astra Zeneca/Novartis, OJ 2004, L110, p1, recital 43
[121]Commission Decision of 6.5.1998 in Case No IV/M.970-TKS/ITW Signode/Titan, OJ 1998,316, p33, recital 40
[122]Commission Decision of 25.6.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2817-Barilla/ BPL/Kamps, recital 14,15
[123]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ2003, L248, p1, recital 31, footnote12
[124]Commission Decision of 14.7.1999 in Case No IV/34.780-Virgin/British Airways, OJ 2000 L30, p1, recital 53,70
[125]Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio, recitals 42 and 43
[126]Commission Decision of 30.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3149-Procter &Gamble/Wella, recital 38, recital 38 et seq, fn12
[127]Commission Decision of 30,1,2008 in Case No COMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling, recital 102 et seq,148,149
[128]Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law OJ 1997, C372, p5, para 16
[129]Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420, OJ 2004, L92, p50
[130]BKart A decision of 2.12.2003-DB Regio et alliistra intalliance AG, published version, p16
[131]BKart A decision of 27.9.2001-Dentsply/Degussa,published version, p 21, para 59
[132]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 11.4.2007-Rbon-Grabfeld, WuW/E DE-R 1958, 1968
[133]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 7.5.2008-Cargotec, printed version p 21; GH judgment of 11.11,2008-E.ON/Stadtwerke Eschwege, WuW/E DE-R 2451,2454
[134]BGH judgment of 4.3.2008-Soda ClubII, WuW/DE-R 2268,2271
[135]Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No Ⅳ/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997, L11, p30
[136]Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M1313-Danish Crown/ Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ2000, L20, pl, recital 29
[137]Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.623-Kimberly-Clar/Scott, OJ 1996 L183, p1
[138]Commission Decision of 31.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue, OJ2002 L57, p1
[139]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M..2187-CVC /Lenzing, OJ 2004 L82, p20, recital 72
[140]Commission Decision of 17.12.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5141-KLM/ Martinair, recitals 139,255,273 et seq
[141]BKart A decision of 20.11.2001-trans-o-flex/Deutsche Post, WuW/E DE-V 501, published version, p24
[142]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 13.8.2003-trans-o-flex/Deutsche Post, AG 2004, 100,101 et seq
[143]Commission Decision of 4.12.1996 in Case No IV/M.774-Saint-Gobain/ Wacker-Cbemie/NOM, OJ 1997, L247, p1
[144]Commission Decision of 22.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice, OJ2000L93, p1, recital 22,23 et seq
[145]Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECRU-2585, para 29 et seq
[146]Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier, OJ 1992, L356, p1, recital 13
[147]KG judgment of 28.8.1979, WuW/E OLG 2182,2183
[148]KG judgment of 24.4.1985, WuW/E OLG 3577
[149]BGH judgment of 25.6.1985, WuW/E BGH 2150
[150]BGH judgment of 22.9.1987-Gruner+Jahr-Zeit II, WuW/E BGH 2433,2437 et seq
[151]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 26.11.2008-Phonak/ReSound, WuW/E DE-R 2477,2487
[152]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 4.12.2002-1001 Radio Aachen, WuW/E DE-R 1058,1061
[153]KG judgment of 13.12.1982-Taschenbucher, WuW/E OLG 2825,2833
[154]BKartA decision of 24.11.2003-Random House/Heyne, WuW/E DE-V 918,921
[155]BKarA decision of 4.6.2004-Siemens/Moeller, published version, pll, para 34
[156]BKartA decision of 8.6.2004-Nokia/Symbian/Psion/Sony, published version, p 7
[157]BKart A decision of 17.12.2002-Neblsen/Rethmann/Bethmann/swb/Bremer havener Entsorgungsgesellschaft/Stadt Bremerhaven/RWE Umwelt, published version, p 11, para 25 et seq
[158]Commission Decision of 8.2.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4475-Schneider Electric/APC, recital 25
[159]BKartA decision of 22.1.2004-Mainova/Aschaffenburger Versorgungs GmbH, WuW/E DE-V983,986
[160]BKatr A decision of 2.3.2004-Ontex/Rostam, published version, p 18, para 52
[161]Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190-Nesle/Perrier, OJ 1992, L356, p1
[162]Commission Decision of 4.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4000-Inco/ Falconbridge, recitals 107,108,110,114,124
[163]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam (PLM)/American National Can, recital 12
[164]Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kynmmene/Haindl OJ2002, L233, p38, recital 17, fe11
[165]Commission Decision of 22.9.2000 in Case NoIV/M.1789-Airtours/First Choice, OJ2001L73, pl, recital 45
[166]Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para,28et seq, particularly para 41
[167]Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No COMP/M.315-Mannesmann/ Valloured/Ilva OJ 1994 L102, p 15, recital 32
[168]Commission Decision of 9.3.2000 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1517-Danish Crown/ Vestjyske Slagterier OJ 2001 L35, p1, recitals 62,83 et seq
[169]Commission Decision of 30.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4374-Ineos/Kerling, recitals 55,56,151
[170]Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lings, recital 35,62 et seq
[171]Commission Decision of 23.9.1991 in Case No IV/M.134-Mannesmann/Boge, OJ1991 C265, pl, recital 11
[172]Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ2004L43, p 13, recitals180,182,188
[173]Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381
[174]Commission Decision of 22.1.1997 in Case No IV/M.794-Coca-Cola/ Amalgamated Beverages GB, OJ1997 L218, p 15, recitals 68,71,75,79, 80,83,84
[175]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC, OJ2003 L70, p35
[176]Commission Decision of 21.6.1994 in Case No IV/M.430-Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz II, OJ1994L354, p 32, recitals68,71,113,115,116
[177]Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lingus, recital 107, fn 105
[178]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corp./P&O Princess, OJ2003L48, pl, recitals61,64,63,64,66 et seq
[179]Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.623-Kimberly-Clark/Scott, OJ1996L183, pl, recital 33
[180]Commission Decision of 31.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue, OJ2002L57, pl, recital 17
[181]Commission Decision of 30.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3149-Procter& Gamble/Wella, recital 11 et seq
[182]Commission Decision of 9.3.2002 in Case No IV/M.1487-Danish Crown/ Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ 2003 L7, p 6, recital 73
[183]Commission Decision of 9.2.2000 ic Case No Ⅳ/M.1628-Total Fina/Elf OJ 2001 [143], pl, recital 28
[184]Commission Decision of 11.10.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1845-AOL/Time Warner, OJ2001L268, p28, recital 21
[185]Commission Decision of 11.3.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4731-Google/ Doubleclick, recital 45
[186]Commission Decision of 21.5.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2794-Amadeus/ GGL/JV, recital 10
[187]Commission Decision of 3.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2220-General Electric/Honeywell, OJ2004L48, pl, recital 9
[188]Commission Decision of 21.1.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3304-GE/Amersham, recital 8
[189]Commission Decision of 15.9.1997 in Case No IV/M.973-Bertelsmann/ Burda-HOS Lifeline OJ 1997 C360, p 8
[190]Commission Decision of 5.5.1999 in Case No Ⅳ/JV.19-Bertelsmann/Viag/Game Channel OJ 1999 C186, p8
[191]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirlli/BICC OJ 2003 L70, p35, recital 17
[192]Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1806-Astra Zeneca/Novartis, OJ 2004 L110, p1, recital 57,60
[193]Commission Decision of 28.10.1999.in Case No Ⅳ/M.1571-New Holland/ Case, recitals 9,11
[194]Commission Decision of 23.3.1998 i8n Case No Ⅳ/M.1133-Bass plc/Saison Holdings.BV, recital 14
[195]Commission Decision of 8.9.1999.in Case No Ⅳ/M.1596-Accor/Blackstone/ Colony/Vivendi, recital 25
[196]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ 2003 L248, p1, recitals 78,91
[197]Commission Decision of 24.1.2001 in Case No Comp/M.2033-Metso/Svedala, OJ 2004 L88, p1, recitals 48,53
[198]Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerie/Gumerio, recital 49
[199]Schrotter H, W Mederer. Kommentarzum Europiiischen Wettbewerb srecht. Baden-Baden,2003, para 102
[200]Werden G. Assigning Market Shares. Antitrust LawJournalVol70,2002,67-104
[201]Werden G. A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of Differentiated Products. Journalof IndustrialEconomics Vol 44, 1996, 409-413
[202]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival/P & O Princess, OJ2003L248, pl, recitals 130,132
[203]Commission Decision of 30.9.1992 in Case No IV/M.214j-Du Pont/ICI, recital 31
[204]Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM Kymmene/Haindl, OJ2002L233, p38, recital 80
[205]Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR-II-4381, para 240
[206]Commission Decision of 30.3.2003 in Case No COMP/M.2079-Raytheon/ Thales/JV, recital 39
[207]Commission Decision of 5.9.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2816-Ernst& Young France/Andersen France, recital 55 et seq
[208]Commission Decision of 22.5.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4404-Universa/BMG Music Publishing, recital 273 et seq
[209]Commission Decision of 29.2.1999 in Case No IV/M.1532-BP Amoco/Arco, recitals 20,22
[210]Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1806-Astra Zeneca/Novartis, recitals 150,415
[211]Commission Decision of 21.12.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3605-Sovion/HMG, recital 49
[212]Commission Decision of 25.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3209-WPP/Cordiant, recital 33
[213]Commission Decision of 25.1.2000 in Case No IV/M.1684-Carrefour/Promodes, recital 63
[214]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3436-Continental/ Phoenix, recitals120,155,171,172
[215]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3544-Bayer Healehcare/Roche OTC Business, recital 37,39
[216]Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3439-AGFA-Gevaert/ Lastra, recital 99
[217]Commission Decision of 26.6.1997 in Case No IV/M.890-Blokker/Toys'R'Us, OJ 1998 L316, pl,recital 59
[218]Commission Decision of 12.4.1991 in Case No IV/M.042-Alcatel/Telettra, recital 17
[219]Commission Decision of 14.2.1995 in Case No IV/M.477-Mercedes-Benz/ Kassbohrer, recital 65
[220]Commission Decision of 12.11.1992 in Case No IV/M.222-Mannesmann/ Hoesch, OJ1993L114, p 34, recital 91
[221]Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 115
[222]Commission Decision of 25.6.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2817-Barilla/BPL/ Kamps, recital 34
[223]Commission Decision of 3.3.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3658-Orkla/Chips, recital 24
[224]Commission Decision of 5.3.2008 in Case No COMP/M4747-IBM/Telelogic, recital 186 et seq
[225]Commission Decision ofl.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2602-Gerling/NCM, recital 44 etseq
[226]Commission Decision of 31.1.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2609-HP/Compaq, Recital 39
[227]Commission Decision of 4.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4600-TUI/First Choice, recital 72
[228]Commission Decision of 21.3.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2694-Mertonet/ Infraco, recital 47
[229]Commission Decision of 29.10.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1879-Boeing/ Hughes, OJ2004L63, p53, recital 42
[230]Commission Decision of 26.5.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3418-General Dynamics/Alvis, recitals 22.27
[231]Commission Decision of 18.1.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1630-Air Liquide/BOC, OJ2004L92, p1, recita158,60
[232]Commission Decision of 14.3.2006 in Case No IV/M.3868-DONG/ Elsam/EnergiE2, recital 549, citing Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 149 et seq
[233]Commission Decision of 5.12.2007in Case NoCOMP/M.4647-AAE/Lentjes, recital 633
[234]Commission Decision of 19.5.2006in Case No COMP/M.4662-Syniverse/BSG, recitals76,78
[235]Commission Decision of 3.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2220-GE/Honeywell, recital 83,227
[236]Commission Decision of 23.5.2003in Case No COMP/M.3108-Office Depot/guilbert, recital 23
[237]Commission Decision of 23.5.2003in Case No COMP/M.2854-RAG/Degussa, recita148
[238]Commission Decision of 23.5.2003 in Case NO COM/M.4508-Alstom UK/Balfour Beatty/JV, recitals 35,36
[239]Commission Decion of 22.5.2007 in Case NO comp/m.4404-Universal/BMG Music publisbing, recitals 114,116
[240]Commission Deciss of 18.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2676-Sampo/Varma Sampo/IF Holding/JV, recital 26
[241]Case85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche[1979]ECR 461, Paras 38,39
[242]Case T-102/96-Gencor v Commission [1999] ECRII-753, para 202
[243]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2033-Metso /Svedala, OJ2004L88, P31, recital 197
[244]Commission Decision of 21.12.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3605-Sovion/ HMG, recital 50
[245]Commission Decision of 10.8.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4094-Ineos/BP Dormagen, recitals 95,97,112-115,129
[246]Church J, R Ware. Industrial Organization-A Strategic Approach. Boston:Boston Press,2002,512
[247]Bain J. Barriers to New Competition. London:Cambridge Press,1956, Massl63
[248]Stigler G J. The Organization of Industry. Toledon:Homewood Press,1968, 117
[249]Gilbert R J. Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in:R Schmalensee and R D Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol I, Amsterdam, 1989,475-535
[250]Sutton J. Sunk Cost and Market Structure. Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration, London:Cambridge Press,1991, Mass239
[251]Dixit A. The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence. Economic Journal Vol 90, 1980,95-106
[252]Economides N. The Economics of Networks. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 14,1996,673-699
[253]Laffont J, P Rey, J Tirole. Network Competition:Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 29,1998,1-37
[254]Office of Fair Trading. Switching Costs, Economic Discussion Paper 5
[255]Scherer F M, D Ross. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd edn).Boston:Boston Press,1990,424-426
[256]Commission Decision of 14.3.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3868-DONG/ Elsam/Energi E2, recital 455 et seq
[257]Commission Decision of 24.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2033, OJ2004L88, P 1, recital 160
[258]Commission Decision of 2.4.1998 in Case No IV/M.1127-Nestle/Dalgety, recital 24
[259]Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.623-Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper, OJ1996L183, P1, recitals 196,211,213 et seq
[260]Commission Decision of 19.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3998-Axalto/ Gemplus, recital 43
[261]Commission Decisiom of 9.11.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4824-kraft/Danone Biscuits, recitals 30,32
[262]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.27069-Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ 2003 L248, p 1, recital 182 et seq
[263]Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1672-Volvo/Scania, OJ 2001 L143, P74, recital 144 et seq
[264]Commission Decision Decision of 14.11.2006 in Case NO COMO/M.4180-Gaz de France/Sueaz, racital 202
[265]Commission Decision of 29.3.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3975-Cargill/Degussa Food Ingredients, recital 133
[266]Commission Decision of 11.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1157-Skansha/Scancem, OJ1999L183, P1, recital 184
[267]Commission Decision of 25.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1225-Enso/stora, OJ 1999 L254, P9, recitals91,94,97
[268]Commission Decision of 10.8.2006 in Case No COMP/M 4094-Ineos/BP Dormagen, recital 149
[269]Commission Decision of 15.10.1997 in Case No IV/M.938-Guinness/Grang Metroplitan, OJ 1998 L288 P 24, recital 75
[270]Commission Decisiom of 31.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue, OJ2002L57, P1, recital 88
[271]BKart A decision of 10.12.2002-Tagesspigel/Berliner zeitung," WuW/EDE-V 695,697
[272]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 29.9.2006-Sannacorp/ANZAG, WuW/E DE-R 1987,1991
[273]BKartA decision of20.10.1999, WuW/E DE-R 451,458
[274]BGH judgments of 2.12.1980-Klockner/Becorit WuW/E BGH 1749,1754
[275]OLG Dusseldorf in BASF/NEPG 30.7.2003 WY W/E-DE-R 1159, "1160 et seq
[276]BGH judgment of 28.4.1992-Kaufbf/Saturn,WU W/E BGH 2771,2774
[277]KG judgment of 22.3.1983-Rewe/Floimex,WUW/E OLG 2862,2863 et seq
[278]BKartA decision of 26.11.2001-Trienekens/Remex, B10-131/01, recital 56 et seq
[279]BKartA decision of 19.9.2001-Lutz/Englbardt, B9-15/01, recital 17 et seq
[280]BKartA decision of 9.11.1999-Beck/Nomos, WuW/E DE-V 191
[281]KG judgment of 18.3.1998, WuW/E DE-R 94
[282]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 22.12.2004-OPNV Hannover, Wu W/E DE-R 1397,1405,1407 et seq
[283]BGH judgment of 7.2.2006-DB Region/ustra, Wu W/E DE-R 1681,1692
[284]Hovenkamp H. Market Power in Aftermarkets:Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case. UCLA Law Review Vol 40,1993,1447-1460
[285]Commission Decision of 14.10.200 in Case No COMP/M.2917-Wendel-KKR/Legrand, recital 31
[286]Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 Case No COMP/M 3439-Agfa-Gaevert/ Lastra, recital 115
[287]Commission Decision of 5.9.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2816-Ernst&Young France/Andersen France, recital 62
[288]BGH judgment of 21.2.1978-KfZ-Kupplungen, Wu W/E BGH 1501,1508
[289]BGH judgment of 18.12.1979-Springer-Elbe Wochenblatt, Wu W/E BGH 1685, 1691
[290JBGH judgment of 29.11.1981-Zeitungsmarkt Munchen, Wu W/E BGH 1854, 1859
[291]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 13.8.2003-Trans-o-Flex, Wu W/E DE-R 1149, 1156
[292]BGH judgment of 16.1.2007-National Geographic II, Wu W/E DE-R 1925,1930
[293]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 30.4.2003-Melitta/Airflo, Wu W/E DE-R 1112, 1116
[294]BGH judgment of 6.10.1992-Pinneberger Tageblatt, Wu W/E BGH 2795,2805
[295]Coate M B. Economic Models and the Merger Guidelines:A Case Study. Review of Law and Economics Vol 1, Iss1,2005, Article 4
[296]Buhler S, F Jager. Einfiihrungin die Industrieokonomik. Heidelberg,2002,135
[297]Bishop B, S Bishop. When Two is Enough. European Competition Law Review Vol 17,1996,3-5
[298]Werden G, L Froeb. Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in: P Buccirossi (ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass, 2008,43-104
[299]Ivaldi M, B Jullien, P Rey, P Seabright, J Tirole.The Economics of Unilateral Effects. Interim Report for DG Competition,2003,40,52,53
[300]Werden G, L Froeb. The Entry Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 46,1998,525-543
[301]Spector D. Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defenses. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 21,2003,1591-1600
[302]Ghandi A, L Froeb, S Tschantz, G J Werden. Post-Merger Product Reposirioning. Journal of Industrial Eeonomics Vo156,2008,49-67
[303]Cabral L. Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry:Why Cost Efficiencies may be a Weak Defense and Asset Sales a Po or Remedy. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 21,2003,607-623
[304]Salant S, W S Switzer, R J Reynolds. Losses Due to Merger:The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, Quarterly. Journal of Economics Vo198,1983,185-199
[305]Davidson C, R J Deneckere. Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 16,1985,473-486
[306]Weinberg M. The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers. Journal of Competition Law and EconomicsVo14,2008,433-447
[307]Baxter S, F Dethmers. Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation:How big is the Gap?. European Competition Law Review Vol 26, 2005,380-389
[308]Roller L H, H Friederiszick. Okonomische Analyse in der EU Werrbewerbspolitik. Mimeo,2005, Point III, A
[309]US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, September Term 2000, No 00-5362
[310]US District Court for the District of Columbia, FIC v Heinz Company and Milnot Holding Corp, Civil Action No 00-1688
[311]US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, September Term 2000, No 00-5362
[312]Wall Street Journal, Baby-Food Makers Heinz, Beech-Nut Call Off Merger Following Court Ruling,27 April 2001
[313]Alfter M.Untersagungskriterien in der Fusionskontrolle, SLC-Test versus Marktbcherrschende Stellung-Eine Frage der Semantik?. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb Vo153,2003,20-28
[314]Commission. Green Paper of 11.12.2001 on Review of Counci Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, paras 159 to 169
[315]Strohm A. Economic Analysis of the Concept of Significant Impediment to Effective Competition, in:G Hirsch, F Montag, F J Sacker (eds), Competition Law:European Community Practice and Procedure. London:London Press, 2008, paral-9012,9013,9015,9017etseq
[316]Commission. Summary of the Replies Received to the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation. 访问:http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ mergers/review/comments/summary publication.pdf. Strohm.
[317]G Hirsch, F Montag, F J Sacker.Competition Law:European Community Practice and Procedure. London:London Press,2008, paral9012 et seq
[318]Staebe E, U Denzel. Die neue Europiiische Fusionskontrollverordnung (VO139/2004). Europitisches Wirtschafis-undSteuerrecht Vol 16,2004,194-201
[319]Founroukakos K, S Ryan. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. European Competition Law Review Vo 126,2005,277-296
[320]Zimmer D. Significant Impediment to Effective Competition. Zeitschrififiir Wettbewerbsrecht Vo12,2004,250-267
[321]Holzwarth S. T-Mobile AustriaJtele.ring:Nicht-koordinierte Effekte als Auffangtatbestand erheblicher Wettbewerbsbchinderungen?. Zeitschrifi flit Wettbe-werbsrechrVol 5,2007,338-351
[322]Commission Decision of 26.4.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3916-T-Mobile Austrial/Tele. Ring, recital 40,72
[323]Schwalbe U. Marktbeherrschungs-oder SIEC-Test im GWB?. Wirtschaftund Wettbewerb Vo154,2004,997:13
[324]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3216-Oracle/People Soft, recital 187
[325]Bundeskartellamt. Untersagungskriterium in der Fusionskontrolle-Marktbeh-errschende Stellung versus Substantial Lessening of Competition?. Mimeo, 2001,14,15
[326]Wiedemann G. Handbuch des Kartellrechts,2nd edn. Munchen,2008, Section 20, item 85
[327]Lowe P. Implications of the Recent Reforms in the Antitrust Enforcement in Europe for National Competition Authorities, Speech 09.12.2003,9
[328]Kapp T, S MeBme. Reform der EU-Fusionskontrolle:Herrscht nun unbeschrinkte Willkiir in Briissel?. Europaische Zeitschrifi fiir Wirtschaftsrecht Vo116,2005,161
[329]Schweda M. Die Bindungswirkung ron Bekanntmachungen und Leidinien der Europiischen Kommission. Wirtschafi und Wettbewerb Vol 54,2004,1133-1144
[330]Epstein R J, D L Rubinfeld. Merger Simulation:A Simplified Approach with New Applications. Antitrust LawJournalVo170,2002,882-919
[331]Hosken D, DO'Brian, D Scheffman, M Vita. Demand System Estimation and its Application to Horizontal Merger Analysis. Mimeo,2002,117
[332]Werden G, L Froeb. The Antitrust Logit Model for Predicting Unilateral Competitive Effects. Antitrust LawJournalVo 170,2002,257-260
[333]Epstein R J, D L Rubinfeld. Merger Simulation with Brand-Level Margin: Extending PCAIDS with Nests. UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No CPC03-40
[334]Hausman J, D Leonard, J D Zona. Competition Analysis with Differentiated Products. Annales d'Economiet de Statistique Vol34,1994,159-180
[335]Beard TR, G S Ford, R P Saba. An Econometric Driven Merger Simulation: Considerations and Application. International Journal of the Economics of Business Vol 13,2006,217-228
[336]Van Damme E, J Pinkse. Merger Simulation Analysis:An Academic Perspective, in:P A G van Bergeijk and E Kloosterhuis (eds). Modelling European Mergers-Theory, Competition Policy, and Case Studies. London: London Press,2006,79-91
[337]Stennek J, F Verboten. Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness: Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations. European Economy, Reports and Studies Vol 5,2001,129-194
[338]Goppelsroeder M, M P Schinkel, J Tuinstra. Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defence in Merger Control:The Werden-Froeb-Index. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 56,2008,778-808
[339]Jayaratne J, C Shapiro. Simulating Partial Asset Divestitures to Fix Mergers. International Journal of the Economics of Business Vol 7,2004,179-200
[340]Ghandi A, L Froeb, S Tschantz. Post-Merger Product Reposirioning. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol56,2008,49-67
[341]Villas-Boas S B. Using Retail Data for Upstream Merger Analysis. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 3,2007,689-715
[342]Walker M. The Potential for Significant Inaccuracies in Merger Simulation Models. International Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 1,2006, 473-496
[343]Froeb L, G Werden. Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in: P Buccirossi(ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass,2008, 43-104
[344]Peters C. Evaluating the Performace of Merger Simulation:Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry. Journal of Law and Economics Vol49,2006,627-649
[345]Bake J B. Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Merger, forthcoming in:K Hylton (ed). Antitrust Law and Economics, London:London Press,2008,187
[346]Farrell J, C Shapiro. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers:An Alternative to Market Definition. Mimeo,2008,165
[347]Commission Decision of 7.1.2004 in Case No COMP/M.2978-Lagardere/ Natexis/VUP, recitals 595,787,829
[348]Hofer P, M Williams, L Wu. Empirische Methoden in der Europiiischen Fusionskontrolle. Wirtschafi und Wettbewerb Vol 55,2005,155-162
[349]Vickers J. Merger Policy in Europe:Retrospect and Prospect. European Competition Law Review Vol 25,2004,455-463
[350]Commission Decision of 22.9.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3459-Seiko Epson/ Sanyo/Sanyo Epson Imaging Devices JV, recital 13
[351]BKart A decision of 21.4.2004-Agrana/Atrys, B2-160/03, para 44 et seq
[352]KG judgement of 22.3.1983-Rewe/Florimex, Wu W/E OLG 2862,2863 et seq
[353]Nirsche R, J Thielert. Die 6konomische Analyse auf dem Vormarsch-Europiiische Reform und deutsche Wertbewerbspolitik. Wirtschaftundg Wettbewerb Vol 54,2004,250-259
[354]Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1672-Volvo/Scania, OJ 2001 L143, p74, recital 31,71-75
[355]Commission Decision of 1.9.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1980-Volvo/Renault VI, recitals 34,39
[356]Commission Decision of 2.3.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2256-Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions, recital 32,33,36 et seq
[357]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2537-Philips/Marconi Medical Systems, recitals 31,32,34 et seq
[358]Commission Decision of 30.4.2003-Siemens/Dragerwerk/JV in Case No COMP/M.2861, rectal 141
[359]Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/ Instrumentarium, OJ 2004 L 109, pl, recitals110,116,117,172,217,243
[360]Commission Decision of 2.10.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3191-Philip morris/Papastratos, recital 32
[361]Commission Decision of 30.10.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3268-Sydkraft/ Graninge, recital 37 et seq
[362]Commission Decision of 7.1.2004 in Case No COMP/M.2978-Lagardere/ Natexis/UVP, recitals 383,700,418,1009et seq
[363]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3216-Oracle/ PeopleSoft, recitals 136,179,183,187,193-195,197
[364]Case T-342/07 Ryan air v Commission, OJ 2007 C269, p3,59,74,187,342, 431,482,485,486,539,784,1141,1143
[365]Commission Decision of 4.12.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4462-Syniverse/BSG, recitals 74,76,78,84,85
[366]Commission Decision of 23.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5047-REWE/ADEG, recital 60
[367]BkartA decision of 16.11.2004-Retbmann/GfA Kotben, Wu W/E DE-V 995, paras 97-118
[368]Bishop B, A Lofaro. A Legal and Economic Consensus? The Theory and Practice of Coordinated Effects in EC Merger Control. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 49,2004, 195-242,217
[369]Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190, OJ 1992 L356, p 1, recital 114
[370]Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2586, para 61
[371]Telser L G.The Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. Journal of Business Vo153,1980,27-44
[372]Porter R H. A Study of Cartel Stability:The Joint Executive Committee 1880-1886. Bell Journal of Economics Vol 14,1983,301-314
[373]Friedman J W. A Guided Tour of the Folk-Theorem, in:G Norman and J F Thisse (eds), Market Structure and Competition Policy. London:Cambridge Press, 2000,51-69
[374]Feuerstein S. Collusion in Industrial Economics-A Survey. Journal of Industry Competition and Trade Vol 5,2005,163-198
[375]Ivaldi M, B Jullien, P Rey. The Economics of Tacit Collusion. Interim Report for DG Competition,2003,19-21
[376]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC, OJ2003L70, p35, recital 82
[377]Commission Decision of 28.6.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1741-MCI WorldCom/Sprint, OJ 2003 L300, pl, recital 279
[378]Dana J D, Y-F Fong. Long-Lived Consumers, Interremporal Bundling, and Tacit Collusion. Northeastern University, College of Business Administration WP# 08-002
[379]Dal-Bo P. Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuation. RAND Journal of Economics Vo138,2008,533-540
[380]Levenstein M C. Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion:A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 45, 2006,117-137
[381]Harrington J E. Collusion among Asymmetric Firms:The Case of Different Discount Factors. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 7,1989, 289-307
[382]Selten R. A Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game TheoryVol 4,1975.25-55
[383]McCutcheon B. Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?. Journal of Political Economy Vo1105,1997,321-350
[384]Church J, R Ware. Industrial Organization, A Strategic Approach. Boston: Boston Press,2000,334
[385]Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR 11-2595, para 192,193et seq
[386]Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997 L11, p30, recital 281
[387]Case T-464/04 Impala v Commission [2006] ECRII-2289, paras 521-541
[388]Schultz N. Market Transparency on the Consumer Side and Tacit Collusion. European Economic Review Vol 49,2005,279-297
[389]Feinberg R, Chr M Snyder. Collusion with Secret Price Cuts:An Experimental Investigation. Economics Bulletin Vol 3,2003,1-11
[390]Commission Decision of 24.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4753-Antalis/MAP, recital 67
[391]Schultz Ch. Market Transparency and Product Differentiation. Economics Letters Vol 83,2004,173-178
[392]Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recital 161
[393]Nillson A. Transparency and Competition. Stockholm School of Economics, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 298,1999
[394]Harrington J E, A Skrzypacz. Collusion under Monitoring of Sales. RAND Journal of Economics Vo138,2007,314-331
[395]Kandori M. Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory Vol 102,2002,1-15
[396]Ellison G. Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 25,1994,37-57
[397]Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvay Montedison/Ausimont, recital 52
[398]Commission Decision of 20.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2533-BP/E.ON, OJ 2001 L276, p31, recital 103
[399]Commission Decision of 23.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5047-REWE/ADEG, recital 73
[400]Case C-413/06-Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008], paras 125-130
[401]Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,OJ 2002 L233, p38, recitals 82,87et seq
[402]Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3439-AGFA-Gevaert/ Lastra, recital 108
[403]Commission Decision of 14.2.1995 in Case No IV/M.477-Mercedes-Benz/ Kassbohrer, OJ1995L211, p1, recital 104
[404]Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, OJ 2007 L 94, p19, para 546
[405]Compte O, Ph Jehiel. Bargaining over Randomly Generated Offers:A New Perspective on Multi-Party Bargaining. Mimeo,2004,173
[406]D avies S W, M Olczak. Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC Merger Cases. CCP Working Paper 07-7,2004
[407]Commission Decision of 20.5.1998 in Case No IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/ Coopers Lybrand, OJ1999L50, p27, recitals 96,103
[408]Commission Decision of 19.7.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, OJ 2004 L62, p30
[409]Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France et al v Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, paras 222,226
[410]Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997 Lll, p30, recita1181-208
[411]Commission Decision of 28.6.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1741-MCI/ WorldCom/Sprint, OJ2003L300, p1, recital 302
[412]Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recitals 161
[413]Commission Decision of 27.10.2000 in Case No COMP/M.2111-Alcoa/British Aluminium, recital 14
[414]Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/ Auwarter, recitals 56,82
[415]Vasconcelos. Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers. RAND Journal of Economics VO136,2005,39-62
[416]Collie D R. Collusion and the Elasticity of Demand. Economics Bulletin Vol 27, 2004,1-6
[417]Kantzenbach, Kottmann, Kruger. Kollektive Marktbeherrschung. Neue Industrie 6konomik und Erfahrungen aus der Europaischen Fusionskontrolle, Baden-Baden,1996,61
[418]Commission Decision of22.7.1992-Nestle/Perrier, OJ 1992 L356, p1, recital 123
[419]Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.315-Mannesmann/ Vallourec/Ilva, OJ 1994 LI02, p15, recital 55
[420]Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/ Auwiirter, OJ2001L116, p 35, recital 32
[421]Kuhn K U. The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries. CEPR Discussion Paper 4769,2004
[422]Shor M, H Chen. Decentralization, Transfer Pricing, and Tacit Collusion. Vanderbildt University, mimeo,2006
[423]Bernhardt D, Ch P Chambers. Profit Sharing(with Workers)Facilitates Collusion (among Firms). RAND Journal of Economics Vol 37,2006,483-502
[424]Spagnolo G. Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour. CEPR Discussion Paper No 4506,2004
[425]Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.358-Pilkington-Techint/SIV, OJ 1994 L 158, p24, recital 47
[426]Kolasky W. Coordinated Effects in Merger Review:From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, mimeo,2002
[427]Philips L. Competition Policy, A Game Theoretic Perspective. London: Cambridge Press,1995,153
[428]Church J, R Ware. Industrial Organization, A Strategic Approach. Boston: Boston Press,2000,346
[429]Davidson C, R J Deneckere. Excess Capacity and Collusion. International Economic Review Vol 31,1990,21-41
[430]Compte O, F Jenny, P Rey. Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion. European Economic Review Vol 46,2002,1-29
[431]Marsumura T. Cournot Duopoly with Multi-Period Competition:Inventory as a Coordination Device. Australian Economic Papers Vol 38,1999,189-202
[432]Commission Decision of 10.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.390-Akzo/Nobel Industries, recital 18
[433]Commission Decision of 11.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2314-BASF/Eurodiol/ Pantochim, OJ 2002 L132, p45, recital 76
[434]Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.315-Mannesmann/ Vallourec/Ilva, OJ1994L102, p 15, recital 64
[435]Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.358-Pilkington-Techint/SIV, OJ 1994 L158, p24, recital 120
[436]CaseT-102/99 Gencor [1999] ECR 11-753, para 276
[437]Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recital 58 et seq
[438]Commission Decision of 13.6.2000 in Case No 1VIM.1673-Veba/Viag, OJ 2001L188, p1, recital 79
[439]Commission Decision of 30.7.1998 in Case No IV/M.1245-Valeo/ITT Industries, recital 54
[440]Commission Decision of 2.6.1998 in Case No IV/MA 080-Thyssen/Krupp, recital 33
[441]Formby J P, W J Smith. Collusion, Entry, and Market Shares. Review of Industrial Organization Vol 1,1984,15-25
[442]Simpson J D. When Does New Entry Deter Collusion?. Research in Law and Economics Vol 18,1997,229-239
[443]Donsimoni M P. Stable Heterogenous Cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 3,1985,451-467
[444]Knieps G. Wettbewerbsokonomie, Regulierungstheorie. Industrieokonomie, Wettbe-werbspolitik,3rd edn, Heidelberg,2008,123-125
[445]Capuano C. Abuse of Competitive Fringe. University of Naples, Nora di Lavoro 91,2005,113
[446]Friedman J W, J F Thisse. Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry. European Economic Review Vo138,1994,271-283
[447]Commission Decision of 10.6.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3130-Arla Foods/ Express Dairies, recitals 87,90
[448]Collie D R. Collusion in Differentiated Oligopolies with Quadratic Cost. Bulletin of Economic Research Vol 58,2006,151-159
[449]Commission Decision of 23.3.1992 in Case No iV/M.186-Henkel/Nobel, recital 17
[450]Commission Decision ofl3.6.2000 in Case No 1V/M.1673-VEBAIV/AG, OJ 2001L188, p 1, recital 83
[451]Commission Decision of 21.12,1993 in Case No IV/M.358 Pilkington-Techint/SIV, OJ1994L158, p 24, recital 31
[452]Church J. Vertical Mergers, ABA Section of Antitrust Law. Issues in Competition Law and Policy,2008,1455-1501
[453]Salinger M A.The Meaning of Upstream and Downstream and the Implications for Modeling Vertical Mergers. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 37,1989, 373-387
[454]Krattenmaker T G, S C Salop. Anticompetitive Exclusion:Raising Rivals Cost to Achieve Power over Price. Yale Law Journal Vo196,1986,209-293
[455]Salinger M A. Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure. Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 103,1988,345-356
[456]Hombert J, J Pouyet, N Schutz. Anticompetitive Merger Waves. Ecole Polytechnique, Working Paper,2007
[457]Higgins R S. Competitive Vertical Foreclosure. Managerialand Decision Economics Vol 20,1999,229-237
[458]Rey P, T Tirole. A Primer on Foreclosure, in:M Armstrong and R Porter (eds). Handbook of lndustrialtrial Organization, Vol III, Amsterdam,2007,2145-2220
[459]Hortacsu A, Ch Syverson. Cementing Relationships:Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices. University of Chicago Working Paper, 2005
[460]Ordover J A, S C Salop, G Saloner. Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure. American Economic Review Vo180,1990,127-142
[461]Chen Y. On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects. RAND Journal of Economics Vo133,2002,667-685
[462]Choi J P, S S Yi. Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications. RAND Journal of EconomicsVol 31,2000,52-71
[463]Reiffen D. Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure:Comment. American Economic Review Vo182,1992,694-597
[464]Avenel E, C Barlet. Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Vol 9, 2000,211-230
[465]Gilbert R J, D Newberry. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. American Economic Review Vol 72,1982,514-526
[466]Riordan M H. Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm. American Economic Review Vol 88,1998,1232-1248
[467]Riordan M H. Competitive Effects of Vertical integration, in:P Buccirossi (ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge Mass,2008,145-182
[468]Bernheim D B, M D Whinston. Exclusive Dealing. Journal of Political Economy Vol 106,1998,64-103
[469]Stefanadis C. Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago School View. Journal of Law and Economics Vol 41,1998,429-450
[470]Segal I R, M D Whinston. Naked Exclusion:Comment. American Economic Review Vo190,2000,296-309
[471]Riordan M H,S C Salop. Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A post Chicago Approach. Antitrust Law Journal Vol63,1995,513-568
[472]Bishop B, A Lofaro. A Legal and Economic Consensus? The Theory and Practice of Coordinated Effects in EC Merger Control. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 49,2004, 195-242
[473]Carlton D W, M Waldman. Theories of Tying and implications for Antitrust, Cornell University. Johnson School Research Paper Series No 24-06,2005
[474]Evans D S, A J Padilla, M A Salinger. A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analysing Legitimate Tying Case, in:C D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annua12003:What is an Abuse or a Dominant Position. London:Oxford Press,2006,167-193
[475]Whinston M D. Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. American Economic Review Vol 80,1990,837-859
[476]Carlton D W, M Waldman. The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 33, 2002,194-220
[477]Choi J P. Tying and Innovation:A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangement. Economic Journal Vol 114,2004,83-101
[478]Denicolo V. Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol48,2000,177-188
[479]Nalebuff B. Competing Against Bundles. Yale School of Management Working Paper Series H No 7,2000
[480]Carbajo J, D De Meza, D J Seidman. A Strategic Motivation of Commodity Bundling. Journal of Industrial Economics Vo 138,1990,283-298
[481]Chen Y. Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization. RAND Journal of Economics Vol35,2004,667-685
[482]Kobayashi B H. Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 1,2005,707-746
[483]Church J, N Gandal. Systems Competition, Vertical Mergers, and Foreclosure. Journal of Economics and Strategy Management Vol 9,2000,25-52
[484]Bolton P, J Brodley, M Riordan. Predatory Pricing:Strategic Theory and Legal Policy. Georgetown Law Journal Vo188,2000,2239-2330
[485]Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR 11-4381, paras16,159,218 et seq
[486]Case C-12/03 Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I 987, Para 74,78,85
[487]Judgment of 14 December 2005 in Case T-2010/01 GE v Commission [2005] ECR 11-5575, paras 70-75,304,424,468
[488]Commission Decision of 25.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5121-News Corp/ Premiere, recital 61
[489]Commission Decision of 14.5.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4854-TomTom/Tele Atlas, recita169,173,221,222,223,228,238,1212
[490]Commission Decision of 2.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4942-Nokia/NAVTEQ, recital 341 et seq
[491]Commission Decision of 4.8.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4874-Itema/ Barcovision, recital 76,77,80,83, fn 52
[492]Commission Decision of 4.4.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4403-Thales/ Finmeccanica/AAS/Telespazio,recital 404,406,411,412,414,419,436 et seq
② 参见欧盟第139/2004号条例第3条第1款之规定。
③ 参见欧盟的《横向集中评估指南》、《欧盟条例》以及《委员会关于合并概念的通知》等文件。
① 参见欧盟公司法第3号指令之规定。
② 参见《委员会关于合并概念的通知》第6、7条之规定。
① 参见我国《反垄断法》第20条的规定。
① 参见我国《反垄断法》第12条之规定。
② 比如说,《德国反对限制竞争法》第37条第1款规定,如果一个企业取得了另一企业50%或者25%的股份,这两个企业可被视为出现了企业合并。参见孙晋：《反垄断法——制度与原理》,武汉大学出版社2010年版,第132页。
① 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第2款之规定。
② 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第3款之规定。
③ 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第4款之规定。
④ 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第3条第5款之规定。
① 参见欧盟139/2004号条例第5条之规定。
② 对于这一点,委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》又规定了一种例外情况,即拥有某个企业股份的股东或企业,可以否决这个企业的战略性决策,但他自己不能将其决定强加给他人,参见欧盟《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第39点的规定。
③ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第19点的规定。
④ 参见Rh ne Poulenc/SNIA(Case IV/M206)(1992)。
① 参见Renault/Volvo(CaseIV/M004)(1990).
② 参见Credit Lyonnais/BFG Bank(Case IV/M296)(1993); Sarah Lee/BP Food Division(Case IV/M299)(1993)o
③ 参见SCA/Graninge/Scaninge Timber(Case COMP/M1996)(2000); Dupont/Air Products Chemicals/JV(Case COMP/M2250)(2001):Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf/JV(Case COMP/JV54)(2001).
④ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第20点的规定。
⑤ 参见Matra/CAP Gemini/Sogeti(Case IV/M272)(1993); Bertelsmann/Mondadori/BOL Italian S. p.A(Case COMP/JV51)(2000)。
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第14点的规定。
⑦ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第21到28点的规定。
① 参见Lucas/Eaton(Case IV/M149)(1991):Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard(Case IV/M292)(1993)。
② 参见Mederic/Urrprimec/CRI/Munich(Case IV/M949)(1997); WOCO/Michelin(Case COMP/M1907)(2000); Reuters/Equant-Project Proton(Case COMP/1875)(2000)。
③ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第26到29点的规定；Philips/Chevron Chemicals/JV(CaseCOMP/M1996)(2000)。
④ 参见Conagral/Idea(Case IV/M010)(1991); Reuters/Equant-Project Proton(Case COMP/1875)(2000)。
⑤ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第25点的规定；Hicks/Bear Sterns/Johns Manvile(Case COMP/M2133)(2000).
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第27点的规定。
⑦ 参见Bertelmann/News International/Vox(Case IV/M489)(1994); Brambles/Ermewal/JV(Case COMP/M2023) (2000)。
⑧ 参见Philips/Thomson/Sagem(Case IV/M293)(1993); Sita/RPC/Scori(Case IV/M295); McCormick/CPC/ Rabobank/Ostmann(Case IV/M330)(1993).
⑨ 参见委员会1996年颁布的《竞争政策报告》(Vo1.XXVI)第74-75页；UBS/Mister Mint(Case IV/M940)(1997)。
⑩ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第14点第3段之内容。
11 参见Arjomari/Wiggins Teape(Case IV/M025)(1990); Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/Munksjo AB(Case IV/M613)(1995); Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Beverages GB(Case IV/M794)(1997)[1997] OJ L218/15.
12 在具体案件中,委员会判定小股东构成控制所要求的股权不同,如在Societe Generale de Belgique/Generale de Banque案中,小股东拥有25.96%的股权,委员会就认为足以构成控制；在Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/MunksioAB案中, 小股东的股权为29.04%,委员会认为构成控制；在 Coca-Cola-AmalgamatedBeverages GB案,小股东构成控制的股权为45%；在Pirelli/Edizione/Olivetti/Telecom Italia案中,委员会判定构成控制的股权为27%等。参见Societe Generale de Belgique/Generale de Banque(Case IV/M343)(1993); Jefferson Smurfit Group plc/Munksio AB(Case IV/M613)(1995); Coca-Cola-Amalgamated Beverages GB(Case IV/M794)(1997)[1997] OJ L218/15; Pirelli/Edizione/Olivetti/Telecom Italia(Case COMP/M2574)(2001),
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第32-35点；Channel Five (Case IV/M673)(1995); Nokia Corporation/SP Tyres UK Ltd(Case IV/M548)(1995); Swissair/Sabena(Case IV/M616)(1995); Telefonical/Portugal Telecom(Case COMP/JV23)(1999); Johnson & Johnson/Mercury Asset Management/Agora Healthcare Service-JV(Case COMP/M1970)(2000).
① 参见Ericsson/Nokia/Psion/Motorola(Case COMP/Ⅳ/JV12)(1998)。
② 比如说,欧盟某些成员国法律规定,电视台的单个股东不得拥有超过一定比例的股权。
③ 参见Fletcher Challenge/Methanex(Case Ⅳ/M331)(1993); Case T-2/93 Sogecable v. Commission [1996] ECR Ⅱ-797.
④ 参见Philips/Grundig(Case Ⅳ/M382)(1993).
⑤ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第9点第2款。
⑥ 参见McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann(Case Ⅳ/M330)(1993); Telefonical Sogecable/Cable-Visiion(Case Ⅳ/M709);委员会1996年颁布的《竞争政策报告》第XXVL卷,第74-75页。
⑦ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第11点的规定：控制对象可能是一个或多个企业,或者是这些企业全部或部分资产；而资产则是指,能够产生营业额的生产经营活动,它包括商标和许可权。
① 委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998] OJ C66/5第9点第1款和第10点的规定,在考虑交易背后的经济现实时,融资来源或关联关系也作为判定的证据,因为它们间接证明了对目标企业的控制,并披露了集中背后的企业。
② 委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》第23点规定,共同控制并不要求收购方有权对企业日常运营施加决定性影响。
③ 比如说,在Elf Atochem/Rutgers案中,委员会认为,共同控制的概念正确地区别于企业的日常管理。但在Charterhouse/Porterbrook案中,委员会在排除适用第139/2004号条例第3条第5款时,似乎又混淆了决定企业的竞争行为,和参与企业日常管理之间的区别；在Ingersoll Rand/Dresser案中,委员会则认为,如果合营企业赋予母公司某些合同性的否决权,是能对其管理层施加影响的权利,就表明存在共同控制；而在Saint Gobain/Wacker Chemie/Nom案中,委员会还认为,在分析共同控制时,首先应考察合营企业的董事会,然后再考察一个被授权管理合营企业母公司的日常经营。参见Elf Atochem/Rutgers(Case IV/M442)(1994)； Charterhouse/Porterbrook(CaseIV/M669)(1995); Ingersoll Rand/Dresser(CaseIV/M121)(1991)： Saint Gobain/ Wacker Chemie/Nom(CaseIV/M774)(1996)[1997] OJ L247/1.
④ 参见Credit Lyonnais/BFG Bank(CaseIV/M296)(1993)。
⑤ 参见Sara Lee/BP Food Division(CaseIV/M299)(1993)。
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第14条规定。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第15条规定。
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第16条规定。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第18、19条规定。
③ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[19981 OJ C66/5第25条规定。
④ 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第37条规定。
① 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第21条规定。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第26到29点的规定；Philips/Chevron Chemicals/ JV(Case COMP/M1996)(2000)。
③ 比如说,在SITA-RPC/SCORI案中,尽管小股东享有对合营企业发展政策等方面的否决权,已超过了一般意义上对小股东的保护,但委员会却认为,由于小股东不能否决合营企业的商业计划和预算,因而不存在共同控制。参见SITA-RPC/SCORI(CaseIV/M295)(1993)。另外,还可参见Eridania/ISI, Usinor/ASD(Case IV/M073)(1991); Lucas/Eaton(Case IV/M149)(1991).
① 参见Saab Ericsson Space(Case IV/M178)(1992).
② 参见Royal Bank of Scotland/Bank of Ireland(Case IV/M681)(1996).
③ 参见Solvay-Laporte/Interox(Case IV/M197)(1992); British Steel/Europipe(Case IV/ECSC1272) 1998); aytheon/hales/JV(Case COMP/M2079)(2001):The Coca-Cola Company/Nestle/V(Case COMP/M2276)(2001)。
④ 在《有关集中概念的通知》中,委员会并没有明确说明对高管人员任命的否决权本身就足以证明存在共同控制,而且实践中,它也没有单独根据这种否决权来判定存在共同控制,比如说在Hicks/Bear Sterns/Johns Manville案中,委员会最终是根据小股东们对年度预算和高管人员任命的否决权,来判定存在共同控制。参见委员会颁布的《有关集中概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/5第25点的规定：Hicks/Bear Sterns/Johns Manville(Case COMP/M2133)(2000)。
⑤ 参见Sonera/Vivendi/Xfera(CaseCOMP/M1954)(2000)。
⑥ 参见Baxter/Nestle/Salvia(CaseIV/M058)(1991).
⑦ 参见Mitsubishi/UCAR(Case IV/M024)(1991).
⑧ 参见Nothern Telecom/Matra Telecommunication(CaseIV/M249)(1992); Avesta/British Steel/NCC/AGA/Axel Johnson(Case IV/M239)(1992)。
⑨ 参见Conagral/Idea(Case IV/M010)(1991); Reuters/Equant-Project Proton(Case COMP/1875)(2000).
① 如,在CCIE/GTE案中,它就规定只有一个股东有权对股东们所任命的多个委员会行使否决权。参见CCIE/TE(CaseⅣ/258)(1992)。
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》OJ[1998]C66/14。
① 参见Volkswagen AG/VAG(UK)Ltd(Case Ⅳ/M304)(1993); Accor/Wagons Lits(Case Ⅳ/M126)(1992)[1992] OJ L204/1; ABB/Brel(Case Ⅳ/M221)(1992); Volvo/Procordia(Case Ⅳ/M196)(1993); Philips/Grundig(Case Ⅳ/M382)(1993); Allied Lyons/HWE-Pedro Domecq(Case Ⅳ/M400)(1994); Ferruzi Finanziaria/Fondiaria(Case Ⅳ/M576)(1995):GM/SAAB(Case Ⅳ/M1847)(2000); Toyota Motor Corporation/Toyota GB(Case COMP/ M2120)(2000); Tate & Lyle/Amylum(Case COMP/M2029)(2000); AMO/Air Liberte/Air Littoral(Case COMP/ M2008)(2000); Bertelsmann/Mondadori/BOL Italia S. p.A.(Case COMP/JV51)(2000); Dupont/Sabanci Holdings/JV(Case COMP/M2213)(2001).
② 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第35-37点的规定。
③ 参见Nordic Capital/Transpool(Case Ⅳ/M625)(1995)。
④ 参见Synthomer/Yule Catto(Case Ⅳ/M376)(1993); Telecom Italia/Eendesa Union Fenosa(Case COMP/ M1973) (2000)、(Case COMP/M2053)(2000)。
⑤ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第43点的规定。
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第38-39点的规定。
① 在BellSouth/Vodafon/E-Plus案中,其中一位享有共同控制权的留存股东增加了对商业计划和预算的权利。参见BellSouth/Vodafon/E-Plus(Case COMP/JV25)(2000).
② 在Avesta II案中,根据股东协议,本有两名股东享有否决权,但其中一名股东退出了企业,因而另一名留存的股东就在事实上享有唯一否决权。参见westa II(Case IV/M452)(1994)。
③ 参见McDermott/ETPM(Case IV/M1154)(1998).
④ 在这里,委员会所指的“资产”是,任何能够在市场上产生营业额的经营活动,如分支机构或企业的某个部门,有时它还包括品牌和许可等。
⑤ 参见Solvay-Laporte/Interox(Case IV/M197)(1992)。
⑥ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第46-48点的规定。
⑦ 参见委员会颁布的《有关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14第49-50点的规定。
⑧ 参见《对理事会第4064/89号条例重述的绿皮书》[2001]745/6第113点和第135点。
⑧ 参见委员会颁布的《有关计算营业额的通知》[1998]C66/25第32-35点；Scandinavian Project(Case IV/M522)(1994)。
① 参见UAP/Vinci(Case IV/M384)(1993); Thomson/Shorts(Case IV/M318)(1993); McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/ stmann(Case IV/M330)(1993); Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada(Case IV/M1025)(1998); BSCH/Banco Totta y CPP/A Champalimaud(Case COMP/M1799)(2000); Brambles/Ermewa JV(Case COMP/M2023) (2000); Telecom Italia/Endesa/Union Fenosa(Case COMP/M1973)(2000); Scottish & Newcastle/Groupe Danone(Case COMP/M1925)(2000); Vivendi/Cannl+/Seagram(Case COMP/M2050) (2000); Canal+/Lagardere/Liberty Media(Case COMP/JV 47)(2000); Hitachi/NEC-DRAM/JV(Case COMP/JV 44)(2000)。
② 参见AOM/Air Liberte/Air Littoral(Case COMP/M2008)(2000)。
③ 参见British Telecom/Banco Santander(Case IV/M425)(1994); Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada(Case IV/ M1025)(1998)。
④ 参见Bell Cable/Medial/Cable & Wireless/Videotron(Case IV/M853)(1996); Cable & Wireless/Nynex/Bell Canada(Case IV/M865)(1996)。
① 参见UGC/Liberty Media(Case COMP/M2222)(2001)。
② 参见Delhaize/PG(Case IV/M47)(1994)。
③ 参见Harrisons & Grosfeld/Akzo(Case IV/M310)(1993).
④ 参见Snecmal/Labinal(CaseCOMP/M2021)(2000);Telia/Telenor/Schibsted(CaseIV/JV1)(1998); Telia/Telenor (Case IV/M1439)(1991)[2001] OJ L40/1; European Aeronautic,Space and Defence Company(EADS)(Case IV/M1745)(2000).
⑤ 参见McDermott/ETPM(CaseIV/M648)(1995)。
⑥ 这里的“政府”是指,所有公法上的实体,它包括成员国本身,以及区域性或地方性的公共机构。参见委员会颁布的《有关相关企业概念的通知》[1998]OJ C66/14注释21。
⑦ 在Pechiney/Usiono、 CEA Industrie/France Telecom/SGS-Thomson和Siemens/Italel案中,虽然两个公共企业属于同一个控股公司,但委员会却认为,它们构成独立经济实体,尽管在集中后没有协调的风险。参见Pechiney/Usionor(CaseIV/M097)(1991); CEA Industrie/France Telecom/SGS-Thomson(Case IV/M216)(1993); Siemens/Italel(CaseIV/M468)(1994)[1995]OJL161/27; Texaco/NorskHydro(Case IV/M511)(1995).
⑧ 参见Ford/Hertz(Case IV/M397)(1994)。
① 参见Ericsson/Nokia/Psion/Motorola(Case COMP/JV12)(1998); KLM/Air UK(Case IV/M967)(1997).
② 对于这种结果,很多人都表示质疑,如Cowling, Mueller、Jenny、 Weber、 Scherer、 Ross等,而且Scherer
和Ross进一步认为,垄断所造成的福利损失,只占GDP的1-2%。参见Scherer/Ross,1990:661-667.
③ 参见Leibenstein,1966; Frantz于1988年撰写的《X-非效率概述》。
④ 参见Button/Weyman-Jones,1992; NIckell,1996.
⑤ 参见Hart,1983; Scharfstein 1988; Schmidt, KM,1997,
⑥ 参见Posner,1975; Tirole,1987.
① 参见Alchian/Demsetz,1972-
② 参见Schumpete,1950; Schumpeter,1952。
③ Arrow最先指出了这一点,即所谓的“替代效应”。参见Arrow,1962.
④ 参见Tirole,2001:392。
⑤ 参见Roeller/Stenneck/Verboven,2001.
⑥ 参见Scherer,1965; Levin/Reiss,1984; Levin/Cohen/Mowery,1985; Lunn,1986; and Scott,1990。
①Coase这个假设已经被Bulow.Stokey.Gul.Sonnenschein.及Wilson等人所证明。参见Bulow,1982；Stokey, 1981:Gul/Sonnenschein/Wilson,1986.
② 参见Bulow.1986
③ 例如,艺术家们为了向消费者表明,其艺术品的复制版本有限,且以后不会再增加了,而经常故意销毁原始印刷版本。
① Carlton和Perloff对市场总需求和剩余需求进行了区分。参见Carlton/Perloff，2005:66-69.
① 确定合并是否会导致企业市场力量发生变化,对是否应禁止某项合并非常重要。参见Baker/Bresnahan, 2008:15。
② 参见Of.fice Of Fair Trading,2002:43-51；Geroski,2003.
③ 参见Office of Fair Trading,2003b。
④ 如果我们很容易确定竞争性价格,则这时只需比较它与所考察的价格水平,即可得出企业是否具有市场力量。如果所考察的价格水平高出竞争性水平很多,则企业就拥有市场支配地位,即企业有能力使其产品要价明显高出竞争性水平。参见Office of Fair Trading,2001:17。
② Maise、 Simo、 Williams、 Werden等人认为,在假定垄断测试的基本分析框架内,根本不存在次级市场这一概念。如果市场上绝大部分消费者能选择替代产品,则企业的市场力量将受到有效制约,以至于它不能将价格提高到竞争性水平之上,这时相关市场就应该包含这些替代产品。在任何微小的市场上,计算市场份额都有可能导致我们错误地推断,企业控制价格和产出的能力。参见Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases,1983:50; Simon/Williams, The Renaissance of Market Definition,1993:816etseq; Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines,1983:574 et seq。
② 但是,这并不是考察单边效果最好的方法,因为市场界定通常对评估区域竞争的潜在损失,并不是很有用。我认为,既然反托拉斯原则在评价不同产品销售商的合并时,赋予了直接证明竞争损害证据更大的作用,则我们就可以预见,反托拉斯原则在其他情况下也会这么做。参见Baker J, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe:In Qualified Praise of Submarkets,2002:218.
① 但是,Hausman, Leonard、 Vellturo等人认为,在实践中,相关市场界定要证明存在价格歧视很难。参见Hausman/Leonard/Vellturo, Market Definition Under Price Discrimination,1996:386。
① Carlton、 Eiszner、 Hay、 Hoerner、 Rapp等人,都对创新市场概念进行了猛烈批评,Gilbert和Sunshine对这种批评进行回应,而Davis又为这种争论提供一个调查报告。参见Gilbert/Sunshine, The Use of Innovation Markets:A Reply to Hay, Rapp, and Hoerner,1995,75-82; Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective,2003,667-703。
② Evans和Noel将反馈效果区分为短期效果和长期效果。短期效果只考虑价格上涨的直接影响,而长期效果则考虑到了两边消费者群体的反馈效果。但是,Filistrucchi则认为,我们没有必要区分短期效果和长期效果,因为假定垄断测试考察的就是价格持续上涨。参见Evans/Noel, The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multi-sided Platform Business,2008:663-695; Filistrucchi, A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets:Some Theoretical Considerations, Net Institute Working Paper 08-34(2008)。
② 尽管这会面临很多困难,但玻璃纸谬误并不意味着,我们需要一种新的理论框架来界定相关市场。相反,SSNIP测试将继续为我们,提供正确地理论框架,因为它的关注点是竞争约束。参见Office of Fair Trading, 2001:29。
③ 尽管假定垄断测试是用定量方法来阐释的,如它认为产品价格上涨5%到10%将有利可图,但它的价值在于,是一个考察产品间是否存在竞争的概念性框架,而不是一个能严格适用所有情况的正式计量方法。参见Office of Fair Trading,2001:10.
① 相关具体内容可参见Office of Fair Trading, Quantitative Techniques in Competition Analysis, Research Paper 17,1999.
② 目前,这方面研究都只阐述了最著名和最常见的方法,而没有提及那些非常复杂的计量经济学模型,如因果关系分析,协调整合模型等。参见Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law,2002:100。
③ 交叉价格弹性和产品分流比,可作为候选市场追加产品的一个指标。
④ Baker、 Bresnahan、 Froeb、 Werden及Scheffman等人认为,如果我们对合并效果进行定量分析,则还需评估需求系统,这些需求系统也是用来界定市场的。参见Baker/Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm,1988,283-300： Scheffman, Statistical Measures of Market Power:Uses and Abuses,1992,901-919。
⑤ Gujarat、 Greene和Hubler对回归分析进行了基本的介绍,而Bishop和Walker则介绍了,竞争分析中的回归分析。参见Hubler, Okonometrie, Stuttgart; Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement,2003:327-350。
① 在过去十年中,边际弹性和边际损失分析已成为标准的分析工具。目前,绝大多数合并案件的调查和诉讼阶段,都会用到它们。Harris和Simons于1988年提出了术语“边际损失”,而Coate和William则对其进行了详细分析。参见Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, mimeo,2002,14-15; Coate/Williams, Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition, Potomac Law and Economics Paper No 05-01。
② KatZ、 Shapiro、 O'Brian、 Wickelgre、 Scheffman及Simons等人,不仅讨论了边际损失分析适用的相关程序,还对其进行了一些批评性评论。参见Katz/Shapiro, Critical Loss:Let's Tell the Whole Story,2003: 49-56; O'Brian/Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis,2003:161-184; Scheffman/Simons, The State of Critical Loss:Let's Make We Understand the Whole Story,2003:1-9。
③ Coate和Williams考虑了不同成本结构下的边际损失分析。参见Coate/Williams, Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition, Potomac Law and Economics Paper No 05-01。
① O'Brian和Wickelgreen分析了不同产品在需求上的边际损失,这为我们提供了一个很好的参考。参见O'Brian/Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis,2003:161-184.
② 但是,如果需求价格弹性随价格的增加而增加,则会产生没有市场力量的玻璃纸谬误,即边际弹性是根据竞争性价格来计算的,而不是假定垄断者设定的更高价格。这时,相关市场界定就会过窄,市场力量也会被高估。参见Froeb/Werden, The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market Delineation,1992:241-247。
③ 最近用于界定反托拉斯市场的价格测试还采用了,上述内容没有讨论的更先进的技术,如Granger因果关系,单位根检验(unit root tests)等。参见Scheffman/Simons, The State of Critical Loss:Let's Make Sure We Understand the Whole Story, The Antitrust Source, Novemberl-9,2003。
① 要指出的是,这些价格测试不能用来回答,市场力量竞争约束这个基本问题,因而我们在使用它们,应时刻注意这一点。
② StigleR、Sherwin、 Bishop、 Walker Lexecon等人率先运用价格相关性分析来界定相关市场,而Audy和Erutku则运用这些价格测试来界定相关地理市场。参见Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law:Concepts. Application andMeasurement,2002:378-403; Lexecon, An Introduction to Quantitative Tchniques in Competition Analysis,2003:5-8; Audy/Erutku, Price Tests to Define Markets:An Application to Wholesale Gasoline in Canada,2005。
③ 有时,这种情况可以通过一个代表价格系列的图形来表示。参见Office of Fair Trading,1999:55。
① Bishop和Walker对Elzinga-Hogarty测试进行了一个很好的演示,而Werden却于1981年对这种测试进行了批评。参见Elzinga/Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits.1973:45-81; Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law:Concepts, Application and Measurement,2002: 404-418; Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipment Data in Defining Geographic Markets,1981:719-737.
② Haldrup对运用不同实证方法来界定相关地理市场,包括Elzinga-Hogarty测试和各种价格测试,进行了深入讨论。而Schffman和Spiller则运用这些方法,界定了美国东部汽油提炼市场。参见Haldrup, Empirical Analysis of Price Data in the Delineation of the Relevant Geographical Market in Competition Analysis, University of Aarhus, Working Paper No 2003-09; Scheffman/Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under the US Department o f Justice Merger Guidelines,1987:123-147.
① 这时,我们应考虑到定性证据。参见Baker/Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust:Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power, in:Buccirossi(ed), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass,2008: 142.
② 对于这种分析,Sacker提出了适用一种经济计划测试,它是基于Bedarfsmarktkonzept和供应方替代来展开的。参见Sacker, Abschied yom Bedarfsmarktkonzepr, Zeitschrtft fur Wettbewerbsrecht Vol 2,2004:1-27.
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs [1989] ECR 803, para 40:如果测试根据特定属性,来区分一个特定路线的航班和其他可能的替代方案,则会得出其他替代方案与特定路线航班是不能相互交换的,因而这些替代方案不能对特定航班施加重大竞争约束。
① 委员会在该案裁决书第51段说道：由上所述可知,在竞争性评估中,由于进口存在潜在竞争,因而每个成员国市场应构成单独市场。参见Commission Decision of 14.2.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2662-Danish Crown/Steff-Houlberg, recital 51。
① 在斯堪的纳维亚、芬兰、英国及爱尔兰四个欧洲大陆地区中,竞争似乎主要发生在同一地区内,这可通过运输成来来解释,但运输时间也能阻止欧洲大陆绝大部分供应商,在客户要求的最后期限内,将产品供应到边远地区。参见Commission Decision of 6.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3431-Sonoco/Ablstrom. recital61。另外,还可参见Commission Decision of 4.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metso/Aker Kvaerner, recitals 18 and 36.
② 在仔细审查当事人的答复后,委员会指出,尽管西欧需求和供应条件有所不同,但这些不同不足以判定构成单独地理市场。当事人主张,大多数海运供应商只在绝大部分海运地区销售铁矿石,而且大多数海运客户也只从较大的铁矿石生产商那里购买铁矿石,这主要是澳大利亚、巴西和加拿大的公司,因此,只有当铁矿石供应商有能力,也有动力对不同地区客户实行价格歧视时,才能构成单独地理市场。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi, recital 159.
③ 这种方法与通知中第8段所描述的“相关地理市场界定”相一致：相关地理市场包括所涉企业从事供应和需求方面的产品或服务,且竞争条件完全同质,并能与邻近地区相区别的地区,因为这些地区的竞争条件是明显不同的。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi OJ 2004, L92, p 50, recital 158 and fn 32.
① 参见委员会关于Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan第56和57段,以及Case No COMP/M.4215-Glatfelter/Crompton Assets第48段的内容。
② 参见委员会关于Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan第84段,以及Case No COMP/M.4215-Glatfelter/Crompton Assets第105段及以下的内容。
③ 参见委员会关于Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan第84段及以下、第153段和第170段的内容。
④ 在德国判例法中, "Bedarfsmarktkonzep t"是界定市场的决定性测试。根据这种方法,如果消费者认为,所有产品能相互交换,则意味着在消费者看来,所有产品在产品特性、经济用途、及价格等方面能满足某种特定需求,因而它们构成一个市场。参见KG judgment of l8.2.1969-Handpreisauszeichner, WuW/E OLG 995,995 etseq;-BGH judgments of 19.3.1996-Pay-TV-Durchleitung, WuW/E DE-R 3058,3062 and of 7.3.1989-Hampffmeyer-Plange, WuW/E BGH 2575; BGH judgment of 5.10.2004-Staubsaugerbeutelmarkt, WuW/E DE-R 1355,1357。
① GWB第23(5)段第2句第3点关于申请合并义务的内容,明确提到了国内市场份额,这表明在根据GWB第24(1)段来确定是否存在支配地位时,只有国内市场与之相关。参见BGH judgment of 24.10.1995-Backofenmarkt, NJW 1996,597。
① 我们可以从委员会裁决fn17中提炼出这些问卷调查,参见Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M,2187-CVC/Lenzing, OJ 2004,L82, p 20。
② 例如,在Tetra Laval/Sidel案中,委员会询问了市场受访者,如果包装系统的成本持续上涨5%到10%,他们是否会从纸盒包装系统转向PET包装系统,反之亦然。调查结果表明,大多数市场受访者认为,这种程度的涨价不会明显影响他们选择包装系统。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2146-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ 2004, L43, p 13, recital 157.另外,我们还可参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Casn No COMP/M. l882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003, L70, p 35, recital 48; Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M.1313-Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterire,OJ 2000, L20, p1, recital 26; Commission Decision of 17.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2547-Bayr/Aventis Crop Science,OJ 2004, L 107, p 1, recital 561； Commission Decision of 1.12.1999 in Case No IV/M.1578-Sanitec Sphinx,OJ 2000, L 294, p 1, recitals 152, 170, and 213; Commission Decision of 29.3.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3975-Cargill/Degussa Food Ingredients, recitals 24 and 60; Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3796-Omya/Huber PCC, recital 222.
① 委员会根据需求方替代得出了这个结论。换句话说,由于LCV天然气价格上涨5%到10%,德国LCV天然气的消费者,会转向HCV天然气,因而这种涨价将无利可图。但有意思的是,如果我们考虑到其他方面,则产品替代将导致LCV天然气价格上涨将有利可图,所以,根据SSNIP测试一开始就能确定LCV天然气涨价是否有利可图,并推断出LCV天然气和HCV天然气能相互替代。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004, L103, p 1, recital 112。
② 分销商和供应商还必须吸收转换单个住户的成本。根据合并当事人——一个转换单个住户非常有经验的公司——所提供的详细成本评估,每个住户的成本大约在60欧左右。而根据一个典型住户每年消费80MBTU的标准,一个当地分销商的价格为3.4欧/MBTU,一个典型住户的天然气价格为8欧/MBTU.如果一个LCV批发输送公司对LCV价格提高5%,则当地分销商的利润将减少13.5欧；而如果上涨10%,则当地分销商的利润将减少27欧。因此,当地分销商要完全收回转换成本,将需要两到四年时间。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil, OJ 2004, L103, p1, recital 128.
③ 一般说来,天然气批发输送公司与当地分销商所签订的供应合同都为10到20年,所以天然气批发输送公司对LCV涨价5%到10%将无利可图,因为这将导致当地分销商转向HCV天然气供应商,但这也只能作为进一步证明分销商转向意愿的证据。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M..1383-Exxon/ Mobil,OJ 2004, L103, p 1, recital 128。
④ 很多证据表明,根据以上数据,一个以谷物杀菌剂为基础的类杀菌剂的假定垄断者,持续性涨价5%到10%将有利可图。如果类杀菌剂价格上涨5%,则成本价格将增加2.5英镑／每公顷。这时,农民种植小麦的收益为：冬天22.5英镑／每公顷；春天7.5-9.5英镑／每公顷。而如果类杀菌剂价格上涨10%,则农民冬天种植小麦的收益仅为5英镑／每公顷。参见Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M 1806-Astra ZenecO/Novartis, OJ 2004,L110, p 1, recital 34 et seq.
① 对于各种混凝土外加剂是否属于不同市场,委员会并没有进行说明。参见Commission Decision of 18.11. 2002 in Case No COMP/M.2854-RAG/Degussa, recital 20。
① 委员会在该案裁决中,对相关地理市场进行了广泛地评估,它还分析了消费者采购和转换模式、英国的进口水平,以及合并当事人利润聚集(the convergence of the merging parties'margins)等数据。参见 Commission Decision of 30.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling, recitals 84 et seq,90 et seq,106 et seq150。
② 一般说来,价格上涨将对利润产生两方面的影响：一是负面影响,即销售额会降低；二是正面影响,即边际利润会增加。边际损失是正负影响相等,它是以产品数量减少百分比来表示。如果实际损失高于边际损失,则涨价将无利可图,这表明相关地理市场必须界定的更宽一些。
③ 在这里,委员会采纳了NERA顾问的意见,认为一般说来,合并竞争评估所考察的时间至少是一年,在某些情况下应提高到两年……因为这个行业大多数竞争都是以一年为周期的。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi,OJ2004,L92, p50, fn 30 to recital 111。
① “专门用于界定市场的定量测试有很多,它包括各种计量经济学和统计学方法,弹性和交叉价格弹性……”产品X自身需求价格弹性测量的是,产品X的需求对其自身价格变化比率的回应；而产品X和Y的交叉价格弹性则是指,产品X的需求对产品Y价格变化比率的回应,参见Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market,OJ 1997, C372, p 5, para 39,fn5。
② 价格弹性值小于1,意味着其他替代金属的交叉价格弹性很小,即其他金属的竞争影响不是很大。因此,需求价格没有弹性表明,珀金构成一个单独相关产品市场。参见Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho,OJ 1997, L11, p 30, recital 56 et seq, recital 57。
① 尽管委员会在竞争性评估中才确定Kimberly-Clark/Scot案的弹性,但它在市场界定阶段就提到了,名牌产品和自有品牌产品构成一个单一市场。相反在Adidas/Reebok案中,委员会又认为,根据扫描数据所确定的弹性是不确定的。参见Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.622-Kimberly-Clark/Scott,OJ 1996 L183, p 1, recitals 48and 173-177; Commission Decision of 24.1.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3492-Adidas/Reebok, recitals 15,17。
② 有意思的是,委员会在其竞争性评估中,将这个分析视为是不同产品施加竞争约束的证据。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3796-Omya/Huber PCC.recitals 20,171 et seq, recitals 306,313.
① 因此,我们不能仅根据绝对价格差异来界定一个昂贵产品市场：这些产品的一般特征是,价格昂贵、包装独特、广告风格奢华、通过独特时尚的专卖店来销售、以及精致的顾客服务和建议等。参见KG judgment of 24.4.1985, WuW/E OLG 3584=
② 因此,这不需要根据两种产品的价格差异来确定是否属于同一市场。参见BGH judgment of 25.6.1985, WuW/E BGH 2153 et seq,2154.
① 参见Commission Decision of 30.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3149-Procter & Gamble/Wella, recital 27：还可参见Commission Decision of 11.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4314-Johnson & Johnson/Pfzer Consumer Healtbcare, recital 42; Commission Decision of 21.12.2005in Case No COMP/M.3696-E.ON/MOL, recital 263=
② “专门用于界定市场的定量测试有很多,它包括各种计量经济学和统计学方法,弹性和交叉价格弹性……而这些方法都是根据一段时间内价格走势的相似性来测试的……参见Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market,OJ 1997, C372, p 5, para 39.
① 因此,即便铝的价格上涨,铝饮料罐供应商也不能提高产品价格表明,铝饮料罐的价格受到另一种在相同产品市场上竞争的产品制约。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam (PLM)/American National Can, recital 12; Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Annex Ⅲ, recital 1。
② 软饮料和瓶装水市场的定价,似乎遵循了不同的逻辑,这进一步证实了这两个市场供应者所面临的竞争约束不同。参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No Ⅳ/M.190-Nesle/Perrier,OJ 1992, L356, p 1, recital 16。
① 例如,航空线路Dublin至London Stansted、Gatwick及Luton的相关性很重要,因为它们的价格相关系数为0.90,这表明这几条航空线路构成单一市场,而对于这些线路与Dublin至London Heathrow是否存在相关性,委员会并没有予以确定。不过,委员会根据定性证据,认为所有伦敦机场构成一个单一市场。参见Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lings, recitals 73,94; Annex Ⅲ, recital 121, fn 128; Annex Ⅲ, recital 43, recital 154; Annex Ⅲ, recital 42 (Dublin-Glasgow), recital 189; Annex Ⅲ, recital 44 (Dublin-Brussels), recital 210; Annex Ⅲ, recital 42 (Dublin-Frankfurt)。
② 可参见委员会关于相关市场界定的公告,或委员会关于Tetra Laval/Sidel案裁决的第178段内容(Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel,OJ 2004 L43, p 13, recital 178).
① 从委员会有争议裁决中的证据来看,委员会犯了两个错误：一是它的调查结论认为,绝大多数SBM机器能够通用；二是根据最终用途来区分产品。这个有争议的裁决并没有提供足够证据,来证明根据SBM机器最终用途所界定的不同次级市场。因此,我们必须对包括低容量和高容量机器的次级市场进行考虑。参见Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECRⅡ-4381, para 269; Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ 2004 L43, p 13.
② 事实上,绝大多数SBM机器是通用的。不过,PET包装线只是SBM机器上的一个部件,它通常用来生产满足客户特殊要求的产品,这对有阻隔性、灭菌或超洁净要求的敏感性产品,或生产用于Combi机器热罐装或无菌罐装的特殊产品很重要。因此,标准的PET包装线不足以替代,用于生产敏感性产品的PET包装线,特别是那些要求采用非常特殊的PET包装线的敏感性产品。例如,专门用来填充碳酸饮料的Sidel SRS G Combi机器,就不能用于填充果汁饮料,它需要采用无菌SRA Combi机器来填充。参见Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ 2004 L43, p 13, recital 177=
③ 委员在Philips/Origin、 Glatfelter/Crompton Assets、 ON/MOL等案中分析了转换成本及相关性。参见Commission Decision of 22.1.1995 in Case No IV/M..668-Philips/Origin, recital 7; Commission Decision of 20.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4215-Glatfelter/Crompton Assets, recitals 30 and 31; Commission Decision of 21.12.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3696·E. ON/MOL, recital 94。
① 因此,从生产低压电力电缆转换成生产高压电力电缆,需求大量时间和成本。在现有生产设备上转换生产不同类型的电缆,会大幅度地提高生产成本。所以,供应方替代性较低。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003 L70, p 35, recital 20 et seq。
① 委员会认为,不同分销或销售渠道构成不同市场,这是因为不同分销或销售渠道针对的是不同消费群体需求,即使某些消费群体可能通过几种分销或销售渠道获得服务。参见Commission Decision of 14.10.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2965-Staples/Guilbert, recital 9。
② 第四,委员会调查结果表明,一些大型餐饮批发商……不以每公斤的方式,向零售市场出售新鲜猪肉。参见Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case-NoⅣ/M.1313--Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier,OJ 2000 L20, p1, recital 38。另外,委员会在(?)1nilever Bestfoods案中认为,食品服务分销或销售渠道,是它们与零售渠道的重要区别,因而属于不同市场。这种区别包括有：服务维度、单独销售力量、不同价格结构、不同包装尺寸、及不同健康和安全制度等。参见Commission Decision of 28.9.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1990-Unilever Bestfoods,recital 9。
① 委员会在Sony/BMG案的合并评估中证实了这个观点,而在Universal/BMG Music Publishing案中,委员会同样将传统音乐出版权和相应在线出版权,界定为两个不同市场。参见Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG,OJ 2007 L94, p 19, recital 27; Commission Decision of 22.5.2007 in Case No COMP/M.404-Universal/BMG Music Publishing, recital 26 et seq。
② 联线广告的定价机制是,“每次点击成本”(cost per click)和“每次印象成本”(cost per impression)。参见Commission Decision of 11.3.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4731-Google/Doubleclick, recital 46。
③ 如果用户游戏是免费的,则它们不构成一个产品市场。反之,如果不免费,则必须根据电子游戏的收费来确定产品。参见Commission Decision of 5.5.1999 in Case No IV/JV.19-Bertelsmann/Viag/Game Channel,OJ 1999 C186, p8, recital 7。
① 该案当事人进一步认为,由于特别大的岩石破碎机器,比小型岩石破碎机器的价格、重量及生产能力,都要大几乎两倍以上,因而产品替代链将会被中断。参见Commission Decision of 24.1.2001 in Case No Comp/M.2033-Metso/Svedala,OJ 2004 L88, p 1, recital 50 et seq。
① 另外,在BAT/Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni案中,委员会认为,合并后企业的市场份额仍低于25%,因而该项集中不会排除这些市场的有效竞争。参见Commission Decision of 27.6.2008 in Case No COMP/ M.5086-BAT/Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni, recital 24.
② 在Nordic Satellite Distribution案中,委员会根据当事人在挪威有线电视市场上30%的份额以及其他因素,判定存在市场支配地位。参见Commission Decision of 19.7.1995 in Case No IV/M.490-Nordic Satellite Distribution,OJ1996L53, p 20, recital 119 et seq。另外,我们还可参见Commission Decision of 27.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2337-Nestle/Ralston Purina, recitals 44 to 47。
③ 例如,在Krupp/Thyssen.Riva/AST案中,委员会认为,虽然合并双方市场份额相加只有41%,但从竞争者的力量和数量,以及生产能力来看,合并将产生市场支配地位。参见Commission Decision of 21.12.1994 in Case No IV/M.484-Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/AST,OJ 1995,L251, p 18.
④ 例如,在News Corp/Premiere案中,委员会指出,市场份额特别高本身就是证明存在支配地位的证据,特别是当市场上其他经营者的份额非常小时。更具体地说,只要市场份额超过50%,法院就会推定存在市场支配地位。参见Commission Decision of 25.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5121-News Corp/Premiere, recital70。另外,我们还可参见Case T-221/95 Endemol v Commission [1999] ECR Ⅱ-1299, Para 134; Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR 11-5575, para 115.
① 另外,对于结构性因素,委员会在Carnival/P&O Princess案中也进行详细说明：“很明显,合并后企业将在市场上拥有相对较高的份额……但是,仅凭这一点并不足以产生支配地位。英国海洋游轮市场一些具体特征,导致委员会认为合并不会产生竞争问题。参见Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/ M.2706-Carnival/P&O Princess,OJ 2003 L248, p 1, recital 196。
① 横向合并评估指南指出,考察产品是否属于相同市场的因索有：产品特性、地理位置、产品质量、品牌形象、技术规范等。如果产品特性不同,则产品就属于不同市场。即使产品特性相同,但考虑到地理位置、产品质量、品牌形象、技术规范等因素,产品也有可能属于不同市场。因此,相同市场上产品或同质产品,也可能存在上述某个方面差异,这将导致它们的替代性不同。另外,委员会在评估合并时,还根据地理情况来考察相对同质产品的亲密程度。例如,在Kronospan/Constantia案中,委员会认为,考虑到合并双方的相对距离,对它们的消费者而言,合并双方的产品能紧密替代,因此,对斯洛伐克和匈牙利的消费者来说,合并将消除一个最近的竞争者。参见Commission Decision of 19.9.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4525-Kronospan/Constantia, recita155。
② 对于这一点,横向合并指南指出,这个因素对证明低于市场支配地位门槛的单边效果尤为重要。
③ 需求交叉价格弹性测量的是,当所有条件都相同时,产品B价格发生变化对产品A数量变化的影响。参见Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, fn 38。
④ 产品A和B的分流比测试的是,当产品A涨价被产品B发现时,产品A销售额损失的程度。参见Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, fn39。
⑤ 参见Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para 29。
① 在Axalto/Gemplus案中,委员会认为,事实上,对SIM卡生产商来说,创新能力是一种战略。如果创新性SIM卡生产商能推出一种新产品,则它在推出新产品第一年内,就能立刻获得利润。之后,随着越来越多的竞争者能供应这种产品,其价格将急剧下降……在这种背景下,合并双方不可能会减少产品研发。参见Commission Decision of 19.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3998-Axalto/Gemplus, recitals 52,53。
① 在APW/APSA/Nordic Capital/Capio案中,委员会指出,在招投标市场上,如ISTC市场,竞争分析的核心不是当事人的市场份额,而是是否存在一个拥有足够信用度的成熟竞争者,以确保未来合同竞争。参见Commission Decision of 16.3.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4367-APW/APSA/Nordic Capital/Capio, recital 56; Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3436-Continental/Phoenix, recital 126。
② 在BT/INFONET案中,委员会认为,在这个市场上,市场份额的高低,远没有消费者选择替代供应者的能力重要。参见Commission Decision of 25.1.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3641-BT/INFONET, recital 16.
① 在Continental/Phoenix案中,委员会指出,客户和供应者在个人化学团队之间的发展合作关系,是证明现有供应者拥有优势地位的有力证据。参见Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3436-Continental/Phoenix, recital 142。
② 这方面内容,可参见Commission Decision of 30.7.1997 in Case No COMP/M.877-Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas, OJ1997 L336, p16, recital 58; Commission Decision of 2.3.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2256-Philips/ Agilent Health Care Solutions, recital 35; Commission Decision of 2.10.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/ Instrumentarium,recital 125 et seq; Commission Decision of 23.5.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3108-Office Depot/Guibert, recital 21; Commission decision of 13.11.2006in Case No COMP/M.4297-Nokia/ siemens,recital 83。
② 例如,在GE/ENI/Nuovo Pignone (Ⅱ)案中,委员会指出,合并当事人在欧共体燃气涡轮机市场上的产能利用率已超过80%,而在全球燃气涡轮机市场上的产能利用率也达到75到90%。GE和NP的任何涨价行为,都会引起投标合同竞争者使用现有剩余的生产能力。而在Friesland Coberco/Nutritia案中,委员会也指出,乳制品行业剩余的生产能力,将极大地限制合并当事人的涨价行为……参见Commissiom Decision of 6.5.1994 in Case No Ⅳ/M.4494-GE/ENI/Nuovo Pignone (Ⅱ), recital 23; Commission Decision of 10.8.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4094-Ineos/Bp Dormagen, recital 73。
① 在Alcatel/Telettra案中,委员会认为,这里必须要有证据表明,产品提供能迅速扩大,而且这种扩大能达到非常明显的程度……而在Nordic Capital/Convatec案中,委员会也指出,例如,现有竞争者缺乏足够财力来扩大生产,并以此限制合并后企业的市场力量。参见Commission Decision of 12.4.1991 in Case No. IV/M 42-Alcatel/Telettra, recital 23 et seq; Commission Decision of 15.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5190-Nordic Capital/Convatec, recital 64.
① 通过Baumo、 Panza、 Willig、 Spence、 Basumol及Willig等人的努力,可竞争市场理论得到了发展。参见Baumol/Panzar/Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure,1982; Basumol/Willig, Contestability:Developments since the Book,1986:9-36。
② 沉没成本是企业停止生产也不能收回的固定成本,如广告费用。
③ 在技术和规模收益递增的情况下,可竞争市场的特征就不是最优福利结果,即价格等于边际成本,而是次优福利结果,即价格等于平均成本。
④ McAfee、 Mialon、 Williams三人对各种市场进入壁垒的定义进行了概述。参见McAfee/Mialon/Williams, What is a Barrier to Entry? Mimeo,2003.
① Harbord和Hoehn在1994年进行了这样的分类。另外,经济学还使用了其他分类,如法律壁垒、结构性壁垒、及策略性壁垒等。参见Harbord/Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition Policy,1994: 411-435; SchmidtI, Wettbewerbspolitik undKartellrecht,8th edn, Stuttgart,2005:69-73。
① Economides和Priest对竞争政策适用网络效应市场进行了讨论。参见Economides. Competition Policy in Network Industries:An introduction,2004; Priest, Rethinking Antitrust Law in an Age of Network Industries, 2007。
② Baldoni和Masson认为,另一方面,现有企业不愿在市场进入后进行激烈的竞争,因为它将丧失大量从常客那里获得的利润。在这种情况下,广告不能作为市场进入壁垒,因为现有企业不能反应过度。因此,广告等因素是否构成壁垒,要看它们影响程度的高低。参见Schmalensee, Advertising and Entry Deterrence, 1983:636-653。
① 参见横向合并评估指南第68段及以下内容。另外,在Nestle/Perrier案中,委员会也指出,在这里,我们要提出潜在竞争这个问题,首先应考察潜在竞争是否存在竞争性意义,然后再考察是否会发生有效进入,如果发生有效进入,它能否限制两个剩余供应商的市场力量。问题是……它们是否会进入,以及进入到什么样的程度,才能迅速有效限制价格上涨,或阻止维持一个超竞争性的价格……参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1991 inCaseNoIV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier,OJ 1992 L356, P1, recital 91.
② 参见横向合并评估指南第70段的内容。这个定义是经济学家Joe Bain做出来的：一个行业中现有卖家对新进入卖家的竞争优势表现为,现有卖家能在多大程度使其产品价格持续高于竞争性价格,而不会引起新的企业进入到这个行业中来。参见Bain, Barriers to New Competition,1956:P3。
③ 参见Commission Decision of 3.5.2000 in Case No TV/M.1693-Alcoal Reynolds, recital 87; Commission Decision of 11.8.2000 in Case No COMP/M.2016-France Telecom/Orange, recital 33; and Commission Decision of 12.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metsol/Aker Kvaerner, recital 86。
④ 参见Commission Decision of 11.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4691-Schering-Plough/Organon Biosciences, recital 56; Commission Decision of 19.12.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5295-Teva/Barr, recital 25.
⑤ 参见Commission Decision of 23.4.1997 in Case No IV/M.754-Anglo American Corp./Lonrbo (OJ 1998 L149, P21), recital 118 et seq; Commission Decision of 21.12.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3696-E.ON/MOL, recital 286; Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3796-Omya/Huber PCC, recital 356; Case T-282/06-Sun Chemical Group v Commission[2007] ECR II-2149, recital 183.
⑥ 参见Commission Decision of 1.7.1996 in Case No IV/M.774-Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM (OJ 1997 L247, p1), recital 184; Commission Decision of 17.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2547-Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, recital 15; Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvary Montedison/ Aussimont, recital 32; Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvar Montedison/ Ausimont, rectial 32; Commission Decision of 12.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metso/Aker Kvaerner, recital 86; Commission Decision of 11.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4691-Scbering-Plougb/Organon Biosciences, recitals 53 to 55。
① 参见Commission Decision of 11.9.1997 in Case No IV/M.833-The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, recitals 72 to 74; Commission Decision of 15.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4611-Egmont/Bonnier, rectals 39 to 41 ； Commission Decision of 17.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5075-Vienna Insurance Group/EBV, recital 1007; Commission Decision of3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets,recitals 119,121.
② 参见Commision Decision of 21.6.1994 in Case No IV/M.430-Procter Gamble/VP Schickedanz II(OJ 1994 L354,P 32),recital 132; Commission Decision of 26.10.2007 in case No COMP/M4828-Owens Corning/saint-Gobaain Vetrotex,recital 71。
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第71段的内容。
④ 在Nestle/Perrier案中,委员会指出,根据品牌数量和产品种类,法国市场是一个成熟的市场……只有已建立的品牌才有可能长期存在下去,这表明市场进入是一个高风险战略。参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1997in Case No IV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier,OJ1992 L356,P 1.recital 32et seq.
② 参见横向合并评估指南第72段内容,或Commission Decision 14.11.2006 in Case No COMP/M.774-Saz的France/Suez, recital 202。
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第69段内容,或Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No OMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer lingus,recitals 624,626。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第69段内容,或Commission Decision of 1.7.1996 in Case No Ⅳ/M. 774-Saint-Gobain/Wacker-chemie/NOM,OJ 1997 L247,P],recital 184; Commision Decision of 19.11.2004 in Case No COMP.3544-Bayer Healthcare/Roche(OTCBusiness),recital 55; Commission Decision of 7.1.2004 in Case No OMP/M.2978-Lagardere/Natexis/VUP,recital 654; Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer lingus recital 623。
⑤ 参见横向合并评估指南第70段内容。
⑥ 参见横向合并评估指南第74段的内容。
⑦ 参见横向合并评估指南第74段的内容,或Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No Ⅳ/M.315-Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, OJ 1994L 102.P 15, recital 119; Commission Decision of 3.5.2000 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1693-Alcoa/Reynolds, OJ 2002 L58 P 25, recital 32; Commission Decision of 19.9.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4525-kronospan/Constantia,Recital 71.
⑧ 参见横向合并评估指南第74段的内容。
⑨ 参见横向合并评估指南第75段的内容,或Commission Decision of 14.5.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4854-Tom Tom/Tele Atlas recital 161.
① 参见横向合并评估指南第64到67段的内容,或Commission Decision of 11.9.1997 in Case No IV/M.833-The coca-cola Company/Carlsberg A/S,OJ1998 L145 p41,recital 81; Commission decision of 25.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1225-Enso/Stara,OJ 1999 L254 P 9,recital 84 et seq; Commission Decision of 3.8.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4750-Luvata/Eco, recital 44.
② 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容。
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容,或Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerize/Cumerio. recitals 151,152。
⑤ 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容,或Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/m1882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003 L70,p35, recital 76; Commission Decision of 4.12.2007 in Case No COMP/M. 4662-Syniverse/BSG,recital 102。
② 参见横向合并评估指南第65段的内容,或Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M 1882-Pirelli/BICC, OJ 2003 L70, P 35, recital 76.
③ 参见横向合并评估指南第67段的内容。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第67段的内容,或Commission Decision of 12.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M 4057-Korsnas/Assidoman Cartonboard, recital 52。
① GWB第二次修订草案解释备忘录中提到了,Bundeskatellamt在合并控制中,考察支配地位所采用的解释原则.参见BT-Drs.265/71 p21。
② 参见Explanatory memorandum BT-Drs 365/71 p 22。
③ 参见BGH judgment of 12.12.1978-Erdgas schwaben WuW/E BGH 1533,1535或Kgiudgment of 18.3.1998-Philipp Holzmann/Hochtief Wu W/E DE-R 9496;或BT-Drs on 2nd revision of the GWB VI/2520 p 21。
④ 参见BGH judgments of 3.7.1976-Vitamin B12 WuW/E BGH 1435,1439或BGH judgments of 16.12. 1976-Valium Wu W/E BGH 1445,1449或BGH judgments of 2121978-kfz-kupplungen WuW/E BGH 1501,1506 et seq或BKartA decision of 10.12.2002-Tagesspiegel/Berliner Zeitung WuW/E DE-V 695,697.
① 参见BGH judgments of 2.12.1980.WU E/E BGH 1749,1755或BGH judgments of 13.07.2004-Sanacorp/ ANZAG WU W/E DE-R 1302,1303或BKartA decisions of 14.3.2002-Pfleiderer AG/Hornitex-Werke,B1-20/02, para 26或BKartA decisions of 23.3.2005-Rbon-Klinikum/Krankenbaus Eisenbuttenstadt, B10-109/04, para 113。
② 参见BGH judgments of 28.4.1992-Kaufbf/Saturn, WUW/E BGH 2771,2773或KG judgment of 22.11.1979,Wu W/E OLG 2457，2458或BKartAdecision of 30.6.1978-RWE/Energieversorgung Leverkusen, WuW/E BKartA 1727,1729.
① 另外,对于这方面的论述,我们还可参见BKartA decision of 14.3.2002-Pfleiderer AG/Hornitex-Werke,B1-20/02, papa 26; BKartA decision of 25.8.2005-EDEKA/SPAP B9-27/05, P 30 et seq。
① 例如,在DB Regioiistra案中,BGH指出,事实上,不论DB Regio在印花布市场上的份额是否巨大,它都能赢得49%的合同,这表明相对于其他合同授予而言,DB Regio拥有巨大的竞争优势,因而它的竞争者不能充分限制其自由行动。参见BGH judgment of 7.2.2006-DB Regioiistra, WuW/EDE-R 1681,1689 et seq.
② 对于这方面,我们可参见BKartA decision of 23.12.2005 in Adobe/Macromedia, WuW/E DE-V 1221,1222 et seq; BKartA decision of 11.5.2007 in KLA-Tencor/Therma-Wave,WuW/E DE-V 1425,1428。
① 如果市场上企业存在实质竞争,即便市场集中度很高,企业市场力量也不会很大,有时甚至可能没有市场力量。例如,在同质产品价格竞争的情况下,市场结果就与完全竞争下的相同。
② 关于在横向合并分析中,如何看待市场集中度的问题,Baker进行了全面概述。参见Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Merger,2008.
③ 对于这一点,我们可参见Ivaldi、 Jullien、 Rey、 Seabright、 Tirole等人的论述。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Case T-2/93 Air France v Commission [1994]ECR 11-323, para 78 et seq; Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999]ECR 11-753, paras 170,180,193。
② 例如,在Office Depot/Guilbert案中,委员会指出,如果相关产品市场是全国范围内的文具店,则Office Depot和Guilbert的市场份额相加在0到5%之间,这对正确评估合并的竞争性效果微不足道。但是,委员会认为,我们应着眼的是未来的竞争状况,而不是现在。根据Office Depot和Guilbert的商业计划和销售预测,随着Guilbert的积极扶植,Office Depot现有市场地位极有可能得到明显改善。参见Commission Decision of 23.5.2003.in Case No COMP/M.3108-Office Depot/Guilbert, recital 33.
① 虽然Dutch Toys'R'Us在市场上经营不善,而且还有财政困难,但其产品还是有很大的市场潜力,特别是在Blokker的帮助之下,因为Blokker拥有必要的专业知识。参见Commission Decision of26.6.1997 in Case No COMP/M 890-Blokker/Toys'R'Us,OJ 1998 L316 P 1.recital 95.
② 相关详细内容,我们可参见委员会以下几个裁决中的内容：Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1672-Volvo/Scania,OJ2001 L143, p 74, recital 116 et seq; Commission Decision of 14.2.1995 in Case No IV/M. 477-Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer,OJ 1995 L211, p 1, recital 63 et seq; Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC,OJ 2003 L70, p 35, recital 71。
③ 另外,当事人指出,由于一些客户不愿意在审计和会计工作上,与Andersen保持合作伙伴关系,因而即使在合并后,Andersen France现有一些与大型上市公司的合同也将面临解除的威胁。参见Commission Decision of 5.9.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2816-Ernst&Young France/Andersen France, recital 64。
② 在这里,合并后企业所降低的成本必须足够大,以至于它所获得的利润,高于其他企业利润的总和。参见Farell/Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers:An Equilibrium Analysis,1990:107-126。
② FTC press release of 7.7.2000, File No 001-0131,http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/heinz.htm,于2011年12月9日访问。
② 另一个原因是,实质性测试与委员会禁止的GE/Honeywell合并案相矛盾,即便美国竞争机构曾授权委员会这么做。问题是,这种矛盾是否会引起不同禁止合并的实质测试。参见Boge, Reform der Europaischen Fusionskontrolle,2004:138-148。
① 对于这个问题,我们可参见英国贸易和工业部回应的37段内容。http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ mergers/review/comments/ref015 dti.pdf。访问时间：2011年8月15日。
① 参见欧盟2004/139号合并规则的内容。
① 对于linear需求系统而言,需求函数是稍微弯曲的,因而合并将导致产品价格上涨很小。在log-linear或AIDS需求系统中,曲线率将更加明显,因而它们预测价格上涨将更大。这些模型在评估价格弹性时,也会得出相似的结论,即价格弹性越低,产品价格上涨幅度越大。参见Crooke/Froeb/Tshantz/Werden, Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria， 1999:205-217。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 12.12.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4187-Metso/Aker Kuaerner, recital 79; Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lingus, recital 342。
② 可参见Commission Decision of 22.8.2000 in Case No COMP/M.2044-Interbrew/Bass,recital 65 et seq； Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recitals 133 and 138。
① 参见横向合并评估指南第28段及以下内容,或Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M. 4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recitals 110 to 112.
① 为了确定合并双方的市场份额是高估还低估了其市场力量,委员会对招投标市场的竞争特性进行了深入分析。第一,根据这些投标竞争取决于现有竞争者的数量和身份,我们可以仔细审查这些市场主体相互竞标的频率。第二,不同产品市场的竞争远比紧密相互替代竞争者的竞争激烈,因而我们可以从定性和定量方面,进一步分析相互替代的紧密程度。第三,委员会试图根据可用数据来确定合并对价格的影响。参见Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/Instrumentarium,OJ 2004 L109,p1, recital 125。
① 这种分析的数据包括合并双方和竞争者所提供的电子文件,以及一系列发票和工作文件。根据这些有用数据,委员会将运用各种计量经济学模型,主要是多变量线性回归,来测量GE和Instrumentarium合并对价格的影响。参见Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/Instrumentarium,OJ 2004 L109,p1, recital 168。
① 上一个禁止的案件是,委员会于2004年9月禁止的ENI/EDP/GDP案。参见Commission Decision in Case No COMP/M.3440-ENI/EDP/GDP.
① 我们可参见Commission Decision of 2.3.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2256-Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions, recital 36 et seq： Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE Instrumentalism, OJ 2004 L4109, p1, recital 243 et seq。
① 但是,如果一次性博弈产生了多个不同收益的纳什均衡,则表明合作是通过多次反复行为才达成的的。另外,有时信息不对称也有助于合作的达成。参见Benoit/Krishna, Finitely Repeated Games,1985:890-904; Kreps/Milgrom/Wilson/Roberts, Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners,1982,245-252。
① 参见OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 7.5.2008-Cargotec, printed version p 21; OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 26.11.2008-Phonak/Resound, Wu W/E DE-R 2477,2488; OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 3.12.2008-springer/ ProSiebenSatl, printed version p 10。
② 参见OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 7.5.2008-Cargotec, printed version p 21; OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 3.12.2008-Springer/ProSiebenSatl, printed version p 10。
③ 参见KG judgment of 1.7.1983-Morris/Rothmans, WuW/E OLG 3051,2080 et seq; BKartA decision of 23.9.1985-NUR/ITS, AG 1986,377,379; Immenga/Mestmacker/Mestmacker/Veelken, Gesetz gegen Wettbe-werbsbeschriinkungen, Kommentar,4th edn, Munich,2007:Paragraph 36, item 172 et seq.
① 同样,如果市场上的资源稀少,则企业们也很难达成协调行为。OPEC卡特尔一个实证调查表明,石油存储量有限是某些卡特尔成员背离卡特尔协议的主要原因。参见Griffin/Xiong, The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC,1997:289-316。
① 对于这个结论,委员会参照另外两个案件的做法,我们可参见Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3439-AGFA Gevaert/Lastra, recital 110; Commission Decision of 4.12.2007 in Case No COMP/ M.4662-Syniverse/BSG, recital 108.
② 但是,如果一个企业不能确定博弈是否将继续进行,则贴现因素值将会下降。另外,企业对待风险的态度,也将影响到贴现因素值。
① 参见Abreu D,Extremal Equilibria 0f OligOpolistic Supergames.J0urnal 0f Economic Thenrv Vnl39 1986 191-225；on the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting.Econo-metrica Vo156 1988 383-396, Hackner J,Optimal Symmetric Punishments in a Bertrand Differentiated Product Duopoly.International 0fIndustrial Organization Vo14,1996,611-630；Lambsonv E.Optimal Penal Codes in Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints',Review of Economic Studies Vo154.1987.385-397,Some Results on 0ptimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames.Journal 0f Economic Thenrv Vn162 1994 ,444-468, Optimal Penal Codes in Nearly Symmetric Bertrand Supergames with capacity Constraints Journal of Mathematical Economies V0124,1995,1-22。
① 参见横向合并评估指南第52到55段的内容,或Commission Decision of 20.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M. 2533-BP/E.ON, recitals 106 to 115; Commission Decision of 27.10.2000in Case No COMP/M.2111-Alcoa/ British aluminium, recital 14,
② 我们可参见Commission Deision of 28.6.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1741-MCI Worldcom/Snrint. OJ 2003L300, p1, recita1280; Commission Decision of 12.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4057-Korsnas/AssiDoman Cartonboard, recital 80。
③ 我们可参见Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam/American National Can. recital 24; Commission Decision of 4.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4600-TUI/First Choice, recitals 110.116,124; Commission Decision of 17.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5114-Pernod Ricard/Ves. recital 107。
④ 参见横向合并评估指南第54段的内容,或 Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M.1313-Danish Crown.Vestjyske Slagterier,OJ 2000 L20, p 1, recital 177; Commission Decision of 6.6.2006 in Case No COMPM.4141-Linde/BOC, recital 146。
② 尽管委员会承认了市场透明度的这种双重作用,但在实践中,它还是倾向于以一般的方式,来评估市场透明度的结构性因素。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L103, p 1, recital 474.
③ 参见Commission Decision of 4.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4600-TUI/First Choice, recital 112; Commission Decision of 11.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5020-Lesaffre/GBI UK, recital 44.
④ 参见Commission Decision of 23.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5047-REWE/ADEG, recital 74; Commission Decision of 17.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5114-Pernod Ricard/V S, recital 108.
① 参见Commission Decision of 3.2.1994 in Case No IV/M.399-Rhone Poulenc-SNLA/Nordfaser, recital 24; Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.358-Pilkington-Pilkington-Techint/SIV,OJ 1994 L158, p 24, recitals 486,525,588 。
② 参见Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho,OJ 1997 L30, p 1, recital 158; Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L 103, p 1, recital 487; Commission Decision of 18.1.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1630-Air Liquide/BOC, recital 102; Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recital 82；Commission Decision of 19.7.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, recital 114.
① 如果市场上企业多,则它们从共谋中获得的好处就少,因为它们每个企业在共谋利益中的份额更少。因此,企业背离协调行为获得好处就更多,因为企业实施背离行为,将减少其他企业从共谋中获得的好处,并使能获得更多的好处。总之,这意味着将有更多的企业背离协调行为。而不是坚持和履行共谋协议。参见Europe Economics,2001:21。
② 例如,在Exxon/Mobil案的裁决中,委员会指出,总体说来,应注意的是,在一个寡头垄断市场上,如果寡头垄断成员越多,则成员背离或叛逃的风险就越大,这是无可争议的。在这里,我们应该注意的是,委员会将术语“寡头垄断”等同于相关市场上,一群从事默示协调行为的企业。参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1393-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L103, p 1, recital 466。
① 但Capuano认为,如果寡头垄断面临竞争边缘,这将使其更容易维持协调行为,即竞争边缘被视为是一个促进共谋的因素。参见Capuano, Abuse of Competitive Fringe同， University of Naples, Nora di Lavoro 91, 2005 。
② 参见Commission Decision of 10.2.1995 in Case No IV/M.533-TWD/Akzo Nobel/Kuagtextil,OJ 1995 C46, p 5, recital 26; Commission Decision of 30.1.2008 in Case NoCOMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling, recital 183。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No iV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil.OJ 2004 L 103, p 1; Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1532-BP Amoco/Amoco/Arco, OJ 2000 L18, p 1; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2499-NorskeSkog/Parenco/Walsum, OJ2002 L233,p38; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,OJ 2002 L233, p 38; Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/Coopers Lybrand,OJ 1999 L50, p 27; Commission Decision of 25.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1225-Enso/Stora,OJ 1999 L254, p 9。
① 但是,如果企业能相互对称,则它们的价格将会趋同,即价格集中在一个点上。参见Scherer/Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,1990:238。
② 这种单向补偿由货币转移支付组成,但如果企业在不同市场上经营,则这种补偿可能通过优惠措施来实现。参见Ivaldi/Jullien/Rey/Seabright/Tirole, The Economics of Unilateral Effects, Interim Report for DG Competition,2003。
③ 很多研究结果已经证实,如果企业成本结构对称,则它们就很有可能进行合作。参见Mason/Philips/ Nowell, Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets:An Experimental Evaluation,1992:662-671。
④ 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier,OJ 1992 L 356, p 1, recital 63; Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrbo, OJ 1997 L 11, p 30, recital 205; Commission Decision of 22.9.2000in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice,OJ 2000 L93, p 1, recital 99; Commission Decision of 13.6.2000 in Case No IV/M.1673-VEBA/VIAG, OJ 2001 L 188, p 1, recital 75; Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/Auwarter, recital 56; Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.315-Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, OJ 1994 L102, p 15, recital 68 et seq; Commission Decision of 28.10.1999 in Case No IV/M.1571-New Holland/Case,recita145; Commission Decision of 28.10.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L 103, p 1, recital 476 et seq; Commission Decision of 11.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Holland/Case, recital 89 to 94。
⑤ 参见Commission Decision of 1.3.1993 in Case No IV/M.331-Fletcher Challenge/Methanex, recital 26; Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/Auwarter, recital 56; Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L103, p1, recital 476。
① 参见Commission Decision of 14.10.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2965-Staples/Guilbert, recital 20; Commission Decision of 19.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4170-LSG Lufthansa Service Holding/Gate Gourmet Switzerland, recital 42。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV.M.1383-Exxon/Mobil,OJ 2004 L 103, p 1, recital 478; Commission Decision of 21.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue,OJ 2002 L 57, p 1, recital 148,
② Rosenbaum旨出,一项美国铝生产行业的研究表明,生产能力过剩与企业利润的大小呈正对应关系。参见Rosenbaum, An Empirical Test of the Effect of Excess Capacity in Price Setting,1989:231-241。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, recital187; Commission Decision of 21.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice, recital 56; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,OJ 2002 L233, p 38, recital 127 et seq; Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRg/Caemi, recitals 238 to 246.
② 例如,在Rexam/American National Can案件,委员会指出,如果两个企业在生产能力上的对称性很高,则它们将没有动力去背离共谋行为,因而它们能维持较高的共谋价格。参见Conmmission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam/American National Can, recital 18。
③ 例如,在Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam案中,委员会指出,供应商们在产品销售能力上的不对称,以及生产能力过剩表明,不存在一个寡头市场均衡,这将导致共谋行为不可能持续很长时间。参见Commission Decision of 28.9.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2542-Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam, recital 18。
① 对于这一点,我们可参见Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recita158 et seq; Commission Decision of 6.6.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4141-Linde/BOG recital 146; Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-NorddeutscheAffinerie/Cumerio, recital 188。
② 对于合资公司这方面的内容,我们可参见Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil, OJ 2004 L103, p 1, recital 480; Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No 1V/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recital 58 et seq; Commission Decision of 2 I.11.2000 in Case No COM P/M.2499-Norske Skog/Parenco/Walsum,OJ 2002 L233, p 38, recitals 95 to 99; Commission Decision of 6.6.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4141-Linde/BOC, recital 144 et seq。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision oflS.10.1995 in Case No IV/M.580-ABB/Daimler Benz, recital 97: Commission Decision of 18.10.1995 in Case No IV/M.630-Henkel/Schwarzkopfi recital 32。
② 参见横向合并评估指南第56段的内容。
② Gallice认为,如果产品价格非常分散,则需求函数的形状将会影响到协调均衡的稳定性。参见Gallice, The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion, CPER Discussion Paper No 6975,2008。
① 对于这方面,我们可参见Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No 1V/M.190-Nestlg/Perrier,OJ 1992 L356, p 1, recital 124; Commission Decision of 20.5.1998 in Case No IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/Coopers &Lybrand,OJ 1999 L50, p 27, recital 99; Commission Decision of 22.9.2000 in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice, OJ 2000 L93, p 1, (annulled in Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR Ⅱ-2585); Commission Decision in Case No IV/M.1673-VEBA/VIAG, OJ 2001 L188, p 1, recital 84; Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvay Montedison/Ausimont, recital 49, p83; Commission Decision of24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997 L 11, p 30, recital 50 etseq; Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M.1313-Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ 2000 L20, p 1, recital 28; Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl, OJ 2002 L233, p38, recital 88, fn 35.
① 参见Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, OJ 2008 C265, pp 6-25。
② 参见非横向合并评估指南第11到12段的内容。
③ 参见非横向合并评估指南第13到14段的内容。
④ 参见非横向合并评估指南第26段的内容。
⑤ 参见非横向合并评估指南第23、25、27段的内容。
⑥ 参见非横向合并评估指南第31段的内容。
⑦ 参见非横向合并评估指南第34、35、39段的内容。
⑧ 参见非横向合并评估指南第41段的内容。
⑨ 参见非横向合并评估指南第47段和第16段的内容。
⑩ 参见非横向合并评估指南第52段及以下的内容。
11 参见非横向合并评估指南第58段的内容。
① 参见非横向合并评估指南第61、67、68段的内容。
② 参见非横向合并评估指南第77段的内容。
③ 参见非横向合并评估指南第93段的内容。
④ 参见非横向合并评估指南第110、46段的内容。
⑤ 参见非横向合并评估指南第118段的内容。
⑥ 参见非横向合并评估指南第117段的内容。
⑦ 参见非横向合并评估指南第84、86、121段的内容。
[1][美]赫伯特·霍温坎普,许光耀等译.联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践(第3版).北京：法律出版社,2009,3,541
[2][德]卡尔·拉伦茨,陈爱娥译.法学方法论.北京：商务印书馆,2003,2
[3]陈金钊.法律解释的艺术——一种微观的法治实现方式.法商研究,2009(5)： 28-36
[4]“中华人民共和国商务部公告2009年第22号：商务部关于禁止可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司审查决定的公告”.参见http://www.mofcom. go v. cn/ aarticle/b/c/200903/20090306108617.html
[5][荷]伊芙琳·T·菲特丽丝著,张其山等译.法律论证原理——司法裁决之证立理论概览.北京：商务印书馆,2005,1
[6][美]波斯纳,孙秋宁译.反托拉斯法(第2版).北京：中国政法大学出版社,2003,2
[7]陈秀山.现代竞争理论与竞争政策.北京：商务印书馆,1997,36,41,44,49,51,55,56,60
[8]王晓晔.企业合并中的反垄断问题.北京：法律出版社,1996,19
[9][美]约瑟夫·阿洛伊斯·熊彼特,叶华译.经济发展理论——对利润、资本、信贷、利息和经济周期的探究.北京：中国社会科学出版社,2009,209
[10]周茂荣,辜海笑.新产业组织理论的兴起对美国反托拉斯政策的影响.国外社会科学,2003(4)：50-55
[11]任建新.美国反垄断思想的新发展——芝加哥学派与后芝加哥学派的比较.环球法律评论,2004(2),234-245
[12][英]亚当·斯密,郭大力、王亚南译.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上卷).北京：商务印书馆,1997,5
[13]王瑶.斯密定理和规模经济——试论马歇尔冲突是一伪命题.经济学动态,2011(5)：145-150
[14]姜华.对规模经济与企业竞争力理论的再认识.鞍山科技大学学报,2003(3)： 221-224
[15][美]阿尔弗里德·马歇尔,朱志泰译.经济学原理(上卷).北京：商务印书馆,1965,290-291
[16]俞哲、张子饮.基于C-D生产函数模型的商丘市农业要素集中化趋势研究.中国集体经济,2009(3)：92-93
[17][美]阿尔弗里德·马歇尔,陈良壁译.经济学原理(下卷).北京：商务印书馆,1964,155
[18][美]保罗·萨缪尔森、威廉·诺德豪斯,萧琛等译.经济学(第19版).北京：商务印书馆,2012,91
[19]陈勇敢.对科斯《企业的性质》再思考.现代企业教育,2010(8)：90-91
[20]盛宇明.科斯《企业的性质》之质疑.经济学家,2003(1)：70-85
[21][英]安德鲁·坎贝尔,任通海等译.战略协同(第2版).北京：机械工业出版社,2000,77
[22]杨世坤.银行并购协同效应陷阱及防范.商业时代,2009(5)：89-90
[23]王泰铨.欧洲事业法(二)——欧洲竞争规范.台北：五南图书出版公司,2000,257
[24]徐孟洲,孟雁北.竞争法.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008,201-202
[25]McTamney v. Stolt Tankers & Terminals,678 F.Supp. E.D.Pa.1987,118
[26]Lucas Automotive Engineering v. Bridgestone/Firestone.9th Cir.1998,140 F.3d 1228
[27]Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Fed.Cir.1997,114 F.3d 1547,1997-1 Trade Cas. 71824
[28]尚明主编.主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编.北京：法律出版社,2004,186,188
[29]G. Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?.28 J.L.& Econ.77,1985,93
[30][美]欧内斯特·盖尔霍恩、威廉姆·科瓦契奇、斯蒂芬·卡尔金斯,任勇、邓志松等译.反垄断法与经济学(第5版).北京：法律出版社,2009,343
[31]Frederick R. Warren-Boulton. The Contirbution of the Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of Non-Horizontal Mergers, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/ 11709.htm,2011-10-09
[32]孙晋.反垄断法——制度与原理.武汉：武汉大学出版社,2010,127
[33]吕明瑜.竞争法.北京：法律出版社,2004,167-169
[34][日]根岸哲、舟田正之,王为农、陈杰译.日本禁止垄断法概论(第3版).北京：中国法制出版社,2007,86,87,127,129,131
[35]时建中.三十一国竞争法.北京：中国政法大学出版社,2009,163-164
[36][日]村上政博,姜姗译.日本禁止垄断法.北京：法律出版社,2008,179-180
[37]高菲.美国反托拉斯法及域外适用.广州：中山大学出版社,1993,25
[38]许光耀.欧共体竞争法通论.武汉：武汉大学出版社,2006,70
[39][西]安德雷斯·冯特·葛拉雷兹、爱德娜·纳瓦罗·瓦罗纳,解琳、叶军译.欧盟 企业合并控制制度——法律、经济与实践分析(第2版).北京：法律出版社,2009,10,15,24,26,30,31,32
[40]Air France/Sabena. Case IV/M517.1992,1134
[41]Arjomari-Prioux/Wiggings Teape. Case IV/M025.1991,4 C. M. L. R.8
[42]阮方民.欧盟竞争法.北京：中国政法大学出版社,1998，214,225
[43]刘和平.欧盟并购控制法律制度研究.北京：北京大学出版社,2006,55
[44]Pepall L, D J Richards, G Norman. Industrial Organization. Contemporary Theory and Practice (2nd edn).Mason:Ohio Press,2002,605 et seq
[45]Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy, DG Competition, Brussels 2002, available at:http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary en. pdf
[46]The Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers. OJ 2004 C31, p 5, para 8
[47]Case T-102/96-Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-973, para 200
[48]Case No IV/M.053-Aerospatiale/De Havilland, OJ 1991 L334, p42, recital 69
[49]Case No COMP/M.2187-CVC/Lenzing, OJ2004L82, p20, recital 161 et seq
[50]Case No COMP/M.3216-Oracle/People Soft, recitals 191,205
[51]George J. Stigler. The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly.72 AM. Econ. REV.19,1982:386-405
[52]Church,Ware. Industrial and Organization.A Strategic Approach. Boston:Boston Press,2000,605-606
[53]Werden.G. Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis. Antitrust Law Journal V0I66,1998:363-414
[54]Scheffman. Statistical Measures of Market Power:Uses and Abuses. Antitrust Law Journal V0I6O,1998,901-919
[55]Motta. Competition Policy. London:Cambridge University Press,2004,107
[56]Van den Bergh, R J. Modern Industrial Organisation Versus Old Fashioned European Competition Law. European Competition Law Review Vol 17,1996, 75-87
[57]Padilla.A J. The Role of Supply-Side Substitution in the Definition of the Relevant Market in Merger Control. Report for DG Enterprise A/4, European Commission,2001,26 et seq
[58]Bishop.The Modernization of DGIV. European Competition Law Review Voll 8, 1997,481-484
[59]Office of Fair Trading. The Role of Market Definition in Monopoly and Dominance Inquiries. Economic Disscussion Paper2,2001,10
[60]Werden. A Closer Analysis of Antitrust Markets. Washington University Law Quarterly Vo162,1984,647-669
[61]Bishop B, M Walker. The Economics of EC Competition Law:Concepts, Application and Measuremen. London:London Press,2002,95,114,122-123, 323-326,382
[62]Camesaasa P D, R J Van den Bergh. Achilles Uncovered:Revisiting the European Commission's 1997 Market Definition Guideliness. Antitrust Bulletin Vol47,2002,143-186
[63]Haldrup N, P Mollhaard, C K Nielsen. Sequential verus Simultaneous Market Delineation:The Relevant Market for Salmon. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol4,2008,893-913
[64]Baker S, A Coscelli. The Role of Market Shares in Differentiated Products Markets. European Competition Law Review Vol 20,1999,412-419
[65]Baker S, L Wu. Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European Commission. European Competition Law Review Vol 19,1998,273-280
[66]Glick M A, D J Cameron, D G Mangum. Importing the Merger Guidelines Market Test in Section 2 Cases:Potential Benefits and Limitations. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 42,1997,121-150
[67]Maisel L C. Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases. Georgetown Law Review Vol 71,1983,39-71
[68]Frankena M W. Geographic Market Delineation for Electric Utility Mergers. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 46,2001,357-401
[69]Bauer J P. Antitrust Implications of Aftermarkets. Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 06-14,2006,743
[70]Klein B. Market Power in Franchise Cases in Wake of Kodak:Applying Post-Contract Hold-Up Analysis to Vertical Relationships. Antitrust Law Journal Vol 70,1999,283-362
[71]Klein B. Market Power in Aftermarkets, in:Mc Chesney, Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs. The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust, Chichester,1998, 47-68
[72]Gilbert R, S C Sunshine. Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis:The Use of Innovation Markets. Antitrust Law Journal Vol 63,1995, 569-601
[73]Filistrucchi L. A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets:Some Theoretical Considerations. Net Institute Working Paper 08-34,2008,516-545
[/4j Evans DS, M D Noel. Defining Antitrust Markets when Firms Operate Multi-Sided Platforms. Columbia Business Law Review Vol 3,2005,667-701
[75]Stocking G W, W F Mueller. The Cellophane Case and the New Competition. American Economic Review Vol 45,1955,29-63
[76]Werden G. Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines:Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches. Review of Industrial Organization Vol 16,2000, 211-218
[77]Office of Fair Trading. The Role of Market Definition in Monopoly and Dominance Inquiries. Economic Disscussion Paper2,2001,20-30
[78]Werden G. Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis. Antitrust Law Journal Vol 66,1998,363-414,389-390
[79]Langefeld J, W Li. Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 46,2001,299-337
[80]Katz M, C Shapiro. Critical Loss:Let's Tell the Whole Story. Antitrust Magazine Vol 17,2003,49-56
[81]Strand N. A Simple Critical Loss Test for the Geographical Market. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 2,2002,697-707
[82]Evans D S, M D Noel. The Analysis of Merger that Involve Multi-sided Platform Businesses. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 4,2008,663-695
[83]Shapiro C. Mergers with Differentiated Products. Antitrust Vol 10,1996,23-30
[84]Lexecon. An Introduction to Quantitative Tchniques in Competition Analysis, Lindsay, A (2006) The EC Merger RegulationSubstantive Issues,2nd edn. London:London Press,2006,7,9-13
;85] Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 495, para 32
86] Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law OJ 1997, C372, p 5, para 7,13,55
87] Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979]ECR 461, para 3 of summary
88] Case 31/80 L'Oreal v DeNieuwe AMCK [1980] ECR 3775, para 25
89] Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 495, para 32
90] Case No IV/36.539-British Interactive Broadcasting/Open OJ 1999, L312, pi, recital 13
91] Case No IV/M.053-Aeropatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, para 8 et seq OJ 1991, L334, p42
[92]Case T-177/04 Easy Jet v Commission [2006] ECR 11-1931, para 104
[93]Case No COMP/M.3280-Air France/KLM, OJ2004, L60, p5, recital 28
[94]Case No COMP/M.2662-Danish Crown/Steff-Houlberg, recital 43
[95]Case No COMP/M.4403-Thales/Finmeccanical/AAS/Telespazio, recitals 56, 62,69,71
[96]Form CO pursuant to the Merger Regulation No 139/2004 OJ 2004, L133, p9, at 15 et seq
[97]Case No COMP/M 2662-Danish Crown/Steff-Houlberg, OJ2002, L14.2, recital 43
[98]Case No COMP/M.2420-Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi OJ 2004, L92, p 50
[99]KG judgment of 1.12.1976-Kfz-Kupplungen, WuW/E OLG 1745,1749
[100]BGH judgment of 26.10.1972-Registrierkassen, WuW/E BGH 1238,1241
[101]BGH judgment of 3.7.1976-Vitamin-B-12, WuW/E BGH 1435,1440
[102]BGH judgment of 16.12.1976-Valium, WuW/E BGH 1445,1447 et seq
[103]KG judgment of 18.2.1969, WuW/EOLG995,1025 et seq
[104]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 27.10.2004-Tagesspiege/Berliner Zeitung II, WuW/EDE-R 1361,1362,1363 et seq
[105]BGH judgment of 24.10.1995-Backofenmarkt, NJW 1996,595,596
[106]KG judgment of 18.3.1998-Philipp Holzmann/Hochtief, AG 1998,483,484
[107]BGH judgment of 5.10.2004-Staubsugerbeutelmarkt, WuW/E DE-R 1355,1357
[108]BGH judgment of 16.1.2007-National Geographic II, WuW/E DE-R 1925,1928
[109]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 27.10.2004-Tagesspiege/Berliner Zeitung II, WuW/E DE-R 1361,1363
[110]BGH judgment of 13.7.2004-Sanacorp/ANZAG, WuW/E DE-R 13011,1302
[111]OLG Dussildorf judgment of 29.9.2006-Sanacorp/ANZAG,WuW/E DE-R 1033, 1987,1988
[112]BGH judgment of 24.10.1995-Backofenmarkt, NJW 1996,595
[113]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 15.11.2000-Fetting, WuW/E DE-R 619,622
[114]Kart A decision of 11.2.2000-Durr/Alstom, WuW/E DE-V 235,237
[115]BGH judgment of 5.10.2004-Staubsaugerbertelmarkt, WuW/E DE-R 1355, 1359,1360
[116]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M,2187-CVC/ Lenzing, OJ2004, L82, p20, recitals 24,32,67,68,136,137
[117]Commission Decision of 30.9.1992 in Case No IV/M.214-Du pont/ICI, recital 23
[118]Commission Decision of 28.10.1999 in Case No IV/M.1571-New Holland/Case, recitals64,65
[119]Commission Decision of 29.9.1999 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1383-Exxon/Mobil, OJ 2004, L103, p 1
[120]Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1806-Astra Zeneca/Novartis, OJ 2004, L110, p1, recital 43
[121]Commission Decision of 6.5.1998 in Case No IV/M.970-TKS/ITW Signode/Titan, OJ 1998,316, p33, recital 40
[122]Commission Decision of 25.6.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2817-Barilla/ BPL/Kamps, recital 14,15
[123]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ2003, L248, p1, recital 31, footnote12
[124]Commission Decision of 14.7.1999 in Case No IV/34.780-Virgin/British Airways, OJ 2000 L30, p1, recital 53,70
[125]Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio, recitals 42 and 43
[126]Commission Decision of 30.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3149-Procter &Gamble/Wella, recital 38, recital 38 et seq, fn12
[127]Commission Decision of 30,1,2008 in Case No COMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling, recital 102 et seq,148,149
[128]Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law OJ 1997, C372, p5, para 16
[129]Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2420, OJ 2004, L92, p50
[130]BKart A decision of 2.12.2003-DB Regio et alliistra intalliance AG, published version, p16
[131]BKart A decision of 27.9.2001-Dentsply/Degussa,published version, p 21, para 59
[132]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 11.4.2007-Rbon-Grabfeld, WuW/E DE-R 1958, 1968
[133]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 7.5.2008-Cargotec, printed version p 21; GH judgment of 11.11,2008-E.ON/Stadtwerke Eschwege, WuW/E DE-R 2451,2454
[134]BGH judgment of 4.3.2008-Soda ClubII, WuW/DE-R 2268,2271
[135]Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No Ⅳ/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997, L11, p30
[136]Commission Decision of 9.3.1999 in Case No IV/M1313-Danish Crown/ Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ2000, L20, pl, recital 29
[137]Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.623-Kimberly-Clar/Scott, OJ 1996 L183, p1
[138]Commission Decision of 31.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue, OJ2002 L57, p1
[139]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M..2187-CVC /Lenzing, OJ 2004 L82, p20, recital 72
[140]Commission Decision of 17.12.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5141-KLM/ Martinair, recitals 139,255,273 et seq
[141]BKart A decision of 20.11.2001-trans-o-flex/Deutsche Post, WuW/E DE-V 501, published version, p24
[142]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 13.8.2003-trans-o-flex/Deutsche Post, AG 2004, 100,101 et seq
[143]Commission Decision of 4.12.1996 in Case No IV/M.774-Saint-Gobain/ Wacker-Cbemie/NOM, OJ 1997, L247, p1
[144]Commission Decision of 22.9.1999 in Case No IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice, OJ2000L93, p1, recital 22,23 et seq
[145]Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECRU-2585, para 29 et seq
[146]Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190-Nestle/Perrier, OJ 1992, L356, p1, recital 13
[147]KG judgment of 28.8.1979, WuW/E OLG 2182,2183
[148]KG judgment of 24.4.1985, WuW/E OLG 3577
[149]BGH judgment of 25.6.1985, WuW/E BGH 2150
[150]BGH judgment of 22.9.1987-Gruner+Jahr-Zeit II, WuW/E BGH 2433,2437 et seq
[151]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 26.11.2008-Phonak/ReSound, WuW/E DE-R 2477,2487
[152]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 4.12.2002-1001 Radio Aachen, WuW/E DE-R 1058,1061
[153]KG judgment of 13.12.1982-Taschenbucher, WuW/E OLG 2825,2833
[154]BKartA decision of 24.11.2003-Random House/Heyne, WuW/E DE-V 918,921
[155]BKarA decision of 4.6.2004-Siemens/Moeller, published version, pll, para 34
[156]BKartA decision of 8.6.2004-Nokia/Symbian/Psion/Sony, published version, p 7
[157]BKart A decision of 17.12.2002-Neblsen/Rethmann/Bethmann/swb/Bremer havener Entsorgungsgesellschaft/Stadt Bremerhaven/RWE Umwelt, published version, p 11, para 25 et seq
[158]Commission Decision of 8.2.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4475-Schneider Electric/APC, recital 25
[159]BKartA decision of 22.1.2004-Mainova/Aschaffenburger Versorgungs GmbH, WuW/E DE-V983,986
[160]BKatr A decision of 2.3.2004-Ontex/Rostam, published version, p 18, para 52
[161]Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190-Nesle/Perrier, OJ 1992, L356, p1
[162]Commission Decision of 4.7.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4000-Inco/ Falconbridge, recitals 107,108,110,114,124
[163]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1939-Rexam (PLM)/American National Can, recital 12
[164]Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kynmmene/Haindl OJ2002, L233, p38, recital 17, fe11
[165]Commission Decision of 22.9.2000 in Case NoIV/M.1789-Airtours/First Choice, OJ2001L73, pl, recital 45
[166]Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para,28et seq, particularly para 41
[167]Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No COMP/M.315-Mannesmann/ Valloured/Ilva OJ 1994 L102, p 15, recital 32
[168]Commission Decision of 9.3.2000 in Case No Ⅳ/M.1517-Danish Crown/ Vestjyske Slagterier OJ 2001 L35, p1, recitals 62,83 et seq
[169]Commission Decision of 30.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4374-Ineos/Kerling, recitals 55,56,151
[170]Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lings, recital 35,62 et seq
[171]Commission Decision of 23.9.1991 in Case No IV/M.134-Mannesmann/Boge, OJ1991 C265, pl, recital 11
[172]Commission Decision of 30.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2416-Tetra Laval/Sidel, OJ2004L43, p 13, recitals180,182,188
[173]Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381
[174]Commission Decision of 22.1.1997 in Case No IV/M.794-Coca-Cola/ Amalgamated Beverages GB, OJ1997 L218, p 15, recitals 68,71,75,79, 80,83,84
[175]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC, OJ2003 L70, p35
[176]Commission Decision of 21.6.1994 in Case No IV/M.430-Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz II, OJ1994L354, p 32, recitals68,71,113,115,116
[177]Commission Decision of 27.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439-Ryanair/Aer Lingus, recital 107, fn 105
[178]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corp./P&O Princess, OJ2003L48, pl, recitals61,64,63,64,66 et seq
[179]Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.623-Kimberly-Clark/Scott, OJ1996L183, pl, recital 33
[180]Commission Decision of 31.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue, OJ2002L57, pl, recital 17
[181]Commission Decision of 30.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3149-Procter& Gamble/Wella, recital 11 et seq
[182]Commission Decision of 9.3.2002 in Case No IV/M.1487-Danish Crown/ Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ 2003 L7, p 6, recital 73
[183]Commission Decision of 9.2.2000 ic Case No Ⅳ/M.1628-Total Fina/Elf OJ 2001 [143], pl, recital 28
[184]Commission Decision of 11.10.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1845-AOL/Time Warner, OJ2001L268, p28, recital 21
[185]Commission Decision of 11.3.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4731-Google/ Doubleclick, recital 45
[186]Commission Decision of 21.5.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2794-Amadeus/ GGL/JV, recital 10
[187]Commission Decision of 3.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2220-General Electric/Honeywell, OJ2004L48, pl, recital 9
[188]Commission Decision of 21.1.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3304-GE/Amersham, recital 8
[189]Commission Decision of 15.9.1997 in Case No IV/M.973-Bertelsmann/ Burda-HOS Lifeline OJ 1997 C360, p 8
[190]Commission Decision of 5.5.1999 in Case No Ⅳ/JV.19-Bertelsmann/Viag/Game Channel OJ 1999 C186, p8
[191]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirlli/BICC OJ 2003 L70, p35, recital 17
[192]Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1806-Astra Zeneca/Novartis, OJ 2004 L110, p1, recital 57,60
[193]Commission Decision of 28.10.1999.in Case No Ⅳ/M.1571-New Holland/ Case, recitals 9,11
[194]Commission Decision of 23.3.1998 i8n Case No Ⅳ/M.1133-Bass plc/Saison Holdings.BV, recital 14
[195]Commission Decision of 8.9.1999.in Case No Ⅳ/M.1596-Accor/Blackstone/ Colony/Vivendi, recital 25
[196]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ 2003 L248, p1, recitals 78,91
[197]Commission Decision of 24.1.2001 in Case No Comp/M.2033-Metso/Svedala, OJ 2004 L88, p1, recitals 48,53
[198]Commission Decision of 23.1.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerie/Gumerio, recital 49
[199]Schrotter H, W Mederer. Kommentarzum Europiiischen Wettbewerb srecht. Baden-Baden,2003, para 102
[200]Werden G. Assigning Market Shares. Antitrust LawJournalVol70,2002,67-104
[201]Werden G. A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of Differentiated Products. Journalof IndustrialEconomics Vol 44, 1996, 409-413
[202]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival/P & O Princess, OJ2003L248, pl, recitals 130,132
[203]Commission Decision of 30.9.1992 in Case No IV/M.214j-Du Pont/ICI, recital 31
[204]Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM Kymmene/Haindl, OJ2002L233, p38, recital 80
[205]Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR-II-4381, para 240
[206]Commission Decision of 30.3.2003 in Case No COMP/M.2079-Raytheon/ Thales/JV, recital 39
[207]Commission Decision of 5.9.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2816-Ernst& Young France/Andersen France, recital 55 et seq
[208]Commission Decision of 22.5.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4404-Universa/BMG Music Publishing, recital 273 et seq
[209]Commission Decision of 29.2.1999 in Case No IV/M.1532-BP Amoco/Arco, recitals 20,22
[210]Commission Decision of 26.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1806-Astra Zeneca/Novartis, recitals 150,415
[211]Commission Decision of 21.12.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3605-Sovion/HMG, recital 49
[212]Commission Decision of 25.7.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3209-WPP/Cordiant, recital 33
[213]Commission Decision of 25.1.2000 in Case No IV/M.1684-Carrefour/Promodes, recital 63
[214]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3436-Continental/ Phoenix, recitals120,155,171,172
[215]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3544-Bayer Healehcare/Roche OTC Business, recital 37,39
[216]Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3439-AGFA-Gevaert/ Lastra, recital 99
[217]Commission Decision of 26.6.1997 in Case No IV/M.890-Blokker/Toys'R'Us, OJ 1998 L316, pl,recital 59
[218]Commission Decision of 12.4.1991 in Case No IV/M.042-Alcatel/Telettra, recital 17
[219]Commission Decision of 14.2.1995 in Case No IV/M.477-Mercedes-Benz/ Kassbohrer, recital 65
[220]Commission Decision of 12.11.1992 in Case No IV/M.222-Mannesmann/ Hoesch, OJ1993L114, p 34, recital 91
[221]Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 115
[222]Commission Decision of 25.6.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2817-Barilla/BPL/ Kamps, recital 34
[223]Commission Decision of 3.3.2005 in Case No COMP/M.3658-Orkla/Chips, recital 24
[224]Commission Decision of 5.3.2008 in Case No COMP/M4747-IBM/Telelogic, recital 186 et seq
[225]Commission Decision ofl.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2602-Gerling/NCM, recital 44 etseq
[226]Commission Decision of 31.1.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2609-HP/Compaq, Recital 39
[227]Commission Decision of 4.6.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4600-TUI/First Choice, recital 72
[228]Commission Decision of 21.3.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2694-Mertonet/ Infraco, recital 47
[229]Commission Decision of 29.10.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1879-Boeing/ Hughes, OJ2004L63, p53, recital 42
[230]Commission Decision of 26.5.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3418-General Dynamics/Alvis, recitals 22.27
[231]Commission Decision of 18.1.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1630-Air Liquide/BOC, OJ2004L92, p1, recita158,60
[232]Commission Decision of 14.3.2006 in Case No IV/M.3868-DONG/ Elsam/EnergiE2, recital 549, citing Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 149 et seq
[233]Commission Decision of 5.12.2007in Case NoCOMP/M.4647-AAE/Lentjes, recital 633
[234]Commission Decision of 19.5.2006in Case No COMP/M.4662-Syniverse/BSG, recitals76,78
[235]Commission Decision of 3.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2220-GE/Honeywell, recital 83,227
[236]Commission Decision of 23.5.2003in Case No COMP/M.3108-Office Depot/guilbert, recital 23
[237]Commission Decision of 23.5.2003in Case No COMP/M.2854-RAG/Degussa, recita148
[238]Commission Decision of 23.5.2003 in Case NO COM/M.4508-Alstom UK/Balfour Beatty/JV, recitals 35,36
[239]Commission Decion of 22.5.2007 in Case NO comp/m.4404-Universal/BMG Music publisbing, recitals 114,116
[240]Commission Deciss of 18.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2676-Sampo/Varma Sampo/IF Holding/JV, recital 26
[241]Case85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche[1979]ECR 461, Paras 38,39
[242]Case T-102/96-Gencor v Commission [1999] ECRII-753, para 202
[243]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2033-Metso /Svedala, OJ2004L88, P31, recital 197
[244]Commission Decision of 21.12.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3605-Sovion/ HMG, recital 50
[245]Commission Decision of 10.8.2006 in Case No COMP/M.4094-Ineos/BP Dormagen, recitals 95,97,112-115,129
[246]Church J, R Ware. Industrial Organization-A Strategic Approach. Boston:Boston Press,2002,512
[247]Bain J. Barriers to New Competition. London:Cambridge Press,1956, Massl63
[248]Stigler G J. The Organization of Industry. Toledon:Homewood Press,1968, 117
[249]Gilbert R J. Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in:R Schmalensee and R D Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol I, Amsterdam, 1989,475-535
[250]Sutton J. Sunk Cost and Market Structure. Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration, London:Cambridge Press,1991, Mass239
[251]Dixit A. The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence. Economic Journal Vol 90, 1980,95-106
[252]Economides N. The Economics of Networks. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 14,1996,673-699
[253]Laffont J, P Rey, J Tirole. Network Competition:Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 29,1998,1-37
[254]Office of Fair Trading. Switching Costs, Economic Discussion Paper 5
[255]Scherer F M, D Ross. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd edn).Boston:Boston Press,1990,424-426
[256]Commission Decision of 14.3.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3868-DONG/ Elsam/Energi E2, recital 455 et seq
[257]Commission Decision of 24.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2033, OJ2004L88, P 1, recital 160
[258]Commission Decision of 2.4.1998 in Case No IV/M.1127-Nestle/Dalgety, recital 24
[259]Commission Decision of 16.1.1996 in Case No IV/M.623-Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper, OJ1996L183, P1, recitals 196,211,213 et seq
[260]Commission Decision of 19.5.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3998-Axalto/ Gemplus, recital 43
[261]Commission Decisiom of 9.11.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4824-kraft/Danone Biscuits, recitals 30,32
[262]Commission Decision of 24.7.2002 in Case No COMP/M.27069-Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ 2003 L248, p 1, recital 182 et seq
[263]Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1672-Volvo/Scania, OJ 2001 L143, P74, recital 144 et seq
[264]Commission Decision Decision of 14.11.2006 in Case NO COMO/M.4180-Gaz de France/Sueaz, racital 202
[265]Commission Decision of 29.3.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3975-Cargill/Degussa Food Ingredients, recital 133
[266]Commission Decision of 11.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1157-Skansha/Scancem, OJ1999L183, P1, recital 184
[267]Commission Decision of 25.11.1998 in Case No IV/M.1225-Enso/stora, OJ 1999 L254, P9, recitals91,94,97
[268]Commission Decision of 10.8.2006 in Case No COMP/M 4094-Ineos/BP Dormagen, recital 149
[269]Commission Decision of 15.10.1997 in Case No IV/M.938-Guinness/Grang Metroplitan, OJ 1998 L288 P 24, recital 75
[270]Commission Decisiom of 31.1.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2097-SCA/Metsa Tissue, OJ2002L57, P1, recital 88
[271]BKart A decision of 10.12.2002-Tagesspigel/Berliner zeitung," WuW/EDE-V 695,697
[272]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 29.9.2006-Sannacorp/ANZAG, WuW/E DE-R 1987,1991
[273]BKartA decision of20.10.1999, WuW/E DE-R 451,458
[274]BGH judgments of 2.12.1980-Klockner/Becorit WuW/E BGH 1749,1754
[275]OLG Dusseldorf in BASF/NEPG 30.7.2003 WY W/E-DE-R 1159, "1160 et seq
[276]BGH judgment of 28.4.1992-Kaufbf/Saturn,WU W/E BGH 2771,2774
[277]KG judgment of 22.3.1983-Rewe/Floimex,WUW/E OLG 2862,2863 et seq
[278]BKartA decision of 26.11.2001-Trienekens/Remex, B10-131/01, recital 56 et seq
[279]BKartA decision of 19.9.2001-Lutz/Englbardt, B9-15/01, recital 17 et seq
[280]BKartA decision of 9.11.1999-Beck/Nomos, WuW/E DE-V 191
[281]KG judgment of 18.3.1998, WuW/E DE-R 94
[282]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 22.12.2004-OPNV Hannover, Wu W/E DE-R 1397,1405,1407 et seq
[283]BGH judgment of 7.2.2006-DB Region/ustra, Wu W/E DE-R 1681,1692
[284]Hovenkamp H. Market Power in Aftermarkets:Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case. UCLA Law Review Vol 40,1993,1447-1460
[285]Commission Decision of 14.10.200 in Case No COMP/M.2917-Wendel-KKR/Legrand, recital 31
[286]Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 Case No COMP/M 3439-Agfa-Gaevert/ Lastra, recital 115
[287]Commission Decision of 5.9.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2816-Ernst&Young France/Andersen France, recital 62
[288]BGH judgment of 21.2.1978-KfZ-Kupplungen, Wu W/E BGH 1501,1508
[289]BGH judgment of 18.12.1979-Springer-Elbe Wochenblatt, Wu W/E BGH 1685, 1691
[290JBGH judgment of 29.11.1981-Zeitungsmarkt Munchen, Wu W/E BGH 1854, 1859
[291]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 13.8.2003-Trans-o-Flex, Wu W/E DE-R 1149, 1156
[292]BGH judgment of 16.1.2007-National Geographic II, Wu W/E DE-R 1925,1930
[293]OLG Dusseldorf judgment of 30.4.2003-Melitta/Airflo, Wu W/E DE-R 1112, 1116
[294]BGH judgment of 6.10.1992-Pinneberger Tageblatt, Wu W/E BGH 2795,2805
[295]Coate M B. Economic Models and the Merger Guidelines:A Case Study. Review of Law and Economics Vol 1, Iss1,2005, Article 4
[296]Buhler S, F Jager. Einfiihrungin die Industrieokonomik. Heidelberg,2002,135
[297]Bishop B, S Bishop. When Two is Enough. European Competition Law Review Vol 17,1996,3-5
[298]Werden G, L Froeb. Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in: P Buccirossi (ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass, 2008,43-104
[299]Ivaldi M, B Jullien, P Rey, P Seabright, J Tirole.The Economics of Unilateral Effects. Interim Report for DG Competition,2003,40,52,53
[300]Werden G, L Froeb. The Entry Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 46,1998,525-543
[301]Spector D. Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defenses. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 21,2003,1591-1600
[302]Ghandi A, L Froeb, S Tschantz, G J Werden. Post-Merger Product Reposirioning. Journal of Industrial Eeonomics Vo156,2008,49-67
[303]Cabral L. Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry:Why Cost Efficiencies may be a Weak Defense and Asset Sales a Po or Remedy. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 21,2003,607-623
[304]Salant S, W S Switzer, R J Reynolds. Losses Due to Merger:The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, Quarterly. Journal of Economics Vo198,1983,185-199
[305]Davidson C, R J Deneckere. Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 16,1985,473-486
[306]Weinberg M. The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers. Journal of Competition Law and EconomicsVo14,2008,433-447
[307]Baxter S, F Dethmers. Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation:How big is the Gap?. European Competition Law Review Vol 26, 2005,380-389
[308]Roller L H, H Friederiszick. Okonomische Analyse in der EU Werrbewerbspolitik. Mimeo,2005, Point III, A
[309]US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, September Term 2000, No 00-5362
[310]US District Court for the District of Columbia, FIC v Heinz Company and Milnot Holding Corp, Civil Action No 00-1688
[311]US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, September Term 2000, No 00-5362
[312]Wall Street Journal, Baby-Food Makers Heinz, Beech-Nut Call Off Merger Following Court Ruling,27 April 2001
[313]Alfter M.Untersagungskriterien in der Fusionskontrolle, SLC-Test versus Marktbcherrschende Stellung-Eine Frage der Semantik?. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb Vo153,2003,20-28
[314]Commission. Green Paper of 11.12.2001 on Review of Counci Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, paras 159 to 169
[315]Strohm A. Economic Analysis of the Concept of Significant Impediment to Effective Competition, in:G Hirsch, F Montag, F J Sacker (eds), Competition Law:European Community Practice and Procedure. London:London Press, 2008, paral-9012,9013,9015,9017etseq
[316]Commission. Summary of the Replies Received to the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation. 访问:http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ mergers/review/comments/summary publication.pdf. Strohm.
[317]G Hirsch, F Montag, F J Sacker.Competition Law:European Community Practice and Procedure. London:London Press,2008, paral9012 et seq
[318]Staebe E, U Denzel. Die neue Europiiische Fusionskontrollverordnung (VO139/2004). Europitisches Wirtschafis-undSteuerrecht Vol 16,2004,194-201
[319]Founroukakos K, S Ryan. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. European Competition Law Review Vo 126,2005,277-296
[320]Zimmer D. Significant Impediment to Effective Competition. Zeitschrififiir Wettbewerbsrecht Vo12,2004,250-267
[321]Holzwarth S. T-Mobile AustriaJtele.ring:Nicht-koordinierte Effekte als Auffangtatbestand erheblicher Wettbewerbsbchinderungen?. Zeitschrifi flit Wettbe-werbsrechrVol 5,2007,338-351
[322]Commission Decision of 26.4.2006 in Case No COMP/M.3916-T-Mobile Austrial/Tele. Ring, recital 40,72
[323]Schwalbe U. Marktbeherrschungs-oder SIEC-Test im GWB?. Wirtschaftund Wettbewerb Vo154,2004,997:13
[324]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3216-Oracle/People Soft, recital 187
[325]Bundeskartellamt. Untersagungskriterium in der Fusionskontrolle-Marktbeh-errschende Stellung versus Substantial Lessening of Competition?. Mimeo, 2001,14,15
[326]Wiedemann G. Handbuch des Kartellrechts,2nd edn. Munchen,2008, Section 20, item 85
[327]Lowe P. Implications of the Recent Reforms in the Antitrust Enforcement in Europe for National Competition Authorities, Speech 09.12.2003,9
[328]Kapp T, S MeBme. Reform der EU-Fusionskontrolle:Herrscht nun unbeschrinkte Willkiir in Briissel?. Europaische Zeitschrifi fiir Wirtschaftsrecht Vo116,2005,161
[329]Schweda M. Die Bindungswirkung ron Bekanntmachungen und Leidinien der Europiischen Kommission. Wirtschafi und Wettbewerb Vol 54,2004,1133-1144
[330]Epstein R J, D L Rubinfeld. Merger Simulation:A Simplified Approach with New Applications. Antitrust LawJournalVo170,2002,882-919
[331]Hosken D, DO'Brian, D Scheffman, M Vita. Demand System Estimation and its Application to Horizontal Merger Analysis. Mimeo,2002,117
[332]Werden G, L Froeb. The Antitrust Logit Model for Predicting Unilateral Competitive Effects. Antitrust LawJournalVo 170,2002,257-260
[333]Epstein R J, D L Rubinfeld. Merger Simulation with Brand-Level Margin: Extending PCAIDS with Nests. UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No CPC03-40
[334]Hausman J, D Leonard, J D Zona. Competition Analysis with Differentiated Products. Annales d'Economiet de Statistique Vol34,1994,159-180
[335]Beard TR, G S Ford, R P Saba. An Econometric Driven Merger Simulation: Considerations and Application. International Journal of the Economics of Business Vol 13,2006,217-228
[336]Van Damme E, J Pinkse. Merger Simulation Analysis:An Academic Perspective, in:P A G van Bergeijk and E Kloosterhuis (eds). Modelling European Mergers-Theory, Competition Policy, and Case Studies. London: London Press,2006,79-91
[337]Stennek J, F Verboten. Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness: Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations. European Economy, Reports and Studies Vol 5,2001,129-194
[338]Goppelsroeder M, M P Schinkel, J Tuinstra. Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defence in Merger Control:The Werden-Froeb-Index. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 56,2008,778-808
[339]Jayaratne J, C Shapiro. Simulating Partial Asset Divestitures to Fix Mergers. International Journal of the Economics of Business Vol 7,2004,179-200
[340]Ghandi A, L Froeb, S Tschantz. Post-Merger Product Reposirioning. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol56,2008,49-67
[341]Villas-Boas S B. Using Retail Data for Upstream Merger Analysis. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 3,2007,689-715
[342]Walker M. The Potential for Significant Inaccuracies in Merger Simulation Models. International Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 1,2006, 473-496
[343]Froeb L, G Werden. Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in: P Buccirossi(ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass,2008, 43-104
[344]Peters C. Evaluating the Performace of Merger Simulation:Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry. Journal of Law and Economics Vol49,2006,627-649
[345]Bake J B. Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Merger, forthcoming in:K Hylton (ed). Antitrust Law and Economics, London:London Press,2008,187
[346]Farrell J, C Shapiro. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers:An Alternative to Market Definition. Mimeo,2008,165
[347]Commission Decision of 7.1.2004 in Case No COMP/M.2978-Lagardere/ Natexis/VUP, recitals 595,787,829
[348]Hofer P, M Williams, L Wu. Empirische Methoden in der Europiiischen Fusionskontrolle. Wirtschafi und Wettbewerb Vol 55,2005,155-162
[349]Vickers J. Merger Policy in Europe:Retrospect and Prospect. European Competition Law Review Vol 25,2004,455-463
[350]Commission Decision of 22.9.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3459-Seiko Epson/ Sanyo/Sanyo Epson Imaging Devices JV, recital 13
[351]BKart A decision of 21.4.2004-Agrana/Atrys, B2-160/03, para 44 et seq
[352]KG judgement of 22.3.1983-Rewe/Florimex, Wu W/E OLG 2862,2863 et seq
[353]Nirsche R, J Thielert. Die 6konomische Analyse auf dem Vormarsch-Europiiische Reform und deutsche Wertbewerbspolitik. Wirtschaftundg Wettbewerb Vol 54,2004,250-259
[354]Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1672-Volvo/Scania, OJ 2001 L143, p74, recital 31,71-75
[355]Commission Decision of 1.9.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1980-Volvo/Renault VI, recitals 34,39
[356]Commission Decision of 2.3.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2256-Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions, recital 32,33,36 et seq
[357]Commission Decision of 17.10.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2537-Philips/Marconi Medical Systems, recitals 31,32,34 et seq
[358]Commission Decision of 30.4.2003-Siemens/Dragerwerk/JV in Case No COMP/M.2861, rectal 141
[359]Commission Decision of 2.9.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3083-GE/ Instrumentarium, OJ 2004 L 109, pl, recitals110,116,117,172,217,243
[360]Commission Decision of 2.10.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3191-Philip morris/Papastratos, recital 32
[361]Commission Decision of 30.10.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3268-Sydkraft/ Graninge, recital 37 et seq
[362]Commission Decision of 7.1.2004 in Case No COMP/M.2978-Lagardere/ Natexis/UVP, recitals 383,700,418,1009et seq
[363]Commission Decision of 26.10.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3216-Oracle/ PeopleSoft, recitals 136,179,183,187,193-195,197
[364]Case T-342/07 Ryan air v Commission, OJ 2007 C269, p3,59,74,187,342, 431,482,485,486,539,784,1141,1143
[365]Commission Decision of 4.12.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4462-Syniverse/BSG, recitals 74,76,78,84,85
[366]Commission Decision of 23.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5047-REWE/ADEG, recital 60
[367]BkartA decision of 16.11.2004-Retbmann/GfA Kotben, Wu W/E DE-V 995, paras 97-118
[368]Bishop B, A Lofaro. A Legal and Economic Consensus? The Theory and Practice of Coordinated Effects in EC Merger Control. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 49,2004, 195-242,217
[369]Commission Decision of 22.7.1992 in Case No IV/M.190, OJ 1992 L356, p 1, recital 114
[370]Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2586, para 61
[371]Telser L G.The Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. Journal of Business Vo153,1980,27-44
[372]Porter R H. A Study of Cartel Stability:The Joint Executive Committee 1880-1886. Bell Journal of Economics Vol 14,1983,301-314
[373]Friedman J W. A Guided Tour of the Folk-Theorem, in:G Norman and J F Thisse (eds), Market Structure and Competition Policy. London:Cambridge Press, 2000,51-69
[374]Feuerstein S. Collusion in Industrial Economics-A Survey. Journal of Industry Competition and Trade Vol 5,2005,163-198
[375]Ivaldi M, B Jullien, P Rey. The Economics of Tacit Collusion. Interim Report for DG Competition,2003,19-21
[376]Commission Decision of 19.7.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1882-Pirelli/BICC, OJ2003L70, p35, recital 82
[377]Commission Decision of 28.6.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1741-MCI WorldCom/Sprint, OJ 2003 L300, pl, recital 279
[378]Dana J D, Y-F Fong. Long-Lived Consumers, Interremporal Bundling, and Tacit Collusion. Northeastern University, College of Business Administration WP# 08-002
[379]Dal-Bo P. Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuation. RAND Journal of Economics Vo138,2008,533-540
[380]Levenstein M C. Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion:A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 45, 2006,117-137
[381]Harrington J E. Collusion among Asymmetric Firms:The Case of Different Discount Factors. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 7,1989, 289-307
[382]Selten R. A Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game TheoryVol 4,1975.25-55
[383]McCutcheon B. Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?. Journal of Political Economy Vo1105,1997,321-350
[384]Church J, R Ware. Industrial Organization, A Strategic Approach. Boston: Boston Press,2000,334
[385]Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR 11-2595, para 192,193et seq
[386]Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997 L11, p30, recital 281
[387]Case T-464/04 Impala v Commission [2006] ECRII-2289, paras 521-541
[388]Schultz N. Market Transparency on the Consumer Side and Tacit Collusion. European Economic Review Vol 49,2005,279-297
[389]Feinberg R, Chr M Snyder. Collusion with Secret Price Cuts:An Experimental Investigation. Economics Bulletin Vol 3,2003,1-11
[390]Commission Decision of 24.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4753-Antalis/MAP, recital 67
[391]Schultz Ch. Market Transparency and Product Differentiation. Economics Letters Vol 83,2004,173-178
[392]Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recital 161
[393]Nillson A. Transparency and Competition. Stockholm School of Economics, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 298,1999
[394]Harrington J E, A Skrzypacz. Collusion under Monitoring of Sales. RAND Journal of Economics Vo138,2007,314-331
[395]Kandori M. Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory Vol 102,2002,1-15
[396]Ellison G. Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 25,1994,37-57
[397]Commission Decision of 9.4.2002 in Case No COMP/M.2690-Solvay Montedison/Ausimont, recital 52
[398]Commission Decision of 20.12.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2533-BP/E.ON, OJ 2001 L276, p31, recital 103
[399]Commission Decision of 23.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5047-REWE/ADEG, recital 73
[400]Case C-413/06-Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008], paras 125-130
[401]Commission Decision of 21.11.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2498-UPM-Kymmene/Haindl,OJ 2002 L233, p38, recitals 82,87et seq
[402]Commission Decision of 9.8.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3439-AGFA-Gevaert/ Lastra, recital 108
[403]Commission Decision of 14.2.1995 in Case No IV/M.477-Mercedes-Benz/ Kassbohrer, OJ1995L211, p1, recital 104
[404]Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, OJ 2007 L 94, p19, para 546
[405]Compte O, Ph Jehiel. Bargaining over Randomly Generated Offers:A New Perspective on Multi-Party Bargaining. Mimeo,2004,173
[406]D avies S W, M Olczak. Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC Merger Cases. CCP Working Paper 07-7,2004
[407]Commission Decision of 20.5.1998 in Case No IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/ Coopers Lybrand, OJ1999L50, p27, recitals 96,103
[408]Commission Decision of 19.7.2004 in Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, OJ 2004 L62, p30
[409]Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France et al v Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, paras 222,226
[410]Commission Decision of 24.4.1996 in Case No IV/M.619-Gencor/Lonrho, OJ 1997 Lll, p30, recita1181-208
[411]Commission Decision of 28.6.2000 in Case No COMP/M.1741-MCI/ WorldCom/Sprint, OJ2003L300, p1, recital 302
[412]Commission Decision of 3.10.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4844-Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets, recitals 161
[413]Commission Decision of 27.10.2000 in Case No COMP/M.2111-Alcoa/British Aluminium, recital 14
[414]Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/ Auwarter, recitals 56,82
[415]Vasconcelos. Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers. RAND Journal of Economics VO136,2005,39-62
[416]Collie D R. Collusion and the Elasticity of Demand. Economics Bulletin Vol 27, 2004,1-6
[417]Kantzenbach, Kottmann, Kruger. Kollektive Marktbeherrschung. Neue Industrie 6konomik und Erfahrungen aus der Europaischen Fusionskontrolle, Baden-Baden,1996,61
[418]Commission Decision of22.7.1992-Nestle/Perrier, OJ 1992 L356, p1, recital 123
[419]Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.315-Mannesmann/ Vallourec/Ilva, OJ 1994 LI02, p15, recital 55
[420]Commission Decision of 20.6.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2201-MAN/ Auwiirter, OJ2001L116, p 35, recital 32
[421]Kuhn K U. The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries. CEPR Discussion Paper 4769,2004
[422]Shor M, H Chen. Decentralization, Transfer Pricing, and Tacit Collusion. Vanderbildt University, mimeo,2006
[423]Bernhardt D, Ch P Chambers. Profit Sharing(with Workers)Facilitates Collusion (among Firms). RAND Journal of Economics Vol 37,2006,483-502
[424]Spagnolo G. Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour. CEPR Discussion Paper No 4506,2004
[425]Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.358-Pilkington-Techint/SIV, OJ 1994 L 158, p24, recital 47
[426]Kolasky W. Coordinated Effects in Merger Review:From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, mimeo,2002
[427]Philips L. Competition Policy, A Game Theoretic Perspective. London: Cambridge Press,1995,153
[428]Church J, R Ware. Industrial Organization, A Strategic Approach. Boston: Boston Press,2000,346
[429]Davidson C, R J Deneckere. Excess Capacity and Collusion. International Economic Review Vol 31,1990,21-41
[430]Compte O, F Jenny, P Rey. Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion. European Economic Review Vol 46,2002,1-29
[431]Marsumura T. Cournot Duopoly with Multi-Period Competition:Inventory as a Coordination Device. Australian Economic Papers Vol 38,1999,189-202
[432]Commission Decision of 10.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.390-Akzo/Nobel Industries, recital 18
[433]Commission Decision of 11.7.2001 in Case No COMP/M.2314-BASF/Eurodiol/ Pantochim, OJ 2002 L132, p45, recital 76
[434]Commission Decision of 31.1.1994 in Case No IV/M.315-Mannesmann/ Vallourec/Ilva, OJ1994L102, p 15, recital 64
[435]Commission Decision of 21.12.1993 in Case No IV/M.358-Pilkington-Techint/SIV, OJ 1994 L158, p24, recital 120
[436]CaseT-102/99 Gencor [1999] ECR 11-753, para 276
[437]Commission Decision of 14.3.2000 in Case No IV/M.1663-Alcan/Alusuisse, recital 58 et seq
[438]Commission Decision of 13.6.2000 in Case No 1VIM.1673-Veba/Viag, OJ 2001L188, p1, recital 79
[439]Commission Decision of 30.7.1998 in Case No IV/M.1245-Valeo/ITT Industries, recital 54
[440]Commission Decision of 2.6.1998 in Case No IV/MA 080-Thyssen/Krupp, recital 33
[441]Formby J P, W J Smith. Collusion, Entry, and Market Shares. Review of Industrial Organization Vol 1,1984,15-25
[442]Simpson J D. When Does New Entry Deter Collusion?. Research in Law and Economics Vol 18,1997,229-239
[443]Donsimoni M P. Stable Heterogenous Cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol 3,1985,451-467
[444]Knieps G. Wettbewerbsokonomie, Regulierungstheorie. Industrieokonomie, Wettbe-werbspolitik,3rd edn, Heidelberg,2008,123-125
[445]Capuano C. Abuse of Competitive Fringe. University of Naples, Nora di Lavoro 91,2005,113
[446]Friedman J W, J F Thisse. Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry. European Economic Review Vo138,1994,271-283
[447]Commission Decision of 10.6.2003 in Case No COMP/M.3130-Arla Foods/ Express Dairies, recitals 87,90
[448]Collie D R. Collusion in Differentiated Oligopolies with Quadratic Cost. Bulletin of Economic Research Vol 58,2006,151-159
[449]Commission Decision of 23.3.1992 in Case No iV/M.186-Henkel/Nobel, recital 17
[450]Commission Decision ofl3.6.2000 in Case No 1V/M.1673-VEBAIV/AG, OJ 2001L188, p 1, recital 83
[451]Commission Decision of 21.12,1993 in Case No IV/M.358 Pilkington-Techint/SIV, OJ1994L158, p 24, recital 31
[452]Church J. Vertical Mergers, ABA Section of Antitrust Law. Issues in Competition Law and Policy,2008,1455-1501
[453]Salinger M A.The Meaning of Upstream and Downstream and the Implications for Modeling Vertical Mergers. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol 37,1989, 373-387
[454]Krattenmaker T G, S C Salop. Anticompetitive Exclusion:Raising Rivals Cost to Achieve Power over Price. Yale Law Journal Vo196,1986,209-293
[455]Salinger M A. Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure. Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 103,1988,345-356
[456]Hombert J, J Pouyet, N Schutz. Anticompetitive Merger Waves. Ecole Polytechnique, Working Paper,2007
[457]Higgins R S. Competitive Vertical Foreclosure. Managerialand Decision Economics Vol 20,1999,229-237
[458]Rey P, T Tirole. A Primer on Foreclosure, in:M Armstrong and R Porter (eds). Handbook of lndustrialtrial Organization, Vol III, Amsterdam,2007,2145-2220
[459]Hortacsu A, Ch Syverson. Cementing Relationships:Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices. University of Chicago Working Paper, 2005
[460]Ordover J A, S C Salop, G Saloner. Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure. American Economic Review Vo180,1990,127-142
[461]Chen Y. On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects. RAND Journal of Economics Vo133,2002,667-685
[462]Choi J P, S S Yi. Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications. RAND Journal of EconomicsVol 31,2000,52-71
[463]Reiffen D. Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure:Comment. American Economic Review Vo182,1992,694-597
[464]Avenel E, C Barlet. Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Vol 9, 2000,211-230
[465]Gilbert R J, D Newberry. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. American Economic Review Vol 72,1982,514-526
[466]Riordan M H. Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm. American Economic Review Vol 88,1998,1232-1248
[467]Riordan M H. Competitive Effects of Vertical integration, in:P Buccirossi (ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge Mass,2008,145-182
[468]Bernheim D B, M D Whinston. Exclusive Dealing. Journal of Political Economy Vol 106,1998,64-103
[469]Stefanadis C. Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago School View. Journal of Law and Economics Vol 41,1998,429-450
[470]Segal I R, M D Whinston. Naked Exclusion:Comment. American Economic Review Vo190,2000,296-309
[471]Riordan M H,S C Salop. Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A post Chicago Approach. Antitrust Law Journal Vol63,1995,513-568
[472]Bishop B, A Lofaro. A Legal and Economic Consensus? The Theory and Practice of Coordinated Effects in EC Merger Control. Antitrust Bulletin Vol 49,2004, 195-242
[473]Carlton D W, M Waldman. Theories of Tying and implications for Antitrust, Cornell University. Johnson School Research Paper Series No 24-06,2005
[474]Evans D S, A J Padilla, M A Salinger. A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analysing Legitimate Tying Case, in:C D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annua12003:What is an Abuse or a Dominant Position. London:Oxford Press,2006,167-193
[475]Whinston M D. Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. American Economic Review Vol 80,1990,837-859
[476]Carlton D W, M Waldman. The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries. RAND Journal of Economics Vol 33, 2002,194-220
[477]Choi J P. Tying and Innovation:A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangement. Economic Journal Vol 114,2004,83-101
[478]Denicolo V. Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol48,2000,177-188
[479]Nalebuff B. Competing Against Bundles. Yale School of Management Working Paper Series H No 7,2000
[480]Carbajo J, D De Meza, D J Seidman. A Strategic Motivation of Commodity Bundling. Journal of Industrial Economics Vo 138,1990,283-298
[481]Chen Y. Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization. RAND Journal of Economics Vol35,2004,667-685
[482]Kobayashi B H. Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature. Journal of Competition Law and Economics Vol 1,2005,707-746
[483]Church J, N Gandal. Systems Competition, Vertical Mergers, and Foreclosure. Journal of Economics and Strategy Management Vol 9,2000,25-52
[484]Bolton P, J Brodley, M Riordan. Predatory Pricing:Strategic Theory and Legal Policy. Georgetown Law Journal Vo188,2000,2239-2330
[485]Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR 11-4381, paras16,159,218 et seq
[486]Case C-12/03 Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I 987, Para 74,78,85
[487]Judgment of 14 December 2005 in Case T-2010/01 GE v Commission [2005] ECR 11-5575, paras 70-75,304,424,468
[488]Commission Decision of 25.6.2008 in Case No COMP/M.5121-News Corp/ Premiere, recital 61
[489]Commission Decision of 14.5.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4854-TomTom/Tele Atlas, recita169,173,221,222,223,228,238,1212
[490]Commission Decision of 2.7.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4942-Nokia/NAVTEQ, recital 341 et seq
[491]Commission Decision of 4.8.2008 in Case No COMP/M.4874-Itema/ Barcovision, recital 76,77,80,83, fn 52
[492]Commission Decision of 4.4.2007 in Case No COMP/M.4403-Thales/ Finmeccanica/AAS/Telespazio,recital 404,406,411,412,414,419,436 et seq