一口价网上英式拍卖的研究
|
摘要
伴随着互联网的诞生,网上拍卖变得炙手可热。网上拍卖的短短历史与其飞速发展相比,存在极大的差异,引起了专家和学者们的极大关注。这就为对于想了解在实践中使用各种交易机制的经济学家提供了丰富的研究课题,同时也为各种经济理论提供了理想的实验基地。这就使得对网上拍卖理论的研究势在必行。本文以网上拍卖为背景,以传统拍卖理论、博弈论以及概率论和其他的数学知识作为研究工具,对网上拍卖中新出现的一种拍卖方式——一口价网上英式拍卖进行了研究,并且对网上最后一分钟竞价也进行了深入的剖析。主要内容可概括如下几个方面:
1、与传统拍卖相比,网上拍卖模式不断创新。网上一口价拍卖作为网上拍卖的创新模式,由于打破了固定拍卖结束时间的局限,而得到广泛应用。其中在众多模式中比较典型的网上一口价拍卖模式有三种,分别是固定一口价、临时一口价和持久一口价。投标者的决策决定了拍卖的最终结果,也是拍卖理论研究的重点之一。在独立的私有估价模型下,采用在固定一口价拍卖方式,估价高于一口价的投标者的最优选择是及早选择一口价;在临时一口价中存在一个均衡点,使得估价高于此均衡点的投标者及早选择一口价是最优的;持久一口价中存在一个临界函数和一个均衡点,使得估价满足临界函数或高于均衡点的投标者及早选择一口价是最优的。
2在关联估价模型下,由于投标者之间的相互影响,不存在最优策略选择。采用在固定一口价拍卖方式,估价高于一口价的投标者不再立即选择一口价,而是观望确认其他的投标者的信息,迟投标是比较明智的选择;在临时一口价中依然存在一个均衡点,均衡点的确定受到其他投标者信息的影响,并且估价高于均衡点的投标者不会立即选择一口价;持久一口价中存在一个临界函数和一个均衡点,它们同样受到其他投标者信息的影响,使得估价满足临界函数或高于均衡点的投标者也不能立即选择一口价。比较在独立私有价值和关联价值模型下的三种一口价拍卖方式的投标策略,发现产生了很大的变化,对此进行分析。
3、从卖家的角度来说,选择什么样的一口价拍卖方式能使自己的收益获得最大,是一个重要的考虑因素。所以卖家在决定采用哪种一口价拍卖方式后,面临设定合适的一口价拍卖的参数——一口价(一口价的优化),以便获取最大的收益。在本文中我们分别讨论了三种一口价拍卖方式中一口价的优化问题,进而在已经设置好的最优一口价下,分析三种不同一口价拍卖方式中卖家的收益问题。在独立私有估价模型下设置相同的一口价时,三种一口价拍卖方式的收益如何?通过数值比对,得出结论:临时一口价的收益最大,持久一口价次之,固定一口价最小。最后以固定一口价为例得到,随着一口价的增加,卖家收益随之增加,直到最优的一口价,卖家的收益随之减小;随着一口价的增加,物品的非成交概率增加;卖家的收益随着参与顾客人数的增加而增加。
4、最后一分钟竞价在网上拍卖中的流行引起了人们的极大关注,一些学者通过不同的角度对此进行了研究,取得了一定的成果。本文中,我们对采用不同拍卖结束规则的拍卖方式下的投标策略,分别在独立私有估价模型和关联估价模型下进行了分析,得出结论:在独立私有估价模型下,采用“硬规则”的拍卖中更容易发生狙击现象,而采用“软规则”的拍卖中,不易发生狙击现象;在关联估价模型下,采用“硬规则”的拍卖中,有更多专业知识的或经验丰富的投标者会选择最后时刻投标;而采用“软规则”的拍卖中,有更多专业知识的或经验丰富的投标者不会获胜。而后对于采用不同拍卖结束规则的拍卖收益进行了分析,在采用“硬规则”的拍卖中,买方可以采用最后时刻投标的策略得到更多额外的收益,这样卖家的期望收益受损;在采用“软规则”的拍卖中,买方只能根据自己的估价进行竞价,不能得到更多的额外收益,卖家的收益由于可以将物品卖给估价最高的投标者而实现收益最大化。
Along with the inception of the Internet, Online auctions have become popular. There will be a lot of contrasts compared online auction with a short history with its rapid development, which made great concern to experts and scholars of. A rich source of research topics are suggested for economists who would like to know the use of various trading mechanisms in practice. Online auction provides the ideal experimental site for various economic theories as well. It makes the research about online auction theory inevitable. Based on online auction, we take the traditional auction theory, game theory, and probability theory and other mathematical knowledge as a research tool to study of a new online auction, buyout price English auction. And we also make in-depth analysis about the last-minute bidding. Main contents can be summarized in the following aspects:
1 Compared with traditional auctions, online auctions make mode of innovation continuously. Online auctions with buyout price, as a mode of the online auction innovation, are widely used because of breaking the auction end of fixed time limits. There are several online auctions with buyout price, and three of them are typical. They are fixed buyout price, temporary buyout price and permanent buyout price respectively. Bidders' strategies decide the ultimate outcome of the auction, which are one of the research emphases of auction theory. Under the independent private valuation model the optimal choice of the bidder with higher valuation than buyout price is to use the buyout price option early in fixed buyout price auction; there is an equilibrium which makes the bidder with higher valuation than the equilibrium use the buyout price option in temporary buyout price auction; threshold function and an equilibrium are existed in permanent buyout price auction, in which the optimal choice of the bidder with higher valuation than the equilibrium or valuation meeting the threshold function is to use the option of buyout price.
2 Under the affiliated valuation model, there is no choice of the optimal strategy because of the interplay among the bidders. Bidders with higher valuation than buyout price do not immediately choose a buyout price option, but they wait-and-see to get the other bidders' information, so late bidding is the wiser choice in fixed buyout price auction; there is a still equilibrium in temporary buyout price auction, and the determination of equilibrium is affected by the other bidders' information, and the bidder with higher valuation than the equilibrium does not use the option of the buyout price; in permanent buyout price auction there are threshold function and equilibrium that are affected by the other bidders' information, so the bidder who has the valuation meeting the threshold function or higher valuation than the equilibrium can't choose the buyout price option. Compared with the bidders' strategies in three auctions with buyout price which are under different models: the independent private valuation model and the affiliated valuation model, we find a great deal of change, and then analyze it.
3 From the viewpoint of seller, the choice of what kind of a buyout price auction to make itself the greatest benefits is an important consideration. So after the seller deciding to adopt a buyout price auction, he face a question about setting a suitable parameter of the auction-- buyout price, that is the optimization of the buyout price, to obtain the max utility. In our dissertation we discuss the optimization problem of buyout price in the three different auctions with buyout price. And then we analyze the seller's profit under the optimal buyout price respectively. How will the profit in the three different auctions with buyout price under the independent private model? After the numerical analysis we conclude: the profit of temporary buyout price is the biggest, permanent buyout price second, and the final is the fixed buyout price. Finally, we use fixed buyout price English auction as an example and get some conclusions. With the buyout price increasing, the seller's revenue is increasing. Until the optimal buyout price, the seller's revenue is declining. With the buyout price increasing, the probability of non-transaction goods is increasing. With the number of customers increasing, the seller's revenue is increasing.
4 The popular of last-minute bidding in online auctions arouse great concern to the people. Some scholars do researches through different point, and then they achieve certain results. In the dissertation we study the bidders' strategies in different end rules under the independent private model and affiliated valuation model respectively. The conclusions are: the sniping is more easily appeared in the auction with "hard" end rule, but does not in the auction with "soft" end rule under the independent private model. The bidders with more informed knowledge and experience choose to bid at the last moment in "hard" end rule, but they will not win in "soft" end rule under affiliated valuation model. Then we study the auction revenue in different auction end rules. The buyers can obtain more additional revenue through the method of bidding at the last moment in the auction with "hard" rule, then the seller's expected profit is damaged. In the auction with "soft" rule the buyers can only bid according to their valuation and can not obtain the additional revenue. So the seller's profit can be maximized because of the object being given the bidder who has the biggest valuation.
1、与传统拍卖相比,网上拍卖模式不断创新。网上一口价拍卖作为网上拍卖的创新模式,由于打破了固定拍卖结束时间的局限,而得到广泛应用。其中在众多模式中比较典型的网上一口价拍卖模式有三种,分别是固定一口价、临时一口价和持久一口价。投标者的决策决定了拍卖的最终结果,也是拍卖理论研究的重点之一。在独立的私有估价模型下,采用在固定一口价拍卖方式,估价高于一口价的投标者的最优选择是及早选择一口价;在临时一口价中存在一个均衡点,使得估价高于此均衡点的投标者及早选择一口价是最优的;持久一口价中存在一个临界函数和一个均衡点,使得估价满足临界函数或高于均衡点的投标者及早选择一口价是最优的。
2在关联估价模型下,由于投标者之间的相互影响,不存在最优策略选择。采用在固定一口价拍卖方式,估价高于一口价的投标者不再立即选择一口价,而是观望确认其他的投标者的信息,迟投标是比较明智的选择;在临时一口价中依然存在一个均衡点,均衡点的确定受到其他投标者信息的影响,并且估价高于均衡点的投标者不会立即选择一口价;持久一口价中存在一个临界函数和一个均衡点,它们同样受到其他投标者信息的影响,使得估价满足临界函数或高于均衡点的投标者也不能立即选择一口价。比较在独立私有价值和关联价值模型下的三种一口价拍卖方式的投标策略,发现产生了很大的变化,对此进行分析。
3、从卖家的角度来说,选择什么样的一口价拍卖方式能使自己的收益获得最大,是一个重要的考虑因素。所以卖家在决定采用哪种一口价拍卖方式后,面临设定合适的一口价拍卖的参数——一口价(一口价的优化),以便获取最大的收益。在本文中我们分别讨论了三种一口价拍卖方式中一口价的优化问题,进而在已经设置好的最优一口价下,分析三种不同一口价拍卖方式中卖家的收益问题。在独立私有估价模型下设置相同的一口价时,三种一口价拍卖方式的收益如何?通过数值比对,得出结论:临时一口价的收益最大,持久一口价次之,固定一口价最小。最后以固定一口价为例得到,随着一口价的增加,卖家收益随之增加,直到最优的一口价,卖家的收益随之减小;随着一口价的增加,物品的非成交概率增加;卖家的收益随着参与顾客人数的增加而增加。
4、最后一分钟竞价在网上拍卖中的流行引起了人们的极大关注,一些学者通过不同的角度对此进行了研究,取得了一定的成果。本文中,我们对采用不同拍卖结束规则的拍卖方式下的投标策略,分别在独立私有估价模型和关联估价模型下进行了分析,得出结论:在独立私有估价模型下,采用“硬规则”的拍卖中更容易发生狙击现象,而采用“软规则”的拍卖中,不易发生狙击现象;在关联估价模型下,采用“硬规则”的拍卖中,有更多专业知识的或经验丰富的投标者会选择最后时刻投标;而采用“软规则”的拍卖中,有更多专业知识的或经验丰富的投标者不会获胜。而后对于采用不同拍卖结束规则的拍卖收益进行了分析,在采用“硬规则”的拍卖中,买方可以采用最后时刻投标的策略得到更多额外的收益,这样卖家的期望收益受损;在采用“软规则”的拍卖中,买方只能根据自己的估价进行竞价,不能得到更多的额外收益,卖家的收益由于可以将物品卖给估价最高的投标者而实现收益最大化。
Along with the inception of the Internet, Online auctions have become popular. There will be a lot of contrasts compared online auction with a short history with its rapid development, which made great concern to experts and scholars of. A rich source of research topics are suggested for economists who would like to know the use of various trading mechanisms in practice. Online auction provides the ideal experimental site for various economic theories as well. It makes the research about online auction theory inevitable. Based on online auction, we take the traditional auction theory, game theory, and probability theory and other mathematical knowledge as a research tool to study of a new online auction, buyout price English auction. And we also make in-depth analysis about the last-minute bidding. Main contents can be summarized in the following aspects:
1 Compared with traditional auctions, online auctions make mode of innovation continuously. Online auctions with buyout price, as a mode of the online auction innovation, are widely used because of breaking the auction end of fixed time limits. There are several online auctions with buyout price, and three of them are typical. They are fixed buyout price, temporary buyout price and permanent buyout price respectively. Bidders' strategies decide the ultimate outcome of the auction, which are one of the research emphases of auction theory. Under the independent private valuation model the optimal choice of the bidder with higher valuation than buyout price is to use the buyout price option early in fixed buyout price auction; there is an equilibrium which makes the bidder with higher valuation than the equilibrium use the buyout price option in temporary buyout price auction; threshold function and an equilibrium are existed in permanent buyout price auction, in which the optimal choice of the bidder with higher valuation than the equilibrium or valuation meeting the threshold function is to use the option of buyout price.
2 Under the affiliated valuation model, there is no choice of the optimal strategy because of the interplay among the bidders. Bidders with higher valuation than buyout price do not immediately choose a buyout price option, but they wait-and-see to get the other bidders' information, so late bidding is the wiser choice in fixed buyout price auction; there is a still equilibrium in temporary buyout price auction, and the determination of equilibrium is affected by the other bidders' information, and the bidder with higher valuation than the equilibrium does not use the option of the buyout price; in permanent buyout price auction there are threshold function and equilibrium that are affected by the other bidders' information, so the bidder who has the valuation meeting the threshold function or higher valuation than the equilibrium can't choose the buyout price option. Compared with the bidders' strategies in three auctions with buyout price which are under different models: the independent private valuation model and the affiliated valuation model, we find a great deal of change, and then analyze it.
3 From the viewpoint of seller, the choice of what kind of a buyout price auction to make itself the greatest benefits is an important consideration. So after the seller deciding to adopt a buyout price auction, he face a question about setting a suitable parameter of the auction-- buyout price, that is the optimization of the buyout price, to obtain the max utility. In our dissertation we discuss the optimization problem of buyout price in the three different auctions with buyout price. And then we analyze the seller's profit under the optimal buyout price respectively. How will the profit in the three different auctions with buyout price under the independent private model? After the numerical analysis we conclude: the profit of temporary buyout price is the biggest, permanent buyout price second, and the final is the fixed buyout price. Finally, we use fixed buyout price English auction as an example and get some conclusions. With the buyout price increasing, the seller's revenue is increasing. Until the optimal buyout price, the seller's revenue is declining. With the buyout price increasing, the probability of non-transaction goods is increasing. With the number of customers increasing, the seller's revenue is increasing.
4 The popular of last-minute bidding in online auctions arouse great concern to the people. Some scholars do researches through different point, and then they achieve certain results. In the dissertation we study the bidders' strategies in different end rules under the independent private model and affiliated valuation model respectively. The conclusions are: the sniping is more easily appeared in the auction with "hard" end rule, but does not in the auction with "soft" end rule under the independent private model. The bidders with more informed knowledge and experience choose to bid at the last moment in "hard" end rule, but they will not win in "soft" end rule under affiliated valuation model. Then we study the auction revenue in different auction end rules. The buyers can obtain more additional revenue through the method of bidding at the last moment in the auction with "hard" rule, then the seller's expected profit is damaged. In the auction with "soft" rule the buyers can only bid according to their valuation and can not obtain the additional revenue. So the seller's profit can be maximized because of the object being given the bidder who has the biggest valuation.
引文
[1]保尔·米格勒姆著,杜黎,胡奇英等译拍卖理论与实务,清华大学出版社,2006年7月
[2]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平编著,拍卖理论与网上拍卖,清华大学出版社,2005年8月
[4]王彦,李楚霖.拍卖机制理论中的收益等价性应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004.4:88-91
[5]Bapna R,Goes P,Gupta A.A Theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions.Information Technology and Management,2001,1:1-23
[6]Bappna R,Goes P,Gupta A.Analysis and design of business-to-consumer online auctions.Management Science,2003,49:85-101
[7]Baye M.R.,Kovenock D.,de Vries C..The all-pay auction with Complete Information.Economic Theory,1996,68:133-148
[8]Benjamin R.,Wigand R..Electronic markets and virtual value chains on the information super high way.Sloan Management Review,1995,36(2):62-72
[9]Budish E.B.,Lisa N.Takeyama.Buy prices in online auctions:irrationality on the internet? Economic Letters,2001,72:325-333
[10]Choi S.Y.,Stahl D.O.,Whinston A.B..The economics of electronic commerce.Indianapolis:Macmillan,1997
[11]Dennehy M.eBay Adds 'Buy It Now' Feature.AuctionWatch.com,2000
[12]Ding M.,Elimhberg J.,Huber J.,Saini R..Emotional bidders:An analytical and experimental examination of consumers' behavior in reverse auction.Working paper,2002
[13]Drakopoulos S.A.Psychological thresholds,demand and price rigidity.The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies,1992,60(2):52-168
[14]Feng Y.Y.,Gallego G.Perishable asset revenue management with Markovian time dependent demand intensities.Management Science,2000,46(7):941-956
[15]Feng Y.Y.,Xiao B.C.Optimal policies of yield management with multiple predetermined prices.Operations Research,2000,48(2):332-343
[16]Hahn J.The Dynamics of Mass Online Marketplaces:A Case Study of an Online Auction.Working paper,2000
[17]Halstead D.Becherer R.C.Internet Auction Sellers:Does size really matter?Internet Research:Electronic Networking Applications and Policy,2003,13(3): 183-194
[18]Hann I., Terwiesch C. Measuring the frictional costs of online auctions:The case of a name-your-own-price channel. Management Science,2003,49(11): 1565-1581
[19]Harris M. and Raviv A.. Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions. Econometrica, 1981,49(14): 77-99
[20]Kannan P.K., Kopalle P.K. Dynamic pricing on the Internet: Importance and implications for consumer behavior. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 2001,5(3): 63-83
[21]Kaufman R.J, Wang B. New buyer's arrival under dynamic pricing market microstructure: The case of group-buying discounts on the Internet. Journal of Management Information Systems, 2001,18(2): 157-188
[22]Lucking-Reiley D.. Using fields experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: magic on the internet. The American economic reviews, 1999, 89(5): 1063-1081
[23]Lucking-Reiley D.. Actions on the Internet: what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics, 2000a, 48(3):227-253.
[24]Lucking-Reiley D..Vickrey Auctions in practice: from nineteenth-century philately to twenty-first-century E-commerce. The journal of economic perspectives, 2000b, 14(3): 183-193
[25]Posner R. The social cost of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 1975,83:807-827
[26]Laffont J.J., Robert J.. Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers.Economics letters,1996,52:181-186
[27]Matthews S.A.. Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 3:370-400
[28]Shubik Martin. Auctions, Bidding, and Markets: A Historical Sketch. In R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans ET A L., 1983:33-52
[29]Talluri K., Ryzin G. van. An analysis of bid-price controls for network revenue management. M anagement Science, 1998, 44(11): 1571-1593
[30]Vakrat Y, Seidmann A. Implications of the Bidders' Process on the Design of Online Auctions. In proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, R. Sprague(ed.), Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, CD-ROM,2000
[31]Wigand R. and Benjamin R.I. Electronic commerce: effects on electronic markets. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 1995,1(3) http://www.use.cduldept/annenbera/voll/issue3/wigand.html
[32]Zhao W.,Zheng Y.S.Optimal dynamic pricing for perishable assets with nonhomogeneous demand.Management Science,2000,46(3):375-388
[1]保尔·米格勒姆著,杜黎,胡奇英等译 拍卖理论与实务,清华大学出版社,2006年7月。
[2]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平编著,拍卖理论与网上拍卖,清华大学出版社,2005年8月。
[4]杜黎,胡奇英.一类网上英式拍卖:顾客投标行为研究.[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):31-38
[5]韩冀东,成栋,张艳研.网上拍卖模式和传统拍卖模式的比较研究,管理现代化,2002,3:36-39
[6]韩冀东.网上拍卖,人民邮电出版社,2004年9月
[7]马俊,汪寿阳,黎建强.e-Auction网上拍卖理论与实务.科学出版社,2003.
[8]Bajari P,Hortacsu A.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Price,and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions.Rand Journal of Economics,2003,34:329-355
[9]Bappna R,Goes P,Gupta A.A Theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions.Information Technology and Management,2001,1:1-23
[10]Bertsimas D,Hawkins J,Perakis G.optimal bidding in online auctions.Working Paper,MIT,2001:153
[11]Beam C.,Segev A.Auctions on the Internet:A field study.Working Paper 98-1032-WP,1998,htp://haas.berkeley.edu/cmit/wp-1032.pdf
[12]Beam C.,Segev A.,Shanthikumar J.G.Optimal Design of Internet-based Auctions.Working Paper,University of California,Berkeiey,CA,1999
[13]Bulow J.I.,Klemperer P.D.Auctions vs.Negotiations.American Economic Review,1996,6:80-94
[14]Cassady Ralph.Auctions and Auctioneering.Berkeley:University of California Press,1967.
[15]Easley F R,R Tenorio.Jump bidding strategies in internet auctions.Management science,2004,50:1407-1419
[16]Engelbrecht-Wiggans R.Empirical Contributions to the Theory of Auctions or Why Do Real Bidders Bid the Way They Do? Notes Prepared for the TOW Conference on Applied Research Concerning Auctions and Mechanism Design,2000
[17]Eso Perter,Futo Gabor.Auction design with a risk averse seller.Economics Letters,1999.65:71-74
[18]Harris M. and Raviv A.. Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions. Econometrica, 1981,49(14): 77-99.
[19]Holt C.A. Jr. Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures. Journal of Political Economy, 1980,88:433-450
[20]KauffmanR J, March S T, Wood A C. Design Principles for Long-lived Internet Agents. International Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, 2000,9:217-236
[21]KauffmanR J, Wood A C. Doing their bidding: An empirical examination of factors that affect a buyer's utility in Internet auctions. Forthcoming in Information Technology and Management,2004
[22]KauffmanR J, Wood A C. The effects of shilling on final bid prices in online auctions. Forthcoming in Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2005
[23]Kazumori E ., J .McMillan. Selling Online versus Live. 2003 http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:AehnEBOyioJ:www.idei.asso.fr/Commun/Confere-nces/Internet/Janvier2003/Papiers/kazu.pdf
[24]Klemperer, P. Auction theory: a guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 1999,13:227-286
[25]Lucking-Reiley D. Using fiels experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: magic on the internet. The American economic reviews, 1999,89(5):1063-1081.
[26]Lucking-Reiley,D.. Actions on the Internet: what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics, 2000a,48(3):227-253.
[27]Lucking-Reiley,D.. Vickrey auctions in practice: from nineteenth-century philately to twenty-first-century E-commerce. The journal of economic perspectives, 2000b,14(3): 183-193.
[28]Lucking-Reiley & Spulber. Business-to-business electronic commerce. The Journal of economic perspectives, 2001,15(1),55
[29]Malone T.W., Yates J., Benjamin R.I.. Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies. Communications of the ACM, 1987,30 (6):484-497
[30]Maskin E .S., RileyJ. G. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers. Econometrica, 1984,52:1473-1518.
[31]Matthews S.A. Comparing Auctions for Risk-Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View. Econometrics, 1987,55 (63):3-46
[32]McAfee R.P., McMillan J. Auction with a stochastic number of bidders. Journal of economics, 1987a, 17:326-328
[33]McAfee R.P., McMillan J. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economics Literature, 1987b, 699-738.
[34]Metha K, Lee B T. Empirical evidence of winner's curse in electronic auctions. Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Information Systems, Cgarkitte, NC,1999
[35]Milgrom,P .R .The structure of Information in Competitive Bidding. New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1979
[36]Milgrom P.R. and Robert J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 1982a,50(5):1089-1122.
[37]Milgrom P.R. and Robert J. Weber. The value of information in a sealed-bid auction. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982b, 10:105-114.
[38]Ockenfels A, Roth E A. Strategic late-bidding in continuous-time second-price internetauctions. Working Paper. Germany: University Magdeburg, 2001
[39]Ockenfels A, Roth E A. The Timing Bids in Internet Auctions: Market,Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents. AI Magazine. 2002, fall: 79-88.
[40]Riley J.G and Samuelson WF.. Optimal Auction. American Economic Review, 1981,71(3): 81-92.
[41]Sanjiv Ranjan Das, Rangarajan K. Sundaram. Auction theory: a summary with applications and evidence from the treasury markets. Financial markets, institutions and instruments, 1996,5(5):1-36
[42]Vakrat Y, Seidmann A. Analysis and design models for online auctions. Proc. Informs Conf. Inform Systems Tech. (CIST), Cincinnati,OH, 1999:64-78
[43]Vakrat Y, Seidmann A. Implications of the Bidders' Process on the Design of Online Auctions. In proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, R. Sprague(ed.), Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, CD-ROM,2000
[44]Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 1961, (16):8-37
[45]Vickrey W. Auction and bidding games. In Recent Advances in Game Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: the Princeton university of conference, 1962
[46] Wang Ruqu. Strategic Behavior in Dynamic Auctions. Economic Theory, Arril,1993, 3(3): 501-516
[47]Wang W, Hidvegi Z, Whinston A B. Shill bidding in English auctions. Working Paper. Center for Research on E-Commerce, McComb School of Business. Austin: University of Texas, 2001
[48]Wilcox R.T.Experts and amateurs:the role of experience in Internet auctions.Marketing Letters.2000,11:363-374
[49]Wood C A.What factors drive final price in internet auctions? An empirical assessment of coin transactions on eBay.Annual Convention of the institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.Nov.6.Miami Beach,Fla,2001
[50]Wilson R.Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information.Management Science,1969,15(7):446-448
[51]Wilson R.A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition.Review of Economic Studies,1977,XLIV(3,138):511-518
[52]Wilson R.Incentive Efficiency of Double auctions.Econometrica,1985,53(5):1101-1115
[1]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[2]丁志刚,孙元欣.在线反向拍卖在企业采购中的应用[J].华东经济管理,2004,18(5):70-72
[3]杜黎,胡奇英.一类网上英式拍卖:顾客投标行为研究.[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):31-38
[4]Ausubel L M,Cramton P.Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing.Economic Theory,2004,23(3):493-505
[5]Bapna R,Goes P,Gupta A..A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item online auctions[J].Information Technology and Management,2000,1(1):1-23
[6]Budish E.B.,Lisa N.Takeyama.Buy prices in online auctions:irrationality on the internet?,Economic Letters,2001,72:325-333
[7]Caldentey R.,Vulcano G..Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management.Stern School of Business,New York University,2004
[8]Durham Y.,Roelofs M.,S.Standifird.eBay's Buy-It-Now Function:Who,When,and How," Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy,2004,4:1-22
[9]Friedman L.A competitive bidding strategy.Operations Research,1956,(4):104-112
[10]Hidvegi,Zoltan,W.Wang and A.B.Whinston,Buy-Price English Auction.Journal of Economic Theory,2006,129:31-56
[11]Klemperer,P..Auction theory:a guide to the literature.Journal of Economic Surveys,1999,13:227-286
[12]Kirkegaard R.,P.B.Overgaard.Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions:Multi-Unit Demand.Department of Economics,University of Aarhus,2003
[13]Lucking-Reiley D..Actions on the Internet:what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics,2000,48(3):227-252
[14]Ockenfels A,Roth A E.The timing bids in Internet auctions:Market design,bidder behavior,and artificial agents[J].AI Magazine,2002,fall:79-88.
[15]Mathews,T.The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Bouyout option:a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay's Buy-It-Now Feature,Journal of economics,2004,81(1):25-52
[16]Mathews,T.and B.Katzman.The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option,Economic Theory,2006,27:597-613.
[17]McAfee R P,McMillan J..Auctions and bidding.Journal of Economic Literature,1987,25:633-646
[18]Milgrom P R.,Weber R J..A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.Econometrica,1982,(50):1089-1112
[19]Vickrey W.Counterspeculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders.Journal of Finance,1967,(16):8-37
[20]Wang X.,Montgomery A.,Srinivasan,K..When Auction Meets Fixed Price:A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Buy-it-Now.mimeo,Carnegie Mellon Universit,2004
[21]Wilcox R T.Experts and amateurs:The role of experience in Internet auctions.Marketing Letters,2000,11:363-374
[1]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.生产力无限时逢低买入与固定价格机制的比较.中国管理科学,2003,11:11-17
[2]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究.管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平编著,拍卖理论与网上拍卖,清华大学出版社,2005年8月
[4]杜黎.一类网上英式拍卖的保留价与起始价分析.西安电子科技大学学报(自然科学版),2005,32(2):300-303
[5]杨兴丽,陈霞,吕廷杰.一口价网上拍卖方式中卖方收益分析,北京邮电大学学报(社科版)即将刊出
[6]Budish E.B.,Lisa N.Takeyama.Buy prices in online auctions:irrationality on the internet?,Economic Letters,2001,72:325-333
[7]Caldentey R.,Vulcano G..Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management.Stem School of Business,New York University,2004
[8]Durham Y.,Roelofs M.,S.Standifird.eBay's Buy-It-Now Function:Who,When,and How," Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy,2004,4:1-22
[9]Hidvegi,Zoltan,W.Wang and A.B.Whinston,Buy-Price English Auction.Journal of Economic Theory,2006,129:31-56
[10]Kauffman R.J.,Wood C.A.Running up the bid:an empirical study of seller behavior in Internet auctions,in Proceedings of the 2000 Americas Conference on Information System,Long Beach,CA,2000:929-935.
[11]Klemperer P.Auction theory:A guide to the literature.Journal of Economic Surveys,1999,13:227-286
[12]Kirkegaard R.,P.B.Overgaard.Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions:Multi-Unit Demand.Department of Economics,University of Aarhus,2003
[13]Lucking-Reiley D..Actions on the Internet:what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics,2000,48(3):227-252
[14]McAfee R.P.,Vincent D.Updating the reserve price in common-value auctions,American Economic Review,American Economic Association,1992,82(2):512-518
[15]Mathews T.A risk averse seller in a continuous time auction with a buyout option,Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics,2003,5(2)
[16]Mathews T.The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Bouyout option:a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay's Buy-It-Now Feature,Journal of economics,2004,81(1):25-52
[17]Mathews,T.and B.Katzman.The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option,Economic Theory,2006,27:597-613.
[18]Milgrom P.R.,Robert J.Weber.A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.Econometrica,1982,10(5):1089-1122
[19]Myerson R.Optimal auction design,Mathematics of Operations Research,1981,6:58-73
[20]Vincent D.What reserve prices may be kept secret,Journal of Economic Theory,1995,65(2):575-584
[21]Walley M.J.C.,Fortin D.R.Behavioral outcomes from online auctions:reserve price,reserve disclosure,and initial bidding influences in the decision process,Journal of Business Research,2005,58(10):1409-1418.
[22]Wang X.,Montgomery A.,Srinivasan,K..When Auction Meets Fixed Price:A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Buy-it-Now.mimeo,Carnegie Mellon University,2004
[1]Ariely Dan, Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E. Roth. An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions. Rand Journal of Economics, 2005,36(4): 891-908
[2]Asker J., Grosskopf B., McKinney C.N., Niederle M., Roth A.E., Weizsacker G.. Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the Internet. J. Econ. Educ., 2004,35(4):330-342
[3]Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003,34(2):329-355
[4]Barbaro, S., Bracht, B. Shilling, squeezing sniping: Explaining late bidding in on-line second-price auctions.Working paper. University of Mainz, German, 2005
[5]Bolton, G.E., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A. How effective are on-line reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Manage. Sci., 2004,50 (11): 1587-1602
[6]Landsburg S.E. My way to the eBay: An economics professor's strategy for winning on-line auctions.Slate Thursday, April 8 , 1999 Available at: http://slate.msn.com/Economics/99-04-08/Economics.asp
[7]Kennan J., Wilson R.. Bargaining with private information. Journal of Economics Literature, 1993,31(1): 45-104.
[8]Ku, G., Malhotra, D., Murnighan, J.K. Towards a competitive arousal model of decision making: A study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions. Organ. Behav. Human Dec. Processes , 2005,26:89-103
[9]McAfee R. P., Daniel Vincent. The Declining Price Anomaly. Journal of Economic Theory, 1993,60(1):191-212
[10] Milgrom P.. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004
[11]Ockenfels, A., Roth, A.E.. The timing of bids in Internet auctions: Market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents. Artificial Intelligence Magazine, 2002,4:79-87
[12] Ockenfels, Axel, Alvin E. Roth. Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 55 (2):297-320
[13]Rasmusen, E. Strategic implications of uncertainty over one's own private value in auctions. Working paper, 2003. Indiana University. Available at: http://php.indiana.edu/～erasmuse/papers/auction.pdf.
[14]Resnick P., Zeckhauser R.. Trust among strangers in Internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay's reputation system. In: Baye, M.R. (Ed.), The Economics of the Internet and E-Commerce. In: Advances in Applied Microeconomics, vol. 11. Elsevier Science,Amsterdam,2002
[15]Roth A.E..The economist as engineer:Game theory,experimental economics and computation as tools of design economics.Econometrica,2002,70(4):1341-1378
[16]Vickrey W.Counterspeculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders.Journal of Finance,1967,16:8-37
[17]Wilcox R.T.Experts and amateurs:The role of experience in Internet auctions.Marketing Letters,2000,11(4):363-374
[2]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平编著,拍卖理论与网上拍卖,清华大学出版社,2005年8月
[4]王彦,李楚霖.拍卖机制理论中的收益等价性应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004.4:88-91
[5]Bapna R,Goes P,Gupta A.A Theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions.Information Technology and Management,2001,1:1-23
[6]Bappna R,Goes P,Gupta A.Analysis and design of business-to-consumer online auctions.Management Science,2003,49:85-101
[7]Baye M.R.,Kovenock D.,de Vries C..The all-pay auction with Complete Information.Economic Theory,1996,68:133-148
[8]Benjamin R.,Wigand R..Electronic markets and virtual value chains on the information super high way.Sloan Management Review,1995,36(2):62-72
[9]Budish E.B.,Lisa N.Takeyama.Buy prices in online auctions:irrationality on the internet? Economic Letters,2001,72:325-333
[10]Choi S.Y.,Stahl D.O.,Whinston A.B..The economics of electronic commerce.Indianapolis:Macmillan,1997
[11]Dennehy M.eBay Adds 'Buy It Now' Feature.AuctionWatch.com,2000
[12]Ding M.,Elimhberg J.,Huber J.,Saini R..Emotional bidders:An analytical and experimental examination of consumers' behavior in reverse auction.Working paper,2002
[13]Drakopoulos S.A.Psychological thresholds,demand and price rigidity.The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies,1992,60(2):52-168
[14]Feng Y.Y.,Gallego G.Perishable asset revenue management with Markovian time dependent demand intensities.Management Science,2000,46(7):941-956
[15]Feng Y.Y.,Xiao B.C.Optimal policies of yield management with multiple predetermined prices.Operations Research,2000,48(2):332-343
[16]Hahn J.The Dynamics of Mass Online Marketplaces:A Case Study of an Online Auction.Working paper,2000
[17]Halstead D.Becherer R.C.Internet Auction Sellers:Does size really matter?Internet Research:Electronic Networking Applications and Policy,2003,13(3): 183-194
[18]Hann I., Terwiesch C. Measuring the frictional costs of online auctions:The case of a name-your-own-price channel. Management Science,2003,49(11): 1565-1581
[19]Harris M. and Raviv A.. Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions. Econometrica, 1981,49(14): 77-99
[20]Kannan P.K., Kopalle P.K. Dynamic pricing on the Internet: Importance and implications for consumer behavior. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 2001,5(3): 63-83
[21]Kaufman R.J, Wang B. New buyer's arrival under dynamic pricing market microstructure: The case of group-buying discounts on the Internet. Journal of Management Information Systems, 2001,18(2): 157-188
[22]Lucking-Reiley D.. Using fields experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: magic on the internet. The American economic reviews, 1999, 89(5): 1063-1081
[23]Lucking-Reiley D.. Actions on the Internet: what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics, 2000a, 48(3):227-253.
[24]Lucking-Reiley D..Vickrey Auctions in practice: from nineteenth-century philately to twenty-first-century E-commerce. The journal of economic perspectives, 2000b, 14(3): 183-193
[25]Posner R. The social cost of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 1975,83:807-827
[26]Laffont J.J., Robert J.. Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers.Economics letters,1996,52:181-186
[27]Matthews S.A.. Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 3:370-400
[28]Shubik Martin. Auctions, Bidding, and Markets: A Historical Sketch. In R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans ET A L., 1983:33-52
[29]Talluri K., Ryzin G. van. An analysis of bid-price controls for network revenue management. M anagement Science, 1998, 44(11): 1571-1593
[30]Vakrat Y, Seidmann A. Implications of the Bidders' Process on the Design of Online Auctions. In proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, R. Sprague(ed.), Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, CD-ROM,2000
[31]Wigand R. and Benjamin R.I. Electronic commerce: effects on electronic markets. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 1995,1(3) http://www.use.cduldept/annenbera/voll/issue3/wigand.html
[32]Zhao W.,Zheng Y.S.Optimal dynamic pricing for perishable assets with nonhomogeneous demand.Management Science,2000,46(3):375-388
[1]保尔·米格勒姆著,杜黎,胡奇英等译 拍卖理论与实务,清华大学出版社,2006年7月。
[2]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平编著,拍卖理论与网上拍卖,清华大学出版社,2005年8月。
[4]杜黎,胡奇英.一类网上英式拍卖:顾客投标行为研究.[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):31-38
[5]韩冀东,成栋,张艳研.网上拍卖模式和传统拍卖模式的比较研究,管理现代化,2002,3:36-39
[6]韩冀东.网上拍卖,人民邮电出版社,2004年9月
[7]马俊,汪寿阳,黎建强.e-Auction网上拍卖理论与实务.科学出版社,2003.
[8]Bajari P,Hortacsu A.The Winner's Curse,Reserve Price,and Endogenous Entry:Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions.Rand Journal of Economics,2003,34:329-355
[9]Bappna R,Goes P,Gupta A.A Theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions.Information Technology and Management,2001,1:1-23
[10]Bertsimas D,Hawkins J,Perakis G.optimal bidding in online auctions.Working Paper,MIT,2001:153
[11]Beam C.,Segev A.Auctions on the Internet:A field study.Working Paper 98-1032-WP,1998,htp://haas.berkeley.edu/cmit/wp-1032.pdf
[12]Beam C.,Segev A.,Shanthikumar J.G.Optimal Design of Internet-based Auctions.Working Paper,University of California,Berkeiey,CA,1999
[13]Bulow J.I.,Klemperer P.D.Auctions vs.Negotiations.American Economic Review,1996,6:80-94
[14]Cassady Ralph.Auctions and Auctioneering.Berkeley:University of California Press,1967.
[15]Easley F R,R Tenorio.Jump bidding strategies in internet auctions.Management science,2004,50:1407-1419
[16]Engelbrecht-Wiggans R.Empirical Contributions to the Theory of Auctions or Why Do Real Bidders Bid the Way They Do? Notes Prepared for the TOW Conference on Applied Research Concerning Auctions and Mechanism Design,2000
[17]Eso Perter,Futo Gabor.Auction design with a risk averse seller.Economics Letters,1999.65:71-74
[18]Harris M. and Raviv A.. Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions. Econometrica, 1981,49(14): 77-99.
[19]Holt C.A. Jr. Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures. Journal of Political Economy, 1980,88:433-450
[20]KauffmanR J, March S T, Wood A C. Design Principles for Long-lived Internet Agents. International Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, 2000,9:217-236
[21]KauffmanR J, Wood A C. Doing their bidding: An empirical examination of factors that affect a buyer's utility in Internet auctions. Forthcoming in Information Technology and Management,2004
[22]KauffmanR J, Wood A C. The effects of shilling on final bid prices in online auctions. Forthcoming in Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2005
[23]Kazumori E ., J .McMillan. Selling Online versus Live. 2003 http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:AehnEBOyioJ:www.idei.asso.fr/Commun/Confere-nces/Internet/Janvier2003/Papiers/kazu.pdf
[24]Klemperer, P. Auction theory: a guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 1999,13:227-286
[25]Lucking-Reiley D. Using fiels experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: magic on the internet. The American economic reviews, 1999,89(5):1063-1081.
[26]Lucking-Reiley,D.. Actions on the Internet: what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics, 2000a,48(3):227-253.
[27]Lucking-Reiley,D.. Vickrey auctions in practice: from nineteenth-century philately to twenty-first-century E-commerce. The journal of economic perspectives, 2000b,14(3): 183-193.
[28]Lucking-Reiley & Spulber. Business-to-business electronic commerce. The Journal of economic perspectives, 2001,15(1),55
[29]Malone T.W., Yates J., Benjamin R.I.. Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies. Communications of the ACM, 1987,30 (6):484-497
[30]Maskin E .S., RileyJ. G. Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers. Econometrica, 1984,52:1473-1518.
[31]Matthews S.A. Comparing Auctions for Risk-Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View. Econometrics, 1987,55 (63):3-46
[32]McAfee R.P., McMillan J. Auction with a stochastic number of bidders. Journal of economics, 1987a, 17:326-328
[33]McAfee R.P., McMillan J. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economics Literature, 1987b, 699-738.
[34]Metha K, Lee B T. Empirical evidence of winner's curse in electronic auctions. Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Information Systems, Cgarkitte, NC,1999
[35]Milgrom,P .R .The structure of Information in Competitive Bidding. New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1979
[36]Milgrom P.R. and Robert J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 1982a,50(5):1089-1122.
[37]Milgrom P.R. and Robert J. Weber. The value of information in a sealed-bid auction. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982b, 10:105-114.
[38]Ockenfels A, Roth E A. Strategic late-bidding in continuous-time second-price internetauctions. Working Paper. Germany: University Magdeburg, 2001
[39]Ockenfels A, Roth E A. The Timing Bids in Internet Auctions: Market,Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents. AI Magazine. 2002, fall: 79-88.
[40]Riley J.G and Samuelson WF.. Optimal Auction. American Economic Review, 1981,71(3): 81-92.
[41]Sanjiv Ranjan Das, Rangarajan K. Sundaram. Auction theory: a summary with applications and evidence from the treasury markets. Financial markets, institutions and instruments, 1996,5(5):1-36
[42]Vakrat Y, Seidmann A. Analysis and design models for online auctions. Proc. Informs Conf. Inform Systems Tech. (CIST), Cincinnati,OH, 1999:64-78
[43]Vakrat Y, Seidmann A. Implications of the Bidders' Process on the Design of Online Auctions. In proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, R. Sprague(ed.), Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, CD-ROM,2000
[44]Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 1961, (16):8-37
[45]Vickrey W. Auction and bidding games. In Recent Advances in Game Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: the Princeton university of conference, 1962
[46] Wang Ruqu. Strategic Behavior in Dynamic Auctions. Economic Theory, Arril,1993, 3(3): 501-516
[47]Wang W, Hidvegi Z, Whinston A B. Shill bidding in English auctions. Working Paper. Center for Research on E-Commerce, McComb School of Business. Austin: University of Texas, 2001
[48]Wilcox R.T.Experts and amateurs:the role of experience in Internet auctions.Marketing Letters.2000,11:363-374
[49]Wood C A.What factors drive final price in internet auctions? An empirical assessment of coin transactions on eBay.Annual Convention of the institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.Nov.6.Miami Beach,Fla,2001
[50]Wilson R.Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information.Management Science,1969,15(7):446-448
[51]Wilson R.A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition.Review of Economic Studies,1977,XLIV(3,138):511-518
[52]Wilson R.Incentive Efficiency of Double auctions.Econometrica,1985,53(5):1101-1115
[1]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[2]丁志刚,孙元欣.在线反向拍卖在企业采购中的应用[J].华东经济管理,2004,18(5):70-72
[3]杜黎,胡奇英.一类网上英式拍卖:顾客投标行为研究.[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):31-38
[4]Ausubel L M,Cramton P.Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing.Economic Theory,2004,23(3):493-505
[5]Bapna R,Goes P,Gupta A..A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item online auctions[J].Information Technology and Management,2000,1(1):1-23
[6]Budish E.B.,Lisa N.Takeyama.Buy prices in online auctions:irrationality on the internet?,Economic Letters,2001,72:325-333
[7]Caldentey R.,Vulcano G..Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management.Stern School of Business,New York University,2004
[8]Durham Y.,Roelofs M.,S.Standifird.eBay's Buy-It-Now Function:Who,When,and How," Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy,2004,4:1-22
[9]Friedman L.A competitive bidding strategy.Operations Research,1956,(4):104-112
[10]Hidvegi,Zoltan,W.Wang and A.B.Whinston,Buy-Price English Auction.Journal of Economic Theory,2006,129:31-56
[11]Klemperer,P..Auction theory:a guide to the literature.Journal of Economic Surveys,1999,13:227-286
[12]Kirkegaard R.,P.B.Overgaard.Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions:Multi-Unit Demand.Department of Economics,University of Aarhus,2003
[13]Lucking-Reiley D..Actions on the Internet:what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics,2000,48(3):227-252
[14]Ockenfels A,Roth A E.The timing bids in Internet auctions:Market design,bidder behavior,and artificial agents[J].AI Magazine,2002,fall:79-88.
[15]Mathews,T.The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Bouyout option:a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay's Buy-It-Now Feature,Journal of economics,2004,81(1):25-52
[16]Mathews,T.and B.Katzman.The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option,Economic Theory,2006,27:597-613.
[17]McAfee R P,McMillan J..Auctions and bidding.Journal of Economic Literature,1987,25:633-646
[18]Milgrom P R.,Weber R J..A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.Econometrica,1982,(50):1089-1112
[19]Vickrey W.Counterspeculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders.Journal of Finance,1967,(16):8-37
[20]Wang X.,Montgomery A.,Srinivasan,K..When Auction Meets Fixed Price:A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Buy-it-Now.mimeo,Carnegie Mellon Universit,2004
[21]Wilcox R T.Experts and amateurs:The role of experience in Internet auctions.Marketing Letters,2000,11:363-374
[1]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.生产力无限时逢低买入与固定价格机制的比较.中国管理科学,2003,11:11-17
[2]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.逢低买入与固定价格机制比较研究.管理科学学报,2003,6(5):34-39
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平编著,拍卖理论与网上拍卖,清华大学出版社,2005年8月
[4]杜黎.一类网上英式拍卖的保留价与起始价分析.西安电子科技大学学报(自然科学版),2005,32(2):300-303
[5]杨兴丽,陈霞,吕廷杰.一口价网上拍卖方式中卖方收益分析,北京邮电大学学报(社科版)即将刊出
[6]Budish E.B.,Lisa N.Takeyama.Buy prices in online auctions:irrationality on the internet?,Economic Letters,2001,72:325-333
[7]Caldentey R.,Vulcano G..Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management.Stem School of Business,New York University,2004
[8]Durham Y.,Roelofs M.,S.Standifird.eBay's Buy-It-Now Function:Who,When,and How," Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy,2004,4:1-22
[9]Hidvegi,Zoltan,W.Wang and A.B.Whinston,Buy-Price English Auction.Journal of Economic Theory,2006,129:31-56
[10]Kauffman R.J.,Wood C.A.Running up the bid:an empirical study of seller behavior in Internet auctions,in Proceedings of the 2000 Americas Conference on Information System,Long Beach,CA,2000:929-935.
[11]Klemperer P.Auction theory:A guide to the literature.Journal of Economic Surveys,1999,13:227-286
[12]Kirkegaard R.,P.B.Overgaard.Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions:Multi-Unit Demand.Department of Economics,University of Aarhus,2003
[13]Lucking-Reiley D..Actions on the Internet:what's being auctioned and how? The Journal of industrial economics,2000,48(3):227-252
[14]McAfee R.P.,Vincent D.Updating the reserve price in common-value auctions,American Economic Review,American Economic Association,1992,82(2):512-518
[15]Mathews T.A risk averse seller in a continuous time auction with a buyout option,Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics,2003,5(2)
[16]Mathews T.The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Bouyout option:a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay's Buy-It-Now Feature,Journal of economics,2004,81(1):25-52
[17]Mathews,T.and B.Katzman.The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option,Economic Theory,2006,27:597-613.
[18]Milgrom P.R.,Robert J.Weber.A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.Econometrica,1982,10(5):1089-1122
[19]Myerson R.Optimal auction design,Mathematics of Operations Research,1981,6:58-73
[20]Vincent D.What reserve prices may be kept secret,Journal of Economic Theory,1995,65(2):575-584
[21]Walley M.J.C.,Fortin D.R.Behavioral outcomes from online auctions:reserve price,reserve disclosure,and initial bidding influences in the decision process,Journal of Business Research,2005,58(10):1409-1418.
[22]Wang X.,Montgomery A.,Srinivasan,K..When Auction Meets Fixed Price:A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Buy-it-Now.mimeo,Carnegie Mellon University,2004
[1]Ariely Dan, Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E. Roth. An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions. Rand Journal of Economics, 2005,36(4): 891-908
[2]Asker J., Grosskopf B., McKinney C.N., Niederle M., Roth A.E., Weizsacker G.. Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the Internet. J. Econ. Educ., 2004,35(4):330-342
[3]Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003,34(2):329-355
[4]Barbaro, S., Bracht, B. Shilling, squeezing sniping: Explaining late bidding in on-line second-price auctions.Working paper. University of Mainz, German, 2005
[5]Bolton, G.E., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A. How effective are on-line reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Manage. Sci., 2004,50 (11): 1587-1602
[6]Landsburg S.E. My way to the eBay: An economics professor's strategy for winning on-line auctions.Slate Thursday, April 8 , 1999 Available at: http://slate.msn.com/Economics/99-04-08/Economics.asp
[7]Kennan J., Wilson R.. Bargaining with private information. Journal of Economics Literature, 1993,31(1): 45-104.
[8]Ku, G., Malhotra, D., Murnighan, J.K. Towards a competitive arousal model of decision making: A study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions. Organ. Behav. Human Dec. Processes , 2005,26:89-103
[9]McAfee R. P., Daniel Vincent. The Declining Price Anomaly. Journal of Economic Theory, 1993,60(1):191-212
[10] Milgrom P.. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004
[11]Ockenfels, A., Roth, A.E.. The timing of bids in Internet auctions: Market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents. Artificial Intelligence Magazine, 2002,4:79-87
[12] Ockenfels, Axel, Alvin E. Roth. Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 55 (2):297-320
[13]Rasmusen, E. Strategic implications of uncertainty over one's own private value in auctions. Working paper, 2003. Indiana University. Available at: http://php.indiana.edu/～erasmuse/papers/auction.pdf.
[14]Resnick P., Zeckhauser R.. Trust among strangers in Internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay's reputation system. In: Baye, M.R. (Ed.), The Economics of the Internet and E-Commerce. In: Advances in Applied Microeconomics, vol. 11. Elsevier Science,Amsterdam,2002
[15]Roth A.E..The economist as engineer:Game theory,experimental economics and computation as tools of design economics.Econometrica,2002,70(4):1341-1378
[16]Vickrey W.Counterspeculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders.Journal of Finance,1967,16:8-37
[17]Wilcox R.T.Experts and amateurs:The role of experience in Internet auctions.Marketing Letters,2000,11(4):363-374