协调失灵，技术抵制与贫困陷阱
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摘要
本文的研究基于这样一个“无法忽视的真相”：持续性的贫困在一些国家和地区仍是一个普遍现象，即使是在世界经济已经取得了极大发展的今天仍是如此。
传统主流文献对这个问题的考察经历了从强调资本积累到强调制度因素这样一个转变。自上个世纪中叶开始的一段时期内，随着凯恩斯主义的盛行，发展经济学对这个问题的解答主要是从资本的积累着手，从而储蓄、投资等因素成为人们看重的影响一国经济发展的最主要因素。对于从这个视角出发的研究来说，贫困国家之所以贫困是由于它们在上述物质资本上的积累还处于一个较低的水平，当资本积累超过一个临界点之后，处于贫困的国家将迈向现代经济增长阶段。而且，由于经济中各部门发展之间所存在着相互协调的问题，从而政府所主导的“大推进”成了这一时期主要的政策选择。
但是，正如诺思和托马斯(North和Thomas，1973)所指出的那样，资本的增加等因素并不是经济增长的原因，而是增长的结果。随着政府主导的发展政策所带来的激励机制的失调逐渐为人们所重视，特别是新制度经济学在上世纪后半叶的兴起，经济学家们开始从制度因素来寻找一个国家陷于贫困的原因。人们对制度是如此的重视以至于在对制度本身并没有一个明确定义的情况下就达成了这样一个共识：制度决定经济绩效。但是正如我们所逐渐意识到的那样，如果单纯地强调制度这个几乎可以容纳一切的“黑匣子”，而缺乏对其背后微观决策机制的分析，那么我们对何种因素影响经济发展并没有更进一步的认识，而“制度决定经济绩效”的论断也将缺乏它原本应有的说服力。
本文正是寻找影响经济发展的微观机制的一次尝试。具体来说，我们并不打算从抽象的制度着手，而是选择一个特定的角度，即技术扩散的机制出发，从经济主体面对新技术的态度来分析影响经济发展的深层次原因。对一个社会中各经济主体面对新技术时的行动策略的重视，将使得我们必须借助博弈论的工具来分析他们之间的协调问题。不过值得注意的是，在早期的“大推进”理论中，对协调问题的分析主要集中在各部门之间的平衡发展，而在本文的分析中，我们关注的则是经济中各主体行动策略之间的协调。
对于本文所关注的贫困陷阱来说，我们的分析将集中在各经济主体之间的协调失灵。在我们的分析框架内，协调失灵将导致一种无效率的均衡状态，而这正是我们用以说明问题的核心。我们以技术扩散为例进行的分析表明，对于一个经济来说，在先进技术的引进对社会总体上是一个帕累托改进的情况下，新的技术仍然会因为可能改变该经济体内部的收益分配而为那些潜在的受害者所抵制。特别是，当处于主导地位的“精英”有着诸如权力等非经济因素的偏好时更是如此，而且，实际上的权力(de facto power)也可以保证这种抵制成功进行。不仅如此，这种处于主导地位的利益群体对先进技术的抵制会对社会中其他群体的决策机制产生影响。比如，厂商可能预期到某项能促进产出的新技术被禁止，从而选择放弃投资该项先进技术。这样，对于该经济来说，整体上会表现出一种对本可以带来帕累托改进的先进技术的抵制。
本文共分七章，并将按以下结构安排展开：第一章为导论部分，我们将对本文的分析视角和选题意义进行说明。第二章为本文的文献综述部分，主要是对与本文相关的文献进行梳理。第三章我们对协调问题特别是协调失灵进行分析，并且把它与非有效的制度安排联系起来以考察本文的主题。在第四章我们首先简单考察前工业革命时期的贫困陷阱生成机制，并在此基础上对后工业化时期落后国家的技术选择策略进行分析。第五章我们从技术扩散的视角出发分析贫困陷阱的生成机制，并且给出了有关技术抵制的微观决策基础。在接下来的第六章我们从技术抵制的视角对人们广为关注的“李约瑟之谜”提出了一个可能的解释。第七章总结全文，并且给出未来值得关注的研究方向。
This research is inspired by such an innocent truth:persistent poverty stillconquers billions of people while their counterparts have been in a relatively betterstate for over two hundred years.
A large amount of literature has been contributed to this never-ending debate ofthe poverty and wealth of nations since Adam Smith.There has been a transformationsince the middle of the last century,at least in an economic perspective,from a pointof emphasizing capital accumulation to the view of considering institutions thefundamental causes of long-run growth.To the capital accumulation view,the poorcountries are poor because such production factors as investment,human capital andsome other elements essential for economic growth,are below a threshold and thepoor countries will take off to modern economic growth once the threshold is brokenby capital accumulating.Thus,government oriented‘big push’becomes a necessarychoice to deal with such coordination failures of imbalance development betweendifferent factors of an economy.
As North and Thomas (1973) has emphasized,there has been a causaldisposition to this capital accumulation view.Such elements as innovation,education,human capital,which are the key variables for the explanation of growth actually arenot the causes of growth,they are growth.From then on,more and more attention hasbeen paid on institution and its vital importance to growth.As we know,institution isa black box itself which people know little as well,and a theory can not be persuasivetaking this‘black box’for granted locked.
This dissertation is an attempt to unlock this black box,at least in a special way.We will leave the abstract institution alone,and focus on the very basis of institutionalarrangement,that is,the strategies of different agents in an economy.Considering theoverwhelming importance of technological change to the development of an economy,our analysis will focus on the technological diffusion process,especially the strategiesof different agents when facing an advanced technology.Thus,the coordinationproblems come into our eyes once again,totally in a different way.
Specially,we will focus on the coordination failures between different agents byconsidering their technology choices.An advanced technology which will bring aPareto superior to an economy as a whole,we assume that,may be deliberatelyblocked ex-ante by those who expect themselves be hurt by the acceptance of the advanced technology,because it is usually the case that advanced technology not onlyenlarge the pie,but alters the distribution of the total pie ex-post.In addition,technology blocking will be the dominant strategy of those potential victims who havede facto power before the introduction of an advanced technology.
This dissertation contains seven chapters and proceeds as follows.In Chapter 1,the introduction section,we will show some key development facts and explain whywe focus on coordination problems in poverty traps analysis.We will make adescription of the theoretical and practical contributions of our analysis,too.Chapter2 is literature review.Chapter 3 deals with the key concept of coordination failure,and establishes a contact between the coordination problem and inefficientinstitutional equilibrium.In chapter 4,we will first discuss the mechanism of povertyof pre-modern economies,and then analysis the technology choice of the poorcounties in our time.In Chapter 5 we establish a technology blocking model withmicro-foundations of different agents based on coordination failures.In Chapter 6 weprovide an explanation for the Needham Puzzle,which has been paid many attentionsto by Chinese scholars,through the lens of technology blocking.Chapter 7 concludesand specifies several potential research areas.
传统主流文献对这个问题的考察经历了从强调资本积累到强调制度因素这样一个转变。自上个世纪中叶开始的一段时期内，随着凯恩斯主义的盛行，发展经济学对这个问题的解答主要是从资本的积累着手，从而储蓄、投资等因素成为人们看重的影响一国经济发展的最主要因素。对于从这个视角出发的研究来说，贫困国家之所以贫困是由于它们在上述物质资本上的积累还处于一个较低的水平，当资本积累超过一个临界点之后，处于贫困的国家将迈向现代经济增长阶段。而且，由于经济中各部门发展之间所存在着相互协调的问题，从而政府所主导的“大推进”成了这一时期主要的政策选择。
但是，正如诺思和托马斯(North和Thomas，1973)所指出的那样，资本的增加等因素并不是经济增长的原因，而是增长的结果。随着政府主导的发展政策所带来的激励机制的失调逐渐为人们所重视，特别是新制度经济学在上世纪后半叶的兴起，经济学家们开始从制度因素来寻找一个国家陷于贫困的原因。人们对制度是如此的重视以至于在对制度本身并没有一个明确定义的情况下就达成了这样一个共识：制度决定经济绩效。但是正如我们所逐渐意识到的那样，如果单纯地强调制度这个几乎可以容纳一切的“黑匣子”，而缺乏对其背后微观决策机制的分析，那么我们对何种因素影响经济发展并没有更进一步的认识，而“制度决定经济绩效”的论断也将缺乏它原本应有的说服力。
本文正是寻找影响经济发展的微观机制的一次尝试。具体来说，我们并不打算从抽象的制度着手，而是选择一个特定的角度，即技术扩散的机制出发，从经济主体面对新技术的态度来分析影响经济发展的深层次原因。对一个社会中各经济主体面对新技术时的行动策略的重视，将使得我们必须借助博弈论的工具来分析他们之间的协调问题。不过值得注意的是，在早期的“大推进”理论中，对协调问题的分析主要集中在各部门之间的平衡发展，而在本文的分析中，我们关注的则是经济中各主体行动策略之间的协调。
对于本文所关注的贫困陷阱来说，我们的分析将集中在各经济主体之间的协调失灵。在我们的分析框架内，协调失灵将导致一种无效率的均衡状态，而这正是我们用以说明问题的核心。我们以技术扩散为例进行的分析表明，对于一个经济来说，在先进技术的引进对社会总体上是一个帕累托改进的情况下，新的技术仍然会因为可能改变该经济体内部的收益分配而为那些潜在的受害者所抵制。特别是，当处于主导地位的“精英”有着诸如权力等非经济因素的偏好时更是如此，而且，实际上的权力(de facto power)也可以保证这种抵制成功进行。不仅如此，这种处于主导地位的利益群体对先进技术的抵制会对社会中其他群体的决策机制产生影响。比如，厂商可能预期到某项能促进产出的新技术被禁止，从而选择放弃投资该项先进技术。这样，对于该经济来说，整体上会表现出一种对本可以带来帕累托改进的先进技术的抵制。
本文共分七章，并将按以下结构安排展开：第一章为导论部分，我们将对本文的分析视角和选题意义进行说明。第二章为本文的文献综述部分，主要是对与本文相关的文献进行梳理。第三章我们对协调问题特别是协调失灵进行分析，并且把它与非有效的制度安排联系起来以考察本文的主题。在第四章我们首先简单考察前工业革命时期的贫困陷阱生成机制，并在此基础上对后工业化时期落后国家的技术选择策略进行分析。第五章我们从技术扩散的视角出发分析贫困陷阱的生成机制，并且给出了有关技术抵制的微观决策基础。在接下来的第六章我们从技术抵制的视角对人们广为关注的“李约瑟之谜”提出了一个可能的解释。第七章总结全文，并且给出未来值得关注的研究方向。
This research is inspired by such an innocent truth:persistent poverty stillconquers billions of people while their counterparts have been in a relatively betterstate for over two hundred years.
A large amount of literature has been contributed to this never-ending debate ofthe poverty and wealth of nations since Adam Smith.There has been a transformationsince the middle of the last century,at least in an economic perspective,from a pointof emphasizing capital accumulation to the view of considering institutions thefundamental causes of long-run growth.To the capital accumulation view,the poorcountries are poor because such production factors as investment,human capital andsome other elements essential for economic growth,are below a threshold and thepoor countries will take off to modern economic growth once the threshold is brokenby capital accumulating.Thus,government oriented‘big push’becomes a necessarychoice to deal with such coordination failures of imbalance development betweendifferent factors of an economy.
As North and Thomas (1973) has emphasized,there has been a causaldisposition to this capital accumulation view.Such elements as innovation,education,human capital,which are the key variables for the explanation of growth actually arenot the causes of growth,they are growth.From then on,more and more attention hasbeen paid on institution and its vital importance to growth.As we know,institution isa black box itself which people know little as well,and a theory can not be persuasivetaking this‘black box’for granted locked.
This dissertation is an attempt to unlock this black box,at least in a special way.We will leave the abstract institution alone,and focus on the very basis of institutionalarrangement,that is,the strategies of different agents in an economy.Considering theoverwhelming importance of technological change to the development of an economy,our analysis will focus on the technological diffusion process,especially the strategiesof different agents when facing an advanced technology.Thus,the coordinationproblems come into our eyes once again,totally in a different way.
Specially,we will focus on the coordination failures between different agents byconsidering their technology choices.An advanced technology which will bring aPareto superior to an economy as a whole,we assume that,may be deliberatelyblocked ex-ante by those who expect themselves be hurt by the acceptance of the advanced technology,because it is usually the case that advanced technology not onlyenlarge the pie,but alters the distribution of the total pie ex-post.In addition,technology blocking will be the dominant strategy of those potential victims who havede facto power before the introduction of an advanced technology.
This dissertation contains seven chapters and proceeds as follows.In Chapter 1,the introduction section,we will show some key development facts and explain whywe focus on coordination problems in poverty traps analysis.We will make adescription of the theoretical and practical contributions of our analysis,too.Chapter2 is literature review.Chapter 3 deals with the key concept of coordination failure,and establishes a contact between the coordination problem and inefficientinstitutional equilibrium.In chapter 4,we will first discuss the mechanism of povertyof pre-modern economies,and then analysis the technology choice of the poorcounties in our time.In Chapter 5 we establish a technology blocking model withmicro-foundations of different agents based on coordination failures.In Chapter 6 weprovide an explanation for the Needham Puzzle,which has been paid many attentionsto by Chinese scholars,through the lens of technology blocking.Chapter 7 concludesand specifies several potential research areas.
引文
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